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PLEASE NOTE: The following transcript is a portion of the official hearing record of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Additional material pertinent to this transcript may be found on the web site of the Committee at [http://www.house.gov/transportation]. Complete hearing records are available for review at the Committee offices and also may be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office.
RAIL SAFETY OVERSIGHT: HUMAN FACTORS AND GRADE CROSSING ISSUES
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1996
Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Susan Molinari (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. MOLINARI. As you may know, we've been called for a vote. We will hurry back and reconvene in about 20 minutes.
[Recess.]
Ms. MOLINARI. We will reconvene now.
Thank you all for coming back today for the continuation of yesterday's hearing on rail safety: human factors and grade crossing issues.
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Our first witness this morning is Mr. James Hall, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. He is accompanied this morning by Robert Lauby, Chief of NTSB's Railroad Division, and Barry Sweedler, Director of NTSB's Office of Safety Recommendations.
Gentlemen, thank you for returning this morning. We look forward to hearing your testimony.
Mr. Hall.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT LAUBY, CHIEF, RAILROAD DIVISION, AND BARRY SWEEDLER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS; AND JOLENE M. MOLITORIS, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY BRUCE M. FINE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY, AND GRADY C. COTHEN, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY STANDARDS AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Mr. HALL. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to present the Safety Board's views on human factors in railroad accidents.
Before I begin, I would like to introduce the staff with me today: Mr. Robert Lauby, Chief of our Railroad Division, and Mr. Barry Sweedler, Director of our Office of Safety Recommendations.
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Thus far, 1996 has been a tragic year for the railroad and rail transit industries. Since January 1, the Safety Board has launched on 17 railroad accidents resulting in 22 fatalities, 230 injuries, and over $64 million in damages. Included in these 17 accident investigations are 6 runaway trains, 5 collisions, 5 derailments, and 2 grade crossing accidents.
Many of these accidents involve human performance issues, a concern in all modes of transportation. In an effort to keep my statement brief, my remarks will be limited to human factors safety issues being investigated in three recent commuter train accidents.
The first issue, fatigue of train operators, is being examined as a possible issue in the New Jersey Transit accident. About 8:40 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on February 9, 1996, eastbound New Jersey Transit commuter train 1254 collided head-on with the lead locomotive of westbound commuter train 1107, resulting in three fatalities.
The westbound train was operating on a clear signal and traveling at about 53 miles per hour. The eastbound train left Harmony Cove Station, accelerated to 53 miles per hour, reduced speed, and impacted the westbound train at about 7 miles per hour.
The operator of eastbound train 1254 was working a split shift. He reported to work at 6 p.m. Thursday and operated trains until about 1 a.m. Friday. He rested—and the rest was by sleeping in an out-of-service passenger car which was being cleaned that evening—from 1 a.m. until 5:40 a.m., at which time he went back on duty operating trains.
He was scheduled to get off work at 7:30 a.m., but he worked overtime and was assigned to operate one more train.
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He dead-headed to Waldwick, New Jersey, and operated the accident train from Waldwick to the collisionsite.
The Hours of Service Act, originally passed by Congress in 1907, allows train engineers to work 12-hour duty periods. The statute allows an engineer to work a 12-hour split shift, provided that the engineer is given a continuous rest period of at least 4 hours duration between shifts. It also allows railroads to have the services of crews for up to 16 hours at a time.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Association of American Railroads, along with a number of individual railroads, have been evaluating the work/rest problems of train crews, and the AAR has urged its members to provide educational information on fatigue to their employees.
We can ill afford to wait until all the research is completed before taking action on this issue. It is high time that the railroad industry and responsible regulatory officials reassess the appropriateness of a guiding law that is almost 90 years old.
Nowhere does the Hours of Service Act accommodate increased commuting distances operating crews encounter as a result of district consolidations, or address the need to properly eat, rest, or attend to personal hygiene matters, or speak to the importance of the 8 hours off-duty time being devoted to continuous rest, or reflect modification in our scientific understanding of human work/rest scheduling requirements over these many decades of human factors research.
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The second safety issue, positive train separation, is a technology that can be used to help control human factors problems. Positive train separation can reduce the severity of human performance train operation accidents by overriding the engineer's actions to prevent train collisions.
The February 16, 1996, collision involving a MARC commuter train and an Amtrak train in Silver Spring, Maryland, that resulted in 11 fatalities, as well as the New Jersey accident I just described, might well have been prevented if a positive train separation system had been in place.
Positive train separation is an issue that has been highlighted over and over again in Safety Board investigations since 1969.
The last issue I would like to discuss is training and communications. It's no secret that training and communications can make businesses more efficient and more profitable, but how does it affect transportation safety?
In the October 25, 1995, grade crossing accident at Fox River Grove, Illinois, that killed seven students, training of the bus driver and communications between the different parties involved in the accident are areas being examined as part of the investigation. The communication breakdown that occurred in the accident certainly had a role in the accident.
Here are a few of the things that went wrong:
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The regular bus driver did not brief the substitute bus driver with any special information that she needed to complete the run.
The Chicago Northwestern and the Illinois Department of Transportation did not adequately coordinate the preemption of the signal. Neither organization understood how the other organization was providing or using the preemption signal.
The local police department had received several complaints about the operation of the Algonquin Road crossing. In response to those complaints, signal maintenance personnel had been dispatched to monitor their respective signals operation. The result of these site inspections had generally been that the signal system was operating as designed.
The Illinois Department of Transportation modified the area of the crossing by adding two additional lanes of traffic on Route 14. No changes were made to the crossing, even though the traffic storage area had been substantially reduced.
The Fox River Grove accident is a textbook example of how things can go wrong when involved parties do not adequately communicate with each other. It will take communication and coordination between all involved parties to prevent future tragedies like that which occurred at Fox River Grove.
Madam Chairman, that completes my statement. I have testimony I will submit for the record, and we'll be glad certainly to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much, Chairman.
I'd like to welcome Ms. Molitoris. Thank you very much for reappearing before us this morning.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee.
With me today, representing the Federal Railroad Administration, are Mr. Bruce Fine, who is Associate Administrator for Safety, and Mr. Grady Cothen, Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety Standards and Program Development.
The tragic rail accidents that have occurred in February 1996 have touched each of us at the Federal Railroad Administration, as they have all Americans. And perhaps they've touched us in a very special way, because each of us, individually and collectively, invests our efforts, our energies, and our whole focus on the pursuit of safety. In fact, we hold this awesome responsibility as a sacred trust to the American people.
For the past 2 years, steadily improving safety statistics on railroads have been encouraging to us, and therefore these accidents have been all the more shocking.
In the face of the accidents, we have acted swiftly to issue two emergency orders regarding operating rules and protocols relative to the commuter and Cajon Pass, California, accidents. We also launched an intense, 24-hour-a-day, 7-day inspection at Burlington Northern-Santa Fe's Barstow and Los Angeles, California, rail yards, looking for the roots of problems that might be related to Cajon.
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In addition, I have met with all the heads of labor, with all of the operating heads of all the major railroads, as well as all of the heads of commuter operations. We have netted important results from those meetings, especially on two critical safety rail issues.
First, the railroads have committed to installation of two-way end-of-train devices on all trains operating on routes of 2 percent grade or more by December 15th of this year, which is a year ahead of the Congressional mandate. In addition, they have committed to imposing and instituting the safety programs for trackside workers that were part of our negotiated rulemaking, and they will do it this construction season. And by early April we will have comprehensive safety plans from each of the commuter railroads.
I want to comment on my partner to the right, Mr. Jim Hall, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, and about the relationship and the working partnership we have.
I believe that our working relationship at this time is very good. It has not always been that way. Historically, FRA's acceptance rate of NTSB recommendations has been 74 percent, which I think was the second lowest in the Department of Transportation. But for the last 3 years we've worked hard on that issue and we are now—we have now raised it to an 85 percent level during these 3 years.
In addition, we are responsive to NTSB, averaging about 44 days, which is less than half of their recommended 90-day window.
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Last week, when we talked, Madam Chairwoman, you asked me to comment on why I thought these accidents were happening, and that is what I'd like to do with my time today, especially focusing on the areas you've established—human factors and grade crossing safety.
Your choice of human factors for the focus of this hearing is really a most appropriate choice, because one-third of train accidents and many personal injuries to rail employees are related to human factors.
Today I will touch very lightly—my written testimony has much more information—on the issues of fatigue, locomotive certification, and drug and alcohol testing.
With regard to fatigue and alertness, FRA and NTSB investigations suggest the need to address irregular work cycles, with particular attention to rapidly rotating shifts that may begin late in the evening.
Train and engine crews in road service are sometimes required to report for duty with as little as 2 hours notice, and this is often the truth with extra board employees.
Some railroads require or permit employees to work long hours on many successive days without a day off. This whole issue of sleep deficit can be a serious problem.
In order to study these effects, we have involved locomotive engineer volunteers in a locomotive simulator, with irregular and stressful schedules similar to schedules worked by many engineers.
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In addition, with the help of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the railroads, FRA has conducted a study of actual work patterns among engineers by gathering activity diaries from about 20 locomotive engineers, and these reports told us that the biggest help they could get to enhance their alertness is to get more information about the schedule of the next job start so they could plan their rest.
Unlike the Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Highway Administration, FRA does not have general regulatory authority over the hours of duty of safety-sensitive employees.
The Department did, in 1991, submit legislation to repeal the Hours of Service Act, but it was not supported by labor or management and was not enacted.
So in 1994 we asked for more limited authority to grant pilot programs, and we have had one application so far for this kind of program, and we expect another, and we are hopeful that fundamental reform of the law will come as a result of NTSB and our research and the work of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the railroads.
With regard to alcohol and drug use, it is worth noting that about a decade ago FRA led the way on drug and alcohol testing by becoming the first civilian agency to adopt stringent testing regulations.
