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AVIATION OPERATIONS DURING SEVERE OR RAPIDLY CHANGING WEATHER CONDITIONS
Thursday, July 22, 1999
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:32 a.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. DUNCAN. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting of the Subcommittee on Aviation to order and welcome everyone to this hearing today.
The idea for this hearing originally arose out of the tragedy in Little Rock, Arkansas, and it was done primarily at the request of Congressman Hutchinson of Arkansas. We will have several witnesses involved in this, and it is a hearing on operations during severe weather conditions.
On June 1st, American Airlines flight 1420 crashed at the Little Rock airport. 11 people died as a result of that accident, including the pilot. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were severe and we are going to look into that to see if there is action that we should be taking in regard to this.
In light of the tragic accident that occurred this weekend involving John F. Kennedy, Jr., his wife, Carolyn Bessette Kennedy, and her sister, Lauren Bessette, there has been an even greater focus regarding weather conditions and information with respect to private pilots.
I would like to state at this time that this is not a hearing into the accident involving John F. Kennedy, Jr. The National Transportation Safety Board has stated that it will take 6 to 9 months to complete that investigation, and I do not think enough details and information are available to really have a hearing on that accident at this time, although some witnesses may feel it is appropriate to comment in regard to it in some way. But this is a hearing that primarily arose out of the accident in Little Rock, Arkansas and, as I said, is being done at the request primarily of Congressman Hutchinson.
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I would like to take this time to extend my condolences to those who lost loved ones in the Little Rock accident, and especially to the Bessette and Kennedy families on their most recent losses. Any fatal aviation accident is certainly a tragedy, a tragedy that sometimes affects the whole country. These two accidents have certainly affected the country profoundly.
I also would like to note the recent loss of Admiral Engen in a glider accident in Nevada. Admiral Engen was certainly a friend of the aviation community and will be greatly missed by all who knew him.
I do want to mention one other thing that is similar to what I just said. We have had a great deal of attention on this hearing in the last 2 days, much more than anyone expected when we decided to have this hearing in late June. However, I hope the attention focused on weather issues as a result of these accidents will help us and the FAA to assess what, if any, improvements and changes are necessary to ensure safe flights for all aviation travelers. Specifically, we want to get the best weather information available to the people who are flying the airplanes.
It is certainly safe to fly now in almost every way, and the general aviation community has a record that is certainly exemplary. The number of aviation accidents has gone down greatly in recent years. Even though our skies are safer than ever, weather conditions remain one of the most important issues with respect to aviation safety. Without up-to-date weather information, airlines and pilots cannot accurately determine where and when to fly.
There is a great deal of information regarding weather available at this time. Information is collected by the FAA, the NWS, pilots, air traffic controllers, airlines, and airports. There are new pieces of equipment, such as the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, that have been located at most of the major airports. We will have testimony about whether these TDWRs should be placed at more airports. Other airports, such as the Little Rock airport, only have a Low Level Windshear Alert System. This LLWAS is not as comprehensive as the TDWR is. It only measures windshears in progress. It cannot forecast developing windshears. Some airports only have Automated Weather Observing Systems. These AWOS systems are computerized weather systems that monitor wind speed, direction, cloud height, and visibility. Other airports have other systems.
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Testimony will show that one of the most important points where weather information is crucial is during approach and landing. One of the questions that we will discuss is who determines and how it is determined what equipment which airports get.
We will hear today from the NTSB regarding its weather recommendations. We will hear from the FAA, the National Weather Service, and the airlines about how weather information is collected and disseminated. We will also hear from the pilots about how they get weather information and what improvements they think should be made. The air traffic controllers and airline dispatchers will also testify about how they receive and communicate weather information. AOPA will discuss weather and how it affects general aviation pilots.
I want to thank everyone for their participation today, and now call on my good friend, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I particularly thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. Obviously, this is an important safety issue that has attracted the attention of many people.
Weather is a major factor in aviation safety. In fact, weather has played a part in the significant percentage of the aviation accidents over the years. According to the National Transportation Safety Board, 33 percent of fatal aviation accidents are weather related. Pilots receive weather information before, during, and near the end of a flight. Pilots can get this weather information from a variety of sources, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Weather Service, and private contractors.
Obviously, technologies exist today that can detect and warn of severe weather, and the information provided by these technologies can help prevent weather related accidents from occurring. However, the information is only helpful if it reaches the right people at the right time and that the people who receive the information know exactly how to analyze and read that information.
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Today we will hopefully learn about the technologies that exist and are being developed that can help detect and warn of severe weather. We will also learn about how and when the information provided by these technologies is distributed to pilots, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers.
It is important to know whether these technologies are being deployed at all airports that need up-to-the minute weather information. It is also important to know whether flight crews are properly trained to receive and digest the information provided.
I look forward to hearing from the many knowledgeable witnesses we have here today. And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on such an important aviation issue. And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
We are always pleased to have the ranking member of the full committee here, Mr. Oberstar. And, Mr. Oberstar, we will call on you at this time for any statement that you have.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I particularly appreciate your framing the hearing as you did, that this is a hearing on weather and aviation and not a hearing on a specific tragedy, particularly the recent tragedy involving the John F. Kennedy, Jr. aircraft and Carolyn Bessette Kennedy and Lauren Bessette. It will be a long time before the NTSB reaches a matter of probable cause in that case, and we should not be second guessing or in any sense prompting the investigation in any way. There will be an appropriate time to take a detailed look at this matter and have a report on probable cause when the NTSB is properly ready to do so.
I join you and I join all the members of the committee in expressing our profound sorrow and prayers for the families in that tragedy as well as those who lost loved ones in the Little Rock tragedy of American Airlines MD–80.
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It has been almost 10 years since my good friend, Bill Clinger, and I conducted hearings, when I chaired the Aviation Subcommittee, on weather. And I commend you and Mr. Lipinski for returning to this subject. It is long overdue to have an in-depth look at the convergence of weather and safety.
Great progress has been made in technology of detecting unusual weather conditions, as you noted. The advance in the terminal Doppler weather radar technology, a joint project of FAA and NOAA, was long awaited by the aviation community, a very costly development, but regrettably installed in only a comparative handful of locations. There are only 45 airports that now have TDWR. Originally, we were scheduled to have 102.
The Office of Management and Budget during the 1980's, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, using a life value—that I think is a rather crude way of making judgments on safety matters—of $1 million, decided that the Nation couldn't afford to install TDWR at more than 45 airports.
Well, today guess what? The Department of Transportation now says a human life is worth $2.7 million. I do not know who does those calculations, but I sure invite them to stand amidst family members grieving over lost loved ones, as we on this subcommittee have had to do so many times over the years in inquiring into and setting higher standards for aviation safety. There is no price on life.
That is not to say that we should not spare any expense, but when we have technology of this kind that can prevent accidents, we ought to install it.
Other technology on which we have made progress is the windshear detection systems. That grew out of the Dallas tragedy of the L–1011 that crashed in a terrible windshear and microburst, one of the extraordinary phenomena that pilots repeatedly have told me they might encounter once in 30 years. In a split second they have to be prepared to train for it. I have participated in simulator training for microburst detection and pilot response and recovery. Those are extremely important training measures, and airlines need to continue to put a great deal of effort into pilot training in response to unusual weather conditions.
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But all airlines place a very high priority on weather knowledge. All commercial airlines have very sophisticated weather services. They have dispatch offices. They monitor the weather before takeoff, at the moment of takeoff, while they're airborne. Pilots are practically trained meteorologists. They have to be. This is critical. Weather is a factor in anywhere from 25 percent to 50 percent of aviation accidents.
The next level from commercial aviation down to general aviation is an area where I think more effort needs to be placed. General aviation pilots also need to have training in microburst and windshear detection and gust fronts and managing heavy precipitation and managing icing. We have weather system processor programs, integrated terminal weather systems at major airports, but those are not always available to general aviation pilots, certainly not those who fly under VFR conditions.
At another and appropriate time, I think we should take a look at the training required of general aviation pilots, the overall training, whether the FAA—and this may be a matter for the NTSB to review—ought to require spin training, how to recover from spin. Unusual attitude recovery. There is no FAA time requirement for general aviation pilots to train for recovery from an unusual attitude. Whether the 5-mile VFR visibility ruling is sufficient. These are matters that I think need to be reviewed not because of the most recent tragedy, but because they have not been sufficiently reviewed in a long time.
Now is the time to begin that review. This hearing is a good place to begin the reevaluation of our weather technology, training for management of flight under unusual weather conditions. And I commend you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lipinski, for initiating this hearing.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Bass needs to go next because he has another hearing to go to I believe.
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Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate your accommodations. I have an Intelligence Committee hearing at 10:00. We don't have very many public hearings, so you want to be present at those.
I would like to commend you for holding this hearing.
I would comment quickly on Mr. Oberstar's mentioning spin training. When I got my certificate in 1970, spin training was part of the routine, but it wasn't particularly good for the airplanes. So, as a result, I think it was eliminated in the early 1970's. It is certainly one of the most serious problems that new pilots encounter when they get into conditions where they are disoriented.
I would just like to commend you for holding this hearing because I think that the issue of exploring weather forecasting and weather monitoring is increasingly important by the day, most notably because of the increased number of flights going in and out of commercial airports, especially commercial flights, and it puts pressure on the system to operate aircraft under increasingly difficult meteorological conditions. I think it is important that we maintain the best possible or acquire the best possible monitoring equipment and exercise prudence in the face of tremendously increasing pressure to make sure the aircraft are not put in a position where they are seriously endangered. I think this is a wonderful hearing.
I appreciate the chairman's willingness to recognize me out of order.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bass.
I believe we have determined that Mr. McGovern was here first and should go next on statements.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement other than to just say that I want to thank you for holding this important hearing today.
I want to thank you and ranking member Oberstar for putting this hearing in proper perspective and displaying sensitivity on behalf of the Kennedy family. So, thank you very much.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you.
Mr. Lobiondo?
Mr. LOBIONDO. No opening statement, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to join with my colleagues in thanking you for calling this hearing today on an important subject.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello?
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have an opening statement that I would like to submit for the record. I want to thank you and Mr. Lipinski for calling this hearing, and I will submit my statement for the record.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hutchinson?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and for examining the broad issue that will be addressed at this hearing pertaining to weather related problems and how they affect our air traffic control system and flights across this country.
On Wednesday, June 2nd of this year, I was devastated to learn of the crash of American Airlines flight 1420 at Adams Field in Little Rock. My own charter flight that night, on which I was actually scheduled to fly into Little Rock that same evening, had been canceled because of the weather concerns. I was greatly relieved that the majority of passengers on flight 1420 were spared from serious injury. However, I was deeply saddened to learn that at least nine passengers died that evening, including six residents of my own congressional district. I was further grieved when two more passed away in the days that followed, and as everyone, my thoughts and prayers are with their families and friends and the survivors who are still recovering from injuries.
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I want to take a minute, though, to commend those involved in the rescue for their diligent efforts in the face of really brutal weather conditions that evening. Employees at Adams Field in Little Rock, American Airlines, Continental, and Southwest, the Little Rock Fire Department, and others stayed through the night and into early morning to see to the needs of the passengers, families, and friends on that flight 1420.
Further, I want to thank America's CARE team, the Red Cross, and the team assembled by the National Transportation Safety Board for their efforts to provide information and assistance to those involved. I think it was well done that evening.
Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, approximately 611 million airline passengers arrived safely at their destination last year. More specifically, American Airlines operates 2,200 flights a day, and since 1980 has had only 2 fatal accidents out of a total of 8 million flights. Flight 1420 was the first commercial aviation accident involving fatalities in over a year and a half, and it was the first fatal commercial accident ever at Little Rock Adams Field. These figures are quite a testament to the safety and efficiency of the American aviation system.
Although the NTSB investigation into the crash of flight 1420 will not be complete for some time, it is fairly clear that severe weather conditions played a major role in its occurrence. I am encouraged that the preliminary reports indicate that there was a free flow of information between the air traffic control tower and the cockpit prior to this incident, including windshear alerts and thunderstorm activity updates.
But many questions still remain. Did the weather equipment available to the control tower and the flight crew provide accurate and timely enough data for a fully informed decision to be made about landing flight 1420? Is there more that needs to be done at Little Rock and around the country to provide better weather information and prevent accidents of this sort from happening in the future? Are weather related issues a sufficient priority with the Federal Aviation Administration?
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In preparation for this hearing, of course, I reviewed, as many others, the June 1998 GAO aviation study in which the headline is 'FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Weather Related Recommendations.' I know that since the agency has worked diligently to implement many of the recommendations, but still, we have to examine whether there is more that can be done. Answers to these questions are what we are seeking today.
For that reason, I want to commend the chairman for calling this very important hearing and thank the witnesses for being here to address these issues. Our efforts this morning will not alleviate the pain felt by those who lost loved ones or suffered injury in flight 1420, but it is my sincere hope that what we do today will provide us with the tools and information to reduce weather related difficulties in flying in the future. I thank the chair.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DEFAZIO. No statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Dr. Cooksey?
[No response.]
Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Danner?
Ms. DANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening statement.
I will say, however, that having been a passenger in a small plane that had inadequate instrumentation for the weather we encountered, I will never forget the terror that I experienced during that time. Fortunately, it was the passenger who was experiencing the terror, not the pilot, and everything ended well. But I do recall that and so I do recognize how important weather is to flying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
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Mr. Moran?
Mr. MORAN. No opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Berry?
Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this hearing on aviation in severe weather.
I think all of us extend our condolences not only to those that had losses in the Little Rock accident, but also the events of this past week.
Weather is listed as the cause of 33 percent of all fatal aviation accidents, and as long as we have airplanes, we will continue to have weather related aviation accidents. We cannot stop the weather. However, we do have the ability to accurately determine severe weather and provide it to aviation users.
What I think we need to focus on today is how the public agencies and private entities can better coordinate and disseminate this information, how to make sure that our airports have the best available technology for collecting weather information, and how to ensure that this information is received by pilots as quickly as possible.
Public safety of passengers should be the first and foremost obligation of our Nation's airports at general aviation airports around the country as well as our Nation's primary airports. Discussion of these weather related issues are essential if we are to continue to live up to that obligation.
However, I think it would be premature for people to think that this hearing is an attempt to place blame for any particular accident on the weather. The National Transportation Safety Board will determine the cause of the accident that occurred in Little Rock, and I have full confidence that the National Transportation Safety Board is working diligently to determine the cause of that crash. They have stated that an investigation will take between 9 and 12 months.
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Members of the NTSB have also stated that the investigation is looking at three main areas: the weather, possible pilot error, and equipment malfunctioning. Other collateral areas such as pilot rest issues are also being reviewed as a result of this crash.
This hearing is a good opportunity for us to focus on the weather related issues that are a part of the Little Rock crash, as well as many other aviation accidents.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berry.
Mr. DeMint?
Mr. DEMINT. Mr. Chairman, I don't have an opening statement. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton?
Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to particularly thank you for your work in organizing this hearing. It is not only timely in light of the accidents that have been referred to earlier, where the families have our greatest prayers and sympathy and thoughts, it is important for the way it focuses on an issue that actually is not new.
I believe it is phenomenal how well American aviation performs in poor and changing weather. I have actually gotten to the point where I am not afraid to fly in bad weather, and that took some doing. And that is because the record is just phenomenally good. That is why it is disconcerting when there is a crash in this country. When you are as good as they are, then we have reason to ask how could this have happened.
Your hearing this morning, focusing on the need for a closer bond between the FAA and the National Weather Service, I believe is very important in moving us beyond our concern and towards solutions.
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Mr. Chairman, I want to say to you that the word ''windshear'' is new to my vocabulary. Not until a few years ago was it a word I had ever heard or ever used. I remember when it first came to my attention, when there was an awful plane crash I believe in Texas and the press began to talk about windshear. We want to know more about windshear. We want to see what we can do about windshear and other rapidly changing conditions.
I think this hearing performs an important national service when you focus us on something that I truly believe we can do something about because of the confidence we have in the FAA and because of the confidence American aviation deserves because of its record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lampson?
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for convening the hearing. I think it is obviously timely as other members have said.
But with regard to how we communicate information to pilots, whether they are commercial or private or involved even in space activities, is critical. Obviously, for the second time I think this morning, the Space Shuttle again was delayed from being able to take off, and the knowledge that we have, the technology that we have developed is being used to provide as much safety as possible. In some of our industries, perhaps we don't allow it to reach to where we can do the greatest amount of good.
So, that is what I am hoping to learn from this, and I would hope that we will hear also about the advances in the technological areas that can be so critical to private pilots.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
We are pleased at this time to have a member to lead off this discussion today, and we are always grateful to have one of the outstanding members of our committee and this subcommittee, our friend, Mr. Traficant. He has brought with him today to introduce to the subcommittee Mr. Richard Detore, who is the Chief Operating Officer of the United States Aerospace Group. Mr. Traficant, you may lead off our hearing this morning.
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TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM OHIO; AND RICHARD DETORE, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, U.S. AEROSPACE GROUP
Mr. TRAFICANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start out by complimenting you and Mr. Lipinski for your efforts. I want to also commend Mr. Hutchinson for his swift approach to the tragic events in Arkansas and compliment all the members who are here.
