Segment 2 Of 2 Previous Hearing Segment(1)
SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS Tables
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Answer. Each embassy has a designated human rights officer. In addition, some embassies have representatives of FBI, DEA, and the Defense Department. These individuals are all tasked with monitoring the flow of U.S. assistance to security force units in their country and with reporting any allegations of gross human rights violations committed by them or by units proposed to receive U.S. assistance. Our embassies are well-connected to local police and military sources, as well as to human rights NGO's, religious groups, and others who routinely report allegations of gross human rights violations. Our diplomatic posts have been instructed to immediately pass this information to Washington by telegram. This is the standard methodology for obtaining and reporting to Washington this information.
Question. This same cable instructed all diplomatic posts to ''report promptly to (the State Department any information which the post may have concerning gross violations of human rights committed by units of host government security forces that could bear on a unit of these forces that may receive INC-funded assistance for FY97...'' and other clear instructions for the immediate reporting back to the Department of such information. What happened to this information from the moment it was received in State to the moment that a determination was made on taking this before the Secretary? Were any units cut-off? If yes, which ones?
Answer. When information is received from posts alleging gross human rights violations committed by security forces receiving or proposed to receive U.S. assistance, a Department of State term from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Bureau of Political/Military Affairs, the regional bureau, and other affected bureaus will meet to review the information. The team will decide whether the information is credible, not credible, or insufficient to make such a determination. In the latter case, more information will be requested. If the information is deemed credible and the security force unit is receiving U.S. assistance, a memorandum will be prepared for the Secretary who will make a determination whether to cut off assistance or whether to continue it, based on whether the local government is taking effective measures to bring the perpetrators to justice. To date, no memorandum has been forwarded to the Secretary. However, proposed U.S. assistance to five units of the Colombian army is on hold while we review information regarding alleged gross human rights violations committed by their members, and the status of ongoing investigations or other judicial proceedings in their cases.
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END USE MONITORING REPORT
Question. The End Use Monitoring Report for calendar year 1994 was published in March 1996; the one for calendar year 1995 was published in February 1997.
What is the reason for the consistent hold-up on the End Use Monitoring Report produced by INL?
Can we expect the EUM Reports for calendar years 1996 and 1997 this year?
Answer. The drafts of the 1994 and 1995 End Use Monitoring reports encountered unusual delays in the internal clearance process. Most prior reports were issued in the summer or early fall of the following calendar year. The report for calendar year 1996 was issued in September, 1997. The target date for the 1997 report is July, 1998.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY (ILEA)
Question. I would like more information on the new Western Hemisphere Law Enforcement Academy. Where is it going to be located? What is its mandate; only counterdrug? Will it train only civilian students, or military as well?
Answer. As part of the Administration's objective of strengthening international law enforcement efforts, the Department of State is establishing regional law enforcement academies to provide training and enhance cooperation. In 1995, the first International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was created in Budapest, and it has proved to be a successful model, drawing on the expertise of U.S. law enforcement agencies and participating nations.
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President Clinton announced a proposal at the San Jose Summit in May 1997 to establish an International Law Enforcement Academy for Latin America, or ''ILEA South.'' The goals of ILEA South are to expand relationships with the among foreign law enforcement officials from the region, support democracy by stressing the rule of law in international and domestic police operations, and raise the professionalism of law enforcement and judicial officials.
We began negotiations to locate the facility in Panama, where we hope it will complement other counterdrug activities which might be based there after 1999. The first course of the academy was held in Panama in November–December 1997, and the second in March 1998. The Administration believes it must be located within the region in order to encourage broad participation and a sense of ownership by countries in the region, which are essential to the success of the academy. Another key concern is the ability to offer significant contributions, so that the United States does not bear all the costs.
ILEA South's mandate is not limited to counterdrug issues, but includes the broad range of law enforcement and judicial concerns. While primarily concerned with training civilian students, training of appropriate military personnel at ILEA South is not excluded.
U.S. MILITARY TRAINING
Question. The 1997 Report to Congress on U.S.-Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation by the Office of National Drug Control Policy details the training of Mexican military personnel consisting of approximately 300 for 1996 and over 1500 for 1997. Are there other Mexican military personnel receiving other training? What is the vetting process to ensure that no trainees have been implicated in human rights violations? What does the human rights component of their training consist of?
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Answer. DoD provided 300 training slots for Mexican personnel in FY 1996 and 1300 in FY 1997. By the end of FY 1997, 829 Mexican personnel had received training. As the ONDCP report indicated, DoD is providing counter-drug training to Mexican military personnel who may be assigned to newly-created special units, one of whose primary missions is counter-drug. DoD also trained over 250 Mexican Navy personnel in maritime operations or skills. There are small numbers of Mexican military personnel receiving other kinds of training through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and a few military officers participate annually in military academy exchange programs.
Personnel selected by the Mexican military to receive U.S. training are chosen from those who have performed well in their own academies and in their military duties. U.S. trainers have given them high marks for professionalism and military conduct. In addition to Mexican government screening, the U.S. routinely screens all foreign students, whether civilian or military, before issuing appropriate visas. This is not a fail-safe process, but has proven to be a practical procedure.
Promotion of human and civil rights is an important part of our counternarcotics and military policies overseas, including Mexico, and is also a standard component of all U.S. training. These concepts are embedded in the program of instruction taught by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo has publicly affirmed his Administration's commitment to uphold internationally-recognized human rights. The independent National Human Rights Commission is playing an increasingly-important role in investigating abuses by military and police personnel.
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Question. I understand that the agreement between the United States and Mexico prohibits the use of U.S.-supplied helicopters in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero. Is that correct? If so, how are we guaranteeing that this is the case?
Answer. As required by our legislation, the Government of Mexico has provided us with binding assurances that any equipment transferred to Mexico will be used only for the purposes for which it is intended—in this case counternarcotics. These are the same required legal assurances provided by all recipients of U.S. excess military equipment, and Mexico will be held to the same standards as all other recipients.
While both Guerrero and Chiapas are states with serious drug production and trafficking problems, they are also conflictive zones, and Mexico has agreed informally not to assign U.S.-provided aircraft to those areas. We are, of course, following closely the situations in these states. We regularly discuss human rights issues with the Government of Mexico, as we do with many other governments.
The U.S. Embassy, by agreement with the Government of Mexico, conducts regular end-use monitoring of the aircraft and equipment provided to Mexico, as is done worldwide. Under the end-use monitoring procedures, Mexico provides bi-monthly reports indicating how each aircraft was used and its operational status. In addition, personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico make quarterly on-site observations at installations where the aircraft are stationed to check the aircraft, interview personnel, and verify the information provided.
These procedures are working well, with no indications that any U.S.-supplied equipment has been diverted to other than authorized purposes. We are confident that this equipment is being used for the intended counternarcotics missions.
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Question. Are any of the INL funded programs actually implemented by the Defense Department? If so, which ones?
Answer. There are no INL funded programs implemented by the Defense Department. INL does reimburse DOD for foreign participant training costs related to various courses offered by DOD such as for pilot training, mechanics training etc.
Question. Are any of the INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement) funded programs actually implemented by DOD? If so, which ones?
Answer. No. INL and DOD have a close partnership in international drug control training and support. INL frequently funds the training of foreign personnel, generally civilians, in DOD training facilities—such as pilot and mechanic training—and purchases spare parts from DOD for UN–1H and other aircraft. Likewise, DOD has provided significant material and training support to INL and to many of our international programs. However, DOD does not manage any of INL's programs.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY MRS. KAPTUR
BOSNIA
Question. How much money has the United States expended from all accounts for Bosnia-related activities? How much have other nations expended?
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Answer. The set of financial benchmarks used in accounting for expenditures in support of nonmilitary Bosnia-related activities is complex. The World Bank has the most comprehensive database for the international effort. That database is broken out into committed, under implementation, disbursed and expended categories. Under expenditures, by yearend 1997 the United States had expended $347.45 million, approximately 20.3 percent of the international total of $1.7 billion.
For military expenditures, the calculation uses fiscal rather than calendar year, but the numbers are more clear.
The Department of Defense Comptroller reports the FY96 cost for U.S. support operations in and around Bosnia to have been $2.5 billion. The FY97 cost for IFOR/SFOR operations was approximately $2.3 billion. FY98 costs for SFOR are projected to be $2.0 billion.
(Note: The President's $1.5 billion FY98 budget request for Bosnia assumed a reduction from 8,500 to 5,000 in U.S. troops by the end of FY97. Higher force levels were required due to the delay in municipal elections to September 1997. The extension of the 8,500 troop level through June 1998 added $487 million to the projected budget.)
The FY99 estimate to maintain 6900 troops in Bosnia as a follow-on force is $1.9 billion. This FY99 requirement was identified to Congress as a non-offset emergency budget amendment for FY99.
Calculating the expenditures of other nations' support of IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping activities in Bosnia is problematic. There is little relevant public information on such spending and few of the participating nations use comparable accounting methods.
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Nevertheless, we can state that U.S. troops today comprise less than 25 percent of the international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina overall and that that percentage will decline as our troop strength drops.
Question. What percentage of all troops in Bosnia are U.S. forces? What percentage of troops in Bosnia are deployed by other nations?
Answer. U.S. troops comprise approximately 24 percent of the military force deployed in support of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The balance is provided by the other nations participating in this international effort.
NONPROLIFERATION: SECURITY OF NIS NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS
Question. How confident are you with the safety and security of NIS nuclear plans and the material associated with them?
Answer. We have been concerned about the security of nuclear materials in the nations of the former Soviet Union. We are working cooperatively with these countries to ensure that the nuclear materials are safe and secure. Together we have already made substantial improvements, and must continue to provide support through completion of these projects several years from now.
Several Administration programs are involved. The Department of State administered Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund provides grants that support a variety of efforts, including strengthening export control regimes to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.
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The Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program works with NIS nuclear facilities to improve security, physical protection, and safety. They are working with each facility which has weapons-usable nuclear material (unirradiated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium).
The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program promotes nonproliferation of weapons materials, and was critical in the programs to help Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine become nuclear weapons-free states.
Question. How confident are you with the containment and remediation of the Chornobyl reactor and site?
Answer. U.S. concerns at Chornobyl rest largely with the 20-story steel and concrete ''Shelter'' built to cover the radioactive remains of the destroyed Chornobyl-4 reactor. Built in just seven months, under difficult and hazardous conditions, the shelter was never intended to serve as a long-term solution for the problems posed by the destroyed reactor. The unstable condition of the shelter is now a source of serious concern and requires prompt international attention.
In the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the G–7 and Ukraine on Chornobyl Closure, Ukraine agreed to permanently close the remaining operational units at Chornobyl by the year 2000. To help Ukraine develop a plan to stabilize the shelter over the destroyed reactor, Ukraine and the G–7 nations approved the internationally prepared Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). At the G–7 Denver Summit in June 1997, the G–7 nations pledged to contribute $300 million toward the $760 SIP million project cost. The U.S. share of this pledge is $78 million. Ukraine has pledged $50 million in kind. As of March 23, 1998, countries have agreed to provide over $400 million over the next 5–6 years to implement the SIP. This total is sufficient to initiate work while additional pledges are sought. Public sector fundraising will continue, and the private sector fundraising effort is expected to kick off within a year.
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Bilateral funding by the European Union and by the United States was also provided in 1996 to enable early work on the shelter to take place. U.S. bilateral assistance are focused on improving safety at the site, and include provision of a nuclear safety monitoring system, provision of occupational safety equipment, and provision of equipment for shelter operations. The U.S. is working to strengthen the capabilities of Ukraine's Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which plays an important role in reviewing and approving implementation of the SIP.
In addition to our bilateral activities at the Chornobyl shelter, the U.S. has contributed funds through the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) at the EBRD to construct two facilities (for liquid radioactive waste management and safe spent fuel storage) which will support decommissioning of the Chornobyl plant. The NSA is also funding four small projects to improve the near-term safety of Chornobyl Unit 3 prior to its closure in 2000. As a contributor to the NSA, the U.S. sits on the NSA Assembly of Contributors and has a vote in determining how projects are implemented. The U.S. is also funding completion of a partially-built heat plant at Chornobyl which will support the site during decommissioning activities, after the last Chornobyl reactor is closed.
Question. How confident are you with the safety and security of Newly Independent States (NIS) nuclear power plants built to the Chornobyl design?
Answer. The Chornobyl-style RBMK reactor is a Soviet-designed boiling water, graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactor which contains fundamental uncorrectable safety deficiencies which would prevent these reactors from ever being licensed to operate in the U.S. These deficiencies include a susceptibility to power instabilities; lack of a modern containment system to prevent release of radioactivity to the environment; and inadequacies in the emergency core-cooling systems, fire protection systems, and electronic control-and-protection systems.
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There are a total of 14 RBMKs operating in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine. The U.S. has strongly urged these countries to close them down as soon as possible. In Ukraine, we have seen excellent progress with the closure of Chornobyl Unit 1 in 1996 and Ukraine's commitment to close the remaining operational reactor at Unit 3 by 2000. In Ukraine, Russia, and Lithuania, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is working with the host country to identify safe, environmentally acceptable and least cost options which will permit other RBMK reactors to close. The programs of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reduce the risks of a serious accident at these RBMK reactors and to strengthen the nuclear regulatory authority in these countries continue.
Question. With the many questions of biological weapons proliferation, who has the final say if a country should get the possible ingredients that could be used for military purpose? I asked this question, because I watched one of the news shows and was stunned to hear a former DOD official say that ingredients that were eventually shipped to Iraq, which he had blocked, were overridden by the State Department and the Commerce Department. What is the current procedure?
Answer. All export licenses for Commerce-controlled dual-use biological weapons-related items are reviewed by the interagency, including the Departments of State, Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Each agency provides the Commerce Department with a recommendation to approve or deny a license application.
Taking into account interagency views, the Department of Commerce determines whether a license should be approved or denied. On those occasions when agencies disagree with the disposition of a license, they may appeal the decision to Commerce-chaired interagency review board.
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A mechanism exists—but it is rarely used—whereby an agency may continue to appeal a license decision to the Export Administration Review Board—which is composed of Cabinet-level officials—and ultimately to the President.
DEMINING
Question. Your budget shows a 700% increase over the last two years for humanitarian demining. I recognize the importance of this work, but can such a rapid ramp-up actually be used effectively?
Answer. Within the last year, we have expanded the program from fourteen to nineteen countries and are seriously examining several additional countries. We are also continuing our support to existing country programs which continue to remove landmines from the ground. Commitments to sustaining existing country programs, and expanding into new country programs, have already utilized the $20 million received for FY 98. The worldwide U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program is managed and monitored by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Humanitarian Demining which ensures effective use of the funds. Actions within the State Department are increasing our oversight and program management which we believe will effectively monitor and manage these resources. In addition, with the announcement of the President's Demining 2010 Initiative on October 31, 1997, we will be working to accelerate all global humanitarian demining operations, including the U.S. program, to eliminate the threat to civilians of anti-personnel landmines by the year 2010.
Question. What commitments do we have for similar contributions from our allies?
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Answer. We estimate that approximately half of all international demining assistance comes from the U.S. with the European Union as the next largest donor. Other major donors include Norway, which has committed $100 million over five years, Japan ($80 million over five years), Canada ($100 million Canadian over five years), Sweden ($23 million in 1998), the United Kingdom (10 million British Pounds per year for the next three years and Finland ($6 million in 1998). The 1998 edition of the State Department report Hidden Killers will include information on international contributions to the worldwide humanitarian demining effort.
With the announcement of the President's Demining 2010 Initiative on October 31, 1997, the U.S. will be hosting a conference in May, bringing together key donor governments and others to create an effective international coordination mechanism to ensure that sustained public and private resources for demining are directed, in an organized and rational manner, to programs in the mine-affected countries, with the goal of eliminating the threat to civilians of anti-personnel landmines by the year 2010. The Demining 2010 Initiative has challenged the international community—public and private sectors—to raise $1 billion annually for global humanitarian demining.
Question. Who administers international demining programs?
Answer. The U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program is administered by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Humanitarian Demining, chaired by State. The Department of Defense designates the Vice Chair. A recent Congressional Report (copy attached) explains the IWG process.