In 1994, only seven employees, or 2.4 percent, tested positive, out of 287 employees providing drug and urine samples for post-accident testing. And in over 43,000 random drug tests conducted by the railroads under our rule, only eight-tenths of 1 percent of employees tested positive for controlled substance in 1994. This is an excellent record.
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With regard, Madam Chairwoman, to your other focus of this hearing, and that is highway rail grade crossings, in the last 48 hours we have lost eight persons in highway rail grade crossings throughout the country. This is the kind of tragedy that occurs—every 90 minutes there is a collision. And the kind of tragic loss of life in these incidents represents, along with trespasser fatalities, over 90 percent of the loss of life in the rail industry.
That is why, very soon after taking office, Secretary Pena established grade crossing safety as a national transportation priority. He also established a department-wide action plan for highway rail grade crossing safety, and our goal is to reduce these incidences by 50 percent by the year 2004.
Fortunately, statistics for 1995 show 9 percent reduction in incidents and 7 percent reduction in fatalities. If we continue that through 2004, we will have reached our goal.
Our initiative includes a national awareness campaign called ''Always expect a Train.'' It includes expanded support for Operation Lifesaver, and a big focus on closing crossings.
In January this year we implemented final regulations for maintenance, inspection, and testing of warning devices at crossings, and just last week I signed the final order for conspicuity rule, which is to have lights on locomotives at the ditch level, which will help motorists see the train. These will be equipped on all locomotives going over 20 miles an hour by December of next year. And the fleet is over half equipped to this point, so we feel good that that will occur readily.
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One last point, Madam Chairwoman. Over the past decade the rail industry has changed dramatically. In the last 10 years, revenue ton miles have increased 50 percent to record high levels, and freight train miles jumped by a third, even as the number of employees and miles of track have shrunk dramatically.
With this increased traffic, it would be reasonable to expect that accident rates would also escalate, yet the train accident rate for 1995, for example, was 3.73 million miles, the lowest even, compared with the all-time high of 14.62 percent accidents in 1978, when nearly 11 accidents occurred.
When I came to this job, I knew that the FRA had to become a 1990's agency, really ready to deal with the enormous changes of our industry. So I had ten roundtables, with all the leaders from labor, management, suppliers, operators, and customers to find out what really needed to be done to make FRA work better. It didn't take long for me to know that we had a lot to do.
With fewer than 400 safety inspectors and an industry with 270,000 employees, 20,000 locomotives, 1.2 million freight cars, and 300,000 miles of track, we needed an agency that could respond to the challenges of these changes. So in 1995 we established a new element of our safety program, the safety assurance and compliance program, which, partnered with our other tools—regular inspection, emergency orders, civil penalties—represents an opportunity for us to identify root causes of the problems.
We have had 13 comprehensive safety assessments, and 20 more are scheduled this year. The results of these assessments are performance contracts by railroads, which are agreed to by labor and FRA, which establish implementation of solutions to these root problems, and the process really works.
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For example, as a result of a safety assessment and action plan, one railroad saw its defect ratio fall from 80 percent to 3 percent because of a plan like this. These are the kind of results that we can get.
We also are looking at a railroad safety advisory committee which will build on the success of the negotiated rulemaking for trackside workers that occurred last year.
One final note, Madam Chairwoman. During our accident investigations and listening posts with labor throughout the country, we have observed and been told about a serious disconnect in terms of internal operational railroad communications. We believe there is a commitment from railroad management to a safe railroad and open communications and employee involvement, but somehow that commitment does not always filter down through the line supervisor and beyond.
Top management must assure fundamental change throughout the entire organization in this regard if safety is going to be achieved. All the capital investment in the world will be for naught if employees are not properly trained to use and maintain upgraded equipment and systems.
Top management's message to everyone in the company must be that safety is the first priority; that direct and consistent communication between and among all departments, crafts, supervisors, and top management is essential; that everyone's job and compensation depends on reporting safety problems and addressing them immediately; and that craft employee concerns are respected, addressed, and follow-up made.
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We believe that this communication issue must be addressed by the railroad industry with the same levels of investment and quality insurance that have been made in capital programs.
In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, I emphasize the FRA's whole-hearted commitment to safety. Our goal is zero tolerance, zero incidents, zero accidents, and zero deaths.
Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much, Administrator. I have so many questions to ask between the two of you. I anticipate we'll go on several rounds.
Let me ask you, Administrator, one very quick question, because I think you can answer it with a yes or no.
The hours of service repeal that you spoke about obviously as attempted during the Bush Administration and was denied. I'm anticipating, from your testimony, that the Clinton Administration would support a repeal of the Hours of Service Act?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Madam Chairwoman, what we are looking for is the results of these pilot programs, and it would be based on the results of these pilot programs and in cooperation with all the elements who have something to say about these issues that that decision would be made.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Nonetheless, either way all we would be doing was taking away the statutory mandate and giving the rulemaking ability to FRA.
Ms. MOLITORIS. That's certainly one way to do it, but, again, our focus is on the results of the pilot program, and we do not have any legislative plan in place at this time.
Ms. MOLINARI. OK. What is the status of that pilot program in terms of when you'll have some final outcome?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, we have received only late last year an application from Southern Pacific, and I was there and spoke to both labor and management, who were quite enthusiastic about their plan, and they believe that it is going to have good results.
What it does is it—in fact, it was something that Chairman Hall referenced, and that was the sometimes increased commute time. They have recognized that.
Part of their proposal would be to offer opportunities for engineers to go to locations which would shorten their commute time.
It's published for approval in the ''Register'' right now, so as soon as that mandatory time in the ''Register'' is completed, we will analyze any comments that we get, and then it will officially begin.
Ms. MOLINARI. What's going to officially begin?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. The proposal that SP management and labor have put forward to us.
Ms. MOLINARI. OK. Maybe there's a disconnect. Maybe I still don't understand the way this is all supposed to work, but the pilot project idea was put into statute in 1994 and it's up early January of next year. Considering that we've had several years pass, what's happened since 1994 to today, I guess is the question.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Madam Chairwoman, as the statute elaborated, it was an opportunity for applications to be made to us, and we encouraged those applications, and this was the first one that we got.
Ms. MOLINARI. How did you encourage those applications?
Ms. MOLITORIS. By letting railroads and labor organizations and anyone who would listen know that we were very interested in receiving them.
Ms. MOLINARI. Obviously—and this is not to place blame—this is a very serious issue, as we've all agreed over the last few days. To have something that should have been initiated and have substantial research be done since 1994 only begin with approximately 7 months left to do the pilot test, to have an analysis, to have a proposal and a rulemaking put forward, in addition to—let's see. You also have to—FRA's got to start moving on passenger car safety. That statutory deadline is looming. You still have pending your power brake safety regulations and your end-of-train devices, which are overdue.
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How do you do all this on such important issues in the last six or 7 months of the year?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, if you would like to talk about the regulatory environment, I'd be happy to do that.
First of all, going back to the Hours of Service, as I mentioned to you, the application by the Southern Pacific for a pilot program is certainly not all the work that we're doing.
As I mentioned, we have work at the Volpe Center, we have work at the IITRI Institute in Illinois, where I mentioned in my testimony that we are developing, through volunteer engineers who are working in a simulator, development of information which will help guide.
In addition, we are working with monitoring and getting reports from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and AAR Joint Committee, which is working on that.
With regard to the passenger equipment safety standards, that has been an ongoing working group. In fact, Mr. Hall's staff is a part of that working group, and this working group is developing all the elements of that notice, and the notice of proposed rulemaking goes in in March, I believe, or this spring. It's already March, Madam Chairwoman. It's gone fast.
Ms. MOLINARI. I know. And what about the status of two overdue rulemakings on power brake safety and end-of-train devices?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Madam Chairwoman, in coordination and in response to an NTSB recommendation, we broke out the end-of-train device rulemaking and have put it on a fast track. And, as I mentioned, through perhaps the bully pulpit, if you will, working with the railroads, that agreement has been exacted from them, and they have committed to install those end-of-train devices on all trains over 2 percent grades by the end of this year and on all trains everywhere by July of next year.
Ms. MOLINARI. But if they don't do that, they're not breaking the law though, are they?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Not right now they're not breaking the law, but they would be breaking a commitment they made very publicly, and I think that is unlikely. We are following this very carefully. We have a time line. We will continue to press forward with the fast track end-of-train device rule, and that we expect to be finalized as a rulemaking somewhere over 100 days.
I think it's important to talk about the power brake rule, because I think it is an example of the kind of work and challenges that are faced in the rulemaking process.
We moved forward with a notice of proposed rulemaking on power brakes.
Ms. MOLINARI. Can I ask when?
Ms. MOLITORIS. September 1994. We had, in I think October 1994, in Chicago, 2 days of extensive hearings in which there was significant testimony given by labor and management, with a great deal of information that disagreed with the information upon which the notice of proposed rulemaking was made.
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We brought all that back, and, at the same time, we recognized that, because we were in the hole 40 rulemakings when I arrived, that doing the traditional process simply wasn't going to get us out of the hole.
We don't want to have 40 rulemakings facing us. We want to get them done. And the success of the negotiated rulemaking, which was at the impetus of the President and his executive order to look at other methods to do rulemaking, showed us that, even on something as controversial as the trackside worker safety, we could reach a strong agreement.
And I'm happy to report that the Office of Management and Budget has approved the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee that we requested. We will have the charter in place in 2 weeks, and hope to have a meeting of this committee either at the end of this month or in April, and that committee will be charged with setting up a priority list. In fact, we have gotten a sense of their priorities, and these committee members will then break up into working groups so that these rules can be worked on simultaneously.
It is important to note, Madam Chair, that FRA will be a part of all of these working groups and will be very sure that all of the elements are addressed, and there must be consensus to move these forward. They will establish time schedules.
