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PLEASE NOTE: The following transcript is a portion of the official hearing record of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Additional material pertinent to this transcript may be found on the web site of the Committee at [http://www.house.gov/transportation]. Complete hearing records are available for review at the Committee offices and also may be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office.






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JUNE 4, 1998

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure


BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
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HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
JAY KIM, California
STEPHEN HORN, California
BOB FRANKS, New Jersey
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
SUE W. KELLY, New York
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
FRANK RIGGS, California
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
JACK METCALF, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
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JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota
CHARLES W. ''CHIP'' PICKERING, Jr., Mississippi
JON D. FOX, Pennsylvania
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
PAT DANNER, Missouri
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JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
BOB FILNER, California
FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
JAY W. JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development

JAY KIM, California, Chairman
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JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana, Vice Chairman
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
  (Ex Officio)

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
  (Ex Officio)





    Corley, Dr. W. Gene, representing American Society of Civil Engineers

    McGoff, Tom, President, Local 2264, and Regional Vice President of Council 236, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO
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    Massa, Dr. Ronald J., President, Lorron Corporation

    Peck, Robert A., Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General Services Administration, accompanied by Clarence Edwards, Assistant Commissioner for the Federal Protective Service

    Ungar, Bernard L., Director, Government Business Operations Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office

    Waszily, Eugene, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. General Services Administration, accompanied by Joseph Mastropietro, Regional Inspector General, New York Audit Office

    Wood, Kenneth, President, Barringer Instruments, Inc


    Corley, Dr. W. Gene

    McGoff, Tom

    Massa, Dr. Ronald J

    Peck, Robert A
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    Ungar, Bernard L

    Waszily, Eugene

    Wood, Kenneth

Corley, Dr. W. Gene, representing The American Society of Civil Engineers, report, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving Building Performance Through Multi-Hazard Mitigation, Federal Emergency Management Agency Mitigation Directorate, August 30, 1996

McGoff, Tom, President, Local 2264, and Regional Vice President of Council, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO:

Responses to questions from Rep. Kim concerning security guard issues

1998 Contract Guard Hourly Rates for GSA Region 1, chart

Massa, Dr. Ronald J., President, Lorron Corporation:

A Facility Glass Plan

Glass Hazard in Urban Bomb Attacks, white paper

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    Ungar, Bernard L., Director, Government Business Operations Issues, General Government Division, responses to additional questions

U.S. General Services Administration:

Responses to questions from Rep. Kim

Responses to questions from Rep. Traficant





U.S. House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development,

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

Washington, DC.
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    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in Room 2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jay Kim (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    Mr. KIM. The subcommittee will come to order now.

    Good morning. I wish to welcome all of the Members this morning and also the ladies and gentlemen who will be testifying today.

    Today we are meeting to receive testimony on Federal building security and efforts undertaken by the General Services Administration to enhance a security system in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995.

    We will hear from the Commissioner of the Public Building Service of GSA, along with the GSA deputy inspector general and a representative from the General Accounting Office.

    In addition, we will hear from several witnesses representing various private sector interests, including manufacturers of building security-related products, the American Society of Civil Engineers and the American Federation of Government Employees. I have been a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers for a long time. I would like to especially welcome them.

    I now wish to thank all of the witnesses for their appearances this morning. I wish to make some observations, however. The loss of life and property in the Murrah Building was an unprecedented event in American history. Never before had there been such a deliberate act of domestic terrorism. GSA displayed complete professionalism and responsiveness in finding alternative space for the agencies which were housed in the Murrah Building. Cleaning crews worked from Wednesday evening to make the neighboring courthouse functional. You ought to be commended for the extraordinary effort following the bombing.
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    Since then, GSA has taken the lead in national security for Federal buildings. GSA responded quickly to meet the results of the vulnerability assessment. However, the results are troubling. According to GAO, $353 million was obligated to upgrade the security in Federal buildings, but GAO cannot specify the exact status or cost of the building security upgrade program. GSA claimed it has spent $397 million for an upgrade, but budget documents show that GSA has spent approximately $750 million on security measures. We have to reconcile these figures today, hopefully.

    We do not know if Federal employees are safer today than they were 3 years ago. More importantly, we do not know if GSA is up to the task of effectively managing a nationwide building security system. I hope today's hearing will shed light on this important issue.

    Now I would like to call on our distinguished Ranking Member Mr. Traficant for his opening comments.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome everybody here, specifically Mr. Waszily, the deputy inspector general at the General Services Administration. I hope I am pronouncing that name right. Mr. Bernie Ungar from the General Accounting Office, in my district his family is well loved, and he has done a great job at GAO. And I have great confidence in GAO, I want you to know that, and more so now that you are there, Bernie. And Mr. McGoff, who is with the Federal Protection Service.

    The testimony supplied by Mr. Ungar and Mr. Waszily paints a pretty much disorganized picture of the Public Building Service. It has a great responsibility in dealing with security issues, specifically since it has become highlighted in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.
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    It concerns me, and it is upsetting for a couple of main reasons. For the past two Congresses, many on the subcommittee have—and I must say this—I think in the past there has been a lot of activity where this subcommittee had the rubber stamp. It is my analysis and assessment of this subcommittee for many years of just approving buildings that were submitted by political figures for a number of reasons, some with greater support and some with lesser, and there is a process there that goes on, and we ought to understand it.

    When I became involved in the subcommittee, I felt there is a lot of money going through this committee, and perhaps it wasn't the type of oversight that was needed, and I felt there were significant security issues that needed to be addressed. As a matter of fact, as the Chairman, one of the last bills I was going to submit, along with my staff of Paul Marcone and Susan Brita, was a program that dealt with increased incentivized types of security we felt was needed, and this was before the Oklahoma City bombing.

    So I think we have heard over these years many reorganization plans. We are given assurances there would be better management for less money. We were assured there would be a flatter organization, we would be better serviced at lower costs. And now, quite frankly, we are faced with the fact that not one, but two very serious reports, one from General Services Administration's own inspector general and the other from the General Accounting Office, both declare that mismanagement is at the heart of a bungled program that limits the provision of better security at Federal buildings.

    We don't know what the cost of that was, how that mismanagement and the lack of reporting accuracy prevents both the GAO and inspector general from determining how effective the spending was, but I think we are trying to find out where and how this money was used and what that mismanagement application actually means.
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    We asked the General Services Administration, relative to this reorganization, to give us more details. Much of the focus was in the Nation's capital, where there are a tremendous amount of activities, and Ms. Norton has been a staunch advocate of ensuring that these things have been done according with the overall plan.

    Now we understand in a recent monthly meeting with the General Services Administration staff, the subcommittee staff was given assurances further reorganization would be put on hold pending an outcome of specifically the General Accounting Office study. We have in our possession, and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that it be inserted into the record, a letter dated June 1, 1998, delivered on June 1, which states the GSA would begin implementing yet another reorganization plan on June 1, 1998.

    Mr. KIM. Without objection.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. In light of a congressional request and a pending GAO report, I find this action hasty and rash, especially with a subcommittee which has consistently been supportive of GSA and enthusiastic about its programs.

    Second, GSA's mismanagement of the security program has affected the Federal Building Fund. And as everybody knows, it would be close to the shortfall of a half billion dollars in that fund, and a large portion of that amount is now evidently attached to funds spent on security enhancement since the debacle and the tragedy of Oklahoma City.

    Both of these reports reflect a belief that GSA, and I quote, does not know the extent to which upgrades have improved security or reduced Federal office building vulnerability to the acts of terrorism or other forms of violence, and that is cited on page 16 of the GAO report.
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    Further, as a result of the shortfall, the core construction program is absolutely stalled. Other Federal projects are now backed up. Construction delay is a consequence of funds diverted to be used in other areas that are now reported to be the subject of wide mismanagement. This situation needs an adequate explanation.

    Finally, I would like to say a word or two about the Federal Protective Service that I have tried to personally involve myself with and influence the total transportation committee to take a look at some of the shortcomings there. Since the Oklahoma City bombing, I have been concerned that the Federal Protective Service does not have either the manpower or the structure to adequately meet the threats that are discussed in both the IG and, specifically, the GAO report. These findings of these two reports have reinforced, in my mind at least, the urgent need to reform and upgrade the Federal Protective Services. I am currently working on legislation that would do that, and I intend to offer this bill in the next several weeks, and I expect that it will be met with scrutiny, but understanding its need.

    I understand that the Public Building Service has a rough job on their hands, and I believe that there have been citations of mismanagement, but I believe, also, there has been an address to this matter at the highest levels of PBS, and I believe today you will have an opportunity to explain to those both your reaction to the reports, and, second of all, the types of initiatives you believe, along with the Congress, can help to resolve some of these issues.

    With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the committee hearing. I think it is very important the scope and dynamics of this particular meeting, and I think they will have benefits for the American people.
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    Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Traficant

    At this time I would like to welcome Mr. Bernard Ungar of GAO and Mr. Eugene Waszily, assistant inspector general for audits.

    You can go ahead and proceed, Mr. Ungar.


    Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Traficant, we are pleased to be here today to participate in this hearing and to summarize the work that we did on GSA's security upgrade program at the request of the subcommittee.

    To basically summarize what we did, we visited a number of buildings that were under GSA's control to physically observe what was done and sort of the status of implementation operation of the program. We reviewed building records that GSA maintained relative to security of the buildings. We talked to a number of people from various Federal agencies who are being protected with the security measures, reviewed various program and financial data that GSA has maintained. We have interviewed a number of GSA people as well as Office of Management and Budget personnel in connection with the funding sources for the program, and we worked very closely with the GSA's Office of Inspector General and collaborated with them and shared information with them during the course of our work.
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    The subcommittee asked us to answer three questions. First, what criteria did GSA use to assess the risks and prioritize the upgrades? We are certainly pleased to report that generally GSA did use the Department of Justice criteria that was established in 1995 at the request of the President. Basically, the Department of Justice identified a number of standards that were applicable to Federal buildings, in terms of perimeter and entry and access, and suggested that GSA set up building security committees and that these committees, in collaboration with GSA's experts, assess the security of the various Federal buildings relative to the standards, and by and large that was done.

    There were some situations in which the timeframes that were set up in the Department of Justice report that weren't met, but by and large GSA certainly tried to adhere to the standards and criteria and to the timetable.

    The second question a little more problematic: What is the implementation and operational status of the upgrade program, and how much money was spent? We had great difficulty in pinpointing exactly what the status of the program is. It was clear to us, as I think it was to the IG, that there were certainly more security measures in place today than there were a few years ago when the program started, and it certainly would appear as though Federal employees and people who visit Federal buildings are safer than they were before. We are certainly happy to report that.

    On the other hand, it was unclear exactly what the status of the program is in terms of how much was done and how much it cost, because there are a number of flaws and errors in the data systems, both a tracking system that GSA had established to monitor the upgrade implementation situation and their accounting information related to the program.
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    There were a number of situations in which GSA's tracking system showed a security upgrade measure, such as installation of X-ray and magnetometer equipment was installed in operating and in fact it was not installed in operating.

    There are a number of situations in which the funding was erroneous, in terms of matching up dollars with security upgrades and vice versa.

    There were also a number of buildings, we don't know exactly how many, where there was no security assessment done as was required. We did some testing and found several cases where there was no indication in GSA's files that a security assessment of a building was made, and on a limited basis we contacted some of those individual buildings and found indeed none was done, no security assessment was done. We are not exactly sure why that happened, but it certainly did happen in at least some cases.

    As was mentioned, we did estimate roughly $315 million has been obligated for the program. However, again, because of a number of errors in the accounting system, we really aren't confident that is the exact amount of money that has been spent.

    The third question that the subcommittee asked us to address was what problems, if any, hindered program implementation, and certainly there were a number of problems. We identified some of them; the inspector general identified some similar ones, plus some others.

