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ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE EGYPT AIR CRASH
Tuesday, April 11, 2000
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr. [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. DUNCAN. Good morning. I would like to call this Aviation Subcommittee hearing to order.
Today we will be examining issues that have come under increased public scrutiny since the tragic crash of EgyptAir 990. Specifically, we are looking at the use of video recorders in the cockpit; the viability of psychological testing for airline pilots; and the use of English proficiency requirements for foreign pilots.
Let me point out that none of these issues are new to the aviation community. The crash of EgyptAir only brought renewed attention to whether some or all of these measures could increase aviation safety. Cockpit video recorders had been discussed prior to the crash of EgyptAir due to their potential as an additional safety feature in the cockpit. Video recorders in the cockpit would have the advantage of visually recording actions in the cockpit, as well as having a record of the gauges and other controls. In the age of glass cockpits, after a crash, the gauges are often not readable. In older cockpits, gauges were readable after a crash. With a video recorder in the cockpit, investigators might be able to view gauges, hand signals between the crew, and even what the crew saw prior to the crash.
In the recent Swiss Air and ValuJet crashes, video cockpit recorders could have shown the conditions in the cockpit, including whether there was smoke or fire. In addition, video recorders could potentially show the pilot's actions, which could have been helpful in crashes like EgyptAir and Alaska Air.
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One issue we will look at today is whether a cockpit recorder can be and should be placed in the cockpit so that only equipment is shown, and not showing the occupants of the cockpit, the crew. This would be in response to privacy concerns that have been raised by pilots.
Renewed attention has also been given to psychological screening of pilots as a result of the EgyptAir crash. Although no official report has been released on the crash, news reports raised questions concerning the pilot's mental condition. Although there has never been a major accident involving a U.S. carrier where a pilot's mental condition has been implicated, there have been several international flights where the mental condition of the pilot has been at issue. Crashes by SilkAir, Air Morocco, and Air Botswana have raised issues regarding whether the pilot intentionally crashed the plane.
In addition, NTSB reports that since 1983, 24 small plane crashes have occurred where the pilot's mental condition may have been a factor in the crash. In light of the relatively small number of incidents, many groups don't believe there is a problem in the United States. Today we will try to determine whether this is an issue that should be explored further.
Finally, we are going to look at English proficiency requirements for pilots. This issue has come to the forefront recently also. Although English has been designated the international language of aviation, the inability of a pilot or controller to speak English proficiently has been implicated in several crashes. NTSB reports that poor communications were a factor in the Avianca crash in New York and the American Airlines crash in Cali, Colombia.
Related to this issue, we are going to show a piece before the first panel begins from ABC's 20-20 about runway incursions and the problems that inability to communicate in English can cause. Congressman Franks is here to talk about that issue, and we are glad to have him with us today.
I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to sit with the subcommittee following his testimony, if he so wishes.
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As usual, we will have the members proceed first, and generally we do not ask questions of the members, as we need to get to the other witnesses as quickly as possible, and also because we know they have a busy schedule and we do have opportunities to ask them questions on the Floor and at other times.
In addition, we are happy to have two very distinguished panels. We have Chairman Jim Hall of the National Transportation Safety Board here today, along with Tom McSweeny, who is the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification from the FAA to speak to these issues.
I would also like to thank Captain Duane Woerth from the Air Line Pilots Association for being here today, and Mr. Bob Frenzel from the Air Transport Association. We also have Mr. Barrett Byrnes, the Chief Air Traffic Controller from Kennedy Airport, to talk about English proficiency, and Mr. Lee Thompson, the CEO of Vision Technologies, to testify about the advances in video recorders by his company that could be used in the cockpit.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, and now I turn to my good friend, the Ranking Member, Mr. Lipinski, for any statement he wishes to make.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The tragic crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 raised several questions, many of which the National Transportation Safety Board is still working to answer. Today's hearing will focus on some of the issues raised by the EgyptAir accident and the initial investigation into that accident, including whether or not video recorders should be permitted in airline cockpits; whether or not pilots should regularly undergo psychological testing; and whether or not current English proficiency requirements for foreign pilots are adequate.
Currently, accident investigators must rely on cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders for information on accidents and incidents. In several investigations, and particularly in the case of EgyptAir Flight 990, a video recorder would have complimented the data supplied by those two recorders, and would have provided additional information to accident investigators.
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There is no doubt that a video recording would be useful in some accident investigations. However, before we rush to place video recorders in the cockpits of commercial airlines, we must answer some tough questions about the cost and the benefit of such technology.
First of all, is the technology ready? Do we have a camera available that can adjust to the dramatic changes in lighting in airline cockpits? Do we have a camera today that can survive a fatal crash? Do we have a single camera that can capture all the vital information needed by accident investigators?
Secondly, is requiring video recorders right now the best use of scarce safety resources? There is no doubt that a cockpit video recorder would help facilitate accident investigators. But what about accident prevention? Should we be encouraging the FAA to require more in the area of accident prevention efforts before we require another—possibly redundant—recorder aimed at accident investigation?
Finally, and most importantly, do we have adequate privacy protections safeguarding the cockpit video recordings and the images of pilots on these video recordings?
These are vital questions that must be answered before we move ahead with cockpit video recorders.
As for the psychological testing of pilots on a regular basis, I do not believe that we can ever devise a test that could be administered effectively and efficiently and still address the small problem in question. Rather, I am confident, due to the low occurrence of incidents involving pilots with psychological problems—especially here in the United States—that current procedures in place adequately address this issue. For example, airlines use screening procedures during the hiring process to weed out pilots with psychological problems. In addition, pilots work in close quarters with other pilots, and are more than willing to report a colleague who is acting ''differently.'' There are in-house procedures to deal with this issue; therefore, testing every pilot before every flight would be very expensive and would bring very little safety benefit.
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The issue of strengthening current proficiency requirements for foreign pilots, as well as for controllers, is an issue that we can and should act on immediately. There are standards in place, but they are not adequately adhered to consistently throughout the world. In addition, this is not just a problem abroad, but also a problem here in the United States. For example, U.S. pilots and controllers use English slang for many of their conversations. However, if all pilots and controllers were required to use the exact same phraseology, both here in the U.S. as well as abroad, then the U.S. pilots would be more comfortable in foreign airspace, and U.S. controllers would be more comfortable with foreign pilots because they would be more comfortable with the standard phraseology. In addition, the aviation industry is a global industry, and almost all U.S. airlines serve points around the world. Most U.S. airlines serve their international routes through code-sharing relationships with foreign airlines; yet as of today, no U.S. airline has an English proficiency training program in place for their international code-sharing partners.
Recently the Department of Transportation issued guidelines regarding the safety of international code-sharing operations. I would encourage the DOT to add English proficiency training to the list of items that the Department and the U.S. carriers should look at before entering into international code-sharing agreements with foreign airlines.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of these witnesses.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LaHood?
Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I think it is important for our subcommittee, when we've had these accidents around the world or in our own country, as we've done in the past, to really try to look into what we might do to try to figure out what happened, and hear from the experts on that.
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But I want to quickly add that I think that psychological testing of pilots is probably one of the nuttiest ideas that I have ever heard since I've been in Congress, for six years. I think it is the most knee-jerk reaction that I can think of as a result of one airline mishap, and I am totally opposed to that, and I hope that we in Congress don't come to that. I think the notion of some sort of a cockpit video recorder is something that perhaps we can look at, if we can figure out how it can really make sense.
But when you consider all of the flights that take place in this country and around the world, and to be proposing some kind of psychological test, I just think it's a little bit wacky, myself, and I am very much against it.
I look forward to hearing Mr. Hall's testimony and some of the other folks, but I just want to go on record. I think we should have this hearing; I think we should discuss what happened, but I think that some of the things that have been suggested don't meet the common sense test that I think we need to apply in some of these instances.
I thank you for the chance to sound off for a minute or two.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I do join with the others in congratulating you on holding this hearing. The safety of the flying public has been my principal concern on this committee for a number of years.
That said, some of the nostrums that are being proposed, I think, are dubious at best. In the case of the EgyptAir crash, with an as yet-undetermined cause—although many of us have our suspicions of what happened, but we're being diplomatic and polite about it—even if you adopted all the recommendations before us, they wouldn't apply to the pilot of a foreign airline. And also as one who studies counselling, if you're dealing with someone who is simply acting out and very disturbed, that's one thing, but that would be observed by other pilots and employees. If you're dealing with someone who has the intent—who has very seriously planned an event to kill either themselves or a planeload of passengers, a cursory psychological exam once a year or whatever would give people a sense of false security. In fact, it would do nothing, in addition to being extraordinarily expensive and intrusive. As one who has studied in the field, I don't put great stock in those sorts of tests at all.
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Beyond that, we do have a problem with the recording of flight parameters, and it has been at the extraordinarily leisurely pace of the FAA that we have been moving forward in mandating recording devices that can record more parameters, because God forbid that we impose any expense on the airline, even if it only figures out to a penny per passenger per year. So I would hope that that comes up in the discussion today.
We are talking about going now with video tapes or whatever, also on the flight deck. Well, how about just getting done with the job of installing state-of-the-art recorders in every plane that's out there, recording as many parameters as possible? We haven't even done that yet, let alone to begin to move forward with some sort of video technology with some of these attendant problems.
So I think it is very appropriate that the committee meet today on these issues, but I do believe that many of the proposed solutions here are akin to many of the solutions after the horrible TWA 800 tragedy, when we rushed forward under the assumption that there was a bomb and imposed a lot of things that in fact were not quite ready or necessary to protect the flying public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Miller?
Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I believe it is very timely.
I would like to associate myself with Mr. LaHood's comments. I believe he is right on in what he said.
I believe we will all agree that air travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in this country. As a member of this subcommittee, it is one of my top priorities that we continue that process.
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In 1997, a GAO report found that of the 169 accidents involving a major airline between 1983 and 1995, 30 percent were caused by pilot performance. They further found that in one-third of those accidents, the pilots did not correctly use the principles of crew resource management. This report concluded that the FAA should develop guidance for teaching crew resource management in the traditional Part 121 training.
As we begin, in addition to discussions on new measures which could improve pilot performance and help explain the tragic accidents which do occur, I would also like to hear about how the FAA has implemented these recommendations. I am particularly interested in how this type of training, in conjunction with the use of the standard phraseology, would contribute to improvements in airline safety.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Berry?
Mr. BERRY. No statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Bateman?
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am just an interested interloper here to listen in. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Isakson?
Mr. ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your calling the hearing and I, like Mr. Miller, would associate myself with the remarks of Mr. LaHood, particularly with regard to the psychological testing area.
I am extremely interested today in hearing discussion and testimony regarding standard phraseology and regarding monitoring. I have a very open mind about both those from the standpoint of improving the communication between the ground and any aircraft in the air, whether in international space or domestic airspace, for that matter, in the case of an international plane like EgyptAir.
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But I have serious questions that psychological profiling would do anything more than be, as the gentleman said, a false sense of security or a tremendous burden, for which the result would be, at best, unpredictable.
I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing today.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Dr. Cooksey?
Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am anxious to hear from the witnesses. This is an interesting discussion, and I hope that it is meaningful in continuing our pursuit of aviation safety. I think we have been quite successful up to this point, when you look at our overall record over the last two or three years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.
Mr. Pease?
Mr. PEASE. No statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Mica?
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your holding this hearing. Sometimes we do enter into these new arenas with a mass of regulation and imposition of new and costly measures for the airline industry and for our airports on a half-cocked basis in response to some tragedy.
I do think that we need to be prudent. We do need to examine any measures that we can institute to ensure safety for the flying public and for others.
I am concerned, though, that we continue lack focus on where we're losing lives. If we look at the air tragedies—Air Florida, the American Airlines, the 737 Pittsburgh flights, the Charlotte USAir crash, the TWA 800, SwissAir—many of these are repetitive maintenance failures, and I have asked the committee time and time again to focus in trying to see that some of the resources that we expend in FAA could be addressed to where we're losing lives.
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We will have periodic instances that we can never institute adequate safety and protection measures for and cover all circumstances, but just some of the flights I've mentioned, we've lost probably a thousand passengers in recent times, and many of them due to repetitive maintenance failures.
So it would be my hope that the subcommittee could focus on that and institute measures in the meantime that ensure safety for the traveling air public.
Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. LoBiondo?
Mr. LOBIONDO. No statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. No statement.
Mr. Bass has no statement.
All right. I guess I should make it clear that no one on the subcommittee has proposed any of these issues that we are looking at here today. We are just simply calling this hearing to look into all of these proposals, because various people have suggested these things as things the subcommittee should look into, and also several of these things are done in other countries. We did have a request from Mr. Franks to testify about this on the English language proficiency question.
The subcommittee staff has prepared a tape from 20/20 that will lead into Mr. Franks' testimony, so we will go ahead and show the tape at this point.
[Video presentation.]
Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much.
We are very pleased to have our colleague, Congressman Franks here.
Mr. Franks, you may begin your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB FRANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM NEW JERSEY
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Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part of the record.
Mr. DUNCAN. Your full statement will be included in the record.
Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to follow that tape. It is particularly graphic, and I think it underscores very well the nature of the problem.
A pilot from a foreign country who misinterprets the orders of an air traffic controller is inviting disaster. That is precisely what happened on January 25th, 1990; Avianca Airline Flight 52 was dangerously low on fuel. The crew failed to properly communicate the extent of the emergency to the JFK tower and TRACON. That plane ran out of fuel and crashed, killing 73 of the 158 people on board. The pilot simply didn't know to use the word ''emergency'' to trigger for the tower an awareness that they were running critically low on fuel.
Unfortunately, that was not an isolated incident. Near-misses due to communications breakdowns are becoming all too commonplace. Last November at LAX, AeroMexico Flight 432 twice failed to understand and obey tower instructions to stop short of the runway. The plane came within 60 feet of colliding with a United Airlines 757 traveling 175 miles per hour. Last April, at O'Hare International Airport, an Air China 747 did not understand the air traffic controller's instructions and came within 30 feet of the top of a Korean airliner.
ICAO, which governs international air travel, requires all pilots who fly internationally to have an understanding of standard aviation English. But what exactly is standard aviation English? ICAO doesn't define it, and neither does the FAA. When a pilot seeks certification from ICAO to operate in international airspace, he merely has to indicate his English proficiency by checking a box on a form. No questions are asked; no tests are given. Nothing is done to confirm that that pilot has any command whatsoever over the English language. ICAO and the FAA simply take the pilot's representation of English proficiency as fact.
This is not the only language barrier that compromises safety. Foreign pilots do not always use the aviation terminology that is standard for U.S. air traffic controllers. Combined, these two barriers to communications between pilots and air traffic controllers pose a serious risk not only to passengers flying on foreign carriers, but to every air traveler.