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Question. Do we directly fund demining operations or is the funding funneled through NGOs?
Answer. In most cases, our goal is the establishment of a sustainable, indigenous demining capability to manage and conduct demining operations in a landmine-affected nation, rather than funding ongoing demining operations. The first step is to establish a Mine Action Center, which is an office of the host nation government responsible for solving the landmine problem in that country. U.S. Government assistance is provided in-kind through the host government Mine Action Center. Where a direct, government-to-government military relationship is not appropriate, we have functioned through the United Nations (in Afghanistan and Angola) and through USAID (in Angola and Rwanda). In the future, new funding through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account will provide additional resources and administrative flexibility to consider accomplishing overall objectives through NGOs as well.
Question. Can you please explain to what extent Laos and Cambodia will benefit this year and succeeding years from this program?
Answer. We plan to provide Cambodia with $2.0 million in NADR funds in FY 98 and $3.0 million in FY 99 (out of the $50 million requested). We plan to provide Laos with $2.0 million in NADR funds in FY 98 and the same amount in FY 99. In both cases, the program has successfully established a sustainable, indigenous demining and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance capability in each country. Ongoing funding provides additional equipment to sustain and expand the program.
Question. How does this compare to the past support?
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Answer. In FY 97, we provided both Cambodia and Laos with $1.0 million each in NADR funds. We have increased our support together with increased managerial capability in each country.
Wednesday, March 4, 1998.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WITNESS
HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Callahan's Opening Statement
Mr. CALLAHAN. Good morning, Madame Secretary, and welcome back to our subcommittee. Between the 1998 request and the '99 request, the Administration, you and the President, have requested that we consider a total of about $31 billion dollars in requests this spring.
And in order to give our members adequate time to discuss these issues with you, we appreciate very much you coming 30 minutes earlier than usual. We respect your tight schedule, and we will try to get you out as quickly as we can.
But, as you can imagine, the members of the subcommittee have a great deal of interest in many of the things you are in charge of, and I am sure there will be a lot of questions.
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Since your last visit, we have a new member of our subcommittee. Congresswoman Kaptur I do not think is here yet, but she is very knowledgeable on international affairs and I am sure when she gets here she will have some very strong questions, especially about the Ukraine.
I am not going to read a formal statement. I invite you—and I have had the opportunity to review your statement—to use as much time as you like, but we will accept your full statement for the record.
And let me just say we hope that you will address especially the Middle East and certainly the problem in Iraq. We have talked with some members of the Executive Branch, some of the under secretaries, in subcommittee hearings.
I think I got from the attitude of the members of the subcommittee that some of us are grossly disappointed that some of the very countries you are requesting aid for this coming year and countries that have been huge recipients of American aid in the past, both military and other aid, did not readily—or at least the perception was that they did not readily come to your side when you visited them.
Conceivably you know something that we do not know, but it is disheartening to me and to many members of our subcommittee when we send the billions of dollars we send to these foreign countries, and when we entertain their leaders as they come to the United States, that they did not readily respond to your request.
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It would appear that either we had a flawed policy or a flawed program or a flawed plan. Or, if that was not the case, it appeared as if maybe they were fair weather friends.
So we are interested to know what took place. I do not imagine you had to call Mr. Netanyahu twice when you went to him for his support of our latest Iraqi venture. But we were very disappointed that other nations did not seemingly come immediately to your side, especially since you went to the tremendous effort you went to in going to visit with them to explain the problems.
Our perception is that what we were trying to do primarily was to protect the very countries who sit in the middle of the most dangerous area—the very countries that refuse to publicly come out and say we are with you 100%.
But we respect your professionalism, and we know that you may have had private conversations with some of the leaders of these countries. But nevertheless, it is a sincere concern. And as these leaders come to visit us, especially this spring in their quest for additional aid, I am certain that some of them are going to have to answer some very tough questions from members of this committee.
I know you just came back from Africa, and I know the President is going to visit Africa sometime in the near future. I am real happy to see that you have taken our advice and have not gone over there promising them the moon.
The President, I think, is indicating there is an additional $60 million for Africa.
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While Latin America is still problematic or some areas of it, your request asks for a sizeable increase in assistance to Haiti. I see no progress has been made in Haiti. As a matter of fact, after our visit there last spring, there was no progress—zero progress that we could see.
And reports that have come back give us an indication there is still very little progress. As a matter of fact, it has deteriorated to the point now that you cannot even safely land a commercial airplane on the international airport because of the cows grazing on the runway.
And there has been no privatization to our knowledge even though they have repeatedly promised us that privatization would immediately begin. To the best that we can understand, there has been no privatization in Haiti.
Other areas in South and Central America—you know of our concerns about this area of the world. We think that more concentration should be put on Central and South America and the Caribbean rather than on some of the countries we are spending so many billions of dollars on.
So we hope that you will continue your direction of giving assistance to countries in this hemisphere and priorities to countries in this hemisphere because they naturally, because of their proximity to the United States, are countries that can mean the most to us not only in trade, but from a national security point of view.
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Russia still has tremendous problems. I know that you are going to visit Ukraine. I think you are leaving tonight or tomorrow to visit Ukraine. We have had reports, this committee has, with respect to business people doing—trying to do business in the Ukraine.
And yet, corruption and the hardship that some of the people in Ukraine give to our American business people gives us heartburn. And I hope that when you go to Ukraine, you will tell them of the Congress' concern about American business people being mistreated in the manner in which they are.
And that if indeed this continued and some of the problems they have created is not corrected, then you are going to have difficulty getting this subcommittee to afford you any money for Ukraine.
I know that you are concerned about that as well. And I hope that before you go to Ukraine, you will discuss some of these problems business people and then address their particular problems with the leaders of Ukraine.
I just want to forewarn you that the request for the additional appropriation is going to be difficult to come by. The chairman and the ranking member of our full committee are here, and we understand that there probably is going to be some kind of highway program, but we are not going to take it out of the surplus.
We are going to, to the best of my knowledge, apply that surplus to pay off some of the national debt. And we are going to have to come up with monies for the IMF or any increased monies you have with the limited amount of resources because I think we are also going to have a highway program that we are going to have to come up with several billion dollars to fund.
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And I think, based upon information I have received, that we are going to take the highway monies out of some existing spending capability. So monies are going to be extremely limited. But let me tell you that I personally appreciate the kindness and courtesies you have shown to me, especially during this last year; that you are a very responsible and forceful leader; and that your respect not only here in the United States but worldwide is certainly a feather in the cap of this Administration.
So we thank you.
And at this time, I would like to yield to the full committee chairman, and then to the ranking member, and then to the ranking person from California, Ms. Pelosi.
Mr. Livingston's Opening Statement
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief because I know the members want to get into questions.
But Madame Secretary, I want to welcome you. I have not had a chance to formally welcome you to the second session of the 105th Congress appearing before the various committees, but I will take that opportunity now.
You have been very busy. You are covering the world and have a lot of problems confronting you and, of course, confronting this Nation as well. And please understand that if the questions get a little tough from time to time, we all share the same goals and do wish you all of the best of success as you undertake prospective solutions to these very difficult problems.
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I would associate myself with the remarks of the chairman, Mr. Callahan. Add only that I will have a number of questions which I would like to ask later on. And if I am not here, forgive me, but I will submit them for the record.
But highlighted among my interests are, in fact, the cost for doing business in Iraq, Bosnia and Haiti. I feel that the Administration and the request has underestimated those costs if not totally in this bill, but certainly when you consider the defense bill in which they did not even make a request for Bosnia, let alone the process in Iraq in the President's request which means we just have to, for fiscal year '99, take it out of thin air or create that money out of other programs.
The chairman mentioned the problems in Ukraine. The fact is we are very much concerned about the lack of security of American investment in Ukraine. And worse than that, the safety of investors as they travel to Ukraine.
That is a very serious problem.
Thirdly, it appears that the Administration has removed the IRA from the list of known terrorists or the terrorist list that we have carried forth from year to year. We removed it last year, and now we find out that the IRA is engaged in acts of terrorism once again.
We will be curious to see how the State Department intends to deal with that problem.
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And finally, we do want to cooperate with you, Madame Secretary, but we have some very tough issues in dealing with the IMF and UN funding and others that will be incorporated presumably in the supplemental bill that will go through Congress within the next few weeks.
And I am concerned that the Administration has taken an awfully hard nosed, inflexible attitude to the very simple request that we made last year to forego the advocacy of abortions around the world and blame the Congress for being intransigent.
The fact is that the pro-life advocates in this Congress made tremendous concessions to reducing their request to that one forbearance, not to lobby for abortion internationally.
And for the Administration to say well that is so totally off the table when we have so many other—much more serious, significant problems on the table before us in the coming weeks is just unfortunate and unwise.
The Department allowed the UN Fund For Population Activities to renew its program in China. That is not only unwise; it is just plain dumb. So I hope that you will deal with these problems in your statement and that we can have a dialogue that can resolve these issues.
We have got a lot of significant and difficult problems to negotiate through the mine fields, and it is going to have to be a two way street. We are going to have to have some give and take if we are going to get adequate solutions for the American people.
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With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have questions later on. And if I do not have an opportunity to ask them myself in person, I will submit them.
But thank you again, Madame Secretary.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Obey's Opening Statement
Mr. OBEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the interest of time, I had not planned to make any comments; but I nonetheless, as I often do, find myself required to respond to some of the comments of my friend, the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana.
Let me simply say, Madame Secretary, I do not believe that the Administration's position has been inflexible at all on the question raised by the chairman.
I think what the Administration's position has been is simply this: the Administration is saying that we have national interests that have to be dealt with with respect to our funding of the International Monetary Fund.
I think the Administration is saying we have national interests that have to be dealt with with respect to cleaning up the arrearages at the United Nations so that we do not wind up asking an organization to do a lot of the work that we want to see done even though we are technically a deadbeat in that institution.
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And I think the Administration is saying that those interests ought to be dealt with on their own without being linked to a side bar issue which happens to be the divisions within the Congress on the questions to how we ought to conduct our family planning issues around the world.
I think the Administration is simply saying that each of those issues are legitimate issues, but they all ought to stand on their own. They ought not be artificially linked politically. They ought not to held hostage to one another.
And as adults, we ought to be able to work them out on a stand alone basis, and I hope that we can. It would be preposterous for us to refuse to defend our economic interests on the IMF front.
It would be preposterous for us to continue to disarm ourselves and our ability to effectively influence the United Nations by getting that tied up into a separate issue involving what our family planning policy ought to be in some country a thousand miles away.
It just seems to me that reasonable people ought to be able to find reasonable solutions on each of those fronts, but they ought not be linked in some kind of a political hostage fashion, and that is all the Administration has been saying, and I think it is correct to do so.
I would simply hope, Madame Secretary, that as you pursue your duties, I would hope that we can find a way to persuade parties on both sides in the Middle East that, for the good of the region and the good of the world, that they need to be more forthcoming in their negotiations with one another.
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I would certainly think the Iraqi situation has emphasized once again the need for us to make progress on the core problem in the Middle East, which is the continuing disagreement between the State of Israel and its neighbors and the Palestinians as well.
So I know that it is very difficult for us to prod two parties to negotiate under these circumstances, but I hope that we will do all we can because, after all, not only is their own national interest at stake, so is our own.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement
Ms. PELOSI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to join you in welcoming Secretary Albright to our subcommittee. And I want to say that I believe our country is well served by and is very proud of Secretary Albright and the job that she is doing.
The Administration's request of $14.1 billion represents about a $900 million dollar increase over FY98. However, even with this increase, I think this amount is the bare minimum necessary to conduct a foreign policy that preserves the national security of the United States.
I want to spend a moment on the budget because that is what this hearing is about. This budget is largely a status quo request. In fact, the only increases of any significance in State Department run programs are for narcotics control, assistance to the New Independent States and in the proliferation, anti-terrorism and demining account.
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Overall resources for the conduct of international affairs remain as only one percent of the U.S. budget. Secretary Albright will, I am sure, present us with compelling justification for every penny today.
As I have said, before, it is the least we can do.
I was not going to bring up the subject of the Mexico City policy, but since our distinguished chairman did, I associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Obey. I believe that we can have that debate separately and let it stand on its own weight.
I commend the Administration for not allowing the poor women of the world to be held hostage to the politics of the Congress of the United States, and opposing any kind of gag rule that some would want to impose on organizations regarding what they do with their own money. We are not talking about U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent on these activities.
We are talking about what they do with their own money. That is a standard I do not think we would want to apply to all of the funding that the Federal Government does domestically or internationally.
We spent a good deal of time discussing the IMF with Secretary Rubin. I know that it is his domain, however it certainly does have State Department involvement even beyond the Mexico City language. I am sure we will touch on that today.
The concerns that I will raise today range from China to Chiapas and everything in between. I am concerned about what is happening in terms of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva regarding a resolution on China's human rights practices.
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And I am very concerned, Madame Secretary, about recent press reports that significant numbers of Mexico Army troops are being trained at U.S. bases and that some individuals from the Mexican Armed Forces are receiving intelligence training.
This training is supposed to be used in the drug war. My questions will relate to how this training may be being used for counterinsurgency purposes in Mexico.
I support the President's leadership and policy in Bosnia, and I know you will give us a justification for the $225 million dollar request. My concern centers around Bosnia war criminals or, as we now call them, persons indicted for war crimes, PIWC's.
And of course, I share the concern of my colleague, Mr. Obey, about a resolution of the Middle East situation as well as the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Your brief is a very full one, Madame Secretary, and I do not want to go into all of it in my opening statement. Suffice it to say that I think we will have a lively discussion today.
In closing, I again want to commend you for your many, many, many successes and the distinction with which you serve our great country.
Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Madame Secretary.
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Secretary Albright's Opening Statement
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
We clearly do have an awful lot to cover. Even though I have covered many issues in my statement, I clearly have not addressed all the questions, thus we will have a great deal to talk about.
I am very pleased to be here to ask for your support for the President's request for funds for the Foreign Operations Program of the United States. I want to acknowledge at the outset that this subcommittee and its members have been leaders in supporting a principled and purposeful U.S. foreign policy.
I think that our record of working together has been great, and I appreciate the fine work that we have been able to do together. I do think that we have been able to move the process forward.
And Chairman Livingston, I am especially pleased to see you here. I cannot resist saying something about your recent decision. As you know, when I became a diplomat, I had all my partisan instincts surgically removed.
But, as a citizen, I am very pleased to say hallelujah. We do not always agree, but I do know a true public servant when I see one, and I am very grateful to you for having made the decision that you made and am very happy to have you here this morning.
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Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, the budget request before you seeks to ensure that we will have the foreign policy tools we need to sustain American leadership and serve American interests.
It includes funds for programs that help us promote peace and maintain our security; work overseas to build prosperity at home; promote democratic values and strengthen democratic institutions; respond to the global threats of international terrorism, crime, drugs and pollution; and provide humanitarian aid to those in need.
I will not read my written statement, but I encourage you all to review it. It deals with some of the vital issues and parts of the world that I cannot include in my oral remarks and still honor any semblance of your time.
Let me instead review a few front burner foreign policy issues where strong American diplomacy is critical for American leadership and American lives.
Ten days ago, Iraq promised UN inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites inside the country, including those previously kept off limits. This step back by Iraq is a step forward for our policy of containing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
If Iraq lives up to its agreement, we will have achieved our goal of maintaining an effective and professional inspection and monitoring regime inside Iraq. If Iraq violates the agreement, there will be greater international understanding and diplomatic support than there would have been previously for a forceful response.
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Either way, the forces of law and stability are strengthened.
We are working with the Security Council and UNSCOM to ensure that the agreement is implemented in a manner that reflects the core principles upon which we insisted: that Security Council resolutions are obeyed; that UNSCOM's integrity is preserved; and that UNSCOM is not prevented from doing a full and professional job.
In the days ahead, UNSCOM will be testing Iraq's commitments thoroughly and comprehensively. And under the agreement, there is no question that operational control for all inspections rests with UNSCOM.
To keep a lid on Saddam's military options, we will continue to enforce the no fly and no drive zones. We will insist that UN sanctions against Iraq be maintained until there is full compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
As President Clinton has said, our soldiers, our ships and our planes will stay in the region in force until we are satisfied Iraq is complying with its commitments.