    First, funding source uncertainties hampered the program or at least confronted the program, anyway, from the beginning. There was no designated source of funds for this kind of massive effort. Some of the more costly security upgrades, such as acquisition of adjacent parking, were put on hold because of the funding dilemma as well as some other issues. However, most of the approved upgrades seem to have been funded at this time, at least up through 1997.
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    Secondly, a number of mistakes were made, and I think PBS acknowledges this, as a result of a very, very ambitious timetable that was set by themselves for this program and by the limited staffing that was available as a result of the downsizing GSA has undergone. This was certainly a very huge undertaking to go through thousands of buildings and see they were assessed properly and to get equipment ordered, installed, and operating.

    GSA had set a number of goals, all of which were quite ambitious. They were not able to meet those goals, and, in fact, I think some of the pressure that was exerted on their field people was probably part of the problem with some of the data problems that came up, and, you know, some of the snafus that occurred in getting equipment in and operating.

    Another problem was the difficulty in estimating the cost of some of these upgrades accurately. A lot of the upgrades were estimated, but the cost of those were underestimated substantially. Some were overestimated, but the underestimates became a problem from a couple of standpoints. Number one, of course, they had to get more money than they thought they would need. And, secondly, at least in our minds, it raises of a question of if people had known from the beginning that the upgrades would have cost as much as they did, would they have gone with those upgrades, or would they have tried to find an alternative that might have been equally satisfactory but perhaps less costly?

    And, finally, from our perspective, information has been lacking on the cost and benefits of the program, the degree to which security really is enhanced overall as a result of the upgrade program, what effect do these erroneous reports in terms of upgrade status have. And what we mean by that is a number of the upgrades were reported as complete, meaning they were supposedly installed and operational; in fact, they weren't. Is that a problem? Does that mean security was inadequate; or that may not be a problem from the context of perhaps some alternative measures were instituted, but you can't really tell that from the data system at this point.
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    We have made a number of recommendations to GSA. We recognize that they had begun to take corrective actions, you know, a while ago, when the inspector general started to report. They are certainly making progress, from what we understand. However, we still felt they weren't done, and we needed to make a number of recommendations. Basically, we have talked these over with the PBS officials and Federal Protective Service officials, and they seem to be generally in agreement with us.

    Basically, we think it boils down to two principal areas. One is the need to secure a designated funding source for the security program. GSA has been in negotiation with OMB to do that. As far as we know, a complete agreement has not been reached yet. We have talked to both GSA and OMB, and it appears as though progress is being made, but we would still like to see a firm agreement for the 2000 budget cycle.

    Secondly, our recommendations are aimed at determining what exactly is the adequacy of security today with respect to the 6- or 7- or 8,000 Federal buildings which are office buildings. As we mentioned, it is not really clear to us from the data systems that GSA has, are the buildings considered to be adequate? Are some buildings not adequate in terms of security? Do some buildings perhaps have a little more security than they might need, given the situation that has occurred? So, again, we would point out the need to emphasize getting a secured funding source and making a real good determination as to where the program is. With that, I would like to conclude my summary.

    Mr. KIM. Mr. Waszily.

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    Mr. WASZILY. Good morning. Thank you for inviting us to testify this morning.

    As you will note in our testimony, our dollar figures with Mr. Ungar's differ somewhat, ours stating a program of $240 million. This was an amount that was specifically authorized by the Congress to upgrade the security equipment and security services at various Federal buildings. We readily acknowledge that the total amount spent on security activities was substantially higher than that. At the time, though, our review focused on these because this is the equipment that was tracked through the GSA system.

    With me this morning is Mr. Joseph Mastropietro, our regional inspector general for New York, and he was the overall project director.

    We became aware of some problems with the security implementation system early in the spring of 1996. We had started our review here in the National Capital Region, given that it is the largest concentration of Federal buildings and Federal employees. Our initial work led us to a warehouse at the Washington Navy Yard in which we found about $2 million worth of equipment being stored. Much of the equipment had been shipped to GSA much earlier. It was still sitting in its packing wrappings.

    We had taken the inventory at the warehouse and we tried to match it to some of the records regarding the security implementations here in Washington. What we noted was that a lot of the projects here in Washington that were reported in the tracking system as being completed, the equipment was actually still sitting in the warehouse.

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    From this point we decided to take a broader physical inspection of security implementations throughout the Washington, D.C., area. We visited 52 buildings here in Washington, mostly of what were considered as the higher level security buildings. And of the 52, 32 of the buildings where they had reported that the security upgrades had been completed, we found that the equipment was either present but not operational, it was physically missing, or in some instances the items were stored back at the warehouse. We brought this situation immediately to the senior officials at PBS, and they did respond very aggressively, very promptly to start correcting the situation.

    At the same time, we took our audit team and expanded our review to cover three other regions. During that part of the review, we took a look at an additional 69 buildings and matched them to the status reports in the security tracking system. We identified there again that 33 of the 69 buildings had inaccurate information about the status of the security implementations. In addition, we had identified in one region that they had taken money that had been specifically allocated, or in GSA we use the term fenced in, for security upgrades and had expended the money on a construction renovation project. Again, as soon as our information was put together, we alerted PBS to the situation, and they have been taking corrective actions.

    We are still in the process of completing our final analysis, and later, probably within a month or so, will be issuing an overall report. But in looking at the situation, the question becomes, you know, what were the underlying problems that caused the shortcomings to the program? Basically, we captured them in three major areas. There was inadequate planning, there was inadequate program supervision and monitoring, and the communications between the different levels of GSA had deficiencies.

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    Just to give some brief examples of the issues that we are talking about, in many instances the Federal Protective Service had acquired security systems prior to assessing the feasibility of actually installing that equipment in particular locations. In a lot of instances, GSA particularly, about half of our space is in leased facilities and in commercial space, and while GSA in general did talk with the building tenants, they didn't talk with the landlords about their plans to implement security. In many cases, when they attempted to bring the equipment into the buildings, the landlords refused to allow them to install X-ray machines or metal detectors in the lobbies of the commercial buildings.

    Another concern that we had was that there really wasn't a system of checks and balances within the process to make sure that information that was being reported was accurate. We had seen evidence throughout the review and throughout the stages of the implementation of the program that there was a tremendous amount of communication at the varying levels of the Public Building Service and the Federal Protective Service, both here and in the field offices. However, the communication in many instances seemed to get diverted or misrouted because in many instances, when we started talking with the actual physical security specialists in the field who were responsible for the actual implementation on the individual projects, many of them had indicated that a lot of critical program information had not gotten down to them, particularly information about when to enter into the system that a project was complete.

    As I noted, we are about to prepare our final report, and we, too, will be focusing on a description of the program's implementation to date. We will be making some recommendations for improvements, and we share GAO's concern about whether or not financial resources will be available to sustain the program in the future and also to address additional security requirements as they come up.
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    In summary, I would like to say, our general assessment is the security upgrade program suffered from some serious deficiencies. The overall control and reporting processes were unreliable. But I would reiterate when Mr. Ungar said that despite these problems, that overall the level of security for Federal buildings is significantly improved from what it had been prior to 1995.

    That concludes my opening remarks.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you.

     Would you mind remaining seated because we would like to invite Mr. Peck. And after we finish Mr. Peck's testimony, then we will ask all of you some questions from the panel.

    Mr. Peck, as you know, is the Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service at the General Services Administration.

    Mr. Peck, go ahead and proceed.

    Mr. PECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting us to appear before you to talk about our security program.

    I have a statement which I would ask that you place in the record, and I will summarize it.
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    I would also like to note that with me today, directly behind me, is Mr. Clarence Edwards. He is our Assistant Commissioner for the Federal Protective Service. Mr. Edwards is a veteran of 30 years in law enforcement. He was a major in the U.S. Park Police, has been head of the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Police, and the chief of police in Montgomery County, Maryland. He joined us 1 year ago and has been a significant addition to our management structure in the Federal Protective Service.

    We in the Public Buildings Service have no more important duty than to ensure the physical safety and peace of mind of the Federal employees who work in and the members of the public who visit the space that we own or lease on behalf of the Federal Government, and that is a lot of space and a lot of people, 1 million employees and uncounted millions of visitors, children in day care centers and their providers, and people who just walk by our buildings. We have more than 1,800 government-owned buildings, as you know, and 6,200 leased locations.

    Within days after a terrorist bomb destroyed the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, taking 168 lives, on April 19, 3 years ago, we have done the following: Supervised the placement of nearly 8,000 security countermeasures, nearly doubled the size of our uniformed Federal Protective Service, more than doubled the number of contract guards in Federal work locations, enhanced intelligence sharing with other Federal law enforcement agencies, revised our policies to provide more protected sites for many new buildings and to discourage colocating low-risk agencies with higher-risk agencies, and redirected training and duties of our security force. We have also issued revised design criteria for new and renovated Federal buildings.

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    The Building Security Committee countermeasures have not been cheap. They have come at a capital cost of $148 million, and with additional operating costs totalling $249 million, for a cost of $397 million since 1995. Virtually all of this cost has been funded through the Federal Buildings Fund, which, as you know, is funded by revenues from Federal agencies who operate in the space we provide.

    And I want to note in response to the question about whether there will be a secure funding source, and as I believe Mr. Ungar noted, we have been in discussions with OMB. In fiscal year 1999, our pricing system will include additional charges to Federal agencies for security, and in fiscal year 2000, we are phasing this in, if our proposal is accepted almost all of our security charges will be charged to Federal agencies.

    I have noted something important to you. We are discovering, as we identify to our tenant agencies the costs of the countermeasures that they have asked us to provide, that they become less interested in many of the countermeasures which they themselves recommended in the first place. And I am anticipating having a struggle with my brother and sister Federal agencies to get them to pay for the security we and they find essential. I just note that that is an issue coming down the road.

    Additionally, our task is complicated by the fact the vast majority of our facilities exist to provide services to the American public. Our buildings must be open and readily accessible to Americans and to foreigners, too, who come with legitimate business to conduct in our buildings.

    We pay a price in this country for maintaining our buildings and for maintaining a democracy, but we are the Public Buildings Service, not the Fortified Buildings Service, and we will remain so.
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    A number of comments have been made about measuring results. People in the Public Buildings Service will tell you I am driving them crazy talking about performance measures and demanding we have measures to measure outcomes in the Service. Security is no exception, but it is a struggle to develop meaningful performance measures in the security business.

    I will say this: With respect to terrorism, I believe the performance measure is a digital one. It is a zero or a one. Since Oklahoma City, thank God, we have had no major terrorist incidents in our buildings, no loss of life because of terrorism. The day that we do, we will have an unacceptable problem, and that is the time at which I would say that the program has failed to do what it should do. Deterrence is the key thing in terrorism.

    I can report to you, however, the criminal activity in our buildings has declined since 1995. In the year 1997, crimes against persons decreased by 6 percent and against property in our facilities by 3 percent.

    Since we have installed the countermeasures, we have had a 31 percent increase in the number of weapons violations we have caught. Again, this shows you the problem of performance measures. It is impossible to know what we don't catch. It is impossible to know what we didn't catch because we didn't have some security measures in place before 1995.

    One other important measure. We survey our buildings every year to get a tenant satisfaction rating under procedures organized by the International Facility Management Association. Our figures from our tenants on their perception of security in the buildings has risen significantly over the past 3 years, and it is at a high level.
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    As you know, on June 28, 1995, in response to Oklahoma City, the Department of Justice issued a report entitled Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities. Following that, we categorized GSA-controlled facilities into four security levels. We established more than 6,500 Building Security Committees, which came up with some 13,000 recommendations for countermeasures. We have analyzed those recommendations. We agreed on 8,000 security upgrades. They included hiring more contract security guards, limiting access to entry points, restricting parking, installing closed circuit television cameras and monitors, installing X-ray machines and magnetometers, and instituting closer scrutiny of employee and visitor identification. As the other witnesses have already noted, it was an enormous task under a considerable time pressure, and in an atmosphere of an emergency.

