SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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79–800 PS
2001
CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEMS--PLANNING FOR THE DECEMBER 31, 2002 DEADLINE
(107–58)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DECEMBER 7, 2001
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
STEPHEN HORN, California
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JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JACK QUINN, New York
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
SUE W. KELLY, New York
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
RICHARD W. POMBO, California
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
HENRY E, BROWN, Jr., South Carolina
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana
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DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
C.L. (BUTCH) OTTER, Idaho
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
BOB FILNER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
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GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
MAX SANDLIN, Texas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine
MARION BERRY, Arkansas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma
JIM MATHESON, Utah
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
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JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN HORN, California
JACK QUINN, New York
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
SUE W. KELLY, New York
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana, Vice Chairman
JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
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JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
DON YOUNG, Alaska
(Ex Officio)
WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, California
MAX SANDLIN, Texas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma
JIM MATHESON, Utah
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
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JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Ellenbogen, Michael, Vice President, Product and Business Development, PerkinElmer Instruments
Hutcheson, Ian, Head of Group Security, BAA
Lanza, Frank, Chairman and CEO, L-3 Communications, Inc.
Muntz, Frederick F., Vice President, InVision Technologies, Inc.
Rimington, Roger W., Chief Aviation Security Consultant, Gleanaly International Limited, accompanied by David Bilcliffe, Director of Operations, Kieran Gracie, Chairman, and Robert Satchwell, Director of Finance
Vehlen, Frank, Executive Vice President and COO, Heimann Systems Corp.
Zaidman, Steven, Associate Administrator, Research and Acquisitions, Federal Aviation Administration
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
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Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., of New York
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Ellenbogen, Michael
Hutcheson, Ian
Lanza, Frank
Muntz, Frederick F
Rimington, Roger W
Vehlen, Frank
Zaidman, Steven
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Zaidman, Steven, response to the record regarding carriage of mail/parcels on aircraft with hardened containers
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CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEMS-PLANNING FOR THE DECEMBER 31, 2002 DEADLINE
Friday, December 7, 2001
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:36 a.m., in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the House Aviation Subcommittee to order. This morning's topic before the subcommittee is checked baggage screening systems and planning for the December 31, 2002, deadline as provided in the law recently passed by Congress. The order of business will be opening statements by Members, and then we have one witness panel, and we will hear from all of those and proceed with the questions in that order. I will begin with my opening statement and recognize other Members.
Today we begin our oversight of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act that was passed last month. This hearing will focus today on the law's mandate to deploy explosive detection systems to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2002.
Before we passed that law, I don't think most people were aware of how little baggage was actually subject to inspection. Until recently checked baggage was screened by a profiling system that resulted in the actual inspection of only a small percentage of the bags that were checked. The Security Act passed by Congress mandated that we make dramatic changes in that process. It establishes an aggressive schedule to deploy explosive detection systems at all airports by the end of next year. This is one year sooner than was required by the House-passed version and much sooner than the Federal Aviation Administration had originally planned.
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While the public should understand that the congressional deadline might be difficult to meet, there are other measures in place right now. Some of those include the strengthening of cockpit doors, and I do have to thank the private sector, the airlines for stepping up to the plate. That has been completed. Every major airline aircraft flying now has secure cockpit doors. That and the rapid deployment of air marshals which is also taking place have significantly improved passenger safety and security for all of the flying public.
To meet the December 31, 2002, deadline, some experts have estimated that it may require more than 2,000 machines at a cost which could exceed some $5 billion. In addition, these machines will not operate by themselves. They are going to take personnel to operate them. There will be substantial costs, additional costs to man this equipment. There is no doubt that meeting the deadline for deployment will indeed be a difficult task. Few agencies have ever been directed to undertake such a formidable assignment.
Even at a time when we were considering the bill, there was concern about setting the deadline that we did establish in the bill. If it were solely up to me, the directives mandated by the legislation would have been different, but at the time it was apparent that some in Congress, the media, and the public were not in a mood for an extended debate on the issue, nor were some willing to listen to reason or even factual information. Now I am concerned that the pressure to meet the December 31, 2002, deadline will cause the Department of Transportation to spend huge amounts of money quickly without any assurance that the equipment will, in fact, detect the explosives that could bring down an aircraft.
Unfortunately that was exactly the approach taken after TWA 800 in 1996. We need only remind ourselves of the $441 million that was spent on equipment in that regard since 1996. Some of that equipment worked, some of it didn't work, some sat idle, and I don't believe that we can afford to repeat those mistakes. It is not enough to simply buy whatever is available in order to meet the deadline in the law. The Security Act also authorizes $50 million for research and development.
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I would hope that the Department of Transportation would begin to use these funds immediately to ensure that we develop the very best explosive detection systems possible. The manufacturers of explosive detection systems have displayed their various technologies on Capitol Hill, and some of them will testify today.
But before we proceed in haste, we need to have a plan, one that ensures that not only is every bag screened, but also that the screening actually detects the articles that pose a threat to the passengers and the crew. I believe the British can be very instructive in this process. As a result of the Pan Am 103 tragedy, they made some dramatic expenditures and also worked several years to achieve 100 percent baggage screening. Furthermore, we must recognize it is not just the machines that are going to be a big expense. Integrating those machines into the existing baggage delivery system will take a great deal of time and money. While the UK experience may be informative, rather than retrofit just several dozen airports like they did in the UK, the United States faces an incredible and formidable task of deploying new technology at hundreds and hundreds of locations.
Today we will hear from witnesses that have actually participated in converting airports to the 100 percent checked baggage screening requirement. We are pleased to have two witnesses from Great Britain here to give us the benefit of their experience. I would like to thank them today for traveling such a long distance to be with us today, and thank them also for meeting with us and our staff earlier and the counsel they have provided us to date. We also have the key manufacturers of bomb detection equipment, two who have certified systems, and two who will be seeking certification of their systems.
Finally, I would like to thank Steve Zaidman of the FAA for taking time from his work on the STARS issue and other technology development issues to share with us the current plans for meeting the statutory deadline, and incidentally, too, Mr. Zaidman, we let you off this week on an update of the STARS, but we will have you back in here right after the beginning of the year, so don't get too comfortable.
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I would also like to particularly recognize a gentleman from Missouri who is unable to be with us, Sam Graves, and also a gentleman from Illinois, Mark Kirk. Both Mr. Graves and Mr. Kirk were two Members on the subcommittee who worked very diligently to get the very best provisions we could and are very concerned that we do address the serious problem of checked baggage not being screened. They both worked diligently to ensure that we had good provisions in this historic legislation to deal with this need. Now we have a difficult task of implementing the congressional directive.
I am pleased to recognize now for an opening statement Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lipinski, the Ranking Member, had previously scheduled business in his district and wasn't able to be here today, but he obviously shares the concern of the Chairman and other members of the committee on this very important issue. I have served on the committee for a number of years and have been through a number of concerns about the acquisition process at the FAA. I have been known to say that perhaps the only department of the government worse than the Pentagon in acquiring new technology is the FAA. I hope to hear testimony today that will prove me wrong.
I have met with a number of representatives of firms who seem to have equipment that somehow is not in favor with the FAA, but which they credibly claim could get the job done. It seems to me it should be fairly easy to set a performance standard and then, no matter what the technology is whether it depends upon crystals or whatever else that can detect the levels of explosive reliably and with speed, we should begin to deploy those various machines or perhaps be using machines in tandem. I hope to see some flexibility and innovation on the part of the FAA.
I believe that the guidelines in the bill were driven by the demand of the public. I think it is very unlikely, given sky marshals, reinforced flight deck doors, and the new attitude of the people who fly on planes that anybody is going to try and take over a plane again, but I am worried about the likelihood of a repeat of the attempt over the Pacific a number of years ago, which was only thwarted through luck, where they had credibly proposed to bring down a number of 747s at once over the Pacific Ocean.
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I believe this is a real and credible threat. The airlines need to realize that and be cooperative. I was very disturbed after September 11 when a number of the airlines were found to have creatively interpreted the FAA Administrator's directive which required the full utilization of the existing bomb detection capabilities and were in some cases running machines, but not putting baggage on them because that was inconvenient for them. That, hopefully, is no longer the case, and hopefully the existing technology is being fully utilized. I am hoping to hear today how we can move ahead very quickly with acquisition of alternative technologies to the one or two that the FAA has so far blessed because it—I am not a scientist, and perhaps I have been oversold on some of these other technologies, but I believe there are other technologies out there today that could be effectively deployed more quickly even than the existing approved technologies to help thwart this threat.
I think this is a very important hearing today. I really appreciate the Chairman scheduling this so promptly and look forward to learning a lot more, and hopefully we will see our way through to getting this equipment in place and better protecting the traveling public in the near future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Horn, gentleman from California.
Mr. HORN. I waive.
Mr. MICA. Thank you.
Mr. Lampson.
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit my statement for the record, but suffice it to say that when people speak as they did in this manner that it is our job in Congress to react as best as we possibly can. It is my hope, too, that this hearing will provide some much needed clarification on the progress of implementation and whether the goals set by Congress will indeed be met with the end result being continued integrity and security of our commercial airlines. And I thank you for holding the hearing and for the presenters for being here today.
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Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman, and without objection your entire statement will be made a part of the record.
We will now turn to our panel of witnesses, and we are pleased to have with us today Mr. Ian Hutcheson, who is head of group security for the British Airports Authority; Mr. Roger W. Rimington, and he is a chief aviation security consultant with Glenealy International Limited, also from UK. We have Mr. Frederick Muntz, vice president of InVision Technologies; and we have Frank C. Lanza, chairman and CEO of L-3 Communications Corporation; Mr. Frank Vehlen, who is executive vice president and COO of Heimann Systems Corporation; and Mr. Michael Ellenbogen, who is the vice president of product development of Perkin-Elmer Detection System; and finally Mr. Steve Zaidman, Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions of the Federal Aviation Administration.
I am not going to hear from Mr. Zaidman first because I want him to hear from all the other witnesses and sit through this with us, and then we will hear his comments.
Let me turn to the first two witnesses. It appears through our research that there aren't too many countries that have undertaken such a task as the United States is now attempting to move forward with, and that is screening 100 percent of all checked baggage, and the UK, again, after a horrible tragedy did undertake that mission and has completed it. So I think it is good that we hear from those two individuals who have joined us today.
So let me call on Mr. Ian Hutcheson first, and he is head of the group security for British Aviation Airports. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF IAN HUTCHESON, HEAD OF GROUP SECURITY, BAA; ROGER W. RIMINGTON, CHIEF AVIATION SECURITY CONSULTANT, GLENEALY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID BILCLIFFE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, KIERAN GRACIE, CHAIRMAN, AND ROBERT SATCHWELL, DIRECTOR OF FINANCE; FREDERICK F. MUNTZ, VICE PRESIDENT, INVISION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; FRANK LANZA, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; FRANK VEHLEN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND COO, HEIMANN SYSTEMS CORP.; MICHAEL ELLENBOGEN, VICE PRESIDENT, PRODUCT AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, PERKINELMER INSTRUMENTS; AND STEVEN ZAIDMAN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, RESEARCH AND ACQUISITIONS, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
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Mr. HUTCHESON. Thank you, Chairman Mica.