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Today I would urge the subcommittee to join with me in calling on the FAA to take a number of steps to address this threat to the safety of our skies.
First, the FAA must demonstrate real leadership and make an all-out effort to convince ICAO to mandate testing of English proficiency for all international pilots. In addition, FAA must agree to take the lead in forcing ICAO to establish an international glossary of aviation commands that all pilots and air traffic controllers around the world would be required to follow.
Next, the FAA should take immediate action to ground those pilots who have demonstrated consistently a dangerous lack of proficiency in the English language. We can't continue to allow pilots who cannot follow basic aviation instructions to endanger the lives of passengers.
Lastly, I am calling on the Inspector General of the DOT to launch an immediate investigation into the extent of the danger posed by foreign pilots who do not understand English aviation commands. It is time for the FAA and the international aviation community to recognize the urgency of taking action to safeguard airline passengers from potentially devastating consequences as a result of a failure to communicate between pilots and air traffic controllers.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Franks. I know of your great concern with this because you were the first person to discuss it with me, and I appreciate your statement here today and your willingness to come here. We have asked unanimous consent to allow you to sit up here with us and participate if you have the time. As previously stated, it is the practice of this subcommittee to not ask Members questions because of your heavy schedule and because we have other opportunities to discuss this with you on the Floor and other places, and because we need to move to the regular witnesses.
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But thank you very much for being here with us today.
Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. We will call forward at this time the first panel. Panel I consists of the Honorable Jim Hall, who is Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, and Mr. Thomas McSweeny, who is Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification of the Federal Aviation Administration. Accompanying Mr. Hall will be Dr. Vernon Ellingstad and Dr. Bernard Loeb, and accompanying Mr. McSweeny will be Mr. David Canoles.
We are pleased to have each of these gentlemen with us, and we will have statements from Mr. Hall and Mr. McSweeny, and the others will be available to respond to questions from members.
Mr. Hall, you may proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JIM HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY VERNON ELLINGSTAD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, AND BERNARD LOEB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY; AND THOMAS MCSWEENY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID CANOLES, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION
Mr. HALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board to discuss EgyptAir Flight 990's crash and aviation issues that the committee has identified that have arisen as a result of that crash and others: specifically, the use of video recorders in cockpits, language communication problems, and psychological profiling of crew members.
With me today are Dr. Bernard Loeb, Director of our Office of Aviation Safety, and Dr. Vern Ellingstad, Director of our Office of Research and Engineering.
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As you know, EgyptAir Flight 990 crashed off the coast of Nantucket in the early morning of October 31st, 1999, with 217 individuals on board, including 101 Americans. The National Transportation Safety Board, with the assistance of the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority, the Egyptian Government's designated representative, is still investigating that crash.
To date, the Board has expended more than 2,400 hours conducting this investigation, excluding overtime, and we have expended more than $13 million in investigation-related expenses for the services of other agencies, including the Navy's search and recovery effort. We anticipate that the final total of these expenses will be about $17 million.
Because we have not concluded our investigation and have made no final determination as to the cause, my discussion of the crash this morning will be limited. However, the Safety Board's investigation into several recent crashes—and I mention ValuJet 592, USAir 427, TWA 800, SwissAir 111, EgyptAir 990, SilkAir, as well the EgyptAir investigation—has highlighted the need for recording images of the cockpit environment. The Safety Board believes that the availability of electronic cockpit imagery would help resolve issues surrounding flight crew actions in the cockpit.
For example, it would tell us which pilot was at the controls; what controls were being manipulated; the pilot inputs to instruments, i.e., switches or circuit breakers; what information was on the video display, the display screens, and the weather radar.
Video recorders would also provide crucial information about the circumstances and physical conditions in the cockpit that are simply not available to investigators, despite the availability of modern cockpit voice recorders, and 100 parameter digital flight data recorders.
The Safety Board has discussed the need for video recording the cockpit environment, first in its report of the September, 1989 incident involving USAir Flight 105, a Boeing 737, at Kansas City, Missouri. In that report we recognized that while desirable, it was not yet feasible. As a result, the Board did not make a recommendation on the use of video recordings at that time. However, in the almost 11 years since that incident, considerable progress has been made in both video and electronic recording storage technologies. Electronic recording of images in the cockpit is now both technologically and economically viable, Mr. Chairman, and solid-state memory devices can now capture vast amounts of audio, video, and other electronic data.
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In February, 2000, as a result of an October, 1997 accident involving a Cessna operated by the Department of the Interior that was not required to have a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder, the Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require crash-protected video recording systems on Part 135 aircraft not currently required to have crashworthy flight recorder device.
To further address this issue, the Safety Board is today recommending that the Federal Aviation Administration require Part 121, 125, or 135 aircraft currently equipped with a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder to be equipped with a crash-protected cockpit image recording system. We should not further delay the implementation of available technology that may help us more quickly determine the probable cause of accidents, and therefore prevent future accidents.
I would like to show you a brief video clip to illustrate some of what we expect to be recorded by a cockpit image recording system.
[Video presentation.]
Mr. HALL. In the first segment, the camera is not fixed in the airplane, so the recording is uneven. As you can see, the video will show which crew member is operating the controls or making selections, such as arming the spoilers.
The video will also capture the interactive displays used by flight crews in the modern cockpit that are not presently recorded on the flight data recorder. You will notice that it is never necessary to focus on the crew's faces to collect this important information.
Mr. Chairman, the Safety Board is extremely sensitive to the privacy concerns of the pilot associations and others that have expressed concern with respect to recording images of flight crews. I believe we've distributed to every member of this committee this brochure. As you know, the Board's reauthorization, passed by this chamber, would require that the same protections already in place for cockpit voice recorders be extended to image recorders in all modes of transportation. Under these provisions, a cockpit image recording could never be publicly released.
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The Board is also aware of concerns regarding the treatment of all recorded media in foreign accidents. We have shared those concerns, and will work aggressively with the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve the protections afforded to these recordings in other countries.
In addition, on April 25th and 26th, the Safety Board is holding a Transportation Safety and Law Symposium that will address the issues of employee privacy and criminal inquiries and their impact on transportation safety. We are also open to suggestions that this committee may have to improve safeguards governing the use of these devices.
The second issue I would like to briefly address is language communication problems. Although the Safety Board has had a longstanding concern about this issue, I must note that we have no evidence of any language difficulties in the EgyptAir crash. However, the importance of this issue has been well documented in a number of accidents, including the January, 1990 Avianca Airlines accident in Cove Neck, New York, and the December, 1995 American Airlines accident near Cali, Colombia. As a result of our recommendations following the Cali accident, ICAO's Air Navigation Bureau has formed a group that will hold its first meeting in October, 2000 to specifically study English language issues.
Finally, the last item I would like to briefly discuss is the issue of psychological testing for pilots. Although such events are rare in commercial aviation—and let me point out that there have been no documented cases of a U.S. pilot's deliberate actions causing an accident—there have been accidents and incidents that may have been caused by a pilot's deliberate actions in commercial aviation. In 1994, an off-duty Federal Express pilot riding in the jump seat attacked the flight crew with a hammer and a spear gun, and in 1997, a SilkAir Boeing 737 crashed in Indonesia. The Indonesian investigative authority has sought the assistance of law enforcement authorities to look into this issue in that investigation.
It is not clear, Mr. Chairman, that any of these crashes would have been prevented by better pilot screening techniques. However, of course, it is in everyone's best interest for the airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure that only the most qualified and capable applicants are chosen to become airline pilots.
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Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement, and I will be glad to attempt to respond to any questions from this committee.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall.
Mr. McSweeny?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would ask that my full statement be added to the record.
Mr. DUNCAN. It may be placed in the record.
Mr. MCSWEENY. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this morning to discuss your issues of concern that have arisen from the recent tragedy involving EgyptAir. I am Thomas McSweeny, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification of the Federal Aviation Administration. With me is Mr. David Canoles from our Air Traffic Organization.
In calling this hearing, Mr. Chairman, you have asked the FAA to address three specific issues:
Number one, the use of video recorders in the cockpit;
Number two, the use and extent of psychological testing of flight crews; and
Number three, English proficiency of air traffic controllers and flight crews.
Each of these items is of critical importance to the safety management of the National Airspace System, the NAS, as well as for international travel. We appreciate the opportunity to share with you and the members of this subcommittee an update of the FAA's activities with respect to each of these concerns.
First, video cockpit recordings. At the present time, the FAA does not mandate the use of video recordings in the cockpit of any aircraft. However, we have taken steps to initiate a discussion within the aviation industry on the future role of video technology in flight data collection. Administrator Garvey and NTSB Chairman co-signed a letter on November 3rd of last year, tasking the RTCA to explore and develop future concepts for flight data collection technologies for use in both accident investigation and accident and incident prevention, and I want to emphasize accident prevention.
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As we noted in the letter to RTCA, new communications, navigation, and surveillance technologies currently being developed, along with new cockpit interface systems, give evidence that new and better concepts for flight data collection are possible. At the same time, the operating environment of our NAS is undergoing the renovation made possible by new technologies. This is an ideal time to take a look into the future and determine which technologies would be most beneficial. Clearly, there are many variables to consider when trying to define future requirements for flight data information technology. Methods and concepts for flight data collection and analysis will need to keep pace with the advanced space-based technology for navigation and data-link communications.
We believe that the use of the RTCA is a proper forum for the discussion of these issues.
While we have asked the RTCA to look ahead at all potential data collection methodologies, we believe a very important medium to evaluate is video recording technology. Many questions and issues on video recordings will need to be addressed. We believe that RTCA is the ideal forum for these discussions. The RTCA committee will have the expertise to explore the potential use of video equipment and its effectiveness in providing useful data.
Second, the psychological testing of pilots and flight crews. Currently, airline transport pilots are required to undergo general medical examinations by FAA-designated Aviation Medical Examiners, AMEs, at six-month intervals. The medical certificate application form contains questions designed to elicit the presence or history of mental or emotional disorders. In addition, the AME is instructed to make observations about the applicant's mental state, and not to issue a medical certificate if significant problems are identified. If a pilot's personal problems result in significant symptoms of depression or anxiety that would have an effect on aviation safety, the medical certification is withheld.
The AMEs are trained to be sensitive to indications of emotional problems. In fact, AMEs are instructed to make observations regarding the applicants appearance, behavior, mood, communication skills, memory, and cognition. During the course of a medical examination, AMEs are instructed to engage the pilot in casual conversation to elicit information about the pilots family, the job, and special interests, for purposes of uncovering personal troubles that may be of significance. Moreover, all U.S. flight crews are randomly tested for drugs and alcohol. At each medical examination, the National Driver Registry is queried with the airman's permission for information on the airman's driving record, with particular attention to any citations for driving under the influence. The abuse of drugs and alcohol is a common symptom of the diminished mental health, and is addressed in the psychiatric portion of medical standards.
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There should be no question that the FAA believes that the promotion of good mental health of flight crews is important. We believe our Airman Medical Certification Program achieves that goal. The staff of the Office of Aviation Medicine routinely interact with medical directors of air carriers, their professional associations, medical consultants to pilots groups, international aviation medical experts, and medical licensing authorities on matters relating to pilot mental health and physical health. Training seminars for FAA's domestic and international AMEs contain models on psychiatry and psychiatric diagnostic techniques, and the Office of Aviation Medicine personnel lecture frequently at international meetings on pilot mental health and physical health.
As part of the FAA's Aviation Safety Program, the Civil Aeromedical Institute recently developed a video, focusing on some psychological and physiological aspects of safety in civil aviation operations.
Last, let me speak to English proficiency.
English is recognized as the common language of international aviation. Any person operating a foreign civil aircraft within the United States is required to have at least one crew member of that aircraft able to conduct two-way radio-telephone communications in the English language, and that crew member must be on duty while the aircraft is approaching, operating within, or leaving the United States.
The International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, requires that its member states ensure that their international air carriers be familiar with laws, regulations, and procedures pertinent to the performance of their duties prescribed for the international areas to be transited, the airports to be used, and the related air navigation facilities.
With respect to foreign pilots, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 129, require each foreign air carrier to conduct operations within the United States in accordance with operations specifications issued by the Administrator. Detailed requirements govern the applications for the issuance or amendment of operations specifications for air carriers operating in the United States which require them to certify that their pilot personnel are able to speak and understand the English language to a degree necessary to enable them to communicate properly with air traffic control. These requirements are enforced through our aviation safety inspectors, who investigate alleged violations involving foreign aircraft operation.
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FAA is taking a leading role at ICAO to promote more specific standards of English language proficiency in international aviation. At the 32nd ICAO Assembly Meeting in 1998, ICAO passed a resolution which urged the ICAO Council to take steps to ensure that air traffic control personnel and flight crews involved in flight operation in airspace where the use of English is required are proficient.
Given this mandate, the FAA launched an initiative at ICAO the following year which has led to the creation of the ICAO Common English Study Group. Integrating its own research with that of other ICAO member states, the FAA hopes to lay the groundwork for the first ever proficiency requirements at the first meeting of the ICAO Study Group this summer.
The goal of the Common English Study Group is to establish a new provision in ICAO requirements to govern both air traffic controllers and flight crews. Subsequent goals include the development of one, standardized testing to determine if proficiency standards are met, and training required to meet proficiency standards.
In closing, the FAA is working diligently to increase the level of safety throughout the entire aviation industry. We appreciate your concerns and look forward to working with you.
This concludes my testimony. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McSweeny.
Chairman Hall, let me ask you this. Some people have suggested that if we do place video recorders in the cockpits, that they focus only on the controls or the instrument panel and not on the pilots at all. Do you think that would be an improvement, or sufficient?
In the Wall Street Journal in an article on Friday, a group of pilots said that this is, I suppose, one of the hottest issues with airline pilots, and that they basically go ballistic over it. One pilot was quoted as saying that he would just hang his hat on it to cover it up.
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What would you say to these pilots? I know you mentioned these privacy concerns, but what would you say to them to try to alleviate some of their concerns?
Mr. HALL. Well, Mr. Chairman, obviously the most important safety item in any aircraft is the flight crew. Their training, their qualifications, their experience is all brought to bear in providing the many safe flights that we have day in and day out in this country.
It was the leadership of the pilot community that brought about the introduction of the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, and I think, Mr. Chairman, it is well documented that the American flying public, as well as the public worldwide that flies each and every day, is much safer because of the advances that have come about as a result of cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders.
I would say to them, I don't believe there is any reason—all of us are responsible for providing a safe environment for the flying public. That includes, obviously, the regulator; that includes the National Transportation Safety Board; that includes this committee. But no one is more interested in that safe environment than the pilot community themselves. They and their representatives are on each and every flight that takes off in the United States and worldwide.