    I will note that while we agree that there have been some problems in accounting for all the measures, let me tell you one problem that there should not have been. In August 1996, I issued a memorandum to all of our regions, saying here is how we would count the completion of a countermeasure. I said a countermeasure would be counted completed when the equipment was plugged in, operating on site, and fully working. If it required a person monitor it, that person had to be in place. If it was a security guard, the security guard had to be hired and on board.

    Let me say this: There could be no confusion by anyone who can read the English language about what our standard was for completing a countermeasure. There is, of course, always the question of whether that information was taken down the line, and we are checking to make sure that it was.

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    I can also tell you that in the 2 1/2 years that I have been the Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service, there has not been a meeting of our senior managers, there has hardly been a biweekly telephone conference call with our regions in which we have not talked about tracking countermeasures. We have reiterated the completion standard I just cited any number of times in our phone calls and in our meetings.

    As I noted, we have increased, based on recommendations given to us by Booz, Allen, Hamilton following the Oklahoma City bombing, the size of our uniformed force from 376 to 672, toward an objective of 724. These are officers who have been hired and trained and placed on the job.

    The Public Buildings Service directs over 5,000 privately contracted security guards. That number, I am telling you, is the number of full-time equivalent security guards, compared to a similar number of 2,300 in 1995.

    As I noted to date, funding for upgrades has come from the Federal Buildings Fund. That means that to some extent, we have deferred some other expenditures to make room for the security program, and that is a responsibility which we have willingly undertaken.

    Of the 8,000 security upgrades, we have completed over 90 percent. In many cases, the countermeasures that remain are more difficult. They either require building redesigns, renovations with a longer lead time, or, as has already been noted, continued and in some cases protracted negotiations with landlords who have not in all cases been cooperative with our requests that we put security countermeasures in place.

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    I will just note, again, when I was told in December 1997 that there might be some question about whether countermeasures that were reported as completed in the National Capital Region were, in fact, accurately reported. The very same day I met with the Assistant Regional Administrator for Public Buildings and the Regional Administrator. We agreed immediately on a course of action, which involved taking a physical look by some people outside the Federal Protective Service, as well as some of those inside, to make sure the countermeasures were in place. Within a week or two, I asked the Inspector General of GSA to undertake a similar audit in all of our regions, and they did so for three regions. We have asked our regions to conduct a 100 percent review of the countermeasures, which is now 75 percent complete. Our goal remains to complete implementation of all the countermeasures by the end of this fiscal year, and we are checking carefully to make sure that we meet that goal.

    I will also note that we did have a large job. You know, when I was in the military, I noted that when we had—I was in charge of supply and administration sections in my unit several times, and I will tell you this. In peacetime, the Army auditors can drive you crazy checking the paperwork. When your unit gets notified it is going to deploy, a different standard applies, and I will say this; that for some period after the Oklahoma City bombing and when I took this job later that year, I said that the key thing was to get those countermeasures in place. And so if there is some question about whether we put the most painstakingly meticulous auditing system in place at the very beginning, the answer is we did that second. We did that after we were sure we were going to get the security into the buildings that was necessary.

    On October 19, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12977, which established the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) chaired by the Administrator of General Services. The ISC has a construction standards working group whish developed security design criteria for new construction and modernization projects. We have changed the design of some buildings underway and have also changed our design criteria so on a building-by-building basis, as we design and renovate new buildings, we will make sure they incorporate these new design standards.
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    We believe that employing the security design criteria in the case of courthouse construction has added approximately 3 to 4 percent of the cost of constructing those buildings, and we identify that cost when we come forward with our budgets for those facilities at that point.

    Let me try to break out the difference between the capital cost which we have incurred in this program to date and the additional operating cost which they will cause us to incur as we go forward.

    Additional costs. In fiscal year 1999, our operating cost will be increased by approximately $120 million because of the additional countermeasures. In other words, that is the marginal increase over what we would have run prior to the 1995 countermeasure upgrade program.

    I will note, too, one other thing about our Federal Protective Service—a couple of issues, actually. One, as I noted, we are increasing the size of the uniformed force. In January 1996, we also revised the position description of our Federal Protective Service officers to reclassify their position and upgrade them from an entry level of GS–6, grade 6 in the Civil Service system, to grade 8. The Office of Personnel Management has rejected our justification for those upgrades, and in July 1997 prohibited us from further hiring and promoting of officers to the GS–8 GSA journeyman level.

    I would like to thank you, Congressman Traficant, for your letter to the Office of Personnel Management about the issue. We obviously have a serious disagreement with them about the level at which Federal Protective Service officers ought to be hired. And in a moment I am going to tell you one other thing we are going to do to deal with that issue.
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    In April of this year, just a little over a month ago, we held a 3-day charrette, an intensive planning process, to consider how we might better perform the functions of the Federal Protective Service. We included GSA managers, our union representatives and representatives of the Departments of Justice, Interior, the Social Security Administration and the American Society for Industrial Security.

    At that charrette there was developed a number of recommendations for improving our responsiveness to tenant agencies; for strengthening our investigative, criminal intelligence, and physical security training; and for increasing the integration of security functions with building design location and operations activities.

    Under Clarence Edwards' leadership we have upgraded training for Federal Protective Service officers, adding a 2-week course tailored to their mission at the end of the 8-week basic training that all officers take at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. We are expanding training requirements for our physical security specialists, who, in my opinion, have not gotten sufficient training in the past, and we are giving intelligence analysis training to our criminal investigators, who are going to take on the function of becoming our chief intelligence analysts. That is not an easy task and requires specialized training. We have armed all our officers with a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun in place of the revolvers they had before.

    We are reviewing the jurisdiction of our officers. We are concerned that the jurisdiction that our officers currently have in law and under interpretations of that law is restricted to Federal property for our uniformed officers, except when they are in hot pursuit. We believe that some area surrounding our facilities is a necessary jurisdictional area, and we are looking at ways to do that. And, again, Mr. Traficant, we have provided some comments on the legislation you have, which also addresses this issue. I think we still have some way to go to get the right formula that makes it clear what our jurisdiction is.
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    One thing I will note, we do oppose the proposition of divorcing the Federal Protective Service from the Public Buildings Service. All of the studies we have done, our security charrette indicates that security needs to be more tightly integrated into the location, design and operation of Federal buildings. Our security is financed out of revenues collected by the Public Buildings Service. For reasons both of fiscal accountability and for operational integrity, we believe we need the Federal Protective Service and PBS tightly interwoven.

    Finally, I will note, the focus of our security program is to protect people while in our buildings. It is a challenging task. It has cost us a lot of money. There is nothing more important to us on an everyday basis. We are trying to improve our response.

    I am pleased to note the previous witnesses did note we have improved security in our buildings. To some extent, as I noted, this is a subjective measure but we do know people feel better, and we believe, just as importantly, we are doing this in a way the American people can still feel the public buildings are theirs.

    That concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you.

    Would you gentlemen remain seated. We have some questions from the panel.

    Any questions from the Members?

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    Mr. Traficant is recognized.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. I have a number of questions. I just want to start out by saying that I believe the Federal Protective Services should have its own structure, be independent, and should be reporting to the General Service Administrator with the close coordinated efforts, so that is one area I disagree with you.

    I am glad to see some of the reports come from both of these, Bob, that there have been improvements.

    The question I have is even though there may have been improvements, it is like a team that may be O and 16, and they go 2 and 14, and could they be contending?

    Mr. PECK. I would say we are 11 and 5.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. But I think, knowing you and your staff, I think you have addressed yourself—and I don't want any part of my questions to be misconstrued as being—as questioning your motives or integrity with which you address this issue, because I think it is very difficult.

    A couple questions I have, I would like to start with you, Bob.

    Number one, do you yourself have a law enforcement background?

    Mr. PECK. No, sir, unless you count the fact my father was a military police officer for 20-some years.
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    Mr. TRAFICANT. Are the decisions on where and how to deploy our Federal Protective Service officers made on budgetary or security considerations? Just briefly.

    Mr. PECK. Security.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Do contract guards undergo the same security background checks as a Federal Protective Service full-time employee?

    Mr. PECK. It is not the same level of check, but there is a security check.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. What are those, just basically? Briefly, if you could, what are the background checks that are undergone by these contract workers?

    Mr. PECK. It is the basic NCIC record check and a fingerprint check through the FBI.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Would you agree—

    Mr. PECK. Let me be clear. What it is not is the kind of background investigation you do when you hire a Federal law officer.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. That is one of the things we are attempting to do with legislation is ensure that everybody be treated the same. Some who believe in the Lombardi theory believe even if people are treated like dogs, everybody should be treated like dogs, you know.
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    Would you agree morale plays a significant role in the efficiency and proficiency of any work force, and maybe more importantly in the structured business of law enforcement activity; do you agree with that?

    Mr. PECK. I would say discipline and morale, yes, sir.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Would you agree that fair compensation would be a significant factor relative to the promulgation of morale issues?

    Mr. PECK. Absolutely.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Then why, in your opinion, is the Uniform Division of Secret Service compensated at a higher level than our Federal Protective Service; are we any less important?

    Mr. PECK. The short answer is it baffles me.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. That must be addressed, Bob, and we will not be satisfied until the Federal Protective Service is compensated commensurate with other people putting their lives on the line, because they certainly do.

    Secondly, I don't know if you have this, but I want to dramatize a point, because I heard about a collection of intelligence, and with all the computer and analytical data we have available to us, terrorism is an unusual beast that rears its head in funny ways because people involved in terrorist activities want to make statements, and in making these statements, sometimes they make these statements around significant events that can dramatize their whole involvement. And although they don't want to be caught, they want to get some credit for having performed this serious act.
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    As a result of analysis done by GSA and PBS following the bombing in Oklahoma City, were there any structural defects or architectural problems discovered with the building, problems that existed prior to that bombing?

    Mr. PECK. In the Murrah Building?

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Yes.

    Mr. PECK. Yes, sir. The building was subject to what is known in the trade as progressive collapse, because of the way the structure was put together.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Real briefly, Bob, was the intent, letter of the law of Congress to build that building, and the amount of money made available to build that building, was there any compromises made in materials and/or possibly security safeguards that were to be imposed that were not?

    Mr. PECK. The way I have to answer that is at the time it was built—it was designed, I believe, in the late 1960s and opened in the early 1970s—it met all of the codes, all of the building codes, whatever, you name it. I don't have any information that would say it was compromised in any way. We just had a different standard back then.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Bob, you weren't there, so don't be offended. Was the glass that was paid for to be put in of significant security safeguards; was that the glass that was put in the building? Would there have been any study to—anybody to investigate that? As an old sheriff, I would like to know that.
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    Mr. PECK. If I understand your question, which is at the time the building was built?

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Yes.

    Mr. PECK. I will have to get you an answer to that. I suspect it was what was for the time ordinary architectural glazing.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Was the Federal Protective Service under your watch at this point—now, you weren't there in Oklahoma City, but under the watch at the time, prior to the time of Oklahoma City, were they aware of the following facts: That on April 19, that happened to be the second anniversary of the Waco fiasco. April 19 was the anniversary of the Revolutionary War battles of Lexington and Concord, and convicted murderer Richard Snell was scheduled to be executed in Arkansas on April 19, 1995, and that this guy Snell had previously threatened to blow up the Murrah Building. Were any of these dates—hindsight is all 20/20 here, but I am just saying, when you talked about intelligence gathering, terrorism is an unusual animal, like we talked about, and this date has some significant dates in history.