Mr. MICA. You may have to pull that up close and hit the little button.
Mr. HUTCHESON. Thank you.
Chairman Mica and Congressman DeFazio and members of the subcommittee, I appear before you today to discuss the experience of BAA plc in the installation of in-line screening systems to achieve 100 percent of hold baggage, better known as checked bags in your country. The BAA experience of concourse screening systems, i.e., setting up X-ray equipment prior to check-in, was that this led to unacceptable levels of congestion within a terminal building. It also presented an additional terrorist target, significant delay to the processing of passengers and an overall poor level of customer service.
With this in mind it was decided to implement a project to implement hold baggage screening, and we began with research and development activities during 1990 to 1992. The first operational trial of an in-line baggage screening system was developed and implemented at Glasgow Airport in 1993, and the final part of the project was completed at Heathrow Terminal 3 in June 1998. The overall cost of this project to BAA was just over $300 million.
The costs of implementing hold baggage screening can be broken down as follows: building works, 20 percent of costs; baggage handling equipment and controls, 37 percent; mechanical and electrical, 7 percent; screening equipment, 21 percent; and others, 15 percent. These figures clearly show that the cost of screening equipment represents only a small part of developing an in-line solution.
The following are some typical time scales for implementation: Heathrow Terminal 3 took 30 months; Heathrow Terminal 1, 18 months; Heathrow Terminal 2, 9 months; and Southampton, which is the smallest airport in the BAA group, 2 months. These time scales assume the development of a design brief, that a baggage handling contractor is available, that equipment is available from manufacturers, and includes overcoming issues of baggage integration, confidence trials and commissioning. BAA continued to run the terminal buildings whilst these projects were implemented. In Terminal 3, for example, this involved 2-1/2 years of night working.
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The BAA baggage design team believes it would now be possible to progress from inception to a completed baggage design within 4 months. Completion of build will vary depending on the size of the system and the complexity of the operation. Recent projects within the group at Stansted and Gatwick have been completed much more quickly. At Stansted an extension to the building, installation of baggage belts, screening equipment and control rooms capable of processing up to 200,000 bags an hour was completed within 12 months, including the design.
The approach in the UK and BAA airports to screening hold baggage in line has been taken to take a five-level approach. Level 1, 100 percent of bags are screened through automated smart X-ray machines. Level 2, the image of all bags rejected at level 1 by the X-ray machine are presented to a screener for scrutiny. Thirty percent screened at level 1 are referred to the screener. Level 3, all bags which the level 2 screener cannot clear are examined at a separate machine by another screener. The screener is required to inspect the image of every bag presented at level 3 and positively clear it. This represents 3 percent of the bags that were screened at level 2. Level 4, this is reconciliation of bags that contain items that cannot be cleared by the screener, but are not thought to contain an explosive device. Less than 1 percent of the level 3 throughput is referred to level 4. Level 5, a bag thought to contain an explosive device, a level 5 threat assessment is then undertaken, and this happens less than 10 times per annum. Bags can go direct from level 2 to level 5.
Currently BAA deploy Perkin-Elmer Vivid machines at levels 1 and 2. Level 3 machines can be either Perkin-Elmer Vivid or InVision CTX, dependent upon the perceived threat to the airline operators. For example, at Heathrow Terminal 3, InVision CTX is deployed at level 3, whilst in Terminal 1 it is a second Perkin-Elmer Vivid machine. The system choice is influenced by the hourly baggage throughput rate of the airport, and careful consideration has to be given to the level of redundancy required. We need a fail-safe system, and also capacity for future growth must be taken into consideration.
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When designing a system, three key issues must be taken into account: the detection levels required, throughput and reliability. The detection levels required, throughput, and reliability. The throughput capability of the machines currently available for explosive detection screening vary by machine type and are dependent upon the operating mode of the machine. BAA's experience indicates that the following throughputs are achievable: The Perkin-Elmer Vivid in level 1 or 2 operation mode will screen 1,440 bags per hour, and CTX 5500, when used with a screener, will screen between 170 to 190 bags an hour. If used in automatic mode, the CTX increases its throughput to 360 bags an hour.
In more written submissions, I have also outlined the UK experience in relation to passenger and baggage reconciliation, a very important part that complements HBS. Passenger profiling, the screening of staff, and access to restricted areas and training, including the performance of screeners and other staff engaged in the scrutiny process. I would particularly draw your attention to the comments regarding new methods for screening and also the research into the performance and training of security staff.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you and your colleagues have. Thank you.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, and, again, we appreciate your being here.
We will withhold questions until we have heard from all witnesses.
Let me recognize next Roger Rimington, and he is chief aviation security consultant with Glenealy International Limited. And thank you also for being with us, and your delegation this week from UK, and the time you spent not only on the Hill, but also with other administration officials. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.
Mr. RIMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear today before you to testify on behalf of Glenealy International Limited on how to scope, develop, and implement systems and procedures to accomplish 100 percent screening of checked baggage aboard passenger aircraft. With me today at are David Bilcliffe, Kieran Gracie, and Robert Satchwell.
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Glenealy's staff has practical experience in 100 percent checked or hold baggage screening systems gained over the past 10 years mainly at Manchester Airport. Manchester Airport handles over 18 million passengers a year, comparable to Washington Dulles. Passenger traffic continues to grow at double-digit rates.
It is important to note that the baggage screening system must fit into the entire baggage delivery system so that bags wind up on the right flights on a timely basis. Moreover, a baggage screening system alone will not repel the terrorist threat. Rather, it must fit into an integrated security system to deter terrorists.
Although difficult, it is Glenealy's view that 100 percent hold baggage screening can be achieved by the December 2002 deadline with a stand-alone baggage screening system if confirmation is received from EDS suppliers, site evaluation of all airports can be undertaken at a matter of urgency and do not reveal the need for significant structural modification of terminals, and the training of staff in hold baggage screening protocols can begin as soon as possible. However, this will result in significant impact on the commercial operations and unprecedented passenger clearing times largely due to the stand-alone process.
Clearly a stand-alone system is only an interim solution and is not sustainable at many airports in the long term. While deploying stand-alone systems to meet the deadline, airports should continue working to achieve in-line integrated 100 percent hold baggage screening systems and high levels of security within a fully integrated system which builds on international best practices.
It took almost 4 years to get the world's first 100 percent smart hold baggage screening system running live at Manchester Airport, largely using American technology. The task was complicated and difficult, but eventually the system worked in cohesion with the baggage delivery system. Fortunately, airports in the U.S. Can build on the lessons learned at Manchester to avoid many of the problems that came with implementation of the first system.
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Initial EDS equipment processed far fewer bags and had higher reject rates than promised. It sent 40 and 50 percent of all screened bags to the CTX, which could only screen 270 bags an hour. This caused what we term as ''dieback'' to the system, a choking of the system that rippled back to the baggage entry point, resulting in massive check-in delays. We also found that airlines' baggage check-in staff created substantial problems in the early days because they did not understand what type of bags should be dispatched through the baggage screening systems and what type should be processed by the out-of-gauge system described above. Improved training of check-in staff in these areas led to significant reduction of these problems.
How did we overcome the problems? The airports replaced initial EDS machines with Vivids, and upgraded the CTX 5000s to 5500s, and added queuing conveyors to the baggage system. The combination of Vivids and the CTX 5500 has solved most of the problems in the baggage screening process. The system now achieves a rate of between 1,000 and 1,200 bags per hour in line in real-world conditions. The Vivid can process and screen 1,200 items per hour. The CTX 5500 can process and screen 384 items per hour. Vivid's reject rate is less than 25 percent, and each Vivid is supported by one CTX. There is a larger version of the CTX, which is a 9000. It is faster, it is bigger, but it is more expensive.
Checked baggage system outputs, as we experienced at Manchester, demonstrates a fully integrated in-line EDS fitted system into the baggage system is capable of achieving 1,200 bags per hour per line. There are 14 lines in total at Manchester Airport.
A vital component of the integrated baggage system at Manchester is the carousel which is not accessible by the public. Bags on busy lines can go round the carousel and find a line that has capacity. The carousel-based design is best equipped to handle the inevitable system malfunctions because a carousel can divert bags from one line to another utilizing redundancy.
Recommendations, therefore. Achievement to the time scale December 2002 is unrealistic if the aim is to introduce 100 percent in-line rather than stand-alone baggage screening systems. The physical and operational complexities of each individual airport are unique to that airport. It is vital that the fully integrated approach is followed. If that were accepted, then the next waypoint would be, for example, to install Vivid, for example, at level 1; CTX 5500, for example, at level 2, or 9000 if capacity required, with the carousel-designed baggage system utilizing redundancy with the appropriate support systems; provide Vivid out-of-gauge and transferred baggage points; and, in concert with surveillance and profiling, utilize a system of radio frequency, for example, whereby tagging bags to ensure that selected bags will automatically be sent to level 2 for enhanced search.
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We believe that stand-alone systems will serve your purpose in the short term until integrated systems are designed and built. Our recommendation will be to immediately adopt the following approach: Categorize airports by passenger levels and target the deployment of equipment and procedures based on these categories as set forth in detail in my prepared statement. Glenealy International will be pleased to draw upon our experience and work with the subcommittee and the administration and other appropriate parties to help refine the planned implementation of checked baggage screening systems.
We thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind invitation to submit testimony and trust that you found our presentation to be useful, and we will be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.
Mr. MICA. Thank you so much, and we will withhold questions.
We are going to hear now from two of the current certified equipment manufacturers. First Mr. Frederick F. Muntz, vice president of InVision Technologies. Welcome, and you are recognized.
Mr. MUNTZ. Thank you very much, Chairman, and to the members of the subcommittee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here today. I have prepared written testimony and ask that it be accepted.
Mr. MICA. Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record. Please proceed.
Mr. MUNTZ. Thank you. To the extent that there are actual highlights in that written testimony, I will actually present those today.
Since I was here on October 11, Invision has been very hard at work. We are manufacturing, we are installing, we are continuing to improve all three models that we produce—the CTX 9000, the 5500, and the 2500—and we believe they will play a vital role in our national response to this very important initiative.
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The Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed by Congress represents comprehensive break-through legislation that will protect the traveling public now and forever. It establishes firm deadlines, firm deadlines that all of us in the industry must do everything we can to try to meet.
We have heard from the Chairman that the assumptions based on employments, numbers of flights, bags per passenger, et cetera, call for a need of about 2,000 machines, and for the sake of this testimony I think we can use that kind of a figure.
A lot of the implementation schemes that you hear about seem to come down into two fashions, stand-alone and fully integrated. I think we have heard today that just the design phase for integrated systems takes some 4 months. Stand-alones provide a rapid response, but they are certainly not the long-term answer. I think what we don't hear enough about right now is some of the very innovative approaches that the airlines in conjunction with companies like InVision and some of our partners have been in the process of developing for some time in anticipation of a deadline that was much further in the future. It was, in fact, the terminal of the future, and now to the very greatest extent possible we have to make that the terminal of 2002.
