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AVIATION SECURITY (FOCUSING ON TRAINING AND RETENTION OF SCREENERS)
Thursday, March 16, 2000
House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, at 10:13 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr. [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. DUNCAN. OK. I have already called the subcommittee to order when we started the closed portion of this hearing at 9:30, and we had many Members here for that, and we will go ahead now and proceed with the open session.
Today's topic is aviation security, with a particular focus on the screeners who check our luggage.
Some time ago, I had the opportunity to tour the FAA tech center in New Jersey with Congressman LoBiondo and Administrator Garvey. While on the tour, we spent some time meeting with those who worked on and developed new technology for aviation security. We were told of many new developments in aviation security technology; however, we also learned that in many cases it is very difficult to train screeners to operate this new equipment, and those who did learn to use it often left for another job soon thereafter. There is such a high degree of turnover that it is becoming very difficult to find people to perform the work.
The FAA has spent at least $145 million purchasing sophisticated machines to screen checked baggage; however, in 1999 the average number of bags checked or screened ranged from 234 to 275 per day per machine. This raises a serious question as to whether taxpayers are getting their money's worth in the development of these very expensive machines.
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Currently, the airlines contract with private security companies to handle the screening of passengers. According to a National Academy study, there are 15,000 screeners who work in the United States. The average pay for these employees ranges from $5.25 per hour to $6.75 per hour. Most of these employees turn over every two or three months. Many leave to work at fast food restaurants in airports where they can make more money.
It has been reported that the turnover rate in some cities runs as high as 400 percent a year. I have seen various figures—300 percent, 400 percent. One figure I saw said an average of 170 percent. So there are varied figures, but it is an extremely high turnover rate.
Under existing requirements, there are no regulations specifically governing screening companies. On January 5th of this year, the FAA issued the certification of screening companies notice of proposed rule-making. Basically, this rule would establish guidelines to certify screening companies. I think this is an important start in this process.
The screening companies and the Air Transport Association support the rule, even though the FAA estimates the rule will cost the airlines $300 million over 10 years. A big concern, though, is that this proposed rule would increase the screening companies' operating cost. With their gross margins anywhere from 4 to 7 percent, I have been told that it will be very difficult for some, especially the small ones, to stay in business.
We are pleased to have today on the first panel Admiral Cathal Flynn, the FAA's associate administrator for civil aviation security, to give us an update on where the FAA is on aviation security. I understand he is retiring later this year, and I would like to say how much all of us on this subcommittee have been impressed with and appreciate the job that he has done and the dignity and integrity that he has brought to his public service, both in the military and with the FAA.
Admiral Flynn is a true public servant, and, although the FAA's security program may have some critics, we know that he has done everything possible to make it better.
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We will also hear from representatives of the GAO, the transportation IG, and Dr. Thomas S. Hartwick, chairman of the National Academy of Sciences panel that assessed the technologies deployed to improve aviation security.
On the second panel we are honored to have Mr. Richard Doubrava of the Air Transport Association representing the airlines; Mr. Cherif Rizkalla of the Heimann Systems and a member of the Safe Skies Alliance, which manufactures security screening equipment.
We also did have lined up Mr. Offer Einav, the head of North American Security for El Al Airlines, but he has just notified us that he is ill and will not be able to be with us today.
We will also hear from Mr. Thomas Vaiden, president of the Aviation Staff and Services for ITS Worldwide, which employs over 13,000 screeners, and Mr. Bill Gilchrist, the FAA Screener of the Year.
I want to thank everyone who is here with us today and turn now to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing today.
We have many knowledgeable witnesses here, so I will keep my opening statement brief.
The United States has a very safe, secure aviation system; however, we must do everything in our power to ensure that it remains a safe and secure system. The security of our aviation system is only as strong as our weakest link.
Mr. Chairman, I am glad that we are going to focus today on the role of the security screeners. I have longstanding concerns about the quality of our Nation's security screeners. Screeners today are contract employees who are not very well paid. As a result, turnover of screening personnel is extremely high; yet, training of new screeners is done on an ad hoc basis.
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I understand that the FAA has a notice of proposed rule-making that will improve the training of screeners. I think this is a very good first step in improving the qualities of our Nation's security screeners.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today to see if there is even more we in Congress can do to improve the quality of screeners.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
Does anyone else wish to give an opening statement at this time?
Dr. Ehlers?
Mr. EHLERS. Just a very brief one.
I appreciate the closed hearing we just had and the progress report we have heard. This is an incredibly important issue. I think we have been very, very fortunate we have not had any major explosions in the past several years. I appreciate the increased security efforts, but obviously we have much, much more to do to make our system really secure, not only here, but even more so in other countries.
I yield back.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson?
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to make a few opening remarks, but I will make it very brief.
Let me thank you, because this is of great concern in my area, and I think, generally speaking, of the flying public, that the security screening program in the Nation's airports is really being questioned. Everyone has seen the stories on the news and in the papers about the high turnover and the low salary. It leads me to say we get what we pay for.
The public does have a right to be concerned, because inadequate training and low morale among screeners threaten safety and security in the skies, and the men and women who stand at security check points are forced to work long, constant hours at minimum wage.
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The flying public really does deserve better, and we do need to have a standardized training, and perhaps even seriously consider increasing the salaries so that we can increase retention and gain some experienced screeners.
Further, I think we should pursue the best and newest technology possible to screen checked and carry-on baggage. The FAA's notice of proposed rule-making is a step in the right direction. Providing uniform training for security screeners I think is absolutely necessary.
I think this hearing is important, and I thank you very much for holding it. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
If there are no other opening statements, we will proceed with the first panel.
We have on the first panel Dr. Thomas S. Hartwick, who is chairman on the Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security for the National Research Council, Academy of Sciences; Ms. Alexis M. Stefani, who is an assistant inspector general for auditing, United States Department of Transportation; Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, associate director, transportation issues, of the General Accounting Office; and Admiral Cathal Flynn, who is associate administrator for civil aviation security for the Federal Aviation Administration.
We will proceed in the order listed on the call of the hearing, and that means, Dr. Hartwick, you will be the first witness. You may proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF DR. THOMAS S. HARTWICK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES DEPLOYED TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; ALEXIS M. STEFANI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; DR. GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND ADMIRAL CATHAL FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
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Dr. HARTWICK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski, members of the committee.
As you know, I am chairman of the National Research Council Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security. We are your volunteer force that is volunteering to check up on issues to make sure we are safe.
The committee was convened in 1997 at the request of the FAA and request of Congress to review the FAA's deployment of technologies to improve aviation security.
In November, 1999, we published our first report. I think you have had that distributed to you. You have also been provided with documentation which describes our charter.
To paraphrase that charter, our job has been to assess the weapons and explosive detection technologies being deployed with respect to their effectiveness, and that means all aspects, to identify areas of improvement, and to assess the status of the hardened cargo container development as an element of aviation security.
To that end, we held several fact-finding meetings, visited airports, interacted vigorously with the FAA, visited the tech centers, and we tried to elicit the best possible appraisal.
We interpreted your request for the study to mean a peer review of the available explosives detection and containment technologies relative to the deployment environment. Therefore; we assembled a committee with experts who can address the various aspects of the problem.
Now I will get a little bit technical here to indicate the areas of expertise.
We have had members that are expert in airport and airline operations, detection technologies, equipment testing, evaluation certification, human factors, computer-based training of operators, systems analysis, statistical data analysis, and aircraft hardening concepts using hardened cargo containers. So we tried to cover the waterfront to make sure that the deployment was going OK. My own background is in device research and development, which apply to advance complex DOD systems.
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We viewed our task as not just a progress audit function, which Ms. Stefani conducts, but we tried to ask and answer the tough questions that impact aviation security that lie within our statement of task.
I can state qualitatively the committee position that the FAA has done a good job bringing the various security technologies on line and has substantially improved aviation security since the start of the deployments.
Although the schedule has been compromised, that has not entirely been their new problem. They are bringing new technologies on line.
Our committee recognizes that airline/airport security is a complex system problem, and, working under these constraints, they proceeded as rapidly as they could.
I will briefly highlight three major areas of concern.
First is a need to treat the entire airport security scenario as a complex system, not break it down in its parts. It is a system from beginning to end.
Up till now, the FAA has not had the luxury to do this systematically because of the time urgency to get the equipment deployed; however, one should plan to deploy all future security enhancements from a system point of view. In other words, try to get the biggest, most bang for the buck.
Second is the need to create a coordinated five-year plan. That is with the principal stakeholders—the airlines, the airports, and so forth. Many of us saw a very efficient team working together in the SEIPT, consisting of the FAA, airlines, and contractors, but those are short-term efforts.
In a complex management structure with policy inter-leaving with planning requires a better long-range plan, so we believe that that coordinated plan has to be developed.
Third is the need to improve operator performance, particularly with respect to operation of the FAA certified bulk explosive detection systems based on X-ray-computed tomography. That is the check baggage system we heard about earlier.
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You certainly realize from your own experience at check-in gates the quality of personnel does not always appear to match the level of reliance we all need to make sure that we are safe. Machines only take you so far. Humans have got to be in the loop. An immediate dividend will be paid if we could improve the quality of the screeners.
Well, to summarize, we had a very active committee. We have held two fact-finding meetings just this past three months, two more planned this year. We are finding that the FAA is responsive. They participate with us, and we plan to issue a second report at the end of the year.
Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Hartwick.
Ms. Stefani?
Ms. STEFANI. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss aviation security. Aviation security is dependent on the coordination of the airport and air carrier security operations, as well as the integration of people and technology. Perhaps the most important factor in an effective security program is a well-trained work force of motivated screeners, baggage handlers, and other employees who process passengers, or have access to secure areas of the airport.
Today I would like to discuss four areas.
The first area is deploying and using technology to enhance screener performance. Since 1997, Congress has authorized more than $350 million for the research, development, and deployment of advanced security technologies, and we commend FAA for its progress in getting both bulk-explosives detection equipment and trace detection devices to our airports.
Although advanced security technologies are effective in detecting explosives, they are ultimately dependent on the human element.
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FAA test results indicate that these new technologies can correctly identify a potential threat in a bag, but a screener can make the wrong decision and clear it.
In May of 2001, FAA expects to issue a final rule establishing training requirements for screeners and requiring screening companies to be certified. However, to achieve this, FAA must have a means to measure performance and methods of providing initial and recurrent screener training.
To implement this rule, FAA will rely on threat-image protection, or TIP. TIP will help FAA to measure the performance of individual screeners and certify screening companies.
TIP is currently installed on bulk-explosives detection equipment, or CTX's, used to screen checked bags. But TIP is not yet ready for the X-ray machines used to screen for your carry-on bags. It is still being tested, and then it will have to be deployed.
FAA will also be relying on computer-based training (CBT), which will enable the screeners at the airport to receive recurring training. It will also provide a means to evaluate and monitor screeners' performance.
FAA has deployed CBT to 37 airports, but of an additional 42 platforms are needed to complete the deployment of CBT to all 79 large airports.