    Mr. PECK. Mr. Traficant, I really can't answer as to April 19, 1995. I can tell you, you are right about the dates seeming to have significance in terrorist activity, of course, and I would tell you that since all the Federal law enforcement agencies pay significant attention to anniversary dates of various events, and we do make all of our officers aware of events on certain dates.

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    Mr. TRAFICANT. Do you have a specific security computer program that literally looks at every day and the significance of those days and the potential of those days to be prime attractions for someone who might take an action, to the best of your knowledge?

    Mr. PECK. Let me answer it this way. We are in an area where I have some information which I am not sure I should share with the public, but there is, within the Federal community, someone keeping track of dates and things like that and getting that information out.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. I think the issue on compensation must be effected. I believe the mismanagement cited by these two reports is significant insofar as many of the facade attempts to promote at least a public confidence in additional security was housed in some warehouse and never enacted. I believe that we are contracting out now with some security forces that don't go through the same rigorous background analysis, and I am not quite so sure that even though on an administrative level we want to feel comfortable with ourselves that security measures are priority measures and budgetary matters are secondary matters, but, quite frankly, being around here for the number of years I have been around here, we have a way of fitting these umbrella needs into the dollar needs we have. And the point I am making is I think when it comes to the security of the American people, if we have to, we have to expand the umbrella in that area.

    Second of all, I am not so sure it is in the best interest to have an amalgamated service where the Federal Protective Service is subject to the administrative decisions of other umbrella items, and that is why, even though we disagree on this, I am a very strong advocate of putting the Federal Protective Service out on its own within the agency, report to the GSA at a communication level where it becomes not only a priority, but the boss of its own destiny.
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    So, with that, I would just like to say, one thing, though, from this report that has been overshadowed, and both Mr. Waszily and Mr. Ungar, who is from my area, and I have great regards for him, said they have seen, even though with the shortfalls, an increased improvement in security, and I am glad to see that.

    I have a couple other questions here and issues for both of the gentlemen, the inspector general, his group, and for Mr. Ungar. And the only question I want to make is this: In seeing improvements, do you see the mismanagement that you cited as something that would be seen in any expansion of any government umbrella entity, not just under our jurisdiction, but anywhere else, and something that maybe the Congress itself must address through the large process that we are involved with, and the cumbersome way at times we come to meet goals that Congress passes, with the amount of years it might take to meet them; do you see anything unusual, is this more of an indictment than what you might normally see in trying to retrofit a system to respond to such a terrorist act like we had sensationalized in Oklahoma City? That is the only question I have of you. I have a number to be submitted, and I would ask unanimous consent my written questions be submitted in writing in a timely manner, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. KIM. Without objection.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Would you like to respond to that?

    Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Traficant, I think the observation I would make is this was a little unusual, I think, from a management perspective, considering the enormity of the task that had to be undertaken in the very short timeframe now—there were some timeframes set out in the Department of Justice report that had to do with the assessment of the buildings. I think that was, in at least our assessment, quite ambitious in and of itself to have about a 7- to 8-month period to go out and assess from a security standpoint somewhere around 7- or 8,000 buildings, with about 200 security specialists at GSA and the building security committees in many buildings that weren't trained, and there was little or no time for training or little time to get well-organized to do this. So that was a problem.
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    Secondly, implementation was a whole 'nother ball game, and, again, this was a huge undertaking. I am not aware of an external mandate that was on GSA to get these countermeasures up and running. I think, to the best that we understand, because of information that GSA had, it had a reason to believe that the anniversary of the bombing, the next year, might be a time for some other events to take place, so I think they felt very pressured into getting as much done in that time frame as possible, and they weren't able to do that, and they are still in the process of doing that. But I think the enormity of the task, the dilemma here with the issue, security and lives of people at stake, makes the situation a little different than a typical upgrade program or a typical management program. That would be my sense of it.

    Mr. WASZILY. The program itself certainly was not typical, and from everything we have observed, everyone within the Public Building Service, and particularly the Federal Protective Service, fully appreciated the significance of this program. And despite the problems we had identified, in fairness, we were well aware that there were a lot of people out there working an awful lot of hours to get these systems in place, and that despite the shortcomings, there were several installations, or even where we found the tracking system inaccurately reported things, at least some of the equipment was in place. It wasn't a total failure.

    Regarding whether or not the problems were what we would typically find in a program, I have to say, particularly, again, I have to focus more on the National Capital Region, that statistically our incident of problems was higher than what we would normally find in testing many other programs. Again, in fairness to the Public Building Service, as soon as we brought it to their attention, they did take aggressive efforts to correct it.
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    Mr. TRAFICANT. Two things just real quick here, Mr. Chairman. Number one, I heard both of you say because of the enormity of the problem and the sensational spotlight brought by the bombing out there in Oklahoma City, neither of you have questioned the motives or the attempts to fortify and strengthen security on behalf of the Administrator Bob Peck; is that right?

    Mr. UNGAR. That is right.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. I think we get that impression, too. That is why we are not jumping on Mr. Peck.

    Second of all, if the Federal Protective Service was fully funded, as it should be, do you see perhaps maybe the mismanagement of some of these things relative to security might have been abated? Just yes or no. I don't want a long one on that.

    Mr. WASZILY. I wouldn't speculate.

    Mr. UNGAR. I would say that if the Federal Protective Service had more staff at the time, starting in the mid-1995 and early 1996 and thereabout, to work with the public, you know, the building security committees, and to be more involved in contacting the lessors or the owners of the non-government-owned buildings and making sure that the needs were well known and everything was coordinated, I think the program would have been smoother, personally.

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    Mr. TRAFICANT. One last thing then. You alluded to the fact, Bob, I had written to the OPM regarding their decision to prohibit further hiring, which is certainly a budgetary consideration, and to prohibit the promotion of officers to the GSA level. Since you have expressed as well your support of my initiatives to effect those goals, even if you could just be brief on it now but maybe submit in further detail, tell us how you can assist us and how in turn we can also work with you to effect those goals.

    Mr. PECK. I have one quick suggestion which responds to the comment about the fact we do only have 200 physical security specialists. One way I think we can do this is I believe—and this is something I discussed with Mr. McGoff, and you would have to ask him if he agrees, I think he does—that our uniformed officers should probably be trained more also in the area of physical security so that they can be just sort of our eyes, as they are, out there, being able to identify where there are vulnerabilities in our security system. Putting that in our officers' position description may help us on the grade front as well.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you. Do any other Members wish to be recognized?

    The lady from Washington, D.C.

    Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Peck, may I begin on a very positive note. Apparently Mr. Barram has exercised his legal authority to compel the FCC to move into a building that has been standing empty, ready for occupancy for months, but where the FCC had simply resisted moving in. I raised this because this committee has, at least as long as I have been in the Congress, tried to effect precisely that change, and it is very important that we don't have an instance here of government waiting further at the expense of millions of dollars to the taxpayers. This had become a public embarrassment to the Federal Government and certainly to this committee, and the media had begun to report and take pictures of an empty building on which the government was paying rent, because the agency which asked for the building refused to move into the building. These are the kinds of issues that give government a bad name, and I wish you would indicate to Mr. Barram that it is the kind of action that we applaud and would like to see more of, and remind him of the Southeast Federal Center.
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    Mr. PECK. Thank you. I will tell him.

    Ms. NORTON. The Southeast Federal Center is 55 acres still waiting for a Federal tenant while we pay millions in rent around the city and around the region.

    I think, first, Mr. Peck, we ought to give you the opportunity to explain the Navy Yard matter, and I think you should want the opportunity, and you owe the committee an explanation for why equipment, security equipment, apparently ordered because it was needed in these agencies, was found unused, unaccounted for in the Navy Yard.

    Mr. PECK. Thank you. I would like the opportunity. Here is what I have been told. I rarely say things like that. I usually take more responsibility for my statements, but, again, this is a matter that I think we need to double and triple check.

    As to equipment, as to some equipment that was sitting around shrink-wrapped or whatever and not in place, I am told that the National Capital Region made a decision at some point in the countermeasure program, to respond to a concern, and here is the concern. I can tell you it was at least valid. It was brought up to me 2 years ago. There was some worry that we were asking American industry, basically, to give us all of its productive capacity for security X-ray machines and magnetometers, and we might not be able to get them ordered. I am told that, therefore, the National Capital Region ordered some knowing they were going to need a certain number of magnetometers, or believing they were going to, ordered in advance a supply to have on hand so they could distribute them as needed, instead of ordering them with a specific requirement in mind.
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    I am then told what happened is we wound up with some excess, either because we had a landlord who wouldn't agree to put it in a place—I mean, I am told we didn't order more than the total number we thought we needed, but we ended up with excess because either we had a landlord who wouldn't put it in place, or some change in the security countermeasure came about that didn't necessitate having that machine.

    Ms. NORTON. Is this equipment still usable; is some of it obsolete? I will ask the two gentlemen from GSA and GAO.

    Mr. WASZILY. I believe most of the equipment is still usable. One of the concerns we had when we first visited the warehouse was that it was not a temperature-controlled environment, and this was electronic equipment. It was just pretty much a wide open space subject to heat or cold temperatures.

    Many pieces of equipment have a 12-month operational warranty, yet they had still been in the warehouse as their warranties were expiring.

    Subsequently, after we had visited, we did understand that much of the equipment had been applied to other security activities. Now, in some instances—

    Ms. NORTON. You mean much of the equipment is now moved?

    Mr. WASZILY. It has now been used for installations in other facilities.
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    Mr. PECK. May I just add, we also went to our other regions and said, we apparently have some excess equipment; if anybody needs it, don't order more, we have it sitting someplace.

    Ms. NORTON. And, of course, if there had been somebody minding the store, they would have done that when they saw the beginning of an inventory that was building up. Is there somebody minding the store now so that can't happen again?

    I ask these questions with this in mind: I believe the GSA was faced with an unprecedented challenge. Probably there is no public or private employer that all of a sudden, with the public breathing down its neck, had to essentially redesign its entire approach to security. I am not unsympathetic with that, but we have been through years now. And the question before the committee is whether or not the GSA is up to the task even now.

    I say that not so much as a criticism to the GSA, but to ask this question: Could a government agency, whose mission is essentially not particularly related to security, without tremendous outside help, can such an agency, in fact, perform this task? I guess I should begin with the question of has the GSA received sufficient expert, experienced outside help to rebuild its security apparatus for the entire Federal Government throughout the country? I am asking each and every one of you that.

    Mr. PECK. Let me start. I will start with Clarence Edwards, who came from outside because I felt we needed that kind of experience and management experience, law enforcement experience, to run the system, and without commenting on any of the management before, I will say that is the kind of people we need running the organization.
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    After Oklahoma City, we had Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, who have experienced consulting on law enforcement matters, take a look at the way we deploy our Federal Protective Service officers. We have recently called in as a consultant someone who had worked with the police commissioner in New York, when they have significantly, I think most people agree, upgraded the capabilities of their force. You can always use more. We had the Marshals Service and the FBI helping us all the way along on this.

    Ms. NORTON. I tell you, Mr. Peck, I think part of the problem may lie right there. You recently called in—you say you recently called in—I'm sorry, who was that you recently called in?

    Mr. PECK. A consultant who worked—

    Ms. NORTON. From New York.

    Mr. PECK. He is not from New York.

    Ms. NORTON. In a real sense, the government may have given you an order you couldn't refuse, but it is very difficult to carry out. I never would have left myself on the hot seat, trying somehow to figure it out, essentially with a consultant here or there or inside. I would have found me some world class consultants and begun from scratch and let everybody know, here, this is not your father's GSA, we have just had—

    Mr. PECK. Good line.
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    Ms. NORTON. —we have just had a monumental event, and we are the target of the world, and this is what we are going to do. It sounds to me as though GSA began to work at the margins, shoring up what needed to be fixed. I guess I would like to hear from GAO and from the GSA inspector general on the approach here so that we don't simply regard this hearing as what they should go and fix here, there, and the other places, if we are dealing with another government problem like an audit problem or a management problem. Can I hear your views on is this the right approach?