In the past we have heard the funding levels for EDS were in the order of 550 million, 440 million or 100 million per year. I think it needs to be made clear that while that money was made available, less than half of it went to the actual purchase of EDS devices. In this year's appropriations bill, a funding level of 97.5 million, only 38 million of those appropriated funds are for the actual procurement of EDS devices. Funding remains a very critical part of this equation.
Since September 11, InVision has received more orders from non-U.S. Customers than from the Federal Government. InVision has contracts in place with the FAA for all three of its certified models, and they will clearly play an important role in the solution to checked baggage security and should be ordered in sufficient quantities so that we can begin an accelerated wartime production. In fact, InVision will be delivering systems in the month of December, this very month, to satisfy last-minute orders that will be placed because of delays in funding. InVision continues to make risk buys to establish that capability, but in order to respond to the mandates of the requirement, a much greater commitment is necessary.
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Regarding certification standards, certification was a requirement of the Aviation Security Act of 1990. It essentially says that before we deploy equipment, we want to make sure that all classes of explosives in quantities known to be a threat to commercial aviation will be detected. A relaxation in the certification standards that knowingly will board threats to the aircraft is not what the public is looking for and will not restore confidence in this system. Confidence in aviation security in America is based on certification, and it should be the keystone to our response. If anything, certification standards should be made more stringent.
We have recently certified software that improves detection capability by some 25 percent based on the latest threat assessment and information and intelligence that we are receiving. That is a very critical component. It is what CT or computer tomography does best. It is a flexible technology that creates cross-sectional images for operators to resolve, and it truly gives the software of the system the ability to detect all levels of explosives. Certification will be what restores confidence in our traveling public.
Regarding production capacity, we have talked to countless people who can assist, people who can partner, additional facilities that we can open. We have spent considerable time and energy to review these aspects, but without funding and a commitment, we cannot begin, and any further delay creates simply more delay in attempting to meet the deadline.
Going back to the implementation of EDS, in the past, implementation of stand-alone systems was to scan only that small fraction of bags. All of the concepts and all of the implementation schemes were intended to support just that. CAPPS has been—is an opportunity to expand the utilization of CAPPS, make it more stringent. It is a very functional bridge to 100 percent certified EDS scanning, but the fact of the matter is that as we plan to do some integrated systems in new terminals, stand-alone to get an immediate response, the opportunity to work with the airlines and to work with the airports and to work with the regulators, IT companies, and various other providers of the services of a networked, fully automated check-in procedure is where this technology can go, and I believe, in partnership with the various companies involved, where it will be able to go in the very near future.
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Finally, I think that the act has taken on the greatest challenge, and that is the people part of the equation. Our systems only require people some 30 percent of the time. Seventy percent of the time with certified detection, our bags pass through the plane knowing they are innocuous. Only 30 percent of the time is an operator necessary, and the wisdom of legislation will attract the right kind of operators, will train the right kind of operators and retain them to be true security professionals so the end-to-end performance of CTX and all technology will be improved.
In summary, I would simply like to say we have taken a very critical first step. There is a requirement. There is a lot of work being done on how to meet that requirement, but the next step, making sure that EDS is available, that it is being manufactured and will be arriving at airports, is the critical step that will drive the correct and the most effective implementation process. Until that happens, there will continue to be just discussion and just plans.
I thank you very much for this opportunity.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, and we will now here hear from another certified equipment manufacturer, Frank C. Lanza, and he is chairman of the of L-3 Communications Corporation. Welcome, and you are recognized, sir.
Mr. LANZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. I have submitted my statement and with your permission would like to make a few—.
Mr. MICA. Without objection, the entire statement will be made part of the record. Please go ahead and summarize.
Mr. LANZA. Thank you, sir.
L-3 is somewhat the new person on the block in this so-called airport security. L-3 was formed in 1997, has grown to a $2-1/2 billion products company. It services about 70 percent of the military and about 30 percent the commercial world, specifically oriented to telecommunications and transportation. We were fortunate in 1996, 1997 to win a competitive contract of 11 companies to build the next generation, as we define, a second-generation system computer tomography, to be implemented on a fast-track R&D program for the FAA. We received that contract, developed the system on a fast track, and in 1998, after about 2 years of R&D, we were certified by the FAA Atlantic City for a certified system for stand-alone or integrated system.
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We developed four systems. Unfortunately the first system developed was sent to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport as a demonstration unit. It was sent there as a demonstration unit. It had in it several parts that were to acceleration, not the final configuration of subassemblies manufactured outside. It had a problem associated with liability, which has since been in the process of being resolved. Future systems after that which were deployed in Hawaii, for example, Atlantic City, had much better reliability, and during the same time line we were fortunate to receive in competitive competition with the new Rome integrated airport, successfully winning that contract, and installed approximately seven machines and one of the world's most integrated 100 percent inspection or screened baggage systems in the world.
We completed that production system of the units, followed on. We received in 2001 a contract for 14 more systems to be developed as preproductions. They were manufactured. They are now being deployed. In fact, four machines are now being deployed in the Baltimore airport which you can see, one of which is fully operational. The other three are being used for training.
Along the situation of developing these machines, of course, we have implemented the disciplines necessary to go into eventually what could be a full-rate production prior to 9-11.
I would like to comment on a couple of areas that I think are important to leave with the committee. Number one, we did complete and successfully develop a second-generation machine that is faster, it is lighter, it smaller, and it has a lower false alarm rate than any machine in the environment today, and a machine that can be produced.
We have two important points to leave with the committee. Number one, I believe you will find that hardware, as it is being focused on today, will not be the limiting factor of meeting the commitment mandated by the committee; the problem we associated with facilitation of the airports, obviously, training of the airports, and resolving the flow in the next 12 months of the airport. Manufacturing the hardware is a simple process.
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Most electronic companies like L-3 outsource about 80 percent of the equipment that goes into a complex electronic assembly, with capacity in America running at about 30 or 40 percent. Because of the telecom meltdown and the Internet meltdown, there are hundreds of facilities available which we use to manufacture the subassemblies that go into a system. So whether you say royalties or licensing, it is not important, or leader/follower, there is plenty of manufacturing capacity in America to build these machines. There is not a lot of capacity in America to do the facilitation, the planning, and the program and system integration, of course, of the airports themselves, let alone the equipment.
It is important to get the process started, as was reiterated here by InVision, and the only recommendation I can say is that with one phone call to any of the selected vendors, one would have to commit about 20- or $25 million in parallel to do the studying that is going on now to get long lead procurements started on these machines, which will never, never be wasted and will be used once the total transportation plan is put together over the next 3 months.
The number two item I would like to leave you with is do not be overcome by entrepreneurs, marketeers, or Beltway scientists, self-acclaimed, to tell you that you should lower the standards. These standards were developed with great foresight. They are being reviewed by several of the most important Federal-oriented countries in the world, and the standards are even being raised based on classified information that we have today. So it is not important to focus on reducing the standards. It is important to focus on maintaining the standards and being robust enough to be able to, over the next 5 years, improve like we do in the Department of Defense processes and threat capability via software, not hardware. That is an area that is important that we focus on.
Third, I would like to comment that we are now working with the Department of Transportation. We have met with Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson says over the next couple of weeks that he will have his time line put together and will be meeting with the contractors that are involved in the situation in order to go over the planning process and where the Department of Transportation intends to go over the next several months, and we are prepared for that, cooperating fully, as we have always intended to cooperate, with the Department of Transportation if we are to play a role in this situation.
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So, in summary, we are delighted to be a new man on the block. We have brought a new kind of vision to this process because we had no self-serving reason. We were not in this business, we were in the defense business. We found this very exciting 3 or 4 years ago because we had a concept to build a fully automated computer tomography machine that takes a 3-D scan continuously of all bags that enter into the portal, and today it is still the only machine available that does this.
The technology is here today. It can be manufactured by many sources in the country via outsourcing of all the touch labor, and we should not focus on whether we can build 1,000 in 1 year, 2,000 or 3,000. We should focus on getting the process started, getting the long-lead items initiated while the Department of Transportation is doing the planning for the facilitation and focus on the facilitation.
Thank you for allowing us to be added value here, Mr. Chairman, and that is the end of my statement.
Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.
And next we will hear from Mr. Frank Vehlen. He is the executive vice president and COO of Heimann Systems Corporation. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.
Mr. VEHLEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Frank Vehlen, executive vice president and chief operating officer for Heimann Systems Corporation, and we thank you for the opportunity today to participate in this very important hearing.
Heimann Systems is the largest supplier of X-ray security equipment in the world. We have over 17,000 systems installed in over 150 countries. One hundred twenty-five of those units are explosive detection systems that are fully integrated into the baggage handling system of the airports like Sidney, Copenhagen, London-Luton, Zurich, Brussels, and many, many more.
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I want to mention that the BAA has just elected Heimann Systems to deliver the next batch of explosive detection systems. We have engineering, manufacturing and technical services in the United States, and we have operations in New Jersey, in Tennessee and in Nevada. Heimann Systems is a major supplier to the FAA and other Federal agencies, and we have more than 3,000 Heimann units already installed in the United States.
Mr. Chairman, allow me to be very straightforward. We applaud the objective of 100 percent screening of checked bags; however, the goal to deploy only current certified EDS to allow 100 percent screening of all checked bags by December 2002 is simply not realistic. Furthermore, deploying the present certified technology, which is all CT-based, extremely costly in both implementation and operation. Also, the logistics and space requirements are not there to effectively support a solution like this.
Prior to September 11, e goal of the FAA was to start phasing in of 100 percent checked baggage screening by 2009 and to complete it by 2014. This was a time frame of 13 years. Now we want to achieve this goal in 13 months.
The economic impact of implementing this goal correctly versus incorrectly could be enormous. Let me explain why. The FAA stated, and we have heard it earlier, that between 2,200 and 2,300 CTs will be needed to accomplish 100 percent inspection. The manufacturers' current capacity will most likely not allow to manufacture up to 2,000 units by the end of next year. Even if they were able to ramp up the production, as we heard earlier, most airports will not be able to receive these units by the end of 2002. The cost of this endeavor is, to say the least, significant, that $1 million per CT, the amount of over $2 billion in hardware that may be rendered obsolete before deployment is completed, and we have heard earlier that the hardware is only the small part of it. This does not include installation costs.
Furthermore, typical maintenance costs for a CT is between 60,000 and $100,000 a year. This could amount to another $200 million in recurring costs. If you add to that the personnel, and we have heard earlier in stand-alone installations there is personnel needed, and if you would take two or three operators per CT, this could amount to about 720-, maybe a billion dollars recurring costs a year. Again where do we take these funds from?
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However, let us forget these figures and look at the other aspects related to deployment of CTs in the lobbies of the airports. The footprint needed of CT and the space for operators, for passengers for queuing is around maybe 600 square feet. An airport such as Chicago O'Hare would need at least 100 CTs. This represents lobby space that could be equivalent to 1.2 football fields. I don't recall seeing 1.2 football fields available in Chicago O'Hare.