Our recent work has found that the CTX machines are still under-used. Over half of the deployed machines still screen fewer than 225 bags per day, compared to the certified rate of 225 bags per hour. Under-utilization of these machines may cause screeners to become less proficient, because under-practiced skills often deteriorate.
In our report in 1998, we recommended that FAA conduct a study to determine the minimum daily processing rates needed to ensure CTX operator proficiency. To date, the study has not been done.
We have also completed recent work on background-investigation requirements. Employees at airports that go into secured areas must have a background check, but, in our opinion, the current requirements are ineffective. For example, there is a rule that requires an FBI criminal check if there was an unexplained gap of employment of 12 months. This rule was designed to identify individuals who were incarcerated for committing a serious crime. However, according to Department of Justice figures, 61 percent of all State and Federal felony convictions result in probation, or an average jail time of six months.
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Also, the list of 25 crimes that would disqualify an employee from getting an ID allowing access to secure airport areas is insufficient. A recent example is at an airport where the Department of Justice investigated smuggling contraband onto aircraft. Fourteen of the 53 employees had criminal records, but for crimes that were not disqualifying. These crimes included larceny, possession of drugs, and creditcard fraud. We support FAA's initiatives to revise these requirements.
The third area deals with access control. When we did our tests in late 1998 and early 1999, we were successful in entering secure areas 68 percent of the time at the airports we visited. Since then, FAA has undergone an aggressive program of testing at the airports. In their most recent tests at 80 airports, they only entered secured areas 32 percent of the time without being challenged.
We want FAA to continue this program of testing, but we also think that they must proceed to issue rules for individual accountability, which would provide for enforcement actions against employees for not doing their job. Better training and reward systems are also needed.
The final area, Mr. Chairman, is the need for an integrated security plan. FAA is continuing, at this point, to focus on acquisition and deployment. We feel they need to move on to integrating the various aspects into a comprehensive, seamless security program. At this point, FAA is about halfway through a billion-dollar effort and plans to spend an additional 600 million through the year 2004. In our opinion, they need a better plan.
Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Dr. Dillingham?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Oberstar. We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the work that we are doing on pre-board aviation security screeners.
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The basis of our testimony this morning is an ongoing review that we are doing at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation. The focus of the review is an examination of the trends in security screener performance over the last decade.
In regard to our findings about performance, or how well do they do their job, I believe that most knowledgeable people, including the FAA, would generally agree with our study's conclusion that we would have to overcome some relatively significant challenges if we are to achieve the desired performance level for those individuals who are considered by some as the last line of defense for our Nation's air transport system.
This morning I would like to briefly focus on three areas that are related to our findings on screener performance: one, the causes of screener performance problems; two, the status of FAA's efforts to address these causes; and screening practices in other countries.
Regarding the causes of performance problems, we found that two of the most important causes of screener performance problems are the relatively rapid turnover among screeners and the relative inattention that has been paid to human factors issues involved in their work.
Turnover exceeds 100 percent at most large airports and has topped 400 percent at one of the busiest airports in the Nation. At one airport we visited, nearly 1,000 screeners had been trained during the course of one year, but at the end of that year only about 140 were still on the job.
The effect of this high turnover rate is to have a significant proportion of screeners on the job with relatively little experience. It also has the effect of mitigating the impact of the sophisticated and expensive equipment that is being deployed to the Nation's airports.
We believe that two of the most important but certainly not only reasons for these turnover rates are low wages and the few benefits that the screeners receive.
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The human factors issues are those elements of the screeners' job that are influenced by human capabilities and constraints. In this case, it is being tied to a repetitive, monotonous, and stressful task that requires constant vigilance.
Although the effect of human factors has been recognized for decades, it is only recently that significant efforts have been initiated to address these issues.
As you have heard, FAA now has several inter-related initiatives underway to address the causes of screener performance problems. These initiatives include establishing a screening certification program, installing the TIP program, and, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act, establishing goals for improving performance.
Additionally, FAA is developing a battery of tests that can be used by screening companies to assist in the selection and training of screening candidates. Unfortunately, none of these initiatives have been fully implemented and most are behind schedule.
For example, the screening company certification program is two years behind schedule, and FAA will not begin to certify companies until 2002. Partially as a result of these delays, FAA has fallen short in meeting its screener improvement goals.
Another aspect of our work is a search for potential best practices or lessons to be learned for improving screener performance. We reviewed screening operations in several other countries and also looked domestically for models. Generally, we found that screeners in foreign countries are required to have more-extensive qualifications, to meet higher training standards, screeners are paid more, benefits are provided, and organizationally, these countries generally place the responsibility for screening with airports on the government instead of with air carriers.
The question is: does it make a difference? The answer is maybe. The five countries we visited had significantly lower screener turnover and may have better screener performance. The ''may have'' is because there is very limited evidence to examine.
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The one example that we have is a joint screener test with the USA and the European country wherein the European screeners detected over twice as many test objects as the American screeners.
Additionally, there are some models that suggest a reorganization of the current passenger screening responsibilities, and models like the Chicago Department of Aviation, which focuses on restructuring the entire process of selecting and training screeners.
We recognize that screener performance problems do not fall solely on FAA's shoulders. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, FAA does have a leadership responsibility for aviation security and it will be up to the agency to provide the guidance and oversight for improving the performance of screeners.
In our view, the actions FAA currently has underway are strong steps in the right direction, and, when fully implemented, may provide the needed improvement. However, it is critical that the Congress maintain vigilant oversight of FAA's efforts to ensure that it implements these actions in a timely manner and achieves its performance improvement goals.
If performance improvements are not achieved, FAA and the Congress may want to consider other alternatives, such as some of the practices being used by other countries or other models to improve screener performance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dillingham.
Admiral Flynn?
Admiral FLYNN. Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, members of the Subcommittee, good morning.
First, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the very kind remarks. I found in the Navy and in the FAA that any success that seems to come was due entirely to the gifted and courageous people with whom I worked.
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I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today on the issue of aviation security. I will discuss several important security initiatives, but I understand the focus of this hearing is on training, performance, and retention of airline security screeners at airports.
I would like to focus my oral statement on our efforts in that area, particularly our ongoing rule-making that would require screening companies to be certified, and note that other elements of our security efforts are more fully described in our written testimony that has been submitted for the record.
Let me first emphasize that the threat to our Nation's aviation community has not diminished. It remains a dangerous world. Governments, airlines, and airports must work cooperatively to achieve our common goal of safe and secure air transportation worldwide.
The number of incidents worldwide of unlawful interference with civil aviation—hijackings and sabotage, bombings—has decreased over the last 20 years, while the number of flights, enplanements, and passenger miles flown, of course, have increased greatly.
However, as graphically demonstrated by the recent Air India hijacking, the decrease in number of events does not minimize the gravity of these crimes.
The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation is higher abroad than it is within the United States. The terrorist attacks against the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania remind us of the global nature of terrorism and the need for everyone to work together to oppose it in the world.
The relationship between Osama bin Laden, who was behind those terrorist attacks on the embassies, and Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in New York and also of attempting to place bombs on a dozen U.S. carriers flying in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995, exemplifies the continuing tangible threat to civil aviation.
Only the wholehearted cooperation of our aviation partners thwarted those attacks in the Pacific. Moreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have established capabilities and infrastructures here.
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Given this security threat, since the early 1970's the FAA has required the screening of passengers and property carried aboard aircraft in order to ensure that no unlawful or dangerous weapons, explosives, or other destructive substances are carried aboard. We have made very substantial progress in improving the security of U.S. carriers overseas as a result of the work of the President's Commission on Security that followed the tragic bombing of PanAm 103 in 1988.
More recently, in response to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and to direction and guidance from this Committee in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, we have focused greatly on improving security within the United States.
We have, to that end, developed a proposal to improve screening effectiveness, which we published in early January. This proposed rule requires the certification of all screening companies, specifies training requirements for screeners, and establishes requirements for the use of screening equipment.
The proposed rule would require screening companies to adopt the FAA improved security programs and would require carriers to install threat image projection, or TIP-equipped X-rays and explosive detection systems.
A TIP system electronically inserts images of possible threats—guns, knives, explosive devices—on X-ray system monitors as if they were within a bag being screened, or they also project the total image with threats on either X-ray or explosive detection system monitors.
The purpose of TIP is to provide training, to keep screeners alert, and to measure screener performance. High scores in detecting TIP images we believe will equate to a high probability of detecting the real bomb when it comes along.
We will continue to closely monitor TIP's capabilities in an operational environment, making necessary adjustments as we gain more experience with the technology.
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Last Friday, we held a public listening session on the proposed rule at FAA headquarters and have scheduled two more in San Francisco and Fort Worth in April. We hope to issue a final rule on certification of screening companies in May of 2001.
As you know, screeners are a critical link in the performance chain. While it is difficult to verify a correlation between better pay and better performance, we can all agree that properly-trained and qualified people who are on the job longer tend to perform better.
Government sets performance, not design standards. The Government can indirectly influence private sector pay through higher performance standards that require more training and more investment in individuals who do the job well.
One thing we do know is that, for good and effective performance, screeners must be given the best tools available to do the job and must be trained to use them properly. Foremost among these tools are explosive detection systems. EDS installation and utilization remain among our greatest concerns. These systems have proven their effectiveness in detecting the amounts and types of explosives likely to be placed in checked baggage or small packages carried as cargo or mail aboard commercial passenger aircraft.
Similarly, explosive trace detection devices have been shown to be effective in discovering even the smallest amounts of explosives in carry-on bags and articles.
I would like to briefly highlight our successful computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system, or CAPPS program, which is a computerized program that essentially selects passengers whose checked baggage will be subject to further security measures. FAA security procedures are intended to concentrate on a smaller segment of passengers using parameters developed within the counter-terrorism community and reviewed by the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice has found that CAPPS is nondiscriminatory, does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and does not involve any invasion of passengers' personal privacy. CAPPS allows us to focus on a manageable population of passengers.
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Until we have the technology to screen all checked bags with EDS without causing intolerable delays in processing departing flights, we must continue to focus intelligently on a smaller segment of the bags. In the meantime, we will continue to relocate equipment and foster sharing among carriers to ensure the most effective use of all deployed security equipment and continue our related R&D efforts.
Another area of increasing importance is air cargo. Cargo screening is improving steadily. We have strengthened the cargo security standards for all passenger air carriers and indirect air carriers—that is to say freight forwarders—by narrowing the definition of known shippers and using security resources on unknown shippers.
In September, 1999, changes to the United States and foreign air carrier security programs and indirect air carrier security programs became effective. In addition, onboard couriers are now required to declare themselves to the air carrier, thus assuring that their bags will be treated as cargo and properly processed.
Finally, access control is another important issue of concern to us all. Department of Transportation inspector general assessments and General Accounting Office audits have properly noted industries' problems in performing FAA-required access control measures and background checks of their employees. More needs to be done by FAA and airports in these areas. We are working with airport operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing controls to eliminate access control weakness. We are doing that on the basis of validating their background checks, and, where it is necessary, we have required 100 percent reissuing of those checks. We have stopped some 14 companies using IDs until those checks have been done.