We believe the technology that is available now should be used to assist and advance safety. As I pointed out, there are seven recent crashes that the Board's investigators believe additional information that would provide for a Safer Skies for all of us is missing that could be there if we had had these video recorders.
We have a great deal of concern, as the pilot community does, for the issue of privacy, and the Safety Board has attempted to address that concern by legislation that has been passed by this committee, that is pending in the Senate; by our actions with the Federal Aviation Administration; at the international level with ICAO, and we would be glad to work with the pilot community to try to address this issue.
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But I think the responsible thing for the pilot community is to step forward, as they did with the introduction of the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, to ensure that all the technology is there, used in a responsible fashion, to provide for the safety of flight.
Mr. DUNCAN. You know there is concern about some of these tapes potentially showing up on the nightly news, and the horror that that would create in family members. Is there a way, as some have suggested, to encrypt these recordings? And would that violate any international agreement that you know of? Would there be—would you like to see this done, if it can't be done on international flights because of problems, just on domestic flights?
Mr. HALL. Well, I think it's an extremely important safety feature, and I think we should attempt to look at any reasonable consideration in terms of addressing the privacy issue that the pilots have raised.
Dr. Ellingstad might speak more to the ability of encryption. He is an expert in that area. However, I would say that my demeanor and tenor in all this, Mr. Chairman, I hope, is to sit down and address the privacy issue in a responsible fashion, because I think that it is a very legitimate issue. But I do sincerely believe that that issue can be addressed and that the videos can provide for a safer environment.
If you would like, I would defer to Dr. Ellingstad.
Mr. DUNCAN. Go ahead, Doctor.
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. Certainly, the encryption technology is available to accomplish exactly what you said, Mr. Chairman. The data can be protected so that it could be only read out by a particular readout station.
That may be a solution that could be considered. There are some practical difficulties that may be a problem in that area, particularly with respect to interaction with other nations' authorities in terms of accomplishing the readout of those kinds of data.
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Another thing that is an issue that we are somewhat concerned with is the capacity to do maintenance on these recorders if the capacity to read them was restricted too greatly. Certainly, the carrier would have to have the capability of knowing that their recorders were recording what the cameras were pointed at.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much.
My time is up, but let me just ask Mr. McSweeny very quickly, if a pilot admitted on his own—or reported on his own—that he had what he described as a ''minor problem with depression'' and occasionally took medication such as Prozac or other forms of medication, but said that he did not do it anytime near a flight, would anything happen?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Not being a medical doctor, I couldn't tell you specifically in the cases you identified. But the use of anti-depressants are in fact things that physicians look at, and in many cases they have denied pilots' licenses.
Over the last couple of years I have asked my folks to go back and look at the records, and in about a two-year period we have actually denied over 2,000 pilot certificates for psychological issues that have been discovered by the AMEs during the normal, routine physicals.
Mr. DUNCAN. Two thousand denials over what period?
Mr. MCSWEENY. A couple years.
Mr. DUNCAN. The last couple years?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Yes.
Mr. DUNCAN. I was pleased to hear your progress report on the English proficiency requirement and what ICAO is doing, because I think you see there is a lot of concern about that, a lot of support for that. We need to make sure that these air traffic controllers—that there is no real communication problem there.
Ms. Danner?
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Ms. DANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony here this morning on a very, very important subject to all of us.
I am wondering, with regard to the technicalities of this video recording, Captains don't necessarily always stay in the left seat of the cockpit; they can change, is that not true, if they want to? They can switch seats with the other individual.
So I am wondering—for example, in the video we saw that one could easily identify that this one man was wearing a large wristwatch, etc. But how, if the family didn't look at that, would one know? Now, obviously, if the pilots have on their jackets and we see the four stripes, we're going to know whether it was the Captain or not. But these individuals weren't wearing their jackets—or, as my husband has referred to them, their blouses. I assume that's your airline usage or military usage of what I call his ''jacket.''
Explain to me how one would determine which individual was in which seat and who was flying the plane, etc.? I would like to know more about that.
Mr. HALL. I would like to ask Dr. Loeb, if he would, to respond to your question, Congresswoman.
Mr. LOEB. We would do that the same way that we handle the cockpit voice recordings and the determination of who is speaking, and that is by having the group members who participate in the readout of the cockpit voice recorder—those include people who know the voices and can identify and distinguish between the pilots. Clearly, at times you will be able to identify the difference just by the size and physical characteristics, but primarily by using that in conjunction with the cockpit voice recorder, so you will have the voice identification as well. Between the two, I think we will be able to identify who was where.
Ms. DANNER. So we would know that they could do this through a peer group and not have to bring a grieving family member in to try to identify them?
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Mr. LOEB. Yes, that is correct.
Ms. DANNER. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaHood?
Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I hope you didn't imply by what I said that I was indicating that you were in support of any of this. I know that you were not, and I didn't mean to imply that in my statement, and I know the importance of this hearing.
I have four questions here; if I don't get to all of them, could we have them inserted in the record and ask the witnesses to please respond for the record? I appreciate that very much.
Mr. Hall, I know that you and your people are really expert in this crash investigation, and I know you have reached conclusions on crashes before after long, detailed investigations. I will speak for myself; I think you people are really highly professional people and you do all that you can to get to the bottom of all of these things.
But I really wonder if you really think that a video camera in a cockpit would have really assisted you in, say, any of these crashes that you've investigated over the last couple of years to the extent that you would have reached a different conclusion about what caused it, what happened to it, what happened during that time? I mean, I haven't read all of your reports, but I do know that you do a thorough investigation now and reach certain conclusions, and I really am curious if you believe that a video camera would be that much more of assistance to you in reaching conclusions about why crashes occur.
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir, I do. You know, our mandate from Congress, Congressman, is not just to determine a probable cause on a particular event, but it is to make recommendations to prevent that event from occurring again. And as we all know, an accident is a chain of events, and what we need to do is constantly be looking for ways we can address any particular piece of that chain.
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Let me just give you a couple examples. For example, in the ValuJet accident, which I am sure you are familiar with, sir, we left the whole issue of smoke in the cockpit, really, without it being finally resolved. A video camera would have shown the visibility in the cockpit, the actions of the crew in response to the poor visibility, whether there was adherence to procedures, were the existing procedures to clear the cockpit of smoke adequate, was the visibility of the cockpit instruments adequate. All of those issues, a video recorder—in TWA 800, we could have seen the fuel flow indicator and the engine reading in general. In USAir 427, we could have seen whether the flight crew made appropriate or inappropriate weather inputs. In SwissAir 111, in which we have been assisting the Canadian investigators, it is very similar to ValuJet, the visibility in the cockpit. In the Alaska Air accident that just occurred, we would like to know the indications of trim settings, flap settings, the crew actions on flight controls, their help with control positions and flight crew responses, and also whether they were using thrust or manipulating landing gear to control the pitch attitude of the airplane.
In SilkAir, which we have been very involved in because it involved the most popular airliner in the world, the Boeing 737—that would have provided information on who, if anyone, pulled the circuit breakers that turned off the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, and whether intentional actions on the cockpit controls crashed the plane.
And finally, on EgyptAir 990, who was in the cockpit, who was in what seat, who left and when, and once departure occurred from controlled flight, what occurred?
All of these together represent millions of tax dollars and thousands of hours of Safety Board investigators' time. I believe, and my investigators believe, that with this information we could make more specific recommendations to prevent occurrences such as those from recurring.
Mr. LAHOOD. I appreciate that, and I think those are good examples.
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I also appreciate the fact that you said you are willing to work with the airline pilots to try to develop a system if, in fact, somebody decides that we ought to do that.
Mr. HALL. I have a great deal of respect for all of the pilot organizations and the pilot community, Congressman LaHood, and anything that we can do to address these—again, let me stress that these are legitimate concerns that need to be addressed.
Mr. LAHOOD. Let me ask a question about psychological testing. Do you think it's a good idea for pilots?
Mr. HALL. Well, sir, the Board's position on that—we have not had any accidents in which we have had that, in which that has been investigated, and we have done no studies on that issue. So the Board has no position on that particular issue, other than the general position that I mentioned in my earlier testimony—
Mr. LAHOOD. You're not recommending that? You don't feel it's necessary? It's not something that you're really pushing?
Mr. HALL. No, sir, we commented on it because it was a topic of the committee, which obviously is one for consideration, but we have no specific recommendations in that area.
Mr. LAHOOD. And you're not pushing that?
Mr. HALL. No, sir.
Mr. LAHOOD. Let me ask you about the video recorder thing one more time, and this will be my last question, at least on this round.
You know, one of the concerns is that when you get these voice recorders, they are released to the public; and so, when we watch the nightly news—after you've finished your investigation—we can hear what the pilot is saying, and the air traffic controller, and so forth.
I think one of the concerns is that if you put a video camera in the cockpit, that that ultimately will be released, and we know that it was in a particular flight—we have evidence where NBC or MSNBC or somebody used that and actually showed what was going on. And you know what the concerns are. There are privacy concerns, there are other concerns, there is concern for the family of the pilot who are actually going to see what's going on in there.
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If this kind of system is developed—and hopefully it will be developed with the airline pilots; I don't know if it will be—but what about the privacy concerns? And is that kind of information going to be displayed on the nightly news for 200 million Americans to see, or however many watch these programs?
Mr. HALL. Well, you asked an extremely important question, Congressman, and I would like to briefly comment, and I would like to ask either of my colleagues if they would like to comment.
First let me say that it is my understanding, since the safeguards were put in place by this Congress, there has not been a release of the cockpit voice recordings by the Safety Board that have appeared on any news program. The Board has put out transcripts; many times the networks will use professional actors for that purpose. There were two incidents in which the pilots—it has been referred to, and I believe it was Dateline—I don't want to get it incorrect—
Mr. LAHOOD. That is correct.
Mr. HALL.—and I wrote a letter to Dateline; I called the head of the news network, and I called the Colombian government. That is totally irresponsible on behalf of NBC News and the Colombian government to put that type of information out in that type of venue. That information is safeguarded for the safety of the American people, and the actions of whoever in Colombia permitted that information to fall into the hands of the news network, and for the news network to use that information, shows a disrespect to everybody who gets on an airplane each and every day.
Mr. LAHOOD. Well, I am concerned if you put a video camera in there, that that information will—you know how the news media are; they are very—
Mr. HALL. As I said, sir, we're going to look at it, working with the pilot community, but I think we've had a very good record in the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder information. The pilot community has advanced that, and I think the general safety of the American people is what the Board is trying to look after to ensure the technology that all of us have paid for as taxpayers is there to provide for the safety of flight.
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I didn't mention this in my remarks, Congressman, but I know the committee is extremely aware of this, in the next 10 years we are going to probably need twice as many pilots as we have today, and we are probably going to have a doubling again, both in this country and internationally, of aviation in the world. So there are going to be tremendous demands to be addressed.
I hope we're being responsive to your questions.
Do either one of you have anything you want to add on this subject?
[No response.]
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. LaHood.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Mr. LaHood for asking a number of the questions that I was going to ask, so I can ask a few other questions. I compliment you on your questions, also; obviously I would, since I was going to ask similar questions.
I welcome everyone here on the panel. It is a pleasure seeing all of you this morning, particularly my good friend, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall, in answering Mr. LaHood's questions, I can understand where smoke in the cockpit would be picked up on the video camera. But isn't there any other way that you could detect smoke in that cockpit and what the pilot, the copilot, etc., were able to see by the voice recorder or the data recorder?
Mr. HALL. Dr. Loeb would like to respond, sir.
Mr. LOEB. Let me try to answer that and perhaps expand a little bit on the statement made by Chairman Hall as to the value of this system.
Yes, the direct answer is that there are sensors. We could put smoke sensors in. There is technology there that could give us some information. The problem is, it will give us some information but not necessarily all of what we want.
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In addition, I don't think we have ever failed to be able to solve an accident because of the lack of video recorders. I do believe that accident investigations have taken far longer than they need to, with far greater cost to the taxpayer in terms of dollars spent on testing and in terms of just the human resources needed to pursue the investigations, that would have been alleviated or avoided if we had had video recorders. And let me just mention a couple of these.
The USAir 427 accident at Pittsburgh involved a 737. That saga began in 1991 with the United Airlines accident, Flight 585 at Colorado Springs. We spent seven or eight years trying to determine what was happening to 737s. We did not have any information to give us the position whether the pilots were using—if they were on the pedals, on the wheel—but even when you have that information recorded by a flight data recorder, what happens is that at times some of the parties to the investigation will indicate that there is a problem with the flight data recorder; it's giving false information. And so you spend years trying to determine whether that really is the case.
I'm going to go back, then, to Northwest 255, an MD-80 accident that occurred at Detroit a number of years ago, in which we believed that the flight crew failed to set the flaps properly for takeoff. Flaps were a recorded—one of the parameters that was recorded on the flight data recorder. Nevertheless, we spent a lot of time doing performance information, performance studies and all sorts of other work to demonstrate that in fact the flight data recorder was correct and not incorrect in what it was presenting to us, because there were those who were saying that the timing of the sensors on the recording device could have been that the flaps in fact were originally set and then retracted.
If we had had a video recorder showing the flap handles, which is entirely possible, which would be part of what we want, that—
Mr. LIPINSKI. Doctor, excuse me for just a moment. Let me interrupt you.
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You have demonstrated to me that having this video camera is going to give you another check on things that, it seems to me based upon what you're saying, you've already checked. It's just a redundancy that you have. I may have missed it, but I haven't heard anything new that the video camera will give you that you don't already have; it's just further—it's another way of gathering evidence for you to convince your investigators, or for the investigators to convince the Board that they have the answer.
Mr. LOEB. In the USAir Flight 427, we did not have rudder pedal position. We did not even have, at that time, the rudder.
Mr. LIPINSKI. But could you get that information from an improved flight data recorder?
Mr. LOEB. It is possible to get that information from an improved flight data recorder; however, we have been going around with the FAA on this issue, and Boeing, where we have asked for both the rudder position and the rudder pedal position, and we have been told, ''Well, there's no need for both of those, if you have one.''
Mr. HALL. Let me just say also, Congressman, that I've had the honor of being Chairman for six years now before this committee, and for six years the Board has said, ''We need to enhance recorders on existing airlines,'' yet we still have aircraft in service in this country with very primitive recorders.
But I do believe that from personal experience, what the video recorder does for you, number one, it provides a more timely answer, and many times time is of the essence in making decisions involving millions of dollars in terms of the fleet. We can look very quickly at the Alaska Air incident that we just went through. And I do believe, to point specifically, I think ValuJet and the SwissAir 111 accidents—both the environment in that cockpit, with smoke, and whether the procedures used were effective at all in clearing smoke from the cockpit effectively, I think a video camera would have been definitive on that. I don't know that smoke sensors would have been able to tell you the actual visibility—
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt you, because my time is running over here.