    Mr. WASZILY. I would like to point out, Ms. Norton, when the program was started, it was started by a research group that was pulled together by the Department of Justice, and they did bring security experts from across government and I believe some outside experts to actually define the basic minimum standards for the different levels of building security that they thought would be appropriate, given the circumstances.

    Ms. NORTON. Mr. Waszily, I am talking about operational, I am speaking operationally. You know, everybody would have brought in a consultant to say, help us classify, reclassify what we have to do. Operationally is the GSA, which is a government agency created basically as a real estate agency, equipped to become a major security agency for the entire Federal Government?

    Mr. WASZILY. I believe, as Mr. Peck had pointed out, and I would side with him, that there is a core level of expertise for security matters within GSA, and the Public Building Service has been adding to that expertise over the last few years. What is the appropriate level or how far or is there another expert out there that would be of great benefit to them, I would assume, possibly, there could be, but I am unaware of any.
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    Mr. UNGAR. Ms. Norton, I have two points. One is that there is an interagency security committee that was set up, which GSA chairs, which has expertise from across government to help, and one of the charges of this committee is it not only sort of reevaluates the standards, but to make sure the standards were being complied with. So that is one potential source of expertise.

    The point that I am concerned about is looking forward, however. GSA, I think, in a positive note, in one sense, has set another ambitious goal, which on the one hand I think it is good to have an ambitious goal, but on the other hand, if it is too ambitious, it can result in some adverse consequences. And this goal is to reinstitute its security inspection program, which it had put in suspension during the upgrade. And what gives me a little bit of concern is they set a target to have all the level four buildings reassessed by the end of this fiscal year. That means having a security specialist go and look at the building, and then having the rest of the buildings reassessed into 1999. I am a little concerned that that may not be enough time, given the number of experts that GSA has.

    Now, we have not looked at that in depth, so I am not in a position to give you a very definitive explanation, but it certainly raises a question in my mind that one of the problems at first was an ambitious time frame, which was being driven by information about some possible threats. I don't know whether this particular goal is being driven by the same situation, but I would suggest GSA perhaps might want to relook at its capacity to do these reassessments effectively. And, secondly, it is my understanding the reassessment is going to be done without—or before GSA has updated its assessment survey to incorporate the threat of terrorism and similar acts, which was a recommendation of the Department of Justice.
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    So I suggest that here is an area where Mr. Peck may want to take another look and reassess the capacity, and perhaps maybe there would be a need for some additional expertise, but, again, we haven't thoroughly looked at that.

    Mr. PECK. I would like to respond in a couple of ways, one specifically today. I agree with Mr. Ungar actually. I think that goal was probably unrealistic, particularly considering now we know there are possibly some buildings that fell through the cracks in the first place. I mean, we need to make sure our first assessment is done.

    Second, he is right that we think we need a better threat assessment instrument. We have talked to the Sandia National Laboratories, which are quite expert in this kind of high security—in very high-security environments, to come up with an instrument to help us do that.

    Let me respond to your question about the structure. It is true that we made a decision, I wouldn't call it working on the margins at all, but we made a decision early on to charge ahead with the recommendations of the Department of Justice report and do what it told us to do first. I happen to agree with you, however, that it is time for us to take a thorough analysis of the Federal Protective Service, the way it is trained, the mission it is given and the way it operates. I mean, you are hearing a lot of piecemeal things. I would like to have an opportunity to report to you, and perhaps in a couple of weeks, on a plan we have to really take a look at the FPS, the way it is run and what it does.

    My response to Mr. Traficant about the officers gives you a hint of what we are looking at. I mean, we are talking about changing the basic jobs we give to a lot of our folks.
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    I will say this: There is, in my opinion, and I am skeptical when I look at these things, enough expertise in the Service, and I have to say this, particularly when you look around the country, it is very impressive. All of us sort of tend to focus on Washington. There is tremendous capability outside of Washington in the Federal Protective Service, too.

    Finally, with respect to whether or not we can do it, I would note—and Mr. Traficant and I do disagree on it seems like only this one issue about where the Service should be lodged. I note, for example, in the Park Service, Park Police are a part of the Park Service. They are a very well-respected organization who work hand in glove with the park rangers and everyone else there. And what is important about that is they really understand the unique mission of the parks, just as our folks have to understand the unique mission of the Public Buildings Service.

    One of the concerns we have is our officers who come out of the basic training course in Glynco have been trained alongside of drug enforcement agents and all kinds of other Federal officers, and we have a very different job. That is why we found it necessary to add some training; that says, here is what physical security is about, what facilities security is about. But as I said, we have just agreed on an outline for changing, in many fundamental ways, what the Federal Protective Service does.

    Ms. NORTON. Mr. Traficant's point about the Federal Protective Service could not have been better placed. My own concern is that—a combination of the Federal Protective Service and how we use equipment. And I want to just preface this question, to close off my last question, I think that in a real sense GSA was caught between a rock and a hard place. If you hadn't moved quickly to do something, this committee would have been on the news and in the newspapers. And yet I do not see evidence that you moved pursuant to goals and objectives to rebuild from scratch, and that is what I believe should be done.
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    The security mission of the GSA, I believe that in a real sense, neither you nor many in this country have sufficient experience to know how to do that. And I believe, and you will see this from my next question, we may be over—that the chances of us over-securing are as great as the chances of under-securing.

    Mr. PECK. May I make one point?

    Ms. NORTON. By all means.

    Mr. PECK. I happen to agree with you. One of the things we have just done, it should have occurred to us earlier, perhaps, I have had some discussions with people from other countries who have more experience with terrorism than we do, to compare what we are doing. We are finding a lot of similarities in what we do. For example, I would say that the British in many of the facilities use a combination of government police and private guards. We have had some discussion about what is the right way to use them and how do you train them and all that, and I think we can learn quite a bit from them, quite honestly, and some others, but I think you are right.

    I am not sure in every instance, and I have said this, it is not necessary in every instance to have bollards around a building and cut it off from the public. There are lots of other things you can do, including, by the way, planting trees, which do the same thing if they are big enough, or redesign a facility. Some of those require more lead time, and I think that is why you saw sort of a marginal approach, an attempt to increase security, given what we had, starting in 1995.
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    Ms. NORTON. See, some model experience, when you have never done something before, is much to be admired. Just let me indicate that in approaching an issue as consequential as this, I would have had all the options there, and I think that you would have been subject to less criticism from within the GSA and from the GAO had, in fact, you said, look, we are going to do what we can now, but our mission is to rebuild the security, and our goals and objectives, which I still don't understand, by the way, are the following.

    I would urge the GSA to, in fact, sit down and think through this as a major mission, new mission, of the GSA, with goals and objectives, the way you would think through a whole new part of the GSA itself. For example, I would want to know what everybody has done; what people like the Israelis have done, which I would not want to do, they are in the midst of terrorist territory, to what countries that have not experienced, as we have not experienced. When you say the interagency, you know, the FBI, the CIA and the Secret Service, I take it, were on it. Were all three of those on the interagency?

    Mr. PECK. Yes.

    Ms. NORTON. I would be interested in what they had to say. The other folks have had less experience with it than you have had. So I would myself like to see GSA approach it from that kind of root and branch view of what has to be done.

    And let me say a word. I represent this region, of course. I have interests that are conflicting. One, the last thing we want to see is anything like Oklahoma City here, yet we are more of a target, you could argue, than Oklahoma City is. That is, you can assume that. You can assume the opposite. You can assume precisely because it is the Nation's capital with 30 police forces that you are less of a target. And what bothers me is that we still don't know what level of security, consistent with a city in which people live and which government agencies must operate, we should have.
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    That has enormous consequences for spending. I am not open to your request for spending because until you show me the cost benefit of additional spending, you have not assured me that you are not doing more than is necessary. And, moreover, you have not assured me that we are not barricading down the capital of the United States of America, sending the word across this world that we are afraid and we are hunkered down, and I still don't know that. You will need not only security analysts to help you, you will need people who understand the geopolitical consequences of doing that and whether it is necessary.

    You say, for example, you collected X number of weapons, but you say it is impossible to know, you know, what that means because we hadn't collected them before. Hey, that is the beginning of building a data system that tells us whether or not we need more security. If, in fact, we collected X number this year, or confiscated X number this year, next year we confiscate twice as many, and that tells us something. If you did it this year and it seems stable, that tells us something else.

    I went to the White House last night. I come to this building with my car, often going across the tarmac. When I went to the White House, the quintessence of where we are supposed to be more concerned, they knew I was coming, and anybody who gets through the motor barricade that they lower can only get through—when they knew, the man lowered it, and I went through.

    Well, I want to know, really, before you put a dime's worth of more stuff all over the city whether I need anything more than that. I really want to know whether anything else is needed. You can convince me, but I don't think this committee should put a dime into security without knowing what is the minimum, not the maximum, what is the minimum necessary to both live in a free city and to not spend ourselves the way we were when you had to move quickly and you got your Navy Yard.
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    That is why I would like to see an overall plan. I would want to give you the time. You rush to do what you have to do, and I think you have to do what you have to do in the short run. But before you go about doing barricades all across the city and then replicating that throughout the country, I believe you have to submit to this committee a plan that, in fact, corresponds with this notion of levels one through four buildings, incorporates the experience of countries around the world, comes to grips with our geopolitical situation, and as well as you can, and we know there are limitations, even with the best information, tell us how much money we should spend. And I would like to ask you if anything approaching that kind of comprehensive investigation of how we should proceed is under way.

    Mr. KIM. Can you answer that briefly, please?

    Mr. PECK. The short answer is, yes, it is. And I actually believe by the end of the summer, I will be able to share it with you. As I said, we already started a reassessment about the way we do business and about the way we think about security. You have raised all of the issues that I think also are the issues we have to address, including the question of minimum versus maximum and cost-effectiveness, and those are all things we are trying to address.

    The only thing I will say that makes this complicated is when you get down to the nub, you wind up still on a building-by-building basis having to make determinations, and it gets difficult.

    Ms. NORTON. Building by building is very important, we don't want blanket determinations made.
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    Mr. PECK. That is my point. But the framework that you described is the framework that I would like to see applied to the building. What is the risk; how much can we afford to spend in the building. I will stop because there are trade-offs between how you run these things.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you very much. I would like to ask some questions myself, seeing as there are no other Members here.

    A lot of concerns have been raised on the question, and I am pretty well satisfied. There are some specific matters that I would like to mention that kind of bother me.

    Based upon the presentation made by the two gentlemen representing the GAO, the following statement has been made, and I will ask you to respond to this. First of all, based upon their inspection, GSA doesn't have any security assessment done. $350 million has been obligated by the Congress, but they are not sure, they are not confident that the money has been spent properly.

    There is some questioning about accuracy of your cost estimating method. There is some questioning about the recordkeeping. Most seriously, there is questioning about $375,000 spent, which is considered misuse of funds, which is supposed to be spent on security and you spent on renovating buildings. But there is a question about almost more than 32 buildings out of 52, just in Washington, D.C. alone, they have completed an audit and found out that all the equipment has been purchased, but it is sitting in the warehouse collecting dust.

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    There is an additional 69 buildings that have been audited, and 33 of them have inadequate information, on and on and on. There is no system of check and balance in GSA, and there were some communication problems, communication has been diverted, and before I go on to other questions, I would like to ask you to respond to those specific concerns I addressed.