A particularly intensive round of access control tests started on February 7, 2000, and will continue at some frequency indefinitely. At one point, 1,500 tests were conducted in only two weeks. In the tests we conducted last year, access control measures stopped 96 percent of our attempts to get aboard aircraft.
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Data from the current effort, which was unannounced to industry, shows some improvement. We expect the level of performance to be maintained. Where it is not, we will move quickly to require the airport or air carrier to post guards, or if necessary, to secure the aircraft or doors. That is an expensive measure but a necessary one where other things have failed.
I assure you that we will continue to work with the IG on these important issues.
Mr. Chairman, we believe the safety and security of the traveling public, our own citizens, and those visiting the United States from abroad is worth the investment that will need to be made by both Government and the private sector. We are moving in the right direction. Let us work together to get the job done and achieve our common goal, safe and secure air transportation worldwide.
This concludes my statement.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Flynn.
Most people who have looked at this and who have talked to me about it and articles I have read say that the real weak link in our security system are all these problems revolving around the screener situation. I think most people seem to agree that we need to try to get the pay increased and the training increased and professionalize this workforce and try to do something to cut down on the high turnover rate.
Without going into specifics, we did hear in the closed session some very alarming statistics. Dr. Dillingham, in his testimony, mentioned the boring monotonous type of work that is done.
The big question here is, as Dr. Dillingham said, if we increase the pay and increase the training and do all these things, professionalize the service and reduce the turnover rate, will it work. He said in his testimony, ''maybe,'' and mentioned one—I got the impression one small study that was done comparing a European country, where the discovery rate for explosives or contraband was twice what it is here.
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Dr. Hartwick, can either you or Ms. Stefani say anything in addition to that or anything stronger than ''maybe''?
Dr. HARTWICK. Yes. I believe the European experience, particularly in the UK, in my opinion, proves that you can take care of this problem with operator inattention. I believe we can improve enhanced security by at least a factor of two with this training.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, a little over a year ago I went to the British Aviation Authority. They asked me to come over at their expense to Great Britain. They wanted to show me their airports and a lot of things that they were doing. They did introduce me to the head of their security, and I had a briefing about how their force over there is highly professional, highly paid. They check every fifth passenger, and they do a lot of things over there.
I know what they are doing, and then sometimes the Israelis are held out.
Admiral Flynn, have we learned something from these other countries in regard to security? And do you feel that they are doing a much better job than we are? Are we doing better than most other countries? What is the situation there?
Admiral FLYNN. Despite the level of threat that I mentioned, we have managed to keep a secure system, as have they, as have the nations that you have mentioned.
The measures and the requirements for screening are appropriate to the circumstances of each country, but, with regard to retention and the correlation between that and performance, I think it is obvious that we have to keep people on the job longer.
At a 400 percent turnover rate, it is difficult to train people to sharpen pencils, and it requires considerably more to get all that can be gotten from the technologies that we are now deploying.
Mr. DUNCAN. What type of background check are these screeners given? We have been told that criminal records, even convictions for such things as robbery and drug convictions, would not disqualify people from positions as screeners. Is that true, or have we been given misinformation about that?
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Admiral FLYNN. You have not. The list of crimes is in the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act. The FAA added another disqualifying crime to it, arson. There are other crimes that might be discovered as a result of a fingerprint check, and when brought to attention of the airport, the airport may deny employment because of them, but these on the list are absolutely disqualifying. A single conviction for any one of these crimes is disqualifying. It does not mean that other crimes—it leaves to the airport authority some judgment as to whether to deny employment, taking into account such things as the age at which the crime was committed and the circumstances in which it was committed.
Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Stefani?
Ms. STEFANI. The screener has the same requirements for background investigations. If you have unescorted access to the secured area of an airport, the law requires the background investigation. But when we looked at the list of 25 disqualifying crimes, they were, in our opinion, insufficient for a number of reasons.
They were primarily aimed at significant crimes associated with activities such as hijacking or terrorists, but if you looked at the recent case at the large airport where the individuals were smuggling contraband, including weapons, onto aircraft, and then looked at the crimes that they had committed, only one of the 15 employees that had a criminal records had a disqualifying crime. And that occurred after he was hired.
In our opinion, it is the concept of being able to put something on an aircraft in return for money that should now be considered as a possible disqualifying crime for the FAA and the airports to be concerned about. In addition, there is a need to do a recurrent criminal check, not just when an employee is hired.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, what about things like drug convictions?
Ms. STEFANI. It is not on the list. Possession of a controlled substance, burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, those are not on the list of disqualifying crimes.
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Mr. DUNCAN. So convictions for all of those things would not necessarily disqualify somebody?
Ms. STEFANI. Correct.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. That seems that we need a little work in that area, I think, as well.
Mr. Lipinski has asked that I go to Mr. DeFazio first.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Stefani, does the FAA have the authority to expand that list or does Congress have to do that?
Ms. STEFANI. While the 24 crimes were listed in the law, FAA had, by law, the right to add to that.
Mr. DEFAZIO. So if you have these concerns and we have these concerns and any common-sense person would have these concerns, why have not they issued an emergency rule to expand the crimes listed?
Ms. STEFANI. I do not know, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Because the labor pool is too short? So we have to have burglars and armed robbers working as security screeners?
Admiral FLYNN. There was a very thorough examination of that, both by the Congress when the Congress adopted the list of crimes in 1990, and by the FAA in bringing in the access control rules. I repeat that there are crimes that are disqualifying. That does not mean that the people who have committed the crimes that you mentioned have to be given access to the airport. It is a matter of discretion. It is a matter of——
Mr. DEFAZIO. Excuse me, Admiral. I was talking to Ms. Stefani. Ms. Stefani was responding to the chairman. She was talking about disqualification for screeners. Is it true or is it not? Is it an absolute that a screening company cannot hire someone who has been convicted of the crimes you mentioned—armed robbery and whatever the other was?
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Ms. STEFANI. If it is one of the 25 disqualifying crimes, which does not include assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, of possession of a controlled substance——
Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. So——
Ms. STEFANI.—you could get hired.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK.
Ms. STEFANI. Part of what we were seeing was the process——
Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. I do not have a lot of time here. So the screening companies can hire these people and we are not doing anything about it. I would suggest that the committee—not putting words in the chairman's mouth—is very concerned at the slow pace at which the FAA is proceeding, particularly given the incidents in Miami where you had these people working there who had committed these sorts of crimes.
But, if I could go on, what is the total cost of providing the security screening at the airports, and what percentage of the airlines' operating cost is it? The airlines have to pay for that; is that correct? The airlines pay for the cost of the screening, the screeners and that?
Ms. STEFANI. Correct.
Mr. DEFAZIO. How much do we spend?
Ms. STEFANI. I do not know.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. If the appropriate agency could provide that number, I would posit that it is probably a very small percentage of the airlines' operating costs. I mean, would anybody disagree with that?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. DeFazio, I think you are right, and I think what goes to that point is that oftentimes the airline will take the lowest bidder for contract screening companies.
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What we have been told is that we have not had an incident; therefore, the concern about upping the pay of screeners and improving that aspect of it is certainly way down below getting the passengers on the plane and having revenue miles.
Mr. DEFAZIO. I wish I could be here for the ATA. I will try and get back, Mr. Chairman, to ask about that. I have to go to a special task force on oil.
That causes me great concern. For a number of years, I have proposed—and I believe a few other members of this committee—have supported that either the airports or the Federal Government perhaps should supervise this function, perhaps even have Government employees and then submit a bill to the airlines.
I have got to tell you, when I am flying I doubt that I could ever find one person on the plane who would say, ''Gee, I would be really upset if I had to pay 1/2 of 1 percent more for my ticket to know that the person who screened me was not convicted of various felonies and at high risk of allowing something to happen on this plane.'' I mean, it is just extraordinary to me that we would let this system continue in this way. Low bidder? Low bidder, with standards that are woefully inadequate on the part of the FAA?
And then, of course, the GAO did recommend in 1987—now, I realize things move slowly and we have only had three Administrations since then, it has only been 13 years, but they did recommend that we have these credentialling standards for the screening companies which might disqualify some of these low bidders who are hiring felons.
Now, of course we would not want to have that, because that might drive up the price to almost what the burger flippers are getting paid at the airport.
This is just extraordinary to me. I mean, by the grace of God we have got good equipment. Most people are honest. We are doing our best. But why have a weak link in a very sophisticated system? Why have a weak link? I just cannot believe that we allow this to continue.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. Isakson?
Mr. ISAKSON. Dr. Dillingham, I really just have one question. I apologize. I had to go out, but I heard the earlier testimony in the closed meeting. This question relates—I believe it was your testimony with regard to Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and some of the other countries who had—I believe it says—twice as good a rate of identification or something like that; is that correct?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. What I said was that the little evidence that we have, which was one test that FAA ran with a European country, the European country was twice as good as we were in terms of identifying the objects.
Mr. ISAKSON. There is a reference in that statement to techniques they use that we do not. Having gone through airports in Asia, Korea in particular, they do random pat-downs and random searches of that nature. Has the FAA concluded in any way that that is a contributor to their higher identification or better performance in terms of recovering items?
Admiral FLYNN. With regard to some items, yes. Pat-down and, indeed, undressing of people does result in revelation of metal things that requires a lot of explanation with regard to prostheses, to articles of clothing that are reinforced with metal, and the like. But that does get to the question—we believe, that the metal detectors, hand wands, are the more appropriate way of doing it in the United States in most instances.
Mr. ISAKSON. Does the United States screener have the authority, if they have some reasonable evidence or some suspicion, to pat anybody down now?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, they do.
Mr. ISAKSON. OK. Thank you, sir.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings?
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to go back for just a moment to the whole question of who the screeners are. I am just wondering why it is that when I look at what happens in my city of Baltimore, where, for a number of the offenses that are not on the list, you cannot become a fire fighter, you cannot do a lot of things. I am just wondering, when I think about a situation where we have perhaps someone who has been convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance—and I certainly have my sympathies with regard to people who may find themselves in difficulty that straighten their lives out, but I am concerned, when we come to something such as a high standard of trying to make sure that when people get on a plane they know that they are going to be safe, and when you consider the catastrophes that could occur and the impact that it could have, not only on individuals that might be harmed in such an incident, but also with regard to the aviation community, it just concerns me.
I have to go back to something that my colleague spoke about a little bit earlier. I am just wondering if we need—we, as a Congress, need or you all or anybody up there think that we need to be doing more with regard to expanding that list.
I also am interested to know, if we do random drug tests and things of that nature. Admiral Flynn?
Admiral FLYNN. Drug testing is required for screeners, as part of their employment check.
Mr. CUMMINGS. How often? Is that random?
Admiral FLYNN. No, it is not. It is done 100 percent in the pre-employment check. There is not a requirement for follow-up random testing on a periodic basis.
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Mr. CUMMINGS. It just seems to me—why is that? I mean, has that—I know that in situations like, for example, people who operate trains, areas where security is significant and life could possibly be at risk, a lot of times you find—and I am not a big advocate of drug testing.