Mr. HALL. Sure.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I can see your point of view, but it just seems to me that the very, very important issue of privacy here that we have—we have to look at this very, very closely, and we have to make sure that a video camera is going to do something for us in preventing accidents that a flight data recorder or a voice recorder cannot do. And before I could support the video camera, I'd have to be totally convinced that that's the only way to pick up this information that we need to pick up to prevent accidents, because I firmly believe that even if you put a video camera in the cockpit that only focuses on the instrument panel, once you get it in there, there are going to be people who are going to lobby and say, ''Such-and-such a crash could have been prevented if the camera would have been sweeping around the cockpit and picking up other information,'' and I think that's a very difficult threshold for us to have to move on with.
But I want to move on also. It's $17 million on the EgyptAir crash that we've spent thus far?
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Who is paying for that?
Mr. HALL. Well, we have requested a supplemental. And right now, Mr. Lipinski, no one is paying for it other than the National Transportation Safety Board, and we are in the position of being in a deficiency situation shortly. But we have requested a supplemental to pay for those expenses.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Do we plan on getting anything from Egypt in regards to this investigation? Or is it going to be entirely the U.S. taxpayers?
Mr. HALL. That would be a decision, sir, of this committee and the Executive Branch of the United States Government. My position has been that we were assigned the investigation, and we have expended the funds necessary—
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, I'm not asking you to defend the investigation. I think it's very worthwhile.
Mr. HALL. No, sir, I just—
Mr. LIPINSKI. I was simply wondering if Egypt was going to come up with any of the money, that's all.
Mr. HALL. I have not made that request. I think it would inappropriate for me, in charge of the investigation, to make that request, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I will see to it that someone for whom it would not be inappropriate will make that request.
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Moving over to the FAA—
Mr. HALL. Could I make one last brief comment?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Certainly.
Mr. HALL. I would like to see, as part of this emphasis on video recorders, it appears to me that one of the side benefits that maybe I didn't anticipate is that maybe we can get the strong support of the committee and the pilots' associations to update and provide existing aircraft with all the available technology—flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder technology—that the Board has requested, two-hour cockpit voice recorders, at least 40-odd parameter recorders in the entire fleet. We still do not have any of that. A backup power supply that we have been requesting. As you know, in TWA 800 we had a loss of power, and in each one of these accidents we've had an additional power supply.
We would welcome the very active support of the pilot community in aggressively pushing the airlines, as well as the Government, to help address this issue.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, you will have my very active and enthusiastic support, and I will certainly speak to the pilot unions in regard to this matter. You can count on that.
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Mr. HALL. We've already had your enthusiastic support, Congressman, and we appreciate it.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Going over to the FAA quickly, what is the FAA—does the FAA have any concrete position in regards to the psychological testing at the present time?
Mr. MCSWEENY. We really believe the present testing that is done during the examination for the medical certificate is adequate to identify any problems that might occur. As I mentioned, over a two-year period we have denied about 2,000 medical certificates.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And my last question to you will be, can you explain to me, in your testimony you talk about airline transport pilots, and then you also talk about commercial pilots. What's the difference?
Mr. MCSWEENY. One is 121 carriers; the other is anybody that is carrying people for comp and hire.
Mr. LIPINSKI. What was the last part of that?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Anyone who is carrying people for comp and hire in other operations.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Okay. And the airline transport pilots, which in essence is the major airlines?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Major airlines, 121 carriers.
Mr. LIPINSKI. They get tested twice a year?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Twice a year, yes.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And the commercial pilots who might be carrying one or two passengers?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Once a year.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Once a year. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. Isakson is next.
Mr. ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hall, help me here on one question that occurred to me with regard to privacy. On the current voice data recorder on airplanes today, is that voice information reviewed on any flights other than those that crash?
Mr. HALL. Either those that crash, or there are serious incidents that meet a certain standard.
Mr. ISAKSON. So it's not a rolling loop where it tapes over, but each flight, when it lands, the recorder is taken off and that information—
Mr. HALL. No, it is a rolling tape, and it is only used when the Board comes and gets it for official purposes.
The flight data recorder is a 25-hour rolling tape. The cockpit voice recorder is a 30-minute rolling tape, and it is only read out by the Safety Board or another authorized entity in the event of a crash or a serious incident.
If I could, Congressman, many times what Congressman LaHood mentioned—hearing things on television—I think it is important to note that the air traffic control tapes, which do have the pilot's voice and the tower controllers' voices, are not covered by the same restrictions as the cockpit voice recorder. Those are many times—after the FAA has released them, you will hear those on television.
Mr. ISAKSON. But I would assume, if the rolling tape is a 25-hour tape, and it is a rolling tape, and you only review them in the event of, A, an incident on the airplane, mechanically, or B, a tragedy, then from a privacy standpoint you wouldn't have historical data past 25 hours. Normal conversation between pilots on a normal, routine flight would never really be heard, is that correct?
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Mr. HALL. Well, the conversations are only 30 minutes.
Mr. ISAKSON. Okay, conversations only 30 minutes. The data is—
Mr. HALL. The 25 hours refers to the flight data recorder.
Mr. ISAKSON. So only the most recent 30 minutes would be heard, and then it's gone?
Mr. HALL. That's right.
Mr. ISAKSON. On ATMs, where video cameras are currently used in this country, if I'm not mistaken they use closed loops, too. So I would assume that if you chose to use videos, and if you chose to focus them as you did in the demonstration, only on the controls and not on the pilots, they were fixed, I would assume those would be rolling tapes, too, and I would assume it would only be the most recent 30 minutes or 60 minutes of time. Is that correct?
Mr. HALL. I don't know, but Dr. Ellingstad might.
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. Basically, the recommendation that we're making asks for essentially the same kind of a procedure. This would be a two-hour recording. And we have also asked to improve our cockpit voice recordings to two hours. These are the newer ones, and the device that would be required for a video would be solid state rather than the old magnetic tape.
But in either event, they would be recorded over, so that it would only capture the last two hours of information, up until the time that an accident happened or that the recorder was pulled or that the power was turned off to the unit.
Mr. ISAKSON. So in your recommendation, the information that would be available would be the most recent two hours, either in video or in voice?
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. That's right, and there would be no anticipation of downloading or otherwise retaining the information, other than in accident and incident investigations.
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Mr. ISAKSON. So the privacy question, then, would deal with the most recent two hours preceding either a mechanical incident or a failure?
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. Absolutely. The privacy issue is specifically related to an accident or incident investigation.
Mr. ISAKSON. The second question I had was with regard to the English language and phraseology question. I know one of the incidents that has been referred to was the American Airlines event in Colombia.
In the major airports around the world, the Pacific Rim, Europe, etc., are there requirements with regard to the native language of the airport where the American carrier may be landing? In other words, are we required to be able to speak a foreign language when we are landing international flights?
Mr. HALL. Let me let Mr. McSweeny address that.
Mr. MCSWEENY. The ICAO requirements are that if requested, and if needed, the entire aviation community be able to speak in English, so that English is in fact the common language of aviation. Ground stations around the world are capable under that requirement of accepting the English language.
Mr. ISAKSON. But with regard to the question, do you know of any current international airport outside of the United States where they require their native tongue to be spoken between the crew and—
Mr. MCSWEENY. No. But I would add that in domestic flights in other countries, quite frequently the native language is spoken.
Mr. ISAKSON. The last question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hall, I appreciate your answer on the cost question with regard to your job to investigate, and I appreciate the great job that you do. But in reading the background paperwork prior to this hearing, the EgyptAir crash is the focus of a large part of the reason this hearing is taking place. In reading, that flight crashed in international waters under international law; Egypt has the responsibility to investigate it. In this case, Egypt affirmatively asked the United States to take its place. Is that correct?
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Mr. HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. ISAKSON. I would like to know, if you get the chance, what international law says with regard to who pays for that when somebody abdicates their responsibility and gives it to someone else. I realize there were a hundred Americans on that plane—
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir, 101.
Mr. ISAKSON. I think we have an absolute responsibility to find the answers, if they are there. But it would seem to me that we can, from a legislative standpoint, be proactive in seeking some type of reimbursement, just as we would reimburse someone else were the shoe on the other foot.
Mr. HALL. Congressman, I certainly see nothing wrong with that. I guess if you would put yourself in my shoes, I don't feel, as the individual responsible for overseeing the investigation, that I should be the person negotiating that. I think the Egyptian authorities have indicated a willingness to pay for portions of the investigation, and I have asked their Ambassador and others to take that request to the appropriate funding committees of this Congress. I think the integrity of my investigation is what I need to maintain, and as far as our U.S.-led investigations are concerned, we need to be responsible, in this particular case, I believe, for the cost.
Mr. ISAKSON. Thank you, sir.
No more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Isakson.
I understand Mr. Rahall has no questions, so that means Mr. Oberstar is next.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Mr. Lipinski for holding the hearing on this rather significant subject of rather broad application.
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I just want to say that we held a hearing about a year ago on air traffic controller communication when I chaired this subcommittee. It was right after the Avianca crash on Long Island. The aircraft ran out of fuel, and the flight deck were having difficulty communicating with the tower.
Two things. One, if Avianca had had a Flight Dispatch Center which would have been able to monitor all systems aboard that aircraft, as a backup, Flight Dispatch could have contacted the tower and said, ''We've got an aircraft in distress; we need to get him on the ground right away.''
Secondly, if the pilot had been truly proficient in English so that there wasn't a communication disconnect, he might have used the right words that would have triggered the right response from the tower.
As I said at the opening of that hearing, I began in several languages—we all speak English, but what English? With whose accent? And there are some countries in which the tower permits the flight deck to communicate in the native language of that country. That just shouldn't be. All pilots have to know what others are saying in the airspace in which they are operating.
But we also have to have clarity about the language of communication. English, indeed, is the ''lingua franca'' of aviation, but with many accents. And as we have seen in the EgyptAir tragedy, even translating or attempting to translate words expressed in the cockpit into English may have many different meanings.
So I just want to recall, on this rather sensitive issue of video recorders in the flight deck, a safety symposium many years ago in which I participated with Jurgen Weber, who then was the Chief of Safety for Lufthansa and is now the President of Lufthansa. He reported on an experiment undertaken by Lufthansa with their pilots, in an understanding that the airline would put a video camera in the flight deck, but whatever happened would not result in disciplinary action against the flight deck crew, that it was a learning experience. And in the aftermath of several flights, both Lufthansa, their chief pilot, their check pilot, and the flight deck crews were amazed to learn that they did not always put their hand on the control they said that they were touching. They did not always pull the right lever. They did not always make the right move. It was a remarkable learning experience, but it was also abandoned as a regular practice by Lufthansa.
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It is perhaps worth considering as an experimental initiative, only with the participation of flight deck crews and the Air Line Pilots Association and the NTSB and the FAA all joining together to see in what ways video on the flight deck can be a training tool and an improvement tool.
Perhaps Chairman Hall or Mr. McSweeny would like to respond.
Mr. MCSWEENY. I think you make some very good points about how to use data. We are clearly going to have to be proactive in solving accidents, to a degree unheard of before, if we are going to keep the accident rate going down as the number of operations goes up. I think there is absolute raging agreement between the FAA and the NTSB on that matter.
I think the real issue about use of video recorders in the cockpit is to first try to decide what it is you're trying to do. I am not one that wants to rush to a solution without making sure I understand what the problem is. There are many things that you can identify very clearly without the use of video recorders, but there might be some things that in fact video recorders would do very well on.
One of the things that we're wrestling with right now is data link where, instead of voice messages coming to the airplane, you're getting video messages.
In accident reconstruction, we have to know what was sent up; not just what came from the ground, which we can record on the ground, but what actually was received in the airplane, because maybe there was a transmission error. Maybe bits were dropped, and things like that.
We are working very hard in this new Future Flight Data Committee to deal with those kinds of issues, this RTCA effort. And we have to make sure that we record that in the very older airplanes. One of the only ways, maybe, to record that is through video. It may be impossible to get all that information on the flight management system, because in the older airplanes they don't have a lot of capacity. In the new airplanes it is not a problem.
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The question is, what is the application that we want to use them for? And clearly, the issue of privacy—I echo what has been said in this entire room about the fact that it has to be dealt with.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Oberstar, I believe you have an excellent recommendation, and the Board would certainly be willing to look at test applications of the video technology. As we know, video is being widely used now by flight safety and almost all of the major airlines in training. How we could take applications of its use in training and put it into the cockpit is certainly something to be sure that we have the proper application and use of video. If everyone approached it with trying to be successful, I think it's something that is an excellent suggestion and certainly something the Board could embrace.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. I would just make one observation.
I am sure you are aware of the recent incident of a tragedy narrowly avoided with Lan Chile and an A-340, when the autopilot was disconnected, the aircraft went into a dive, and then into a climb and stalled, then dove again, and the flight deck crew regained control of the aircraft 800 feet above ground.
Did the pilot disconnect the autopilot on purpose? Or did he, in this most modern of flight decks, accidentally touch it? And did he accidentally touch other controls? And then did he also respond in instinctive ways that were counter to the appropriate response to the situation at hand, and with controls that are in a sense unforgiving because they are so highly automated in that glass cockpit of the A-340?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Oberstar, when you talk about all the different accents in English, Chairman Hall and I can tell you that the only place where they speak English with no accent whatsoever is east Tennessee.
[Laughter.]
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Mr. HALL. That's correct. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. So we could send all the foreign pilots to east Tennessee.
Dr. Cooksey, I believe, is next.
Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Hall, for being here.
I want to start off by saying that I think this Administration's appointments in the FAA with Ms. Garvey, Mr. Rigley in NTSB, are probably the premiere appointments of this Administration, and I don't agree with a lot of their appointments. But you guys have done a great job. Aviation safety is at the highest level it has ever been, and I feel comfortable flying.
Now, that said, I have several questions. I'm going to throw them out and let you divide up my time.
English proficiency—that is an issue. I was told, and unfortunately I cannot remember the source, that China Airlines—that's mainland China, the PRC's airline—has pilots that are probably very good, proficient pilots, but have limited proficiency in the English language, and they have an interpreter in the cockpit to interpret. Does anyone know whether or not that is true? Is it true of other airlines that possibly don't have good English proficiency? I'd like an answer to that.
The second question, AME, Aero Medical Examiners, psychological profile. Quite frankly, I have been an Aero Medical Examiner since I got out of the Air Force, and in two weeks I'm going to spend the weekend with the FAA over here, getting my two-year annual update.
I have a lot of confidence in our pilots. I feel that by the time someone gets an ATP rating, they have gone through so much screening and training as to be competent as pilots; and if you've got someone who is psychologically a problem, you will get them out.