If Iraq does not comply, we have made it clear that we have the responsibility, the authority, the means and the will to respond. I am convinced that this is the best policy to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies in the Gulf.
It embodies both our desire for peace and our determination to fight if necessary. It takes into account current realities without, in any way, ruling out future options. It presents the leaders in Baghdad with a clear choice, and it reflects principles that are vital to uphold not only in the Gulf now, but everywhere always.
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In the Middle East, the United States has been working hard to encourage the parties to make the hard decisions that will move the peace process forward. This matter is urgent and the stakes are high.
Under the Oslo Accords, a permanent status agreement is mandated by May 4, 1999, less than 14 months from today. We take that deadline seriously. The parties must tackle the hard issues now.
I hope as we strive to move ahead on the diplomatic front that we will have the subcommittee's support for our requests for assistance to our partners in peace, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the areas under Palestinian self rule.
Over the years, the level of assistance provided to this region has been the subject of scrutiny. This is appropriate, and we welcome Israel's discussions with the Executive Branch and Congress on a gradual reduction and eventual phase out of economic support funds coupled with the proposed increase in security assistance.
I look forward to coordinating closely with you as consultations on this subject continue. In Bosnia, we must finish what we started and continue helping the parties to implement the Dayton Accords. The nation remains deeply divided, but multi-ethnic institutions are once again beginning to function, economic growth is accelerating, more refugees are returning, and more indicted war criminals are facing trial.
Perhaps most importantly, a new Bosnian-Serb Government has been elected that is committed to implementing Dayton and has begun to make good on this pledge.
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In response, I have waived restrictions on our assistance with the understanding that our support is designed to help the builders of peace, not those determined to undermine it.
In order to continue the progress that has been made, we and our allies have agreed that NATO will continue to lead a multi-national force in Bosnia after SFOR's current mandate expires. We have already held informal briefings with members of Congress on these consultations, and you can expect to hear more from us on that in the days ahead.
Mr. Chairman, the infrastructure of Bosnian peace is gaining shape and the psychology of reconciliation is taking hold, more slowly than we foresaw, but as surely as we hoped.
The funds we request for Bosnia in fiscal year 1999 will help make this welcome process irreversible by strengthening democratic institutions and bolstering the rule of law. These monies will also help ensure that when our forces do leave Bosnia, they do so for good.
Let me also take this opportunity to reiterate the Administration's deep concern about recent violence in Kosovo. We have made clear to President Milosevic that making progress on Kosovo is a precondition to lifting the so-called ''outer wall'' of sanctions against his country, and that the use of force to resolve what is a political problem can only deepen the isolation of his regime.
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We also expect the Kosovo-Albanian leadership to distance itself from those who use violence for political ends.
More broadly, we are working with our European partners to make further progress toward a continent whole and free. We are adapting NATO to new challenges and seeking Senate support for admitting three of Central Europe's new democracies.
With respect to Russia, we are working to keep economic reforms on track while urging START II ratification by the Duma, pressing for new measures to prevent proliferation and continuing our support for Russian membership in the WTO.
We are also supporting Ukraine's fragile economic and political reforms.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, tomorrow I will travel to Kiev where I will bring a strong message of friendship, but also a warning. As you know, later next month I must certify that Ukraine has made significant progress in resolving complaints by U.S. investors or see our aid cut by 50%.
I hope that I will be able to indicate to this body that progress has been made.
Throughout the new independent states, the construction of stable market democracies remains a work in progress. Our contribution through the Partnership for Freedom will not remake the region overnight.
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But this program provides essential help to a process that is vital to the stability of this region and has major implications for our own long term prosperity and security.
In our own hemisphere, we have important interests dictated not only by proximity of geography but by proximity of values.
And next month, President Clinton and the democratic leaders of this hemisphere will gather for the Second Summit of the Americas to set an agenda for the 21st Century, an agenda of education, trade, economic integration, fighting poverty, the war on drugs, judicial reform, the environment and human rights.
In Haiti, the job of creating a democratic culture and market economy where neither has ever existed is especially daunting. Other young democracies have taken years and endured much violence to sort out tensions similar to those Haitians now face.
If we turn our backs now on Haiti, we run the risk of creating a Haitian future that mirrors the past. Accordingly, I ask your support to continue and increase our investment in Haiti to respond to basic human needs, strengthen civil society, expand opportunities for free enterprise, and give democracy a chance to put down deeper roots in Haitian soil.
In Africa, we have a rare opportunity to bring newly democratizing partners into the world economy and gain valuable allies in the fight against terror, narcotics trafficking and other global threats.
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As we prepare for the President's visit later this month, I urge the subcommittee's support for our initiative to promote justice and development in the Great Lakes region. I also ask your support for our request for funds for education, development and a substantial new program of debt relief.
In Asia, we are working to promote stability during a time of great economic uncertainty. The approach we have taken to the East Asian financial crisis is clear. To recover, a nation must reform its economy. And if a nation is willing to work seriously on reform, it will be in our interest to help.
In South Korea, the new President, Kim Dae Jung, has built his career and staked his life on the idea that democratic development and economic growth go hand in hand. He is working now with the IMF to restore financial confidence, promote better governance and encourage greater openness in decision making.
In Thailand, both the leaders and the people have taken strong steps to put their fiscal house in order and to enact a more democratic constitution.
In Indonesia, however, it is plain the government must do more. Former Vice President Mondale has delivered to Jakarta our message that full implementation of the IMF agreement is essential. If Indonesia is to restore confidence and growth, it must address the problems of its financial sector and attack longstanding structural problems, including corruption and a lack of democratic accountability.
As people throughout the region look for reassurance about the future, it is vital that timely support from the international community be forthcoming. This matters to us economically, but the IMF reforms also promote better governance and thereby stronger democracies.
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The IMF's programs are a ''hand up,'' not a hand out. These programs are loans that will be repaid with interest as our trade with the Asia-Pacific region recovers and grows. Thus, I hope we can work together to contribute our full share of the IMF's quota increase which will support economic recovery in East Asia and help prevent similar crises elsewhere.
Our supplemental request would also extend to the IMF a line of credit for use in the event of a serious financial crisis. These requests are for budget authority only. They require no outlay of funds and have no effect on calculations of Government spending.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, in addition to this IMF request we have unfinished business which includes arrears to the UN, which undermine our diplomatic leadership and cost U.S. taxpayers money.
I ask your support for prompt action that is not tied to any unrelated issues on our supplemental appropriations request for UN arrears. Let us act quickly and put this issue behind us to enable us to restore American influence within the UN system, pursue our reform agenda and get on with America's diplomatic business.
Mr. Chairman, when we help end conflicts; pursue arms control; fight terrorism, drugs and crime; promote child health and support democracy, we advance the long term interests and safety of Americans. In each of these areas, we ask your support in exercising U.S. leadership and promoting the values our people cherish.
Mr. Chairman, half a century ago a Democratic President and a Republican Congress worked together to help forge the institutions that have shaped our foreign policy and defined the history of our age; institutions that proved instrumental in the defense and spread of freedom, the growth of prosperity, the defeat of Communism and the confirmation over and over again of America's standing as a leading force for justice and law around the world.
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Our predecessors were not prophets. But because they stood tall, they were perhaps able to see a little bit further into the future than others. They also had faith in our people and in the principles upon which our Nation was founded.
Today we have a responsibility to honor their faith, to reject the temptation of complacency and to assume uncomplainingly, the leader's role established by our forbears.
For only by living up to the heritage of our past can we fulfill the promise of our future and enter the new century free and respected, prosperous and at peace.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for listening to my statement. And now I am very pleased to respond to your questions.
[The statement of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright follows:]
offset folios 582 to 608 insert here
HAITI
Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Let me just comment briefly on some of the things that you expressed in your opening statement. Number one, and I know today we do not have time to go through an elaborate and detailed discussion of Haiti; but as I mentioned in my opening statement, we see very little progress there.
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The subcommittee has visited Haiti. We have met with the president of Haiti. We have met with the leaders of Haiti. We see zero progress, and yet we see a request nearly doubling the assistance to Haiti while we see countries like Bolivia who are trying to do the right thing with respect to the drug situation have their funds dramatically cut.
So Haiti is going to be a problem with this committee. It is going to be a problem with me. It is not that I do not think we should help. I think we have other priorities in this hemisphere, and I doubt very seriously if we are going to be able to come forth with this additional money for Haiti.
And I see little justification. If there was an indication of progress in Haiti, it would be different. But there is no progress being made in Haiti. You have huge unemployment. The only economy they have is foreign assistance and our military.
When we were there, we were trying to assist Haiti, for example, on their road building problems. Their roads are in horrible condition. We had the U.S. Army Reserve down there building them a road. And according to the commander of that force, we could not even get the Haitians to deliver rocks to help build a road for them.
So we, I think, are going to have to tell Haiti that we are sorry; but in the absence of any progress, we might have higher priorities in this hemisphere.
KEDO
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Kedo is still problematic. The fact that they are borrowing money and borrowed it without any notification to this committee—and I realize they have the collateral backed up by promises from other countries.
We are concerned about the increased borrowing taking place in Kedo.
Bolivia, as I mentioned, is a problem. We are going to have to find some resolve to the tremendous cuts which appear to be some type of punishment for Bolivia when they are making progress and when they have a new Administration there that has pledged to eliminate the growing of cocaine leaves by the year 2002.
We should encourage this, not discourage it.
The vice president of Bolivia was here this week. He met with some of us. He told us that it was an insult to his country after the cooperation they had pledged, the progress they have made for us to cut them as dramatically as we did.
I know that some of the instructions of that came from this committee and this Congress when we instructed you to provide Blackhawk and Huey helicopters for Colombia. But we will correct that this year.
But we must find something immediately in the form of relief for Bolivia.
IMF
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The IMF, as we told Secretary Rubin a couple of weeks ago, has serious perception problems. People in America do not understand the IMF. They think it is a slush fund for the President. They do not understand, as you so, I think, diplomatically explained to the Senate committee, it is a credit union—that we are a member of the credit union and that we are not providing all of this aid, but it is important that we participate.
They do not understand the Mexico bail out when we promised Mexico $30 billion dollars, that Mexico paid all of that money back, that we have never lost money on any IMF endeavor.
As a matter of fact, on Mexico I understand we even made a profit because they paid us back immediately. But still, the American people do not understand, and someone has to get the message out.
Now you mentioned in your statement not to tie anything to the IMF issue. But it is going to be tied. It is not necessarily the will of all of the members or even a majority of the members of this committee, but the issue is going to be there.
We are going to have to face the reality of whether or not this Mexico City language or something along those lines is more important with respect to the Administration than IMF. That issue is going to be there. It is not going to be put on in this subcommittee; but when we get to the full, we are going to have to address Mexico City language. Other administrations have lived with Mexico City language and it has not impeded their ability to have an effective foreign policy.
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And I know the White House has a strong feeling with respect to that, and I know a lot of members of this subcommittee and the House and Senate have strong feelings. But it is an issue that is here. And it is something that we cannot do anything about.
But we have to recognize that the issue is here and that a great majority of the members of the House feel that way and we are going to have to address it in some form or fashion.
I am really happy to see that the Administration has finally come to their senses on child survival. It was created in this committee, and, for the first time, you requested that it be funded.
Albeit, you did not request the full funding of last year, but we are going to give you more than you requested in the child survival account this coming year.
IRAQ
With respect to the perception of problems you faced with the leaders you went to see on your visit prior to the Iraqi situation, I think you should address that to make certain that we fully understand the responses, if that is something we can publicly talk about.
If some of the conversations are classified or you would rather do that in a closed meeting, we would be happy to accommodate you there. But once again, perception in this industry we are in, you are in, is very important.
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And the perception is that our allies turned their backs on you. And that aggravated me not only for you, but for this country. It aggravated me when a similar thing happened to Secretary Baker when he went to the Philippines and they refused to meet with our Secretary of State.
We are not going to tolerate that. And the only vehicle we have to respond is the fact that we are the ones who hold the purse strings for the money that you get to provide to these countries.
So I wish you would address the perception of the lack of support of our endeavors in Iraq with the leaders you visited, if you can.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say that the perception is wrong because we are confident that we have the support that we need if in fact we have to pursive a military option. But there clearly is a perception, and therefore let me address at that.
First of all, I think that we have to understand that the threat this time is less concretely visible than it was when there was an attack by Iraq into Kuwait; an attack by one Arab country and an invasion by one Arab country into another Arab country, which I think was a concrete act that was easier for people to understand and to react to.
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We have maintained very close contact with all the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf. I went there, as you know, and so did Secretary Cohen. We actually got what we considered good statements of support at a time when many of those countries believe that our sanctions policy is hurting the Iraqi people.
That is a perception that I believe is wrong. If I might parenthetically say it here, the United States has done and cares more about the Iraqi people than Saddam Hussein does. And we have made provision for humanitarian assistance by allowing the Iraqis to sell oil in order to buy humanitarian assistance.
These Arab countries were concerned about the fact that they believe that our policies were hurting the Iraqi people.
Also, the threat of weapons of mass destruction and instability in the region I think is something that we need to pursue. It is a national interest issue for the United States, but it is harder, I think, for these countries to understand than we feel about it.
The main point, though, and I must say this, is that in private, I felt that I had very good assurances, which we can discuss if you like in some other setting. But you have to understand that thoese countries' public statements are geared to the fact that they are in the neighborhood with the bully.
We are there as the main protector, but we are not there all the time. They are in the neighborhood with Saddam Hussein, and therefore their statements, to some extent, are tailored to that reality.
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But I have to tell you that both Secretary Cohen and I feel comfortable with the support that we are getting from these countries.
MONETARY SUPPORT
Mr. CALLAHAN. Imagine how disappointing though when these leaders of these nations come and they tell us how much they need and how badly they need our monetary support both from a military and an economic support factor only to read, and perception though it may be—only for us to read that you were not warmly received.
I am sure personally they warmly received you, but your message was not warmly received. So it is a concern to me. And I intend, as they come to visit us this spring, to press this question.
You know, our attitude, or at least my attitude, Madame Secretary, is that you are the voice of the United States of America. And they must respect that. And either they must tell you why your plan is flawed, or they must stand beside you.
As I mentioned, I do not imagine you had to call Mr. Netanyahu twice before he immediately responded. I do not imagine you had to call the leaders of Kuwait twice because they remember very vividly how protective we were to them in the Persian Gulf encounter.
But some of these leaders we are giving hundreds of millions of dollars to should recognize that the reason we are doing that is for their securit. At the same time, in return for that, if we are going to protect them, we expect them to stand beside us in our endeavor.
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The message they send by being silent, even though they could possibly have some political problems in responding openly, it is the wrong perception. And if we are going to give them monetary support, we expect in return their full support anytime you call on them or any endeavor we might undertake.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, if I might say, I did in fact make statements such as the one that you have just made and made quite clear that not only the Administration but our friends in Congress would make that message quite clear.
So I would be very happy if you made those statements.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you.
And now I will yield to my colleague from California, Ms. Pelosi. And after Ms. Pelosi, I am going to ask the committee members to respect each other and to limit their questions, including the response time, to five minutes and we will try to get through twice.
So Ms. Pelosi, I kept mine to six minutes, but the floor is now yours.
Ms. PELOSI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to defer to the ranking member of the full Committee.
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Mr. Obey, I do not know if you have other committees you have to cover this morning and if you wanted to go first.
Okay, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
HAITI
Chairman Callahan and I share a different view of the Administration's successes in Haiti, but one would have to admit that we still have a long way to go in reaching the success we would like to see there, and I look forward to working with you on that issue.
I visited Haiti with the chairman last Easter and his characterization of what we saw is correct. However, I believe that the President has done the right thing by being involved in Haiti.
We just have to make sure that our policy is more effective, including in terms of the cooperation we receive from the Haitian leaders. But I do not think we can walk away from that situation.
IRAQ
I want to go directly to the Iraq situation because I did not mention it in my remarks except to associate myself with the remarks of others.