Admiral FLYNN. Yes.
Mr. CUMMINGS. But, at the same time, I think that—say, for example, you hire someone who has some type of history of drug usage, and it just seems kind of logical to me that you might want to check from time to time.
Admiral FLYNN. I think the difference is between the danger that is involved when someone is operating a locomotive or flying an aircraft, on the one hand; on the other hand, the question of attentiveness. There are other ways to observe the performance of people when they are doing the screening job. It is a question of balance.
With regard to crimes, again I say there are certain crimes that, even if they are not necessarily felonies—there can also be misdemeanor convictions on that list provided in the 1990 Act, and with the addition of arson, and not necessarily involving a felony conviction, are absolutely disqualifying. There are other crimes that the operators and the screening companies may deny employment to people on that basis.
We think that a single misdemeanor drug possession at some time, at some age, may well have been committed by someone who has later gotten his or her life squared away. So I think it is a question of judgment.
We would welcome Congress giving some attention to this, and if, in the judgment of Congress, that list of crimes should be added to as absolutely disqualifying, misdemeanor or felony conviction, then we would certainly act with it, welcome it.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Stefani, did you have something?
Ms. STEFANI. I just wanted to point out with regard to the drug testing, the Department, as a whole, has made a distinction between safety-related jobs, such as the train operator or pilot, and requiring drugtesting for them, versus security-sensitive jobs. The requirements for security-sensitive jobs are different.
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Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.
Ms. STEFANI. They are less strict.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you think the list needs to be expanded?
Ms. STEFANI. I think that the list should be expanded. There is also a question of how long the disqualification would be. Some of the crimes would be more significant. Right now it is a ten-year disqualification for airport access.
I think there is a need for more of a nationwide approach to this. If you allow each airport to do its own thing, you might considerable differences. There are differences in how local jurisdictions will classify a crime. It is a complex issue.
I do not want to leave the impression that FAA is not concerned with it. They are. And the people we have talked to have been very concerned about how to address the background investigation area and strengthen the policy.
Mr. CUMMINGS. My last question, Mr. Chairman, are there certain crimes that when you look at it, when you look at the list, that you say just jump out at you and just say, ''Well, maybe we ought to have these three or four things that are not on there''? In other words, are there things that sort of are just glaringly missing?
Ms. STEFANI. What we conclude from the incident at the major airport where people were smuggling things onto aircraft, was a need to expand the list to deal with crimes involving a willingness to take money for putting something on a plane that should not go on a plane.''
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thune?
Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Panel, I appreciate your being here today.
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Just as a matter of personal observation as somebody who flies a lot, it seems to me that many days you could walk through totally undetected. Enforcement is, from all appearances, very lax at some airports.
I am curious to know if it does vary. Are there more egregious violators? Where are the more-serious problems? Does it vary from airport to airport?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. That is a part of our work. The answer that we can provide now is yes, it does vary by airport. It also varies by region. For specifics on that, we would be willing to meet with you in private session to talk about that.
Mr. THUNE. I assume it varies by companies, too, the screening companies? Is that fair?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. It varies by company. It varies by threat object. It varies all over the board.
Mr. THUNE. Dr. Hartwick's study points out that a passenger who fits a profile as a potential terrorist could avoid examination of a bag by an explosive detection system by checking the bag at the gate rather than at the ticket counter. Is that something we should be concerned about?
Admiral FLYNN. It is something to which we give concern. There is a security measure for bags that are checked at the gate and go into the hold of the aircraft, and, of course, the carry-on items as well as that one that is put into the hold have been screened. The question is the efficacy of the screening, and we need to improve that.
There are security measures. If a bag is taken from you at the gate and goes into the hold of the aircraft, it is subject to the same security measures at it would have if you had checked the bag.
Mr. THUNE. I am told that there may be an effort to change the provision that requires—my understanding is, at least right now, foreign airlines abide by the same regulations in terms of security—is that a fair assessment—and that there may be an effort to change that?
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Admiral FLYNN. Yes. There is a provision in the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act that requires the Administrator to make the air carriers flying to the United States from airports served by the U.S. carriers, implement the identical program, the identical security measures as are used by the U.S. carriers.
We have issued a notice of proposed rule-making on that. There are very considerable and cogent objections to that rule. There are real problems with the intent of that and implementing it in a way that would not harm security.
Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any other questions.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Oberstar, I guess we can start.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. I have three areas that I want to proceed in questions, and I can deal with one of them now and in subsequent rounds of questioning come back to the others.
The first is the background investigations. Before I proceed, I would ask unanimous consent to include in the record my written statement.
Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. OBERSTAR. First, I would also congratulate Admiral Flynn on his splendid service in this very difficult position. As he contemplates, as is rumored, retirement, I would wish him all good things in retirement, including good health and peace of mind, which certainly will come from knowing that you have done a superb job.
I recall, when Admiral Flynn was engaged by Administrator Hinson, Administrator Hinson went to the White House with this message: ''If we are going to be involved in terrorist action against U.S. carriers, I want in charge of security a person who has faced a gun and knows what its consequences are,'' and that was Admiral Flynn.
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You have kept that injunction in mind all these years.
I served on the PanAm 103 Commission—in fact, wrote the legislation that created it at the request of President Bush—and participated in the writing of all the recommendations. As you can see, my copy of it is well earmarked.
On this subject, we recommended in the Commission a ten-year background check. The law that we wrote provided a ten-year background check, but the rule requires only check of the five most recent years, and there is a very good reason for that.
The airlines engaged former FBI Director William Webster to lobby the Congress on their behalf against a ten-year background check. He came to my office arguing that it would be costly, would not produce benefits commensurate with those costs, and the same result could be achieved by investigation of a 12-month employment gap.
But, as Ms. Stefani's testimony demonstrates, FBI criminal checks are required only under very certain circumstances, and that 61 percent of all State and Federal felony convictions resulted in probation or jail sentence of six months, and for violent felonies, 43 percent in jail time of just seven months. That does not leave a 12-month employment gap. It certainly leaves one that is explainable.
I think that the wisdom of the law, the wisdom of the Commission's recommendation after a year of deliberation on this subject, ought to be restored and reinstated.
I am not opposed to people with felony convictions reentering the workforce. They need to be. Our society needs to be recreated. My daughter works in a job program where 90 percent of the applicants are ex-offenders. She places them in gainful employment, but not in security positions.
I would like your reaction, Admiral Flynn.
Admiral FLYNN. Of course. Thank you very much, Congressman Oberstar, for your very kind remarks.
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We think the real way to do this is to go to 100 percent fingerprint checks for the screeners and for those who ought to be given unescorted access to the ramps, and consequently have the ability to get to and at the aircraft.
There are now technological improvements in the ability of the FBI to do those checks and to transmit them, and that is the way we ought to go.
Mr. DUNCAN. Admiral Flynn, I apologize to you, but we have just got a little over five minutes left for the vote, so we will have to break at this point, and we will start back in and let you complete your answer when we come back.
Thank you very much. We will be in brief recess.
[Break.]
Mr. LOBIONDO [ASSUMING CHAIR]. The committee will reconvene, and we will turn to Mr. Lipinski for his questions.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you.
I was interested, Dr. Dillingham, when you were talking about airports in Europe that you checked out. Could you tell me what those five airports were?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. We went to Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France, and we did the major airports in each of those countries.
Mr. LIPINSKI. That is four countries. I thought you said five.
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Canada. I am sorry.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Canada?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Canada. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I would not think Canada was a foreign country, either.
You did not go to Germany at all?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Are you familiar at all with what they do in Germany?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. That is unfortunate, because someone told me that the government is much more involved in Germany in handling the screeners. I was hoping that you were either there or you knew something about that.
Admiral?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, you are right. It is a Federal system, of course, and it is done at the basis of the lander, which is the province of the airport, and there is a very considerable role of that government and the authority in the training of screeners.
I have seen the screening training being conducted at Frankfort, and it is well done.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And you say it is done by what, in essence, would be a State government here?
Admiral FLYNN. State government. I would need to refresh my memory of the relationship between the airport authority and the State government.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And someone, in testifying, or maybe Mr. Oberstar or someone else—I think it was somebody that was testifying—is it in Germany where screeners actually can be tracked into other employment within the aviation industry with an airline or something?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. I mentioned that, Mr. Lipinski, and that is what we learned in England—that, in fact, they try and matriculate the people all the way through with a career path up through the airlines.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Does anybody know if they do anything like that in Germany? Of course, if the state is running it, more than likely there would not be any career path into employment in the rest of the aviation industry.
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Admiral FLYNN. But there may be one into other aspects of security, Congressman Lipinski.
Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentleman will yield?
Mr. LIPINSKI. I certainly will.
Mr. OBERSTAR. During the Presidential Commission inquiry in Germany, we were given a very thorough review of airport practices on screeners, and one of the factors that was very important in retention and improvement of skills was the opportunity within the structure of screeners to move to other positions, and regularly screeners are moved after three to four months to another job within the airport, and after three or four months to another position, and ultimately rotated back to security screening to keep them fresh, alert, to give them other opportunities, and also for career advancement within the German government. But their screeners, of course, are provided by the government—the Federal Government and the lander and the airport authority.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I will yield to you again to answer this question. You said by the ''lender,'' which I assume is the state government, and the Federal Government. What role does the Federal Government play there?
Mr. OBERSTAR. The Federal Government, in effect, hires the screeners, although there are some arrangements for the state to do that, as well, and pays them more than twice as much as screeners were paid in the United States.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Are the standards for the screeners throughout Germany the same? And is that set by the Federal law?
Mr. OBERSTAR. It is set by Federal law, but the difference between our system and theirs is that their background checks are not as intrusive or as thorough as even our skimpy five-year background check because of law and the German Constitution, which recoiled from any such intrusiveness in the background of individuals reflecting on and emanating from the Nazi Era.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you.
Reclaiming my time, it was mentioned by someone on the panel and confirmed by the chairman that it seemed like the United Kingdom did an extremely good job with screeners there, and he said that he could not understand why. He is not here, so I cannot ask him why he understood that, but someone else on the panel mentioned that also, and I was wondering, what is it that the United Kingdom does that is so good? I think that might have been Dr. Hartwick?
Dr. HARTWICK. Yes. Our committee received a briefing about the United Kingdom system and the way trainers are retained and trainer effectiveness, and, in that briefing we recently received, we were told that the airport is responsible for the hiring and retention of trainers.
There are opportunities for advancement and similar types of incentives that improves the screener performance. That is what we were told.
Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. Getting back then, just for a moment, in the United Kingdom they are hired by the airport?
Dr. HARTWICK. That is my understanding. Yes.
Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. And in Germany they are hired by a combination of the state government and the Federal Government.
Dr. Dillingham, what about the other three countries that you were in? Did the carriers hire them, or who does the hiring of the screeners there?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. I believe it is either the airport or the government, as opposed to the carrier, sir.
Admiral FLYNN. In Canada I believe it is—perhaps we ought to check, but I believe in Canada it is an airline responsibility.