Quite clearly the current discussed solutions of only deploying certified systems with dramatic throughput limitations will require a substantial number of systems, a significant increase of security personnel for management of manual baggage handling and logistics, all at a dramatic cost to the taxpayer. In addition, this solution will put further obligations on the traveling public to commit additional time for the security screening process. Is an additional hour to the already burdensome process today—I mean, we all have been at airports—acceptable? We don't really know, but we are confident that any significant inconvenience to the traveling public will hinder the opportunity for the aviation industry to fully recover.
What is the alternative? And I do have a small image here that I will run while I continue. As seen in numerous airports worldwide, and we have heard it from the BAA, integrating fast security screening technology immediately allows for the screening of all checked luggage while decreasing the number of systems required and significantly optimizes the overall processes with no inconvenience to the traveling public. More than 300 of these kinds of systems, fully integrated, are already operating in airports around the world, and most of these systems are designed to screen 100 percent of the checked baggage. Mr. Chairman, I would like to invite members of this committee to visit one of these fully integrated EDS solutions.
What is the difference? Most of these units have been tested by the FAA and typically meet the FAA advanced technology detection level. Recognizing that detection can be improved, 3 years ago we have started the development of the next generation of high-throughput EDS, called EdtS, that combines the detection criteria set by the FAA with the operational requirements of the airport. The goal is full integration into an existing conveyor system of airports, throughput of 1,500 bags an hour, and meeting or exceeding all FAA requirements at significant lower cost than the current CT.
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I do have an image of this next generation here for you, and I did hand another image to your staff earlier this morning.
EdtS has taken proven technology and applies it in an innovative matter to accomplish the desired results. It combines the dual energy technology of the current high-speed EDS with the volumetric density analysis a CT uses to detect explosives. We plan to deliver EdtS to the FAA in May 2002 to commence certification. So we started 3 years ago looking at a start of 2009, and now all this is tried to be done in 13 months.
What is our recommendation? What should be done immediately to reach 100 percent screening? We believe it is a multi-solution approach that will improve security, be operationally practical, mediate risk and avoid wasteful spending.
Use the current deployed certified EDS in conjunction with CAPPS to its maximum throughput and capacity. Analyze the airports to determine which airport baggage handling can be modified for integrated EDS equipment. Start the planning for integration of high speed EDS immediately and deploy available equipment which will be certified in the near future.
Deploy the current EDS technology in the lobbies of airports that will not be able to accommodate integrated solutions. So I am not saying don't buy CTs.
Finally, support the final development and engineering steps for high-speed EDS to meet certification as soon as possible, and to have a practical solution.
You mentioned in your opening statements that $50 million will be available for additional R&D. And in the meantime, to reach 100 percent, deploy conventional x-ray units in combination with trace detection at locations that are being prepared for integration. These solutions can be delivered by several manufacturers today, and they are probably the fastest solution to achieve 100 percent screening, possibly even achieving the December 2002 deadline.
When the integration is done, these units can be used in other applications so these units will not be obsolete and the capital cost is way lower.
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And, in addition, accelerate the development of complementary technologies like x-ray diffraction to be implemented for automatic false alarm resolution. We heard that there is 25 percent false alarms; something has to be done with that.
Activity does not mean progress. Let us be smart and approach the challenge of checked baggage screening in a way that ensures a practical and manageable solution for the airport, the air carriers, the traveling public and the Federal Government.
Let us put a system in place that addresses the current security needs and at the same time allows insertion of technology as it evolves. Last but not least, let us put a technology in place that is much more cost effective to the taxpayer.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. Thank you very much.
Mr. MICA. Thank you for your statement.
We will now hear from Michael Ellenbogen. He is Vice President of Product Development with Perkin-Elmer Detection Systems. Welcome, sir, you are recognized.
Mr. ELLENBOGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation and the opportunity to speak to the committee today.
Perkin-Elmer Detection Systems is owned by Perkin-Elmer, Incorporated, a publicly-traded company whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, has operations in over 125 companies, over 12,000 employees and $1.7 billion in revenue.
Detection Systems is a leading supplier of x-ray-based security equipment with over 16,000 x-ray machines in operation. I guess that makes us number two behind my friend here.
The company produces a complete line of conventional imaging, automated detection systems, cargo and certified x-ray systems. We are headquartered in Massachusetts, with a 85,000 square foot manufacturing facility in Cypress, California, and a satellite office in the UK. Detection Systems has a global sales, service and distribution network and is projected to sell over $80 million worth of x-ray equipment this year.
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Since this hearing has focused on implementation of 100 percent checked baggage inspection, I would like to talk briefly about our 10 years of experience developing and integrating advanced automated x-ray systems into airports to achieve 100 percent checked baggage inspection. These are the Vivid systems that you have been hearing about today.
Detection Systems is a leading developer and supplier of automated x-ray systems for explosives detection in checked baggage with over 450 systems installed to date.
These automated systems are based on our patented dual energy x-ray technology, and are fully integrated into the baggage handling systems of many of the world's largest international airports.
In addition, two airports in the U.S. Have adopted this screening method in their newest terminals, and have already achieved 100 percent checked baggage inspection, while maintaining efficient airline and airport operations.
These integrated systems are characterized by a multi-level, multi-technology approach that you have heard about so far. As mentioned, the machines are actually built into the baggage conveyor system. Bags are checked in as usual. The inspection process occurs while the bags are routed from check-in to the aircraft. Bags are inspected by a first level automated x-ray. These machines are able to inspect up to 1,800 bags an hour. That is one bag every 2 seconds.
Images of alarm bags are reviewed by a small number of security operators without stopping the bags or slowing the process. Suspect bags are sent for threat resolution, typically using an off-line CT scanner.
Perkin-Elmer Detection Systems manufactures devices for all three levels of this system. Our machines are approved by regulators around the world and deployed for 100 percent checked baggage inspection. Every day millions of bags are inspected using this process at some of the busiest airports in the world.
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These high speed integrated solutions are very convenient and completely transparent to the passenger. Unfortunately, throughput requirements to achieve 100 percent inspection prohibit the use of today's certified CT technology at the first level.
I would like to make you aware of the availability of a machine, funded and tested by the FAA, that is capable of certified detection at five times the throughput of existing CT machines. Perkin-Elmer's MVT machine is the only non-CT technology that has been tested for certification.
In FAA testing, the MVT met the stringent detection requirement, achieved 1,500 bags per hour throughput, but demonstrated a false alarm rate that exceeds the certification limit. With additional development, false alarm reduction can be achieved. Flexibility regarding the false alarm rate requirement will enable the U.S. To deploy this proven approach for 100 percent checked baggage inspection.
MVT can be installed at the check-in counter today, and then the same machine can be later integrated into the baggage handling conveyor system when that system is ready.
In addition, development of Perkin-Elmers ARGUS CT-based machine is nearing completion. ARGUS is designed to meet and exceed all FAA certification requirements in a smaller, lighter, less expensive system. We anticipate submitting ARGUS for FAA certification very early in 2002.
Detection Systems and our partner, Analogic, Incorporated, one of the largest manufacturers of medical CT systems, can produce 50 ARGUS units per month, once manufacturing is fully ramped up. Even with pending certification, we still cannot overemphasize the value of a combination of high speed and certified CT solutions.
Based on Perkin-Elmer Detection Systems' 10 years of experience in integrating checked baggage inspection into airport operations, we offer the following insight.
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First, the committee should recognize that manufacturing capacity is not the gating problem. The three qualified suppliers have more than enough capacity to overwhelm the FAA's and the airport's ability to install and integrate these machines. We need to get past the issue of supplier capacity in order to address the equally challenging issues of site preparation, installation, operator hiring, training and customer service.
Supplier pipelines are filling with international orders, all trying to beat the anticipated FAA orders. The FAA should start ramping up the manufacturers now by buying machines with certified detection.
Secondly, the FAA must develop a cohesive security plan for screening passengers and baggage. A cohesive aviation security plan will focus the technology suppliers, the airports, the airlines, and the government toward concurrent solutions for many of the challenges that we are going to face rather than addressing each of them sequentially. With a plan, airports and airlines can being to prepare sites, suppliers can start producing machines, and the government can start hiring and training operators.
In an effort to jumpstart this process, Detection Systems has already submitted a draft security plan to the FAA for reviewing and comment. We will be following up on that plan on December 18th and 19th in meetings at the FAA headquarters and at the Technical Center.
And, third, a combination of technologies is required to achieve 100 percent checked baggage inspection. Simply installing hundreds of stand-alone CT scanners in an airport is not a practical solution, nor does it constitute a cohesive security plan. Alternatives based on proven high-speed technology must be part of the deployment strategy.
Based on our experience, a combination of free-standing lobby systems, and high-speed integrated installations is imperative if the goal of 100 percent inspection is to be achieved without crippling airport operations.
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In conclusion, solutions are available that will allow the FAA to meet the requirements for 100 percent checked baggage inspection. A combination of existing certified CT scanners as well as high speed solutions that provide the same level of detection will all have to be utilized if this goal is to be met without adding significant delays and inconvenience to the U.S. Flying public.
Perkin-Elmer Detection Systems is prepared to support 100 percent checked baggage and screening at certified detection levels. Regardless of the outcome of the plan, Detection Systems has products, services and capacity to meet this need. We stand ready to move in any direction the FAA deems appropriate.
In these challenging times we actively seek opportunities to make our experience and expertise available to this nation's planners and policymakers. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the committee today.
Mr. MICA. Thank you. And our final witness, we appreciate him coming forward today, especially after hearing from two that have already completed the tasks, two that are certified to start the equipment requirements and two wannabes. Welcome Steven Zaidman, Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Thank you, Chairman Mica. I will be brief and look forward to your and the committee members' questions, and thank you for inviting me to testify on the availability of technologies to screen for explosives in checked baggage.
With the horrors of September 11th not far behind us, we all agree that we must aggressively proceed toward the new era of aviation security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act best articulates the urgency of this mission.
The act transfers security responsibilities that once belonged to air carriers and security oversight responsibility that once belonged to the FAA to the newly created Transportation Security Administration, or TSA, and we at the FAA are committed to maintaining the highest level of dedication to aviation security through transition to the functions of the new administration.
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One key element in enhancing airport security obviously is the expanded deployment of explosive detection systems, EDSs. Prior to September 11th, EDSs were primarily used in the U.S. to screen checked bags belonging to persons identified by the CAPPS program, Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. CAPPS allowed the air carriers to focus EDS screening on passengers who we cannot discount as potential threats to civil aviation based on parameters developed within the counterterrorism community and reviewed by the Department of Justice to ensure that methods of passenger selection are legal.
CAPPS also selects passenger bags on a random basis for additional screening, and in the aftermath of September 11th, FAA committed to increasing the number of randomly screened passenger bags. As of yesterday, 161 EDS systems have been installed at airports across the country. Furthermore, EDS machines are now running continuously at those airports and they are being used.
CAPPS has also been adjusted based on classified information, we have obtained during the weeks since the attack. Passengers and their carry-on items are also being screened now at the boarding gate in addition to the central screening point.