I really want to commend the Administration for making a diplomatic solution possible. I hope that Saddam Hussein will comply. In the last few weeks, I have had the occasion to be in several different churches and the sermon was always the same, a rejection of the use of violence.
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My pastor has a different responsibility than the President of the United States, but I think the American people very much want a diplomatic solution to this conflict.
I know that requires carrying a big stick, but I was pleased that the Administration gave the opportunity to Saddam Hussein to comply. I hope and pray that he does.
You have explained, if he does not comply, what some of the options are. Since you set up that ''if he does not comply,'' structure, I have a different ''if they do not comply'' question for you.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
In your statement, you mentioned some of the successes that you see in Asia, and you count China's commitment to strictly control nuclear exports, its assurances on nuclear cooperation with Iran as steps in the right direction.
Last year, the U.S. Navy identified China as one of the most active suppliers of Iran's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons program.
In a March 1997 report, the Office of Naval Intelligence stated that ''Discoveries after the Gulf War clearly indicate that Iraq maintained an aggressive weapons of mass destruction procurement program. A similar situation exists today in Iran with a steady flow of materials and technologies from China to Iran. This exchange is one of the most active weapons of mass destruction programs in the Third World and is taking place in a region of great strategic interest to the United States.''
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The statement goes on to talk about the C802 ballistic missiles which are not weapons of mass destruction but delivery systems. I was disappointed in the Administration's certification that China is cooperating in halting proliferation, and I hope that Congress would act on that.
However, I do believe that placing an emphasis on weapons of mass destruction is very important. There is probably nothing more important to our national security. I think our voice on it would be more respected if it were more consistent.
Since you mentioned what would happen if Iraq did not comply, I wondered if you would comment on what would happen if China did not comply with the promise. Certification in the past has really been built on performance, not promises.
And in this case, the Administration certified on the promise that China would act in a way completely different than the Office of Naval Intelligence has described them acting. If they do not comply with restrictions on the export of weapons of mass destruction technology to Iran, especially in the nuclear area, what action would the Administration take?
Would that lead to a decertification of China? Would the sanctions which the law requires be put into effect? Or what other option would you suggest?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first, Congresswoman, thank you very much for your statements. And let me say that China has acted consistently with its May 1996 pledge not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
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And it is also agreed, as you have stated, to end nuclear cooperation with Iran, and we believe that China is serious about this commitment. We are strongly encouraging China to complete their nuclear related dual use export control regulations which the Chinese have said would be issued by mid 1998.
We are also stressing to China the importance of using effective export controls to block any transaction which would be inconsistent with their pledges.
I also believe we should look at how far China has come in the last years in developing a whole set of initiatives—of being part of the NPT, the CTBT and the chemical weapons convention. They are systematically moving to put themselves within the international regimes of weapons of mass destruction.
We are going to keep pressing them on this subject and making them live up to their obligations. If they do not, they will be subject to the series of potential actions that you have stated.
But what we are doing now is pushing them very hard on these issues because we do consider them of major importance, and would not certify or take action that we believe was contrary to the promises or pledges that they have made.
Ms. PELOSI. Well, I think you are being very generous. I just repeat—because you say they are honoring what they said in May '96—that one year later, the Office of Naval Intelligence says, ''A similar situation exists today in Iran with a steady flow of materials and technology from China to Iran. This exchange is one of the most active weapons of mass destruction programs in the Third World and is taking place in a region of great strategic interest to the United States.''
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UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
On another subject, the President said when he delinked trade from human rights with China that the U.S. should step up efforts to insist that the UN Human Rights Commission pass a resolution dealing with serious human rights abuses in China.
I just wondered what the plan was for the Administration this year because, as you know, the meetings begin March 16th, very soon.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.
First of all, again, I think that you know how strongly the President stated the case to President Jiang Zemin when he was here making very clear publicly that China was going to be on the wrong side of history if it did not live up to greater responsibilities as far as the human rights issues are concerned.
As far as the UN Commission, we are currently consulting about our next steps on a resolution's introduction.
Ms. PELOSI. So this begins March 16th. This is what, the 4th of March now, and we are still consulting. I mean, does not it seem like a decision should be soon if we are going to make something more than a pathetic or feeble attempt at this, that this should be something that we had been working on for a longer period of time than—what is this, is this the 4th?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes, yes.
Ms. PELOSI. Eleven days before the——
Secretary ALBRIGHT. We have been very actively consulting on this. We will have an answer very soon. What is happening, Congresswoman, is that the EU countries are basically thinking that this is not the best approach.
We know that we have a very difficult row to hoe here. We are dedicated and committed to pushing on the human rights issue in China and will continue to do so.
Ms. PELOSI. Well, all I can say is that when the President rejected one approach, he suggested another. And I would suggest to you that the United States be a leader and not a follower of the EU.
We know that China has, ironically, used the surplus that it makes out of U.S.-China trade to buy peace with smaller countries on the UN Commission, as well as with countries they trade with in Europe.
So the trade issue now, instead of delinkage in the U.S., has been linked to the Human Rights Commission. And I would hope that we would not be followers in the UN Commission but leaders there.
Mr. Chairman, how am I doing on time? One more minute? Okay.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have to go to the next round.
I think I have shared with you our concerns about Bosnia, and you spelled out why you issued the waivers. You know of those concerns and I support your overall policy in Bosnia. I think you have made an enormous difference in saving lives and helping to bring a civilized resolution to that issue.
I am going to come back later on questions on the Middle East, but I did want to ask about Chiapas because I have concerns that I raised earlier about whether we are sure that the money that is targeted for the drug war is not being used against the Mexican people in Mexico.
CHIAPAS
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, on this, we are not engaged in any counter insurgency training. And the Mexican Government has not requested such training, nor do we expect it to. And the Mexican Government has said it wants to reach a negotiated settlement on Chiapas, and we welcome their efforts to do so.
We discussed that with them. But I will—I know that you raised many questions on this, and we will get back to you with more of the details.
Ms. PELOSI. Thank you, Madame Secretary. I would be particularly interested in the end use monitoring of the assistance that is going supposedly in the drug war.
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I think my time now has expired. Thanks again, Madame Secretary.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Porter.
Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, thank you for the outstanding job you are doing for our country and for the energy and commitment that you bring to your job.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
IRAQ
Mr. PORTER. I would like to talk to you about Iraq, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Turkey and Cyprus.
Critics say that we have placed all of our peaceful approaches in Iraq in one basket, the UN basket; and that Saddam Hussein has had seven years to comply and is not going to comply, and that he obviously cares more for his weapons programs than he does his own people.
Madame Secretary, why do we not pursue an alternative approach to declare Saddam Hussein a war criminal and provide support to the opposition within Iraq, the Kurdish groups in the north and the Shia in the south and southwest?
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Why do we not prevent any movement of military material or personnel within Iraq from the air, no fly, no drive, no movement whatsoever? And why do we not set up and begin immediately broadcasting a PR message, both within and outside of Iraq, through Radio Free Iraq, to reach the American people and the people of this world. Broadcasting the truth about this regime will help to undermine Saddam. It is obvious that he is not going to comply with UNSCOM and so, are left not only looking weak in the UN but attacking when people do not want us to attack.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think that it is very important to understand that actually the policy that we have been following in terms of getting rid of weapons of mass destruction has been working.
UNSCOM itself, when it is able to do its work, has been able to get rid of more weapons of mass destruction than were gotten rid of during the Gulf War. I think that in the course of this last couple of weeks that this fact has been forgotten because UNSCOM has not been able to do its work.
But when it can, I think UNSCOM has been very effective. We also have managed to keep Saddam Hussein in his strategic box. He has not been able to threaten his neighbors, and we have lessened his abilities to do so.
What has created this most recent crisis was Saddam's attempt yet again to break out of his box and our pushing him back.
In March 1996, I gave a speech in which I made quite clear that we were ready to deal with a post-Saddam regime. And we would like to do that. We have been working with opposition groups. We are looking for ways to work with them more effectively.
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Some of the suggestions that you have made are suggestions that we have in fact been looking at and are exploring. The indictment campaign, the war criminal concept, I think is something that bears looking into. It is not simple because he is the head of a state, but we are looking into that.
Also, in terms of looking at different ways to strengthen some of the points that you have been making, I think that, however, we should not forget that the containment policy of the no drive, no fly zones has been working while, clearly, in the last couple of weeks we have been frustrated by UNSCOM's inability to go into Iraq.
UNSCOM should be able to do that very soon. And what I am very pleased about is that Chairman Butler has stated now many times that he feels comfortable with the arrangement that has been made; that he is in operational control of these new teams that will be going in and of the arrangements, and we will have to test.
At the same time, Congressman, we are looking into the kinds of suggestions that you have made.
Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
TURKEY
I just returned from, among other places, Turkey with a congressional delegation looking at human rights because in my judgement, human rights are preventing Turkey from moving into partnership with the EU, gaining a good relationship with their neighbors and destroying the fabric of Turkish society within by using only military means to address social and economic problems that I believe exist.
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Prime Minister Yilmaz has put forward a five point program which he announced here. He has vowed first to decriminalize free speech; to release imprisoned journalists and parliamentarians, of which there are more journalists in the world in prison in Turkey than anywhere else; to reopen human rights NGO's and to end the state of emergency in the six southeastern provinces where the fighting has occurred; and to provide some social and cultural and economic support and development in that area.
Are you hopeful that this can be accomplished politically within Turkey? Also, what is the United States doing to help the Prime Minister get from where Turkey is to where they need to go and help them become a member of the EU and be accepted there as they should be?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, let me say how much I agree with you in terms of the importance of Turkey becoming a part of the EU. I think it is very important to make sure that Turkey stays turned westward.
In my visits to Turkey, I have made that clear, as well as in my discussion with Prime Minister Yilmaz when he was here and my very frequent discussions with Foreign Minister Chem.
We do continue to urge the Turkish Government to make systemic human rights reforms. I will not repeat them because you stated them, and I think it is a case that we make very loudly to them.
The Turkish Government has taken some positive steps in 1997. They lifted the state of emergency in three provinces, and they have reduced the maximum pre-arraignment detention period in the southern part of the country, and they have granted some provisional amnesties to six jailed editors; however, they do have a ways to go.
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Now what has happened is that I asked Assistant Secretary Shattuck to visit Turkey—he did that last month—to deliver a very firm message and to review our concerns, including the recent arrest of some Kurdish politicians.
We expect his Turkish counterpart to visit the U.S. soon, and we will continue to keep our focus on these human rights issues. They are of great concern to us and obviously of great concern in other parts of the world.
I do think that some of the reasons that Turkey is not a member of the EU are other than those associated with human rights concerns, and we are talking to our EU friends about this.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Mr. PORTER. Madame Secretary, can we talk for a moment about Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh because it seems to me this is a place where, with the right negotiations, there can be a win-win-win situation.
And by that, I mean a win for Azerbaijan in terms of its relationship with Armenia and vice versa; a win for Armenia in terms of sharing in the economical development of the Caucasus oil fields; and a win for American oil companies who can develop those oil fields for the Azeris.
This is a very difficult part of the world where people do not think in terms of winning; they only think in terms of one side winning and the other side losing. There have been some very pronounced developments, particularly politically, within Armenia very recently with the resignation of President Ter-Petrosian and the elections that are about to occur.
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Congressman Wolf has been very concerned about the situation with Azeri refugees. And we are both concerned about reports that humanitarian aid intended for Azeri refugees has been improperly diverted by the government agency in Azerbaijan which is responsible for distributing that aid. Further, there are reports that the Azeri government does little to assist these persons.
The Azeri refugees number pretty close to three quarters of a million or maybe more than three quarters of a million people living in very, very difficult circumstances.
So I would ask if you would comment upon what Congress did to encourage the Minsk process in this fiscal year? What hope do you have for that process working and what can we do to assure that the humanitarian assistance that this country wants to provide to the people displaced by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh actually gets to these people and helps them.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes, thank you.
Again, this is one of these disputes that we have been involved in trying to resolve through a number of methods. One is the Minsk process. Also, the United Nations has tried to support that process.
What I think is very important to understand is that despite the fact that there have been these attempts, the peace efforts have generally made little progress. There have been four Security Council resolutions that have not been abided by.
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What has happened is that Nagorno-Karabakh, which is backed by Armenia, retains a lot of the military advantage; whereas Azerbaijan has the economic clout and leverage; thus they are at a stalemate to a great extent.
What we have tried to do, given that we do believe that we have a strategic energy interest as well as an understanding of the importance of strategic this area, is to try to make the Minsk process work as well as provide aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan, though aid to Azerbaijan is limited, as you know, by legislation.
We are starting a direct aid program to Nagorno-Karabakh. We are seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. And we are now pursuing a tripartheid approach, and Strobe Talbot is the co-chair of the conference along with Russia and France.
And that had been working to some extent in 1997.
Mr. PORTER. That may be part of the problem, Madame Secretary, I am sorry to say.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. The fact that there are three of them?
Mr. PORTER. No, the fact that Strobe Talbot is in charge.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I would dispute that because I think that he is taking great interest in it and working very hard on it.
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The co-chairs presented a new peace proposal in May 1997. But given the intractability of the process, they proposed an interim agreement to liberate the occupied territories, allow the displaced persons to return and guarantee security to permit the sides to negotiate on status with no threat of resumed hostilities.
Now, Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted this proposal as the basis for negotiations. But Nagorno-Karabakh rejected it because they were determined to trade land directly for a status amounting to independence.
Now we have the added dimension of the change of government in Armenia. And the Minsk co-chairs have met in February to try to develop some new steps. They are going to be briefing the OSCE chairman and office this week, and then further negotiations await the inauguration of a new Armenian president and the establishment of a new government.
It has been a process that was not exactly marching forward before and now has the added issue of the Armenian elections. That is where we are on that.
In terms of assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh we have tried to work through a coordinators office to make sure that the assistance is properly distributed. Before giving approval to spend any of the funds, you all asked the coordinator in December, to send an assessment team to the region.
In January, a USAID team went to Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and that report is still in draft. It concludes that there are no acute humanitarian crises in the region, but it does identify several humanitarian needs that we should address.
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The first assistance program will be an effort to treat tuberculosis, including preventative immunizations for children under five. And USAID has identified a non-governmental organization to implement that.
When we get the final report, we will talk to you again about this. Moreover, I will look specifically into the Azeri displaced issue.
Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Yates.
Mr. YATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you. I am in favor of the work that you have done and the Administration's foreign policy in general.
IRAQ
I do have a question with respect to Iraq. I could agree with you as far as the bombing to enforce the ceasefire agreement with Iraq. But what happens after that? What are you going to do after the bombing? Provide foreign aid to Iraq? Then what happens—do you put a government in there? I do not believe you can install a democratic government in Iraq.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think that we do hope that this diplomatic approach will work.
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Mr. YATES. I join you in that.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. What has been very interesting, as a former professor of international relations, is that now I am practicing what one always reads and writes about—to try to have diplomacy backed by the threat of the use of force; that that is sometimes where diplomacy can make its greatest contribution.
I was very pleased that Secretary General Kofi Annan has made quite clear that the presence of American and British forces in the region added a lot of clout to his diplomacy. And the diplomacy that he carried out was very much guided by the red lines that the United States had put down.
We hope very much that the agreement made will in fact bear fruit. But, as the President said and I have said, it has to be tested. We will be testing to make sure that Saddam Hussein does live up to allowing these inspectors to go forward and do their jobs unfettered, unconditioned and be able to go to all the sites.
If we have to take military action, it will be for the purpose of diminishing his weapons of mass destruction threat and his threat to his neighbors. At the same time, as I responded to Congressman Porter, we are looking at ways to work with the opposition groups more effectively and at some of the other suggestions that he made.
But we believe that a continued approach of containing him is the best way to go.
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Mr. YATES. That answer does not quite satisfy my curiosity. How are you going to enforce the agreement? I mean, all right, we have bombed Iraq and the teams are now looking for the chemical and biological weapons sites.
Are you going to put any U.N. troops with the teams in Iraq to look for the weapons of mass destruction? Are you going to put occupation forces in there—in there, in Iraq? How are you going to do it?