This was scheduled several weeks ago. It has nothing to do with the recent tragic events we are all concerned with.
I would like to take a minute, Mr. Chairman, before I introduce my guest, whom I have great respect for and I believe can impart knowledge to this committee that is very important in the process currently underway with the Federal Aviation Administration.
I am simply the son of a truck driver, and they call me more than that, Mr. Chairman. But one thing I have done, since coming to Congress, is I have found a niche and worked towards safety. And I am very proud of that. Guard rails, signs, lights, bridge impact attenuators, barriers, my legislation to make them 100 percent fundable. My dad was a truck driver. Our roads are much safer and we must do more.
In that regard, I got an opportunity to meet people of the National Transportation Safety Board, and I would like to compliment them starting out. I think Jim Hall and the board have done an outstanding job.
In that regard, I had met and come across individuals that have expounded upon and have developed a visual laser guidance system that makes flight safety that much more enhanced. In doing that, I had an opportunity to meet with several at FAA, including Jane Garvey, who has done an outstanding job, and there are three people that worked for this committee at some point, Suzanne Sullivan, Mary Walsh, and David Traynham, and they have done a great job for our country. I want to compliment Suzanne Sullivan who has worked personally with me and the Administrator, Jane Garvey, on this particular issue.
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But specifically, Chairman, I have come to find out that Congress does a great job and many of their great accomplishments many times are overlooked, the small, not sensational things that we do, such as today. So, I want to compliment you and close by saying this.
I not only went out to visually inspect the technology, I asked the chairman of our subcommittee, a Republican from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan with his son on a rainy night spent a whole hour getting out there and did not get home until late—in fact, early in the morning—but took the time personally to do this. And I want to put that on the record because that is the kind of chairman he is and that is the commitment he has. We thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, today I am here to introduce Mr. Richard Detore. He is the CEO of U.S. Aerospace Group of Manassas, Virginia. Rick is a typed rated airline transport pilot with more than 12,000 flight hours of experience. He was a DC–9 and MD–80 pilot for a major U.S. passenger airline. He is a certified flight instructor with extensive international flying experience and hours. Rick is also a test pilot that has flown in all kinds of weather conditions.
Rick is a graduate of the University of Delaware with a degree in physics. He has a background in advanced meteorology. He is the developer of, in fact, the visual laser guidance system and is director and has been the director of flight operations for a commercial air carrier.
I have come to know him, admire him, and I believe that his involvement in flight safety is a great help to America and will be enlightenment to our committee. I am proud to introduce Mr. Richard Detore, Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Traficant. Thank you for your kind words.
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Mr. Detore, you may begin your statement.
Mr. DETORE. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Lipinski, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here this morning to talk about the challenges of flying in adverse weather conditions. As I know the members today have an extensive and packed schedule, I am going to be brief.
My experiences include a wide spectrum of aircraft from general aviation to high performance jets. I have had the good fortune to fly some of the state-of-the-art equipment and some equipment that is not even available currently on the market today.
As a result of my college background and training in meteorology, I was selected to pilot specially modified aircraft into active thunderstorms. My observations I have come away with is that mother nature is an extremely dynamic force and still to date is very unpredictable. It was readily able to thwart some of the Nation's best meteorologists' interpretations as to what the storms were doing and going to do next.
Thunderstorms, even the smallest, carry more raw energy than an atomic blast. Even with pilots trained to give thunderstorms a wide berth, the NTSB files are covered with aircraft that have strayed in or near thunderstorms with deadly results. Radar systems installed on most commercial and business aircraft can provide misleading and sometimes inaccurate information to cause pilots to fly into the worst part of the storms. Doppler weather radar at airports is a potential solution to augmenting and offsetting these shortcomings of airborne aircraft radar. Unfortunately, these systems, due to cost, are available at only some of the highest use airports.
A possible alternative to this is to use commercially available Doppler weather radar that is available at local television stations and data linking it into the aircraft. I believe this could be provided at a relatively low cost in comparison to terminal Doppler weather radar at all airports.
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Adding this information in the cockpit adds to situational awareness. Situational awareness is a major item to address and as important as equipment enhancements to airports and aircraft. In fact, more aircraft are lost due to the loss of situational awareness by the pilot than to thunderstorms and severe weather themselves. Loss of awareness as to where the aircraft is in relation to the runway or landing zone can and has in the past met with disastrous results. Fatigue, overload, absorption, inexperience, or preoccupation by the pilot contribute to the loss of this awareness.
Making the approach and runway more readily visible to the pilot through enhanced lighting would significantly increase the pilot's situational awareness and improve his ability to pilot and fly a stabilized approach to landing. The lack of a stabilized approach where the aircraft is not on airspeed, proper descent rate, or in final configuration can all but guarantee a poor or hazardous landing. In fact, this is one of the most significant factors in landing an aircraft safely at night and during low visibility conditions as associated with severe weather, fog, or haze.
Current airport lighting can actually become the cause of a nonstabilized approach or a loss of situational awareness. Visual illusions resulting from irregular spacing, intensity levels, or the effects of rain and fog on lighting can lead the pilot to perceive the aircraft in a different position to the runway than it actually is. Many NTSB reports show cases where pilots were unable to overcome the visual illusions resulting from the type of lighting or lack of lighting.
Current runway and approach lighting provide very poor information on the approach path in relation to the runway, critical for a safe landing. Accident reporting shows the majority of all accidents during descent, approach, and landing phase. Most accidents occur in these phases, the typical impacts happening between the outer marker and the runway. This clearly demonstrates the need to enhance approach lighting beyond what is currently in use today to maintain situational awareness during the approach. Currently 99 percent of all landings, even with autoland aircraft, are see-to-land type of landings where the pilot must visually acquire the runway.
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Without a doubt in my mind, the pilots flying into Little Rock would have had a reduced chance of having been met by tragedy had they been better able to conduct a stabilized approach with greater situational awareness through enhanced lighting and better weather information.
Sometimes it comes to the fact that even with the best technologies and all the technologies being available to the pilots, it comes down to the simplest form of simply being able to see the environment you are landing in. I have had the responsibility of flying probably hundreds of thousands of passengers over the years. It is a big responsibility and it is one that I never took lightly. And I can tell you one of the most difficult things to the pilot was visually acquiring the runway and visually understanding the situation that the aircraft was in. There comes a point where you need to transition and look outside of the aircraft. Enhancing runway lights and enhancing airports to be more visually acquired would greatly reduce the number of tragedies and accidents the Nation currently faces.
And I thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Traficant, I might just mention that the night that we flew and had our demonstration, the lighting that we are discussing here was very, very visible to us on really a night of very bad weather, and I am sure you recall that.
Any closing comments you wish to make?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I thank you, Chairman. Looking back at that night for the members, foggy, heavy rain, I think visibility less than a mile, and from approximately over 10 miles out, we saw the laser light and we landed exactly the same spot I think twice we would have and we landed one time.
The only thing I would like to say for the members to understand is, as you see these three lights here designating our time, maybe to explain the system, it is a very simple system. From 20 miles out, you are within about a 5-mile corridor. If you get in with that 5-mile flight path, you are going to see a flashing light. If it is green, you have got to go right. Or red, you have to go left. But when you hone in on the amber, you are home. It is an additional aid. I like it because it is very simple, easy to understand, does not cost the pilot one penny, and it is retrofitted at the airport relatively inexpensively.
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I think the point that maybe has to be made is we are preoccupied many times with great tragedies, but many times with the small aviation craft, the disasters that occur do not get the attention in Washington that many times they should. I think general aviation also needs this particular type of helping hand.
So, I may not have described the colors exactly right, Mr. Chairman, but you and I are certainly not pilots. Not only you and I but your boy as well saw that light, and we saw that laser in a condition that we would have seen no other lights. That is the first light we saw.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I think it would be good if other members could see that same demonstration that we saw, particularly under the conditions.
But the agreement that we had with Mr. Traficant—we already had a large number of witnesses lined up for this hearing, and so if there are any questions for Mr. Detore, I would request that members submit them in writing and they will be included in the record.
Mr. Detore, thank you very much for your statement this morning and your very helpful testimony. Mr. Traficant, thank you very much for bringing Mr. Detore to us today.
We will go ahead and call up the first panel then. We have a very distinguished panel. We have with us once again Mr. Jim Hall, who is Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, and he is accompanied by Dr. Bernard Loeb, who has been with us on several occasions. We have Mr. Steve Brown, who is Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services at the Federal Aviation Administration, and we have Mr. John F. Jones, Jr., who is Deputy Assistant Administrator of the National Weather Service for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. We are very pleased and honored to have all three of these witnesses with us.
We are ready to begin the testimony by the first panel as soon as they have a chance to get seated. We always proceed in the order in which the witnesses are listed in the call of the hearing. That means that, Mr. Hall, we will go with you first and then Mr. Brown and then Mr. Jones. Thank you very much for being with us. Mr. Hall, you may begin your statement.
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TESTIMONY OF JIM HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY BERNARD LOEB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY; STEVEN J. BROWN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AND JOHN E. JONES, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I have just put water all over the table, so it will take me a second here.
Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, and distinguished members of this committee, it is a pleasure to be before you again.
And to Congressman Hutchinson and Congressman Berry from the State of Arkansas, the Board is actively involved presently in looking at the accident investigation in Little Rock, and we will be able to comment, as we can, on that investigation today, since it is an active investigation.
We are pleased to be here today to discuss hazardous weather and aviation safety in the airport terminal area.
Before I begin, I would like to introduce Dr. Bernard Loeb, who is the Director of the Board's Office of Aviation Safety.
Weather related aviation accidents occur too frequently, Mr. Chairman. Current data indicate that 33 percent of all fatal accidents are weather related. Of the weather related fatal accidents that occur, close to 40 percent occur in the airport terminal area.
Weather hazards in the airport terminal area continue to be a significant safety concern. These hazards include low ceilings and visibility; airplane airframe icing both on the ground and airborne in the airport terminal area, runway contamination by ice, snow, and water; and thunderstorms and convective activity, which produces low altitude windshear, strong and gusty winds, heavy rains, hail, and lightning. As the recent accident in Little Rock, Arkansas that took the lives of 11 people shows, thunderstorms and convective activity continue to be among the most significant issues in aviation, especially in the airport terminal area.
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The Little Rock accident occurred June 1, 1999, and involved American Airlines flight 1420, an MD–82 on a flight from Dallas, Texas, to Little Rock. The aircraft crashed after landing, resulting in 11 fatalities including the captain. At the time of the accident, there were heavy thunderstorms in the area of the airport. Although the investigation is ongoing, we can share the following preliminary information on the weather conditions with you.
I have brought two charts that will show the weather that evening. Do we have them now, Dr. Loeb, in the proper order?
Mr. LOEB. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. We appreciate the assistance of the committee staff in placing these before you, and they will be referred to.
[Charts]
Mr. HALL. A thunderstorm was in progress at the airport at the time of the accident. As you are aware, the National Weather Service provides six levels of weather echo intensity. Level 1 is a weak intensity with light to moderate turbulence, and level 6 is extreme and possible severe turbulence. Level 6 was reported in the airport area at the time of the Little Rock accident.
The two charts before you show Little Rock's National Weather Service Doppler weather radar for approximately 5 minutes leading up to the accident. The center of the airport is located at the cross marked with LIT. This type of information is not provided to controllers.
Before the accident, the National Weather Service issued a convective SIGMET advisory for severe thunderstorms, and a severe weather forecast alert was in effect for an area that included the airport, both of which the pilot received. A severe thunderstorm warning to the public was issued by the National Weather Service and was in effect for an area that included the Little Rock airport. This information was not provided to the controllers or flight crew. The severe thunderstorm warning is not an aviation product and is not typically provided to air traffic control or flight crews. We will be evaluating this issue, Mr. Chairman, as part of our investigation.
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The Little Rock airport did not have a terminal Doppler weather radar or an airport surveillance radar with the ability to depict weather echoes and intensities. It did have an improved low level windshear alert system that issued several alerts prior to the accident which the pilot did receive. The pilot also received updates on the winds during the final approach.
A Doppler weather radar, operated by the National Weather Service, was located 6 nautical miles north-northwest of the airport and provided detailed and accurate information on the thunderstorms, including wind speeds in the Little Rock area to National Weather Service personnel. National Weather Service personnel used this information to formulate and disseminate severe weather warnings to the public. However, this information was not available in real time to the flight crew, to the air traffic control personnel, or approach control. Safety Board investigators are looking into this issue as part of the investigation.
According to an interview with the first officer, the flight crew was using their airborne weather avoidance radar to display the location and intensity of the thunderstorms. The thunderstorms in the airport terminal area should have been displayed on the aircraft's radar as significant weather echoes indicating hazardous weather. This issue is also being looked into as part of the board's investigation.
Because the Safety Board's investigation is ongoing, no conclusions have been reached. However, there are a number of important questions that are being addressed, such as why did the flight crew continue the approach and landing at Little Rock? What additional weather information and training should flight crews have to augment their decision making process? What was the aircraft airborne avoidance weather radar showing, and how are flight crews trained to interpret and use the radar display? What are the limitations of airborne weather avoidance radar in the terminal area and what improvements need to be made?
The Safety Board will be considering all these concerns in its investigation of the accident at Little Rock, evaluating what action should be taken to address the concerns, and developing, as appropriate, recommendations for corrective action.
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Two days after the Little Rock accident, Mr. Chairman, on June 3, 1999, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratories issued a report sponsored by NASA's Ames Research Center, and paid for by funds from the taxpayers, entitled ''An Assessment of Thunderstorm Penetration and Deviations by Commercial Aircraft in the Terminal Area.'' This particular report focused on the Dallas-Fort Worth airspace. The report's findings are based on data from slightly more than 60 hours of convective weather. During that time, there were nearly 2,000 airplane encounters with that type of weather.
The report indicates that almost two-thirds of the airplane encounters resulted in the airplane flying through the convective activity. Instead of deviating around storms in the airspace around an airport while approaching to land, pilots regularly penetrate storms with significant precipitation. Arriving aircraft were more likely to penetrate storms when they were following another aircraft, more than 15 minutes behind on their scheduled trip, or flying after dark. This information is disconcerting because it suggests there is a tendency for air carrier pilots to penetrate convective activity similar to that at Little Rock near the airport.
Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged with the developments of much needed equipment and other recent improvements with regard to weather reporting and dissemination. However, the most up-to-date technology is ineffective for aviation safety unless flight crews reexamine their decision making process, airlines reevaluate their procedures and training regarding flight in and near significant weather echoes located in the airport terminal area and we can find ways to provide real-time weather radar inside the aircraft.
This completes my formal testimony, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Loeb and I will be available at the appropriate time to respond to the committee's questions.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Hall.
Before we go to Mr. Brown, just very quickly so we understand these charts. The white lines or dashes or dots is the path of the airplane.
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Mr. HALL. If this is a convenient time for the committee, I will ask Dr. Loeb if he would walk the committee through the two charts briefly.
Mr. DUNCAN. Briefly, yes, that would be good. Go ahead and take a couple minutes to do that, Dr. Loeb.
Mr. LOEB. Mr. Chairman, you are correct. That dashed white line is the flight path of the airplane, and so it is over a period of time. Both of these charts are over a period of time.
The right chart shows a time at which that occurs is when the airplane is in the green area, if you see the chart on the downwind leg, but in the green area. So, at that time he is not physically seeing the worst of the storm.
However, you can see on the chart at the left, that at the time of the landing, which is what that chart is, he has penetrated and is in fact in a level 6 storm at that time.
Mr. DUNCAN. And these two charts show 5 minutes. So, the first chart is roughly 2 and a half minutes. Is that roughly correct?
Mr. LOEB. That is correct, approximately.
Mr. DUNCAN. So, it shows that they were flying through the most severe weather conditions just prior to landing it.
Mr. LOEB. Yes. They are about 5 minutes apart, but yes. At the time, he was clearly in a lower level than he entered at the time he actually made the approach to landing.
Mr. DUNCAN. So, there is 5 minutes difference then in these two charts.
Mr. LOEB. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. I think it shows you, simply trying to study those myself, what is basically taking place is that you can see the weather move on the plane during that 5-minute period.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Really, these pilots had no warning that that severe weather was going to move in on them that quickly. Is that correct?
Mr. HALL. I think it is something we can address further and we will certainly be addressing in the analysis and report. However, I would like to say that they did have significant information about the weather.
Mr. DUNCAN. Oh, they did. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brown?
Mr. BROWN. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to discuss the role that FAA plays in providing weather information to pilots. I would like to take the opportunity both as a pilot and a flight instructor for many years to outline the interrelationships between technology, pilot actions, and other factors in the aviation system.
I can, of course, personally attest that good weather information, timely and accurate data is important to any pilot flying in the system and the end of a successful flight. But much more important than just those factors of knowledge in a pre-flight briefing are many other considerations in the flight relating to operational efficiency, especially for commercial operators, and also passenger convenience, which is always a consideration.
But weather primarily for all of us is a factor in aviation safety. It is the primary factor that we look at in the FAA, and as the agency mandated with ensuring aviation safety, we recognize the prominent role that we play in the distribution of weather information.