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I happen to know about the three accidents where some problem was alleged to have occurred because of psychological profile. Air Morocco—my wife and two daughters were flying an Air Morocco flight the night that occurred. We were flying from Casablanca to Fez. SilkAir, which is a Singapore Airlines affiliate, had a similar supposed problem, and EgyptAir. I have met some of the people from Egypt, and I think they have very good people in that airline, and I would fly their airline tomorrow, but maybe there is a problem there.
I was impressed that there had been 2,000 denials. My question is, of the denials, how many of those were ATP denials, Airline Transport Pilot denials? I would assume that most of them were entry level pilots, because I just cannot fathom that many people with an ATP rating being denied. And if so, why?
My third area of questioning—and again, you can divide these answers up any way you want to—is about monitoring. I have been through a couple airlines training facilities. I happened to go to Continental Airlines in Houston and was really impressed with what they do. I mean, they are on the same level as, or maybe exceed, our military. I happened to fly from Houston to Narita in Tokyo this past November on a Boeing 777, made in Seattle, and they monitored every aspect of our flight.
What would it take to retrofit these older airlines so that someone in Houston or New York or New Jersey could monitor every plane the way we were being monitored? We got over the Pacific, and the pilots demonstrated to me that someone in Houston knew exactly what was going on every minute in every plane. What would it cost to retrofit those with everything except the video monitor, if that is reasonable?
Now—and I will conclude my series of questions by saying that I understand your responsibility as an investigator. I did about three accident investigations when I was in the Air Force, and it's a problem to go back and try to put these together. These were military accidents.
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My overriding concern—I mean, I think air safety and the safety of the flying public is more important than privacy. I think that there is also a threat that the airlines could use this video recording against pilots, and I think the pilots could become more focused on, you know, looking good. I know politicians are bad about primping and fixing their hair blue or whatever they have to do to look good on television, but I would be concerned that if there were a video camera there, there might be a tendency to address the camera more than flying the airplane.
My other concern is that if you had someone like—let's pick just a random name, like ''Bozo Geraldo'' or some name—I have no idea. Let's take somebody that is on TV, that has a TV program, and has one of these TV tabloid programs that does not have a lot of integrity—I doubt if there's anyone out there like that, but let's say there was. What would happen if someone like this, who could not pass an FAA or AME psychological profile, got this video and it was on television? My concerns, three questions. I guess you got them all: the English proficiency question, number one; number two, the AME psychological profile issue, and who are the denials, are any of them ATP; and the third area of questioning was monitoring, and what reassurance can you give to that?
I hope I haven't used up all my time in questions. Thank you.
Mr. HALL. Congressman Cooksey, what I will suggest with Mr. McSweeny is that I will try to briefly address the first one, and then defer to him, and we will try to go through all three very quickly.
Let me say at the outset, Congressman, that I want to be sure that the committee is aware that the Board has reached no conclusions in the EgyptAir accident investigation. We do not know whether we're dealing with a situation that is similar to the other two accidents you referred to.
In English language, I would have to defer to Mr. McSweeny on the specifics of interpreters in the cockpit. I'm not aware of any; I don't have any personal knowledge. Let me say that the Board did, after the Avianca crash and the Cali crash, make very specific recommendations to the ICAO with the Federal Aviation Administration and the International Civil Aviation Organization, to address proper English usage. It is a concern to the Board. We have a number of recommendations in that area. We have worked with the FAA to push that at the international level, and there is going to be a committee later this year trying to come up with standard phraseology. However, that is only part of the process. Once we have the standard phraseology, we have to be very aggressive about training in a pilot community worldwide that is due to double, probably, in the next 10 years.
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Mr. McSweeny?
Mr. COOKSEY. My concern is that the pilots of foreign airlines out there say, ''Well, look, we can't train these people to be proficient in English; we ought to put an interpreter in there.'' To me, that's not good enough. That's my concern.
Mr. MCSWEENY. Let me try to deal with that.
My recollection of the ICAO requirements is that they used the words, ''crew member.'' So it would have to be one of the crew members, either one of the two flying crew members on a two-person crew, or one of the three if it were an older airplane like a DC-10, which has a flight engineer.
I would like to make a point, though, about China Air. I was privy to a meeting that we had last week, a briefing that was presented in a meeting we had last week in Australia with six of the bilateral partners that we work with on a regular basis. A presentation was made by the Chinese authority on English language training that they have initiated. They have, in fact, issued a rule that requires every pilot, by June of next year, to pass a proficiency training course, both in English proficiency in general and in telecommunications. Every carrier in China now has a program to train their pilots better and to pass this test. Four thousand pilots have been tested already, the good news; and the bad news is that 61 percent failed. The rest of them did not pass. The test is a CD-ROM based test; it has a random set of questions, so when you take it again, you are going to get different questions. They have actually offered it to other countries to use as the basis of training of their pilots. There was quite a bit of interest in the meeting from some of the other countries that were there.
So I think the activity that we're doing in ICAO to really heighten the awareness of this issue is bearing a lot of fruit, and I was just pleased that China had taken this initiative.
Mr. COOKSEY. That's very reassuring, and I'm glad to know that they're doing that. I just hope that other airlines do it as well. I am glad that we're not having to learn Chinese.
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[Laughter.]
Mr. HALL. The issues on Aero Medical Examiners—
Mr. COOKSEY. Excuse me, let me interrupt you, Chairman Hall, just for one second.
Mr. McSweeny, you said that 61 percent didn't pass, and the others failed. Would you—obviously that is not correct. Would you run by me what is correct?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Yes, 61 percent passed, 39 percent failed.
Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you.
Mr. MCSWEENY. And to me—well, you could say, ''Gee, 39 percent failed; that really indicates the problem that is out there,'' yes, that is true. But it also indicates that you have a good test, I think, because it is showing the kind of results that probably are out there.
Mr. HALL. I would defer to Mr. McSweeny on how many denials he mentioned were ATP.
Mr. MCSWEENY. I quickly looked at the information that was given to me. It's both new entrants and renewals. I don't have it broken down into any more detail than that. I can get it for you, if you would like me to.
Mr. COOKSEY. I just think it would be good for the purpose of this hearing.
[Information received follows:]
[insert here]
Mr. COOKSEY. You know, a lot of people apply for a license; a lot of people have entry-level licenses. But I just cannot imagine that many ATP rated pilots having that kind of psychological problems.
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Mr. MCSWEENY. We will break it down to whatever we can with the records that we have.
Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Thank you.
Mr. HALL. And finally, Mr. Cooksey, I believe what you were referring to is data linking, and I would like to supply those numbers for the record. It would be very expensive to retrofit older aircraft to that technology, but we would get it for you.
I don't have specifics. I asked the experts with me and they don't have an answer, so we will have to get you an answer, sir.
Mr. COOKSEY. Ballpark.
Mr. HALL. Sure.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton?
Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a very important hearing.
I would like first to ask a question about English proficiency. I have always been fascinated that we are able to fly across national boundaries—apparently with very few mishaps, for the most part, related to communications—even though certainly few in this country are multilingual, and I imagine that's the case in most countries except for certain countries in Europe, where I marvel at the degree to which some of the average citizens can speak several languages.
But I am interested in controllers in particular, perhaps even more so than pilots, and wonder if there are any English proficiency standards for air traffic controllers; and if so, how those would be implemented by countries.
Mr. MCSWEENY. Let me ask Mr. Canoles to respond to that question.
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Mr. CANOLES. Good morning. Here in the United States we have a very comprehensive evaluation program by which we measure controllers' compliance with standard phraseology. Phraseology standards are put into place to minimize the possibility of confusion between pilots and controllers. If the pilot hears the same phrase, ''clear to land''—
Ms. NORTON. But that's in this country?
Mr. CANOLES. Yes, it is. We also assist other countries, generally at their request or at the request of U.S. carriers who provide service to that country, in facilitating English language instruction in some instances. Recently, as we opened some routes over northern Siberia, the FAA acted on behalf of an airline providing service in that region, and in fact, facilitated and arranged for English language to be taught in that region. We didn't pay for it, but we certainly made the source available to the Russian government.
Ms. NORTON. So you don't know whether or not there are—I'm interested in English proficiency particularly because of the amount of air traffic that comes into jurisdictions, flown by pilots who are likely to speak only English. And what I'm asking is not about English proficiency in this country—God help us if the controllers don't have English proficiency here. I'm asking about the proficiency of controllers in nations around the world who receive a disproportionate amount of air traffic from English-speaking countries.
Mr. CANOLES. We have responded in some events; again, only to U.S. carriers who, for example, have voiced dissatisfaction with levels of service, in some cases due to language deficiencies in other countries, and have gone to that government and provided assistance and help.
Ms. NORTON. So there are no international standards, then?
Mr. CANOLES. None that we know of.
Mr. MCSWEENY. Let me add to that. The ICAO effort and the ICAO requirements that I mentioned in my opening comments will apply to both pilots and controllers. The China activity that I referred to about English testing was for both pilots and controllers in China.
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So the effort that we are doing in ICAO is both a pilot and an international controller activity, so yes, we will be working to enhance the need to speak English. And I agree with you; with more and more routes opening up over parts of nations that never were overflown before, it is an exercise that we need to stay in front of.
Ms. NORTON. One more question, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder if any foreign nations have implemented periodic psychological testing of pilots; and if so, how you would assess the effectiveness of such testing.
Mr. MCSWEENY. To our knowledge, we do not know of any countries that do psychological testing. Our medical physicians at the FAA work very extensively in international symposia and talk to other countries about the need for making sure that when pilot certificates are issued, that there is some evaluation. But we have no knowledge of any country whatsoever that is doing psychological testing.
Ms. NORTON. Even the part of a normal medical examination—I mean, when you go into the armed services of almost any country, for example, today, if you're going to be a buck private, they want to know if you're crazy or not, whether you've got two heads or not, and I wonder if there are any minimums whatever at the psychological level, or if all you have to do is be a fit human ''animal'' with a good brain that registers well in testing or in education to be a pilot in countries around the world.
Mr. MCSWEENY. It is part of the normal medical that is given pretty much throughout the world. There are questions that elicit answers and behaviors that could lead the physician to some evaluation of the psychological well-being of the person. As I mentioned, over a two-year period we have denied 2,000 pilot certificates, both to new entrants and to recurrent.
But what I was speaking to when I said there was no psychological testing was that there's no psychological testing using standard testing profiles—there's a ''Minnesota profile,'' there are various other profiles. Some airlines are doing testing as part of the requirements to hire new pilots. But as far as medical certification testing in the psychological area, there is really nothing other than the questions that are asked in the medical itself.
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Ms. NORTON. That's a little bothersome, frankly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HALL. Ms. Norton, on your first question let me just say that to answer your question generally to my knowledge, and then specifically to what the Board has done, generally to my knowledge our major manufacturers, Boeing as well as the airlines, do invest quite a bit of money in English language training when they fly into particular nations. But after the American Airlines Cali accident, the Board had a specific recommendation that asked the member states of ICAO to put together a program to enhance controllers' fluency in common English language phrases.
In October of 2000, their Air Navigation Bureau has formed a group that is going to hold a meeting to address that specific issue.
Ms. NORTON. That is a whole lot less troublesome. Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. I will say to Ms. Norton that in part of the material provided to me there is a statement that says, ''Japan Airlines revamped its program after a crash in 1982 where a pilot deliberately tried to crash his DC-8 and went down in Tokyo Bay, killing 24 and injuring 141. It has an intensive psychological screening procedure that begins with counselors that oversee the training of student pilots training at the airline.''
I think there's a Wall Street Journal article also that mentions that Japan Airlines has the most intensive psychological screening of any airline, probably in the world.
I think Mr. Mica is next.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could, let me just continue along the line of this questioning. The subject of this hearing is issues arising out of the EgyptAir crash.
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First of all, we don't have any mechanism—or do we—that requires that a pilot that comes from, say EgyptAir or a foreign carrier qualify with some psychological testing? Mr. McSweeny?
Mr. MCSWEENY. No. You are absolutely correct; we do not have any means by which we could psychologically test pilots entering the United States, or even U.S. pilots.
Mr. MICA. Even if that were imposed—for example, the Chairman just spoke about Japan and said that Japan instituted something—we still wouldn't know whether that Japanese test would, say, qualify under any standard that we might set. And we don't have the ability to set an international standard, do we?
Mr. MCSWEENY. We would look to ICAO for international standards. We would have to issue standards for the U.S. directly if we chose to do psychological testing.
I think the greatest challenge is to define what ''normal'' is.
Mr. MICA. Exactly.
There have been different mechanisms brought up here today to try to see what we could do. Fortunately, this type of incident—you're not able, really, as to whether there was a psychological problem with an EgyptAir pilot, although evidence that I have seen seems to indicate that. But again, this isn't something that occurs on a regular basis.
I expressed concern in my opening remarks about how things that we know repeatedly have resulted in air crashes. I heard Dr. Loeb talk about the 737, the stabilization problems that we've had there. I think Mr. Hall has also convinced me that implementing video recorders is overdue.
You are focusing on what caused the crash. I know what caused some of the crashes, and I am concerned that we haven't instituted changes in procedures and refocused FAA assets on going after where people are dying from crashes.
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But I notice that this A-99-60 recommendation—I guess that would stand for your recommendation—came in 1999 for five-year implementation, is that right, Mr. Hall, of standards for equipping airlines?
Mr. HALL. That one in 1999, sir, specifically referred to single turbine aircraft that are not presently equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. We are issuing recommendations today in regard to the larger aircraft.
Mr. MICA. And that—okay, so the smaller one would be out of the 1999 edict?
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MICA. And what do you think would be a timeframe in which these airlines, these major carriers, should comply with installation of that equipment?
Mr. HALL. Well, I will let Dr. Ellingstad, if he would, comment on the specifics of the recommendation.
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. In the recommendation that was issued today for the video recorders in large operations, there are two separate recommendations, one for a retrofit that would be January of 2005 for existing aircraft to be equipped with a cockpit video recorder; the other would speak to newly-manufactured aircraft, and that date that we suggest is January 1st, 2003, basically—
Mr. MICA. Why so long?
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. We've heard it put the other way, ''Why so fast?'' There are some technical issues that do need to be resolved with respect to the sampling rate, how many frames per second you need to capture to document movement, for example, to determine whether the crew member is reaching for and activating a switch. So there are some standard-setting operations that are required to be performed, and then there is the business of, essentially, mobilizing the fleet to do this.
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Mr. MICA. Well, it seems to me—I am not a technical wizard; I did visit some vendors recently that sold some of this monitoring equipment. I was stunned at the advances since the last time I looked at it, which was maybe five or ten years ago. It is absolutely unbelievable, what they have, what can be hooked up, and at very little cost. I'm sure your equipment has to be a lot more sophisticated, but is there any estimate as far as cost imposition for installing this equipment, retrofitting and also new?