And suppose Suddam Hussein does not cooperate with you? What then?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, I am hoping that the diplomatic route will work, and the questions that you are asking are indeed hypothetical. I think that if he breaks the agreement now, there will be much greater support for our use of force than there was before, and therefore more support potentially in terms of pressing Saddam Hussein to allow the inspectors to go back in even after a bombing.
I am not going to discuss any further what the operational aspects of the bombing would be. But basically, as I have said, the purpose of that would be to diminish his weapons of mass destruction threat.
We have no intention of having an occupying force. We would continue to work through various sanctions regimes and the support of the international community which I am convinced would be much greater if Saddam Hussein now does break the agreement that he made.
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Clearly part of the issue here is how one gets him to live up to what his obligations are. We cannot do that alone. We need international support to do that.
Mr. YATES. Well, I believe that is true. Have France, Russia and China indicated they would support you in the event of a breach now of Kofi Annan's agreement?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. They have in fact said that the atmosphere would be so different if he broke with the agreement that they—they have described it that way, that they—I do not want to commit them here, but they have made quite clear that they would view a breaking of this agreement as a completely different situation and that they would be supportive of us.
Mr. CALLAHAN. If the gentleman would yield just for a second.
Madame Secretary, Saddam Hussein broke the agreement that the UN drafted when he surrendered after his invasion of Kuwait. He has already broken the agreement. So that is a point that I think they are laying a lot of blame on us.
The UN drafted the agreement. Saddam Hussein signed it and agreed to it in his surrender policy. And then he totally ignored it. So we go and negotiate another one saying we hope he does not break this one.
I am sorry, Mr. Yates, I just wanted to make that point.
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Mr. YATES. That is all right.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. YATES. How do you reply to the chairman?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I mean that Saddam did sign an agreement. And for seven years the international community has been able to carry out its task. It was only in the last few weeks that he totally impeded it. He has now signed an agreement that actually has his—as Chairman Butler has said—''his thumbprint on it.''
Saddam has been part of negotiating it. And I think it will be even clearer to the international community that he has broken his word. The United States, as I said in my statement and we have said repeatedly, is prepared to act if he does not follow through.
Mr. YATES. Did not he break his word to the international community, as the Chairman indicated?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. He did, and that is why we took the action that we did and are prepared to continue to take that kind of action. We were not opposed to what Kofi Annan was trying to do based on some red lines that we provided.
We now have another opportunity to give diplomacy a chance and have the inspectors test the agreement. And, as I said, if Saddam Hussein does not pass this test, we are prepared to use force again.
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It is my considered opinion that, were that to happen, the countries would be with us on supporting the use of force.
Mr. YATES. Countries would be with us—does that include Egypt, for example?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, we have talked to the Egyptians and they I think, and others all wanted to provide one more chance. In discussions that I have had in the last 48 hours, I think that they all agree that the severest consequences, which is what the Security Council resolution said, which in fact is code word for the use of force, would apply.
Mr. CALLAHAN. If I just might comment in following up on what Congressman Yates is saying.
You know, we keep talking about perception here, Madame Secretary. And the agreement that was broken was a UN agreement. And if any agency or any group should have initiated this type of response and retaliatory efforts toward Iraq, it should have been the United Nations.
Instead, the United States took the leadership because this was a threat not only to the Middle East, but to the entire world. Why in the world the United Nations did not initiate the threat of military activity before we had to force the issue is a mystery to me.
Now you are coming and saying we must come forward with some arrearage monies to fulfill our obligation to the United Nations. But what General Secretary Annan did was to give the perception that the United States are warmongers and that the UN are the peacekeepers.
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But they were the ones that should have initiated the action. It was a threat to the world. Saddam Hussein does not have the missile capability of bombing the United States of America. We were trying to protect the members of the United Nations from the activity that no doubt would come if we allow him to continue to develop this.
So while all heaps and praise are being placed upon the United Nations Secretary General, in my opinion he should have been the one initiating the original military threat to Iraq if he did not cease to break the agreement he signed with the United Nations.
So maybe Secretary General Annan is going to get the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, but he was derelict in not initiating the threat to Iraq if indeed they would not permit the continued inspections as they agreed to do.
So a lot of activity and a lot of focus is placed on his efforts to peacefully trust a man that you cannot trust. But at the same time, he was derelict, as was the United Nations, when they permitted this to take place without the threats other than some type of agreement that ultimately was negotiated.
I do not want to get you embroiled in that international controversy, but once again, perception is there, Madame Secretary. The United Nations failed. The United States of America did not fail in foreign policy.
We did exactly the right thing by utilizing our force capabilities, stationing them there and threatening him with military action if he did not comply with the UN agreements.
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So while the Secretary General is accepting all of this praise worldwide for his peacekeeping activities from keeping the warmongers in the United States from bombing innocent people, that is the wrong perception.
The United Nations was wrong in not initiating this insistence that we threaten Saddam Hussein if indeed he continued to denounce the capability of further inspections that he agreed to.
Mr. Packard.
Mr. PACKARD. I'll try to be brief because I came in late. I was conducting a hearing of my own. We were, fortunately, able to conclude in time to be here. I'm sorry I missed your testimony, Madam Secretary.
UKRAINE
I'd be interested to know—I'm aware that you will be going to the Ukraine shortly—tomorrow, I believe it is, is it not?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Correct, yes.
Mr. PACKARD. And we have been fighting this battle with the Ukrainian government and business over there, the joint ventures, and, in specific, on the Gala Radio issue. That has gotten worse, rather than better, in my judgment. And it will be your responsibility to make a decision as to whether the Ukraine has literally made progress in corruption and impeding of joint venturing in their country by U.S. business and industry.
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I would be interested in knowing how you plan to follow up on that. I've got a press release that shows that the Ukrainian government is actually now retaliating against the Gala Radio because they have used their right to arbitrate their disputes through the process that has been set up.
And now that they have initiated arbitration proceedings, the government of the Ukraine is literally retaliating by investigating, on three separate fronts, their employees in the company, and really things have deteriorated and gotten worse rather than better. It's almost unconscionable for us to send $200 million to the Ukraine when they are literally impeding American joint venturing in their country.
I'd be interested in a response and what you intend to do as you go visit there tomorrow.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Congressman. At some point, I would like to respond to what the Chairman said in his last remark, but I probably won't get another chance.
Mr. PACKARD. You're welcome to do that before you answer——
Secretary ALBRIGHT. All right. Let me just say this. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we need to separate the United Nations per se from some of its member states. There clearly were members of the Security Council that did not want us to take action forcefully. The Secretary General, I believe, was doing the job that he is mandated to do—to try to help resolve some disputes.
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I also do not like the fact that the United States is being portrayed as the warmonger while others are taking credit for peace, when I believe that the United States is the greatest force for peace. And statements that the Secretary General made in which he said that his diplomacy was aided by the use of force I think are the appropriate statements to make.
I believe that the United Nations per se is one part, and some of the member states with whom we disagree are another. I also think that it's very clear that this should not be an Iraq versus U.S. struggle but an Iraq versus the world struggle.
And it is my considered opinion and belief that this is not a matter of trusting Saddam Hussein. It is testing him. And if he fails this test, then the international community will, once again, see his actions as causing the disruption of peace, and the U.S. actions as those supporting peace.
Now, let me say that on the Ukrainian issue, we have been very concerned about the issues that you are raising in terms of investment disputes. Vice President Gore, Ambassador Sestanovich, Ambassador Morningstar, and others have raised these issues with Ukrainian officials, and I will do so on Friday when I am in Kiev.
I am going to be meeting with the business community there. President Kuchma assured Vice President Gore that the Ukrainian government would act in a forthright manner to seek the resolution of these disputes, and we're determined to do everything to get these matters settled.
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We are concerned about the fact that while there has been some progress in macroeconomic stabilization and privatization, we are concerned about the fundamental pace of economic reforms in Ukraine. I will be raising those subjects there. Private investors do continue to face major hurdles. Some of the unresolved investment disputes are responsible for the government's inability to create a favorable climate.
We very much have a chicken and egg problem—that they have serious economic problems because they are not able to attract investment. One of the reasons they're not is that they haven't been able to undertake all of their economic reforms. It would be premature for me to speculate on what decision I'm going to make on certification, but I clearly am going to raise these points.
On the Gala Radio issue specifically, the U.S. Government has weighed in strongly on behalf of the company with all levels of the Ukrainian government, and I will do so again. Ambassador Pifer, on February 27th, expressed serious concern to the government about the actions against Gala that have occurred since the government of Ukraine was served notice of Mr. Lemur's filing under the Bilateral Investment Treaty in mid January. We will continue to press on that, and I can just assure you that I will personally do so.
Mr. PACKARD. I hope that you will bring up the concern that we have that—if the Bilateral Investment Treaty is to resolve these kinds of disputes. If a company uses that process in an effort to resolve the dispute, only to find that the government retaliates against the country, then that process is of no use.
And that would be very frustrating to any company, whether it be American or any other country that is investing in the Ukraine—to simply not be able to use the system in place to resolve disputes because it will invite retaliation. I would——
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. We'll make that point.
Mr. PACKARD. I would hope that you would—I'm not just looking at the one company. That's the most obvious example of the macro problem that exists there on corruption.
Mr. CALLAHAN. It might be a good idea, Madam Secretary, if you met once again, if your time permitted, with some of these American companies with complaints before you visited with the political leadership in the Ukraine.
I think there have been some new developments since they last talked with you, and maybe you should be aware of them.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. We'll try that.
Mr. CALLAHAN. So if your schedule permits, it would be best.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mr. PACKARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Yes.
Ms. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, may I defer to my colleague, Ms. Kaptur, for just 10 minutes, since I was just informed I have to rush off. We're always pulled in different directions. But I did want to ask you some questions. And if I could defer to my colleague, and then I will return in just about 10 minutes. Is that okay?
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Mr. CALLAHAN. That would be good.
Mrs. LOWEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
Welcome, Madam Secretary. We're so proud of the work that you're doing. I know that I'm watching living history, I guess, and it's pretty exciting.
CYPRUS
I wanted to ask three or four different questions. One concern in your statement on page 5 which you mentioned is Cyprus. And our country—the administration—has taken a really strong stand on the United Nations security resolutions concerning the Iraq situation. However, the Security Council also, over the years, has passed a number of resolutions concerning Cyprus. And there appears to be a less vigorous enforcement of those than perhaps others that have been passed.
And so my question to you is: Since you mentioned Cyprus in the testimony, what is the administration doing to resolve that particular situation? When you were at the U.N., you affirmed the territorial integrity of Cyprus; in fact, quoted as saying the illegality of the Turkish army's occupation. I am very interested in what the administration intends to do to resolve this particular situation.
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, this has been, I think, one of the longest-running and most troublesome disputes that we have had to deal with, and that has been on the United Nations docket. We place a very high priority on resolving the Cyprus dispute, and we are actively engaged from the President on down on this.
We have assembled a very strong negotiating team led by Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Tom Miller. What we are doing is supporting U.N. efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute on the basis of the bizonal/bicommunal federation through direct talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders.
We have been working very hard to create a positive climate in which the U.N. settlement talks can resume. I took part in this when I was U.N. Ambassador, and I have tried to be involved in it at this stage. We have been somewhat delayed for the moment because of the elections in Cyprus, which are now over. With President Clerides reelected, I think that we are now reengaging very actively to get them to talk to each other.
Part of the issue, as you know, has to do with Cypriot accession to the EU and the various problems in trying to assemble a delegation, and trying to get those two processes working together. But I can just assure you that it is high on our agenda. Now that the elections there are over, I think we will be able to reengage more actively.
Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. We would hope to see that as soon as possible.
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
DEMINING
Ms. KAPTUR. Your budget includes now in southeast Asia the demining issue. Your budget shows a 700 percent increase over the last two years for humanitarian demining. One of my questions is to what extent Laos and Cambodia will benefit this year and succeeding years from this program. Will it be an increase in those particular countries compared to past years?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have to get you the specific numbers on that. But generally our approach here is to add a great deal to demining. We have a demining project going. Ambassador Endrfirth is heading that up. It is our major effort, to dealing with the horror of land mines. And we will be elaborating more with you what the various parts of that program involve. I'll have to get the numbers Laos and Cambodia for you.
UKRAINE
Ms. KAPTUR. We'd be very interested in that.
I am very interested in your upcoming trip to Ukraine. Our family traces its roots to the western part of that country. Of course, it has been five different nations, and at one point the area in which our family came from was occupied, et cetera, by other nations.
But I guess by traveling back several times long before independence, and now after independence, I have a growing concern about our ability at the village level. I know how it is to travel as a Congresswoman. You're insulated from so much. It's a real hindrance. It's a handicap in traveling. I can only imagine what it must be as the Secretary of State in traveling for the United States in many of these countries.
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But I am more and more concerned about the ability of people at the village level to feed themselves and to sustain life because of the complete breakdown of agriculture in the old system. Production in Ukraine has gone down by about 85 percent now compared to prior years in the breadbasket.
This will sound so simple. We talk about these big ideas and big projects, but I think one of the most important aspects of stability in Ukraine right now is to get seed into the hands of those who own private plots, not with 150 horsepower tractors to till up the land, but little rototillers, anything, to let people at the village level feed themselves over this most difficult transition. It isn't very romantic. It isn't very exciting. You don't make the front page by doing it.
However, what I have found in my recent travels is that people are literally crying at the village level for the ability to feed themselves. It has become harder, even though, our agricultural efforts in that country are very well meaning, I don't think they're having the kind of impact that they need to have at the most local of levels.
So I would just encourage you in your capacity, if you could, to meet perhaps with some of our agricultural specialists over there while you're there to think about a project this spring using some of our money from this country and other nations that are trying to help, working perhaps through the churches and the philanthropic groups that have a presence at the local level to get good seed, which we can absolutely do, with some minimal amounts of fertilizer, into the hands of the private plot owners. We do not even have to deal with these largely privatized collective farms yet because it is going to take us a while to turn those around. But just making this available, so people at least can have potatoes and perhaps some tomatoes and things to feed themselves over this period of time.
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The other point I wanted to raise—I also serve on Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee and I talked with former Congresswoman Jill Long Thompson, now Under Secretary of Agriculture, yesterday. There is going to be a large conference of women in agriculture and rural development here in our nation's capital in June. I would hope that as you meet with people in Ukraine you might suggest that some of the women leaders of that country who are involved in agriculture might send a delegation. I know about the Gore talks, and some of the people have been appointed to these international bodies.
I just wonder how many women are involved since they're the ones that are holding things together at the village level. They're trying to feed their families, take care of sick children or incapacitated husbands, or just being heads of families themselves. And I just think if we could reach out more to the women farmers of Ukraine, since they're the ones working these private plots, we could do an enormous amount to hold things together while we try to assist in fixing the rest of that system.
In that regard, I know one of Mrs. Clinton's priorities is ending the slave trade and prostitution in all of those states, including Ukraine. And many of these are village women have been taken in on these schemes. The very women I'm talking about would be much better back home in weaving co-ops, and planting on these private plots to support their families.
I would hope that you could be as supportive as possible to Mrs. Clinton's efforts, and hopefully our efforts on this subcommittee, to try to stem that tide and to give these women better alternatives.
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I think it's very hard sometimes to communicate between Kiev and the villages. But Ukraine is the breadbasket, and, in my judgment, her future is in agriculture. We have to help her get there as soon as possible, starting from the private plot level on up. I think this is worth mentioning.
My own observation in meeting with many well-meaning people from the western world over there is that our presence is too fragmented. It is too short term. In other words, you send somebody in; they're out in six months. We have a lot of very well-meaning Peace Corps workers—God bless them—but they don't have the experience that is needed in agronomy in the kind of concentrated effort to start at the grass roots level.
In my humble opinion, too many of our people end up in Kiev. They make $325 a day as consultants, and that's great, but the future of Ukraine has to be built in the countryside. So I would encourage you to advocate such a position.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much for that statement because in my previous life, before becoming Secretary of State, I spent a lot of time in Ukraine actually at the village level doing a lot of surveys. I have seen what you're talking about. And, in fact, I went to one place called Ushagarod that had been in five different countries at different times. So I know of what you speak.
I think you've made some very, very important suggestions, and Ambassador Morningstar is going to be with me, who does our aid programs. And I will direct that we spend much more time talking about some of these village issues, which I think you're absolutely right about.