While FAA will never be able to change the weather, we have to work aggressively to minimize the negative impacts that it has on the system and on individual flights. To do this, obviously we combine our efforts with other agencies and work closely with them to deploy technology, as well as provide more timely information.
As was mentioned by Chairman Hall, over a 10-year period of recent evaluation, 24 percent of all accidents were related to weather and 33 percent of the fatalities were also related to weather.
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It is important, I think, to understand that technology is certainly a key leverage point in our strategy to minimize accidents and to improve safety in the system. But it is only one element of the overall effort. As the Chairman eloquently pointed out in his statement, other important pieces are pilot training, pilot judgment during the flight, and the overall support they receive from ground systems with which they have contact for timely information. The tragic events of this past weekend have reemphasized that for all of us and they are clearly prominent in our minds today.
I think it might be helpful if I briefly describe how FAA participates in distributing information to pilots and how they typically act on that information once it is received. General aviation pilots can get information from many sources, probably most important, from an FAA flight service station. They also can access weather information by using a personal computer terminal known as DUATS, and those are provided by the agency and many private sector vendors as well. Commercial pilots typically receive their weather information pre-flight from airline distribution centers and dispatchers, and there is a significant investment made by airlines in their own weather distribution systems for the purposes of not only efficiency, but the safety of flight.
The primary information that goes into these distribution systems is provided from many sources, chiefly the FAA, the National Weather Service, and the Department of Defense. All of that information is integrated and brought to pilots through differing distribution systems either prior to flight or during an actual flight.
The value of weather information provided by pilots, who are en route, to other pilots, known as pilot reports, are often underestimated in terms of their actual value. Nothing is better than having an observation from a crew in flight in terms of the conditions they have just encountered or that they see from their on-board equipment. It is much more valuable than what might be sent to them from sensors on the ground. While we have great technology, nothing yet surpasses the ability of the eyeball to gather information.
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Pilots obviously are interested in three types of information: weather at the departure point, weather en route, and weather at the destination. Once that complete set of information is available, pilots make many decisions, primarily tactical decisions, during the flight. They focus on things like the actual ceiling, where the clouds are, what the visibility is, what type of thunderstorms and the intensity of the thunderstorms that may exist. Is there turbulence en route? Will there be icing, and as was pointed out in early statements, would there be windshear as well?
Pilots obviously can plan around bad weather and can anticipate it from pre-flight information, and commercial operators plan routes that are both safe and economical.
As many of the Members of the Committee know, the FAA has an air traffic control modernization program in place, and much of it is targeted toward providing better weather information to pilots with new technology. Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) that has been mentioned here earlier, the low level windshear alert system that has also been discussed, our new weather system processor to be hosted on our terminal radars, as well as automated surface observation systems, are key components in our ability to provide both regional and local weather information to pilots en route.
One of the programs that we are most excited about is the weather system processor where we will be upgrading our ASR–9 terminal radars to provide a capability that is 90 percent of what previous radars, known as TDWR, could provide at far less cost on existing facilities. This allows us to upgrade radars to enhance weather capabilities similar to that of TDWR without going through lengthy environmental approvals, finding new land, and deploying a system much more rapidly. We believe this option will dramatically enhance information to pilots and will be able to deploy rapidly.
The FAA is also exploring the use of satellite based services and data link systems, as they become available, to get information to pilots in a more timely way.
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Finally, I would like to address the General Accounting Office report that was mentioned earlier today that found that FAA was not adequately coordinating its efforts primarily with the National Weather Service. Since that report, we have concentrated our efforts and focused on creating a stronger partnership between the two agencies to more effectively get information out more quickly and to maximize the investment that we have in new sensor technology. FAA also provides leadership on an international basis to achieve many of these same outcomes in an international system rather than just in a domestic context.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say both in my role as the Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services and as a pilot with 25 years of experience, I am personally very aware of the importance of aviation weather, its accuracy in both flight planning and in the conduct of a flight. Clearly, it is our responsibility at FAA to provide accurate and timely weather information, and it is the responsibility of pilots, when they receive it, to use it wisely and exercise good judgment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to any questions you or other Members may have.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Jones?
Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on the National Weather Service's provision of aviation weather information to the FAA. Before I begin, let me state the Department of Commerce's NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Weather Service serve our customer, the American public, through a partnership with other Government agencies, academia, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. The essence of our mission is to deliver credible and timely products and services. Our highest priority is to translate customer and partner needs into products and services when needed most.
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Mr. Chairman, my testimony today will focus on the aviation weather services and dissemination provided by the National Weather Service in our interaction with the FAA.
The National Weather Service has a long history of interaction with the FAA and the aviation community in order to define requirements for safe aviation. To ensure a safe and efficient national airspace system and in support of the FAA's mission, the National Weather Service provides warnings, forecasts, meteorological advice, and consultation through several phases during the planning and execution of flight. Specifically, our longer-term forecasts and warnings provide the most important weather information to aviation partners and customers in the pre-flight and planning phase. During the takeoff and climb-out phase, short-term forecasts and warnings are given greater emphasis. During the en route phase, and especially a key concern of controllers, is the separation of aircraft from hazardous weather. Many long-term and short-term forecasts and warnings are issued by the National Weather Service to assist in this activity. During the aircraft's transition to the airport terminal area and during landing, short-term warnings and surface observations are of greatest importance to aviation partners and customers and given more emphasis.
The scope of aviation services provided by National Weather Service forecasters range from global to local. Let me walk you through these phases.
On the global level, the National Centers for Environmental Prediction provide international flight planning, forecasts, and internationally required meteorological forecast parameters for global aeronautical operations. The National Centers for Environmental Prediction operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
On the hemispheric scale, meteorological watch offices in Kansas City, Miami, Anchorage, Honolulu, and on Guam provide aviation warnings, forecasts, and advisories for the national and international aviation community. These offices also provide around-the-clock services.
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Also on the hemispheric scale, NOAA operates two of the nine worldwide volcanic ash advisory centers, one in Washington, D.C. and the other in Anchorage, Alaska. Volcanic ash advisory centers are the focal point for gathering and evaluating information on volcanic eruptions and subsequent eruptions that could affect international air routes.
Additionally, in the late 1970's, center weather service units, also known as CWSUs, were established in response to the National Transportation Safety Board recommendation A–77–68 calling for the FAA to ''formulate rules and procedures for the timely dissemination to air traffic controllers of all available severe weather information in inbound and outbound flights in the terminal areas.'' Based on this recommendation, the FAA, with the assistance of the National Weather Service, formed the CWSUs.
At the regional scale, National Weather Service forecasters at the CWSUs provide warnings and forecasts to the aviation community, as well as advice and consultation to air traffic controllers, in maintaining an efficient national air traffic network. These CWSUs are located at each of the 21 FAA air route traffic control centers.
Under an interagency agreement, the FAA provides to the National Weather Service all supporting equipment, communications, and supplies at the CWSUs. The CWSU provides services to air traffic controllers during peak hours of operation. Duty hours vary among our CWSUs between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. in the evening local time, 7 days a week. When weather conditions pose a threat to an air route traffic control center's area of responsibility, the traffic manager has the option to retain the CWSU forecaster on overtime beyond their tour of duty for the duration of the threat.
On the local scale, the National Weather Service operates 121 weather forecast offices which provide local airport terminal forecasts and warnings, as well as air route traffic forecasts for specific air routes around the country on a 24 hour per day, 7 days a week basis.
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Working arrangements for meteorological communications between the FAA and the National Weather Service is defined in a memorandum of agreement between the two agencies.
At the national level, the FAA, in consultation with the National Weather Service, has the responsibility to install, operate, support, and maintain a national meteorological communications system which serves aviation interests. At the air terminal level, the FAA is responsible for ensuring local collection or dissemination of weather observations and other aviation weather information.
Agreements at the air terminal level are negotiated between the local National Weather Service office's meteorologist in charge and the chief of the FAA control tower. At locations where these agreements exist, the technology used to ensure information dissemination varies from telephone to data transmission lines.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me direct the members to the accompanied diagram provided to each member and as you see here on the easel.
[Chart]
Mr. JONES. It is a simple representation of how weather information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated between the National Weather Service and the FAA. The diagram depicts basic weather communication pathways. I would like to point out that the National Weather Service has no direct contact with aircraft. National Weather Service products are delivered indirectly to the aircraft by the controllers. Information is delivered almost exclusively in small text files with very limited graphic capability.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you and this subcommittee of our commitment to deliver a credible, timely, and relevant suite of seamless weather, water, and climate products and services which exploit technology to the fullest to meet our customer and partner needs.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear and I will be glad to answer any questions you or any member of the subcommittee may have.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Congressman Berry wants to make an introduction at this time I think.
Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to recognize our colleague from the second district of Arkansas, Vic Snyder, in whose district this Little Rock airport is located. I know of his great concern about this issue also.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much. We have told Congressman Snyder that he can have a seat with us and participate in this hearing, if he wishes. I am not sure he is going to be able to, but we are pleased to have you here with us today.
Mr. Jones, let me ask you. We heard that this storm that these pilots flew into was a level 6 storm and that that is the most severe type of storm. How often does that type of storm occur? Is that a frequent thing?
Mr. JONES. It is not rare. It does not happen all the time, but is not unusual in thunderstorms that occur over Arkansas and really thunderstorms that occur anywhere over the country that we get a level 6. We don't base our warnings strictly on levels.
The advantage of having a Doppler radar is that we also get to observe wind motions in the atmosphere. It is by observing these wind motions in the atmosphere, we are able to detect storms as they are forming and can provide warnings with lead times before the storms get to that severe level.
Mr. DUNCAN. I see. So, the Doppler radar would give you more lead time in order to issue the warnings.
Mr. JONES. Right.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Brown, in the mid–1980's, in a hearing before this subcommittee, the FAA said there were 150 airports across the country that had significant exposure to windshear. Shortly after that, an FAA study called for placing Doppler weather radar at 102 airports. Yet, Mr. Oberstar mentioned in his opening statement that this radar has only been placed at 45 airports. Can you tell us why that is?
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Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in part in the statement, since that time, we have made additional advances in technology that will allow us, with the weather system processor and other capabilities we have developed in the intervening years, to deploy a capability very similar to that of our terminal radars that are existing and are installed today. It allows us then to bring that kind of capability and much of that information into the terminal environment in a more cost effective way and in a more timely way, not having to add additional environmental evaluations since we have an existing piece of equipment in place. So, the program moved from the initial deployment of the terminal radars you mentioned on to a capability that was more cost effective more rapid in distribution.
Mr. DUNCAN. I am told that one of the places that the FAA recommended to place Doppler radar was New York, but that the National Park Service objected. What is the story behind that?
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, we are in discussions and have been for some time with the Park Service on trying to implement that radar that would serve both JFK airport and LaGuardia because it would serve two primary and important airports. The siting of the radar is quite important, and there are very few options in terms of geographically where it has to be positioned.
We have identified a site. It is a site that is under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service. We are talking with them about the use of the site. We very much want to put that radar in, have been aggressively trying to do so, in fact with Chairman Hall's support and assistance. The Justice Department is now involved in trying to make sure that that radar can go in place and begin to serve the public.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hall, you provided us with information or stated that the NTSB has issued over 120 weather related safety recommendations. What is the status of most of those recommendations? Have they been addressed or implemented by the FAA?
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Mr. HALL. I would like Dr. Loeb to give a little oversight on that. If I could first, Chairman Duncan, just briefly comment on the terminal Doppler Weather Radar situation. As you know, while there are 45 that the money has been provided for, there are only 39 of those systems actually operational in place as we speak today. I have written the Secretary of the Interior—I have yet to receive a response from the Secretary—regarding the Board's concerns about the failure, after an extended period of time, to have this system in service in some of the most active airspace in our country for the Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports. I have spoken with Administrator Garvey and her general counsel to assure her that the Board will do anything in trying to resolve this issue. To have this very expensive technology sitting in a warehouse somewhere is just inexcusable, and it needs to be addressed and resolved immediately.
Dr. Loeb will try to provide an overview of the over 100 recommendations the Board has made on weather related accidents in the past.
Mr. LOEB. The vast majority of those weather related recommendations have been closed, some of them years ago. This goes back in a record that is 25, 30 years old. Some of them were windshear recommendations, some thunderstorm recommendations, icing recommendations. Most of those, I am pleased to say, have been closed in a positive manner. There are a few recommendations that are still open. Three that are most important are open in an acceptable manner. The FAA is currently acting on them. If we have a concern it is over the length of time to complete action.
One of the recommendations issued in 1995 addresses the center weather service units. After the USAir accident at Charlotte, we asked for them to reevaluate how the CWSUs operate and to reevaluate and revise the procedures so that weather would be more readily and accurately disseminated in a more timely fashion to the crews.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
We will go for first questions now to Mr. Lipinski. All right. We will go to Eddie Bernice Johnson for questions. Ms. Johnson?
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Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being a little late this morning.
The study mentioned by Lincoln Labs on thunderstorm penetrations and deviations by commercial pilots sounds very interesting. What would you suggest as a follow-up to this work, and is anything currently planned?
Mr. HALL. That report was issued 3 days after this particular accident, and therefore as part of what I anticipate will be a board hearing on this accident, we will certainly have the representatives of MIT come in and provide an overview of this work. I believe it is a most significant study. As I said, the study indicates some disturbing patterns of operation in the aviation community, and I think the unfortunate accident at Little Rock gives the board an opportunity to give a close look at both the study and this issue.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you.
A number of the witnesses raised concern about weather training. Have you ever evaluated this issue and do you have any plans for that training?
Mr. HALL. Yes. Dr. Loeb?
Mr. LOEB. Yes, we have in the past looked at this issue, and it will be a central part of this investigation. Training varies from air carrier to air carrier. but most do provide extensive weather training. Whether it is adequate, fully adequate, whether there is more work that needs to be done, these things we will be looking at in the course of the investigation of the Little Rock accident.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you.
Now, for the FAA, I understand the FAA has a priority system in its budget process for the national airspace system. Under this system, weather is categorized as essential rather than critical. Is the practical effect of this categorization that aviation weather systems are not among the most protected programs when the budget cuts have to be made?
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Mr. BROWN. Congresswoman, in my experience, no. The weather systems compete very effectively for available resources I think for reasons that many of us would recognize. First of all, those systems are some of the newest technology that has been developed and offer the promise that NTSB has recommended to us in their previous investigations over the years. Second, there is a lot of support from our customers, from pilots, from airlines, and others for the implementation of those systems and that is well recognized by the agency. So, we have a great desire to continue to make improvements in weather technology.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Johnson. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the original request or the idea for this hearing came from Congressman Hutchinson, and we will go to him for the next set of questions.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really do appreciate your so promptly recognizing the need for this hearing and taking the leadership in it. I also want to join my other colleague from Arkansas in recognizing Congressman Vic Snyder and his interest in this. Certainly it is in his district that this crash occurred, and he has great concern about it, as I do, since six of the fatalities resided in my district.
I think the witnesses' testimony has been helpful today, and I am very grateful for your work on providing a safe traffic system for our pilots.
I wanted to go to the testimony of Mr. Hall. You indicated that there was a level 6 thunderstorm that existed at the time the pilot landed the aircraft. You mentioned in your testimony that the pilot received weather information. Was he aware that it was a level 6 thunderstorm?
Mr. HALL. Dr. Loeb is in a better position to respond, and I call on Dr. Loeb to respond, with your permission.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Certainly, absolutely.
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Mr. LOEB. The terminology ''level 6'' was never, to the best of our knowledge, communicated to the crew, and it is not clear at all that anyone in the tower knew that as well.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. What terminology would be used to reflect the severity of a level 6 thunderstorm?
Mr. LOEB. Well, that kind of information could be provided and certainly if a Terminal Doppler Weather Radar had been available and that information and perhaps even with the ASR–9 and the WSP that Mr. Brown has spoken of, that information could be provided. But it simply couldn't be provided in that kind of terminology at the time.
Now, having said that, there was clearly exchange of information, and clear knowledge on the part of the flight crew that a thunderstorm was in the vicinity, but not necessarily the knowledge that it was a level 6.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. If the air traffic control individual wanted to communicate the severity of a thunderstorm, would he use the term ''level 6'' or another term?
Mr. LOEB. That is a question I think may be better answered by Mr. Brown in terms of what the air traffic controllers would actually say.
Mr. HALL. We understand the question, sir. I did not, unfortunately, have any of my experts in that area available. I will get the answer for the record. If either Mr. Brown or Mr. Jones knows the specific answer, I would call on them.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Brown?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Hutchinson. Normally they would refer to it as a severe thunderstorm.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Did the public have the information through the National Weather Service that this was a severe thunderstorm in this area?
Mr. LOEB. Yes, they did but the flight crew also had gotten a convective alert that indicated that severe thunderstorms were possible in the area.
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. And were those same radar pictures that we saw that were demonstrated by Mr. Hall available to the pilots in the aircraft?
Mr. LOEB. No, sir.
Mr. HALL. No.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. And those pictures were from NWS?