While the Security Act's mandates do present challenges that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in the area of explosive screening, we recognize that only in meeting these challenges will we be able to restore Americans' confidence in the security of the aviation system.
In order to meet the December 31st, 2002 need for 100 percent EDS screening, over 2,000 EDS systems may likely be needed. Today products of two EDS vendors have been certified, and now improved variations of these products are currently going through the certification and testing process.
The Department and the TSA and FAA will continue to work with the companies that manufacture EDS machines to see how quickly we and they can produce more of those machines and deploy them. We will also continue to explore new EDS type technologies being developed with visions of the next generation products.
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In addition to enhancing production of existing EDS machines and exploring next generation products, the FAA, as has been mentioned before, has been working on a program that we call ARGUS to develop a smaller and less expensive version of EDSs. Based on our research and testing, we believe that the equipment, once certified, will be suitable for use at smaller airports because it will have a lower processing rate, and will be smaller than existing FAA-approved EDS equipment. It is, however, expected to be just as reliable and substantially less expensive than current equipment.
FAA fully funded the R&D for these machines for three vendors. One vendor's system is expected to begin the certification process in March, and two other vendors are expected to begin the certification process after this coming spring. All three vendors currently in the program are expected to complete the process for certification in time to be deployed before the Security Act's EDS screening deadline.
In addition to EDS, FAA is currently purchasing explosive trace detection devices. These are the hand-held wands which can detect the presence of explosive materials. As of yesterday, we have installed 851 of these devices in 180 airports.
So just as the new legislation raises the bar for aviation security, it also challenges us to develop new ways to meet aviation security needs. We are leaving no stone unturned to make sure we are not missing anything that is out there.
We have heard from thousands of individuals and companies who are offering their ideas, proposals and services. We will share this information with the Congress, with the Department and the new TSA. With Secretary Mineta's leadership and by working in partnership with the Congress, we will together ensure that the Nation's air transportation system operates with the highest levels of safety, security and regularity.
Thank you very much.
Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.
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Let's begin with the questions. I have got a couple for our UK witnesses. I think you testified that it took approximately 30 months to implement complete baggage screening at Heathrow, I guess the largest airport. Is that correct?
Mr. HUTCHESON. Yes, Chairman. It was 30 months for Terminal 3, which is the most complex, and involved building it complete with new baggage system on the mezzanine floor.
Mr. MICA. You also testified that it took about $300 million. Was that to do how many airports?
Mr. HUTCHESON. It was seven airports in the UK, which currently now handle 125 million passengers.
Mr. MICA. $300 million, and we have—Mr. Zaidman, have you given any thought to what the estimated cost may be based on either the British model or some of the costs that you have experienced to date?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Our calculations show that the cost to deploy 2,000 machines, integrated in the airport, would be approximately 4 to $5 billion.
Mr. MICA. Okay. Some of the costs that the British testified to included the—the installation—I guess there is electrical, there is physical plant, there is—all of the elements of retrofitting an existing airport. Is that how you estimate those costs? Is that what was included in your cost?
Because you gave us some percentages of different costs. I have got 20 percent was attributed to one part. But, Mr. Zaidman, do you think that to fully integrate for equipment and also design—it sounded like it took some time to get design work, and each of these airports that are existing are stand-alone, individually designed operations.
So does your 4 to $5 billion include—would that include that?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, it includes a combination of mainly stand-alone and some integrated systems.
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Mr. MICA. And then the additional personnel, I think we have heard an estimate of about a billion dollars for the personnel, because somebody has to operate these machines. It sounds like maintenance is also a relatively significant factor. Is that correct, Mr. Rimington? What kind of operational costs are attributed? Once you have got the equipment installed, it is going to cost us something to operate it.
Mr. RIMINGTON. Yes. At it matches the—our system is most unique. You are quite right to say that each site is individual. The process we chose to go down was minimal resource ongoing costs, instead preferring a level 1 Vivid, followed by a level 2 CTX, whereby any rejection was sent to the operator to determine whether or not there was any threat within the item, in which case it cleared it, and which would be dealt with.
So the actual on costs were fairly minimal. But the overall costs in terms of providing the system, the fully integrated baggage system was in the region of—for processing 80 million people was approximately $20 million U.S.
Mr. MICA. 20 million. Okay.
I guess our operational costs then would be about a billion dollars, Mr. Zaidman?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I really don't have a number at this time for the operational costs. The numbers I was referring to was for the capital cost, the installation costs and the operation and maintenance, but not the people part of it.
Mr. MICA. One of the things—I may be getting a little bit ahead of myself here, but there was also some design lead time. Again, given the individual designs of the various airports, how much time did that take? You have some small airports all the way up to Heathrow.
Mr. HUTCHESON. Clearly the design time takes, depending on the size of the airport, but 4 months is seen as a reasonable time to go from inception to design. And in relation to staff, the manufacturers can now provide matrix systems, which require the minimum number of screeners to be deployed.
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And again, as Roger said, it is—there is no one solution. It depends on the complexity of the airport. Some of the solutions can be fairly simple and very quickly delivered. Probably in the Category X airports, that is where all of the complexities lie.
Mr. MICA. But you also have a maintenance staff and then I would imagine that you have some sort of oversight, continually checking to see that the equipment is working and testing the system.
Mr. HUTCHESON. The equipment is tested daily for efficiency. Our own staff do all of the first line maintenance, and then there are maintenance contracts in place for the various vendors. Clearly an immediate response is a requirement, because the system has to operate for the duration that the airport is open.
Mr. MICA. Mr. Zaidman, the only two that are certified manufacturers—manufacturers that are certified are the two that are testifying for this type of equipment?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. That's correct, sir.
Mr. MICA. Okay. One of the problems that we had is one of the two manufacturers is sort of new in the game. And I mean you testified, Mr. Lanza, to that effect. And we have also found that the L-3 systems are found to have reliability problems, and still working out sort of the improvements that are necessary to meet the high standards that are required.
Mr. Muntz, that leaves you as sort of the big manufacturing entity in this. How much—how many pieces of equipment have you turned out say in a year or a month maximum, the most you have ever produced that can do this EDS job?
Mr. MUNTZ. After TWA 800 we received a deployment order from the FAA in conjunction with our foreign customers that required us to move into a new facility to easily accommodate 10 to 15 units per month.
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Mr. MICA. You were producing 10 to 15?
Mr. MUNTZ. That was our capability. We really only received orders to this point of 8 systems per month. We have never been capacity constrained, we have only been order limited.
Mr. MICA. And to produce the equipment now—we have—again there is a question about what kind of equipment, stand-alone equipment. I think some people testified that might be the only way we could meet the goal is to produce stand-alone equipment. But then there was some concern about producing stand-alone equipment and not doing the job and that we should be looking towards the integrated systems in the long term.
So what would be the—Mr. Lanza, you wanted to comment?
Mr. LANZA. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, the systems that are being delivered now, including Baltimore airport, can either be used by stand-alone or integrated.
Mr. MICA. Or converted to integration?
Mr. LANZA. Not converted. Without any changes they can be made—they are—the same machine is used for integrated as well as for stand-alone.
Mr. MICA. But we have had several testify that they didn't feel it was realistic that we could produce the equipment necessary to do the job by December of 2002 with only the certified vendors to date.
Mr. Rimington, is that what you testified to?
Mr. RIMINGTON. Yes, sir.
Mr. MICA. You think that would be very difficult? That is just based on your experience?
Mr. RIMINGTON. Yes. Purely because of the processing, the number of bags you can process per hour. The Vivid and the Perkin-Elmer machines can process 1,200 and possibly more, whereas the CTR restraint currently, because of where they are, scientifically can maximize around about 5 or 600.
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Mr. MICA. Again, based on your experience of actually seeing this done on a limited basis, not to the scale of the United States.
Well, I have got the two vendors who are certified who think that they can do the job. Go ahead and comment, Mr. Muntz.
Mr. MUNTZ. Well, I think it is very, very important for us to consider even some of the statements that were made earlier regarding the integrated systems. There was a statement made that depending on the threat scenarios of the various terminals, when we considered—I forget which terminal at Heathrow it was that had a high threat, that is when we decided to use more CTX.
I think one of the great debates during the Aviation Security bill was that we wanted to finally consider every airport in this country at the same level of security.
Mr. MICA. Right now we are talking about checked baggage. We haven't talked about passenger screening. And the baggage that they are carrying on board and updating that equipment, because that is going to be—that is another task that we need to address.
Mr. MUNTZ. Absolutely. But to the extent that we want to provide the same level of security, and certainly following September 11th, we would have to deem the need for security or the threat as high, much like they did in Heathrow. When there was high threat they used CTX, or basically certified technology is what we are talking about. I think that that needs to drive our response, and we can develop the ways to implement the technology now that there is finally a requirement to do so.
Mr. MICA. Mr. Vehlen, you said that there are 300 airports—now, I think you have mentioned to the subcommittee before that there is the one fully integrated airport. Is it Nuremberg, Germany?
Mr. VEHLEN. Well, in the world there are several fully integrated airports.
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Mr. MICA. Has Nuremberg been on from sort of the beginning to the end, or was it a retrofit?
Mr. VEHLEN. Nuremberg is a small airport in Germany. It is fully integrated. It uses automatic level 1 and automatic level 2. And the alarm rate at the end is a very, very small percentage. That is a fully integrated system using, in level 1 at the current, AT technology, the EDS, and in level 2 an HDX, which is a diffraction technology, which is a new technology to clear false alarms.
That is absolutely true. It is fully integrated, and the model that I showed on the screen was actually showing it.
Mr. MICA. But the only country that really has completed this 100 percent, that would be the UK; is that correct?
Mr. VEHLEN. Well, the Europeans, they have a goal of 2002 to meet 100 percent screening, but that goal was set about 5 or 6 or 7 years ago. It was originally 2000. It was moved out. I am sure that Ian can confirm that.
Most of the major airports in Europe are moving in that direction to do 100 percent screening with integrated systems. That is basically the solution. You don't see stand-alone systems. It is all basically integrated systems.
And maybe a comment about the integration time. We have received an order a year ago in December to do Sidney airport, the international terminal. Basically from the moment of the order it took about a couple of months to do the engineering work. We shipped the units down there and it took about 2 months for the installation, integrating into the conveyor system.
That terminal is now fully integrated, operating. So it is about a 9-month time frame.
Mr. MICA. Well, I have a couple of final questions. And I appreciate your invitation to look at what you have done, and also to look at what the UK has done. And I mentioned to some of the members on the subcommittee, if we can get away in January, probably take us about a week to go and look at what you did, bring some folks with FAA so we can see.
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We have heard many reports, we have had testimony, but it might be good to look at some of these. So we appreciate your counsel on looking at people who have already invented the wheel, and hopefully successfully.
I do have a final question, though, for Mr. Zaidman. Mr. Zaidman, it appears that we are going to have to speed up the certification process in order to meet this goal. Is that something you all are working on, or can it be done without Mr. Lanza's expressed concern, which I would be concerned too, about lowering standards? We don't want to just put equipment in place, to put equipment in place that doesn't work. Can that be done or is that something—.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. We will take any company, any manufacturer who feels that their products are ready to be tested and certified. We will work as quickly as we can with any vendor. We, too, share some concerns about any lowering of the certification standards. But within the parameters that we have, we will go as fast as humanly possible to certify a product. We don't want to be the roadblock in this process.