Mr. LIPINSKI. In Canada it is an airline responsibility? I asked the question in the closed session pertaining to who does the hiring of the screeners, and I thought I received an answer that it was, to a great degree, done around the rest of the world the same way it was done here, by the carriers, but in the course of this question and answer period it seems to me like, you know, the system we have here where the carriers do the hiring of the screening company and the screening company does the hiring of the screeners, other than Canada, it seems like no one else we have talked about so far handles it that way.
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Admiral, could you give me a clear breakdown on what most of the rest of the world does in regards to hiring screeners?
Admiral FLYNN. Most of the countries that I know of use security companies, and they are generally contracted by the airport.
Mr. LIPINSKI. By the airport?
Admiral FLYNN. By the airport rather than by the air carriers. The airport doing the central screening rather than the air carriers is the norm, in my experience.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral, do you have any idea why in our country we do it with the carrier hiring the screening company?
Admiral FLYNN. It stems, of course, from the responsibility of the air carrier for the safety and security of that aircraft and, consequently, everything that goes into it.
There is also a question of the—one difference between the United States and these other nations is the scale of things. Some of the countries that Dr. Dillingham mentioned have one major airport and then some rather tiny ones. The UK is not that case, but that is essentially the case in Belgium and the Netherlands.
The scale in the United States is much larger, with more than 40 percent of the world's civil aviation and enplanements here in the United States.
Were we to look for commonality, well, we regulate 450 airports for security. There are 155 air carriers that we regulate for security. So, from the point of view of commonality, we are dealing with fewer entities when we deal with air carriers than we would with airports, with 450 of them.
The scale of things here makes things quite different.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And I suppose, also, the fact that, in many cases, in other countries around the world, certainly up until recently, many of the carriers were owned by the government, itself. I am sure that that had an influence on how the situation developed.
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Admiral FLYNN. Very much so. And there is an enormous movement worldwide to privatize both the air carriers and the airports, so the airports are becoming publicly-owned companies rather than government entities. That is happening worldwide.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Does anyone on the panel have any knowledge in regards to where the airports that were responsible for security, where they have been privatized, have they continued to have the responsibility for security, or has that been switched to carriers or to a government entity, whether a state government or a Federal Government?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. I do not have any information on that.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral?
Admiral FLYNN. I could not generalize. I think, generally, it has stayed that where the responsibility was with the government-owned airport, it has stayed with the privately-organized and-funded airport, I think. But that bears checking.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Dr. Dillingham, you were talking about checking some airports in this country in regards to the turnover of screeners, the percentage of turnover.
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Did you check O'Hare Airport?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Can you give me what the percentage of turnover is there?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. They are on the very highest end. They are closer to the 400 than the 100.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Is that 400 percent?
Dr. DILLINGHAM. They are closer to that end than the 100 percent turnover.
Mr. LIPINSKI. That is comforting to know that when I fly in and out of there twice a week.
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That will be all for right now. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. Oberstar, I think you want to continue.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Picking up where we left off, Admiral Flynn, you were saying that you believe 100 percent fingerprint check would be sufficient to delve into the background of applicants.
Admiral FLYNN. I think it is a much more efficient system than trying to distinguish between a seven-month gap in employment as an unexplained gap, as a trigger for the fingerprint check.
Mr. OBERSTAR. You were not suggesting, though, that that be a substitute for a five-year background check?
Admiral FLYNN. Well, I think that the——
Mr. OBERSTAR. I mean for a ten-year. Excuse me.
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, I think so, because recall that those——
Mr. OBERSTAR. Fingerprint would pick up going back as far as ten years?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes. And then the question that I think we in FAA have given very serious thought to and that we would welcome the Congress' thought is: what crimes, committed how long ago, ought to be the disqualifiers, absolute disqualifiers for screeners and for those people who should be given unescorted access to the secured areas of airports?
In the later category, I might point out, we are talking about 600,000 people at those 450 airports that we regulate for security. In the case of screeners, it is something in the order of 18,000 people.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. The 1990 aviation security law set forth a number of crimes by reference to a title of the U.S. code, with further provision that that listing was not intended to be exclusive, because it had a further provision that the FAA could, by regulation, include other crimes not covered in this list. Has the FAA moved to expand the list of crimes for which an applicant would be excluded?
Admiral FLYNN. The crimes that would mandatorily prohibit the employment had only one added to them, arson. I think what we are giving very serious consideration to is the addition of others.
I quite agree with the point about propensity to commit crimes. If it is the crime of putting drugs aboard aircraft, from the security point of view, the terrible danger there is that someone thinks he is putting drugs aboard the aircraft and it turns out to be a bomb.
So we need to look at these indirect indicators not of terrorism, but of criminals who are used as the vehicle for getting bombs aboard aircraft.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, there is much more we could explore on this, but that is sufficient for the moment.
In considering security, we ask ourselves—I was going to ask the panel, but I will not do that—who or what is the object of the terrorist. We asked that question on the PanAm 103 Commission. The answer is the United States, the flag of the United States. Who are the victims? U.S. citizens. Who provides the protection? Not the U.S. Government, but the private sector.
Mr. Lipinski asked the question, ''How did that come to be?'' He did not get a very complete answer. It came to be just by accident. It came to be just because that was the way it started in 1968 and 1969. Up until that time, we were having, on average, a skyjacking every two weeks. When the metal detectors went into effect in U.S. airports, it dropped off and we have not had one since.
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Who is to pay for it? Well, there is a big debate, and it just fell upon the airlines to pay for it. They hired security providers to do it.
I think we should begin a policy debate about this 30-year-old practice, and the issue would be resolved that security should be provided by a government agency, whether Federal, State, or airport authority, and that it should be paid for by a security tax.
The French have a security tax. It does not go into a trust fund. It goes into the general revenues. But it is a tax calculated to recover the cost of providing the security.
France uses its national gendarmerie and other countries do the same. They use their national police force or their military. I do not want to put ourselves on the same combat footing that Israel does for El Al, but I think that we ought to revisit the question of who should provide security and how shall it be paid for.
My final area of inquiry would be the so-called ''Hatch Act.'' There will be 230 million Americans traveling overseas by air in the next decade. We have to be mindful that security measures and equipment must keep ahead of the state of art of the terrorists.
In the commission's consideration of this issue, we recommended—page 39 of the report—that the United States must strike a strong negotiating posture with host governments, with the goal of assuring that U.S. passengers, whether they fly on U.S. or foreign airlines, are afforded the same level of protection. Specifically, bilaterals must address the issues of testing foreign security procedures, access to the entire airport, adequate background checks of security employees, and must assure the United States a role in oversight of those procedures.
The CASLO program is supposed to do the latter. Bilaterals have rarely addressed the matter of security measures. Background checks are not uniform around the world. They do not measure up to ours.
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But the Hatch Amendment, which was designed to address what was considered by air carriers to be a deficiency in the 1990 act, requires that language, the same level of protection.
We did not include that language in 1990 in the conference report because the Bush Administration argued that including the same level of protection language was a competitive and not a security issue and, at the instance of our foreign trading partners, vigorously opposed ''same'' language, the word ''same.'' The Hatch Act revisits the issue and uses the word ''identical.''
Now, that has created some problems with our foreign trading partners, but the reason we put that language in in the first place is that standing at a counter of a U.S. carrier in Frankfort, commission members observed across the aisle a sign at the check-in desk at Lufthansa, a sign that says, ''Tired of waiting in line? Fly us. The lines are short.''
That is a competitive practice. They are making security a matter of advertising, attractiveness to fly another carrier.
Carriers should not use security measures to gain a competitive edge, but the Hatch Act language does not leave enough flexibility to determine what is appropriate for individual foreign carriers that are serving the United States.
When you further consider that, under code-sharing arrangements, U.S. passengers who leave our country on an America carrier, arrive at a foreign destination, continue their journey on a foreign carrier with the U.S. carrier's code implanted on it, should have the understanding and the confidence that security is provided just as in the United States, and it may not be. It may be better, it may be worse. In certain parts of the world it is.
So how do we address this issue, Admiral?
Admiral FLYNN. I think by following the wisdom of the 1990 Act and calling for the—the adjective really does not matter very much, whether it is ''similar'' or ''identical'' levels of protection, which takes into account the level of threat to the aircraft. And, as you mentioned earlier, the threat is to the flag. It is to that aircraft as being a United States entity.
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There are nations, and, consequently, national aircraft that are less threatened than ours, provided that they are meeting the standards of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, that are providing the identical level of protection. There is less threat involved.
Under the 1990 Act, we have negotiated bilaterally with many nations a requirement for them to adopt more-stringent measures than are required by the convention. Many of them had already done so because they were fully aware. For example, El Al does not need me or anyone from the United States to let them know about their degree of threat and the measures that they need to deal with it. But, again, that brings a point. Would we have El Al, who has stronger measures, in order to fly to the United States, weaken them to make them identical to the United States?
The problem of identical measures causes us, as we go through the rule, to see that there are very considerable elements in it, as we would try to implement it through regulation, that would work to lessen security rather than to strengthen it.
So what was put in place in the 1990 Act, is how we ought to proceed, augmented by not just the CASLOs, who do a tremendous job of integrating airport and airline security and working with the security elements of other nations, but our very strong assessment program where we assess the security of hundreds of overseas airports and inspect, in conformance with the law, the application of the security programs by foreign-flag carriers, not just in the United States but at the airports from which they fly to the United States.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for your very thoughtful answer.
Just one final question. Why is it going to take until May, 2001, to issue final regulations for certification of screeners? What is taking so long with that?
Admiral FLYNN. Well, at the present moment we are on the comment period on the notice of proposed rule-making. That comment period ends on May 4th, and then the process of going to a final rule will take about another year to analyze and do the economic analysis and move it through the rule-making process.
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More fundamentally, why has it taken all this time to get where we are now? We needed to be assured that TIP-equipped X-ray would work as a way of measuring performance. We based our projections of how long this would take on what the manufacturers were saying—and they were probably saying it in good faith—of this equipment. Well, when we tested it in order to establish the reliability of this, we saw we needed to change some things.
Mr. OBERSTAR. It is not your problem and it is not your fault. It is the way the regulations are set up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Flynn, in your testimony you talked about in 1996 the reauthorization act asked the FAA to conduct a study and report back to Congress on the possibility of transferring certain air carrier security responsibilities either to airport operators or to the Federal Government. You said that the report was submitted in December, 1998. Who was the report submitted to?
Admiral FLYNN. Well, to the——
Mr. LIPINSKI. Has the report been made public? That is a better question.
Admiral FLYNN. Yes.
Mr. LIPINSKI. It has?
Admiral FLYNN. The report is public, and it was submitted to the committees that requested it.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Do you recall who the committees were that requested it?
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Admiral FLYNN. I will check on it and get back to you.
Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. I would like to get a copy of the report.
Admiral FLYNN. Certainly. We will provide it to you.
Mr. LIPINSKI. No sooner asked than done. That is fantastic.
Chairman Duncan never got that material to me that fast. Oh, this was Schaffer that passed it along to you?