Mr. LOEB. Yes, sir, from a weather surveillance radar that was in the area that was about 5 miles away and was providing information to the NWS and to meteorologists.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Now, Mr. Jones I believe information was provided about the communications flow from weather related information and how it gets to the aircraft in its circular fashion. It all goes through the air traffic control system. I want to know Mr. Hall's reaction to that communication flow and if there is any means available for a pilot to have the same radar picture that we saw that seemed to be very clear.
Mr. HALL. Congressman, I think that your request to the Chairman for a hearing in this area is very timely. I also hope that the Board's investigation into the Little Rock accident will help to further put attention on the growth in aviation in our country, not just at the 40 large airports that are targeted for the most sophisticated weather equipment, but at numbers of airports such as Little Rock, Arkansas; Knoxville, Tennessee; Chattanooga, Tennessee, where I happen to live; and other communities across the country that while they are not major hubs, are very important parts of the aviation system.
I think also we need to look in the areas of both part 121, as well as part 91, general aviation, on doing a better job to get the technology that the public has into the aviation community, to the cockpit, to the pilot, to the operators, the air traffic control system, because obviously that weather information is sensitive and important to the public. I sit at home. If there is bad weather system in Chattanooga, all the TV stations will be running a streamer across the bottom of the screen with the information. Yet, someone maybe 5,000 or 15,000 feet in the air may not have as good information as I have sitting in my living room.
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the gentlemen for the responses and I thank the chair.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Traficant?
Mr. TRAFICANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple questions about Little Rock. Mr. Hall, was it a fact that plane did land on the runway?
Mr. HALL. I will defer to Dr. Loeb on that.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Just briefly.
Mr. LOEB. The answer is yes, sir.
Mr. TRAFICANT. It landed too far down the runway to be salvaged. Is that a correct assessment?
Mr. LOEB. It landed in a position down the runway where it could have stopped safely on the runway.
Mr. TRAFICANT. It hit a light tower.
Mr. LOEB. Yes, sir. Well, it hit a tower past the end of the runway.
Mr. TRAFICANT. I have a couple questions. A number of people over the years have brought up weather training and integration of weather training and the increased need for it. Just real briefly, Mr. Hall, is that a priority and is that something that we are re-energizing?
Mr. HALL. I would hope so, yes, sir.
Mr. TRAFICANT. To the FAA, there is a priority system in the budget process for the national airspace system. Under this system, weather is categorized as essential rather than critical. Is the practical effect of this categorization that aviation weather systems are not among the most protected programs when budget cuts have to be made?
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Mr. BROWN. Congressman, they certainly compete effectively in the overall priorities within the agency. We have very strong support, both inside the agency and among our customers, for the delivery of that service, and they do quite well.
Mr. TRAFICANT. In 1995, the National Research Council criticized the Federal Aviation Administration for inadequate management of its aviation weather activities, especially for poor coordination with the National Weather Service, and I want to quote, ''for lacking a clear policy on your role in aviation weather.'' Later the same year, an advisory committee echoed those concerns, and last year a panel convened by the General Accounting Office did, though, credit you with improvements. And we are glad to see that. But they still rated the agency's progress in a few areas from poor to fair.
Specifically, what steps have you taken to improve the coordination with the Weather Service, number one?
Number two, what progress has been made in the Administration's role in weather related activities?
Finally, have you undertaken any internal reorganization to streamline the varied weather requirements research and operations offices within FAA that was highlighted by several of these groups and by the General Accounting Office?
Mr. BROWN. If I could start with the last part of your question, first, have we taken any steps to streamline what was previously a decentralized organizational focus on weather, the answer is yes, we clearly have. We took those recommendations seriously and we followed each of them I think generating the response you referred to that we have acted and been responsive to those recommendations.
We formed a focused aviation weather office and made that a centralized function with clear responsibilities and began to develop improved memorandums of understanding that were referred to in Mr. Jones' statement between the agency and the National Weather Service. So, we clearly understood the roles that each had not only in technology, but in developing new procedures and distributing information to the users.
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So, we took important steps I think to address those. We are not done. We are not resting on what we have done so far. There is much more that we can do, and we are doing that in conjunction with our customers and asking them what their needs are.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would have a number of questions I would like submitted to each respective group represented here, and I would like them submitted in writing and spread across the record.
I would just like to close by saying that this subcommittee and the full committee supports your efforts. We think, even though there have been some of these reports, that every one of you have responded very well.
I think if we look back and I look at my experience on this committee, Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Oberstar has addressed most of these things and many of them now have come to pass. So, I am hoping that we would continue to work with our leaders and I think we can be of assistance. We want to help. So, I appreciate it and yield back my time.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thune?
Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to credit you for addressing this important issue, and I would like to, if I might, focus on a couple of issues that are sort of important I think to smaller airports, airports in my State which serve not hundreds of thousands of passengers or millions of passengers but tens of thousands of passengers and also do a good amount of general aviation traffic.
In recent years we have done away with a lot of the manned flight service stations and gone to AWOS, ASOS type programs in primarily what I think is a transitional period. Some contract weather observers have been in place as well at smaller airports. I know that the AWOS and ASOS have been touted as adequate for smaller airports that serve nearly a dozen daily commercial flights and then some general aviation traffic.
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But I think that despite all that, the technology does have its limitations. In fact, one of the shortcomings of the technology is its ability to detect and report icing conditions on a runway and haze and fog in the air. I think a human presence at these airports would certainly help detect troublesome weather conditions.
What I would like to do is direct a question, if I might, at Mr. Brown and Mr. Jones. Is there technology available to some areas of the country at larger airports, for example, that is not now available to cities, like Pierre, South Dakota, Watertown, Aberdeen, Huron, that might overcome some of the shortcomings of ASOS, AWOS systems?
Mr. JONES. There are two levels of ASOSs. At larger airports, some of them have uninterruptable power supplies that are now available at the smaller airports. There are four categories of levels of airports that get ASOSs, A, B, C, and D, that have been assigned by the FAA. We are improving our sensors specifically for freezing rain and those will be deployed this summer. So, we are working along with the FAA to try to improve what ASOS can do at every airport.
Mr. THUNE. Anything to add, Mr. Brown?
Mr. BROWN. I would just add that I think the freezing rain sensors will address the issue that you raised. We are also working on integrating our lightning detection systems with ASOS as well. So, those systems are quite capable and they report many parameters that pilots need to know, all the ones, of course, that are necessary under the regulations, but additional ones as well that help with the quality of the decisions they make.
Mr. THUNE. Are there other efforts that your agencies are undertaking to ensure that various types of aviators, whether they are commercial or general aviation, have access to timely and accurate information? You mentioned some of the things that you are doing in terms of upgrading those systems. Are there other things that we can or that you are doing currently?
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Mr. BROWN. I think your question really addresses our distribution systems,
Mr. THUNE. Right.
Mr. BROWN.—how readily we can make the information available either through telephone systems—and we have certainly upgraded and evolved those over the years—through personal computer access since many, many more people have access to those both at home as well as in their work environment. So, we are obviously expanding that capability.
We are also looking at enhancing our broadcast service of weather information so that it is more widely available en route, not just in terms of pre-flight planning.
So, we look at not only the technology for sensing and observing the weather, but also how we can more effectively distribute it both in advance of a flight and during a flight to pilots.
Mr. THUNE. Well, that is really important, timeliness of information, a lot of that data. Our State has some very dynamic weather conditions. We have certainly a number of calm days throughout the year. In fact, at one time we were described as the Sunshine State, but there is also a tendency for severe weather to strike with very little notice and also to wreak a tremendous amount of damage, as has been true in the last couple of years. So, I guess as far as making that information available and the efforts that you have underway to do that is certainly very important, particularly given the fact that we have shifted some of the technology away from manned stations to the AWOS and the ASOS systems.
Just, if I might, a question for Chairman Hall. What practices and/or technology would you recommend be implemented by airports working with the National Weather Service and the FAA?
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Mr. HALL. If I could, again I will ask Dr. Loeb to comment on that, sir.
Mr. LOEB. I think the issue raised by Congressman Oberstar earlier about the 102 airports that were originally going to get Terminal Doppler Weather Radar is still of concern to us. As Mr. Brown said, some of the airports will get the advanced ASR–9 weather processing system, and we think that will help as well. What concerns us right now is that we think that system is probably only going to go into another 35 or so airports and that still leaves a number that are uncovered.
I think one of the things that needs to be explored and that we will be exploring in the Little Rock investigation is how to get the information from the weather surveillance radars, the WSRs that are out there, the 88's that are out there, to two places. One is to the control personnel and to the airplanes through a data uplink. I think right now the WSR information is available through the Internet to the public. Certainly it can be made available to the personnel in the towers and the approach control facilities. So, that is something that we will be exploring.
Mr. HALL. Congressman, just on a practical level, what we have seen, of course, those stations are still of concern I know to the members of the Alaska delegation. The Board completed a safety study in Alaska and made some very specific recommendations in regard to that State because of the level of aviation activity there. But when this system was put in place, it was a one-size-fits-all. There are some unusual airport locations in the country and there are some unusual weather conditions in the country that may require more human reporting.
The other issue is basic common sense. As we see this technology and the responsibility for the interpretation of this technology transfer from a trained professional to report it to the operator, there has got to be an increased emphasis on the training of the operators, whether they be again in commercial or general aviation, to effectively interpret it, as well as trying to get the technology so it speaks in the simplest terms possible in terms of information that is essential to safety.
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Mr. THUNE. I see my time is expired. I thank you for your answers.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I do have a statement I would like to have made part of the record.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. We will make your statement part of the record.
Before we go to Mr. Oberstar, that was a question I had. If we do a good enough job in getting advanced weather equipment in the airports and into the planes, Mr. Jones, do the pilots need more training in reading and interpreting this weather information?
Mr. JONES. All our meteorologists went through 4 weeks of training in how to learn how to interpret the radar. So, yes, there is a lot of training that is needed when it comes to interpreting Doppler weather radar depiction, yes.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall, I want to compliment you on the manner in which you have conducted the inquiry into the Kennedy tragedy. Your calm and reasoned, dispassionate, factual presentation of information is in the tradition of the NTSB and of the highest traditions. It reminds me of Vice Chairman Francis' conduct of the ValuJet and TWA tragedies in the same high manner.
Mr. HALL. Thank you, sir.
Mr. OBERSTAR. There are so many factors in weather that we have come to understand and define much more sharply and clearly in the last, I would say, 15 years that have also led NOAA, FAA, oftentimes prodded by NTSB, to develop technology for better detection. We know much more about microbursts, a phenomenon that was poorly understood 20 years ago, now very clearly I think understood, windshear detection systems, storm cell information, lightning information, terminal area winds aloft, as well as runway level winds, short-term visibility predictions, all those critical pieces of information to be integrated into manageable information for en route centers, for TRACON controllers, for tower controllers, and for commercial as well as general aviation pilots. The latter is the group that I think does not get as much information as they need, and I want to come to that in a moment.
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There is a system that integrates all of that that FAA has been working on, WARP, weather and radar processor. According to FAA's report on all the air traffic systems' development, the status report which I get and have been reading faithfully every month for years, WARP is condition red, behind status. This is the technology that will put NEXRAD and information about all those other weather conditions I cited on the screen for the DSR at en route centers. What are you doing about getting that up to speed and getting Raytheon to produce?
Mr. BROWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, as we have worked with Raytheon, we have indicated our displeasure over the time that it is taking to fully develop and deploy WARP. As you mentioned in your question, it is integral with the deployment of DSR, the display system replacement. We are doing very well with DSR. It will be fully implemented. We began earlier this year. We expect to have it fully implemented as the platform for all the new en route center displays by the end of this fiscal year, at the end of September.
WARP was originally scheduled to come along in the implementation phase, as you indicated, just following closely behind the deployment of DSR. We have not been able to keep it as tightly coupled as the original schedule pointed out. We have worked with Raytheon in reprogramming and trying to come up with a more expeditious schedule. We have worked with our employees and the bargaining unit to more rapidly define the maintenance procedures and the certification procedures that we will use to take care of some of the delays that were associated with the development of those procedures as well. And we are making modifications to the console, the actual set of racks that the equipment would be placed in, to make it more maintainable and to be able to field it more quickly than the original design would have permitted. Some of these changes, as you are well aware, are human factor related changes that will make the system more usable and certainly more maintainable, but they have cost us time and we need to move more expeditiously to conclude that.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I urge you to stay on top of it. Raytheon has other problems that we have explored in this committee such as delay with STARS and another technology I want to raise, the I-T-W-S, or ITWS, the integrated terminal weather system, that also brings together a number of technologies and puts them in hands of controllers. It was scheduled to be Y2K certified by August. I would like your comment on whether that has been achieved, but also your comments on code red for ITWS as well. Your latest report shows that Raytheon is going to exceed budget and be behind baseline on deployment of the technology.
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Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have ITWS prototyped now in three locations in the system: in Dallas, Orlando, and in our New York facility. As I indicated earlier with regard to WARP and as you alluded to in your question, this is another program that we have been focusing on with Raytheon.
We recognize the critical benefits that it will provide, as you pointed out. The integration function is one of the most important things that can be done in taking separate pieces of information and actually bringing them together in a more meaningful way for decision making.
So, ITWS is a program that is in trouble, as you pointed out. We have worked very hard over the course of the spring and the summer to try and get it back on schedule. We recognize the priority that it has.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I see my time is running out here, but if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall I think very appropriately commented on the human factor in weather, whether there is sufficient training for pilots to assimilate the complex data that they are receiving, whether to get recurrent training, whether commercial pilots, general aviation pilots—I think commercial pilots probably do get the recurrent training they need, but general aviation pilots are not required and do not necessarily get the kind of training they need to be on top of the latest weather technology and information.
There is certainly now simulator capability to train general aviation pilots in unusual attitude recovery and spin recovery. I would like a comment on whether the board has reviewed those matters, whether the board has assessed the capability of flight service stations to cope with the changing conditions, to have the adequate technology to provide information to general aviation pilots as well as the commercial pilots who do call in to flight service stations. I have plugged in and heard them checking in. Your assessment of the state of the art of flight service stations, training of pilots, general aviation pilots.
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Mr. HALL. I again will ask Dr. Loeb to add comments in this area, Congressman. My observation in this area, and basically what I have learned through my term on the Board or reading information on issues that you raised many, many years ago, that these are not new issues.
Let me now refer to Dr. Loeb.
Mr. LOEB. You have raised, Mr. Congressman, a number of issues. Going back to the issue, though, of spin training, years ago spin training was a part of the program. It can be dangerous. It was cut out of the program. I believe you are correct, that simulator development has come to a point where I think it is certainly something that can be explored as to whether some of that could be done. There are some issues about having adequate data available and so forth. But those are things that we will be looking at as a part of the ongoing investigations.
As far as the flight service stations, one of the issues that we are still concerned about is that there are localized conditions. Other concerns include: you do not have the adequate on-scene personnel; handling that information and getting it to the people in the cockpit on time; and finally, are they trained well enough to be able to use what they are given. These are things that I think still need to be explored and more needs to be done.
Mr. HALL. You have given me a thought this morning. We routinely hold a number of hearings on issues that follow major commercial aviation accidents. I don't want to sound like every other head of an agency in Washington, but resources have been difficult in the general aviation area because we do have the responsibility, through our eight regional field offices to provide probable cause reports on all general aviation accidents. It has been at an average of 2,000 over the years. This means many of our general aviation accident investigators are more involved on a day-to-day basis looking at a specific accident, and trying to possibly spend time working with many of the fine organizations that represent private pilots and maybe trying to focus on some of the major issues that we see developing.
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So, I will ask Dr. Loeb to give some thought as to whether it would be timely for the Board to start preparations on a hearing that might focus on several of the important general aviation issues. We obviously would try to consult with the appropriate associations at that time. So, maybe we could look a little more closely at these items that you are so familiar with and were part of your question.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have several times urged the Board to perhaps expand its scope and engage in broader review, broader issue area review of these safety matters and categories of safety issues. This is one that I think cries out for attention. While we have a handful of commercial aviation tragedies, 630 on average general aviation pilots or their passengers die every year. About a third of those are weather related. But most of the fatalities, almost 90 percent of the fatalities, in general aviation come in conjunction with weather related accidents.
So, the availability of flight service station, technology information, training of the weather controllers, and the human observers. Once in a while, someone has got to stick his head out of those buildings and sniff the air and look at the horizon, as they did in the dawn years of aviation, and say, we have got bad weather here.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. DeMint?
Mr. DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank the panel. After touring a control tower a few weeks ago, I particularly appreciate that you are all sitting panel table together.
I got the impression after my tour that maybe sometimes you do not talk to each other. I know one tour does not an expert make, but I was concerned to see a monitor provided by the National Weather Service that had a 5-or 10-minute delay that I was essentially told sounded great as an idea, but they really didn't use it and they could be much better off if they could have a cable weather station as far as updated news. As we saw this morning, in a few minutes the weather can totally change. So, their information at least in this medium size tower—it sounded like we had the funding, we had the technology, but we have not talked about how is the best way to get it to the tower and to the pilots. So, that is a concern of mine.