I know that Mr. Oberstar had mentioned that, in experiences with other committees similar to this, sometimes there was a foot-dragging element. We've already established that there would be tight time schedules to get these rules done and out.
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If, at any time, there is an impasse, then we will take that out of the process and move it forward on regular rulemaking.
Ms. MOLINARI. I don't want to drag this out, obviously, Administrator, and I do want to have Mr. Hall comment on this, but because we're obviously confronting a situation that's going to require some Congressional motivation from here on in, we have to try and figure out a way that, when Congress passes a statutory deadline, that FRA, whether it's this FRA or FRA in the Bush Administration, understands that it's a statutory deadline. It's not really up to the Administration to determine their priorities.
When you have something like you coming forward saying—and, again, I know there are a million reasons there—that in September 1994 you moved with a notice, and my document tells me that in December 1993 the rule was supposed to be set, so it took even a year before there was an acknowledgment that there was a statutory deadline that you had passed, I don't know where to go from here.
Maybe, Mr. Hall, I can ask you for some suggestions as to how we in Congress—we obviously don't want to micro-manage. We want to leave the rulemaking and the regulations up to individuals who understand this business better than we do. However, I'm not comfortable in dealing on a basis where rulemakings are allowed to go two or 3 years and where we're relying on the commitment of an industry, albeit honorable, that would have no punitive repercussions if they didn't hit deadlines because there were no rules in place.
Mr. HALL. A suggestion, Madam Chairwoman, and that would be that the FRA, on matters that they think are of specific safety significance, issue emergency orders, as they have after these recent accidents, and then let the rulemaking proceed. That may add some emphasis to the people that are participating in the rulemaking to reach consensus so that a final rule can be passed.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you. I'd like to come back to this, but at this point I'd like to recognize my ranking Member, Mr. Wise.
Mr. WISE. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Administrator, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to start with NTSB.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for the efforts of your department and your staff immediately following the Silver Spring MARC collision with the Amtrak train. We were in close contact with you. You stayed in contact with us over the weekend so that we could provide information to our constituents. You came and briefed us in our office as soon as you knew anything, and you've kept in regular contact. I appreciate that greatly.
I have a question concerning the Cajon Pass situation. Some of these questions will be very quick.
Regarding the Cajon Pass accident in California and the St. Paul, Minnesota, accident, my question is: there have been allegations of sabotage in those accidents. Do you have any evidence of sabotage?
Mr. HALL. We do not have any evidence at this time, Congressman, of sabotage in either one of those accidents. I might say a better word might be ''vandalism'' in terms of some of the alleged activities. But at this time our investigation does not reveal evidence of any vandalism or sabotage.
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Mr. WISE. In either one of those?
Mr. HALL. Either case.
Mr. WISE. If I could ask either Chairman Hall or Mr. Lauby—and I appreciate your coming by the office recently—when you made recommendations to Amtrak about passenger car safety standards, have you made those recommendations, as well, to the commuter rail carriers? And my question is: if so, what response did you get?
Mr. HALL. Well, let me defer. I'll ask Mr. Lauby to answer that but, Congressman, if you might permit me just to follow up on your compliment to the staff at the NTSB in our Rail Division. We have a total of 19 people, 17 investigators, and they have worked very hard, and they intend to be and will be very responsive to this committee and to any of the Members of Congress. I appreciate the work they do and I will ask Mr. Lauby then to respond to that question.
Mr. LAUBY. Yes, Congressman. Basically, when we have an accident we issue recommendations to the regulatory people—and in most cases that's either the Federal Railroad Administration or, in some cases, a State Department of transportation—and we also issue recommendations to the people directly involved in the accident.
When we have accidents that have safety issues that involve other commuter trains, we do make those recommendations. We have not had that many accidents where some of the issues that we have on the MARC commuter train have come up.
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With Amtrak we have a number of accidents that we've investigated, and we have dealt directly with them on some issues including emergency windows. As the opportunity arises with a particular commuter line, we do make those recommendations.
Mr. WISE. Have you made recommendations concerning making every window in a passenger car an exit window, a safety exit, so that a person can get out of it?
Mr. LAUBY. Not on commuter trains, because we have not had the accidents that support that particular recommendation. Even with Amtrak, our recommendations on windows initially started with asking Amtrak to provide emergency windows on each enclosure, and the driving impetus of this recommendation was a fire that occurred on a sleeper car.
In response, Amtrak did what we asked in our recommendation and more. On their new cars they provide emergency windows with every pair of windows they have on the train.
Mr. HALL. Let me just add to that, if I could, Congressman. We have made a number of recommendations to FRA that they promulgate rules and regulations, first in 1975 to establish minimum standards for the interior of commuter cars so that adequate crash/injury protection and emergency equipment will be provided; again, in 1977, to establish standards for the interior design of commuter cars to prevent and reduce injuries from accidents; ensure that when the car's power source fails emergency lighting is adequate and doors can be operated easily from inside and outside; establish standards for the evacuation of passengers; and prevent a passenger train from entering an occupied block.
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In the 1970's and 1980's numerous recommendations were made by the Safety Board to the FRA that they establish regulations in this area.
Mr. WISE. What has been the status of those, the result? If I could have the chairman answer, then I'll be glad to have the administrator answer.
Mr. HALL. There has really been—at present there are no standards for passenger cars, either rail or commuter trains in this area and the areas that you've mentioned.
Mr. WISE. Madam Administrator?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Wise, we spoke about the passenger equipment safety working group and the fact that the notice of proposed rulemaking would be coming out this spring, and all of the NTSB recommendations will be part of that.
Mr. WISE. I'm new in this, and I know that most of this isn't on your watch. I mean, these recommendations started back. But I've heard of working groups up the wazoo and I'm tired of it. I'm tired of it throughout Government.
The reality is that they can often be an excuse for just delay, delay, delay, and at some point—I'm looking at a door right there that I saw on the MARC train which I rode the other day, and you read the directions on that, and that thing has probably been permitted to exist I guess for 20 years.
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I've got to make sure, if I've got a disaster, that I have a quarter, because then I have to make sure—actually, it's better if I have two quarters and I'm ambidextrous, because then I have to put one up here and one down here and I have to turn these things so that I release two catches. I then pull this thing out and I pull down the level. I've got to know to pull down the lever so I can get out the door, because if I can't get out the door I've got four exit windows for 40 windows, and I've got to know about that, and I've got to know where they are, and no signage on the outside, and I've got to find my way through smoke.
That's what happened to those people on the MARC train.
That's why I get frustrated when I hear about working groups and how long it's going to take.
Mr. Hall, there is obviously some allocation of responsibility between FRA and NTSB, but I'm just curious. I suspect that the administrator doesn't have all the resources she needs to get some of these rulemakings out. That would be my guess, and that would be a question of mine, as well. But I'm just curious whether FRA should be—are their resources—if you were making a recommendation, do their resources go toward more inspectors? Where do those resources go? Do they go toward rulemaking? Where do those resources go, if they have additional resources?
Mr. HALL. I would respectfully suggest, if there were additional resources, that they be put in rulemaking so that the rules and regulations could be brought current to the standards that we find in other transportation industries.
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Mr. WISE. Madam Administrator, would you care to comment on whether or not more resources are needed for enhanced rulemaking?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Wise, our reorganization of our department is for the purpose of using the resources we have to make it work, because, as you commented, when I came in the door there were a lot of very difficult challenges there.
Our goal, through the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program, is: instead of doing just individual inspections only, get these things solved on a system-wide basis; instead of just doing symptomatic inspections and fines, get at the root of the problem. That changes the whole dynamics for how we use our 400 inspectors, and the whole Railroad Safety Advisory Committee way of working on the rules will change the dynamic of doing that.
One of the frustrations we have, sir, is that when Congress does give us a deadline we aren't just able to put it in the ''Register.'' We have a list of developmental activities we have to do. We have to do the research necessary to get the facts on something like power brake, which is an enormous, very complex, technical rulemaking, and that has been part of our problem.
We think the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is going to address these rules in a way that will get them out faster, will get them in a position where they are well implemented throughout the industry, and will help address the problems that we have faced in the past.
Our goal is to use the resources we have and use them in a way that's going to get the job done.
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Mr. WISE. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Kim?
Mr. KIM. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do have a couple of questions.
I want to go back to this. By the way, Mr. Hall, thank you again. You were great that night you were out there in San Bernadino County conducting a meeting that I was participating in. That was great. I was impressed by FRA inspectors out there and all the other hard-working people. I appreciate it very much.
I want to go back to this sabotage issue one more time on Cajon Pass.
Yesterday we had a hearing, and one of the representatives from the union made a strong accusation. I want to read this to you. He said, ''In addition to the air brake problems, there was oil leaking from the cushioning device. Rather than repair or replace the cushioning device, the carrier instructed the carmen to replace the brake pipe and burn the oil off of the outside of cushioning device to hide any evidence that it was defective. The car was released without repairs.'' Now, does that sound like sabotage or just human mistake or deliberate attempt? What is this?
I'd like to ask Mr. Hall perhaps, or Mrs. Administrator to answer this question, and then I do have a couple more questions.
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Mr. HALL. I'll ask Mr. Lauby, who is familiar with our investigation there, to respond.
Mr. KIM. All right.
Mr. LAUBY. Yes. I heard that testimony yesterday, and it's certainly something we're looking at in our accident investigation. But it doesn't sound like sabotage or vandalism to me, it sounds like an attempt to release a car and move trains. Even if there was a hazardous condition with this car, there still seemed to be an attempt to want to get that car out of the shop and put it in a train and deliver goods.
Mr. KIM. Even though it's full of toxic chemicals? You feel it's just a human mistake, judgmental error, or——
Mr. LAUBY. A lot of this goes back to the policy of the railroad, how important safety is for the particular railroad, and how that's reflected down to the people that make the day-to-day decisions.
Mr. KIM. Who makes the policy?