[Laughter.]
Mr. LIPINSKI. Just trying to make up for not putting my carry-on luggage in the AIR–21 bill. OK. That is an inside joke. I continually harass Mr. Schaffer, who does an outstanding job on the subcommittee.
Talking about that study, can you—at least talking about this study, really, and since I had these questions I will ask them to you. It will save me the trouble of reading that part.
What were some of the elements reviewed in this study?
Admiral FLYNN. Some of the elements were the views that had been expressed in Congressional hearings and analysis of how security is done in other countries and how that relates to the situation in the United States, including an analysis of the scope of what is involved in managing pre-board screening, and taking into account the views and the arguments that have been expressed by the regulated entities and the potentially-regulated entities.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And I will not ask the other question, since I have a copy of the report here. I just want to say, in conclusion, that, Admiral, I am going to be very sorry to see you go because I think you are one of the most competent, professional individuals I have met in the seventeen years and three or four months I have spent in Washington, D.C., and I thank you for all the work you have done on behalf of the United States, not only in your present capacity but in your previous capacity.
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I certainly hope to see you between now and the time you allegedly are going to retire.
And I want to thank the entire panel for their participation, also.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
We would like to thank the entire panel for your participation this morning, and we will now move to the second panel.
I want to thank our second panel for being here. We will start off with Mr. Cherif Rizkalla.
TESTIMONY OF CHERIF RIZKALLA, PRESIDENT & CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HEIMANN SYSTEMS; THOMAS M. VAIDEN, PRESIDENT, AVIATION DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL TOTAL SERVICES, INC.; BILL GILCHRIST, PRE-BOARD SECURITY SCREENER, INTERNATIONAL TOTAL SERVICES, INC.; AND RICHARD J. DOUBRAVA, MANAGING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. RIZKALLA. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.
My name is Cherif Rizkalla, president and chief executive officer of Heimann Systems Corporation. Let me give you a brief history of Heimann, just to situate the people here.
Heimann is a company specializing in X-ray security equipment, with a total of more than 17,000 X-ray units deployed worldwide, 2,000 of which are right here in the United States.
Heimann has five different offices in the world. Our U.S. headquarters are in New Jersey. We also have a manufacturing plant in Tennessee.
I would like to offer a little bit the manufacturer's perspective on what was discussed here today.
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First, the X-rays started in the early 1970's, when there were a series of hijacks. Heimann was one of the inventors of such X-ray applications for security.
The equipment that is now deployed 30 years later is, of course, very different from what was back then, and is now pretty efficient in deterring or avoiding the carrying of weapons on aircraft.
The challenge now is very different than it was 30 years ago. Today, the main challenge is still the interdiction of weapons and dangerous devices, but not only as carry-on, but also in the hold area.
We must, as manufacturers, manage to maintain an efficient, non-intrusive level of passenger screening at the airport security without completely destroying the throughput that is of great concern to the air carriers.
The industry has succeeded fairly well in developing X-ray and metal detector technology to almost eliminate the carriage of weapons and dangerous devices aboard aircraft. Although there have been some recent events, they are, in most cases, not related to the technology, itself, but rather to other circumstances surrounding that.
The passengers' bags are very clearly imaged, but it remains up to the operator to determine whether there is a threat in this bag or not. I think we touched on this subject a lot today.
Heimann has, indeed, worked very hard and found that the operator human factors is extremely important. The operator remains right now one of the weak links in the security process at U.S. airports.
In conjunction with the University of Heidelberg, Heimann Systems spent approximately two years completely redesigning the human interface of its systems, focusing on two major components—the reduction of operator fatigue, and offering the clearest image to the operator on the first pass. This is extremely important, as operators do not have much time to make a decision whether there is a threat or not.
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Second, Heimann has developed a software option called ''high TIP.'' Born as a functional requirement by the FAA human factors group, this new feature allows the automatic and random projection of threat images onto otherwise innocent passenger carry-on.
This new powerful option results in an increase of awareness and can also be used for on-site operator training and testing. Currently 450 of these units will be deployed, I believe, in the months to come in the U.S. airports.
Many other country governments have expressed an interest in this new technology, including Canada and some European countries.
Heimann has also developed a new tool allowing the automatic detection of organic materials that match the atomic profile of an explosive. This feature, called ''X-ACT,'' is useful in assisting operators in identifying explosive devices more effectively and less intrusively.
The National Safe Skies Alliance located in Knoxville, Tennessee, has recently completed testing of the X-ACT technology and has reported the results to the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City. It is our hope that the National Safe Skies Alliance will be soon testing other beneficial features such as a new ergonomics feature and image enhancement options.
One of the challenges for manufacturers is the difficulty to actually have operational test results for the options that we develop, and this is a good opportunity to have them.
Another primary challenge to aviation security is the secure transport of checked baggage and cargo. This challenge is somewhat different from the inspection of carry-on bags for several reasons. First, the focus is only on explosive devices, since weapons such as knives and guns do not constitute a threat once checked. Second, the inspection of bulky, more densely-packed bags is very challenging, from an X-ray technology standpoint. And, third, a passenger's bag cannot be opened and physically searched without the passenger being present.
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Initially, there were the positive bag match and also CAPPS that were discussed earlier today.
In Europe, passenger profiling is widespread, and is mostly conducted by security personnel in an interview form. In Canada, I believe there is a new method that is going to be used called ''positive profiling,'' where, instead of profiling the passengers that should be inspected, they are actually profiling the ones that should not, and all others are inspected further.
Whether in the United States or other parts of the world, technology is usually employed once a passenger is profiled. Although technology is advancing very rapidly, it has not yet reached a level allowing 100 percent detection of explosives with no false alarms. Compromises are, therefore, needed.
Europe and the United States have compromised in different ways. A high explosive detection rate with the current available technology is the greatest obstacle to baggage throughput. In Europe, most countries are employing high-speed systems integrated in baggage handling systems that have a lower detective rate than the certified system here in the United States.
In the U.S., the FAA has opted for a lower throughput system meeting certification criteria in terms of detection and false alarm rates. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. One allows integration into existing baggage conveyor systems, thus allowing automatic feeding of the system, allowing inspection of a higher number of bags, but without meeting FAA certification criteria.
Actually, in Europe they try to inspect 100 percent of bags, so all checked bags in a lot of European countries are inspected, but the detection rate is lower than required in the United States.
The FAA has actually deployed 20 of these systems in the United States, two of them from Heimann. San Francisco and John F. Kennedy Airports I believe have respectively deployed eight and four of these systems.
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The principle of operation of both types of systems, certified and noncertified, is the same. The technology automatically detects explosives with various detection rates, depending on the type of explosives and false alarm rates, bearing between 20 all the way up to 30 percent.
The difficulty is, once again, an operator has to look at the image created by a bag that is considered to contain a threat, and he has to decide whether this bag is cleared or whether this bag is, indeed, a real threat. This remains one of the weakest points.
Heimann Systems has addressed this weakness and developed a new defraction-based system called ''HDX,'' allowing to replace the level two operator by technology. This I think is the way of the future. Technology has to replace the operator. I think the detection of weapons by an operator is a lot easier than the detection of explosives. Explosives could be in any shape, any form. They are extremely difficult to pick up, so replacing that by technology is actually the way of the future.
This HDX system is a defraction-based system that gives a clear fingerprint of the actual explosive material with a very, very high detection rate and almost no false alarms.
Of course, there are some problems with this in the sense that throughput is also very low, and we could only analyze with this type of system threat areas, and an entire bag cannot be inspected with this.
Right now, this system is installed at the Nurenberg Airport in Germany and level one and level two explosive detection system is unmanned. Less than 5 percent of bags are transferred to a level three, where we still have an operator there that is going to either open the bag or clear the threat with other technologies.
The HDX can currently only be interfaced with Heimann Systems level one systems, but the FAA has expressed interest in looking at the system at the technical center.
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While there is no silver bullet, the industry, and particularly Heimann Systems, continues its quest for high detection, high throughput, and low false alarm system to meet the needs of securing the traveling public.
Thank you.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.
Now we will go to Mr. Thomas Vaiden.
Mr. VAIDEN. Good afternoon.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Good afternoon.
Mr. VAIDEN. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for the opportunity to come and address what we perceive to be a terribly important issue.
Having said that, and in the essence of time, I think what I will do is attempt to speak with some specificity to the issues associated with the certification process that more directly affect the security companies that provide that service within the United States—more especially, the one that I represent.
One of the issues that is of considerable concern to us is what appears to be a loss of control of the training process. Because we frequently operate in environments short of necessary personnel, we need to be extremely flexible and aggressive in our scheduling of training classes and the testing sessions that follow. If we need to delay such training and testing until an airline employee is present to oversee these sessions, it will only create additional employee shortages and delays at the check points.
Critical delays in training due to the background in drug testing results is another area of concern to us. In the current environment, ITS simultaneously obtains documentation to verify background histories and drug testing results while the students are in the initial stages of the required training. The requirement that states that no training could be initiated until all background histories and drug testing results are completed will inevitably lead to enormous delays in the training process.
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This element of the proposed certification process works in direct opposition against our often-critical need to fill open lines at the check point. Additionally, it positions us in an at-risk environment as it relates to our ability to fulfill FAA mandates as they currently stand.
The partner versus secondary recipient role is an area that has come under some close scrutiny by us, only out of a lack of clarity. In a shared environment, or an environment of accountability, we need to be considered, at the very least, an equal partner in the certification process. This means that companies like mine, ITS, need to receive material directly from the FAA, versus being the recipient of selected or interpreted material from the airlines.
It makes sense that, as the certificate holder, we would need to receive all information directly from the FAA to avoid any miscommunication or the accidental oversight in information transmission.
Along these same lines, it is also necessary that companies like ITS should be able to gain approval directly from the FAA for any modifications to our training programs that we feel would be appropriate, rather than having to obtain preliminary approval from the airlines.
Again, as the certificate holder, we may, in many cases, be able to more quickly recognize what is needed in terms of implementation as it relates to full compliance with all FAA mandates.
The program as we understand it also involves computer-based training. While we certainly understand the requirements of the English language capability, a more-flexible approach is necessary to allow for a positive instructor-student environment. The approach offered by the NPRM certification guidelines suggests that CBT would be applicable in all circumstances. Many screeners have little to no experience with personal computers, including senior citizens, who make up a fairly large percentage of our workforce.
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A point-and-click environment could be difficult for many employees who otherwise, under different testing circumstances, understand the material, content, and the testing of same.
Additionally, many screeners may not have a level of fluency in the English language necessary to process the standard CBT format.
As we read through the many pages—in excess of 240—that constitute the proposal for certification, we found some language there relative to disabilities and civil rights that we feel is worthy of the committee's attention.
We, ITS, need additional clarification on the specific requirements for the Americans with Disabilities Act and civil rights categories so that we can wholly fulfill the comprehensive requirements of the FAA, the DOT, and the ADA.
On a going-forward basis, we would need these Federal Government entities to work closely together to ensure that all training requirements are easily understood by providers that accomplish the following: guarantee that training programs can be designed, implemented, and integrated with relative speed and, more importantly, serve the full intent of the law.