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I think the great sadness of Ukraine as you drive through is that you do actually see this black earth, and you know what it could produce. And I think I will take up everything that you've said, including the issue about the women leaders.
Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Knollenberg.
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Madam Secretary, welcome. In going along with my colleagues, I, too, want to say that I'm impressed by the way that you handle yourself, speaking straightforward, and your grace and your grit. You've got both and you need both in that job.
BLACKHAWK HELICOPTERS
A very quick question—I have a couple—it has to do with Colombia. The Chairman alluded to this comment on the helicopters. As you know, the FY 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Report included $36 million for three Blackhawk helicopters, for the Colombian National Police, because they need them at that altitude. It is one of the few helicopters, I think, that can fly at that altitude.
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Congress directed this action because of the dramatic influx of heroin, etcetera. What is the status of this procurement? Are you continuing to hold funds because you are thinking about reprogramming them for some other expenditure? Or what is the status of that?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. This is a very important issue, and it has to do with the difficulties of Bolivia and our narcotics budget. First of all, we're reviewing very carefully the report language and the technical issues relating to the helicopters.
We understand the need to conduct these kinds of missions and the altitude, need to fly at a higher but we've developed a more cost effective way to deal with this. Over the weekend I was down at South Com, where they handle a lot of the drug aspects of it. They do not believe that these helicopters are essential to the program, nor does General Barry McCaffrey. And the cost of procuring the Blackhawks, and the much greater expense of operating them, would seriously reduce our budget to support operations against cocoa and opium in Columbia.
To take $36 million out of our total budget would hit the other programs terribly hard. That is, in Bolivia and Peru. While we do think that there is obviously the need for greater attention to Columbia, the Blackhawk helicopters are not the best use our funds, and so we are studying this.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you. Let me also associate myself with the comments of Mr. Porter in regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. As you know, he and I authored the language that did designate $12.5 million in humanitarian aid that would be used specifically for Nagorno-Karabakh. And you had said—if I am paraphrasing you wrongly, you can tell me—but that you will work to ensure that the Nagorno-Karabakh assistance is properly delivered.
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My question is: delivered to whom? And will it be done in accordance with the intent of Congress? Madam Secretary, this is March. This was done last fall. And to my knowledge, I don't think there is a single program that has been placed in effect by the administration. We want to work with you on this. But one of the things you mentioned, too, was the needs assessment that took place recently, and it has yet to be finalized.
According to information that I have, there is some interim reporting that has taken place at least that indicates there are some very, very major concerns that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have. Shelter is a vital need, refugee housing obviously, there are serious sanitary problems, there are infrastructure problems, there are problems with hospitals and medicines.
And I also believe that the medicines are housed in a single building that makes it very difficult to transport throughout the region. Stepanakert happens to be that particular city, and the warehouse is in that city. So a lot of this isn't getting out. They do need help. And my question is—and we want to work with you on this—but can you respond with what do you intend to do, and when is the first money going to be distributed in Nagorno-Karabakh?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I would expect that this NGO that is going to be handling the issue of the tuberculosis would be giving children in the region their TB shots next month. Based on the final assessment of this team, we will be submitting additional projects to you very shortly for approval.
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I think that based on all of your and Congressman Porter's question, I will make an additional effort to see what is exactly going on.
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. We'd appreciate that. We want to work with you on it. We know that there are significant problems, and some of those obviously you're more aware of than I. But we both have traveled there in the last year, and we feel strongly about movement in the direction of seeing something happen on the basis of what was in the report language.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Obey.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, before I ask my two questions, I'd simply like to note we have our friend James Bond in the room, who used to be the counsel for the Senate Subcommittee. [Laughter.]
I see Jim Bond in the room, but I don't see Sean Connery. [Laughter.]
Just kidding, Jim.
MIDDLE EAST
Madam Secretary, let me ask about the Middle East. As you know, I strongly believe in pushing the peace process forward. But as you also know, there are a good many members of the American Jewish community who are concerned about that process. I'd like to ask you, how do you assess that peace process at this point?
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And what would you say to those in the American Jewish community who are concerned about what they see as insufficient action by the Palestinians and the PLO to respond to Israel's security concerns, who think that Israel's security may be put at risk by further Israeli concessions?
Why is it in the United States' interest as well as Israel's interest for this peace process to continue to move forward, and for us to continue to deal directly with the PLO? I think it's important that they understand why, and I think it's important that this committee understand why.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say that, clearly, 1997 was not a good year for the peace process. We had been pressing all along to try to get two things accomplished.
If I might just take a minute to put this into context, the Oslo agreement set up a process to have some interim agreements take place before the final status talks would begin. The purpose of those agreements was really so that the two parties would work together, would learn to have confidence in each other, and be able to develop some not only confidence but imagination to go to the permanent status issues.
What happened was that, in fact, as the process began to move forward with the Hebron Agreement, and some of the subsequent acts, rather than working to build confidence, the interim process began somehow to erode it. And yet there are various parts of it that need to continue to take place in order to move to final status.
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There are questions about an airport in Gaza, a Gaza industrial state, a seaport, trying to get further redeployments of territory from the Israelis to the Palestinians. Those things have all been held up because of this lack of trust and ability of the leaders to deal with each other on some very serious problems.
We do think—and I gave a speech last year that indicated that perhaps the way to move forward now was to marry the interim process to the final status process in order to begin to eliminate these frictions in order to be able to get to the permanent status.
We have been working on trying to do two very specific acts. There is no question that security is a sine qua non, that it is essential for the Palestinians to take all of the steps necessary to make sure that there is not a security issue. You cannot negotiate in an atmosphere where there is concern as to whether security is being taken care of. And we have insisted that the Palestinians make a 100 percent effort on the security issues.
We have pressed Arafat repeatedly on this, and we're going to continue to do that. We also have talked about the importance of a timeout in terms of issues by either side where there is a certain unilateral act that, in fact, kind of corrodes the atmosphere. We have been trying to make sure that those kinds of steps are not taken, and we are working to get the parties to move forward on the further redeployment schedule.
We've had a number of meetings with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. Dennis Ross has been meeting with people at other levels, and we are going to do everything we can now to reinvigorate the peace process.
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We deal with the PLO because it is the authoritative body that is, in fact, moving things forward and has made some progress. And we believe that Chairman Arafat is in a position to exert the effort on security, as well as be able to make the decisions necessary.
What has to happen, Mr. Chairman, is that they have to do a great deal, but we cannot make the hard decisions for the leaders. They have to make the hard decisions, in terms of what the security issues are and the further redeployment, and then move to final status. That is what we're going to be trying to do is to reinvigorate it.
And I sure hope that 1998 is better than 1997, because our national interest is based on the fact that we need to get this peace process moving.
NATO
Mr. OBEY. Thank you. Let me just not so much ask a question but simply raise, again, my concern about one issue with which I profoundly disagree with the administration, and that is expansion of NATO.
As you know, I have minimum high regard for that decision. And I simply noted this morning in the paper a comment by Alton Frey, and I'd simply like to quote some of the points he made in that article this morning. First of all, he said, ''There is no near-term threat to the three candidates' security''—the three countries who have been invited to join.
Second, he said, ''Modernizing their economies will do far more to shore up their democratic institututions than symbolic association with NATO.''
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Thirdly, he said, ''Meeting the military requirements of NATO membership will divert resources from the urgent economic transformations needed for admission to the European Union.''
Fourthly, he said, ''Phasing them into NATO after they join the European Union will greatly strengthen their economic capacity to meet the substantial procurement, training, and operational costs alliance membership imposes.''
And lastly, he said, ''Their active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace already affords them the full range of effective military cooperation for which they are prepared.''
And then three paragraphs later he asserted this, he said, ''Without rejecting the three pending candidates, the Senate can stipulate that final admission to NATO should await entry into the European Union. Indeed, by linking the two processes, the Senate would be applying useful leverage to encourage the European Union to expedite accession negotiations with the three countries. That would, in fact, serve Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic better than prematory admission to NATO.''
I agree with that, and I note that Senators Moynihan and Warner are evidently offering an amendment in the Senate that would provide exactly that. And while I would not presume to lobby the Senate to adopt the amendment, I would certainly state that I think that's a good idea.
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And I, again, would simply say that I am concerned. The defining moment in my life, in terms of my view of international affairs was watching what happened in this country when we went through a ''who lost China'' debate, and McCarthyism ran rampant in this country and destroyed decent dialogue between all kinds of people in this country for a good almost a decade.
I am afraid that the way in which we have approached the expansion of NATO eastward could, in fact, down the line contribute to a similar debate within Russia with virulent nationalist forces directing the same kind of vicious attacks against those elements in Russia most friendly to us as were directed against very responsible parties in the State Department years ago when we had the debate about China.
And so it just seems to me that it is a mistake, and that, in fact, we might be stimulating the very threat that we're trying to prevent by extending NATO membership. And I guess I would just ask you, since you have a right to reply, what would be wrong with requiring the action that is contemplated in the Moynihan amendment before they actually join.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, let me say that all of the arguments that you read I clearly disagree with. I think that while there is no specific army standing on the borders of those countries at the moment, I do think that what we're trying to do is widen the area in which there would not be instability and a military threat.
When we don't have the best way to prepare for not having a military threat is to try to deal with it at a time of peace. We already know that the major problem in Central and Eastern Europe are problems among the countries, and they have already dealt with a whole series of their border disputes, just on the hope of getting into NATO, and it has been a very positive action.
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In terms of their economies, I think that they would have to provide for their military defense anyway, and they find this is actually a better way, even as we are pressing them to fulfill their budgetary obligations toward an expansion of NATO.
Now, on the specific issue of the EU, I think it would be great if these countries got into the EU, but we are not a part of the EU and we cannot force their pace. We also know already that there are certain questions about some of the products that the new countries are strong in, that are creating problems within the EU. So it is very hard to tie one process that we think is moving at the appropriate pace, in which we do have an influence, to one that we have no influence on, while I do believe that ultimately it would be very good for these countries to get into the EU.
On the question of Russia, let me just say that I deal with this on a daily basis. While there are Russians who are not happy about NATO expansion, it is not preventing them from having a positive relationship with us on a whole series of issues, and they are, through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, very much more drawn into discussions that they were not a part of before.
I think that the best way to strengthen the forces of reform in Russia is through our various assistance programs that we are going to be talking about, or have talked about, understanding their status in the world as a powerful, diplomatic force, and they did play, I think, a positive role on the Iraq issue. I think, generally, supporting the forces of reform, not giving in to the forces of looking inward and backward is the best policy for the United States.
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Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Kingston.
Mr. OBEY. Yes. I would just say I think you're right. I mean, I hope you're right on the latter.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. My first answer was good. [Laughter.]
Mr. OBEY. No, I was—I think I misspoke. But let me simply say that I do really find it ironic that the Europeans ought to have at least as much interest as we do in the welfare of Central Europe. The Western Europeans ought to have at least as much interest in their welfare as we do.
I do find it interesting that for a variety of very self-seeking reasons, some of which relate to agriculture, that the Western Europeans are saying to the United States, ''Oh, go ahead. You let them into NATO, and you spend the money that you have to spend to help effectuate that process.'' But no, we won't let them into the economic union, which, after all, ought to be, in my view, the very first step that is taken if we're to actually integrate those countries into our——
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Obey, if I might interrupt, your 20 minutes is up. [Laughter.]
We have some people who have been waiting all morning, and I think we ought to make certain they have the opportunity.
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Mr. Kingston.
LATIN AMERICA
Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary—excuse me, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary. Switching hemispheres.
The congressional presentation refers to the importance of human rights in several places in the international narcotics section for Latin America, yet in Ecuador, according to your U.S. Department of State January 30, 1998, report, it just says, ''In Ecuador, people are subject to arbitrary arrests. Once incarcerated, they may wait years before being convicted or acquitted, unless they pay bribes. More than half the prisoners in jail have not been formally sentenced.''
Then, a New York Times article from August 22, 1997, goes into more of that. It says that human rights groups and government investigations have scrutinized the system which finds that judges demand payoffs to move a case toward trial. Defendants found not guilty remain in jail, are tortured. One statistic is that some 60 percent of Ecuador's inmates are eventually found not guilty. Of 2,700 inmates, 80 percent who have not been sentenced have an average waiting period of 400 days before they come to trial.
Should an American citizen find himself, unfortunately, in this situation, what sort of support can he count on from the State Department?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. The support they would get is obviously from our embassies and consular services. We work very hard to try to give all the support we can to Americans that find themselves in a legal situation abroad.
Mr. KINGSTON. To get into that a little bit, if an American in that situation is not satisfied that the embassy is looking out for his interest, or believes that signals from Washington prevent the embassy from looking at his interest, is there a way to redress it?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that part of the issue here is we know how to handle our people. But the problem is that in each country there are sovereign laws, and they apply them to people regardless of their nationality, and many times they can be inefficient or corrupt.
Now, our role is to ensure that the rights are observed. While we can't get every American citizen released, we do our best to try to figure out how to move the process forward. We are prohibited by law from acting as legal counsel, but we can be present in the court to monitor and report on legal proceedings, and we visit incarcerated citizens, which we have, in fact, done. We do this quarterly in Ecuador as you mentioned, and once a month in Peru. We can provide dietary supplements and various other items.
But it clearly is a difficult situation when we are operating within the laws of another country, but we do the best we can to assist.
Mr. KINGSTON. In some conversations with officials from Ecuador, it has been suggested to us that—I mean, in my office—that sometimes the United States really pushes for convictions and arrests, and in doing so can sometimes put that in front of human rights or due process. How would you respond to that?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. I would respond that I do not think that is true. I think that what we try to ensure is that the rights of Americans arrested under foreign law are fully observed, and that they are treated humanely and according to international standards, and any violations we protest.
You're saying that we push for convictions?
Mr. KINGSTON. Excuse me?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. That the U.S. pushes for convictions?
Mr. KINGSTON. Well, there has been some suggestion that sometimes, if it's an international drug ring, that it might be easier—if United States doesn't have a good enough case against the citizen, that it might be okay, not necessarily by the State Department, to let somebody sit in jail as a pawn in a foreign country to maybe get them to testify against somebody else in another country as part of an international drug ring.
Have you ever heard of that? Does that—I mean, that doesn't sound like the good old U.S. of A. to me, and I would expect that you would react strongly in agreement.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I have not heard of that, but I will look into that.
Mr. KINGSTON. We have written—our office—and 13 other members of Congress have written a letter to your office on December 2nd, which now is three months, regarding one case. And I would really hope that you could get us a response to that letter as soon as possible, because, you know, it's been three months.
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IRAQ
Let me switch to Iraq. And forgive me for not knowing the exact fact, but I understand that there was an increase in the allowable oil sales to Iraq very recently, prior to the agreement. Are you familiar with what I'm talking about?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. KINGSTON. How much was that?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think it's very important that people really understand what this is all about. As I stated earlier, there are those who believe that the people of Iraq are suffering greatly as a result of the sanctions. We have never had any argument with the people of Iraq; we have an argument with their leadership.
The various sanctions have never prohibited humanitarian assistance going into Iraq. The problem has been that the Iraqi government says that it does not have enough money in order to purchase the food and medicines necessary.
In order not to allow Saddam Hussein to use his people as pawns in front of the international community, saying that we are starving them, we have for some time been pressing a regime that would make it possible for him to sell oil in order to buy food and medicines, which then are distributed in a very specific way to the people that need it and not to his cronies.
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It's a way, basically, for the United States and other countries to show the fact that we have no argument with the Iraqi people. What has happened is that recently that Oil for Food Program has been increased to—what is it? $4 billion I think is the figure.
Mr. KINGSTON. I think it was $8 billion.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think it was $4 billion.
Mr. KINGSTON. I'm not certain.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Basically, the thing that needs to be made absolutely clear about this is that this in no way goes into Saddam Hussein's hands. It is a way, actually, to get around him so that the ordinary people of Iraq are benefited.
Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Also, in an exchange with the Chairman and Mr. Yates——
Mr. KNOLLENBERG [presiding]. Mr. Kingston, if I could, can you close in about one minute? We have someone to get to, and we're trying to exercise getting——
Mr. KINGSTON. Before we vote?