Mr. HALL. The policy, of course, should be reflected in the rules and regulations that are established by FRA and in statute, and then, of course, come from management and would be reflected from the top to the bottom of the organization.
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Mr. KIM. The impression I got yesterday from yesterday's hearing is that union members have been addressing this safety issue many times to management and FRA and obviously are having problem with response from you and have some close communication. Could you answer that, please?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Are you talking to me, sir?
Mr. KIM. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Kim, I think that probably Mr. Bruce Fine is one of the FRA people that you met. He's our Associate Administrator for Safety, and I'd like him to just address the Cajon Pass accident, since he was there, himself.
Mr. FINE. In response to your first question, Congressman, I agree with the NTSB Chair that that certainly does not sound like sabotage. It would be inappropriate for us to comment on the specifics of that issue while the investigation is going on, and also, with the potential for enforcement actions against railroads and employees, I would not want to get into the specifics.
In terms of the overall issue of inspection at Barstow, we are certainly looking into that very, very heavily.
In response to your last comment about us being informed, I guess I would disagree with that. That's one of the frustrations we have. We've had inspectors there, we've had the Public Utility Commission of California, and we were not informed of the systemic problems. That's why this is a very good example of why we need to change our approach and get more employee involvement so that they do feel free to bring these up when there is a systemic problem ongoing.
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Mr. KIM. Obviously, there's no sabotage. Sabotage has been ruled out, but there was a big article in the newspaper. I believe it was the ''L.A. Times,'' that there was sabotage.
Now, I asked a question yesterday. The representative told us that the sabotage rumor was fabricated by the management. Do you agree with that?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I have no comment on that, Mr. Kim, about that allegation.
I would like to just mention, sir, that there are a couple of comments you made about the union messages yesterday, that they have been trying to get these issues out, and that's why, in the last 3 years, we have reorganized the way we do business so that labor is at the table, not only as they were at Cajon Pass, but in terms of policymaking, in terms of the system-wide plans for railroads, so they can be very forthright in what they see, as the first-line people who actually have experience with safety issues that need to be corrected.
I also might mention, there is a very good system at Amtrak, which Mr. Downs has put into place, where they not only have the opportunity to report a safety problem to their supervisor, but there's a 1–800 number in which they can do this kind of reporting.
What we want to do is get them in an environment where they feel very free and, in fact, are rewarded for bringing safety issues to the forefront.
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Mr. KIM. Madam Chair, can I ask one more question? You mentioned today that you'll have a rulemaking that would ask everybody to install end-of-train device on anything more than 2 percent grade, and then, from next year, everybody has to have it.
But these Cajon accidents happened back in 1989. The same thing happened again and again three times. It was an identical accident. People jumped out of the—the crew members jumped out of the train because it was out of control. One of them head-on to another train, the other one head-on into houses and killed six people, the third one was just derailed and then burst into flame and all the toxic chemicals burned. The groundwater has been contaminated. It's a very, very serious matter.
Now, I understand in the 1989 accident it took 2 years to finish the investigation, and they had a definite recommendation. Why wait such a long time after three accidents, identical accidents, and now suddenly we come up with emergency fast track rulemaking? Why couldn't you make this a year ago or 2 years ago based upon the first accident?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Kim, the installation of the two-way end-of-train devices in Cajon Pass was not part of a rulemaking, but there was an agreement between the California PUC inspectors, who we work closely with, and the railroad. The purchases were made and the installations made.
One of the issues I mentioned in my testimony was the critical role that communications—open and free communications which are acted upon—plays.
Mr. KIM. The EOT device? Are you referring to that?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. I'm sorry, sir?
Mr. KIM. The EOT device, is that what you're talking about? Two-way communication?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I'm talking about two-way end-of-train device, but I'm talking about the fact that these devices did not work consistently, and neither PUC inspectors or our inspectors received any word of this.
The inspections were made, the installations were there, they were armed, and we had no information that these were not working.
That is part of the key element that communications played. Why we were not informed or the PUC, I do not know. That's why I established in my testimony that this issue of free and open safety communication is crucial.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you, Mr. Kim.
Mr. Oberstar?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
This is a very important follow-on to the hearings yesterday and, as you have said before, the beginning of a series of inquiry into safety in the railroad industry.
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Chairman Hall, describe for me the compliance attitude of the Federal Railroad Administration. And, in doing so, compare their compliance record with the other DOT agencies—Coast Guard, Pipeline Safety, Federal Highways, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. HALL. Congressman Oberstar, the Federal Railroad Administration, over the 29-year history of the Safety Board, has an acceptance rate on our recommendations of approximately 74 percent. Other than the United States Coast Guard, it is the lowest response rate of any of the modal administrations. That response rate has improved, as the administrator pointed out, under her leadership at the FRA.
It has been a personal observation of this chairman, that the emphasis on public safety in the railroad industry, as a whole, both in the Government oversight and responsibility, as well as the entire industry, that there is not as much emphasis on public safety in railroad as there is in the aviation area.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. The compliance response, though, has improved in the last 2 years?
Mr. HALL. It has improved, but a lot of the recommendations that we previously made going back as far as 1969, 1974—are involved in rulemaking for a number of years.
Mr. OBERSTAR. You've got a previous at least 27-year history of abysmal compliance and foot-dragging.
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Describe for me the compliance attitude of railroad management.
Mr. HALL. I think that railroad management has recently taken their responsibility more seriously.
I had the opportunity to speak at the Norfolk Southern awards ceremony recently. They have placed a great deal of emphasis on employee safety and received the Harriman Award for a number of years for their work in employee safety. I challenged their CEO at their awards ceremony that they place the same emphasis on public safety as they have on employee safety and improve their record.
The Class I railroads have recently placed an emphasis on safety that has not been there previously, and I'm encouraged by that.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I get the feeling that they pass the safety award around to each other just to make themselves feel good, but their compliance spirit is one of resistance rather than of active action on the recommendations of the NTSB and on the initiatives taken by the FRA.
Mr. HALL. I would say that there has been a pattern of resistance to regulation over the years. To just address a subject that Congressman Kim addressed, two-way end-of-train devices, that's not rocket science. That's been a Canadian regulation since 1987, something that the industry, as a whole, is very familiar with, and an area that they could have voluntarily taken action on without any action from Government.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Is the FRA required, as is FAA, to undertake a cost/benefit analysis on the rulemakings in safety?
Mr. HALL. Yes, it is, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. How long does that—how long should that have taken for positive train separation, one of the three primary safety priorities that the NTSB has cited?
Mr. HALL. I don't know, Congressman, that there's any requirement in terms of time on those cost/benefit analyses. The administrator might be able to respond on that.
Mr. OBERSTAR. How long has that rulemaking been in progress?
Mr. HALL. Years.
Mr. OBERSTAR. And how much effort is made on the part of the railroads to resist it?
Mr. HALL. There is no PTS rulemaking—let me correct myself—at this point in time. There is a pilot project that is underway out on the west coast that is a cooperative effort of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe and the Union Pacific to look at positive train control.
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The Board has just recently seen—and I must note, Congressman, that this came as a result of the head-on collision that occurred in Kelso, Washington, the first time we have seen recently that the industry is taking a positive action on looking at positive train control systems.
There was a pilot project that one of the railroads had that was looked at and then abandoned.
Mr. OBERSTAR. One question, and then I'll have a number of others in my next round, Chairwoman Molitoris.
I get the clear impression that, while there is a lack of staffing at FRA, both for inspections and for rulemaking, that there is perhaps a greater fear of lawsuit by the railroads against your rulemaking than there is fear of proceeding aggressively on rulemaking.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Are you talking to me, sir?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, that is absolutely not the policy of this Administration, and I can tell you that for sure.
Obviously, we need to develop——
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Doesn't it bother you that the railroads might sue over rulemaking? You proceed aggressively, notwithstanding the fear that they would bring you to court?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, that's why we have lawyers at the FRA.
Our goal is a safety goal, and that is the best rule that can be implemented throughout the country to achieve safety, and that is not a fear. No, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Why is it taking so interminably long to address Hours of Service Act changes, positive train separation, railroad grade crossing safety issues?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, we do not have authority for hours of service, so there is no rulemaking for that. With regard to the power brake rule, we have broken out the end-of-train device so that that will be on the fast track. It's a smaller piece, as compared to the very large and complex power brake rule.
We have taken all the information that we got at the 2 days of intense hearings on the power brake rule, and we believe that will be a top priority of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. And we think from the work of that committee will come a very strong rule.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I compliment you for moving ahead as you've done, but you're moving against 25 to 27 years of inaction. We just need more aggressive initiatives.
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My time has long expired. I appreciate the indulgence of the Chair.
Mr. WISE [ASSUMING CHAIR]. Recognizing the bipartisan spirit of this committee, the Chair asked me to recognize and pass the baton to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman from West Virginia for yielding me time. I wanted to ask the administrator a couple of questions.
I'm new to the railroad industry, at least as far as Congress is concerned, and I started to read up on some of the background about safety. Of course, with CSX involved in one of the crashes, I asked them for information. I was surprised at actually how good their safety record was.
Then I had the opportunity to read your testimony and some of your comments to the press, I think in anticipation of the hearing, and actually they don't—you don't see this reflected in the stories recently, but the whole industry, as far as freight traffic and passenger traffic, is actually traveling more train miles, and the safety record seems to be improving, even with much heavier freight traffic, according to the information you released. Is that true?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes, it is, Mr. Mica. In fact, as I testified, one of the saddest and most tragic feelings to us was that for the last 2 years the safety statistics in almost every category have improved, and so that's why these accidents in 1996 have been so frustrating and terrible for us.
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Mr. MICA. Isn't that the same, too, for people working in the industry, employees at the work place around the train industry, rail industry, is it's safer, at least accidents per year? I think that's also improved.