The certification guidelines, as offered in the document, are also moderately confusing to us because they do not clearly address the decertification process, and, in the rare times that that may occur, the recertification process that may follow.
In that ITS serves approximately 108 airports in the United States, comprising approximately 80 percent of the commercial facilities, we are very concerned about the certification process in terms of site-specific enforcement.
Additionally, in the rare instances when decertification might prove applicable, the recertification process must be thoroughly and clearly explained.
Given these concerns, we ask the following:
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We request that the FAA provide detailed information relative to their internal hierarchy to facilitate the intent of the certification process and clearly define the areas of responsibility. In our view, this could be accomplished via organization charts defining areas of direct responsibility.
In view of the time constraints associated with the training requirements outlined in the certification guidelines, we request that current employees be grandfathered into their positions, rather than retrained under the formal certification guidelines applicable to new employees.
If retention of a service provider's certificate is predicated on overall TIP performance, definitive guidelines must be established prior to the implementation of the program. This will preclude an overly-subjective approach to acceptable performance.
Finally, our last concern—and I think of equal importance with all other points raised—is the financial burden that comes with the program.
Given the precedent that has been set with regard to cost for trace detection equipment and in view of the $22 to $24 million previously stated as applicable to the certification process—that being TIP—one question weighs heavily: is it reasonable to expect that Federal funding can be anticipated with regard to future costs associated with equipment upgrades?
In the absence of Federal assistance, it is felt that the financial implications of the certification process may well deal a debilitating blow to aviation security as we know it today.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.
Now we will turn to Mr. Bill Gilchrist.
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Mr. GILCHRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
My position as a pre-board screener is a very interesting yet challenging job. I am gratified by working with the public and I am proud of my work I do at ITS. There are, however, many challenges to the job that make daily tasks and the overall operation less effective than I know that it could be.
In the last three years I have worked for ITS, staffing has been like a revolving door when it comes to pre-board screeners.
Retention is a problem across all the age groups that we have employed. This puts a strain on all aspects of our operation because we constantly have new, inexperienced individuals doing the job.
Training takes time to be a good screener. You must have experience. To be at our best, we must work as a team, and that is quite difficult when we have so many screeners that come and go on the check points.
This is not an easy job. The training is in-depth and the hours are long. Many people we attract do not have customer service backgrounds, which is a big part of our jobs; yet, the importance of customer service is often overlooked in the hiring process. Those who are motivated by serving the public will not enjoy this job.
The turnover problem also puts additional pressure on our supervisors and their staff, because they must constantly monitor on-the-job trainees and the many less-experienced certified screeners.
Our training requirements allow for both classroom training as well as OJT, which is on-the-job training. In my opinion, the real and most valuable training in this job takes place on the check point during the OJT period and continues as the screener builds experience and becomes confident in his or her judgment. Judgment is a big thing in our job. This is the reason that long-term employment on this particular job is important. Learning and applying skills over time allows the screener to build expertise on the check point.
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I have found the following procedures in putting my training to work has led me to some success. I was chosen by the FAA as Screener of the Year after deterring what could have been a disastrous situation. While on a temporary assignment in Kalamazoo, Michigan, last year, we had three passengers come through the check point in a great hurry to catch their flight. I sensed that something was not quite right with this situation, so I ordered a bag search—in other words, we took and went through their luggage—revealing that they had sewn several unauthorized items into their coats, including stun guns, disassembled revolvers, and police-issue mace, the large canisters.
At that point, we followed procedure, though, and turned the situation over to the law enforcement and to the FBI.
What made me question the situation was that I was not comfortable with the fact that these individuals were trying to rush me in doing my job. I do the job and do it right. Ultimately, it was my training that helped me use my judgment in that snap moment. It made me put the brakes on and say, ''Hey, let's do this by the book. Let's do it right.''
We have training and procedures in place for this type of incident. This is what we are there for.
We have made some improvements. One improvement we have made is we have added the EDT, the explosive detection system; however, if you talk to different screeners across the country, the key piece of equipment we use are the X-ray machines. I would say, on an average, at the airports I have worked, most of the machines are at least 20 years old. They are black-and-white monitors, hard to see. In fact, we had an incident just a week ago on a gate I was working at Kansas City where the monitor started flickering. We replaced the monitor with another one—same thing. So we worked a 12-hour shift with this monitor that was completely hard to see.
At the same time on that day, there were many families going on vacation with their kids. I thought to myself, ''Are we really doing the best we can for the public in this type of situation?''
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Thank you.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Gilchrist.
Now we will turn to Mr. Richard Doubrava.
Mr. DOUBRAVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Richard Doubrava, managing director of security for the Air Transport Association of America. ATA represents the major commercial passenger and cargo air carriers in the United States, and, on behalf of our 28 members, I would like to thank you and the other members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in this hearing today.
For purposes of brevity, I will summarize my statement.
The industry takes its responsibility for the safety and security of our passengers as our number one priority. The industry and the Federal Government have worked closely to improve the aviation security baseline. We believe the progress made over the past four years has resulted in a more secure environment for the traveling public, but we still confront significant challenges.
Today's hearing is most timely, given the evolution of the security check point with relation to equipment, training, and human performance issues, as well as the pending process by the FAA to certify security screening companies.
All of these efforts were guided by the commitment of both industry and government to improve check point performance and screener proficiency in an ever-changing security environment.
During this same time, security threats have grown dramatically. Additional security measures are required to be conducted as the result of valid domestic and international security concerns, and the weapons of threat have become more sophisticated and more difficult to detect.
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The challenges of the check point have multiplied. In September, 1996, ATA presented a far-reaching security plan to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, committing our members to a number of goals, including calling for the establishment of a Federal certification process for aviation security screening companies to enhance check point security.
The industry has strongly supported these efforts throughout the legislative and regulatory process underway to achieve this important goal.
Clearly, once the regulation is in place, it will result in a major change in the current screening check point environment. The FAA screener certification process will make security screening companies a full partner in the check point process.
We have concerns and questions in a number of areas with the FAA's proposed rule. These include issues of clearly defining accountability, as well as the regulatory structure which will be devised to support this process.
It is important that FAA not create a bureaucratic structure which becomes over-burdensome to the industry.
ATA is also concerned about the ultimate regulatory and economic impact the proposed certification process may inflict on some aspects of the security screening industry, possibly affecting their continued ability to compete in a new regulatory environment.
A number of companies providing such services are local business entities in small airport environments and unfamiliar with the Federal regulatory process. They may find it difficult or economically unfeasible to continue such services.
We believe that the continued development and deployment of enhanced screening technology will further contribute to this improvement.
We were pleased when the FAA agreed to support the industry recommendation to implement a multi-year plan to replace current check point X-ray technology with new state-of-the-art equipment, which includes threat image projection and operator assist functions.
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A number of security equipment vendors are participating in the FAA selection process, and they have worked closely with FAA and the industry in developing technology that improves detection and also addresses the carriers' reliability and customer service needs.
With initial deployment set to begin at our Nation's largest airports within the next several years, this replacement plan needs to be fully funded on a multi-year plan by the FAA and continue until all airports obtain such updated equipment.
The industry continues to be keenly interested in further exploring the human factors and associated responses at play at the check point operation. This includes the vital role of motivating employees in the stressful environment of an airport check point site.
We also look forward to obtaining reporting data and trend information from current FAA studies underway at a number of check point screening locations to attempt to determine relationships between screener ability, performance, compensation, and workplace environment. This is an area where there is little in definitive data and information and should serve as a preliminary review for issues which need further study and consideration.
The ATA carriers are grateful for the continued support of this committee in providing ongoing commitment and funding to achieve the goals which industry and the government jointly developed in 1996. We remain dedicated to working in partnership with the Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration in all areas of aviation security.
Thank you again for providing us the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I would be pleased to respond to any questions the committee might have.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much.
We have heard testimony concerning the ability and the motivation of screeners, the turnover rate, and there is, obviously, experiences to be shared from other countries that have a better situation than ours.
What are the single biggest factors? I mean, is it just money, alone, that is going to keep people from turning over? Why do certain countries not seem to have this problem anywhere near the degree that we do? What are suggestions for us? Anyone?
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Mr. DOUBRAVA. Why do not I start off the conversation here.
Mr. LOBIONDO. OK.
Mr. DOUBRAVA. I think you have put your finger on a number of issues. It is an interlocking complexity that industry, the Government, and the FAA have struggled with for over ten years.
Let me refer specifically to the check point operation. When the check point operation was first developed, it was done in the context of hijackings, and at that time what were seeking to identify items viewed as pretty simple to detect—guns, hand grenades, pipe bombs, and dynamite. It initially started as a Federal responsibility.
Then, shortly thereafter, it was the view of the Federal Government, now almost 30 years ago, that the air carriers knew more about the operational nature of what went on at a departure time than did the Government. This is how the transition began whereby the security oversight of the check point migrated to the air carriers.
As a result of that development, the industry has gone through a prolonged series of challenges as the security baseline has had to be raised which brings us to where we are at today.
I think that one of the most important aspects of your hearing today is to jointly determine where we are at and where we need to go.
With regard to international security, as Admiral Flynn and your other witnesses indicated today, it is a much different environment. In most of the other nations the security operations at the check point at the airports are the responsibility of the airport authorities acting as agents of the local or Federal Government. So, in the context of how we approach screening security responsibilities in the United States, it is far different than what the other countries do.
Clearly, there are benefits and negatives in these differing approaches.
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One of the major reasons why the industry has strongly supported the screener certification process is that we operate in an environment that requires new approaches to old systems.
As we move through these processes we clearly know that they need to change—they need to continue to evolve.
This certainly applies to the state of security screening, as well.
Admiral Flynn has made the comment numerous times, that lays out the proper scope of what has been jointly accomplished since the Presidential Commission in 1996. That this is the biggest deployment of security equipment done on a national basis since World War II. This clearly has resulted in a host of challenges. The technology, while improving quickly, still does not meet the operational needs of the industry. The evolution of the check point is going to take a cooperative effort by both industry and the Government, to make certain that we set the security baseline where it needs to be.
I think it is important to delineate that, while there are shortcomings in the current checkpoint environment, one only needs to look at the commitment of screeners like Mr. Gilchrist and the other 8,000 screeners out there—to see the good job that they do for us every day. Their record has been very, very good. But, we are in an environment where that baseline needs to improve and needs to change, and the industry is certainly committed to that process.
Mr. VAIDEN. May I add one point to that?
If I understood your question correctly, the direct answer is no. It is not driven by money alone.
The idea of a security check point, where these men and women spend considerable hours each day, is not far flung from a military-type environment.
These people are a family unto themselves. They work long hours. In order for them to be effective, there has to be some kind of esprit de corps. There has to be some pride taken in the work that they do.
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Unfortunately, to try to assemble a workforce where that exists so that it can translate into the product that we all hope for, we have to find a way to not only use salary but to have a total package for them.