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I also had a concern that the visibility decisions were made by the National Weather Service about a half mile away in a valley, and many times flights appeared to be held up because the visibility there was not good while the tower could see for miles and miles around the airport. Again, it sounded like for the sake of some standard structure, some common sense might have been pushed aside.
So, after our hearing on the Park Service this morning, it kind of heightened my concern that some common sense safety decisions might not be made, even with the funding, even with the technology, because of jurisdictional boundaries that might exist.
My question really goes to any of you, but Mr. Hall, I will just start with you. Can you give us some assurance that in reviewing these safety problems and challenges that we can bring the different agencies together in a way that would deliver the best safety solutions and not just something that sounds good in one segment of the issue?
Mr. HALL. Human performance in the government, Congressman, is going to require constant oversight of this committee. With the various agencies to achieve coordination is something I think each of the individual agencies attempt to do, but many times this gets down to leadership, such as the leadership I have seen with Administrator Garvey and at the National Weather Service. As I mentioned earlier, we have completed a safety study in Alaska. As a result of that study we now have focus and better coordination between the United States Post Office, which is an important player in terms of aviation safety in that State, the National Weather Service, and the FAA. But it is a matter that required Congressional observation and Congressional oversight.
So, we will all continue to do our best. I know the gentlemen at these tables, but to give you a blanket assurance, I could not do that. I think that is a day-to-day challenge in government to be sure that the various agencies and organizations, not just at the Federal level but as they interface with the State and local entities, are well coordinated.
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Mr. BROWN. Congressman, just specifically to what you pointed out, as hard as we work, we are not infallible. So, I think your comments are important. In particular, the sensor that you talked about. If we have a sensor, an observation piece of equipment that we have not located as well as we should, then we should look at that, and I would like to follow up with you on that.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. JONES. I guess the only thing I would add, as Steve said in his testimony, we are working to improve our relationship both at a national, regional, and local level. I hope what you saw was not typical of what you would see if you took another tour to another tower.
Mr. DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeMint.
Mr. Lampson?
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I mentioned at the beginning, Mr. Hall, NASA and the fact that the Space Shuttle twice this week did not go up. I know that there is a difference in launching a space shuttle, as opposed to launching a couple thousand airplanes out of an airport. However, there have been some very specific parameters set for decisions to be made when NASA is considering whether to light the fire and launch the shuttle into space.
Have we explored what NASA does in its procedure in making those decisions, and can we not learn from what they do procedurally that might help us make decisions and help pilots make decisions in airports?
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Mr. HALL. One of the recommendations that came out of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security said that more of the information and resources that are available to NASA, specifically in the area of safety and security, should be utilized in ongoing programs. Based on that recommendation, there has been a program that has been initiated by the FAA and by NASA to better interface and use that information. But the Board always looks on what is being done by NASA and the NASA facilities.
One area that is not rocket science but is very important to aviation safety both in space and in aviation is the subject of fatigue. We cosponsored a symposium several years ago on fatigue and what had been learned on fatigue and fatigue countermeasures with NASA Ames. Each one of these centers, as I am sure you are aware, has a specific area of expertise.
I think just this month we will be using the facilities at NASA Langley for electromagnetic tests. So, the Board is constantly active in that area.
And possibly Mr. Brown might want to speak more, if the Congressman so desires, on the ongoing relationship between the FAA and NASA.
Mr. BROWN. Well, Congressman, most of our extensive technical work with NASA is focused in our research and acquisitions area. As Chairman Hall pointed out, they are a very creative agency. They developed leading edge technology in a number of domains, some of it highly technical with regard to powerplants or airframe structures, but also in the area of human performance.
We work with them closely in our research programs and joint teams to take advantage of what NASA has developed. Often NASA will develop a technology, and our focus is really on implementing it. How is it practically applied to the national airspace system or how can it be built into a product that is manufactured? And we assist in trying to shape the technology in that sense, so, it becomes practical and implementable.
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Mr. LAMPSON. I wonder if it wouldn't be helpful, Mr. Chairman, for us to invite that NASA team to testify at some point in time. I would appreciate it if you would give consideration.
Mr. DUNCAN. We could do that. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. LAMPSON. Two other quick things, and I know my time is going to be extremely short.
What will it take both in cost and delivery to be able to get the equipment that we have been talking about here and the knowledge? Has there been estimates made as far as getting both equipment into the airports and to the airplanes and knowledge to the pilots? Would you comment on that briefly?
Let me go ahead and ask my other question, and whoever wants to, can get it out because I know that we are going to run out of time in about a minute.
We talked and Mr. Oberstar talked about WARP and ITWS and other systems that are being developed. As those systems are developed, is there going to be equipment that will become less needed at airports that we are presently trying to beef up? Will this affect the use of TRACON or any of the other types of facilities that we see located at our airports? And are we going to make sure that we don't duplicate, that we don't spend our money out of order as we improve our ability to see in these areas?
Mr. BROWN. Well, Mr. Lampson, quickly, we have talked about a number of systems here today. In general, the agency spends just over $2 billion a year on its facilities and equipment programs. We also have funds that we spend, of course, on airport development that average in the area of $2 billion a year. So, we make a significant investment in both airport technology and navigation and landing systems there, as well as in these other radar related systems we have talked about.
Overall, on your second question, I think it really dealt with decommissioning. As we put out new systems, are there older systems that we can take out? That is clearly the case. As we deploy new radar systems that replace systems that may be 30 or 40 years old or lighting systems or other items, we do decommission the previous systems as we frequently deploy the new ones.
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Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sherwood?
Mr. SHERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
As I have listened to the testimony today, it strikes me that our technology has surpassed our ability to fund, supply, convey, and interpret it to our controllers and our pilots. One specific instance of that that I would like to get into a little more, because I think the more technical aspects have been handled by people more knowledgeable than I, is New York, some of the busiest airspace in the world. How long have we been trying to get this new radar system set up for New York? Mr. Hall, can you help me with that?
Mr. HALL. I think Mr. Brown could probably give you the specific dates, but it has been a long time, sir.
Mr. SHERWOOD. How long?
Mr. BROWN. It has been a couple of years, Congressman.
Mr. SHERWOOD. Two, three, four?
Mr. BROWN. I could actually give you the exact dates for the record, and I would be happy to do so, but it has been years.
Mr. SHERWOOD. And that has been you have been asking the Park Service for permission to put it up? How long have we had it?
Mr. BROWN. It has been approximately 5 years from the time that we initially planned.
Mr. SHERWOOD. So, we have been working on it for about 5 years.
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
Mr. SHERWOOD. And we have actually had the equipment ready for——
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Mr. BROWN. A similar time period.
Mr. SHERWOOD. And you want to put it on ground owned by the Park Service?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
Mr. SHERWOOD. And you have determined carefully that that is the best location?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, we have. As I mentioned I think earlier in the hearing, we wanted to serve both airports, LaGuardia and JFK, and it is because of the geometry of serving both of those airports that that particular site is critical for that location of that radar. We actually own the land, but the Park Service is involved in the land as well in terms of it being a park and a part of their system. And the National Park Service owns adjacent land around our site. So, those are the general issues there. But we clearly are working with them and we have to work with them to deploy the radar.
Mr. SHERWOOD. Well, I understand that you are attempting to work with them.
Mr. Hall, do you think it is important to the safety of all those passengers going in and out of the New York area to have that new system put up?
Mr. HALL. Oh, yes, clearly, Congressman. We had an accident there with Eastern Airlines in 1975, a very catastrophic commercial aviation accident. Of course, given just the density in that airspace and the uncertain weather in that area, it is a no-brainer. It needs to be there.
Mr. SHERWOOD. Well, thank you. It is clearly a no-brainer that it needs to be there. You have been working on it for 5 years. I would certainly like to hear the Park Service's reasons for denying you that. It looks like the Federal Government is shooting ourselves in the foot here. And what specific reasons do they give you for delaying the installation of that?
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Mr. HALL. Before Mr. Brown comments on that, Congressman, I wrote to Secretary Bruce Babbitt concerning that subject, and the Board has issued recommendations to the FAA based on previous accident investigations, specifically the USAir accident in Charlotte, North Carolina that occurred in 1995. I can provide this letter for the record and for your review.
Mr. Brown, do you want to get into the specifics?
[The letter follows:]
[insert here]
Mr. BROWN. The Park Service has expressed two general concerns. One is the suitability of a radar, a large structure on the land, and whether it is compatible with the purposes of a park as they see it and the function of a park.
Another issue has to do with citizen concerns about potential emissions from the radar. We, of course, believe that the radar is perfectly safe. We have radars in urban areas around the country, and we have made that point aggressively to the Park Service.
And we believe that the radar can be sited in a way that doesn't totally destroy the value of the park, but yet offers tremendous aviation benefits to the Nation.
Mr. SHERWOOD. How do you feel your negotiations are going? Do you see an end here to this? And what are the resolutions? Does this eventually have to go to court? How do we keep from having this unnecessary delay?
Mr. BROWN. I hope that it doesn't end up where you are talking about. As I mentioned earlier, the Justice Department is now actively involved in the issue, and I think we should get a quick resolution to this.
Mr. SHERWOOD. A quick resolution now after 5 years of work.
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Mr. BROWN. I hope so, Congressman.
Mr. SHERWOOD. Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherwood.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen.
I would like to start off by going back to Mr. Hall's testimony, and I just do not quite follow this. On page 8, it starts off at the top, ''At the time of the accident, the National Weather Service issued a Convective SIGMET advisory for severe thunderstorms, and a Severe Weather Forecast Alert was in effect for an area that included the airport, both of which the pilot received.'' Then you go on to say that the ''Severe Thunderstorm Warning to the public was issued by the National Weather Service and was in effect for an area that included the Little Rock airport. This information is also not provided to the controllers or flight crew. The Severe Thunderstorm Warning is not an aviation product. It is not typically provided to air traffic control or flight crews.''
Now, I assume that the other information that wasn't given to the controllers or the flight crew was the fact that there was, on page 7, a level 6 thunderstorm going on. Is that correct?
Mr. HALL. I will ask Dr. Loeb to speak to this.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Sure. Dr. Loeb?
Mr. LOEB. Yes. The specific knowledge of the level 6 cell within the thunderstorm was not known and not provided to them. They got two pieces of information: the convective SIGMET that was issued perhaps just less than an hour earlier and the severe weather forecast alert. Those two things were provided to the flight crew. The severe thunderstorm warning that resulted from the WSR–88 Doppler NEXRAD radars was not provided to them. It is not something that is normally provided to them. It is for meteorologists to use in a variety of ways.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Was severe thunderstorm warning the level 6 warning?
Mr. LOEB. That was precisely why I raised the question that Steve Brown addressed. The terminology that is used now in aviation is severe thunderstorm.
Mr. LIPINSKI. So, 6 and severe thunderstorm is the same thing.
Mr. LOEB. I believe, but perhaps Mr. Brown can answer. I think they would probably use that terminology for a level 5 as well.
Mr. LIPINSKI. So, it could be 5 or 6.
Mr. LOEB. So that the word ''severe'' would cover a couple of levels.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, OK. By the way this testimony was given, at least by the way it was written up, it appears to me that the National Transportation Safety Board is saying that there would have been a tremendous difference if the pilot had gotten the severe thunderstorm warning?
Mr. HALL. As you know, Congressman Lipinski, the investigation is ongoing. This is an issue that will be analyzed as part of that investigation. We are trying to be responsive, but at the same time all we can do at this time under our procedures is provide you factual information.
Mr. LIPINSKI. You talk about in your statement here in this paragraph that the convective SIGMET advisory and the severe weather forecast the pilot did receive. Then you go down here, though, and you say that the severe thunderstorm warning the controllers did not receive or the flight crew did not receive. I am assuming that flight crew now takes the place of the word ''pilot,'' and we could have used ''pilot'' down here where we said ''flight crew.''
Mr. LOEB. Yes, sir.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Now, does the FAA or the National Weather Service have anything to say about what I have just gone over? Yes, sir, Mr. Jones.
Mr. JONES. Could I try to explain the difference between severe thunderstorm warning——
Mr. LIPINSKI. Dr. Loeb, we will get back to you. I have plenty of time.
Mr. JONES.—and convective SIGMET? A severe thunderstorm warning used by the National Weather Service does not necessarily depict any specific level observed on a radar. Severe thunderstorm warning is a warning to the public to say that wind speeds will occur in excess of 58 miles an hour or hail larger than three-quarters of an inch. Those are our criteria for issuing severe thunderstorm warnings not a specific reflectivity level on the radar. Again, that is a warning to the public.
Convective SIGMET is very similar. It is an advisory that we provide strictly for the aviation community. So, these two products are meant to serve different types of customers.
I just want to be sure that you understand that when we talk about a severe thunderstorm warning, it is not in direct association to a reflectivity level on a radar screen, whether it be a 5, a 6, a 4, or whatever. We are looking more at warning the public about severe thunderstorms that will meet those two criteria, and again we are trying to put that warning out before the severe thunderstorm ever develops. Again, with the Doppler effect, we are looking at the movement of the winds in the atmosphere.
Mr. LIPINSKI. So, you are saying that the severe thunderstorm warning could be a 4, 5, or 6? Or are you just doing away with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6?
Mr. JONES. No, we are not doing away with the reflectivity levels. Weather products in direct association with reflectivity level is something that we did away with when we went to a Doppler weather radar. The Doppler effect allows us to observe the wind motions and we can see the thunderstorms actually forming. So, we can put out a severe thunderstorm warning before the effects of the thunderstorm ever affect the surface of the earth. That is what we are trying to do, not trying to say that a thunderstorm on a radar screen is not going to be a level 4, 5, or 6.
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I hope I haven't confused you more.
Mr. LIPINSKI. But it would seem to me that knowing if it was a 4, 5, or 6 would be important to people flying into it.
Now I will ask the gentleman from the FAA. Mr. Brown, would it be important to know if it is a 4, 5, or 6?
Mr. BROWN. Well, they are all terrible, Congressman.
Mr. LIPINSKI. We agree. Well, if they are all terrible, how come the pilot and the controllers don't get this information?
Mr. BROWN. They don't get the information in the form of the levels that you spoke about.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, according to what I just read, though, I thought that the severe thunderstorm warning, in this case in Little Rock, the controllers or the flight crew didn't get. Is that right, Mr. Hall?
Mr. HALL. That is correct.
Mr. LIPINSKI. OK.
Mr. BROWN. And we don't have that, as I think was covered previously, connected into the system for distribution in that way. I think the Board is looking at that as part of this accident, and we should let them investigate it and we would react to it.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Hall, has the board conveyed this information to the FAA and to the National Weather Service over here about the fact that in this particular accident, and apparently generally speaking, controllers or air crews don't receive this information about severe thunderstorm warnings?
Mr. HALL. Congressman, it is mandated by Congress that the FAA to be a part of our investigations. I am not positive whether the National Weather Service is a party to the Little Rock investigation or not. But the FAA is always a party, and therefore they would have the same information the Board has.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. The reason I asked that question is it would seem to me that the FAA should at least disseminate this information to anyone that is flying in this country and see if we could not possibly, at least until all the facts come in here—it might be of great help to people flying in this country and if we couldn't get the severe thunderstorm warning information to all the pilots in the country.
Mr. Jones?
Mr. JONES. Yes, Congressman. What we try to do through our convective SIGMET is to relay to the aviation community similar information that we relay to the public through the severe thunderstorm warning. So, we try to relay similar information to different types of customers using different types of our products. That is why I tried to—maybe I didn't explain well enough before.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Yes, Dr. Loeb. We were going to get back to you. I am sorry.
Mr. LOEB. I would like to just add and perhaps clarify something. That convective SIGMET was nearly an hour old. I am not quite certain how old exactly, and it is a general kind of thing. What was available at the time of the accident and shortly before it was some very specific information on a NEXRAD radar that simply was not made available to the pilots because the system does not now do that. That information——
Mr. LIPINSKI. Does the system have the capability of doing that?
Mr. LOEB. It would take some work to do it, but I believe it certainly can be done, although I can't speak for the FAA. That is something that probably Mr. Brown can address. But it is something clearly we are going to be looking at very carefully in this investigation and could well make some recommendations on.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Brown, are you doing anything in regards to that at the FAA?
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Mr. BROWN. Congressman, I am not an engineer and not working on that program. I can't personally give you that information, but I can follow up.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Any of those FAA people sitting behind you have that information? I don't mind taking it from them.
Mr. BROWN. No, I understand. I don't have the engineers here today.
[The information follows:]
The Little Rock, Arkansas airport (LIT) air traffic control tower (ATCT) does receive weather data from the Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS); however, this information is time-delayed. There are radar improvements scheduled for the LIT ATCT in 2003 that would provide 'real-time' weather data.
Mr. LIPINSKI. All right. Thank you. By the look on everyone's face there, I apparently confused everyone with this, but let us move on to the next one.
Mr. Hall, a Doppler weather radar operated by the National Weather Service was located 6 nautical miles north-northwest of the airport. I am not going go through this whole thing. Let me get down to the point, though. It talks about ''However, this information was not available in real time to the flight crew.'' Now, what do you mean by ''real time''? And it is on page 8, your last paragraph.