Mr. MICA. The other thing is at my insistence we put in the $50 million authorization for research and development. I have heard several of the witnesses say that they feel that they can get to sort of the next generation of equipment, which we do want—and I am sure the equipment and technology development is an evolving process. But will we have a plan to move forward, Mr. Zaidman, with the R&D part of this?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Yes, we will and we do. Once receiving the money we would give research grants out to the applicants. We would like to set up a pilot program at airports where we can see these technologies in practice, to be able to set standards and to learn from that. So we would move out very aggressively.
Mr. MICA. Finally, one note here, Mr. Oberstar and Mr. DeFazio. I think Mr. Muntz testified that $97 million had been appropriated. Was that you, Mr. Muntz, and $38 million was spent on EDS equipment?
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Mr. MUNTZ. In the facilities equipment budget in the FAA budget for 2002.
Mr. MICA. Okay. Well, I will ask staff to see what happened to the balance of the money and how that was expended. I think the appropriators are in for one heck of a shock before this is all over, to have that loss ratio; you are talking about $15 billion.
I have no further questions. Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The integrated technology, and I guess I am trying to struggle to understand this. If you are running the Vivids at level 1 and then you divert a certain percentage of bags into level 2 because of some perceived problem or something that can't be identified, what would be—what would happen if you had run all of the bags through level 2? Are there potentially threats missed at level 1, or is the idea that level 1 has a fairly high false alarm or unidentified object rate, but the machines run at a higher rate so therefore we are diverting—we are doing this for efficiency and then diverting bags into level 2 for additional scrutiny? But if we ran every bag through level 2, are there things that would miss detection in level 1, or is it the opposite? Are you getting essentially a false alarm rate, then we are sending them to level 2, which is slower with the CTXs? Do you follow me?
Mr. RIMINGTON. Well, all of the evidence is clear that there are no threats missed.
Mr. DEFAZIO. None are missed at the level 1?
Mr. RIMINGTON. Right. Threats are passed on to level 2. It is approximately 30 percent. And obviously each line will be different, depending on what kind of a passenger profile it has got. But the pro rata average is approximately 30 percent.
And between the two machines, the level 1, the level 2, it can actually process the 1,200 bags. Clearly the—when you know you have actually made it is the passenger will check in as normal, will go through the central search as normal, and arrive on the plane as normal, and the bag will actually be there having been through a very technologically advanced screening system which safeguards them on the aircraft.
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Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. But in the U.S., Mr. Zaidman, we wouldn't because of the standards we have set and the error rates we have set. We couldn't employ such a system because the error rate at level 1 would be too high to be acceptable to the FAA, and we haven't yet approved an integrated system approach. Is that correct?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I think the rule of common sense has to apply here. So I think we are open to anything that protects the flying public. Currently we do have standards that are set, per machine. But we are willing to look at other ways of doing business.
Let me just say that the standards have several qualifications. They are not technology based, but we are concerned about the probability of missing a bomb or explosives that could go through as well as the false alarm rate of oversampling. So some of our concerns would be in the level 1 system, to be able to capture any potential explosive which can bring down an airplane.
If that is not false alarmed or captured, then one potential outcome of this system is that could go unchecked by any other level. That is why the certification criteria design is the way that they are.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Rimington just said that is not the case.
Mr. RIMINGTON. No, sir. The government obviously reserves the rights just to what it wants to capture. That will in itself determine what the processing capability is of that machine. So it is feasible, depending on what level it was set at, for threats clearly to be missed. But at the end of the day, it depends how many explosive numbers you want to put in there. You could put every single one known to mankind. The problem with that is nothing will be going through that machine.
Mr. DEFAZIO. So the FAA has set—has more potential explosive devices and therefore your level 1 would not meet the FAA standard for explosive detection?
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Mr. RIMINGTON. I couldn't possibly say that. I know that the standard in the UK is probably different than the standard being looked at by the FAA. But that would—I couldn't substantiate that.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Muntz.
Mr. MUNTZ. I think it is important to note that the certification standard has been well understood for many years. It has—there has been money spent on non-CT solutions. There has been money invested. They have failed to deliver. The certification standard allows the confidence to know that the technology finds the threats deemed to be a threat to civil aviation.
Mr. DEFAZIO. But what about this tandem usage idea or the level 1, level 2? You are saying level 1 can't detect all of the potential threats.
Mr. MUNTZ. If it is not certified. It clearly needs to be certified to be able to make the same confidence level statement. What is important is that—.
Mr. DEFAZIO. But the question is, is the lack of certification because it misses explosives or because of the high error rate? If it is the high error rate, then it is a faster machine, which then allows your machines to be used at the second level, which are slower machines, larger and more expensive, that is the nub here. I mean, I don't want to miss explosives, but I am not so concerned about a false error rate that can be corrected by using a second machine.
Mr. MUNTZ. Understood. First of all, certification is a little bit difficult to discuss in public, because we certainly don't want to comprise security sensitive information. But when false alarm rates are so high that they actually contribute to the detection rate, and that you have not actually detected, but you have created a false alarm, and were fortunate enough to have be a test bag, that is where the marriage of detection and false alarm rate need to be more clearly understood.
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The certification procedure covers those two aspects for very important reasons that I think you should pursue with the FAA in closed session, and not from manufacturers with an obvious vested interest. But it is a very important standard that every one who wants to get certified is available to take advantage of it. They would love multiple certified vendors. All that was needed is the—take it seriously.
Mr. DEFAZIO. But the difference in theory here is stand-alone versus different systems in an integrated system. And we are still pushing toward the—Mr. Ellenbogen, you had your hands up a number of times.
Mr. ELLENBOGEN. Thank you very much. I think it is important to understand the certification standard has a detection requirement, a very high detection requirement, and a false alarm rate maximum.
The way the machines work is all of our machines look at the materials in the bag. The operator then looks at the image and looks for the other pieces you would need to make up an explosive device. So there is a threat resolution process. It is the same as walking through an archway metal detector. If the machine is sensitive enough to find small weapons, it is also going to hit on the change in your pocket. There is a threat. If you take your change out of your pocket, you show it to the operator, you walk through. They have a means of clearing that alarm.
There are systems available today, high speed systems, that can be used in line, that achieve the certified detection requirement, but the false alarm rate is higher than the certification standard. All you do is send those images to the operator, they are looking for the same things they are looking for in the certified machine but they might see more images because the alarm rate is higher. So there are systems that can be deployed immediately that meet the detection, that allow us to do high speed in-line solutions and solve this 100 percent checked baggage problem.
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We have a certified CT that we will be bringing to the FAA, a certifiable CT that we will be bringing to the FAA in early 2002 for certification, full certification. The standard to date in order to achieve certification, only CT technology has been able to achieve that.
And to date there is no CT that has been invented yet that has the throughput to be able to achieve this high-speed in-line solution. So a little bit of flexibility on that alarm rate issue that you mentioned will allow us to achieve the goal in a realistic scenario that won't cripple the airport.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Zaidman, can you comment on that? This seems to really be the nub of it. I don't want to miss any explosives, but I am not so disturbed by having an alarm rate which requires some diversion of bags into a secondary device. And why am I wrong there? Why is he wrong?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, I think it is a matter of degree. The certification process looks at a number of types and mass of explosives. I know it is an open session. We found an extraordinarily high false alarm rate for the machine that Mr. Ellenbogen is talking about--the order of eight times what the standard called for. Eight times. That in itself may be manageable in certain situations.
What we were also concerned about is we all obviously know that the terrorists are going to find weaknesses in the system and are going to exploit those weaknesses. So there is a balance here of creating a system that adequately does the job without compromising the system, because once it is known how to comprise the screening system then these EDS machines will have relatively little utility.
So we will remain flexible. We will discuss alternative solutions, but we don't want to significantly degrade the current standards.
Mr. DEFAZIO. What about the requirement of full automation; that is, no operator involvement that the FAA sets?
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Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, we don't really have a requirement for automation versus manual. We do have a requirement for throughput, the number of bags that can be—.
Mr. DEFAZIO. So the FAA doesn't—say for instance with back-scatter, which requires an operator, you are not disqualifying that technology because it has an operator; you are not saying that it doesn't meet your operational standard?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. As long as the probability of detection is above a certain level, false alarm is below a certain level, and the availability under throughput is at a certain level, against a predetermined range of explosive types, that is correct.
Next year we will be adding a number for reliability of the equipment, and that will be a new requirement.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Vehlen, the Nuremberg and Sidney systems which you talked about, Nuremberg fully automated, level 1 and 2, and I am not sure about Sidney. Do those systems—would they meet the FAA standard?
Mr. VEHLEN. Right now the technology meets the AT standard, which is an advanced technology standard that the FAA put in place about 5 years ago, and that is being met right now.
But what I mentioned earlier is that there is technology very soon to be deployed that is going to meet the certification criteria with a 1,500 bags her hour throughput which is needed, as the BAA confirmed, to really integrate sufficient solution into the conveyor system.
Mr. DEFAZIO. That will be an integrated system, not a stand-alone?
Mr. VEHLEN. That will be a fully-integrated system, the system that I put on the screen basically. And, I mean, since everything changed over the last 2 months, what we are saying is, I mean, sure, we need the CTs, there is no doubt. But also, look at the evolution of technology which may be available 6 months from now, and put something in place that doesn't, as you put it, cripple the aviation industry, but basically gets these systems to the certification level with all efforts that are there from the Federal Government and from the corporations and put multiple systems and multiple solutions in place, depending on what the airport needs.
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I mean, some airports can't even take integrated solutions, some can. So that is what we are saying. Don't rush now just because you have made this decision and 6 months from now or a year from now, you say, oh, my God, now the whole aviation system is slowed down, it is a lot—there is a lot of inconvenience for the passengers, and we can't really work that way, and then you start over again, and then you have spent $4 billion or $5 billion. That is my point; that is, basically make it smart, combine the technologies.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Sidney I assume is considerably larger than Nuremberg as an airport?
Mr. VEHLEN. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. DEFAZIO. At Sidney you would meet the AT standard but not the current certification standard? What is the shortcoming for the certification standards? False alarm rate?
Mr. VEHLEN. In the AT technology it is the detection rate. There is—principally there is one major category. It is all classified, as we know, where the current AT technology—that is also true for the current Vivid technology—has a problem.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Uh-huh.
Mr. VEHLEN. The new system is going to solve that problem, because it is combining basically what the current ATs are doing. They are meeting the detection criteria already with what the CTs are doing, looking at density. If you combine these two informations, they are going to increase the detection rate dramatically, and at the same time reduce false alarm rate.
I can tell you that the initial tests are very, very promising.
Mr. DEFAZIO. And where will this new system first be deployed, or when will it be deployed?