Ms. MOLITORIS. It's per million train miles.
Mr. FINE. For employees it's based on an OSHA standard of per 200,000 hours worked, and that has improved dramatically. Yes.
Mr. MICA. The thing that we're trying to get, I guess, out of this then is—and I guess there have been some problems in coming forward with some rules—is what can we do. You know, we've got limited resources, taxpayer dollars, and we're trying to do a better job in safety. You just testified to Mr. Oberstar, the ranking Member, that you have enough attorneys. Are there enough attorneys there?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I believe that I didn't comment on the number, sir. I did comment on their willingness to move forward with rulemaking in the face of any potential——
Mr. MICA. But as far as resources, legal resources, you have access. Is there—I want to know, for the record, are we not providing you with adequate resources to go after these folks if you need to?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Our goal and the Administration's position is that the resources that we have need to be used to the maximum, and we're reorganizing with that in mind.
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Mr. MICA. Well, it's part of the larger question that I wanted to ask, again given limited resources: is there anything else we can do in lieu of huge chunks of money? There's not much that money wouldn't solve. Is there any additional authority you need from Congress to perform certain oversight functions or other things that are lacking? Is there anything else you can do?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Mica, I think the elements that I addressed here in my testimony and support from the committee for the new way of doing business for supporting the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to move these 40 rulemakings along, the ability to focus on system-wide answers, and to let these new approaches to doing business take effect, they have really just begun. March 1995 was when I announced the new rail safety and compliance program I think we're seeing tremendous results, but we have to also deal with the fact that 1996 has given us a terrible jolt, and we have to make sure that we go after every root cause connected with these accidents.
Mr. MICA. In a final moment here, then we're also spending a lot of money. I noticed one of these accidents was on the Northeast Corridor. We've put a lot of money in there—$1 billion, I guess, over the years, and we're committing more money for it. Is the way we're spending money on improvements on the Northeast Corridor—are safety considerations given a top priority in those improvements?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Mica, I'm not familiar with the accident. I do not believe there was one on the Northeast Corridor. One of the real success stories in rail passenger service is the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak is really becoming a much more competitive company. They are increasing their revenues. They're keeping their ridership, even though they have decreased service in a variety of ways, equaling almost 20 percent. But they're managing their company, they're appealing to customers more directly.
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Mr. MICA. But this hearing deals with safety, and as safety is one of those priorities and money that's being spent on the types of improvements also, some of this is going toward safety improvements?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes, it is, sir.
Mr. MICA. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI [RESUMING CHAIR]. We have a hearing at 1, and Mr. Duncan, who is going to be heading up this hearing, has meetings so that we cannot delay this at this point in time.
I'm going to ask the remaining Members to ask one quick question of the FRA administrator.
Mr. Hall, you're testifying before us for the next mark-up. Can I ask if you can stay for about 15 minutes after that, or anyone from NTSB, so our remaining Members can ask question.
Mr. CLEMENT. Madam Chair, am I the last one to ask questions?
Ms. MOLINARI. No. I have two more on this side, too.
If we can do one quick question each of the administrator, then we'll come back.
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Go ahead.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you.
Madam Administrator, Mr. Oberstar made it very clear a while ago. I think patience is running out when it comes to this rulemaking and how long it's been dragging out, and something needs to be done now.
We're hearing more and more from people all over the United States about railroad safety, and we heard testimony yesterday that was very alarming. Mr. Kim commented about it a while ago. We had witnesses say things are unraveling, there's blatant disregard for safety, and if some of the employees even report a safety issue they can expect to be disciplined.
These are very, very serious charges. And then we have some of the comments that have already been made today about the fact that the railroads are resisting any rules, and regulations, and maybe the fear of your office when it comes to issuing a rule or regulation, simply because the railroads may take us to court. What's going on?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Clement, let me repeat again. I disagree with the comment that there is any fear of our office in issuing rules. That is not true.
I can only comment, of course, on my tenure here. It is part of our focus to make sure that labor has a voice at the table. That was one of the most critical issues facing us when I came to this job, because labor clearly spoke to us about not being involved, not having a voice.
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I think that you can ask labor about their involvement in FRA development of programs and policies. They are at the table when we do system-wide analysis. They must agree and concur with the safety system plan that the railroads present to us.
I will tell you, in terms of any intimidation and any sort of repercussions that would be negative for any report of a safety violation, we will pursue that to the limits of the law and with aggression, because that is totally unacceptable.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Clement, thank you.
Mr. Quinn, very quickly, please.
Mr. QUINN. Thank you.
Madam Administrator, we've talked with your staff from my office, I think, and we've shared a letter we received just last night after yesterday's hearing from a Mr. Godwin in my District of Buffalo, who's the general chairman of the General Committee of Adjustment for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
He asked more of a technical question, and I told your staff I don't necessarily need an answer today. If you need some time, we'd appreciate your getting back to us, in the interest of time here today. But Mr. Godwin points out and suggests—as he writes to the President, by the way. We were copied, and a bunch of other people. You were not, so that's why we gave you the copy. He talks about the recommendations on deficiencies, as he describes them.
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Through all of what we've talked about here yesterday and some more today, we've heard the Transportation Safety Board talk about suggestions, and I'm just trying to determine whether they're the same thing.
Are there suggestions that have been made, and then are there other recommendations on deficiencies that are out there? Or are we talking about the same things?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I'm not quite sure I understand your question, Mr. Quinn.
With regard to the National Transportation Safety Board, they make recommendations to us——
Mr. QUINN. Yes.
Ms. MOLITORIS [continuing]. That we act upon. Are you talking about other suggestions, sir?
Mr. QUINN. As you take a look at the letter from Mr. Godwin, he points out, as he writes to the President, points out also that the President is in a position to influence you and others in your department, so I sort of wanted to give you heads-up on the letter, but he talks about recommendations on deficiencies as if there is a list of some things that have been discussed in the past and that you have those things, or someone has those.
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I just want to spend the next couple of days, not to belabor it today, but we'd like to work with you these next few days and into next week before next week's hearing to find out just what Mr. Godwin's talking about. We'll deal with him back home in our District, and with your help and others we'll make sure that we don't have another whole list of things that have been talked about.
Fair enough?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I would be very happy for the opportunity. Thank you.
Mr. QUINN. Very good. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Quinn, did you have a copy of the letter to give to the administrator?
Mr. QUINN. Yes, we do.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you.
Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, one thing in all these hearings that I don't think has been said—and I think it probably ought to be the story in the newspaper—is that commuter rail travel is about 19 times safer than getting in your automobile and driving a mile. So I'm going to introduce a letter from the National Association of Rail Passengers which sets that out. They did a study for 10 years. In moving a passenger one mile, it's absolutely 19 times safer to move him by commuter rail, so someone is doing something good.
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We've basically got a very safe operation that we're trying to make safer when it comes to commuter rail.
A second point I'd like to make is that the National Transportation Safety Board, you all have made recommendations for positive train separation for a long time. We've realized that it's just a dollars and cents issue. I think 90 percent of the rail collisions, the big ones that we talk about, could have been prevented by positive train separation.
I think the railroads are coming around to that, and in that regard I think we just have to set up a time table and say, on certain routes, certain traffic, ''When are you going to do it?'' if we want to do that and if we want to make that.
It's not only a safety issue, it's a business issue. We've got to do that.
Aside from that, I think the two areas—and I'm just going to ask a question about one. One is trespassers, which is probably the hardest thing to solve of all, but there are some things we can do. The other is grade crossings. My question to both of you all is: there are 4,000 grade crossings in Alabama. Just take Alabama. Don't call it Alabama. Just call it XYZ State has 4,000 train crossings. How many of those crossings could we close? I'd say 700 of those are gated with gates and/or lights, one or the other.
I've also said in these hearings I think you have to gate them with four-quadrant gates to really do the job, but let's just say 700 of those are gated. How many of them could we eliminate if it were just an ordinary State? How many of them—and I'm talking about public crossings—how many of them that aren't signalized should be signalized, and how many should we totally separate? What do you see as what would be your suggestions?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Bachus, the closing of crossings is one of the primary goals in the Secretary's safety action plan. In fact, we have a goal that was articulated by my predecessor, Mr. Carmichael, to close 25 percent of the crossings nationwide. Since 1992, we have closed 18,000 crossings, but we have a lot more to do.
Mr. Bachus, I think the greatest opportunity is to work with cities and counties and states. For example, in January I was in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, helping them celebrate closure of 68 crossings in one town. This was a victory for safety there.
We have been promoting. In fact, we have several manuals that we have provided. Here's a guide to closing crossings. We need to get all Americans involved in this life-saving activity. It can even improve transportation, as they found out in Fort Collins when they closed 20 crossings. Their transportation was better after they made that move.
Mr. BACHUS. I appreciate that. What percentage have we closed?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I know 18,000 since 1992. I'm not sure what the percentage is.
Mr. BACHUS. Are we maybe halfway?
Ms. MOLITORIS. The overall crossings, sir, including public and private now, is 314,555. So, as you can see, we have a long, long way to go.
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Mr. BACHUS. Right. I would say to you all, if you all could give us specific things that we could do to help—and I know one may be making the 130 program, giving incentive payments to municipalities for closing crossings—but give us some things that we can do as a Congress statutorily.
Ms. MOLITORIS. I'd be very happy to submit those for the record, and also to you directly, sir.
Mr. BACHUS. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you.
Because there is a vote, I'm going to—Mr. Kim had one quick question, and then we have to break because they have to set up TVs, but it gives us time for one additional question, and then we have to move on.
Mr. KIM. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very much.
Just one more question, going back to Cajon Pass, again. It says that EOT, end-of-train device, was added to the train, it was tested, but it was not armed. That's what it says.