Mr. KNOLLENBERG [continuing]. Everyone through before we all have to go. Yes.
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Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Well, I'll tell you what. Let me go ahead and close now. We're having a second round, correct? Correct?
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I'm not at liberty to say. I guess as long as the Secretary can—it would be a very quick round, yes.
Mr. KINGSTON. If everybody was held to five minutes, we would—but I——
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Right.
Mr. KINGSTON. I notice time gets shorter on the further edge of the platform up here. I'm going to yield for right now.
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. The Chair recognizes Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST
Madam Secretary, good morning. We are figuratively reaching high noon, and literally as well. Thank you for the work you do and for using your bully pulpit around the country to speak on behalf of American interests.
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I'd like to return off the global tour for a minute back to the President's supplemental budget request. Congress is about to take up the President's request for a supplemental. I'd like to review it very briefly. We've got $18 billion for IMF. We've got money that is needed for U.N. arrears of about $921 million. We've got up to—and this is—I anticipate it's going to be coming from the White House—$1.3 billion for the existing deployment in the Persian Gulf. We've got another $600 million to cover the Bosnia mission from July through September. And I understand we have somewhere in the neighborhood of $380 million for recent storm damage.
Since the hour is late, I'd like to give you your last best shot at why it's important that we get this supplemental through, because if you match the supplemental—and I know that you say that the IMF money is not out of pocket—and you compare it to our foreign aid budget, to the American taxpayer it is their money regardless of whether it's taken from the treasury for the IMF or whether it's supplemental. I just want to get your last best shot on why we need to have these critical dollars.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all——
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And if these dollar figures are accurate.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, let me say that this supplemental is composed of the items that you have mentioned, and they are all very important to us. The IMF issue, I think, is one where it is very clear that the Asian financial crisis is a deep one and one that could, in effect, have an effect on the American economy. The IMF, we believe, is the best vehicle for trying to get these countries to reform. They underpin the whole support for an orderly financial system that is critical to our own financial system.
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On the international organization aspect, I think it is essential that the United States be a member in good standing in an international organization that we founded, and that normally, if you have large bills to pay, you pay them. As a result of having held back last year on the U.N. arrears, it has cost us about $100 million a year, because one of the things we were trying to do was to renegotiate our assessment rate.
And because we missed the deadline on that, we missed saving $100 million this year. Hopefully we can get this supplemental passed. Otherwise, we don't get a chance until the year 2000.
On Bosnia, I really do think that we have to be able to deal with success. I think that we've done very well in Bosnia. As Senator Dole said, we're in the third quarter and we're ahead, and it seems kind of crazy to walk off the field. Therefore, what we need for Bosnia is a way to have the military force continue there in a way to provide security so that the civilian implementation can go forward.
On Iraq, I believe that the presence of our forces there has given us the possibility of a diplomatic solution. If we cannot have a diplomatic solution, then it is in our national security interest to use force in order to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruction and our security in the region.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I think we've got a deadline. Thank you for your time.
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. The Chair sitting in calls for a temporary recess until the Chairman returns. We do have a vote on, as you all know. We'll proceed with that. We'll take a recess for a few moments. When the Chair returns, hopefully we can open up, so that if anybody does have a question—I think Mrs. Lowey is returning—then we'll have the continuation of questioning. Until that time, thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. CALLAHAN [presiding]. I am sorry, Madam Secretary, but congressional activity sometimes is necessary. I'm sure that some committees will be interrupted when we're trying to convince the Congress to vote for the appropriation bill for the Department of State and for foreign affairs. So I know you understand.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do appreciate the Secretary's patience and staying with us, and I'll be brief.
NATO EXPANSION
I did mention to the Secretary that I, too, had some questions about NATO expansion, and I won't discuss them now. But I think it would be very important, Mr. Chairman, if we can perhaps have an informal discussion—it doesn't have to be a formal hearing—to satisfy many of our questions, such as the amendment that's being brought up in the Senate and others as well.
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MIDDLE EAST
So I'll move on, back to the area of the Middle East, because I do want to have a discussion with you on some of those issues.
I know also that our leader, Mr. Obey, had an in-depth discussion on some of the areas with regard to the Middle East. I personally wanted to express my appreciation to you. I think this administration, your leadership, and that of your Department, has been absolutely persistent and determined in moving the process forward. And I know that because of the complexities of the issue, and the long-standing difficulties in the region, it has been very, very difficult. But most of us really appreciate your efforts, and I do want to personally express that to you.
I am concerned, however, about the discussions that the administration is going to publicly issue a plan, issue an ultimatum. I have always felt—and I know in our discussions you have expressed your views—that the role of this administration is to facilitate, to bring the parties together. Behind the scenes, maybe, it is appropriate to push the parties together in discussing various options. But in the final analysis, the parties have to talk to each other, and have to agree that they are ready to move the process forward. And in many of your statements, you have talked about the United States as a facilitator.
I just feel strongly that public pressure sets the process back. And I am not convinced that it is productive, and we all are committed to moving the peace process forward. Could you comment?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. First of all, I did make the statement that 1997 has been a bad year for the peace process. Unfortunately, when you're standing still on the peace process, in many ways you are going backwards, because it's something that needs to have momentum to it. And we are very concerned about the fact that there is not enough traction at the moment.
There is no such thing as an American plan. We have some ideas that we have been proposing, and I have said over and over again that it is essential for the leaders to make the hard decisions. They have not been making them, and it has been a source of disappointment to all of us, because we can have nine million ideas of various levels and of various complexity, but ultimately the leaders themselves have to make the decisions.
The pressure is not by us. The pressure is because the people of Israel and the Palestinians want peace. And I think what's essential is for the leaders to figure that out and make the hard decisions, and we are going to continue to press in the best possible way we can.
Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I thank you. And I just wanted to emphasize again that moving the process forward, bringing the parties together, pressing the parties to talk and take action, as you've said in the past, is the best way to proceed. I am just very concerned about perception or reality, that the United States is exerting pressure publicly because, in my judgment, this could lead to a real stalemate. And we all want to see the process move forward.
You have also said in the past that the peace process will not succeed without security cooperation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and I agree. There are reports that there have been some violations and that the Palestinians have been not living up to their commitments. Could you discuss with us your current assessment of security cooperation in that region?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that, clearly, security cooperation is essential, and we have been pressing Chairman Arafat to have 100 percent effort in terms of cooperation, generally with what needs to be done to make sure that there is not violence, and that every effort is made.
I believe that there has been progress. More can be done, but we are constantly in touch with Chairman Arafat and his people pressing for even more progress in this area, and want to make sure that he does continue to show 100 percent effort on it.
Mrs. LOWEY. The Chairman, I know, has met with Israeli Finance Minister Neeman, who came with a proposal. He discussed it with this administration and many of us here on the committee. Following up on the Prime Minister's speech to the Congress talking about cutting back and weaning Israel from economic assistance, Finance Minister Neeman talked about bolstering the security assistance while cutting back on economic assistance.
Now, certainly we've seen—and our Chairman mentioned before that in this latest crisis, as the Chairman said so well, the administration didn't have to call Israel twice. They have been, certainly, our allies in the region. Could you discuss with us some reaction of the administration to the Neeman proposal?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. We very much welcome Israel's initiative for the Neeman proposal, and we have launched a dialogue. We are looking forward to working with them on this and trying to sort out exactly how to make this work. And we also would very much like to see Egypt take some kind of a similar step that would allow us to restructure our economic program.
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And we're going to consult very closely with you all in terms of how to work the Israeli aspect of it out. We want to maintain our unshakable commitment to Israel's security, and also maintain our strong support for Egypt. But we think that this proposal, if properly carried out, will allow us to free up funding for other regional priorities. We do want to spend a lot of time working this through with you. And, as I said, we welcome the initiative.
Ms. LOWEY. This administration has consistently reiterated its commitment to uphold Israel's qualitative military edge, and we certainly understand the complexities of that region and how important that is. And this commitment was most recently underscored in meetings last November between Defense Secretary Cohen and Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai.
There has been concern that a flow of new technologies to the region, even sometimes before Israel has been the recipient of some of these same systems, has developed problems in maintaining the qualitative edge. Could you comment on your judgment? Do you feel that Israel's qualitative edge can be maintained while too often shipments are going to other adversaries in the region? And we know that Israel's security and Israel's strength gives it the option of taking risks for peace. Could you comment?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say that, as I've said, we are committed to having Israel have a qualitative edge. We work with them very closely. It is my belief that they have it and will continue to have it. We are very conscious of various aspects of military deployments in the region and continue to be committed to Israel's security.
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I do hope, in fact, that the fact that they do have a qualitative edge, and will continue to have it, will allow them to move forward in the peace process. Obviously, as you pointed out, that is a relationship that exists, and we are totally committed to Israel. We've made that very clear. But we also believe that it is just necessary, as I said in the previous response, to move the peace process forward.
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING
Ms. LOWEY. Well, let me just say we are certainly in agreement, and let us be optimistic that the year 1998 is more positive than certainly the year before. And another area, Madam Secretary, there has been a good deal of discussion in this committee and in the Congress about not linking international family planning to the issues of the IMF and U.N. arrears and new arrangements to borrow.
Could you share with this committee your view of the importance of international family planning and why that issue should be dealt with on its merits alone?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say that we worked—all of us—very hard last year to get a package together that included United Nations arrears and the IMF and reorganization of the State Department, and I think that everybody really devoted a great deal of effort to it.
The issue of family planning is one that is of huge importance to an awful lot of people on both sides of the issue. I happen to be on one side, and other people are on another, but I do think that there are very good people on both sides of this discussion.
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I, as you know, believe in family planning and the importance of it for domestic as well as foreign purposes, because population expansion is one of the huge problems that we face as we move into the 21st century. The United States Government does not promote abortion. I think that is a misunderstanding. No taxpayer funds are used to promote abortion.
We have supported organizations that deal in family planning, and what compromises were offered would not allow organizations that do not use taxpayer money for this to even attend conferences at which family planning is discussed, or the abortion laws of the countries in which they are taking place are being discussed. It's an international gag rule. There's no other way to describe it.
But my feeling is that since this is an issue of such major import, it's an issue of principle to both sides, that the point that should happen is to vote on it. Let's have a separate vote on this issue, because it is important and people should be allowed to discuss it, and we should do it in a democratic way—vote—and not shut down our foreign policy because of this particular issue.
I give credit to people on both sides of this. Let's discuss it and let's vote it up or down.
Ms. LOWEY. Probably lastly, Mr. Chairman, right, or is it two lastlies or——[Laughter.]
Mr. CALLAHAN. One lastly.
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Ms. LOWEY. And then I'll submit the rest of the questions for the record.
RUSSIA
But we remain very concerned about Russia's delivery of ballistic missile technology to Iran. There are reports that the Russian intelligence community is aware of it. There is other information that Russia is working to stop it. Could you clarify for us recent reports, frankly, that the intelligence community is aware of it? The threat is very clear.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. This is an issue of major import, and we have been working it at all levels. The President has been talking to President Yeltsin about it; Vice President Gore to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. I discuss it on a regular basis with Foreign Minister Primakov, and we have established a channel whereby Frank Wisner has been dealing with Mr. Koptev on this, and I think that there have been some very good and serious results.
The Russians have issued an executive order making sure that their government is not involved in this kind of trade, and the Vice President is reviewing the subject. It again will be a subject at the Gore-Chernomyrdin meetings, which will take place next week. And we see some progress. We're monitoring this very carefully because it is a serious issue, and we will continue to do so. I think that in these Gore-Chernomyrdin meetings we will get some additional information on it.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Kingston.
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Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, on Chernomyrdin's recent decree, are there punishments involved in that, do we know, and has that decree been implemented?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, the decree has been published, and they will have their own processes in Russia to deal with it. We watch it because, from our perspective, there are sanctionability punishments that would go with it.
IRAQ
Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. I want to get back to you on Iraq. You had said earlier in an exchange with Mr. Yates that—and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but here is the way I understood it—is that Iraq had followed the U.N. peace agreement for six or so years and only in recent weeks started violating it. Did I hear that?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. No. What had been established was an inspection regime, which had been working more and more intensively and following out a string of clues. Iraq had lied, in fact, about its biological weapons possibilities until Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected and told them that there was a biological program.
What has happened is that UNSCOM, in its work, has been able to destroy more weapons of mass destruction than during the Gulf War. And the figures are really quite astounding about what they were able to get at. But at all times UNSCOM was pushing up against the Iraqi government that was basically trying to develop excuses for not providing the information that UNSCOM should have.
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When I was Ambassador to the U.N., I spent a great deal of time listening to reports by Chairman Ekeus, the first Chairman of UNSCOM, talking about the difficulties of getting inspections taken care of. But the inspections did proceed. They would be stopped, and then they would move in again and they would require certain documents, and after a lot of arguing they would get the documents.
What happened several months ago was that the Iraqis prohibited the inspectors going in to do these jobs. What has happened as a result of this agreement is that there were certain sites that were never part of what the Iraqis were allowing any inspectors to go into. Now, as a result of this agreement, they have said that there would be unfettered, unconditional access to all sites—something that UNSCOM never had before.
Now, the question is whether, in the testing of this, this will actually happen.
Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. One of the parts of the Annon Agreement is that there would be a new inspection team, and I think a two-tiered level with some new appointees on there. And one of the concerns that I've heard is that there would be pro-Iraqi folks on there who would, in fact, because of the two-tier, warn Iraq up front that there is going to be an inspection, and so the element of surprise would be out of it. How do you feel about that?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Okay. If I can take a minute to describe the structure, I think it might clarify things. There is the Chairman of UNSCOM, and underneath him there is a group of experts that have been divided all along, from the time they were formed, into committees dealing with whatever issue they have—chemical, biological, et cetera.
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Then, there are a group of commissioners who meet a couple of times a year—experts—who review the work. Chairman Butler is in charge of both. What this agreement has done is create a group within the group of experts whose job it will be to do presidential sites. Those are these eight designated sites.
That group is under the overall control of Chairman Butler, and there is going to be a commissioner from this other part that will also be directing the special group under Chairman Butler. Chairman Butler has made it very clear that he feels that he is in operational control of this group.
The inspectors themselves, the experts, will be selected from UNSCOM or IAEA experts—the atomic energy experts. They would be accompanied by a small group of diplomats, who would be chosen by the Secretary General in consultation with Chairman Butler. Their only role in this is to be observers. They will have nothing to do with the inspection.
Kofi Annon last night, in fact, on TV said that part of what they would be doing would be also observing to see if the Iraqis are making the access possible and are not standing in the way of the inspectors coming in.
I have spoken to Chairman Butler, and so has Ambassador Richardson, so have others; basically, there will be a system set up whereby the diplomats will not be in a position to warn anybody. I can't go into the details of this, but this is one of the things that we have been concerned about, and Chairman Butler is working on a mechanism whereby they will not know ahead of time.
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Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. I think that's the essence of it.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR
Mr. Chairman, if I could have one more minute, certainly of great interest to me personally, the situation, again, in Ecuador, an American in a jail as described by your January 30th report. We would very much like to have—and I don't want to put you on the spot and ask for your commitment, but we'd love to have maybe a little more proaction on the State Department to try to help us with the constituent who has found himself in an Ecuadoran jail with apparent human rights violations.
As you know, all of these cases are very long and complicated, and there is lots of back and forth on all sides. But we do have a constituent who, since September '96, has been in jail. And it has just absolutely ruined the family, and we're trying to work through it.
I would like to see a little higher energy level by the State Department. But let me say this, more the State Department in Washington than in Ecuador, because I think your folks in Ecuador have been pretty good. But I'm under the impression—just a gut feeling—that their hands are tied at a certain level, and they can only do so much.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me look into it more.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mrs. Pelosi?
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Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. PELOSI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Madam Secretary, the Chairman has told me I have two minutes, not one second more, so I'm going to just associate myself with the concerns expressed by my colleagues about Nagorno-Karabakh. I hope that in making the decision about aid that we will be respecting the process and I support the administration in that. But in order to build support for the process in Nagorno-Karabakh, we must give as much aid as we legally can under the legislation.