Mr. HALL. I do have my rocket scientist engineer with me, Congressman, so I will let him answer.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Oh, OK. That is fine with me.
Mr. LOEB. Congressman Lipinski, that is precisely what I was just talking about. That is the information that is available, could be made available to the flight crew and to the air traffic controllers. It is information that in fact is available on the Internet. And the real time meaning is what is happening right now rather than what was forecasted 45 minutes ago or an hour that may happen; you can tell them right now. That is what this Doppler radar could do if it was connected into the system in a way in which the information was either uplinked to the flight crew or somehow electronically made available to the controllers.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Perhaps my problem in reading over the testimony is that you folks are so diplomatic, it is sometimes difficult to really find out exactly what you are referring to.
Mr. HALL. Well, we try not to be diplomatic after we complete the investigations at all times, but we do follow the rules of our investigations.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And I can certainly appreciate that.
Someplace in here, Mr. Hall, your testimony also in regards to planes flying—you have it on page 10, second paragraph. You talk about planes flying into these very stormy areas. Rather than flying around, they continue to try to penetrate the storms, particularly when an aircraft preceded it by maybe about 15 minutes or so.
I am reading into this, but it seems to me that one pilot is radioing to another pilot that he is going in in this direction and he has just come through the storm and the storm really isn't that severe. Consequently, the ones behind him proceed to do the same thing. It would seem to me that that is something that the FAA should also warn the pilots about is that there is a tendency on the part of people rather than to go around the storm, to follow a preceding aircraft through the storm. And we may have a situation where the storm gets a little bit worse and perhaps the pilot in the second plane or the third plane or the fourth plane may not be quite as experienced and as capable as those that preceded him, and maybe they get into trouble that way also. So, it would seem to me that that is something that the FAA should be warning our pilots about also.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Lipinski, you make a good point. There is certainly a whole realm of human decision making elements in your question. But I think you are really focusing in on one of the key areas now. We have talked a lot about what kind of information is available on the ground from various technologies, but each of these aircraft has on-board weather radar and weather information system and there is more than one pilot, of course, in airline aircraft, as you know. So, different individuals are able to make assessments on their own in terms of their experience and the weather radar that they have available in the aircraft. So, they should be making their own decisions in terms of how they see the weather from their perspective along their route of flight and obviously have the responsibility to do that.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. In conclusion, what I am attempting to do is the National Transportation Safety Board comes up with very good recommendations after they are finished investigating accidents. But oftentimes there is a great deal of information that they come up with in the course of their investigation. They present that information in a very diplomatic way, but I think that if the FAA would be more sensitive to some of these recommendations, I think there are things that could be implemented by the FAA that would benefit everyone, the flying public, the pilots, everyone involved in the aviation industry. And I don't think that the FAA should wait until the conclusion of these investigations where there is a formal report presented to implement many of these suggestions.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Lipinski.
We have been told that the system is not set up to presently get some of this information to the flight crews, but sometimes we make things more complicated than they need to be. It seems to me that there is something still as simple as the telephone, and when we have a level 6 storm, someone at the Weather Service, which was 6 miles away, should have picked up the phone to call the air traffic controllers to convey that information to the flight crews. I assume that all the commercial pilots would know that a level 6 storm is an extremely severe storm, and if they do not, then the FAA should send out that information to all the pilots and tell them that this crash in Little Rock apparently was caused because of weather conditions that reached a level 6 severity. People should be warned about that instead of relying on putting it into some type of complicated system. Dr. Loeb said this information was available for about an hour, and I don't know. It just appears to me that this information should have been given to the flight crew. More than just that it was a severe storm, they should have been told that it was a level 6 storm. Mr. Jones said while those happen with more frequency in an area like Little Rock, it still is not something that goes on all the time.
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So, we do need to move on to the next panel, though. Thank you very much for being with us today. You have been very, very helpful.
We will go now to panel number II, and once again, we do have a very distinguished panel of witnesses. As they are approaching the table, I will introduce the second panel. The second panel consists of Mr. Robert H. Frenzel, who is Senior Vice President for Aviation Safety and Operations of the Air Transport Association of America; Captain Paul McCarthy, who is Executive Air Safety Chairman for the Air Line Pilots Association, International; Mr. Calvin M. Smith, Jr., who is Liaison to the Aviation Directorate of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Mr. Steve Caisse, who is President of the Airline Dispatchers Federation; and Mr. Phil Boyer, who is President of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. Gentlemen, we are very pleased to have each of you here with us, and we will proceed now with Mr. Frenzel on his statement.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. FRENZEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR AVIATION SAFETY AND OPERATIONS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; CAPTAIN PAUL MC CARTHY, EXECUTIVE AIR SAFETY CHAIRMAN, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; CALVIN M. SMITH, JR., LIAISON TO THE AVIATION DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; STEVE CAISSE, PRESIDENT, AIRLINE DISPATCHERS FEDERATION; AND PHIL BOYER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Mr. FRENZEL. Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the Air Transport Association regarding aviation operations during severe or rapidly changing weather conditions. My comments today will briefly review how air carriers operate within the system today and then focus on how collectively we can continue to make the system better. I cannot make any comments with reference to the accident in Little Rock, which is under investigation by the NTSB. Chairman Hall talked about that earlier.
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The Federal aviation regulations currently provide very specific guidance on the duties and responsibilities for aircraft dispatchers and the pilot in command, specific guidance on equipment requirements, and generalized guidance on operations in severe weather conditions. Some examples of those requirements are noted in my full testimony.
The Air Carrier Inspector's Handbook provides additional guidance as to the use of aviation weather data by an airline and lists the products which should be available to both the aircraft dispatcher and pilot in command. It is the carrier's responsibility to provide these products to pilots and dispatchers.
The dispatcher/pilot in command relationship can best defined as joint responsibility for the safety and operational control of the flight. Some of the weather related responsibilities of the aircraft dispatcher are also noted in my full testimony.
With regards to training, both pilots and dispatchers receive meteorological training as part of the certification process. They also receive additional training both initial and recurrent training after employment by a carrier. While the FARs list general subject areas that are to be covered during this training, airlines typically provide training which goes beyond what is required. Pilots receive specific windshear training during ground school, and then specific windshear scenarios are required during flight training, and recovery scenarios are a required element on all pilot check rides.
Dealing with severe weather situations is a constant challenge for air carriers and the FAA alike. The best way to respond in any given situation is to have rapid, accurate, and reliable information available regarding current weather conditions. This information can be obtained in a number of ways: through real-time weather radar data, weather sensing equipment, predictive weather models, visual observations, and as you just mentioned, plain, old voice communications.
There are six primary areas where continued improvement can be found.
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Air carriers need increased access to weather data. While we obtain information from the National Weather Service in a number of ways, we do not have direct access to data, for example, from terminal Doppler weather radar, low level windshear alert systems and the like.
Additionally, we would like to see that there is time to allow for access to the future weather system processor and the integrated terminal weather system, or ITWS.
Information from the National Weather Service and FAA needs to be disseminated to air carriers in a more timely fashion. Basically data delivery systems need to keep pace with data gathering systems. There was a question about this a little earlier.
Unfortunately, many of the potential benefits of getting improved weather data to the cockpit will not be realized without a continued commitment to implement data link. As more information is being sent to the cockpit, available radio frequency spectrum is further burdened. New data link efforts such as controller/pilot data link, VDL Mode 2, and NEXCOM are critical elements of making spectrum available for critical uses such as this.
As new technology is developed, we need to get that out to the end user community quicker. Near term a focused deployment of systems currently under development such as WSP and ITWS should be a priority.
Additionally, improvement and maintenance of current technology needs to be ongoing as well. In that regard, we also support the deployment of interim volcanic ash detection technology such as VOLCAM to replace lost capabilities while a long-term solution is developed.
And FAA needs to continue to commit funding and staffing a weather program within the flight standard service. Funding and staffing such a program will show FAA commitment to weather issues. The current weather national research specialist position within FAA remains vacant following a recent retirement.
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Now, air carriers have not been sitting idly watching the weather go by. In addition to direct participation in the development of many of the technologies and products outlined above, there are a number of initiatives that have been undertaken to address weather operations.
ATA carriers have adopted a standard seat belt use policy.
In conjunction with FAA and McDonnell Douglas, ATA produced a turbulence training aid, a copy of which will be made available to the subcommittee as well.
In a partnership with the National Weather Service, nearly 50,000 meteorological reports per day are sent to the National Weather Service from data captured by sensors placed on ATA member aircraft.
There is also a future potential of using the FOQA program to collect and analyze weather data and aircraft flight performance characteristics to help develop predictive tools.
Delivery of weather data to general aviation aircraft is being tested through the FAA Safe Flight 21 Program's Capstone project, and air carriers are participating in that project as well and looking for ways to adapt that technology.
ATA is working the National Weather Service and FAA in developing a collaborative convective forecast product which would be a daily forecast of severe weather that would impact the national airspace system.
Although there is much to show for our efforts to improve collection and use of weather data, there is still much left to do to further reduce the risk of weather related incidents and accidents. ATA remains committed to helping with that challenge.
Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to your questions.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Captain McCarthy?
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Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Captain Paul McCarthy, Executive Air Safety Chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association. We represent 55,000 professional pilots who fly for 51 commercial airlines in the United States and Canada. ALPA appreciates the opportunity to appear before you today to join with other members of the aviation community to discuss both the current and future architecture of the Nation's aviation weather system.
Unfortunately, we have discussed these issues before. Several times in fact. Virtually every time a commercial air carrier and its passengers are victims of a weather encounter, we gather. We don't always fix the right things to preclude further meetings.
Pilots are the final stop in the operational decision tree. Without good information upon which to base them, decisions may be flawed. Each time we have gathered to analyze weather related accidents, the need for better information on the flight deck has invariably been identified as a causal factor. We said this after Eastern 66 at Kennedy in 1975; Delta 191 at Dallas-Fort Worth, 1985; USAir 1016, Charlotte, 1994; American 1572 at Bradley in Connecticut in 1995; Delta 554 at LaGuardia, 1996; American 1420, Little Rock, 1999.
It is more frustrating now because in this age of electronic technology, every one in the chain has better weather information than the pilots have in the cockpit. The time has come to institute a fundamental change in the approach to solving this problem. The solution is to provide flight crews with direct access to real-time weather information tailored to help them make strategic and tactical decisions. An airline passenger seated in the back of an aircraft equipped with a seat-back phone and a laptop computer can receive real-time weather data that the crew flying the airplane cannot receive.
We continue to hear that we are on the verge of providing the capability to simultaneously data link the same weather graphics to pilots, controllers, and dispatchers. Though we each have weather displays that we utilize now to do our job, our information varies. Data link technology will ultimately allow us to standardize that information and operate from the same data page. Development of this technology has been slow partly because commitment to fund some levels of system development has apparently been hesitant. ALPA recommends that if a review of programs is necessary to eliminate any obstacles that are currently hindering final implementation of data link, then that review must be done.
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Despite the fact that progress has been made with ground based radar systems to detect and identify hazardous weather, the data only arrives in the cockpit as second-hand, filtered information a significant period of time after it was identified on the ground. 44 of the busiest airports have TDWR, the leading radar system developed as a result of our years of experience with windshear accidents, and enhanced low level windshear alert systems to help controllers identify windshear and hazardous weather. We have already spoken about the New York Kennedy and LaGuardia situation. 39 of the next busiest airports, Little Rock included, have only the LLWAS as their primary hazardous weather indicator. Many of the remaining 200 or more air carrier airports also have an LLWAS, but those older systems are programmed for eventual removal and for fiscal reasons will not be replaced.
Aside from the fact that our approach pages tell us what weather systems exist at each of these airports, our interaction with controllers at all of these stations is essentially the same. Information is filtered to our cockpits in different ways. At Charlotte, air traffic had a great deal of information that could have been shared with pilots, but the NTSB report indicates that ATC failed to share some parts that were crucial. At DFW, none of the crucial weather information was passed on to the pilots of Delta 191. At Little Rock, ATC shared everything available, but may have been hampered by inferior hardware. The Little Rock ASR–8 surveillance radar is less capable as a weather monitor than the ASR–9 system used at all of the busier airports. Under circumstances like these, crews may allow other information or past experience to supersede prudent decisions. All three of those crews had seen the airport and runway environment, and their decisions to attempt landings were probably influenced accordingly.
We need raw, unfiltered data in our cockpits for tactical weather decisions. Airborne Doppler weather radar would fill that requirement nicely. Airborne weather radar systems are required for all part 121 air carrier aircraft, and that rule was written following weather related accidents many years ago. Unfortunately, some of the airborne systems operating today were developed when that requirement was written, and their capabilities show it. Airborne weather radar systems with a Doppler capability to identify air mass and particle movement would be a giant step in the avionics systems development. Such a capability would enhance the ability to identify and predict windshear, turbulence, and perhaps paint a clearer picture of thunderstorms and associated convective activity. If technology has given us such a capability with ground based radar systems, airborne systems are possible.
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How many accidents or incidents must be experienced to help us understand the lessons?
Several years ago after windshear accidents at New York, New Orleans, and Dallas, researchers, regulators, and industry experts collectively cooperated to develop and produce detection and prediction equipment that could reduce the risk of operations where windshear is a threat. The earliest versions of LLWAS were deployed. NEXRAD Doppler weather radar was developed and deployed for the National Weather Service. ASR–9 surveillance radar with superior capability was developed and deployed for the FAA, although not everywhere. Little Rock is an example. Weather research continues and complex projects to optimize and share information are being developed and tested through the system.
Either we have reached a turning point from which we will expand our capabilities and reduce current risk levels, or we will continue on our present course, allow the frequency of incidents to grow, and continue to meet to discuss here weather related shortcomings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Captain McCarthy.
Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is Calvin Smith. I am the Liaison to the FAA Aviation Weather Directorate for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association..
Weather can have a great effect on air traffic control. Heavy rain, gusts of wind, dense cloud cover, ice, and snow are usually predicted by meteorologists early enough to ensure flight safety. But sudden weather shifts alter the requirements for safe and efficient operation requiring the full attention of air traffic controllers and pilots. Air traffic controllers must provide more information to pilots while less airspace is available for maneuvering. A successful landing is the norm. Yet, one-quarter of aviation accidents are weather related. Methods employed by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Weather Service display the crucial relationship between air traffic controllers and pilots, but struggles between the FAA and the National Weather Service plague efforts to ensure air safety in the face of severe weather at non-hub airports.
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Until 1995, the National Weather Service provided the bulk of aviation weather observations, including radar information, warnings, and forecasts. Prodded by the push to reinvent government, the Federal Aviation Administration was charged with the oversight of aviation weather and created the Aviation Weather Directorate to identify aviation weather needs and capabilities associated with disseminating information to air traffic controllers and pilots.
Four technologies dominate aviation weather information: the automated surface observing system at 864 airports, the digital automated information service, next generation weather radar, and the terminal Doppler weather radar only employed at large, primary and bad weather airports. Funding levels dictate that primary non-hub facilities rarely receive advanced technologies unless identified as bad weather facilities by the FAA, a result of analyzing 30 years of weather data and flight activity. Airports with basic technology like the low level windshear system are hamstrung during severe weather. The weather systems processor, a scaled-down version of the Doppler system, is a lower cost means to providing advanced technology. Regional centers also facilitate weather analysis with the weather and radar processor.
At large airports, most aviation weather reports are provided by the automated surface observing system, ASOS. A system of FAA service levels dictates the extent of weather technology and personnel allocated to airports with ASOS technology. Although very good at reporting conditions directly overhead, the ASOS system fails to present an accurate picture of the entire approach area up to 15 percent of the time because the data received is averaged to determine ceiling height and visibility. In rapidly changing conditions, an unrepresentative picture of weather conditions hampers the safety of an aircraft's approach path.
Because thunderstorms, tornadoes, hail, freezing rain, volcanic ash, and virga, which is rain not reaching the surface, escape the reach of ASOS sensors, air traffic controllers, National Weather Service personnel, and pilots are forced to evaluate the conditions to ensure safe travel. As weather changes and weather duties gain importance, air traffic controllers must split attention between observational duties and the broadcast of weather information.
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Lessening the air traffic controller's role as a purveyor of weather information at very busy facilities, the Digital Automated Terminal Information Service provides weather observations and airport information to pilots via the radio. Cost prohibits the deployment of the digital-ATIS to all facilities, but a simpler automated broadcast system deployed to all ASOS facilities would bolster current aviation related technology and ensure safety as air traffic controllers can devote more time to separating aircraft.
The National Weather Service, in cooperation with the FAA and the Department of Defense, deployed 161 next generation weather radar systems. Ironically air traffic controllers have scant access to improved weather information; monitors with mapped data, much like the news broadcasts, are unavailable per FAA directive. Air traffic controllers must rely on numeric printouts of windshear and microburst information rather than graphic displays. This system provides many safety enhancing products such as windshear, microburst, runway oriented wind speed and direction information. The TDWR has a graphic display terminal but is not available to the controller at the radar position. A top technology is again under-utilized putting aviation safety at risk.