Now, why? Because your rulemaking, your rule asking them to be tested—well, let me put it the other way. Your rule only required the device be tested. The law did not require that the device actually work. That is a very serious charge to me that they should test it but you don't have to make sure it works. I don't understand it. Can you comment on that, please?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes, sir. I'd like to have, again, Mr. Fine, who was at Cajon, comment.
Mr. FINE. The reason the device wasn't armed, Mr. Kim, was not because the engineer just chose not to. Those devices weren't working, and that was not made known, as the administrator has said, to us or to the Public Utility Commission inspectors.
The devices, when they are armed, when they go up the hill, they disarm when the engineer tries any number of operations like an odometer reading or a car count, so they can be armed, and that's what the inspectors saw when we went in and looked. The devices were on the locomotives, they were armed. We didn't know that they disarmed because of malfunctions once they took them out into service. That's why it was not deemed to be particularly important to arm the devices. That was not known to us, certainly, or to the Public Utility Commission inspectors.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you all very much. We will adjourn again, to reconvene again at the end of the next hearing.
I'd like to thank you all for your patience.
Mr. BACHUS. Ms. Chairman, could I point out one thing to the other members?
Ms. MOLINARI. Sure. Please.
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Mr. BACHUS. If you will read Mr. Lauby's testimony that he submitted, he says something in there that I think we ought to all realize when we're dealing with all these. You're dealing with human performance, and any time you're dealing with human performance you have human error.
What we need to get at is some things—I mean, we're not going to be able to make rules which say people don't get fatigued or they don't get bored or they're not inattentive.
A lot of what we've been discussing here today is trying to come up with a rule or a law which says people don't get bored or they don't get fatigued. I mean, they could——
Ms. MOLINARI. It's a good thing we don't have to make it up for Members of Congress during hearings like this, right, Spencer?
Mr. BACHUS. I think if you read his testimony, he sort of highlights measures that work and things that we're spinning our wheels doing, and I think it was very good.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you, Spencer. I appreciate that.
Mr. MICA. Madam Chairman?
Ms. MOLINARI. Yes, Mr. Mica?
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Mr. MICA. Just one quick comment for the record.
I noted yesterday, when I finished my eloquent testimony about the safety record of CSX, my colleague, Mr. Bachus, noted that he had sued my constituents, but I want the record to reflect that I checked and it wasn't in the safety period I talked about, it was back in 1981. So just that for the record.
Ms. MOLINARI. And I think that's a good note on which to adjourn this hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene later the same day.]
Mrs. KELLY [ASSUMING CHAIR]. We are here this afternoon to continue the rail safety human factors hearing.
Mr. Oberstar, have you any questions?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I certainly have.
Mrs. KELLY. All right. Would you care to begin?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
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I appreciate our panel being reconvened and coming back after all these interruptions of votes and other committee business that we had to attend to.
Ms. Molitoris, I want to ask a question that leads up to a policy issue. Who has the last word on whether a train moves or doesn't move? Does the locomotive engineer have the ability, the power, the authority, in whatever shape or form, to say, ''I will not move this train. It is not safe?'' Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, if you are talking about in the face of a safety problem, sir—is that what you mean?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Any employee who sees a significant safety problem should report that to the supervisor before—if there is an issue about whether that train should go.
Mr. OBERSTAR. That's not the answer to my question. My question is, again: does the engineer have the power, the authority to say, ''I am so concerned about the safety of this equipment that I will not move this train?'' Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, I am told that there is nothing in law that permits the engineer to override the supervisor.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Who does have the authority to say it's not safe to move this train at this time until this safety defect is remedied?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I'm going to ask Mr. Cothen to comment on this, sir.
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Mr. COTHEN. Mr. Oberstar, I'm being reminded of the specific provision. It's in section 20109 of 49 U.S. Code, and it creates a qualified right, on the part of the employee. When I say, ''qualified right,'' the refusal must be made in good faith and no reasonable alternative to the refusal is available to the employee, and that would be in the case where a reasonable individual in the circumstances then confronting the employee would conclude that the hazardous condition presents an imminent danger of death or serious injury, and the urgency of the situation does not allow sufficient time to eliminate the danger through regular statutory means.
That's a qualified right, but in the more common case where you have a simple issue of marginal non-compliance with a particular item that may not be an imminent safety concern, then that would be between the employee and the company, and for later investigation by the Federal Railroad Administration.
Mr. OBERSTAR. In the airline business, when the captain decides that there is a thrust reverser inoperative, or two of the three thrust reversers on a 727 inoperative, and even though he's got the best of weather conditions and ideal temperature and atmospherics, can say, ''I will not move this aircraft until this is fixed.'' Now, the captain has to have good grounds for this decision. It's a very significant decision that has revenue consequences for the company. But there is a locus of authority and of responsibility.
In the railroad business it seems to me this is all vague and disparate and you've got very complex language in here—I mean, not you, but there is in the law.
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes. Mr. Oberstar, if I could reference one development recently where we have addressed that problem, that is in the trackside worker negotiated rulemaking. What that gives to the employee, the trackside worker, whether it be maintenance-of-way or signal, gives them the right to refuse to work in an environment because they don't think it's safe. It gives them the right to call for protection. It gives them an absolute right as an individual in that category.
Mr. OBERSTAR. It sounds rather limited.
Chairman Hall, what do you make of this situation? What recommendations would you have? Ha NTSB looked at that aspect of railroading?
Mr. HALL. No. Not that I'm aware of, Congressman. I'm concerned, and I'm sure the Administrator is concerned, about all the individuals saying that unsafe conditions existed and were not addressed.
I have asked Mr. Lauby, as part of our investigation process and as part of our oversight responsibilities, to see whether these are allegations that are made for one reason or another, or whether these are serious matters and issues that need to be addressed.
I'm familiar, as you are, with the importance that the operator has in the aviation area to not move that airplane until he or she is confident that it's safe to do so, and I don't know——
Mr. OBERSTAR. I would certainly like to see the NTSB review this matter from an independent status and, given the long experience NTSB has with aviation matters, look at the practice in the railroad sector from the standpoint of clear lines of authority on who can shut down an operation until the unsafe condition is removed.
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Mr. HALL. We will do that.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. The second question I have is: one of the great tools available to NTSB, to the airlines, and to maintenance personnel is the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. The most recent technology of flight data recorders is that they can monitor up to 150 parameters of aircraft operations.
To my knowledge, there's nothing comparable in the railroad sector. There is an event recorder of some kind used on railroad locomotives. Do they provide your investigators the information they need? Are they solid enough to withstand the effects of the types of crashes that typically occur in the industry?
Mr. HALL. I'd like to make a general comment, Congressman, and then ask Mr. Lauby to deal with the specifics of your question.
Flight data recorders, have been extremely helpful in advancing safety in the aviation area. It is my understanding—and I intend to learn more about this—that with regard to event recorders in the rail and highway area, that the countries of Europe are ahead of us in terms of use of that technology, even though some of that technology is being purchased from the United States. That's an area that we are going to look at and be more active in in the surface area.
Mr. OBERSTAR. That's an astonishing observation. We are developing the technology, we produced it, and the Europeans are using it and U.S. operators are not.
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Mr. HALL. That's correct. And, Mr. Lauby, if you want to go into specifics of the crashworthiness and information that we do get off the event recorders now.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Try to summarize.
Mr. LAUBY. OK.
Mr. OBERSTAR. This could get very technical. I understand.
Mr. LAUBY. There is an FRA regulation that requires that event recorders be placed on trains. I think it has been in existence for a year and a half or 2 years. There is a lot more that we need to do as far as improving both the type of data that we get off the event recorders and the crashworthiness of those event recorders.
In fact, our aviation experts—experts in cockpit voice recorders and aviation data recorders—are working with the FRA to come up with a specification for crashworthiness of railroad-type event recorders.
We expect to see improvement in that area in the future.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Now, I've only been involved in this railroad safety issue for the time that our committee has had the jurisdiction of it, but I've talked with the safety experts—and I won't name names—on the line in NTSB, and others generally in the safety industry, and they say that the condition of this technology is laughable in the railroad industry.
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Ms. Molitoris, do you have any thoughts about moving aggressively to require railroads to install such technology?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, we have and are moving aggressively. As Mr. Lauby said, since I have been at FRA we have a rule on event recorders and we now, along with the NTSB involvement, are moving toward the next generation, which will establish even greater possibilities for these event recorders and take advantage of the latest technology.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I'd like to encourage you to come up and visit with our committee members and staff and bring us up to date on what's happening.
Ms. MOLITORIS. OK.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I think this is an extremely important issue.
If I may proceed, Madam Chairman?
Mrs. KELLY. Go ahead, Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. OBERSTAR. The negotiated rulemaking on roadway worker safety, it's taken more than—we're 7 months now past the time when a consensus was reached. Why has it taken so long to promulgate the rule? Is there a problem with OMB? If there is, let us know about it and we can jump on them. Is there a problem with the railroads threatening to sue? We'll threaten them.
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, the first negotiated rulemaking was agreed to by labor and the railroads, and you are right, it was finalized at the end of August.
We are very frustrated too, as are all parties who have been involved.
This is a first-time, cutting-edge kind of an effort. There was a lot to be developed in a variety of areas, like cost——
Mr. OBERSTAR. But the consensus was reached.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes.
Mr. OBERSTAR. What has happened in those 7 months that has prevented you from issuing the rule?
Ms. MOLITORIS. The fact that it was negotiated and agreed to did not relieve us of the regulatory responsibility to go through the process that was in place.
We have the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, as well as many others, working hard to move this through the process. We think it will be moved through that process very soon.
But I will say to you, sir, that there is a very significant discussion going on at very high levels of government to get the processes in place that will facilitate these kinds of rulemakings in the future so there isn't this kind of lapse.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. You know, in the FAA, from the time a rulemaking has been agreed upon in Tony Broderick's office, whether certification of aircraft or flight and duty time rules for flight attendants and flight deck crew, there are 15 sign-offs required from the time it leaves his office until it becomes a rule. Sometimes we've had to get out a blow torch to make that process move and apply it to parts of the anatomy. Maybe that's what's needed here.