    Mr. PECK. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying a couple of your statements do not accurately represent the facts, nor even the testimony of the two gentlemen here. I believe that they testified to one instance in which money that was supposed to be applied to law enforcement equipment was applied to a building renovation. That has not been a general finding. I categorically reject any suggestion that there has been anything other than the most minute misapplication or misuse of funds applied to the security program. That is not anything that we have found or that they have found. We have found instances where countermeasures that were reported as complete were not counted as complete.

    Second, it is not accurate to say that there has been no assessment of threats in the buildings. In fact, what they found is the vast majority of the Level IV high-risk buildings were, in fact, given a security assessment. They found some buildings. I will go back to Mr. Ungar said any number of times ''in a number of cases'', or ''some cases'', or ''some buildings.'' But we don't have indications that that is a significant percentage, nor do they, and I believe he said they don't know that is a significant percentage. We found some problems in a program, as I said, that was moving this fast to do something we felt was important. I don't think it is surprising out of 8,000 countermeasures, we found some that weren't completely accounted for.

    On cost estimation, we made cost estimates on the fly in 1995, and it turns out we underestimated the cost of some of the security measures. That is unfortunate, but we paid for those security measures, and like I said, whether we estimated better, I am not sure we would have gotten any more money, because most of it came out of our funds anyway.
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    So I just want to be clear. They found some problems in the auditing of this program, but over 90 percent of the countermeasures we agreed to do are now in place, and if results count, it seems to me, that is, in fact, what counts.

    Let me make one other note about the Federal Protective Service. The Federal Protective Service is a law enforcement and security agency, and they do a very good job of that. They are not by and large trained in logistics. We asked them to take on a large quartermaster program, in effect. About a year and a half ago, I brought in people from a property management section to help them out because quite honestly, some of the management of FPS here and in the regions just weren't trained to run this kind of a tracking system, and they needed some help.

    I will say this: I think part of what might have happened in the National Capital Region and in FPS generally was a reluctance to admit that they needed help on that recordkeeping score, and I think that is unfortunate. I am afraid, and I think that may be part of what happened. And if there is any failing on my part, it was probably not recognizing that myself and getting the help to them quicker.

    Mr. KIM. Mr. Waszily, obviously Mr. Peck is disputing the findings that you have presented today. Do you agree with that, or do you have any comments to make?

    Mr. WASZILY. My impression, sir, is that he wasn't disputing our findings. I think he was trying to frame them in a perspective. It is accurate that there were several projects that we had looked at, that what had been reported in the information system versus what had actually been accomplished were clearly inaccurate. Mr. Peck is also correct that the only misapplication of funds that we identified was one situation in one regional office. We didn't identify any other financial misapplication of security funds.
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    Mr. KIM. Let me ask you a question, Mr. Waszily. When you discovered the bunch of equipment in storage at the two warehouses you mentioned, did you confer with FPS to find out why this equipment was not in use and collecting dust; did you want to know why?

    Mr. WASZILY. When we identified the equipment, as I mentioned, we had tried to match it up with the information in the tracking system. Much of the equipment had earmarked on it particular buildings that it had been designated for. Several of the buildings had been Defense Department installations. When we raised the issue with the security specialist as to why the tracking system was showing that this had been installed at defense facilities, yet it was still sitting there, the indication was that after they had gone to talk with the security specialist at the Defense Department, Defense responded back that the particular equipment that the Federal Protective Service had ordered was not of a level of sophistication that would meet their requirements, so, therefore, it was left in the warehouse.

    There are various examples, or various reasons why other installations weren't complete. In some instances the equipment, particularly large X-ray machines to scan the mail as it came into a facility for a particular building, the scanner itself might have been too large for the space that was available to put it into. And as we pointed out earlier, a lot of the inability to install items was that the landlords just wouldn't let us put them in.

    Mr. KIM. You also mentioned GSA's security program has been a, quote, inadequate planning and hasty decision, inadequate communication, unquote. Can you elaborate on that, please?
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    Mr. WASZILY. Yes, sir. Primarily the point we were making there was that a significant amount of equipment had been ordered prior to actually assessing whether or not it would fit in the space or whether the landlords would allow us to install the equipment.

    The other planning issue that we had brought up is that the Department of Justice study had pointed out that the security levels defined, they recognized that each individual location would have unique situations, and that the study had urged that the specific site be examined and assessed, and judgments would have to be made as to how to design the security plan. It strongly emphasized working with the tenants in the buildings, which GSA did do. They formed the building security committees, and there was a lot of dialogue with the Federal tenants in the buildings. The shortcoming in the planning area was that in many instances they didn't talk to the landlord regarding the security plans and get their input into the process beforehand.

    Mr. KIM. I would like to ask one sort of broad question to you, going back to this equipment sitting in the warehouse. Was there any evidence of deliberate attempts to mislead officials about this equipment? In other words, was there any questionable procurement transactions?

    Mr. WASZILY. During our review there were some questionable transactions that had taken place.

    Mr. KIM. Can you tell us what those questionable transactions were?
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    Mr. WASZILY. Sir, when the auditors encounter situations like that, we have a counterpart organization of criminal investigators, and those activities are referred over to them. In general, in public forum, while something is under active criminal investigation, we generally would not provide the information. If the committee would like information regarding the details of those transactions, we can arrange that in private.

    Mr. KIM. In the interest of time, I would like unanimous consent to submit more questions in writing. You don't mind, do you? I have a dozen more questions to all three of you gentlemen.

    The last question to Mr. Peck. The FAA has been doing a wonderful job in this security system in the airport. Have you ever consulted with them?

    Mr. PECK. You know, we have not consulted directly with them, but I will tell you one of the things we have looked at when we talk about how we guard the front doors is to look at the way the airports guard the entrances to the passenger areas of airports. It suggests some things about the use of contract guards, and uniform guards and contract guards together that we are looking at, but, no, we have not talked to them directly.

    Mr. KIM. You report some kind of false reporting. Page 4. What kind of false reporting has taken place; what are you doing about it?

    Mr. PECK. What kind?

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    Mr. KIM. Page 4, I believe you mentioned there is a false reporting done by your staff?

    Mr. PECK. We were told—the one thing maybe of all the issues, the one I was most concerned about when I was told in December 1997 that there were some instances of inaccurate reporting in the National Capital Region is that it appeared there was a possibility that someone had deliberately falsified a report of completion to the countermeasure. There is a continuing investigation, so I shouldn't comment. But to date no one has been charged with deliberate falsification of a report.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you.

    Since I don't see any other Members that have any additional questions, I would like to thank you very much for a fine presentation.

    I would like to invite the next witnesses here.

    I am sorry, we will have just Mr. McGoff alone at this time, and the other three gentlemen will join us together later.

    If you are ready, you can identify yourself for the record. I would like to welcome you to this hearing.

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    Mr. MCGOFF. Chairman Kim, Representative Traficant and other distinguished Members of the House Public Buildings and Economic Development Subcommittee, my name is Tom McGoff. I am here before the subcommittee to let you know I wear two hats. I have been a police officer for 5 years; am presently a physical security specialist, which I have been for the last 3 years. I am also the president of AFGE Local 2264, regional vice president for AFGE, National Council of GSA Locals, Council 236.

    With me today is Marilyn Brown. Ms. Brown also wears two hats, one as an FES police officer and the other as GSA's president for local 1733.

    During my 8 years with the Federal Protective Service, I have had the opportunity to be involved with the law enforcement operations pertaining to the World Trade Center bombing and subsequent trials, and also with the Ruby Ridge trials that were involved with the killing of U.S. Marshal Degan in Idaho. I have witnessed the risk the average government employee is now under. As a law enforcement officer, I have experienced the trauma of the Federal family when antigovernment groups, both foreign and domestic, have demonstrated their contempt by the killing of innocent individuals.

    I have also experienced as a physical security specialist the need to enhance the physical security of all Federal facilities based on the Department of Justice vulnerability assessment. I was involved in developing and implementing security countermeasures on over 370 separate facilities throughout the New England region. I am also aware this process is not over, but is dynamic in nature.

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    These issues now, more than ever, significantly identify the need for uniformed police officers and security professionals. These are inherent government functions and not the work created for the private sector. I commend the General Services Administration for taking the lead role in funding over 200 million needed to enhance securities of the Federal facilities which they own and operate.

    I am here to tell you that all the equipment in the world can't replace the police officer on the beat. Machines can't tell you if a vehicle looks suspicious or that thefts in Federal buildings increase during the holiday season. Machines can't replace the information a police officer receives when gathering intelligence or the rapport he or she has with the employees they are charged to protect. It is the police officer that responds to electronic devices installed in these facilities. Equipment is merely a tool to help the police officer complete his or her daily mission.

    A recent IFMET survey indicated a high degree of customer satisfaction, which was a direct result of the priorities GSA gave to completing these DOJ countermeasures. GSA must continue this high priority by elevating the role of the Federal Protective Service and not considering a blanket contracting out of services to answer their inherent responsibilities.

    The use of contract guards was implemented for augmentation of FPS services, not for the replacement of the Federal Protective Service police officer. A recent FPS investigation, conducted by three uniformed officers, revealed that a contract guard to one of the largest Federal facilities in the New England area was observed through the use of video surveillance and the officer's investigative skills illegally confiscating a laptop computer from the Department of Labor. When the guard was questioned and subsequently arrested, he admitted to stealing five other laptops, valued at over $30,000. Further investigation revealed that prospective buyers of the laptops who had been given access to the facility had purchased these items, which leads to the adage, you get what you pay for.
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    In close, I would just like to state the fact that government employees deal with the public as an integral part of their job. This interface increases the threat of harm. The very publicness of the job puts government workers at greater risk than most private sector employees. Personal security is a major concern for government employees, especially since the tragic episode at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. GSA is tasked with and has an obligation to provide the highest quality protection for the Federal employees and the public they serve.

    Thank you, and I will try to answer any questions you may have.

    Mr. KIM. Any questions? Mr. Traficant is recognized.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. I have one question, and I will submit the rest for a written response and ask unanimous consent that that be so.

    With that, I want to thank you, Mr. McGoff, for your job and your analysis. And I think you have served a tremendous purpose of this subcommittee. As you know, I am working on a bill to make the Federal Protective Service a separate service within GSA. Just right to the point, yes or no, do you support it or not?

    Mr. MCGOFF. I do support the bill.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Second of all, can you provide the subcommittee with any information which indicates private service is, in fact, even more expensive than in-house employees? And I am not going to ask you to cite all that now, but I want that specified as a priority in your written response.
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    Mr. MCGOFF. I will.

    Mr. TRAFICANT. Thank you. With that, I thank the gentleman.

    Mr. KIM. Ms. Norton.

    Ms. NORTON. I just have a couple questions, Mr. Chairman. Congress passed a bill last year allowing the U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia to coordinate the various protective services and other Federal police in the city, to the extent that they can be further involved in overall crime-fighting and security matters, leveraging and assuring that there is not needless overlap and that the officers are being maximally employed, and the Protective Service was very supportive of this bill.

    We learned in our investigation that there are ranked differences between the way protective service officers are used, according to the agency where the officer happens to work. Has that been your experience, some have a great deal more latitude, and others may be used far more restrictively by the agency, or is it your experience that there are overall standards followed across agency lines for how these officers are used?

    Mr. MCGOFF. Let me see if I can answer that. FPS typically is an aging work force. We haven't had the ability to hire in a long time, up until recently. And if I am answering you correctly, I think some of the younger officers may do more than some of the older officers. Am I going the right direction?

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    Ms. NORTON. We found that 30 agencies which have various kinds of officers, some of them are more like guards, some are more like Federal Protective Service officers, we found instances where some officers felt they weren't supposed to go outside the building, that what they were supposed to do involved literally the four corners of the building. Some were told they were not supposed to engage in law enforcement activity. If they saw a crime being committed, they were supposed to call 911, the District police. We were very disturbed at that. And I wondered if your experience indicated that kind of difference among how officers are used, based on what the agency may, for example, desire.