Mr. Gilchrist is married. There are children involved. This gets into insurance programs. When we are within the airport community, we compete directly with the airlines. The airlines have entry-level positions. Their pay is, obviously, better than what we are able to provide to our people. They have insurance programs. They have free flight benefits.
So it is only natural to assume that when we are able to draw a truly good employee, that he becomes attractive to others in the airport that are looking for people to come into their entry level positions.
So we are almost in a catch–22 situation. When we are fortunate enough to find good people, we are unfortunate all too often in the loss of those people much too early in their security career.
Mr. LOBIONDO. I appreciate what you are saying, but what I am trying to understand is, last August I had an opportunity to receive a briefing from Israeli security and El Al, and I am disappointed that the panelist from El Al was ill and not able to be here today, but they specifically discussed how the folks in these positions were motivated and there was low turnover and there was a high esprit de corps, and there were a whole lot of things that seemed to make for them being able to have a continuum that we just do not seem to have.
If it is not money that is the motivator, the prime motivator, where are we falling short? Why are we falling short? And why is El Al able to do this?
Mr. DOUBRAVA. If I could take a minute to respond to that, the Israeli security program is applied by the state of Israel in Israel. El Al, of course, has their own security program, as do our own air carriers. But the screening and operational security of the Israeli airports are applied by the military in Israel. This is an approach that clearly would be difficult to apply elsewhere.
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When you put that in the much larger context of the U.S. environment—I think Admiral Flynn pointed out the sheer numbers of U.S. airports and the passengers that we carried—our Federal Government currently does not assume the same oversight role in the U.S.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, then, that leads to my next question. Should the Federal Government take that over? Should that be a role of the Federal Government because of what is at stake?
Mr. DOUBRAVA. Let me tip off the discussion here, because I am sure all of our witnesses have discussion points on that.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Go ahead.
Mr. DOUBRAVA. This has been the challenge for all of us since aviation security basically developed in the early 1970's. In two Presidential Commissions, there has been strong discussion about what the Federal Government's security obligations ought to be. Clearly, our industry believes that the proposed Federal certification of the screening companies provides a renewed opportunity to foster discussions on the appropriate obligations of the U.S. Government.
We are having those discussions internally with our own member carriers as well.
If you pick a pure world as who should pay for aviation security and who should apply it—all things being equal—the government has a clear obligation and this has been a major issue since airport screening began.
Clearly, these discussions were undertaken in major ways during both Presidential Commissions on Security. Sadly we have never been able to come to a consensus on this issue.
The airline industry believes this is a very, very appropriate time to renew those discussions, not only between the air carriers and the Federal Government, but between all parties, including the public, as to what that role should be.
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Then there is the difficult issue of how these needs are going to be funded and how it will be applied. I think that this is really the ultimate challenge.
I can tell you that I am not prepared to sit here, as a representative of the ATA, and commit to you that we have a consistent view on these issues among our membership. However, I will make the commitment to you that we are willing to sit down with this committee and with the other Members of Congress and the other Congressional committees with appropriate oversight to begin these discussions. We think this is a vital matter that needs to be resolved.
In the February, 1999, aviation security report entitled, ''FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities in Funding for Airport Security and Certified Screening Companies,'' the GAO lays out that issue by saying in this 1997 estimate that the security needs of the largest airports over a ten-year period would come to over $3 billion in those figures. This amount would only cover the largest and busiest U.S. airports. Further, the report says, ''Funding methods for aviation security improvements is an issue that the Congress and the FAA will be faced with for a number of years.''
We have yet to begin to resolve those issues.
Mr. LOBIONDO. I have some more questions, but, Mr. DeFazio, I would like to give you an opportunity.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We heard from the previous panel—I believe it was the GAO who said that inevitably the lowest bidders get the contracts, so I assume it is a fairly competitive environment in that.
Mr. Vaiden, how many facilities do you have? I am sorry I missed your testimony. I was in another meeting.
Mr. VAIDEN. Approximately 108 airports are served.
Mr. DEFAZIO. So you have 108 under your company?
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Mr. VAIDEN. Yes.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. And that was a competitive bidding process?
Mr. VAIDEN. That is correct.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Did you ever get a contract where you were not the low bidder?
Mr. VAIDEN. Yes, we did.
Mr. DEFAZIO. How many, do you think? What percentage? How common is that?
Mr. VAIDEN. It is extremely uncommon.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Extremely uncommon. OK.
Mr. Gilchrist, if you do not mind—but when you put yourself on a panel you expose yourself to all sorts of things—what are you paid?
Mr. GILCHRIST. In KCI at Kansas City we get $7.20 an hour, sir.
Mr. DEFAZIO. That is $7.20?
Mr. GILCHRIST. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEFAZIO. And what kind of benefits do you get?
Mr. GILCHRIST. They have some insurance benefits available, you know.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Do you have to pay for it, or do they pay for it? You have to pay for it?
Mr. GILCHRIST. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEFAZIO. It is sort of as a group that you can buy into?
Mr. GILCHRIST. Right. Group insurance. Right.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK.
Mr. GILCHRIST. This is a key—can I just answer one thing here?
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Mr. DEFAZIO. Sure.
Mr. GILCHRIST. You know, we have heard this morning about 100 percent turnover, 400 percent turnover. I see this, even at KCI. We, in some cases, are paid a little higher than a lot of the airports. A lot of them are still at minimum wage.
So it comes down to this industry being run by people yet. Technology is there to replace us, probably, in a certain extent, but still the people on the gate working with the public are the key to this.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. GILCHRIST. And if you talk to any screener at any airport, they will say one thing: we are underpaid for what is expected of us.
This is the whole key to this, from my standpoint and from my fellow screeners.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. GILCHRIST. I cannot say how the funding should go, but we need to have you gentlemen look at this situation from the point of the people on the gate dealing with the public. Where can we get the funding for improved wages?
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. GILCHRIST. I think, sir, if we do that you are going to see career-minded people getting into this field, because it is an interesting job.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. GILCHRIST. I have done it three years now, and I have enjoyed it. I think it is a challenge. I like to go to work. But if I did not have some extra income, I could not work at KCI.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Extra income? You mean you——
Mr. GILCHRIST. I have got some commercial property that supplements my——
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Mr. DEFAZIO. So you are subsidizing your job?
Mr. GILCHRIST. Right. And you have to.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. GILCHRIST. I could not afford to work at KCI. But that is my point. If we could look at the situation right here for the screeners, it would be much appreciated if down the road something could be done.
Thank you.
Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Well, then, that brings us, I think, to the ATA.
You know, can you answer the question I asked of the last panel? What are the total costs for the airlines for the security screening and what percentage of revenues is that and/or operating costs?
Mr. DOUBRAVA. Mr. DeFazio, I do not have that information because it is preferential, but what I can do is to make an effort to obtain that information and provide it to you. This information is not normally provided to the trade association. I will be glad to request it.
Mr. DEFAZIO. I think it would certainly be helpful to the committee in these deliberations.
If we are talking about less than 1 percent, or 1/2 percent, or whatever, which Mr. Oberstar was positing to me in just an estimate, I do not know. I mean, I really do not know.
I have had this conversation on many topics with the ATA. I find very few people in the air sitting next to me on the plane who are not willing to pay an extra $0.50 or $1 to know that they are going to get there alive, whether it is because we have the proper standards for flight duty time, whether we are doing the most rigorous things we can do in terms of maintenance and preventive maintenance, or whether we are preventing someone from getting on that plane whose intent is to destroy that plane and the people on it, or to minimally hijack it.
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You know, I really think it is a very difficult job, Mr. Gilchrist, because I do 32 round trips a year east to west and spend a lot of time going through airports, and I am always saying to people who are getting really uptight—and I have to even sort of crank down on myself sometimes—in those lines, and say, ''Look, you know, this is for our benefit.'' They could unwrap a present. I say I have had to do that, too, because you have just got to know if you have got something that looks weird on the X-ray you should not wrap it before you go to the airport.
Mr. GILCHRIST. That is right.
Mr. DEFAZIO. There are ways I think we could better educate the public to what this means, but I think intuitively most of them know. And to crank down to Mr. Vaiden or anybody else that the message to him is, ''I had better not be raising my wages much here or give a good benefits package because I am not going to get that bid,'' I mean, that is not a good message.
Mr. GILCHRIST. It is a problem.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. VAIDEN. You should know, if I may, sir, that our company—and I do believe it applies to all—the way we bid these jobs is wholly driven by the wage, and we make that information available to the airline. We show them what the wages is, we show them what the line items are, and then we add—in our case, we would like to run a target of about 6 percent, and that is the number that we provide to the airlines.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes.
Mr. VAIDEN. So it is certainly a very cost-effective program for the carriers.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But we have these other problems, or potential problems.
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I mean, I would just observe here on Capitol Hill there are a tremendous number of uniformed officers on the Hill providing a deterrent effect and a real screening. Essentially, in a lot of ways, it is an even less-sophisticated version of the job that Mr. Gilchrist is performing, in terms of the equipment they are provided to screen, and yet, of course, their starting salaries are about, I would guess, probably more than twice or three times what these folks are starting at.
We somehow have got to deal with this issue. I really believe we do.
Thank you.
Mr. VAIDEN. We agree.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.
Mr. Rizkalla, does the threat image library on the screening equipment reflect up-to-date threats and state-of-the-art explosives?
Mr. RIZKALLA. I am sorry? Could you repeat that?
Mr. LOBIONDO. The threat image library on the screening equipment, does that reflect the up-to-date threats or the state-of-the-art explosives?
Mr. RIZKALLA. Right now, as it stands, the TIP library is, indeed, pretty close to reflecting what is out there. I think it is a little bit too small right now. We need to add images, and we are waiting for the FAA to provide us with a list of new threats and new images that we need to take. Right now it is a little bit small.
Mr. LOBIONDO. How would the equipment that you are working with compare to, say, what would be used by the Israelis?
Mr. RIZKALLA. That is a very good question. I am not aware of everything that the Israelis use right now, but right now the technologies available are worldwide pretty much the same. There is nothing, I believe, that the Israelis are currently using that is not available here in the United States and used by European and American government.
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Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. In your testimony, you mentioned that at the Federal Aviation Administration facility in New Jersey they were looking into the next generation of scanner. Is that what you were saying? I did not quite get that.
Mr. RIZKALLA. No. What I said is that they expressed interest in it. It is a project that we are going to be sending one of our new defraction systems to the FAA for evaluation. But it is not done yet. No. They are not looking at it currently.
We have had three people from the technical center that traveled to Nurnberg and have witnessed the operation of this new technology.
Mr. LOBIONDO. So the process would be to convince them that this is worth their looking into, and then they take it to their facility and determine if, in fact, they would want to proceed with it?
Mr. RIZKALLA. Yes, that is correct. I believe the first step is already taken with the technical people in Atlantic City. They found this technology to be certainly worth looking at, and they have expressed interest in having us send it to New Jersey.
Mr. LOBIONDO. OK.
Well, I want to thank you very much for providing the testimony. Obviously, this is an area we are going to pay a lot more attention to and appreciate your taking the time to be here.
The meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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