I see you as a very well-intentioned, well-meaning person trying to do a job in an industry and in an agency whose rules are encrusted with age, tied up by an industry that does not want to be regulated, that resists regulation, that resists efforts to improve its act at every step of the way, and someone's got to break that bottleneck, and that's got to be you, and that's got to be the NTSB pushing you.
If you're running into problems at the Office of Management and Budget that you can't move it, or in the Department of Transportation that you can't move this rulemaking forward after a consensus has been reached, something's wrong with that. People are frustrated.
I go back to Duluth and face 38,000 people who were chased from their homes by benzene fumes because a rail car was overturned in a terrible accident that could have been prevented by better safety. I can't go back to them and say, ''Gee, I'm so sorry it's taken 7 months to get this rule out.'' Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, I very much empathize with your frustration. We are, too, because we worked terribly hard, along with labor, who worked very hard, and the railroads, who worked very hard, and we believe that we will see this in the ''Federal Register'' very, very soon, sir.
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As I said to you, all the processes in an evolving government have not caught up to one another just yet. We think that there is a very substantive discussion going on at very high levels of government which will get this resolved.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.
Mr. Lauby, fatigue—we've looked at fatigue in the airline sector. You have at the NTSB. John Lauber, a long-time Board member, one of the leaders worldwide in human factors issues in aviation and in all modes of transportation, often referred to fatigue as a safety factor.
In our hearings that we've conducted over the years on fatigue as a factor in airline accidents and in controller mistakes, time and again the FAA has come back and said, ''Well, we haven't been able to scientifically prove that fatigue was a factor in the pilot's error or in the controller's error.'' There is no autopsy that I know of that can demonstrate that this dead person died because of fatigue. But we know what fatigue does.
Vince Lombardi said one time, in talking to his team, ''Fatigue makes cowards of us all.'' Fatigue does strange things to people. We know that it's a serious factor.
Now, you've got this law that goes back to 1907 in the railroad industry, and on the one hand there's railroad labor that says, ''Gee, we're afraid if you ever change that law what evil things might happen to it.'' On the other hand there's railroad management that says, ''Oh, my god, don't change that law. It's good the way it is.'' It needs to be fixed.
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What, in your long experience in the safety field at the NTSB, would you consider to be a better approach to hours of service regulation?
Mr. LAUBY. Certainly the hours of service is an old law, it was first put in place in 1907. It's been revised over the years. But at this point I think the worse thing that we can do is do nothing. We're waiting for results of different research, and I don't think we're ever going to get a conclusive solution on exactly what needs to be done.
But some of the things I heard yesterday in the testimony I found very interesting. One thing that the unions have advised is an 8-hour lead time before they have to go on duty. Now, they are required in their contracts to have a 2-hour lead time right now. If they had an 8-hour they would certainly have access to more information that would allow them to make informed decisions about what they're going to do in that 8 hours, whether it's rest or continue with their family activities or whatever.
I think that may be a very important part of a modified hours of service law. .
Second, there is a lot of foot dragging on this law. One reason I think that's true is because this is a dollars and cents issue. If we say that the engineers cannot go to work as often, this means to the railroads that they're going to have to hire more engineers. If we tell the engineers that you're not going to work as often or as many hours as you did, that's a dollars and cents type issue to those engineers because they're not going to be able to——
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Don't you think that those engineers would rather work fewer hours than not work because they're dead?
Mr. LAUBY. Certainly. But many people do what they have to do to survive and to take care of their families.
Mr. OBERSTAR. They have no right to demand more hours if doing so endangers the lives of other people.
Mr. LAUBY. I would agree with that, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Nor does the railroad management have the right to insist that people work those kinds of hours so they can haul more freight and make more profit. We're talking about safety, lives of people, innocent bystanders and those who are working on those trains.
Madam Administrator, would you consider convening a conference that would bring together best minds in industry and labor, researchers in circadian rhythm—all the people who have contributed in this manner to the advances we've made in the airline sector in limiting the hours of work for flight attendants, and now for pilots? Would you consider undertaking such an initiative, with the view to bringing that to change either in law or in rulemaking?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, we have been acting very aggressively in that area, and we have scheduled on April the 4th a conference just like that with experts, not only from those areas who have been doing research, but with all parties, so that we can try to bring a collective meeting of the minds on this issue.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. I hope it will be as comprehensive as was the aviation safety session convened in January 1995 and the aging aircraft conference convened shortly after the Aloha Airlines crash that brought together world experts and resulted in our Aviation Committee legislating changes in the way older aircraft are maintained—something Mr. Clinger and I both consider to be probably the peak of our careers in the Congress.
Ms. MOLITORIS. We'd be very happy to work with you or your staff to review what we've planned and accept your advice and counsel on this.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I would anxiously look forward to working with you.
Madam Chairman, you may have some questions.
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Oberstar, I'd just like to add, if you're going to have this conference, that you include perhaps people from the trucking industry, too, so that we're looking at land, rail, and aviation all at the same time and then we won't have to do it in separated hearings, if you're going to start have something of this kind of nature of hearing.
I want to just ask one question about the—Mr. Harper yesterday spoke about the fact that he felt there should be a mandatory Federal inventory of grade crossings, with a view to setting priorities for closure and for upgrading protective equipment on crossings that can't be closed.
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I want to know if the FRA has investigated any comprehensive measures to improve grade crossing safety.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Congresswoman Kelly, we have an enormous body of ongoing work on the grade crossing issue.
With regard to the data base, we have a national data base which is updated annually, and we have been working with States to encourage them to get a more comprehensive data base.
I know, from our own State of Ohio, that when they began to examine the timeliness and the contemporariness of the data that they had, they realized they had to do a real State-wide reevaluation, and they worked with all railroads, communities, State and county roads, and came up with a very contemporary, well-done data base. So we do have that data base available.
As you know, we have a 55-point initiative that was kicked off by Secretary Peña to address all elements of grade crossing safety. In fact, we introduced legislation at that time, and it is now present. In fact, Mr. Mica asked what are some things we could do.
Senator DeWine has introduced a bill recently which includes all the elements of our grade crossing safety legislative initiative, and so that would be a piece of action that could help really move this. It includes giving money to motivate towns and cities to close crossings.
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As you know, we have a national program of awareness that we're working with Operation Lifesaver on, the ''Always Expect a Train'' program. We have research on new technology. I know that's an interest of yours. And we have several pilot programs on four-quadrant gates, on arrester nets from the airline industry, as a matter of fact, Mr. Oberstar, where those arrester nets that are used on NAVAL vessels are also being experimented with in Illinois, and they have the ability to stop a heavy truck at 45 miles an hour so there is not an intrusion into a rail corridor.
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you very much.
Mr. HALL. Congresswoman, might I comment on those, as well? I would like you and Congressman Oberstar, because of your interest in this subject, to be aware of some of the things the Board has done in this area, as well.
In the grade crossing area, we issued a grade crossing study that came out in 1987. We did a study on grade crossing conspicuity of rail cars that goes back to the 1980's. While there are a number of things that need to be studied and a number of things that can be done, a lot of those things are already being done in Europe.
If you go to a rail crossing in France, there's a telephone there so if there's a problem with the rail crossing or there's someone stuck on the rail crossing you can pick up a telephone and call somebody and something can be done.
We made a recommendation out of an accident in Sycamore, South Carolina, just yesterday that we have an 800 number just at the rail crossings. We've had two or three serious accidents where low trucks have gotten hung up on rail crossings. In, this particular accident, the truck was there for 35 minutes before the Amtrak train came along and hit it. No one knew who to call to stop the train. That's unacceptable. It should be unacceptable to all of us.
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A lot of these things—and please, I have the greatest deal of respect for this administrator and the work and leadership she's provided at the FRA, but, as a citizen and as the head of the Safety Board, I must tell you that some of these things have been looked at for years and years and years. To just have another meeting to look at them again—what we need is to implement some of these things that are common-sense things that can be done.
In the fatigue area, in 1989 the Board made a recommendation to the Secretary of Transportation that we look at the problem of fatigue in all areas of transportation. The Board convened a meeting last year to look at the problem of fatigue across all modes of transportation, and I'll be glad to provide you all a copy of the proceedings of that symposium.
But I would encourage you and your staff to look at the millions of dollars that have been funded by this Congress to the various departments of administration, through this Administration and previous Administrations, to study fatigue. There have been studies done at the University of Michigan in the surface area. There have been studies at NASA Ames that have been done in the aviation area. The Volpe Center has done studies.
With all due respect, sometimes it is in the interest of the people who study an issue to continue studying it as long as possible.
I would say to you what Mr. Lauby said, that at some point in time—and we're not the ones to make that decision, but at some point in time somebody needs to address laws that have been on the books since 1907, and be sure that we are looking at what factors we now have learned in the ensuing 90 years in terms of transportation safety and see that those are implemented into the rules and regulations and procedures.
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We have done extensive work and all of our studies and work, Congresswoman, come out of actual accidents in which damage has happened, individuals maybe in some instances have been killed or badly injured, and that is the genesis of these recommendations.
There is a wealth of information that is available of things that have been previously studied and previously recommended that we would be glad to share with this committee.
Mrs. KELLY. Good. Thank you very much.
I think that at this point there's only one other question that I have, and that is: yesterday we talked about the human factors with regard to the design of the emergency exits on passenger and commuter rail cars.
One issue brought up was the marking of exits, internal and external exits. I just want to know if any consideration was given to the painting of emergency exits with some kind of a distinctive outline, the roof exits as well as the doors, the way it's done on an aircraft, so that someone arriving where there has been an accident can identify those exits and get people out.