    Mr. MCGOFF. Yes, I mean, there are different directors who have different ideas of how to secure buildings and how to provide security and law enforcement functions. Some directors may not be more dynamic than others, some may not be more progressive than others, and I am sure there are cases where a particular director will say, don't do anything, stay in your building. But to answer specifically to instances, I can't answer that.

    Ms. NORTON. What that says to me is as we look at security overall, one of the things we ought to look at is whether we are making maximum use of our Federal protective officers for security purposes, which include crime around the building, of course, because that crime could be a terrorist, or it could be somebody who is having an adverse effect on employees or on visitors to the building.

    Could I ask you, what effect do you think downsizing, either in the Federal Protective Service or in GSA generally, has had on security, from your point of view?

    Mr. MCGOFF. The contract guard issue is a big issue with me. The high turnover rate of contract guards in the Federal facilities is enormous. We do run background checks, we do try to train them in the use of these electronic equipment, these X-ray machines, and, you know, one day there will be a guard there, and the next day it is a different guard.
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    Ms. NORTON. Do the guards have the same qualifications as Federal Protective Service officers?

    Mr. MCGOFF. No, not at all. No. It is a cursory background check and subsequent fingerprinting. They could be on board while we are checking them.

    Ms. NORTON. Well, they are doing precisely the same work as Federal protective officers were doing.

    Mr. MCGOFF. No, essentially they are at the perimeters of building access control. In some cases they sit in offices through SSA, or the IRS may ask for an officer in their building, but there is essentially a fixed post. We are trying to make sure that doesn't change. There is some talk of them actually responding to calls and doing patrol work that the police officer has the inherent responsibility to do.

    Ms. NORTON. I think that GSA needs to evaluate their effectiveness. I can understand the pressure, of course, to use lower-paid people perhaps on jobs that would be in the private sector, because this is the standard that obviously the Congress is going to impose on the GSA, to use the same kinds of people that would be used there. The problem is we have just heard testimony about security, huge security concerns here, and consistent with that we need to know whether the use of guards versus protective service officers is consistent with our security concerns, and I appreciate that you have helped to bring that issue to light.

    I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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    Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Norton.

    Mr. KIM. I do have just a couple of quick questions.

    According to the GSA report, we have roughly 5,000 contract guards nationwide. You said a while ago that obviously we don't have any screening system, just a cursory check. That bothers me. There are 5,000 of them, and there is just a cursory check. Are you sure about that?

    Mr. MCGOFF. We conduct NCIC, a background criminal history check on the individual, and we do send the prints to Washington, the FBI. Sometimes it takes a long time to get that information back, and it is very difficult for the contract to give bodies, so these individuals come to work, and then we find out a month later we have to let them go. But that is a long time to wait because of a criminal history that may have arisen in their background check through the FBI. That would be my concern.

    Mr. KIM. During that 1 month—

    Mr. MCGOFF. It could be less, it could be more. But in some cases you walk into the building, you see a guard there, you walk in the building the next day, there is another guard, and you are wondering, before he comes aboard, has he been thoroughly checked. And 5,000 of them, I am sure there are instances where we haven't gotten around to checking these individuals.

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    Mr. KIM. Doesn't it make sense to you that you place him on the job after the total check is conducted? How can you place him on the job, it is a security guard job, while checking his background, and if it is no good, you send him back? I don't understand this.

    Mr. MCGOFF. I don't either, quite frankly.

    Mr. KIM. What type of authority do these contractors have? Who supervises them? How do you know the difference between the contract guard and Federal Protective Service personnel? Who supervises who?

    Mr. MCGOFF. The supervision is within the contract language. The contractor is supposed to supervise its own people, that is the idea of contracting out, so we don't have to do the supervision or training. Typically a physical security specialist may do an inspection of the guard contract, or police officers are charged with inspecting. When they come to a building, they would inspect the guards to see if they are at their site, their operating manuals are present, they are clean-shaven, they are in the right clothing. But the supervision is supposed to be done by the company who is providing the service, and we pay a premium for that. Are they on site? No, not necessarily.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you very much, Mr. McGoff. I appreciate it.

    Mr. KIM. The next witnesses, Mr. Kenneth Wood, representing Barringer Instruments, Inc.; Dr. Ron Massa, president of Lorron Corporation; Dr. Gene Corley, representing the American Society of Civil Engineers.
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    Starting from left to right, Dr. Massa, would you like to start first.


    Dr. MASSA. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like to begin my testimony today by commending you for your attention to security of Federal buildings and public buildings in general. As an international security consultant with more than 25 years of experience, I can guarantee you it is a matter worthy of your attention.

    Secondly, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify here today on behalf of the Laminated Glass Information Center.

    As I have learned from my evaluations of terrorist incidents around the globe, architectural glazing, also known as window glass, plays a pivotal role in maintaining building security. This role will be the focus of my testimony today. I will attempt to be brief in my verbal remarks, but I would like to ask that my entire written testimony be submitted for the record, with your permission, sir.

    We need only look to recent history, first to define the problem of building security against bomb attacks, and, second, to help us develop a solution. The Murrah Federal Building, Khobar Towers, the World Trade Center, Bishopsgate in London, and the IBM headquarters in Peru all dramatically highlight the need for increased security against bomb attacks for all high-risk government and private buildings.
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    Unfortunately, the bomb remains the weapon of choice for the terrorist today. One of its most attractive features, outside of the media attention which major bomb blasts attract, is its ability to involve tons of building materials, especially glass, as part of the weapon, rather than as a component of the defense. In fact, glass is the single greatest source of both building damage and human injury in urban bomb attacks. This was the case in Oklahoma City where 75 percent to 80 percent of all injuries—were caused by glass—I should say nonfatal injuries were caused by glass.

    Moreover, flying and falling glass places everyone in the neighborhood at risk of injury, not just the occupants of targeted buildings. However, it is technically and economically feasible to mitigate glass effects in both new and existing buildings. We believe the best way to do so is through the use of laminated glass. Some of the other solutions, such as structural changes, increased stand-off distance and more security personnel, which we have heard a great deal about today, simply do not share this technical and economic feasibility.

    Now, you may know laminated glass already as the material that has been used in your car windshield for more than 60 years to protect you and your families from injury in automobile crashes, hundreds of thousands of such crashes. Note that in a highly technical, cost-competitive, worldwide auto industry, we don't use polycarbonates, other plastics or filmed glass. There are many reasons why, and most of them apply equally well to building glazing. These reasons include strength, lifetime, cost, ease of maintenance, and postbreakage behavior.

    Each of you should have a small piece of laminated glass before you. This is the laminated glass; this is the interlayer that is between it. That is all it is. It feels and looks much like any other window glass of the same thickness.
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    If we subject this glass and ordinary window glass to a blast, to a bomb blast load, both will crack. Both will crack, but that is where the similarity ends. Unlike the conventional window which will break into dangerous glass shards, the glass in the laminated glass window will tenaciously adhere to this tough interlayer and remain in its frame, protecting those inside the building and outside the building from dangerous glass shards, while also keeping blast pressure from entering the building and causing more personnel injury and damage inside the building.

    As a result of Oklahoma City, many Federal agencies, including those which have testified earlier today, have looked at many other options, including window films, which, in fact, have been used to retrofit some existing Federal buildings. However, in addition to their relatively low blast resistance, window films tend to scratch, yellow or peel and require a replacement every 7 to 10 years, driving the life cycle cost well above that of laminated glass, which lasts for the lifetime of the building.

    I recommend in the interest of public safety and cost-effectiveness that a glass plan be prepared for each public building, providing site-specific guidance on how integrated solutions can reduce glass damage and mitigate injuries in bomb attacks. We must recognize, however, that there may not be a solution that is both better and cheaper than simply using what we have used for 60 years. This is certainly the case in new buildings, where laminated glass should be the universal choice. While the acquisition cost of laminated glass might increase the overall construction cost of a building by 1 or 2 percent, its benefits more than compensate for this small cost increase.

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    In a perfect world, we would not have to worry about threat of attacks against our Federal buildings, explosive or otherwise. Of course, unfortunately, ours is not a perfect world, and since few of us are eager to work in buildings without windows, we must, therefore, use better windows. So let's learn from the past. Let's use the 60 years of experience with this material and the experience gained in thousands of bomb attacks around the globe. Let's use that as a learning base. With it, let's do it right, based on science and engineering, rather than perception or fear. Let's do it now with our government setting a rational and meaningful example for private interests to follow. And, finally, let's do it with the most effective and versatile material presently commonly available today.

    Thank you for your time and for your attention. I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you. We will have some questions after the testimony is completed.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Chairman Kim. It is a pleasure to be here to address yourself and the committee today, to give you an industrial perspective on security and how the technology fits into that.

    My name is Kenneth Wood. I am the president of Barringer Instruments. We are located in Murray Hill, New Jersey, and are principally engaged in the development of analytical instruments for the high sensitivity detection of chemical substances, such as explosives and narcotics.
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    The IONSCAN you see off to my right-hand side here on this card. I thought it would be a good idea to get a visual look at what technology looks like these days. It is no longer big and bulky as perhaps it was in preceding years. This is the latest, most advanced explosive detection device manufactured by Barringer and was developed in the late 1980s in response to growing demands for technological solutions to explosives detection and drug detection requirements that were becoming quite pronounced in that period of time.

    Significant advances in securing airports, public buildings and military facilities have been made over the past few years as state-of-the-art explosive detection equipment has been successfully deployed at numerous high-profile installations.

    A key point that I believe is very universally accepted today is there is no single technological solution to the terrorist bomb, and the key to enhancing security is now clearly recognized to be the development of an integrated systems approach, deploying an array of technologies that together offer the best defense we have against the terrorist event.

    The task today of detecting an explosive device primarily falls into two categories or two approaches to the task. One is looking for large amounts of an explosive substance, and that is known as bulk detection; or looking for very small microscopic amounts of an explosive substance, known as trace detection.

    Visual imaging techniques such as dual energy X-rays and computed tomography techniques are addressing the bulk detection requirements, but the other very essential technological component of any security system is trace detection, which is the technology that allows an operator to detect minuscule amounts of explosive materials in samples taken directly from the suspected item. The IONSCAN, of course, falls into the category of trace detection.
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    Barringer Instruments has been engaged in the explosive detection instrumentation business for the past 10 years, and today there are more of our devices installed than all other detectors combined. We have approximately 850 deployed throughout the world, serving some very prestigious installations and some very significant security missions. It is a very stable and field-proven technology. Virtually every Federal law enforcement agency in this country and their counterparts around the world utilize the IONSCAN to assist in daily operations.

    For example, the FBI in this country has deployed the IONSCAN since 1991, using the instrument in a wide variety of drug interdiction missions, as well as postblast forensics analysis. To give you a few examples of how this technology has assisted in those areas, this capability was deployed for looking at debris in the postblast area of the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, Atlanta Olympics, and TWA incidents. The United States users include the Coast Guard, the DEA, National Guard, Department of Defense and, of course, the FAA, which is very actively engaged these days in deploying explosives detection technology.

    A further interest is that the IONSCAN has been used to perform all the trace detection work at Eurotunnel, linking the UK and France, since it opened in 1993.

    The technology is extensively deployed and is very clearly serving a critical role in antiterrorist and law enforcement activities.

    Trace detection technology works by taking advantage of the fact that microscopic amounts of a target substance, such as an explosive material, will typically be present on exterior surfaces of the particular packaging the bomb is made up into. These traces can be quickly collected and analyzed in a few seconds to provide the operator with real-time information about the item he just sampled.
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    For example, it is extremely difficult to manufacture a bomb inside a piece of electronics, such as a personal computer or a radio, without leaving explosive residue on the outside surfaces on the electrical item. A simple wipe of the target item will collect the residue, followed by a quick chemical analysis on that collected sample.