The weather systems processors is an alternative to the TDWR with projected deployment to 34 facilities. The WSP provides similar information to the Doppler system but at less cost, making it an attractive technology to employ at non-hub airports. But WSP cannot be employed without a pre-existing ASR–9 radar. At facilities operating with earlier systems, establishing the WSP and an ASR–9 would be a costly endeavor. But the low level windshear system remains the primary source of on-site windshear information to 39 airports. While LLWAS lacks the ability to detect activity outside of the sensor layout, usually within a mile of the runway, it provides no graphic representations. In severe weather scenarios, LLWAS is of little assistance.
The FAA plans to deploy the integrated terminal weather system at approximately 45 facilities, a prime example of the type of weather tools needed by terminal air traffic controllers. A hybrid of technology, similar to systems employed at major hubs, the system will provide weather products from all available weather sensors and short-term forecast tools like wind shifts, gusts, storm fronts, storm growth and movement, and 2-minute forecasts of microburst activity. Safety and capacity is enhanced, but ITWS' cost at $1 million-plus makes universal application prohibitive. The major focus must be how to provide this type of system, but at a cost that doesn't prohibit exploiting it must be advanced.
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With the closure of the National Weather Service offices, countless air traffic controllers lost easy access to aviation forecast and local weather warnings. If the facility lacks the automation of field operations and services system, called AFOS, calling the automated flight service station to obtain a forecast is necessary to plan for airport operations and pilot reports, though air traffic controllers receive the center weather advisories, convective SIGMETS, SIGMETS, and airmets via FAA systems. If a forecast is amended or severe weather or tornado watches or warnings are issued, air traffic controllers are not alerted. They must again call the flight service station themselves, diverting attention from pilots and aircraft.
Research to provide more reporting capabilities is being conducted. An improved freezing rain sensor, the use of lightning detection equipment for automated thunderstorm reporting, and inclusion of runway visual range data automatically added to the weather report is ongoing. Next spring a test will be conducted to show more capable sensors for ceiling and visibility. While this is a help to start to resolve some of the sensor limitations, it does not fix the need of access. Under the year 2000 program, the FAA replaced a noncompliant, outdated system for information display and began the testing program to allow more systems to be displayed on it, a start towards better distribution of weather and other operations data to increase aviation safety.
In addition to terminal weather systems, the weather and radar processor, WARP, will provide NEXRAD information to air traffic controllers working en route traffic. This system enhances the quality of radar data to both the controller and the pilot, but is of minor use to terminal facilities.
Training is the key to increasing aviation safety. Most controllers receive weather training early in their careers at Oklahoma City, and biannual briefings on thunderstorms in the spring and icing in the fall are basic and predictable. Air traffic controllers complete weather observer training only if they assumed the weather observation duties with ASOS, and little or no training is provided for the use of radar weather information unless a new system is installed such as the ASR–9. A refresher course on both general aviation weather and weather radar displays would allow a better understanding of what and why weather is occurring. Technology is only useful if fully employed. Enabling air traffic controllers to operate in a safer, more efficient manner by having a better understanding of airspace conditions is essential.
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While the FAA is charged with providing aviation weather service, overlap with the National Weather Service is confusing and limiting. 4 years have passed without a clear delineation of the FAA's role in aviation weather and the interface with the National Weather Service regarding personnel and policies. While coordination and communication between FAA and the NWS have improved, many shortcomings remain. The center weather service units and the aviation weather center examples should be transferred to the FAA because their function is weather related. While the National Weather Service oversaw aviation weather, they provided complete aviation weather services. Invested with responsibility, the FAA should also receive the authority to lead the aviation weather effort.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Caisse?
Mr. CAISSE. Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. On behalf of the membership of the Airline Dispatchers Federation, I would like to express my thanks to this committee for allowing us to appear before you today. My name is Steve Caisse. I am ADF National President.
Mr. Chairman, ADF is an all-volunteer professional organization focused on promoting aviation safety. We do that by fostering a global understanding of the nature and benefits of positive operational control.
Operational control is the authority that allows an airline to start a flight, to conduct a flight, and to terminate a flight. At each airline, it is the aircraft dispatcher and the pilot in command who jointly exercise this operational control.
Mr. Chairman, with very few exceptions, no airline's flight on aircraft with 10 or more seats may depart unless an aircraft dispatcher has specifically determined that the flight can be conducted safely and in compliance with existing regulations. Dispatchers are required to provide all relevant information on weather, route of flight, fuel requirements, and other operational factors to the pilot in command so that a consensus decision on the flight's safe operation may be reached. During flight, the dispatcher must monitor the aircraft's progress and advise of any conditions that would modify the original flight plan and affect the safety of flight.
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Severe and changeable weather conditions affect these decisions dramatically both in the planning and en route phases. A critical component of the dispatcher's decision making process is the availability of information on weather elements affecting safety of flight. Mr. Chairman, while this information is available, as you have heard this morning, current methods of obtaining certain elements are inefficient and time consuming.
In addition to data currently available, accurate and timely information on windshear, microburst activity, runway visual range values, and other vital safety indicators should be channeled through dispatch facilities filtered for relevancy, then T-ed up for delivery to pilots prior to their departure and while en route. Joint decisions can then be strategic, not reactionary, and operational control maintained.
The availability of some of this safety critical information has recently been delayed as a result of changes to the Free Flight Phase 1 Action Plan. Mr. Chairman, this greatly concerns our membership. Single point access to safety data is essential for the dispatcher to meet legal responsibilities for information dissemination.
In addition, current handling of air traffic in this country during severe weather situations suffers from a lack of coordination between the airlines and the air traffic control system. In addition, ATC may inadvertently infringe upon operational control when they place flights on new routes which dispatchers and pilots may not have been able to thoroughly analyze for safety and legality. Enhanced collaboration would eliminate situations whereby these flights are placed on routes for which they have insufficient fuel, which take them through hazardous weather, or which exceed the performance capabilities of the aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to deviate from my prepared remarks for just a moment. I have heard stated in here numerous times this morning that information is lacking in the hands of air traffic controllers and pilots, and I would like to remind everybody in this room respectfully that the aircraft dispatcher is the primary individual charged with providing weather information to the airline pilots of this country. As everybody knows, an aircraft accident results from a series of links in a chain which ultimately lead up to the accident. The dispatcher is the person that can break one of those links early in the process and prevent the accident from happening. Dispatchers are not players when an aircraft is on a 1-mile final in a thunderstorm, but aircraft dispatchers are very much in the game as aircraft are starting their descent.
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I can tell you that I have numerous times as an aircraft dispatcher contacted a flight under my care and advised the pilot in command that I felt the conditions at the destination airport were unsafe. I have recommended airborne holding. I have briefed the captain on the fact that weather is moving across the airport, and I will state for the record that I believe there is no airline pilot in this country that would attempt an approach except in an emergency if an aircraft dispatcher has stated that conditions were unsafe for that landing.
So, as you talk about providing safety critical information to the aviation community, I would like to remind you that the airline pilot is the primary customer of the aircraft dispatcher, and by depriving dispatchers of safety critical weather information, you are depriving the pilot of that information as well.
Mr. Chairman, ADF applauds this committee for its leadership and direction in H.R. 1000. We hope that the FAA will embrace the benefits of an enhanced relationship between dispatchers, air traffic controllers, and pilots by strengthening collaboration and focusing on collaborative routing.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you this morning. I will be pleased to answer questions at the appropriate time.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Caisse.
Mr. Boyer?
Mr. BOYER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I represent AOPA, and AOPA represents about half of the pilots in the United States, making us the world's largest pilots' association.
I am happy to be here to discuss weather and general aviation operations, but I know that you shoe-horned AOPA into this hearing which had already been scheduled because of the tragedy that occurred last Friday night, the loss of John Kennedy, Jr. off the coast of Massachusetts, his wife Carolyn, and his sister-in-law or her sister Lauren.
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Obviously that has turned a lot of attention to general aviation. It has turned a lot of attention to general aviation safety, and I do appreciate the opportunity because I know this committee and all Members of Congress are being asked by their constituents right now what is happening here, what about general aviation, what about some of the rules. And in this short period of time, I would like to take just a chance to set the record straight, do almost a primer on basic general aviation flying.
I agree with many of the comments set forth already. Many of my colleagues have addressed general aviation and weather in their remarks. But I think it is right to look at some of the facts.
[Slides]
Mr. BOYER. GA provides great utility to our country's air transportation system. Many of the airports in South Dakota that Congressman Thune was talking about are served by general aviation, but it does offer more risk. There is no question. There is a wide range of operations, and instead of just 700 airports that we have talked about earlier to day and we are worried about which ones are going to have the latest state-of-the-art weather radar, we serve 15,000 airports. And mostly general aviation pilots fly in or below the weather, not as our airline counterparts, especially in the en route phase of flight, flying above the weather.
Obviously with the number of flights, the amount of activity, the number of airports, we have more takeoffs and landings. We don't have flight dispatchers that are responsible for each and every one of our flights. We don't have crews as talked about. The pilot himself or herself has the individual responsibility for those flights and their passengers.
In spite of all this, the GA accident record, as you well know on this committee, has been better each and every year. As a matter of fact, our decrease in all accidents is 94.3 percent during the period in which we have been measuring those accidents. Now, obviously, there are many more cars on the highway, obviously many more accidents, but if we look at all the improvements, seat belts, air bags, bumpers, crash effectiveness in cars, their decrease over a similar period of time has been about 20 percent.
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Fatal general aviation accidents are obviously extremely important to us, and in terms of fatal accidents, there has been a decrease of almost 90 percent in the period we have been keeping track.
But who flies these operations? Who are the pilots in our Nation's system, including those of our friends at the Air Line Pilots Association? There are a total of 618,000 pilots, 1998 stats, in this country. Student pilots, the feeder system for our airlines, our military, and for business and personal use are about 16 percent. The greatest number of pilots, I guess during this week the most maligned group, are private pilots; 41 percent of the entire population are private pilots. Commercial pilots, about 22 percent. Those going on for an air transport category rating, 22 percent. And only half of this Nation's pilots hold an instrument rating.
Also, here is an important statistic: 17 percent only of all of those pilots fly for a living. Many of our pilots today, private pilots, commercial pilots, have earned those ratings because they want to be more proficient. They want personal achievement and satisfaction.
What kind of planes do they fly? We have been talking about air transport category aircraft all day. Our members, the general aviation pilots, fly primarily fixed gear and single engine retractable gear airplanes. 86 percent of the airplanes we are talking about in general aviation are from this category.
How much flying do these people do? There has been a lot of attention to how many hours do you need, and we are going to be looking at that as the NTSB investigates this accident and other accidents. How experienced was the captain in the aircraft we talked about at Little Rock? Well, the average pilot flies about 21 to 50 hours.
What is a private pilot, this very maligned word the last few days? It is the driver's license basically of flying. It gives you the right to carry passengers, not to charge those passengers for carrying them, but for carrying passengers. It allows you to fly in good weather only and you must, as I said earlier, not make the use of professional dispatchers and others, but plan and fly your own flights. We talked all day about the judgment of the flight crew in this airline. We talked all day about the judgment of the FAA and others and the Weather Service. Judgment is critical to any flight operation.
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How are these pilots trained? Well, the FAA requires to get that private pilot certificate a minimum of 40 hours at the average type of school, or another school can pass that license on with a minimum of 35 hours if the person has the skills. In actuality, people are spending 77 hours on average to get a private pilot license.
What kind of training and certification are required? So, you do go to school for 77 hours and you do many things. Well, you have to take a test before you solo the airplane, fly it by yourself with no passengers. You take a very complex written test. You take an oral test with an FAA examiner, and just like you do when you first got that driver's license, or if you need to renew a license at some point in time, you take a comprehensive flight test with an FAA examiner.
And then private pilots are required to recertify themselves or go through a review with a certified flight instructor every 2 years.
A medical certificate is required, something that is not required when driving a car or operating other vehicles. A medical certificate that tests you for both physical and mental conditions every 2 to 3 years depending on age.
Good weather is what private pilots can fly in. We call it VFR, or visual flight rules. These pilots cannot fly in the clouds, let alone that kind of weather we saw on the graphs from the NTSB and the National Weather Service. They must have at least 3 miles of forward visibility. The whole purpose of this is safe flight, to allow them to see and avoid other aircraft, to navigate visually, and to use electronic nav aids.
If my technology will work here. I wish Congressman Oberstar were here because he was touting the PC simulators that are very, very popular today. I would like to give you just a brief demonstration, if we could, with a certified flight instructor at the controls, of what it is like, in other words, to fly VFR. Forget those instruments. They really aren't needed. But what a pilot is looking at is out the window, and there is the ground and there is a horizon line and there is straight and level flight. To turn left or right, the pilot merely banks the airplane and doesn't need instruments to be able to see that he or she is in a turn. With another simple maneuver, pulling back on the yoke, the pilot can go into a climb, once again no instruments needed. It is very plain and simple to see that that airplane is climbing.
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Now, if we look at another phase of private flying, it might be the opportunity to fly at night. In the private pilot exam—not the instrument exam, the private pilot exam—which gives you the ability to carry passengers, you are required to have 3 hours in complete dark flight conditions. You are required to have 10 takeoff and landings.
Just a sidebar, when I got my license many years ago, my instructor took me up and in just a little more than a half an hour, three takeoffs and landings. Here is what it is like without landing lights. Here is what it is like without panel lights. You are ready to go.
Over the years, the regulations have been improved to this point, and very, very recently, 1997, we added the necessity for a 100-mile cross country at night so a pilot could experience the sensation of flying away from an airport traffic area.
Once again, with the aid of some of our visuals here, we might take a look at changing the conditions outside to night and see what it would be like to fly in this particular condition in a general aviation airplane.
Once again, the horizon is visible, the lights of a city are visible over the cowling. Turns can be accomplished in the same manner that we talked about previously, and climbs and descents can also be accomplished.
Now, what about instrument training for a private pilot? We all talk about the panacea being the instrument rating. Instrument training is given for the private pilot, straight and level flight, turns, a 180-degree turn, climbs, descents, and recoveries from unusual attitudes.
As a matter of fact, I would like to show you the regimen that a private pilot goes through when flying on instruments and when landing. So, if we could bring up the panel of the airplane. To do this, many pilots don't fly in instrument conditions. They are asked actually to put on a hood, a device that limits their ability to see out of the airplane, and now the pilot will only be flying in reference to the instruments. You notice the instrument in the center there, the blue and black instrument, is showing straight and level flight. A small turn to the left or right will allow that pilot to, you see, bank and turn. Now, once again, he is not seeing the outside like you are.
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There are other cues. As you can see, in the lower left corner, there is a device which shows the angle of bank, the altimeter, the airspeed indicator, et cetera.
The pilot trains on each of these things, and one important thing the pilot trains for is a 180-degree turn. In other words, the pilot has to demonstrate to an examiner for the private pilot certificate that if they inadvertently enter a cloud, they are able to recover from that situation. As a matter of fact, why don't we demonstrate that right now. This pilot is flying along, isn't paying attention perhaps, is looking at a map, and all of a sudden loses complete sight of the horizon because they go into a cloud. Now, at that time they have got to look at these instruments only. The airplane is climbing. The airspeed is beginning to decay, it easily can begin to add airspeed, begin a descent, looking at that primary instrument again in the center, maintaining a straight and level attitude. Once again, these are all things a private pilot is trained to do. And in a reasonable length of time, that pilot should find himself or herself immediately in VFR conditions, just as our demonstration did right here.
Now, the most common form of accidents is visual flight instrument meteorological conditions. As a matter of fact, 83 percent of our fatal weather accidents have been caused by this type of flying. Pilots need judgment. CFIs warn them: Do not exceed your own limitations. Judgment will never, can never be legislated or regulated. We have to ask the pilot for that.
We have talked about an air carrier crash, and we have heard several times most accidents are the result of a sequence of events, rather than a single catastrophic event. And as the NTSB investigates the tragedy that occurred on Friday night, hopefully we will look at the sequence of events that built up to this particular accident.
Is night VFR dangerous many would ask. Is flying at night more dangerous than during the day? Well, I guess we have to look at the record. We have looked at the number of hours flown, and .88 percent is the total fatal accident rate per 100,000 hours flown during the day. Actually, VFR flying produces fewer fatal accidents at night, .76.
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What about night VFR? Is ours the only country that allows this? 95 percent of all pilots around the world are permitted to fly as private pilots VFR at night.
What about flight plans to maybe solve some of the problems we are seeing in weather related and other accidents? Flight plans are encouraged. They are not mandatory. A phone search doesn't even start until 30 minutes after the pilot is to land. Typically the search by just phoning the place they left, the place they landed takes 2 hours. There is no air traffic control involvement, and these are difficult to both open and close.
FAA offers a variety of services that pilots can take advantage of: flight following, radar tracking. We have seen in this recent accident the fact that the FAA almost by about 2 days ago pinpointed the point at which that airplane had a problem. That is because of their radar tracking of these flights. Pilots can ask for that track. They can get immediate help. These are all free FAA services.
What about black boxes, you ask, in these small planes? Well, many pilots and small planes do not carry them, but because of the Hale Boggs accident, they were required to carry emergency locator transmitters. Sometimes these have false activations, and even though there is new technology, there is quicker, more efficient information, they do not work under water.