Mr. ELLINGSTAD. We don't have any specific cost estimates here. The typical flight data recorder box is something on the order of $20,000. The basic recorder technology is not very different between this device and a flight data recorder; the memory is essentially the same. The camera equipment is also relatively—
Mr. MICA. Does FAA do the research, or assist in getting this equipment up and ready, so to speak, something that is certifiable to your standards?
Mr. MCSWEENY. The FAA would certainly have to issue the standards. At this point there is an activity underway in Europe to develop a standard for video recorders that would be crash-protected. Once that is completed—and it could be as much as six months or so before that is completed—we would then reference that in one of our Technical Standard Orders, which would be the basis upon which it could be improved in the United States.
Mr. MICA. It seems like you could put out an RFP and say ''We want these specs, and someone to deliver this equipment,'' and you would have a couple models. Couldn't we do that fairly inexpensively?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Well, we actually would issue the generic standards. Our standards are generic in the sense that they don't specify a specific technology or a specific kind of box to do the job. Historically we actually leave it up to the industry to propose whatever solutions they believe are appropriate.
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Mr. MICA. The other thing that concerned me is, again, we are here talking about putting something else in, which sounds like a good idea; I don't see, technically or cost-wise, why it shouldn't be done, and be done in an expedited fashion. That would help us save money as far as determining the crash and maybe getting some of the other problems that I've alluded to fixed.
Mr. Hall, you have testified again today that we still have a percentage—and maybe you can tell me what percentage—of the old black box recorders that are in these that are not adequate, in commercial planes. Can you tell us again where we are on this outdated recording equipment?
Mr. HALL. Well, Congressman, I would have to get that information. I will be glad to do that for the record.
Mr. MICA. I would like to have that for the record, a percentage or where we are in the retrofitting and where we are in the new equipment. I think that's very important, because we sometimes focus on where we're going to go and not the things that we have an obligation to do that should provide us with basic information from some of these flights.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
I believe Mr. LoBiondo is next.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a couple areas I would like to touch on.
Mr. Hall, I wanted to let you know my strong feelings, along with those of Mr. Lipinski, concerning Egypt's role in paying for this. And I understand what you're saying, of what is appropriate for you, but I'm a little bit disappointed that the issue wasn't raised by someone who would have been appropriate at this point.
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Another area, am I understanding you to say that as far as you're concerned, with the psychological testing issue at this point, you are satisfied with what's required presently for medical certificates, and are not seeking to do anything further?
Mr. HALL. Congressman, let me just say that in my capacity as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, speaking on the Board, the Board has not taken a position on that issue. As you know, we work from actual accident or incident investigations, and we have not had any in which this has been an issue, nor has the Board had a safety study in this area. So is it a legitimate issue for conversation by this committee? I think so, in light of the number of additional pilots that need to be brought into the system within the 10 to 15 years, and with the change in the cockpit environment from a personality—from individuals that basically are ''stick and rudder'' folks, into people that are basically monitoring electronic gear.
But the Board has no specific recommendations in this area and does not have any specific changes that we would be requesting at this time.
Mr. LOBIONDO. So there is nothing the Board is pursuing at this time?
Mr. HALL. That is correct, sir. We were being responsive to the committee's request.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. I understand.
On the situation with the video recorders in the cockpit, I have heard your discussions and your strong support and the reasons why. Without repeating, I want to strongly associate myself with the comments of Mr. Lipinski and Mr. LaHood, but to ask you, Mr. Hall, how do you intend to proceed from here? Where does it go from here, from your standpoint?
Mr. HALL. Well, sir, first let me say that, of course, that I am not a member of this committee, but I would also like to associate myself with the comments of Mr. Lipinski and Mr. LaHood, and I hope I did. This privacy issue is an important issue and it is one that needs to be addressed.
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The Board today has issued recommendations in this area. I would hope that we would see activity, based on our recommendations, from the regulator to address our recommendations. They have a 90-day window in which to prepare a response, and I would hope that based on the FAA's recommendation, that together the FAA, the NTSB, the pilot community, and the manufacturers could move forward to ensure that the state-of-the-art technology that is available today and that has essentially been paid for by the American taxpayers is there for their safety when they fly each and every day on all the various flights.
And at the same time, and I do personally believe it can be done, address the very important issues that the pilot community has in the privacy area.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Up to this point have you and the Board been involved in discussions with outside groups such as the pilots, who have a strong interest in where this is going?
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir. I have just recently met with the members of ALPA. I have met with the members of two or three of the other pilot organizations and associations. We interact with them all the time. They are always, of course, a very important party to our investigations and an important party to flying safety. So I am very aware—we've had a discussion of these views, and I had an opportunity, I think it was about two weeks ago, to have the gentleman you're going to hear from soon, the President of ALPA, and his representatives come in and very forcefully and effectively express their views on this issue. And I hope we took those into consideration in framing the recommendation, sir.
Mr. LOBIONDO. And it would be safe to assume that that dialogue will be continuing and ongoing with this issue?
Mr. HALL. Certainly from our standpoint it will be, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo.
Let me apologize to Mr. Franks. I felt I had to go to members of the subcommittee first, and I understand that Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Pease don't have any questions. We're going to move on to the second panel as soon as Mr. Franks has a chance to question this panel.
Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to join you today.
Mr. McSweeny, how many reports has the FAA received over the past 10 years detailing incidents where a language problem was a contributing cause to a near miss or other potentially dangerous event?
Mr. MCSWEENY. Let me ask Mr. Canoles to deal with that.
Mr. CANOLES. Sir, there have been fewer than 100 reported where language specifically was cited as the failure.
Mr. FRANKS. Of those 100, were there investigations around those incidents where you drew some conclusions?
Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir. I can't speak to all of them. Some of them were filed with the NASA safety reporting system, so we did not necessarily investigate those. But all of the ones in air traffic, yes, they were investigated.
Mr. FRANKS. And are they still under active investigation, or are they essentially closed?
Mr. CANOLES. Sir, I would cite that the majority of them are closed.
Mr. FRANKS. Does the FAA, where they have identified that a language problem was a principal contributing cause to a near miss, does the FAA under current regulatory schemes or statutory authority have the right to ground a pilot?
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Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir, that could be accomplished. I don't recall it, and I've been associated with quality assurance and air traffic now for about 15 years—I don't recall language ever leading to a near miss. It has led, obviously, to misunderstandings on airport surfaces and such. But communications are the primary failure when incidents like that occur. I just can't recall very many that are specifically related to language.
Mr. FRANKS. Were you here for the video tape that opened this hearing?
Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. FRANKS. Did a language problem not result in a near miss occurring there?
Mr. CANOLES. I am not sure of my specifics, but there was a case with Air China—the airplane was parked at the gate, and some representative of the airline was calling, asking for a clearance, a routing to go to their next destination. So certainly not a safety event there.
The second one was with the Air France aircraft. To assure consistancy and integrity in air traffic communications, we charge the controller with the responsibility of assuring the accuracy of the readback from the pilot. The pilot who, to me, had a French accent, clearly said, ''no hold.'' Well, that's a term that is foreign in aviation. While I had the benefit of sitting in an office the next day listening to it on a tape recorder and the controller didn't—he only had one opportunity—that phrase being out of the norm should have prompted the controller to go back and once again query and reinforce the ''hold short'' instructions. So we charged that error against the controller, sir.
Mr. FRANKS. It sounds to me as if that affirmative burden you place on the controller might not be productive if—the pace of activity that I've seen when I've visited these towers, the volume of traffic these controllers are asked to handle, is it a prudent policy by the FAA to put that affirmative burden on the individual controller to continually revisit with this pilot, who is obviously having difficulty engaging the controller in a conversation about the circumstances that both of them are trying to work through—is that kind of burden appropriate?
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Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir, I feel strongly that it is. And communications, of course, are a shared responsibility. I'm not in any way suggesting that the controller is solely responsible. However, the controller has the onus to assure that control instructions are, as I said, adequately received and complied with.
Controllers have the ability and the authority and are charged with stopping traffic, if necessary, to assure safety, because safety is first and foremost in the air traffic system.
Mr. FRANKS. When you said that in the one instance you charged the air traffic controller with having made the mistake, or having been responsible for the incident, have you ever determined that it was the pilot's fault, that despite every reasonable effort by a controller the pilot simply didn't have adequate proficiency in the English language? And did you find fault ultimately with the pilot?
Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir. And in fact, in this instance we found fault against the pilot, as well. The controller issued a clearance to hold short of a specific taxiway. The pilot misunderstood that; and even though it was our responsibility to assure that he correctly read that restriction back, the pilot did inaccurately accept a clearance and operated not in accordance with air traffic instructions, so he was violated as well.
Mr. FRANKS. So you've had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 reports where language was involved in an incident which the FAA investigated?
Mr. CANOLES. Yes, sir.
Mr. FRANKS. Did any of those language issues lead to the grounding of a pilot?
Mr. CANOLES. No, sir, not to my recollection.
Mr. FRANKS. Never?
Mr. CANOLES. Not to my recollection.
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Mr. FRANKS. There's never been an incident where a pilot has been deemed to be so lacking in English language communication skills, the international language of aviation, that the FAA saw fit to ground that particular pilot because it would create a risk to the flying public?
Mr. CANOLES. I have not seen one in an air traffic incident, sir. Let me ask Mr. McSweeny if he's seen any in a broader range of incidents.
Mr. MCSWEENY. I'm not sure of my specifics, but I do recall being told that there was an incident in Puerto Rico where a business jet came in and the pilots could not speak good English, and the airplane was not allowed to leave until they hired an English-speaking pilot so that they could take off and operate in our system.
As far as an air carrier, though, I have no recollection myself at all.
Mr. FRANKS. Chairman Hall, if I may, let me ask two questions of you.
This hearing has covered three areas with real focus. One is whether or not we have adequate, state-of-the-art cockpit monitoring technology on board aircraft; another is the adequacy of psychological testing; the third issue has been these language barriers.
If we don't take any action in light of today's hearing, which one of those three areas will most likely be involved in the next crash of an airplane?
Mr. HALL. Well, Congressman, I don't know, because aviation accidents are extremely rare events, and the Board is not in the probability business. However, I think each one of them is an issue that deserves the consideration of this committee, and I think the committee has given them excellent consideration this morning.
We are investigating those incidents you just discussed with Mr. McSweeny on English language. We had three runway incursions that occurred last year at three of our busiest airports in the United States, and I know that in two of those, English language proficiency was one of the items that is being looked at. That it is being looked at, of course, is part of the larger picture of the problem of runway incursions, and the technology that is available, so that we are not entirely dependent on the communication between the controller and the flight crew, be it domestic or foreign, in getting correct directions on the aircraft surface. We have not completed those investigations, but I anticipate that when we do, there will be recommendations that the Board will have.
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Obviously, the video recorder technology would be used in almost any serious accident that the Board would investigate. In that case, a picture might literally save lives in the future.
The third issue is one, of course, that I hope I've clearly addressed, that the Board has no experience in, but it's certainly one that I think is worthy of consideration by the committee.
Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, let me just add my personal observation. I think the work that the NTSB does is absolutely world class and state-of-the-art, and the investigations that you have conducted—not only in aviation, but in a variety of other transportation modes—have been extraordinary.
But I want to voice my opinion, and among those three it sounds to me like we have some disagreements as to how to proceed on psychological testing. We perhaps could improve on our monitoring of the cockpit; but if you can't talk to the controller, you're going to crash your planes at some point.
Mr. HALL. And that is a concern—again, Congressman, not just in this country, but worldwide, and one where we have made specific recommendations both in this country, as a result of Avianca, and to the International Organization as a result of Cali.
Mr. FRANKS. Chairman, you have a wonderful procedure at the NTSB to monitor what happens after you make recommendations to an agency within the DOT. You have talked to me about a lack of compliance in some of those areas. What about in this case? Take particularly the English language proficiency recommendations you made after the Avianca crash and the Cali incident. What grade do you give to the FAA?
Mr. HALL. Well, in one I would refer to Cali, and then I would like to defer to Dr. Loeb or Dr. Ellingstad on Avianca, because that's more in their time period.
But in Cali, it has taken us about five years, moving through the International Civil Aviation Organization, to get the matter addressed. And I am pleased to see that in October of this year we're going to have a committee formed to address that issue. So we have been successful in getting the issue addressed with all the member nations of ICAO, but obviously there it has taken more time than I believe—it was not moved in as rapid a fashion as it could have been, and that's not the—the FAA and the NTSB were attempting to push that at the international level, together.
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Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, let me just be clear. You say five years to get it addressed. ''Addressed'' in this instance means ''on the docket,'' it took us five years to get someone to attend to the issue we've raised?
Mr. HALL. That's correct. It's slow. It's slow.
Do you want to address Avianca?
Mr. LOEB. Well, in the Avianca accident, we made a recommendation that was domestic, and within three years we closed it out as an acceptable action on the part of the FAA.
Mr. FRANKS. And the core of your acceptability grade for the FAA was what in the Avianca crash?
Mr. LOEB. We had asked them to address the English language issue in terms of developing a standard glossary of definitions and so forth. That action was done, and it took about three years to get it completed.
Mr. FRANKS. I need to follow up on that.
Mr. McSweeny, there is a glossary of all aviation terms? There is phraseology that you have developed?
Mr. MCSWEENY. This is the glossary that I think we're talking about. The latest revision was February 24th of this year. I would be more than happy to leave it with you.
Mr. FRANKS. So it's a working product, not something that was done following the 1990 Avianca crash?
Mr. MCSWEENY. I'm saying the latest revision to it. It certainly has been out for a while.
Mr. FRANKS. And is that the product that you're taking to ICAO and urging them to adopt internationally?
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Mr. MCSWEENY. We will be taking this, along with anything else we can, to go to ICAO to both look at the English proficiency for crew members, and to look at English proficiency for controllers.
Yes, it is just beginning, and I recognize how long it has taken to get to this point. But we are giving it a very aggressive approach within the agency, both from the pilot community and the air traffic controllers.
Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time. I do hope the subcommittee and the full committee will continue to put pressure on the FAA to continue the pressure on ICAO to make progress on this issue, because merely getting it on the docket after five years does not necessarily result in Safer Skies until there is this glossary and this training and this testing.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Franks, and I think we will make progress on this.
We need now to move to the second panel, and I want to thank all of you for being here with us and for being outstanding witnesses and for your contributions.
Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lipinski and members of the committee, for the opportunity to participate today.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.
Mr. MCSWEENY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Our second panel is also a very distinguished panel. It consists of Captain Duane Woerth, who is President of Air Line Pilots Association, International; Mr. Bob Frenzel, who is Senior Vice President for Aviation Safety and Operations of the Air Transport Association; Mr. Barrett R. Byrnes, who is Chief Air Traffic Controller at John F. Kennedy International Airport; and our fourth witness I am going to call on Mr. Hutchinson to introduce.