    The IONSCAN utilizes a technology known as ion mobility spectrometry to perform a chemical analysis on the sample under test. In approximately 6 seconds, the IONSCAN will look for the presence of six or more individual explosive substances. If a detection is made, the operator is alerted with an audio/visual alarm, and the specific explosive substance is identified. The operation is totally automatic, requiring no interpretation from an operator, as you have with a situation with an X-ray device. That is an interpretive type of mechanism, at least on the older version X-rays.

    Additionally, Barringer has implemented a remote monitoring capability for many of its installations, particularly at our airports in the country, where we are able to obtain, through a wireless modem, statistical and parametric data on each instrument. This data is transmitted back to our facility each day and allows us to monitor in a remote fashion the proper functioning of each instrument. The important information, such as the number of samples run on each instrument, the number of alarms that occurred and certain calibration data, are provided to us through this capability.

    In addition to the installed base we have at airports in this country, which is increasing every day through the efforts under the Gore Commission to enhance our aviation security, Barringer's IONSCAN is being extensively used at our military bases overseas to prevent another disaster similar to that that occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1996. The detector is used to screen vehicles and packages at perimeter locations before they are allowed near the actual military installation.
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    Additionally, and to the credit, I believe, of the GSA and the individuals that testified earlier, the new Ronald Reagan Building here in Washington uses the IONSCAN at each entrance to the underground parking areas, where vehicles are screened with this device to prevent the type of disaster that occurred in the World Trade Center, where a vehicle was very easily driven into the underground garage, left, and detonated in a remote fashion.

    While these are a few examples of increased security, much more can be done to improve security at our Federal facilities, both here and abroad. Upon entering many Federal buildings in the country, the most you might see is a rather old X-ray and a metal detector. Neither are going to offer much detection capability against the terrorist bomb, which is likely to be constructed from easily available or easily fabricated plastic explosives and is likely to be hidden inside a piece of electronics.

    Technology such as IONSCAN is reasonably priced. This is not expensive, million-dollar equipment, and it installs literally in a few hours. Operational training is straightforward, and screening personnel are very quick to pick up on the security task. Our discussions with dozens of screeners and security personnel who utilize this equipment indicate they are very comfortable with the instrument, enjoy using advanced technology to assist with their responsibilities, and believe trace detection facilitates the proper performance of their job.

    Along with others, Barringer has worked very hard in developing detection technology that meets the needs of the various user organizations. We are proud of the capability we have developed and are proud to see our equipment serving the security needs of the United States.
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    We applaud and support the efforts of this subcommittee to identify deficiencies in our Federal building security systems and to enhance security through the deployment of trace detection technology. With the right detection equipment, security can be provided to the American public effectively, efficiently, economically and with minimal inconvenience.

    Thank you, Chairman Kim and the rest of the subcommittee. Of course, I would be more than happy to show you the equipment in operation at any time you would like.

    Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Wood.

    Dr. Corley.

    Dr. CORLEY. Good morning. Thank you for the invitation to discuss security of Federal buildings.

    I am Gene Corley. I am a licensed structural engineer with more than 35 years of experience. Currently I am vice president and managing agent for engineering for Construction Technologies Laboratories, Incorporated.

    Today I am here appearing on behalf of the American Society of Civil Engineers, and although, Mr. Chairman, you know the American Society of Civil Engineers very well, for the record, I would like to point out that it is an organization of 120,000 members, all design professionals. Within the organization there are suborganizations, one of structural engineering, the Structural Engineering Institute of 15,000 members; the Forensic Engineering Council of 2,000 members; and the Architectural Engineering Institute of 1,000 members and growing. All of these groups have vital interests in providing safe buildings for the public.
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    I am speaking here today, or was asked to speak today, because I am the Chair-elect of the Forensic Engineering Council, but more importantly because I was a principal investigator of a building performance assessment team that investigated the damage to the Murrah Building after the April 19, 1995, bombing in Oklahoma City.

    In the few more minutes that I will be speaking, I will present a brief highlight of key findings from the Oklahoma City report that we prepared. I will discuss what can be achieved through our recommendations for multihazard mitigation. I will mention barriers to mitigation that exist in the design community and offer some recommendations to improve the situation.

    In our report, one of the key findings was that if buildings such as the 1976 Murrah Building had been built using today's knowledge and recommendations for seismic design detailing, as much as 50 to 80 percent of the structural collapse of that building would have been avoided, along with a similar percentage in fatalities. The resulting additional cost for achieving that type of performance is not measured in millions of dollars for that building or for any building of that size, it is measured in a few thousands of dollars.

    A second finding was that for existing buildings, retrofitting is more difficult and more expensive, but there are cost-effective things that can be done.

    I would like to mention a couple of examples of demonstrations where performance has been shown to do what we said it would do. For example, in the Middle East, there have been several buildings that have been subjected to terrorist bombings, and they had some of the details that we recommended. These buildings showed that they could withstand progressive collapse. They did not collapse. In the Northridge earthquake of 1994, again, buildings there that had the details that we recommended showed that even when they had severe damage, the progressive collapse was avoided, and people could escape from the buildings, even though they were severely damaged.
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    At the present time, getting this information to designers and into buildings is, at best, a haphazard operation. I recently discussed our report at a technical meeting, and after the meeting a design professional came up to me and told me that he had a contract to design a prominent government facility, one that, in fact, does have a risk of terrorist bombing, and he said the design was so far along, he was just about ready to make the—what he thought would be the final presentation in the design concept. And I asked what he had done about the blast resistance, and he said up until that point, nobody had mentioned it, it had not been considered, he had no guidance on it.

    One of the reasons for this, I believe, is that there is no single authoritative source for mitigation techniques that can be used. Design professionals need a consensus standard that can be applied to Federal buildings, as well as any other building that might be at risk. ASCE has worked on developing similar documents for other loadings, and the society stands ready to assist the Federal Government in developing this much needed standard.

    Finally, I have three recommendations to the committee. First, a study should be performed documenting all sources of information, including the information available from all branches of the Federal Government, and this should then be used to develop the data to go into the standard. Second, a national voluntary consensus standard should be developed to provide the needed direction to the design professionals. And, finally, through the literature review and standards development effort, gaps will be identified where additional research must be focused and needs to be funded. In fact, as a result of our work in Oklahoma City, we already see some gaps and see some research that is needed.

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    Thank you, I would be happy to answer questions.

    Mr. KIM. I will start with a couple of questions to Dr. Corley. I want to talk about the retrofitting process. In California, we have extensive retrofitting programs for many, many years since the earthquake. You mentioned you need some kind of consensus, some kind of guidelines from the Federal Government which gives a direction to design professionals. We have an extensive retrofit program in California without any guidance. They simply follow a structural code. We have a uniform building code in this country which has been upgraded since the California earthquake.

    What additional guidance do you need from us? Is it only applied to Federal buildings only, or can it be any public buildings? I am not sure what specific consensus guidelines from the Federal Government you are seeking.

    Dr. CORLEY. Mr. Chairman, what is missing at the moment is a design guideline, a building-code-like guideline, applied directly for blast resistance of buildings. At the moment—

    Mr. KIM. I see.

    Dr. CORLEY. At the moment, there is no guideline that specifically addresses blast resistance, and a few people are aware that applying the recommendations for seismic resistance is one of the things that needs to be considered. But there is no guidance even on how to apply those recommendations.

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    Mr. KIM. Dr. Corley, the UBC has that particular section, and the last, I think it is an appendix, it talks about this blast resistance, in the UBC code, the latest one.

    Dr. CORLEY. To the best of my knowledge, there is not adequate guidance in there that would permit a person to design, for example, a building such as the Murrah Building or its replacement to resist the types of blast that might be experienced in the future from terrorist activities.

    Mr. KIM. You mentioned there is some kind of volunteer groups. Instead of the Federal Government coming up with guidelines on this highly specialized area, isn't that sort of ASCE or structuring engineers groups, also their responsibility to come up with some kind of recommendation to us which you are dealing with the public safety? You are going to wait until we tell you how to do the design for this blast-resistant structure?

    Dr. CORLEY. No. In fact, the proposal is that the ASCE develop a consensus standard through the private resources, that could then be used by the Federal Government as the standard that they want their buildings built to. This would be done in the same way that ASCE currently develops the document ASC 7, which is on loadings for buildings. It is a consensus standard that is developed on a voluntary basis. It brings in all of the interests, such as design professionals, materials suppliers, government agencies, puts them all together and gets all of the information in.

    The one thing that is needed, in addition, is access to the information that is available and no doubt will be developed in the future about blast resistance of particular elements of buildings, particular reinforcing in buildings. This information is not available, readily at least, to those code writers that might put a document together like this, and that additional information is needed.
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    Mr. KIM. You already have this consensus standard developed by ASCE and other private professionals. Why do you need guidance from us then? Does that mean we are not accepting your consensus standard, is that it? You need approval from us? I am still puzzled. What guidance do you need from us?

    Dr. CORLEY. There are really two items. One is that strictly for blast resistance, there is information that is available—well, that is not available in the public archives that is needed to be able to write a standard that is suitable for blast-resistant design of the particularly Federal buildings, but any building at risk of a terrorist bombing. That information is not readily available in the private archives and is needed.

    The other thing is that nobody has put this document together. To the best of my knowledge, it neither exists within the government agencies nor within the private sector, where the document addresses how to design for blast resistance in modern buildings. That information needs to be put together in a codified form so that the design professional will know how to calculate the loads, what loads to consider, then what details are available to resist those forces.

    Mr. KIM. Can you give us a little memo precisely of what information that we have but is not readily available to you, what we have to do to finish this, maybe even perhaps a joint venture? We are dealing with public safety. I don't know why we have to keep dragging each other and looking at each other. Give us a little memo so we can pursue it.

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    Dr. CORLEY. I would be pleased to prepare something like that.

    Mr. KIM. I really don't have any other questions for the other two gentlemen, except, Dr. Massa, you mentioned this glass is economically feasible and widely accepted, but why don't we use it? Is there any particular reason why?

    Dr. MASSA. For very much the same reasons that Dr. Corley just mentioned. There is no requirement or standard or code related to blast-resistant design. When this glass is used, it is used largely because either the owner of the building is sensitive to these issues and is willing to spend a little more money, or because it offers other benefits, like sound control, like thermal isolation, UV reduction, et cetera. But what is needed is some kind of a code which says that glass right now is fundamentally designed by the requirement to meet wind loads. A bomb doesn't create a wind in the same sense that a hurricane does. So what we need is for someone to say—some building code, some requirement to say we must have our window glass resist some level of blast load. That simply does not exist. Anyone who uses this uses it for either other reasons or because they are simply circumspect about the issue of bombings.

    Mr. KIM. Who is somebody? You keep saying someone should put this in there.

    Dr. MASSA. Well, ideally it would become part of building codes. Just as they say the window must survive wind loads, it would say the window must survive perhaps a rock or a piece of pebble coming at the window from a hurricane at some speed, and they might also come with some basic blast resistance requirements. For example, it has taken years to get hurricane requirements into building codes in Florida, where hurricanes are a big issue.
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    Mr. KIM. Dr. Corley, would you agree with that; maybe we should include that as part of this?

    Dr. CORLEY. It is precisely the type of thing that would be in this standard, that it would include the design criteria needed for windows, and then no doubt the laminated glass would be something that would satisfy it, and there may be other things that would also satisfy the requirements. But that is exactly the type of things I would expect to be in the standard.

    Mr. KIM. Okay. Well, Minority counsel, any questions?

    Okay. Thank you very much. I don't see any other questions from the Members.

    We will take a look at that on the way down. I understand it.

    Thank you very much for participating today. I appreciate it very much.

    The subcommittee stands adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

    [Insert here.]

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