Mr. LAUBY. This is certainly something we're looking at, especially in the MARC accident. We have looked at the current emergency exits and their marking, and I think that you can expect some recommendations that this marking needs to be improved. The locations of these exits need to be somehow marked so that passengers, especially in emergency situations, can find them. We've also seen some of the instructions that were inside the car on how to release the doors.
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We're working with the MARC people right now, trying to help them to develop a better way of marking these exits, and I think you'll hear a lot about that in the future as this accident investigation progresses.
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you very much.
At this point, Mr. Oberstar, do you still have further questions?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I've got three more issues I want to raise.
Mrs. KELLY. I have to go on to another appointment, but what I will do is turn the Chair over to you, if you don't mind.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I'm familiar with it.
[Laughter.]
Mrs. KELLY. Then allow me, Mr. Oberstar, to hand you the gavel.
Mr. OBERSTAR [ASSUMING CHAIR]. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Before you leave, I must observe that in my first term in Congress in a hearing on aviation safety I asked the very similar question you asked about train markings to safety exits, and it's in the hearing record. The response was, ''Don't be silly. That's the most ridiculous thing we've ever heard of. Hang around for a while and learn something.'' Fifteen years later I got to be chairman of a committee that had something to do with it. I came back to the same issue, and that's why you have those markings on aircraft.
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It may take a little while, but I ain't going away.
[Laughter.]
Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Administrator, the power brake rule, you've all said that this is one of the most important rulemakings that you now have underway. When is the working group on the power brake rule going to begin its work?
Ms. MOLITORIS. The Office of Management and Budget has approved the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. The charter will be submitted in 2 weeks, and at that time we will have the first meeting of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, and it is from that group that a working group will come and begin its work. So I would say in April.
Mr. OBERSTAR. What timeframe do you anticipate within which the work can be completed and you can proceed to rulemaking?
Ms. MOLITORIS. That is an agreement that must be reached by the members, and that will be something done at the first meeting.
Mr. OBERSTAR. We'd like to be kept informed of the progress.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Be happy to, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. You've said that the safety assurance and compliance program is designed to, as you put it, ''identify root causes of safety problems.'' And your testimony went on to address 33 major safety concerns.
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First of all, can you address common threads among safety issues that you've identified as root causes, and can you give me some examples of comprehensive safety concerns that FRA has found?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, one that I had mentioned in my testimony, sir, was the particular railroad with an entire fleet that had an 80 percent defect ratio, and when the flaw was identified by our people and a situation worked out, it went down to 3 in a very short time.
In addition, for example, in the eastern part of the country one railroad is completely eliminating a fleet of cars because we have identified a common thread that is a problem in that fleet, and they were replacing 2,000 cars. That's a system-wide answer to that initiative.
I'd like Mr. Fine to give you some more examples, if that is all right. He is our Associate Administrator of Safety, and he has been working directly on this.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Mr. Fine, what was that common problem that affected 2,000 cars?
Mr. FINE. These cars had extremely high defect ratios and they were causing some problems with derailments, potential derailments. They had conditions of inoperative air brakes, excessive brake piston travel, defective plain-bearing conditions, a lot of safety appliance defects. There were 2,000 cars in the service. The railroad, quite frankly, didn't believe us when we went with this problem to them. They worked with us, and subsequently they have decided that the cars are not worth salvaging. They're getting rid of them. I think there are 1,200 cars remaining. They're getting rid of the rest of them by—they'll be scrapped by April 30th.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. That's very, very significant.
Mr. FINE. The other example that the Administrator used was on a western railroad. They had a systemic problem, very high defect ratio in freight cars. There were a lot of problems connected with that. The train crews were not properly trained in inspection procedures. They weren't conducting freight car inspections very frequently at various locations.
Since the work that we've done with them, again with labor presence, they've assigned additional carmen at one of their shops, they've hired an additional machinist, they've added supervisory trainees, and they've improved their training program, and that's why their defect ratio has gone down.
Mr. OBERSTAR. What was the response of the company when you addressed these issues with them?
Mr. FINE. It varies by railroad, quite frankly. Some of them, as I said, don't believe there's a problem until we prove it with factual information, and that's the real value of doing this system-wide rather than coming at them with individual, site-specific inspections. They definitely don't believe us. They tell us that those are isolated cases.
When we present them with the data and then go out with them and rail labor—it's very important that it be done together—then they can see the problem and they address it.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Is generally the—in cases where you've got the goods on them, where you've got the facts and confront them, is there then a willingness to comply?
Mr. FINE. Well, you had used the statement that you don't go away, Mr. Chairman. We don't, either. We monitor them very closely, and if they don't abide by their action plan we take appropriate action. That can vary in terms of violations filed or spending a lot of time on their property with inspectors.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. If you have a written report or summary of this information, it would be very, very useful for our committee purposes.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, one thing that perhaps I can do, we have a whole sort of book of results that we've gotten around the country, and maybe your staff would like to review that.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I'd like to review it.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. You, in your testimony, talk about first-line supervisors not getting the message about safety, and that's certainly a concern that I have, based on what I have heard from those on the firing line.
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What does management need? How do you get this message across to management to get to their first-line supervisors that they need to be more safety conscious and more safety compliant?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, we're using sort of what I call the ''pincer'' movement. First of all I met with all the operating chiefs of the railroads and let them know, with examples, what exactly I was talking about, so they got the message directly. Now I'm meeting with CEOs one-on-one, and I met with one last Thursday. He and I will meet again this Friday, and he will present me with a system-wide plan to address this problem.
This problem is different than addressing a fleet problem or a capital investment program, because what we're dealing with here is a culture that's been around for a very, very long time, and it has to do with—in some senses it's a human factor issue, because it's a systemic way of communicating and working together, and it's a—I think there was something in my testimony that said it's sort of—one person sort of summed it up by saying, ''When it gets down to the lower levels of the railroad, it's 'Get the trains out at all cost.'' That's the focus that has to be changed.
We need to reward, and railroad management needs to reward all of their employees as they demonstrate a willingness to report any safety issues, and there needs to be an environment and a culture which sees that as a plus, and I think that we're dealing with really a deep-seated culture problem that is not easily addressed, but I am looking forward to my meeting this Friday and to the plan that will be presented.
I said in my testimony and I will repeat, I think it is incumbent upon the railroads, as they demonstrate their commitment to safety, to invest as much in this problem, with money and with quality assurance, as they have in their capital investment program.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to encourage you to continue to work, and especially at the top.
One of the lessons we learned in the airline safety inquiry and work that the committee has done over many years is that safety starts at the corporate board room. There has to be a corporate culture of safety.
Where we found a corporate culture of neglect we found tragedy. That cannot be tolerated.
That is a responsibility on your shoulders and on everybody in your agency.
Where the NTSB finds problems and bring them to your attention, to the attention of the railroads, it's got to start at the top and work its way down to the bottom. And where those first-line supervisors know that the CEO wants safety to be conducted to the most thorough degree, then it will be done.
I look at these railroad laws and I shake my head. I just can't believe that this stuff is on the books. The charter for the FAA, the act of 1958 that created the Federal Aviation Administration out of the old Civil Aeronautics Administration, in its opening paragraph insisted—I should say ''insists,'' because it's still law—that safety will be maintained at the highest possible level. Not safety at the margin, not only that safety that they can afford, not only safety on the cheap, but safety at the highest possible level. There are no fewer than six references to safety in the FAA Charter Act. And that agency is permeated with the responsibility.
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Maybe if locomotives traveled at 7 miles above the earth's surface where there's no curb to pull over, no siding to find refuge in, there would be a helluva lot better attitude toward safety than there is today.
They need to get that message.
I've talked with maintenance-of-way road workers who, over a period of almost a year now, have been telling me of their concern that they don't have enough time to get on the line to do track maintenance because the railroad business is so good, they're running those trains so heavy and so hot, that on an eight-or 10-hour shift they may have only a half hour or an hour at the most to actually do track work.
Are you aware of that kind of situation? And my NTSB friends will be thinking about this, as well.
Ms. MOLITORIS. We have been focusing with the BMWE on the whole issue of their rights and their safety environment when they are doing the work, but I will follow up on that, Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Chairman Hall?
Mr. HALL. Mr. Lauby?
Mr. LAUBY. We have certainly seen an increase in rail traffic, and this does cut down the time of maintenance. But probably more of a concern for the Safety Board, and something that's based in a couple of accidents that we've done, is that the people responsible for track inspections, the people who are doing the work, do not have so much territory that they cannot properly inspect the territory that's assigned to them. And this has been an issue in some of our past accidents.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. I will wind down here because it isn't quite fair that there isn't another viewpoint, if there is another viewpoint on the safety issue. I can't imagine that there is another viewpoint.
Mr. Lauby, you've looked at the work of inspectors and maintenance personnel in the rail industry. Are you concerned about people, workers in one craft being asked to do inspections and work in another craft for which they are not properly trained? Second, is that circumstance a significant cause of accidents?
Mr. LAUBY. It's difficult to say if that's a significant cause of accidents, based on the accidents that we've been looking at right now.
As far as the NTSB is concerned, which craft is doing it does not really matter to us. What really matters is that the people doing the inspection and doing the maintenance are fully qualified to do that work, and have been fully trained so that they can be successful at that work.
But do we have an accident history on it? We don't specifically have an accident history where we've had one craft doing another craft's job that's caused an accident. No.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank you. And I hope that the result of these hearings is going to be a heightened attitude and concern about safety on the part of all those involved in this sector: the rail management at the very top; labor always is concerned—they're the ones who stimulated these hearings; the Federal Railroad Administration.
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I think you've got the message we want you to be more aggressive, assertive, stand up to these folks who are dragging their feet who think it's cheaper to pay lawyers to fight rules than to comply, and keep on them.
Thank you very much for participating with us today.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. OBERSTAR. These hearings will continue, as our Chair has indicated, and we'll consider these hearings only to be the beginning of a very long walk together.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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