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Mr. Hutchinson?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my pleasure to introduce a constituent and a great member of the Arkansas community, Mr. Robert Lee Thompson. He is Chairman and founder of Vision Technologies, which was established in 1988. Vision Technologies is a company which has developed leading edge digital imaging systems for use in markets such as aerospace, aircraft maintenance, military, security, and many others.
He holds a B.B.A. from the University of South Florida and did graduate studies at Denver University. His technology that he has developed is very significant for this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted that he is here because I have personally been out—I believe it was a year ago—and saw his new technology, his digital imaging, which is extraordinary. I think it would be very useful in the aviation industry in terms of safety.
So I want to thank my constituent, Mr. Thompson, for being here today and welcome him to this panel.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Thompson, welcome, and welcome to all the witnesses. We will proceed in the order listed on the call of the hearing, and that means that we will go right down the line.
Captain Woerth, your statement, please.
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; ROBERT H. FRENZEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR AVIATION SAFETY AND OPERATIONS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; BARRETT R. BYRNES, CHIEF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER, JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; AND LEE THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, VISION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
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Captain WOERTH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am Captain Duane Woerth; I am President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International. ALPA is the single largest union of pilots, representing the professional interests of 55,000 members who fly for 51 airlines in the United States and Canada.
Before I begin my remarks I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Shuster and Ranking Members Oberstar and Lipinski and all the members of the committee, for the leadership and dedication you exhibited in obtaining passage and eventual enactment of the landmark aviation legislation, H.R. 1000. ALPA views this legislation as one of the most significant chapters in aviation history, and we are pleased to have played a role in its passage.
We appear before you today, however, to address three issues that have been the subject of much media attention since the tragic crash of EgyptAir Flight 990, namely, the introduction of video recorders in the cockpit; psychological testing of airline pilots; and more stringent requirements for proficiency in the English language by foreign pilots.
Let me say from the outset that we agree that improved communications skills of all pilots is needed and will enhance safety. However, we strongly disagree with the notion that video monitoring and psychological testing of flight crews will make any contribution toward increased air safety.
In recent years the air transportation industry and the Federal Government have expended a significant amount of money and effort to identify and implement priority safety initiatives which would provide the most safety benefit with available or foreseeable technology. Since 1994 we have had the Department of Transportation Aviation Safety Action Plan; we've had the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security; we've had the National Civil Aviation Review Commission; and finally, we've had the FAA Safer Skies Initiative.
Though each of these endeavors made significant recommendations, none—not one of them—even mentions video recording of the cockpit or psychological testing of pilots.
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The installation of video recorders in the cockpits of our airlines is a complex and rather contentious issue. To the uninitiated, cockpit video has the false allure of the inexpensive, all-inclusive solution to the nature and the cause of every accident and incident; ''if we could just see what is happening in the cockpit,'' the flawed reasoning goes, ''we could easily solve this accident and prevent the next one.'' The reality is quite different.
There can be no argument that pilots have a vested interest in changes of equipment and procedures that make their work environment in the air transportation system safer. However, in this case we do not believe that air safety would be best served by the installation of cockpit video cameras. Cockpit video is an egregious invasion of privacy for minimal, if any, safety data. Air safety would be far better served by continuing to focus on improved flight data recorders and proactive safety programs, such as the Flight Operations Quality Assurance, FOQA, and the Aviation Safety Action Plan, ASAP.
The privacy issue involved with the installation of cockpit video cameras is of prime importance to our membership. Based on past experience and existing legislation, ALPA has little confidence that abuses and inappropriate releases of cockpit video material can be prevented, either domestically or internationally. While our Government and industry generally acknowledge the need for protection of recorded information, this acknowledgement is not necessarily recognized or embraced by outside parties, especially foreign governments and the media. While the cockpit voice recorder has served the cause of accident investigation for almost 40 years, we should have learned lessons long ago along the way with regard to abuses and the inappropriate release of information. The cockpit voice recorder has been used for sensationalistic purposes by the media; it has been used by litigants in civil and criminal cases; it has been used by employers for surveillance and disciplinary purposes. So even with existing procedures and legislation to guard against such abuses and events, we are still not where we need to be with regard to absolute protection of cockpit voice recordings.
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Outside the United States, the sanctity of cockpit voice recordings is an entirely different matter. Other countries have different laws and often different cultural perspectives as to what is acceptable. While ICAO acknowledges the need for data protection, its ability to enforce change is limited. Real changes must be made on a country-by-country basis in the form of new or revised legislation.
The recent playing of the actual cockpit voice recorder tape of the American Airlines accident in Cali, Colombia on NBC Dateline was an outrage to all pilots in this country. This occurred despite the fact that it involved a U.S. crew, operating a U.S.-registered aircraft, and that the United States National Transportation Safety Board participated in the investigation, and the cockpit voice recorder was read out and transcribed by the National Transportation Safety Board.
However, the release and airing of the recording was not—I repeat, it was not—a violation of any Colombian or United States law because the accident occurred outside the United States. This event reinforces our belief that if video recorders are mandated on U.S.-registered aircraft, even with significant changes to existing laws and regulations, all protections would cease to exist once the aircraft crossed the 12-mile limit and exited the United States. This situation, Mr. Chairman, is totally, unequivocally unacceptable.
In recent years the National Transportation Safety Board, at the Congress' direction, has spent significant time and resources on increasing the consideration afforded to families of airline accident victims, as they should be. We urge that the families of flight crew members be afforded at least the same consideration. Imagine the emotional trauma to the families of deceased crew members should some producer decide that ''Must See TV'' is showing a video of their loved ones' last living moments on the evening news.
ALPA believes that routine and recurring psychological testing of airline pilots in the United States is a solution in search of a problem. When it comes to physical and mental health, as well as professional performance and competence, airline pilots are the most frequently tested and monitored professionals in the world, period. The psychological health and well-being of airline pilots in the United States has never been cited as a safety issue, and the mere suggestion that pilots should be required to undergo periodic psychological testing is not only unnecessary, but offensive to our profession.
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As a part of the thorough pre-employment screening and evaluation process, pilots undergo psychological and cognitive testing. This commonly includes personality inventory testing, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or the MMPI. Memory, judgment, and problem-solving are tested as well.
After being hired, pilots are subject to at least an annual medical certificate examination; Captains take these exams every six months. During these exams, pilots are evaluated on broad mental standards that affect their performance. In addition to these FAA-required exams, some airlines require pilots to take additional exams at intervals determined by the company. Pilots are also subjected to periodic training sessions that include performance evaluations. Crew Resource Management, CRM, is an integral part of pilot training and airline operations. This emphasizes crew interaction and pilot performance as part of the crew. Any deviation from accepted standards and procedures may be called into question by other crew members. Although in some cultures outside the United States the Captain's word is never questioned, I can assure you that in our country this is not the case. Crews are strongly encouraged to work together, and if that means questioning the Captain's deviation from safe procedures for whatever reason, that will and is done.
In addition, ALPA has a Professional Standards Committee at every carrier that we represent that evaluates allegations of unusual behavior. Pilots who may develop emotional difficulties have an array of medical services available to them through their company and through their union.
Mr. Chairman, my submitted statement contains several recommendations on improving English language proficiency as well as air traffic control and voice communications in general.
In the interest of time let me conclude by saying that based upon analysis of accidents and incidents, this is the only issue addressed today that has the merit as a proactive safety initiative. I hope it receives the attention it deserves.
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I will be happy to answer any questions you may have, sir.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Captain Woerth.
Mr. Frenzel?
Mr. FRENZEL. Good afternoon and thank you. I ask that my full remarks be admitted for the record.
Mr. DUNCAN. They will be placed in the record.
Mr. FRENZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. My name is Robert Frenzel; I am the Senior Vice President for Aviation Safety and Operations at the Air Transport Association. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the ATA.
There is momentum building toward a requirement to install cockpit video recorders in all air carrier aircraft. Some of our members see this as inevitable and believe that video may add some technical value to the investigation process, and video recorder technology has improved in recent years and many of the lighting, resolution, and other problems have been overcome.
We would acknowledge that a video recording of the EgyptAir accident might be helpful to investigators who are charged with attempting to piece together the final critical minutes of pre-crash activities. However, we don't think that the video recorder, like the voice recorder and flight data recorder before it, is always going to provide the ''golden nugget'' that solves the mystery; and yet, some believe that to be the case.
The industry is proceeding with caution because experience shows that even with the existing rules protecting voice and flight data recorders, there is an unfortunate history of abuse when the information contained in the devices falls into the wrong hands—for example, NBC Dateline's decision to play a portion of the cockpit tape from the Cali accident was an act of bad judgment. There have been other recent news shows that have also included tapes involving an unruly passenger on an Alaska Airline flight, as well. In a society that thrives on graphic images, one can only imagine how an irresponsible media would exploit videos of aircraft accidents that for their perceived entertainment value.
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The ATA member airlines recognize that at some point, cockpit video recorders will perhaps be the norm. We believe that we are not yet ready to use them properly. Before we proceed down that path, there are many issues that will need to be discussed, and we know that our members and their crew members will insist on protective provisions to encompass all aspects of basic privacy.
I would also note that I have agreed to be the industry co-chair on the RTCA committee that is going to look at this issue.
I would also like to thank this committee and other Members of Congress for including language in AIR 21 that requires FAA to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to protect air carriers and their employees from enforcement actions for violations that are reported or discovered as a result of voluntary reporting programs, such as FOQA and ASAP which, in support of earlier comments by Congressman Lipinski, deal more with accident prevention, which is something which needs to be continued in our active focus.
Your action sends a positive message that you are interested in proactive, not just reactive, safety programs.
As far as English proficiency, the basic methods and principles of ground-to-air communication between the controller and the pilot have not changed substantially for decades. The equipment has improved, and there is a new form of communication called data link, but the basic means of receiving and acknowledging air traffic clearance is still dependent on voice transmissions.
The Avianca flight that was mentioned earlier was a highly publicized accident that clearly demonstrated a lack of understanding of the English language. English is the ICAO-recommended language for use within the air traffic system, but it's only a recommendation. ATA believes that in order for the air traffic system to function efficiently and safely, pilot and controller use in standards of the English language must be improved. These anecdotes and issues outlined above are focused on one narrow element of air-to-ground communications. For voice communications to provide the level required for safe operations, we must emphasize the use of standard phraseology. At the present time there are many differences on file with ICAO over the use of air traffic phraseology, official government positions that do not support ICAO recommendations. Some differences may be appropriate, but others may need to be revised. Pilots flying throughout the world must be aware of these differences, or run the risk of placing their flight in danger.
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ATA supports a comprehensive review of all ICAO differences, along with a U.S.-led effort to enhance global communications standards. Our member airlines will join with our code-sharing partners, with Government and labor, and with other interested parties to do our part in this initiative.
With regards to psychological testing, before we get into some specific details I think it is important to set the stage with regard to the scope of the issue before us today. In reviewing the history of suicide and self-destructive behavior in aviation, data obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics and the National Transportation Safety Board for the period between 1979 and 1989 show that 10 persons committed suicide by domestic aircraft crashes. Twenty aircraft crash fatalities were also reported during the period in which the intent of death could not be determined as either suicide, homicide, or accidental. It is important to know for the purpose of this hearing that all fatalities were during the operation of small fixed-wing aircraft.
Airlines have utilized many forms of psychological testing over the years. The typical pilot-hiring process is a series of subjective evaluations, conducted by both trained human resource experts and by experienced airline Captains. A number of our members also use objective testing, such as the MMPI testing protocol, or another product called CogScreen, which is designed to test congitive functioning.
Before the interview process, however, the candidate for a flight crew position with a major carrier must possess a current medical certificate, issued by an FAA-designated medical examiner. The FAA therefore provides the first checkpoint in the process through the issuance of a medical certificate. An airline Captain is required to renew his or her medical certificate every six months.
Assuming that a pilot is successful in his quest for a position with a carrier, all initial programs by our member airlines contain Crew Resource Management training. This teaches pilots to be aware of the performance and behavior of other crew members and other fellow employees with whom contact is made.
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The bottom line is that there are no hard and fast absolutes when it comes to detecting the likelihood of psychological problems. There are a number of checkpoints within the aviation environment, beginning with pre-employment evaluations and on-the-job training. These work to minimize the likelihood of serious problems arising in the cockpit due to psychological problems. Admittedly, these checkpoints are not infallible; however, unlike metal detectors at security checkpoints, there is no mental health detector in existence that can pick problems out of the stream of life.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Frenzel.
Mr. Byrnes?
Mr. BYRNES. Good afternoon, Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski and members of the subcommittee, and thank you, Congressman Franks, for inviting me. My name is Barrett Byrnes. I work for the FAA as an air traffic controller at John F. Kennedy Airport. I am also the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, NATCA, facility representative at Kennedy Airport. NATCA is the exclusive representative for 15,000 air traffic controllers nationwide.
My testimony today is that it never ceases to amaze me that every day, 365 days a year, so many foreign jumbo aircraft transverse our oceans, arriving and departing our international airports. I am not here to challenge the professionalism of these pilots, for they are true professionals. I am, however, here to testify that the language barrier, if not addressed, may lead to yet another devastating runway collision, as witnessed in Tenerife in the Canary Islands on March 27th, 1977, where 580 people were killed. The language barrier was the causal factor contributing to this, the world's worst aviation disaster.
English is the universal language in air traffic control, but internal FAA memos remind controllers that we must be extra vigilant due to all the foreign languages spoken at JFK. Consequently, we air traffic controllers are held to a higher standard.
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The airspace in New York—JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark—is the busiest airspace in the world. We are not only expected to work this busy traffic; we are also expected to sort out the many different heavy accents and dialects.
To ensure safety, we must make certain that pilots repeat back to us verbatim the instructions we issued. If a pilot reads back something else and a loss of separation results, the controller is held to blame.
The FAA mandates that we as controllers are required to use the prescribed standard phraseology. If we do not, disciplinary action could result. However, pilots are not held to the same stringent policy. The English language barrier is only the first very serious issue. It is further exacerbated by a second language barrier when pilots are not required to use the standard phraseology. For instance, and as we saw earlier, on June 27th, 1999 at JFK, an Air France 747 was told to hold short of Runway 22 Right at Taxiway Juliet. An Icelandair 757 was departing on Runway 22 Right when the Air France 747 crossed the runway directly in front of Icelandair, causing a near collision.
An investigation ensued. Five different controllers, the air traffic manager, and the supervisor on duty that evening listened to the tape recordings of that incident. Not one of these individuals heard the pilot of Air France say ''no hold short.'' ''No hold short'' is not FAA-prescribed phraseology; it is either ''cross'' or ''hold short.''