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Mr. VEHLEN. Our current schedule, and the whole R&D is done, just from corporate funds, is to have a system in the second quarter here for the FAA to look at it. If we would find a way to accelerate that process, we could have that earlier, there is no doubt.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Ellenbogen, you had your hand up.
Mr. ELLENBOGEN. There is no need to go all the way to Sidney to see a fully integrated installation. They are certainly visible throughout Europe and in New York or in San Francisco. So if the committee is interested in that, it is basically in our backyard.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Fully integrated?
Mr. ELLENBOGEN. Fully integrated at the AT level that Mr. Vehlen was referring to, that combination.
Mr. DEFAZIO. I think you referred—I am trying to remember. Someone had in their testimony that there were two—.
Mr. ELLENBOGEN. That is right. JFK and San Francisco International, using the combination of AT high speed level 1, with certified CT at level 3.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay.
All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Horn.
Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder, Mr. Zaidman, in this certification will this be quite different because of the recent type of possible bombs and all of the rest? So I would be curious the degree to which seamlessness from the existing machinery and software and even training of people, what kind of a priority base do you have? I have Los Angeles International as part of my constituency, and I also have Hawthorne, and so do others in the southern part of California.
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So how are we going to phase in all of these things?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, we envision certifying different types of products for different airport environments. We are going to be doing that simultaneously. I had mentioned in my opening statement the ARGUS machine, which is designed for a Hawthorne-like airport. It is small, smaller. It has the same technical characteristics in terms of probability of detection and false alarming, yet is designed for the smaller airport.
It is half the cost. It is lighter, and it is cheaper. At the same time, for airports like Los Angeles, we will depend on larger throughput, and larger machines. So we will be doing both simultaneously, and installing them both simultaneously as well.
Mr. HORN. Are you going to require a particular type of human running that machine, or what kind of approach will we have there?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. That is one of the challenges for the new Transportation Security Administration. The law does require, within 60 days, training of the new Federal work force, and those procedures are being put in place as we speak right now.
Mr. HORN. Often the infrastructure is the least of the costs in the long run. I just wonder if you are working out the human factor, which would have a curve upward, where the machinery would be part down in terms of your whole cost.
What are the thinking in that part?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I think the human capital, as you said, Mr. Horn, is the long pole in the tent, in acquiring the people, and retaining the people, training the people. We have learned through history that often the weak link in the system is not the technology, but the human part, the observers and the screeners, and most of the Department's energy will be toward the human part of the equation.
I think the technical part, as was mentioned here before, exists right now.
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Mr. HORN. Has any thought been given to centralizing some of the baggage if there are airports that are fairly close? In the case of Los Angeles, it would be Los Angeles, Ontario, Long Beach, so forth. Is there a way to have a centralized packaging after—what do you think on that?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, I have seen proposals on that. I think that has to be worked out. There is certainly no prohibition against centralization of baggage handling. Part of the challenge would be for security, when the bag is screened off site, if you will, and transporting it. It would be a people issue, too. How do we know that when the bag was screened 10 miles away that it is still the same bag as was loaded on the aircraft?
So I think those are challenges that have to be worked out, but certainly it is within the realm of feasibility.
Mr. HORN. Now, in the figures it was mentioned earlier in USA Today that 2000 machines will be needed. Is that what the estimate is at this time?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. That is our current estimate. We are confident that technology will succeed in lowering the false alarm rate. Once that is done, then we can integrate more and more of these machines into the baggage conveyor system. And having done that successfully, then that number I expect will come down. So that 2000 represents a mixture of integrated, but primarily nonintegrated, stand-alone machines.
Mr. HORN. How much will the airports have to put up as to placement and all the rest?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. With displacement?
Mr. HORN. The placement.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Oh, it is a challenge under the current technology. These are generally machines that need 20 to 30 feet, are quite heavy, in some cases require the floors beneath to be reinforced. It is a challenge. So depending upon the airport and the configuration, there is going to be a lot of work ahead.
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Mr. HORN. Now, has that been put to the airport operators? Do they know that that is coming?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. They know. We have deployed these systems for the past 3 or 4 years now. We have them deployed at 53 airports now, mainly hub airports. They are very familiar with it. But it is a big piece of machinery. I think we have at least four in National Airport. One can go by there and see them.
Mr. HORN. Have any of the airports said let's put this off where the rental cars are now? You no longer have that at the airport where you pull up your car and go running for the plane.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I haven't heard of that. But certainly we plan to work cooperatively with the airport sponsors. And they have to be placed in a situation where we can assure the security of the bags once screened. But, we are going to be totally flexible and open in working with the community. We have a major job. We want to be part of the team, and we are going to maintain maximum flexibility.
Mr. HORN. Some of the vendors have complained that the Federal Aviation Administration is not receptive to their ideas for their bomb detection equipment. They also point out that one of the engineers evaluating their equipment was the one who invented the CTX sort of CAT scan technology and he was not receptive to other technologies.
How would you respond to that?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I hadn't heard that frankly. Let me just say that we will work in partnership with vendors, foreign and domestic, that can best meet the criteria that we have established for bag certification.
Mr. HORN. What machines or technology, other than the ones that you have certified, and we have two here, are you considering for checked baggage screening throughout the—well, it is sort of what I had already said. Let's get it away from the airport. And what kind of options are there?
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Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, there are up and coming technology options for the machine itself. I think Mr. Vehlen mentioned diffraction x-rays. There is nuclear technology. So I think we are at maybe level 1 or 2 of the technology on the curve. But there are additional promising technologies that come along.
The challenge again, as you mentioned, Mr. Horn, is the people challenge. And it is not essentially where the bag is screened, but once the bag is screened, how to assure that those bags aren't compromised between the time they are screened and the time they are placed on board the aircraft. Once we are able to successfully demonstrate that, then I think where the machines are becomes academic.
Mr. HORN. Is that going to be one of the criteria for certification, if these machines can be upgraded and you don't have to buy another whole machine?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, the certification standard is based on the machine itself. But that is an interesting point, about doing it in a more systematic way, and I will be glad to take a look at it. But, currently that is not part of the technical certification.
We are working with the airports, and where we can assure ourselves, as well as the airport community and the new TSA that the physical security is maintained throughout the baggage screening and loading process, then we will be okay with that.
Mr. HORN. In the November 28th Washington Post, an aviation consultant was quoted as saying, quote, you can do things with C4 plastic explosive, you can roll it out so that it is paper thin in the lining of a suitcase. A hand search won't turn that up, unquote.
Would each of your machines detect that paper thin plastic explosive for those that have been certified now?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. I would prefer not to answer that in a public forum, but I will be very happy to take that off-line with you or in closed session for obvious reasons.
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Mr. HORN. Fine, we will do that.
Mr. HORN. The manufacturers, the two certified, and some of those that want to be certified what—is that type of—in your particular machines also?
Mr. MUNTZ. The 3D is qualified to meet all known types of projected threats, including those that are described in recent articles.
It is important to tell you, the reason, as the manufacturers of level 1 equipment have discussed today that they are improving their equipment to meet the FAA standards by adding a CTX or equivalent is because a level 1 does not meet the standards of the FAA in the threats as defined, which are realistic, nor the standards of other very, very threat-oriented countries to satisfy the requirements for these threats and future threats.
That is why they are want to find level 1s to try to achieve the same capability as a CTX. The limitation in the CTX is that we are capped at 500 bags per hour. Level 1 machines can go to 1,500 or 1,000, 2000.
So the cap on us right now, not because of technology, is a 500-bag-per hour. Over the next year you will see that speed increase dramatically, because it is only limited by the development of commercial computers, which every 6 months double their speed.
So you are going to see a curve where the CTX speed, the only limitation over the next year to 2 years, will increase dramatically and cross over with the level 1 machines. That is not to replace the machine in the future, replace a processor that probably costs $4,000 2 years from now.
Mr. LANZA. So it is a robust configuration that meets all the threats we project today and the threats we project over the next 5 or 10 years because it is software programmable.
Mr. HORN. Do the manufacturers agree with Mr. Lanza on this?
Mr. MUNTZ. Yes, I do. And in fact, I think it is exactly CT technology that gives you the kind of flexibility you are looking for in software upgrades. It is because of CT data acquisition that you have a data-rich environment that will allow you to improve detection, false alarm reduction through software upgrades. We recently certified and released a 25 percent improvement in detection in the very areas that you asked just previously because the data is there through CT acquisition. We in fact do produce specialized software packages for countries like Israel who have very specific needs and threat factors, much like you were talking about that our machine satisfies, and the technology that they purchase exclusively for this purpose.
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Mr. HORN. Mr. Zaidman, do we need at this point the degree to which there is at least 100 percent checked baggage screening? Do we have problems the minute we leave Europe or Israel or the United States and you are landing planes in parts of Latin America, Asia, and so forth? What do we look for in that situation?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, there is an international requirement that international flights have passenger-baggage matches. If your bag is on the airplane but you are not, that plane doesn't take off. Also we have the CAPPS program, which identifies people that need to have special treatment, if you will, in terms of screening. We identify them as early as when they make the reservations. Also, we are trying to move ahead as rapidly as we can at employing these technologies which look for explosives.
So I think it is a three-tiered approach. I think that what the Department of Transportation and the FAA are striving to do is develop a system where we keep the bad people as far away from the aircraft as is possible, beginning at the reservations when they purchase their tickets. So it does have to be looked at as a systems approach from reservations to getting an advanced list of who is coming into the country, comparing databases, screening with technology and up to hardening the cockpit door. So it does have to be a systems approach.
Mr. HORN. Well, thank you and I was very impressed with your testimony, gentlemen, and delighted that the chairman had such a report, and I now yield back to the chairman any time I still have.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. Mr. Zaidman, I am still a little puzzled. You say you certify the machine itself so because there is some confusion among people I have talked to in response to my first question about whether a machine that requires an operator can meet your certification standards and you said that it could, but then you said a little later you certify the machine itself. So if a machine depends upon an operator but could meet your standard, how would you certify that?
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Mr. ZAIDMAN. The machines, the ones that we are certifying now, can operate in either the automatic or the manual mode, either having an operator or alarming automatically and then having an operator intervene. We generally run the certification through the automatic mode. We are concerned about whether the machine alarms.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But if someone presented a machine to you which required an operator but which could otherwise meet all your standards, could it be certified?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Yes. So long as the probability of detection, whether it is human in the loop or not, meets the criteria as well as the false alarm rate and the throughput. So we are basically looking at the technology, but the way vendors have come to us, it is a combination of both automatic and human. We do run the machines and the certification test in the automatic mode, but we are going to be as flexible as we can.
Mr. DEFAZIO. But if someone presented to you that did not have the capability of meeting in the automatic mode but required an operator, it is possible it could be certified?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Let me explain with a caveat. The machine does need to alarm and the human does need to understand how to do it, but having a machine that doesn't light up or ring or highlight a bag would be something that we wouldn't be able to certify. The machine does have to recognize what is in the bag. And to certain machines—.
Mr. DEFAZIO. But if it required an individual to resolve the highlighted thing, that would still be—.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. As long as the machine operates within the probability false alarm and the detection rate, but the machine has to do that, not the human.