You heard Bob Frenzel here from the Air Transport Association talk about the Capstone project, Safe Flight 21, the airlines are interested in. This is new technology. We are very close to GPS telling an airplane where it is, a pilot where he or she is, and also telling the ground. This will be our future black box in both air carriers and in general aviation to add safety.
How about flotation devices over water? Well, there are only required when the airplane by regulation is 50 miles from land. Pilots often fly near shore. And the gliding range of a typical general aviation plane, the type I showed you, flown by private pilots at 6,000 feet is about 10 miles. And remember what a pilot expects to do, if a sudden catastrophic loss of an engine, would be to glide to the nearest land mass.
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The U.S. Supreme Court said in 1972—and it applies to both air carriers and general aviation—safe is not the equivalent of risk free.
Thank you for giving me the extra time. Thank you for varying just a bit from the subject, but I know we will be talking about this in the many months to come. We anxiously await the findings of the NTSB, and we do appreciate the review of just what general aviation flying is about.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, Mr. Boyer, thank you for a most interesting presentation. That has been one of the finest presentations that I have seen.
I would like to go first for questions to Mr. Sweeney.
Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to ask unanimous consent that I submit for the record remarks.
Mr. DUNCAN. Your statement may be placed in the record.
Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you.
Mr. Boyer, again, a great presentation. I was actually going to start in a different area, but since it is the closest to our presentation.
You mentioned that 83 percent of the nations don't have regulations to prohibit VFR night flights for general aviation pilots.
We have heard today testimony and we have heard over long periods of time testimony that weather information is not always accurate and that there are certainly great problems and concerns that this committee has, and that is why we have this hearing.
You also said something that I agree with on a general basis that judgment can't be regulated or legislated. However, it seems to me that we need to continually look at the requirements that we have. It is a never-ending evolutionary process and that if a pilot hasn't received instrument rating certification, as they do in Canada, is not a prudent policy then to provide some sort of structure or construct that limits that pilot's ability to fly in the evening?
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Mr. BOYER. First of all, about 95 percent of the pilots around the world have night VFR privileges. I am not sure I heard you state that exactly in that form.
In terms of a pilot's ability to fly on instruments, what I hoped to demonstrate was that even a private pilot, every time they go up with a flight instructor for the biannual flight review, must demonstrate proficiency on instruments to get them out of the situation of inadvertently flying into a cloud. Night VFR is slightly more difficult on a pilot, especially a low-time pilot, than daytime VFR. It is very possible against a night sky to fly into a cloud. That is why the judgment of getting a proper weather briefing and updating that weather briefing all the way along is extremely important. But properly used, night flying can be some of the best flying that exists. The air is calmer. A lot of people flew last Friday night in the Cape Cod area, VFR at night.
Once again, it boils down to using all of the tools available, updating your weather in flight. And these are services that I am not going to bad mouth the FAA on, and that is usually what I am here doing. These are services available to pilots to use.
Mr. SWEENEY. What are the rules, though, for those who are not instrument rated as it relates to night flying?
Mr. BOYER. Those who are not instrument rated are three takeoffs and landings to a full stop every 90 days to make sure that person has flown at night, and VFR weather minimums, which are 3 miles forward visibility and to be at least a 1,000-foot ceiling or to be clear of any clouds, in other words, to be flying in clear weather.
Mr. SWEENEY. I want to thank all the other panelists as well for their great presentations.
Captain McCarthy, I would like to go to you first. We have heard discussion about the situation concerning Kennedy and LaGuardia and the need for the implementation of the Doppler radar systems there. I noted in your statement you said, ''Each time the aviation community has gathered to analyze the weather related accidents, the need for better information on the flight deck has invariably been identified.'' And then you gave the number of examples, two of which were Kennedy and LaGuardia incidents.
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I thought it would be constructive for the record as well if you could provide for us some general observations from the pilots' perspective on how serious the problem is at Kennedy and LaGuardia and the need for that implementation.
Mr. MCCARTHY. I think, Mr. Sweeney, the best way to answer that, the lack of weather information is equally serious to a given aircraft every time you make an approach to any airport. So, for my airplane, depending upon where I am landing, I would like to have the best weather information available.
The seriousness in the New York terminal area is the volume of traffic because we are talking Kennedy, we are talking LaGuardia, but we are talking an impact that goes out to Islip, over to Newark, to West Chester, to Teterboro, can get down to Philadelphia, put SWAP in effect. The impact of not having that equipment in the New York metropolitan area is dramatic because of the volume of traffic. Any given airplane to any given airport, the effect is the same. Not having it is not having it. It is a matter of quantity.
Mr. SWEENEY. And would you not agree that that implementation is critical and important for the safety of your members and for the general public?
Mr. MCCARTHY. It has been critical for a number of years, sir.
Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.
Mr. Boswell?
Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with you that our panel has submitted very excellent presentations. Not to single him out, but Mr. Boyer, as a member of the organization, I am very proud of your presentation. Well done. I am going to give you a AA on that one.
Mr. BOYER. Just renew next year, OK?
[Laughter.]
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Mr. BOSWELL. I will. I have got an old Piper Comanche that I fly around in still.
I notice that you had good data on the VFR day and night. Do you have any data on IFR day and night or did I miss it?
Mr. BOYER. No. I do. It is sitting under my chair over here, but I will tell you from memory that IFR at night is not as safe as VFR at night. All IFR flying obviously puts aircraft in the weather, above the weather. So, I can provide that to you, but you should realize that IFR at night there are more——
Mr. BOSWELL. You have confirmed what I thought was what you said. So, I do not need the information. I thought maybe the panel here might be interested.
How do you feel about the adequacy and availability of weather information for those of us that fly from remote locations and so on?
Mr. BOYER. Well, I think if we use all the sources available, we use a lot more than relying on the airline dispatch system where it is all collected by one person, we have improved actually not by the FAA's actions necessarily but by the local stations providing Doppler radar on their local newscasts. I think a pilot's friend—and those of you who are pilots would well know it—is the weather channel. It is on in our house like Musak. And then the continuing updating of that information through an en route system.
I was just in Alaska last week and they do not even have the system in which you can call on one frequency and get a weather update at any particular moment of your flight. If there is any place in the United States that you would think you would have that capability, it would be with the changing conditions in Alaska.
But I think if we use all the tools, we are pretty prepared.
We are on the brink of new technology. It was talked about by Bob Frenzel and others and that is the ability to data link or Internet these products that the NWS and others produce directly to our general aviation cockpit. I saw a dramatic demonstration of that a week ago last Saturday with Bob in Ohio for the cargo airline carriers, and it will dramatically improve weather.
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I think today we have a good system. Let's improve, however, the automated systems which, as you heard earlier in the day, do not detect lightning, do not detect freezing rain, and you did not hear the FAA tell you that they are not all tied into the system. So, a pilot needing weather, let's say, from Martha's Vineyard after the tower closes, cannot get it from the automated system unless he is as close as 50 miles away on his radio.
Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that, and I think that is good.
I see a lot of things on the market that I would like put in my airplane that I don't feel I can afford, and so I don't. I don't know why I delayed putting in the GPS panel as long as I did because that is a remarkable piece of equipment. But, you know, I would like to have a storm scope and some of those things, but they are pretty costly. And it changes almost every time you pickup the magazines that publish this stuff. Why, there is something new about every publication. So, I would guess the reason some of this is not in those multitude of single engine airplanes out there is the cost factor. I don't expect any answer on that. I think that is one of the reasons that they are not out there.
Your criticisms from time to time about ATC and so on—I don't experience that. When I lift off of an uncontrolled field that I am on, just as soon as I get a little bit of altitude, I get a hold of my nearest approach control and tell them where I am and where I am going, whether I filed or not, and they are extremely helpful. I am very, very satisfied with the service that I can get flying off of an uncontrolled airfield. I can telephone and talk to flight service. I can telephone and talk to approach control if I want to go to that trouble. I do, like you, with Doppler radar over our State—I fly out of Iowa. It is fantastic. And then I call flight service and kind of talk to somebody that is looking at forecasts. I feel pretty well prepared when I go. But then again, I have been doing it for a long time as you have.
I can still remember some of those moments in those earlier days when you flew in at night and got into a little cloud or something you did not expect. I would guess that you and I could sit down and write the scenario of what happened to John, Jr. pretty easily, just reflecting back on our own lives.
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So, I appreciate this panel here, Mr. Chairman, and your having this hearing.
I guess my only caution would be to myself and to the rest of us. Let's walk before we run and not be hasty about putting some requirement on that is not really necessary. That statistical data looks pretty good. It is always proper to review and analyze and put everything right back on the table and check it out. I am very appreciative of your doing that, and thank you for the time.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hutchinson?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I want to address some questions to Captain McCarthy. I want to thank everyone for their testimony today.
Captain McCarthy, were you present during the previous panel's testimony?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. And so you listened to the testimony of Jim Hall of the National Transportation Safety Board?
Mr. MCCARTHY. I did.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I just wanted to know what your reaction was to his testimony in regard to the Little Rock crash and the information that was provided to the cockpit prior to the crash. You heard the testimony, but it was my recollection of his testimony that he indicated that the cockpit was provided information concerning the convective activity in the air, but they were not provided the specific information as to the severity of the thunderstorm. I rely upon your own recollection, but what was your reaction to that testimony from a pilot's standpoint?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Unfortunately, sir, my reaction from a pilot's standpoint is that it wasn't terribly well explained to this panel.
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Very quickly, the SIGMET that was delivered to the aircraft is a product that says in a large geographical area, Arkansas, western Tennessee, Iowa, in this area bounded by navigational descriptors, there is a likelihood of the development of storms which could, if you want to use level 5 or level 6 or you want to use severe, pilots will understand either one, but that within a large geographical area there is a likelihood or the climatic conditions are appropriate for the development of the storms and the severe weather warning that is broadcast over your television screen will be, as the gentleman from NOAA said, either again a forecast that they are likely or a radar hit that you have seen on the weather channel, the radar picture coming towards a given location to be broadcast out to the general community to warn people. You might not want to go inside. You could have hail. You could have high winds. Get out of your sailboat, that sort of thing. But neither product will address a particular storm.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. OK. Now, the radar pictures were very specific, though. Now, would that have been helpful to a pilot?
Mr. MCCARTHY. That is exactly what I was talking about, sir, in my testimony. The Doppler information is the type of information that we need to get on the flight deck to allow me to make a valid, tactical decision with a high level of certainty. I don't have that today. I cannot get it today, and until I can get it on my flight deck, I have to use judgment, a lot of years of experience to get what is available on the ground.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. It was available on the ground. It was available to the National Weather Service.
Mr. MCCARTHY. But it was not available to the controller and it was not available to the pilot.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. And so, the question that we need to address and the FAA needs to address is how you get that information in real time to the pilots.
Mr. MCCARTHY. Precisely, sir.
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. Now, you indicated that the person in the back of the aircraft could hook up and get more information than the pilot in the cockpit.
Mr. MCCARTHY. That is correct.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Now, why cannot the pilot in the cockpit do the same thing?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Two reasons. Number one, the information that comes off of an Internet site is not tailored to aviation use, and the dispatchers and the controllers and the pilots will all tell you that we need a product that is specified to exactly what we are doing. One example might be I need to have it track up instead of north up. I need to have the weather radar information aligned with the track over the ground of my aircraft so that I can quickly—quickly—and accurately interpret what it means.
And the second thing is I don't think people want me getting on a telephone with a laptop because I am doing other things at the same time.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me ask you one final question, Captain McCarthy. If I might, Mr. Chairman, just one more question. Jim Hall testified and referred to a June 3, 1999 MIT report, and I am going to read from his testimony. It says the report indicates and so on, and it says, ''Instead of deviating around storms in the airspace around an airport while approaching to land, pilots regularly penetrate storms with significant precipitation. Arriving aircraft were more likely to penetrate storms when they were following another aircraft, more than 15 minutes behind on their scheduled trip, or flying after dark.'' And he suggests ''a tendency for air carrier pilots to penetrate convective activity'' near the airport.
Would you just give me your reaction to Mr. Hall's testimony and his reference to that MIT report?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Right. I think it sort of proves our case. If you assume that a commercial airline pilot is not intentionally going to penetrate hazardous weather, at least not after the New Hope, Georgia accident back in the early 1970's, we are going to avoid it, but we are also going to try and work in the terminal airspace. So, the fact that pilots do daisy chain through the weather or interpret the weather based on their airborne weather radar or the information they are getting from other sources and still penetrate that type of activity proves the case.
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We do not have the capability to accurately and consistently make a valid go/no go decision. Quite frankly, if we tried not to fly in the face of convective activity, we would be subsidizing Amtrak.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you very much, and I thank the chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, particularly Phil for his usual magnificent presentation. I am not going to have any questions of him today because I think it would be somewhat inappropriate to get into general aviation in light of the tragedy over the weekend, but I am sure Phil will be back very soon and we can address those issues at a more appropriate time.
Captain McCarthy, you were already asked, I think it was by a previous member asking questions, about your testimony on page 3 in talking about people in the back having a better setup to know what the weather conditions are than the pilot. In your opinion, why is it that pilots do not have the equipment to get the type of information that they have to have or that they should have, let us say?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, right now—and I think Mr. Frenzel alluded to it—the data link capability is being worked, but in terms of how aggressively you work a particular system, it probably is not being worked as aggressively as it might be to give us the frequency and the data rate transmission capability to get appropriate information onto the flight deck. And the key word here is in real time. If we cannot do it in real time, if it is dated information, it really doesn't answer my needs. So, it is a technology driven thing. The technology is there, but it is a question of relative priorities. Have we prioritized the technology to a sufficient level? Probably not.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Are you saying that it is the FAA that has not prioritized this?
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Mr. MCCARTHY. There is a national airspace consensus. If you are familiar with the CAST process that is ongoing, one of the things that is next up in the CAST agenda will be weather, and I expect that CAST will attempt to aggressively advance this type of agenda. I think that it is incumbent upon both FAA and the industry and the manufacturers to all get cracking.
Mr. LIPINSKI. When you say industry, are you referring also to the air carriers themselves? It would seem to me that this would be a significant improvement and that the air carriers themselves—and when I say air carriers, I am referring to the commercial airlines—would invest some money into this and some time and resources, and maybe they could help accelerate the implementation of this. Not only the FAA, but even the Pilots Association might be able to get involved in this too.
Mr. MCCARTHY. We are involved in it very heavily, sir, and I will say that the airlines, by and large, are drivers in this thing. We, the practitioners, the people who are on the line, both the airlines and the flight crew, are going to drag this system into existence. We are not going to wait for it to happen. We are going to drag it into existence.
Mr. LIPINSKI. That is good to hear.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any further questions of this panel. Thank you all very much, gentlemen.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Lipinski, thank you very much.
I am running late for another meeting, but let me just thank everyone for being here.
I do want to point out one thing, though. Mr. Boyer, in a group of clippings that I have been given, in today's USA Today, they have got a headline that says ''In Other Countries, Flying Rules Would Have Grounded Kennedy.'' And I said this wasn't going to be a hearing about the Kennedy crash, and it is not. But this would lead someone to believe that other countries have stricter rules than we do. Yet, you said 95 percent of the private pilots around the world are allowed to fly at night.
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I really have the impression that our training that we put our pilots through is just as good or better than most other countries in the world. They say there are stricter rules in Great Britain and Canada.
What do you have to say about that?
Mr. BOYER. Well, we did this survey obviously starting Monday, and AOPA is affiliated with 49 other AOPAs around the world. We are still collecting the data, but basically what you will find is the countries that have a robust general aviation allow night VFR. Third world countries, countries with five general aviation airplanes—I like to look at Japan as a country that does not have much general aviation at all—will restrict night flying. So, my 95 percent number comes from where the concentrations of airplanes and pilots are.
I am sure USA Today has been able to find, and we found, almost 60 percent of the ICAO signator countries do not allow or have some restrictions on night VFR, but those are the countries without general aviation and without general aviation pilots. Obviously, our country is a very robust general aviation environment.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I think we have heard some ideas today on ways that we hopefully can improve the weather information that is given to or available to pilots in this country, and I hope that by having a hearing such as this, we alert once again or remind once again pilots all over this country that weather is a very prominent factor in many, many aviation accidents. We have heard one-third, but I think you had a much higher statistic when it comes to general aviation accidents because the general aviation community is generally flying in or below the weather.
So, as I said to start this hearing, the Kennedy tragedy was a horrible tragedy for both his family and the Bessette family who lost two daughters, but you have to hope—I suppose everyone hopes—that some good can come out of the worst things that happen. Hopefully private pilots all over this country will become much more careful than even before about flying into bad weather or even hazy conditions.
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It is not just inexperienced pilots that have problems. Obviously, the crash that really caused us to set up this hearing in the first place, the Little Rock incident, they had a very experienced flight crew and yet bad things happen. So, we all need to work to do better and all pilots I think need to be even more careful than they have been up to now because of this. And then we need to work to make sure that the information that is given to pilots is the best that is out there.
With that, we will go ahead and close this hearing. I thank each of you for your very informative testimony.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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