On yet another occasion recently I told an Air Mexico 757 to hold short Runway 22 Right at Taxiway Foxtrot. Air Mexico read back, ''Cross Runway 22 Right.'' I immediately transmitted, ''Negative, Air Mexico, hold short of Runway 22 Right.'' It was just a key buzzword; as the aircraft said that, I immediately picked it up.
As the FAA was saying before, two days after the incident, where they blamed this on the air traffic controller, along with the Air France pilot, in the Quality Assurance Alert Bulletin it says, ''Lessons learned: Be aware of the foreign pilots and their accents and how they may say phrases differently than we are used to hearing, and using nonstandard phraseology. Remember, FAA Order 711065, which is the Air Traffic Controller's Handbook, pilot acknowledgement readback requires when issuing a clearance or instruction to ensure that the items read back are correct; and if not, you have to correct those instructions.''
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As we are all aware, JFK tower has numerous foreign pilots operating at this airport. Controllers must be extra vigilant to the differences in accents and the use of nonstandard phraseology.
The Operational Air Report on this incident, the preliminary analysis indicates that due to the foreign air carrier using nonstandard phraseology and the accent of the pilot, the controller was unaware that the pilot read back, ''and no hold short.'' It is not standard phraseology to say ''no hold short,'' yet the pilot took this clearance to cross the active runway. This was prepared by the Air Traffic Manager at JFK tower.
The request from the Air Traffic Manger at JFK tower to the Regional Office, to Franklin Hatfield, signed by Jim Buckles, to reclassify this as a pilot deviation as opposed to a controller error: ''Your request for reclassification of operational error, JFK-99-E002, is denied. The requirement of the FAA Handbook on pilot acknowledgement readback was not fulfilled. The controller did not recognize the response to the control instructions to hold short of Runway 22 Right.'' If you can't understand the controller, and you're not speaking the same language, how are we to know if the pilot is reading back the correct statement?
We are working numerous aircraft at any given time. This is totally unfair.
A last piece of information. The preliminary operational error deviation investigation, possible factors: read back, hear back; and the other pertinent factors, boxes checked, which has pilots' phraseology.
Bear with me one second, please.
Over the past years the FAA has been changing a lot of our procedures to comply with ICAO procedures, yet they continue to state that they cannot impose change to ICAO to conform with FAA procedures. I believe diplomacy and everything else must be made to take a back seat when it comes to safety. Safety is paramount in this business.
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Another area that should be pursued is to stabilize the workforce at our busy international airports. As in any business, the less turnover of personnel, the better. Veteran controllers have the ability to translate many of the heavy dialect transmissions as a result of working with these accents over the years. Unfortunately, these veteran controllers leave these facilities because they want to work in the inner cities, and they have better quality of life in moving out to the radar facilities, which are our TRACONs and Centers. This is due to the FAA's current practice of rating the airport solely on the number of arrivals and departures. Language problems and heavy jet operations that require 20 to 50 percent more separation between aircraft, among other criteria, are not considered for rating. However, the FAA now has the ability—and should exercise the option available to them—to institute a recruitment and retention incentive bonus which would enable us to retain our most experienced controllers, which would definitely help on the safety problem.
In closing, this is not a new issue or a new safety problem. My father, Buddy Byrnes, dedicated 35 years to air traffic controller and dealt with the same situation back in 1940 at LaGuardia. Tony Catalano, one of the first controllers hired at JFK—then Idlewild—in 1947, also witnessed this language barrier firsthand, and they both wondered how long it would then take the CAA, Civil Aviation Agency, to fix this critical safety issue. Well, it is 60 years later; the airplanes are faster; the traffic has increased to an unprecedented pace; we have an anticipated increase from 650 million passengers to over 1 billion passengers by 2008. We have global positioning, we have a global economy, yet we continue to deal with this very serious safety issue, which is a global problem.
Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Byrnes.
Mr. Thompson?
Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be here and be able to testify before this committee today. Thank you, Congressman Hutchinson, for the kind words.
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Although we are a relatively new company in this field, the reason we are here today is to inform you of the new technology that is available today through digital imaging. We would also like to bring to your attention some of the products that are currently under development in the storage of data and the transmission of data in the digital imaging arena.
Digital cameras can be placed within the cockpit so that they are not going to be showing the crew at any given time. Also, we would like to let you know that cameras can be placed around the aircraft, whether it be externally or internally to the aircraft, to provide images for the cockpit crew and people on the ground.
The images that can be provided to the crew from internally and externally could allow pilots to see what's going on on the exterior of the aircraft at any given time. Those pictures can be transmitted to a ground station or to a satellite imaging system.
One of the things we would like to show today, just to give you an example of the type of cameras that have been developed, is this camera right here. The camera is the small piece on the end; the large piece is just to hold it so that we don't lose it.
We are not really here to tell the FAA or the pilot associations how they should run their business. We're just here today to let you know what technology is available and how it can be used to help the industry and to increase the safety, both in the aircraft flight and in maintenance.
Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Captain Woerth, let me start off by asking you this. You heard me ask Chairman Hall how he would respond to a group of pilots who expressed some of their strong feelings, as stated in the Wall Street Journal article.
How would you respond to the people who have said that bank tellers and convenience store clerks and department store clerks and many employees of different businesses have video cameras on them all the time, and they don't have 200 lives depending on them; and as far as anyone knows, they've never raised any privacy complaints. How would you respond to people who say that?
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Captain WOERTH. I think we need to focus on the work of this committee, which has been so diligent in trying to advance aviation safety, the issue is really about a prioritization of resources. As we fought for H.R. 1000 and the appropriators have hundreds of projects to deal with, this simply doesn't make the cut of all the necessary things we need to spend our resources on. Those special commissions we talked about which resulted in FAA's Safer Skies, they will bring all the aviation experts together and decide how to prioritize the resources, video recorders never came up.
So I think that's where we have to focus, Congressman Duncan, putting the priority on preventing accidents, not just watching them on the news.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Frenzel, do all the airlines have procedures and policies in place for weeding out pilots who have psychological or emotional type problems? And is this something which occurs with much frequency at all, as far as you can tell?
Mr. FRENZEL. The procedures that we have in place run the gamut from the pre-employment—as I said, some of our members still use the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI; they use another product called CogScreen. Some of them use that as a screening tool; some of them use that as a baseline measuring tool, so that if a person comes in for additional testing in the future, they would have something to refer back to.
A lot of this, as I think Mr. McSweeny alluded to, a lot of this work that gets done is done through the normal physical process that the pilots go through with the AMEs, and that's part of it. In addition to that, the whole environment that pilots operate under—with the multiple crew members within a cockpit, you also have flight attendants and other members of that operating crew on the aircraft that work together, travel together over the course of several days; you have a lot of checks and balances in terms of people being able to recognize if there are problems that are starting to manifest themselves.
So there are a number of different checks and balances. The physical objective testing, there is a wide difference in use of those specific tools.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask Mr. Byrnes, how frequent is it that you have problems understanding foreign pilots? Is this a common thing? I know there was some mention that some airlines have interpreters in the cockpits. Is that something that comes up very often? And then also, I saw that when Mr. Canoles was sort of placing the blame on the controller, I saw you sitting there shaking your head back and forth. What can you tell us about those things?
Mr. BYRNES. Well, working at a place like JFK, about 50 percent of our traffic is international traffic—
Mr. DUNCAN. What percentage?
Mr. BYRNES. About 50 percent. So half of our traffic is international.
I was asked yesterday to provide a list of the aviation users. I will not do that, of course; if you wanted to speak privately, of course, I could. But some are notorious and repeat offenders.
For the FAA and ICAO not to require that we use the same phraseology, even one event is too much. Unfortunately, every single day at Kennedy there is something—whether it's just a misinterpreted wrong turn on a taxiway, a missed ''hold short'' or to follow somebody—but usually when the weather is bad, we are on certain flows where we land on the outboard runway and we take off on the inside runway, and the aircraft that are landing that have to cross the departure runway, that's when things happen. The incidents like Air France—last year at Kennedy, I was working in the control tower when that happened; it scared the heck out of me. You could hear a pin drop in that tower as both of those aircraft passed that intersection.
So it's a very serious issue. I'm not here to say that the sky is falling; I really appreciate Congressman Franks asking me to be here today. I would just really like to fix this problem, then there are only a couple more problems in the system that we need to fix, and we do have the world's safest air traffic control system. However, if we just improve on this one situation, hopefully you won't see me back here again.
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Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Captain you mentioned the medical examination. The Captains take it every six months, and everyone else in the crew, flight officer or first officer, they take it once a year, is that correct?
Captain WOERTH. That's correct, sir.
Mr. LIPINSKI. In your testimony, to almost quote you, is it your union's contention that absolutely no safety benefit can be derived from the installation of a cockpit video recorder? And if so, how can you reconcile that belief with the National Transportation Safety Board's testimony that such devices could have played a key role in recent crashes, such as SwissAir or EgyptAir?
Captain WOERTH. We do not believe that there is any appreciable safety value from the cockpit video recorder that cannot be obtained by other means. Valuable information can be obtained by other means, particularly with these new digital flight data recorders that can be improved upon either further.
But while we're talking about SwissAir and ValuJet, what value is it to have—
Mr. LIPINSKI. EgyptAir is what I asked you about.
Captain WOERTH. EgyptAir as well. I think we will be able to determine, without a cockpit video recorder, what went on at EgyptAir to satisfy the accident investigators. It was a flight data recorder they had on board that aircraft.
These other aircraft accidents that were also mentioned, there was smoke in the cockpit. Incidentally, in SwissAir and ValuJet, fire burned through the cables that supplied the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, so we can probably assume a video recorder wouldn't have worked, as well. At SilkAir, the cockpit voice recorder was disabled, as was the flight data recorder. We don't know why, but whoever did it would probably have done the video recorder as well.
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We just don't see any real safety enhancement benefits by cockpit video recording.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Of course, you do see an enormous concern in regards to privacy pertaining to these video recorders, do you not?
Captain WOERTH. Absolutely. We just think—that like the Dateline incident, where they played the tape to the cockpit voice recorder provided by the Colombians we are convinced that it will happen with video recorders if they are ever made available. Somehow somebody will get a copy, and it will be on the 11:00 o'clock evening news, much to everybody's horror.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Captain.
Mr. Frenzel, based upon your testimony, oral and written, the ATA doesn't really have a position at the present time in regards to the video recorders? Is that correct?
Mr. FRENZEL. We would prefer to continue on the accident prevention route, spending our money to promote the furtherance of FOQA and ASAP, as Captain Woerth mentioned. And then at some point in the future, I think many of our members realize that this is probably going to come back down the pike. But right now, we would prefer to spend our safety dollars on preventing accidents.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Why do some of your members think that this is going to come up further down the road?
Mr. FRENZEL. Probably just their impressions of the way the issue has been brought up several times. This isn't the first time it has been mentioned. It's just individual thoughts in terms of how this would play out in the future.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I was going to say, in regard to the psychological testing and the video recorders, there certainly has been no consensus among the panelists here whatsoever that this is a good thing to do, that this will help safety; nor certainly with the membership that has appeared here today at the Aviation Subcommittee. There certainly was no consensus that video recorders or psychological testing is a direction in which we should go. So I was just wondering why you were saying publicly that you felt—that some of your members felt—that it was going to be inevitable that we were going to have to deal with this in the future, and there were possibilities that we would have to implement it.
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I guess you answered that to the best of your ability already.
I get to the air traffic controller, and I can't see your name because the camera is in front of me.
Mr. BYRNES. Byrnes.
Mr. LIPINSKI. You aren't any relation to a fellow by the name of Tommy Byrnes that used to pitch for the New York Yankees, are you?
Mr. BYRNES. No, but I wish I was.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Because he spelled his name exactly the same way. If you knew his record, I don't know if you'd want to be related to him at all.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LIPINSKI. Obviously, the one place we seem to have consensus amongst most of the panelists today, and certainly amongst the members up here, is that we need an awful lot of work in regards to using English and using the proper phraseology between the pilots and the air traffic controllers, and certainly your testimony here today leads us even more strongly in that direction. So I think your testimony is the one area where most of the people, if not all of the people, involved in today's hearing agree that we should go.
Mr. Thompson, how would your camera be utilized in regards to maintenance? I noticed in your testimony that you talked about maintenance, but you really didn't elaborate. I was wondering if you would elaborate on that.
Mr. THOMPSON. Current technology allows us to utilize the small camera that we passed around to store digital images into a computer-type camera that allows the maintenance crew to go into the bore-scope holes of engine compartments, and also inspect the airframe of aircraft, storing those images onto a flashcard with as much as 64 megabytes of memory, then taking those images that have the aircraft tail number, the crewman's name, and time and date, which have been stored on those images, and maintain those for a period of time, and they can be transmitted anywhere all over the world through the Internet. So it allows him to do things that he's never been able to do before.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Do you have any idea what the costs would be of installing your camera just in the cockpit of aircraft—not for maintenance purposes, and not during the course of flight, where they would be on the outside, just in the cockpit itself?
Mr. THOMPSON. The cockpit itself, if you're not going to count the cost of the flight data recorder and the storage mechanism for the digital data, the cameras for the cockpit alone would probably be less than $30,000.
Mr. LIPINSKI. And what if you were going to count the cost in regards to the other items that you mentioned?
Mr. THOMPSON. We're really not able to tell you what the other corporations that build the flight data recorders are going to charge for that product.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I guess that's understandable.
Mr. THOMPSON. When we worked with them—we're working with several large corporations now—they don't anticipate the cost of that storage to increase significantly.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I thank the entire panel.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
Captain, I have a question for you. Chairman Hall stated, in response to earlier questions, that he would support an effort to look at what improvements should be made to existing flight data recorders prior to taking any action on the video recorders.
Do you have any comments about that, or any reaction to that?
Captain WOERTH. Yes, sir. We think that's a very good idea. We are participating with the RTCA in looking at all future flight data collection requirements, and it is our belief that the more time we spend on this, the more effort, we're going to find better ways that will actually enhance aviation safety and allow us to analyze accidents better, and will probably preclude the need for cockpit video.
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So we support any efforts that look into this effort more fully before we proceed, just based on a knee-jerk type reaction.
Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. So you don't have any doubt in your mind that specific improvements could be suggested that would enhance the ability of the National Transportation Safety Board to draw conclusions from those improvements of flight data recorders?
Captain WOERTH. That's correct.
Mr. DUNCAN. Okay.
Mr. Lipinski, do you have any other questions?
Mr. LIPINSKI. No, Mr. Chairman, I am finished. Thank you very much.
Mr. DUNCAN. Okay.
I would like to thank all the panel members, and the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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