Mr. DEFAZIO. And that would go again to the experience in Great Britain, which would be as I understand it that you have got some enhanced training and criteria for the work force. How is that worked out? What is your turnover rate and those sorts of things? How confident are you and your operators?
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Mr. HUTCHESON. The turnover rate within BAA is about 3 percent. Most of the screeners in the carry-on, in fact all of the screeners involved in the carry-on baggage process are employed directly by BAA. In the checked baggage screening, the screeners are employed directly by the airlines as contractors. But over the last 2 years in the UK the government, the BAA, and other airports and the defense establishment research agency have invested considerable sums and time in a human factors program which is aimed at testing the performance of screeners.
So I would say that we can demonstrate with data that we have achieved a 60 percent improvement in detection, particularly in the carry-on process. We are about to move towards the certification of screeners which should be achievable within the next 12 to 18 months. Once we have achieved that from carry-on, we would then move towards the same process for screeners involved in the whole baggage screening process.
But to go back to the point you are making, the machine with a screener, a machine with a screener will actually probably only process 360 bags to 400 bags an hour. And that is why automated systems were designed in the first place, for two reasons. One was to actually give speed and the second one was to reduce the human involvement in the process, but I think we are very confident in the training program we have in the UK and I have got considerable details in the paper I have submitted.
Mr. DEFAZIO. And you mentioned TIP as I recalled. Are you using TIP now? Has that been implemented for the carry-on screening?
Mr. HUTCHESON. On every BAA airport in the UK, TIP is operating on the machines and it is through the use of TIP that we have actually been able to demonstrate from reliable data that this improvement has been made.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Mr. Zaidman, where are we on TIP?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. We have 750 TIP X-rays already deployed, several hundred more coming in this fiscal year. We have a lot of that capability.
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Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay, good. Then there is some controversy and I want to try to get that cleared up here, and I ask Mr. Zaidman and then Mr. Lanza to respond on the L-3. We have heard conflicting testimony through a couple of previous hearings on this committee about what happened with the L-3s, particularly the ones in Texas, and whether or not the technology itself has a problem, and Mr. Lanza said it was early on, that some vendors installed equipment on the earlier versions. Are you confident that those problems have been resolved?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. They are in the process of being resolved. The technology is wonderful. We did have some reliability problems. Part of it was software, part of it was mechanical. We have had a number of meetings, visits onsite with L-3. We went to Dallas. We went to the plant. We have agreed upon a program which will demonstrate improved reliability for the product with milestones. There has been substantial improvement in the L-3 equipment at Dallas-Fort Worth, not to the level that we would like to see yet, but there has been a demonstrated improvement in reliability and we are fairly comfortable that we are making progress.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Lanza, do you want to expand on that at all?
Mr. LANZA. I think he's the best testimony. He's the customer and I would say something self-serving obviously, but verifying, we have made substantial improvements in reliability. The Dallas was an unfortunate situation. It was a demonstration unit. We have found four components in the unit over the last several months that account for 60 percent of the problem. We fixed all four. One of them has already passed—the most difficult one has passed 1,300 hour MTBF and it is the most critical component in the whole device. So reliability we lived with in DOD for 40 years. Everything has got to be reliable. And you can't do it with one system. We have never had the ability to have enough systems deployed to get operational feedback.
That was the limitation on our program. The 14 systems certainly helped us dramatically. Working with Atlantic City, who has run these tests with us, FAA Atlantic City, is a tremendous advantage to us. I can guarantee you one thing when you bring me in a year from now. We will be delivering 40, 50 systems a month and the reliability will be somewhere between 800 and 1,000 hours. That's factual information. Reliability is something that is not science. It is just good engineering, and that is what we are doing and the technology was never stated in Dallas that we didn't detect bombs.
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There are people in the press who said it didn't work, had a high false alarm rate. Those are not true statements. The only problem was we did not meet the reliability within our own company. We had no spec on it. But independent of a spec, it is L-Three's responsibility to deliver reliable equipment to the FAA. It is not the FAA's responsibility that they have to define the spec. We are obligated to build it whether it is in the spec or not, and the first systems didn't have that reliability.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Zaidman.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. As I mentioned before, next year when we begin the next line of procurements we will have what we call availability, which translates to reliability as part of our certification requirements.
Mr. DEFAZIO. In previous times I had some extensive hearing and discussion on the committee about the possibility of thwarting explosives through enhanced cargo bay issues. Some planes actually used containers. There were containers developed that were bomb resistent and then there were other discussions about the cargo base themselves for planes that didn't have containers. I haven't heard anything about that. Have we totally abandoned that and are we going to totally depend upon the detection? Is that where we are headed?
My concern would be what we did with fuel tanks, which was the idea of isolating them from the potential for a spark as opposed to in any way enhancing or dealing with the actual explosive capability of a fuel tank, particularly an empty tank or a partially full tank, et cetera. There obviously has been a problem with that. Can you respond to that?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, for the area of checked bag containers, particularly for wide bodies we have developed through our R&D program a hardened baggage container that looks very good. It weighs a little more and frankly the carriers are not running to buy the—.
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Mr. DEFAZIO. Because of the weight issue?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. And they may not be as durable as they are pounded around with front-end loaders and they may have a shorter replacement cycle. So there is a cost issue. But we think the testing we have done in Atlantic City really shows dramatic reduction in the effects of a blast. So that is encouraging. Several carriers have recently expressed interest, both domestic and international. So we are very pleased that that program is moving ahead.
There is no short-term technology that I know of that can screen cargo. We are talking about large bulk pieces of cargo. There is some technology that we are funding through a grant program that will have the ability to take large cargo containers and run them through--even trucks, even tractor trailer trucks. That is some years away, although we have been willing to set up a pilot program for that. On cargo we are still relying on our procedures with respect to known carriers and more systemic approaches to be able—.
Mr. DEFAZIO. We are talking about pure cargo, now, not cargo on board passenger aircraft, right?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Random inspections, canine inspections, known carriers. So cargo screening is less technological except for the canines, but there is an R&D program in place, and in fact in the new appropriations language that came out of conference there are specific technologies and grant programs specified for that issue.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Has there been any thought about—and I don't even know how you get there—inducing the airlines to look at or more seriously consider the issue of the hardened containers for the planes that accommodate them. It seems to me then we may be able to add more random factors into this that are going to thwart an attempted bombing of an aircraft. It is like you were saying earlier, if we develop one technology someone eventually figures out how to beat it. It is like what goes on in software every day with new viruses. We get an antivirus and someone develops a new virus. People work really hard, and very sophisticated people perhaps, to develop bombs that could still get through some of our best equipment.
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Wouldn't it be a good idea, at least where it is applicable, to be pressing ahead on hardened containers and/or other factors in baggage compartments?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Yes, we agree. We are sharing the results of our Tech Center tests. There has been recent interest in buying this. I used to work for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as part of my career and there was a reluctance, if I can draw an analogy, on air bags at that time and now—.
Mr. DEFAZIO. It is a marketing tool, right.
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Rather than immediately leaping to the regulatory answer, I feel confident that once this product is put into production, there will be a demand which the carriers will recognize.
Mr. DEFAZIO. So we might see some ads in the near future, ''we use hardened baggage containers on all our transoceanic aircraft and you can fly with more confidence,'' you think?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. One of the carriers is in the Middle East and if they go through with their anticipated procurement I think it will provide additional pressures on other carriers.
Mr. DEFAZIO. It reminds me of the smoking issue, which I fought on this committee for many years, and we finally only got through the appropriations process because we failed by one vote to pass my amendment in committee on authorizing. I would talk to the airlines and they would say we will lose passengers. It is a competitive thing. I would say, no, if it is a competitive thing, I will go to your airline if you will stop the smoking. So that may work, but I also think we may be looking at some regulatory issues here, too, because, as we know, we have gotten to this point through extraordinarily difficult events. There has been resistance because of costs and the airlines are now hurting. For them to incur additional costs voluntarily may be problematic. If we think there is some great value in these containers, we may either want to be looking at inducements or regulatory issues.
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Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Zaidman, following up on Mr. DeFazio's questions about the hardened baggage containers, is there a differential from the FAA between what would happen for passenger baggage as opposed to commercial parcels that I understand that has been suspended, the airline's ability to generate that revenue from handling small commercial parcels? Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Well, I am not really knowledgeable of what the recent regulations say. Maybe I am not fully understanding your question.
Mr. LOBIONDO. My understanding is that prior to September 11 that commercial carriers were generating revenue from transporting packages, small parcels, that the FAA has directed that they stop doing that for security reasons because they can't screen all these small parcels. If the information I have is correct, it could be 4-, $500 million a year in revenue that could be associated with this, that the carriers are hurting, this is something they could do anyhow. So are the regulations any different from what you are looking at or is this something you can get back to me on?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Yes, I would like to be able to get back to you on that because I am not that familiar with it.
Mr. LOBIONDO. On the question of the baggage containers themselves, you said there hasn't been a rush from the industry to order these hardened containers. So the FAA has cleared or certified and it is a matter that there is not a demand because of cost or other reasons?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. We are confident that we have done sufficient testing in Atlantic City. So the process is that an applicant, in this case an airline, would come to the FAA and request approval to use hardened containers and I anticipate that we would grant that.
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Mr. LOBIONDO. You will try to get an answer from me that if a commercial carrier, passenger carrier, wanted to use a hardened container for parcels, you will tell me what the FAA's position on that is?
Mr. ZAIDMAN. Right away, yes.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Hutcheson or Mr. Rimington, can you tell me how that is being handled in Europe or the UK, both in whatever turn?
Mr. RIMINGTON. Following Pan Am 103 there was a full aviation security program put in place which encapsulated all of the processes in relation to cargo and mail. There are manifests which are checked on a very regular basis by the inspectorate and in fact there is a screening process which is mandatory before items are released from what is known as controlled land side into the air side location before they go onto an aircraft.
So it is a controlled process all the way through and really the key to the whole process is that everything has to go through a screening process, everything that goes on board that aircraft, and that includes mail and cargo as well.
Mr. LOBIONDO. So you have a full screening process, and do you utilize hardened baggage containers at all for any of the parcels?
Mr. RIMINGTON. No, sir. No, we don't.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Hutcheson?
Mr. HUTCHESON. I am aware, Chairman, that there was cooperation between the UK government and the FAA in the experimentation and testing of hardened and baggage containers, but at this point in time there is no requirement for airlines in the UK to use them. But I fully understand if they had been approved by the FAA, the UK government would probably look favorably upon it. In relation to the small parcels issue, like in the United States there was a ban immediately after September 11, but I am aware that has now been lifted in the UK and additional screening for small parcels have actually been deployed. I think Rapiscan saw something like 96 systems into FedEx and other courier type operation so this type of parcel can be screened prior to being carried on a passenger aircraft. But I think cargo and courier mail, there is a considerable amount of work to be done throughout the industry.
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Mr. LOBIONDO. So the UK has resumed shipping of small parcels through commercial air passenger carriers after thorough screening?
Mr. HUTCHESON. Yes. The suspension has been lifted.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. DeFazio? Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]