IRAQ
And in terms of Iraq, I want to convey to you the concern that my constituents have. I said earlier, no use of violence, but Mr. Porter also mentioned Radio Free Iraq. I wondered if there was any way we could drop food into Iraq, too. There is grave concern about the Iraqi people. I know that Saddam Hussein is the cause of those problems, but nonetheless, the problems exist.
AFRICA
And I just have one question, and that is on Africa. I don't think any questions have been asked today about Africa.
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The Africa Growth and Investment Act—I'm sure you're familiar with that—the centerpiece of the administration's new Africa policy—was strengthened by Representatives Gilman and Smith, who amended the bill to require that participating countries must respect the rule of law, they would be ineligible to participate in programs to receive assistance or other benefits, if the President determines that they engage in gross violations of human rights.
Has the administration endorsed this amendment to the bill? And if so, why so, or why not?
HUMAN RIGHTS
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I don't have an answer on that yet, but let me just say that we obviously feel very strongly about making sure that the rule of law and human rights are abided by. In fact, we have an initiative on a whole rule of law initiative in the Great Lakes. It's one of the things that I was pressing on my last trip.
Ms. PELOSI. And speaking of that area, I want to commend you for raising the case of opposition leader Etienne Tsiseked: directly with Mr. Kabila. What other concrete actions is the U.S. taking, publicly and privately, to underscore the concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in the Congo.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I told Mr. Kabila that I would call him when I needed to deliver such a message. I have done that. We will continue to press him to have a better understanding of what it means to run a democratic government. We are very concerned about what is going on in the democratic Republic of Congo, and believe that it's essential for the system to be opened up.
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Ms. PELOSI. And just, in closing, I understand also that you are very concerned about the resurgent genocide that could happen in Rwanda. I also understand that the administration may be considering providing security assistance to the Rwandan military. What concrete measurable steps is the U.S. taking to encourage the military to investigate and prosecute its own officers who may be responsible for serious rights violations?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Again, when I was in Rwanda, I made a very strong point of the fact that they had to do more in terms of their own investigations. We are trying to provide them with additional judicial technical expertise and telling them about the importance of—obviously, the Rwanda war crimes tribunal is operating. It's not operating as well as the Bosnian one. But we are encouraging them to do that, and also doing more on the rule of law in Rwanda.
Ms. PELOSI. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I am very pleased with the focus that the administration is placing on Africa. Sometimes I think that there is no southern hemisphere when I hear all of the big talk around here. I'm not talking about the administration, and I'm so glad that our Chairman is leading the way on the Latin American initiatives, and the administration is doing that as well with Africa. I think that's the right thing to do. I commend you for it, and thank you for your testimony.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
Ms. PELOSI. And for your leadership.
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Mr. CALLAHAN. Madam Secretary.
Ms. PELOSI. Thanks, Mr. Chairman——
Mr. CALLAHAN. I'm sorry. We're——
Ms. PELOSI [continuing]. For your leadership, too. If I had more time, I'd talk about you, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
Mr. CALLAHAN. Well, I will yield to the lady for——
[Laughter.]
Let me try to get you out of here. I'm going to close with a few statements, Madam Secretary, but to remind you that a lot of the questions that have come up today have revolved around policy as much as appropriations.
I notice that you had four hours with the International Relations Committee, and that's commendable. However, in the absence of the ability to fulfill a total passage of legislation, sometimes it falls upon the shoulders of this committee to handle the responsibilities of both, and thus your four hours with them is not quite as—it's a little bit longer than the three and a half hours you spent with us.
ECUADOR
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But nevertheless, let me echo my concerns about Ecuador that Congressman Kingston was talking about. I, too, have a personal interest in that case, and I am really concerned about that situation. I would appreciate and echo the concerns of Congressman Kingston. I would also like for you to look into one in Honduras, the same type of situation where I have first-hand knowledge of an American citizen, Gustave Valle, who has been imprisoned in Honduras for five years without a trial, huge abusive human rights violations, I'm going to ask the State Department to get personally involved in that.
It's very difficult for us to justify continued support to these countries who treat our citizens in such a manner. We're not prejudging guilt or innocence. We're just simply saying we cannot tolerate a country who permits an American citizen to remain in jail for five years without a trial and under the most inhumane of circumstances. So I'm going to ask you to look closely—personally at the Gustave Valle case.
IRAQ
We talked a lot this morning about Saddam Hussein and the problems there, and I don't think we have different philosophies. And maybe we should change directions. There are a group of us who feel that Saddam Hussein has violated so many international situations, such as human rights, of his own people, such as the breaking of his commitment of surrender to the United Nations, that maybe it's time our mission should be to indict Saddam Hussein.
If we cannot bomb him out, maybe it is time for the United States and the Secretary General of the United Nations, who wants to negotiate with that mad man, maybe it's time to bring this man to some type of international court and have him stand trial rather than have us face these problems we have with him from time to time.
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Ms. PELOSI. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you.
FAMILY PLANNING
With respect, I'm going to say something you're not going to agree with—with respect to family planning. You say why don't we have an up or down vote on this. Madam Secretary, I'll remind you that the Republicans have not always been in charge of the Congress. We have not always been in a majority. And when we had a Republican administration and a Democratic Congress, it was not uncommon at all to attach things that President Bush or President Reagan disagreed with, or that the minority disagreed with to very important legislations.
So this is not something that is happening for the first time in history. This is a very, very important issue to a majority of the members of the House. We know that if we pass that legislation single-handedly, the President would veto it, and we do not have the votes. So we have to use every piece of ammunition we have in order to get some of our points across.
And the administration—I'll echo what I said earlier—has got to recognize this and to recognize that a government such as the United States can live with Mexico City policy, without tremendous interference into their ability to have an effective foreign policy. I know you'd like to debate me on that, but time is of the essence.
BOSNIA
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Bosnia—once again, we have cooperated. This committee has been to Bosnia. We fulfilled the President's request for reconstruction monies in Bosnia. We did everything we've been asked, and now we're being asked to even extend what was originally asked, and there has to be some type of definite time limitation put on it.
Now you want $200 million more in additional reconstruction assistance, and sooner or later we're going to run out of patience, unless there is a more definitive plan of withdrawing from Bosnia.
IMF
The IMF—I have expressed our concerns about that and the perception that the American people have of IMF. I agree with the importance of funding the IMF. I agree with the importance of helping correct the situation in Asia, with respect to Indonesia especially.
A plant in my district has been forced to shut its doors idling 900 people for several weeks because a business in Indonesia was one of their largest customers. The economic situation there is causing problems that only IMF can hopefully correct.
Haiti—once again, big problem. Bolivia—we must find a way to convey to the Bolivian people that we were not penalizing them for doing the right thing with respect to drug interdiction.
MIDDLE EAST
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The Ukraine—you've heard from us on that. Let me echo that we want to work with you. We don't want to interfere with you. We have supported you in your every endeavor. We think that you did an outstanding job on the Middle East with respect to the most recent problem with Iraq. It is no reflection upon your activities.
It is a reflection of our disappointment that our allies that we support so aggressively, that we take from needy programs here in the United States, turn their back on you. So we are incensed that you didn't get what we feel is the total respect you deserve as our diplomatic representative in that region. So we're going to be supportive of you.
We're going to work with you with respect to the budget you have submitted. We're going to forewarn you that there is not going to be enough money allocated to this committee to fulfill all of your needs. And it's going to be very difficult.
But, nevertheless, we appreciate you keeping us informed as you do. I notice when you went to the Middle East, prior to your visit to the leaders there to talk about Iraq, you called and briefed me on what your mission would be. But the President has been extremely silent to members of Congress.
Normally, when there is a problem, he calls some of us who support the philosophy of the constitutional charge that gives responsibility of foreign policy to the executive branch. He calls us to the White House and explains, but he has been extremely silent, or at least he has not contacted me with respect to what he expected in Iraq.
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So maybe there should be more communication between the President and some of us in Congress who support his endeavors in foreign policy. But let me, once again, tell you that the American people are proud of you. And as you well know, the people of South Alabama are proud of you. They speak very kindly of you there and with every good reason.
So we are sorry to detain you as long as we have today, but, once again, we thank you for appearing before our committee.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Pelosi. I think this is a great committee to work with, and I think we went through a lot of issues. And I'm very grateful to all of you for the fine support and the great working relationship. Thank you.
Mr. CALLAHAN. The meeting is adjourned.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN CALLAHAN
ORGANIZATIONS THAT RECEIVED FUNDING FROM MRA AND ERMA IN FY 1995–FY 1997
Question. Please provide a list of organizations that received funding (grant, contract, or otherwise) through the account ''Migration and Refugee Assistance'' and the account ''Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund'' for the fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997; the amount of funds provided for each fiscal year, and the purposes for which the funds were made available.
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Answer. The attached charts outline the information requested. Please contact the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration if additional clarification on any of the attached materials is desired.
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
DECLINE IN ''PERSONS OF CONCERN''
Question. Since 1994, the number of ''persons of concern'' has declined from approximately 27,400,000 to approximately 22,700,000. Why hasn't the budget for ''Migration and Refugee Assistance'' fallen during that period?
Answer. 1994 marked a year where the vast majority of the world's refugee populations were in first asylum countries and required assistance (e.g., food, shelter, protection) from the international community. Due to political resolution of some of the crises, repatriations are now underway for a significant number of refugees. Repatriation programs constitute additional costs for a period of time following the actual return of refugees. Such costs include transportation and reintegration assistance.
U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR UNRWA
Question. Please provide a list of the funding provided for each of fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); anticipated funding levels for fiscal years 1998 and 1999; and the purposes for which the funds have been used—by project, if possible.
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Answer. During fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997, the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) made the following voluntary contributions to UNRWA using funds from the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account (MRA).
FY 1995: $74,821,120 Total:
$70,000,000 for UNRWA's Regular Program Budget.
$2,000,000 for costs associated with UNRWA's Headquarters Move to Gaza.
$2,821,120 for various UNRWA Peace Implementation Projects (PIPs) in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
FY 1996: $77,000,000 Total:
$74,000,000 for UNRWA's Regular Program Budget.
$1,000,000 for costs associated with UNRWA's Headquarters Move to Gaza.
$2,000,000 for various UNRWA Peace Implementation Projects (PIPs) in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
FY 1997: $79,153,869 Total:
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$75,000,000 for UNRWA's Regular Program Budget.
$1,000,000 for costs associated with UNRWA's Headquarters Move to Gaza.
$1,500,000 for UNRWA's 1997–1998 Special Appeal for Palestine Refugees in Lebanon.
$1,653,869 for various UNRWA Peace Implementation Projects (PIPs), primarily in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
U.S. contributions to UNRWA's Regular Program Budget help cover the costs of the Agency's 637 schools, 123 health clinics, 7 vocational training centers and numerous relief and social service programs serving over 3.4 million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.
(Note: In addition to the MRA funding listed above, UNRWA also received funding from USAID from 1993 to 1997 for specific PIP projects and other development activities, principally in Gaza. USAID contributions during this period totaled $29.2 million.)
Thus far in FY 1998, the United States has provided in initial contribution of $70,000,000 to UNRWA for its Regular Program Budget (the same level as the initial FY 1997 contribution). The United States may make additional contributions to UNRWA's Regular Program Budget and/or specific Peace Implementation Projects later this year, following an analysis of prioritized needs. U.S. contributions to UNRWA in FY 1999 are expected to be at similar levels.
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U.S.-FUNDED PROJECTS UNDER UNRWA'S PEACE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM
Question. What are the ''specific projects'' identified in the budget justification that the United States has supported through the UNRWA Peace Implementation Program? Please identify these projects by purpose and by funding provided through ''Migration and Refugee Assistance.''
Answer. Since FY 1994, the United States has provided UNRWA a total of $12,547,379 in funding from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account for specific UNRWA Peace Implementation Projects (PIPs). Nearly all of these projects have been targeted to benefit Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
The attached table provides a summary of each projects including year, location, purpose, cost and number of expected beneficiaries.
U.S. ASSESSMENT RATE WITH IOM
Question. The United States pays an assessment of almost 30 percent to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Why is this assessment above the general assessment for United Nations organizations of 25 percent? If the U.S. contribution is in Swiss Francs, what are the savings due to exchange rate gains that are anticipated for fiscal year 1998 and 1999, compared to the budgeted levels?
Answer. IOM is an intergovernmental organization separate from the UN. IOM's membership, while expanding in recent years, is much more limited than that of the UN's (IOM currently has 60 member states while the UN has 185). Hence, mathematically every member government receives a higher assessment percentage than in the UN.
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For 1998, we anticipate a total exchange rate savings of $900,000 from the budgeted level of $7.6 million. The FY 1999 request includes $7.8 million for the 1999 U.S. assessment, based on an exchange rate of 1.3 Swiss Francs to 1 $US. As the overwhelming majority of the MRA budget provides voluntary contributions, any savings or shortfalls are allocated to/from other MRA Overseas Assistance requirements.
AUDITS OF IOM
Question. Has the United States commissioned, or been involved in reviewing, audits of IOM finances in the past three fiscal years? If so, please provide copies of the executive summaries of these audits.
Answer. As a member of the IOM governing body, the U.S. reviews annually audits of IOM, as well as participates in the selection of the Board of Auditors. For the years 1998–2000, member states selected the Austrian Court of Audit to audit IOM's accounts.
Attached for your review are the Executive Summaries of the audits for the past three years.
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
MRA: WHY INCREASE IN MULTIREGIONAL ACTIVITIES
Question. Why are funds for multiregional activities with the account ''Migration and Refugee Assistance'' projected to increase by $10,940,000 in fiscal year 1999?
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Answer. The increase in Multiregional Activities is composed of the following components:
$5,940,000—UNHCR. This increase is for the multiregional categories of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees General Program. This category includes such items as UNHCR's Emergency Fund, the Voluntary Repatriation Fund, the Program Reserve, and other components of UNHCR's General Program that are not region specific.
$3,500,000—Children's programs. Report language accompanying the 1998 appropriation bill recommends $5 million for increased attention to children's activities. Of this amount, $1.5 million was in the base of the FY 1998 budget; the additional amount incorporates the committee's full recommendation into the FY 1999 MRA request.
$1,000,000—Migration Activities. Increased funds are requested to support migration activities that promote international cooperation on migration issues.
$500,000—ICRC/IOM. This increase provides for increased headquarters costs of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration. These items fulfill statutory requirements.
MRA: REGIONAL DELEGATIONS IN EAST ASIA
Question. The budget justification for ''Migration and Refugee Assistance'' indicates that part of the funds allocated to assistance programs in East Asia is projected to ''support ongoing programs such as regional delegations throughout East Asia * * *'' What does that mean? What specific activities are supported?
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Answer. This references the regional delegations (i.e., offices) of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which currently has regional delegations in Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.
In addition to the administration of emergency activities and early warning of impending crisis, ICRC's regional delegations have specific tasks and objectives that can be grouped under two main headings: ''operations'' and ''humanitarian diplomacy''.
To meet their operational objectives, regional delegates (i.e., staff) must respond to emergencies caused by outbreaks of violence in countries covered by the delegation, and to needs created by active or sporadic conflicts or by tensions that can affect a region even in times of peace. Staff working in regional delegations can be called upon to act as neutral intermediaries, carry out visits to security detainees, provide tracing services or conduct limited, short-term emergency operations.
Regional delegations also have major objectives that can be met through humanitarian diplomacy, i.e., developing and maintaining regular contacts with governments, regional organizations, local Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and senior officials in all the countries in their regions.
ANDEAN ERADICATION RESULTS
Question. What have been the eradication goals, eradication results, total production levels; and net changes in production in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia in each of the years 1993–1997?
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Answer. The table below provides the information requested:
OPIUM POPPY ERADICATION AND COLOMBIA
Question. What have been the eradication goals and eradication results for opium poppy eradication in Colombia from 1993–1997? What are the anticipated goals for 1998 and 1999?
Answer. Illicit opium poppy cultivation, while documented as early as the mid-1980's gained a foothold in the early 1990's.
1993—The Government of Colombia sprayed 9, 821 hectares in 1993; environmental experts monitored the aerial application of herbicides to opium poppy.
1994—Progress throughout the year was not exceptional, but in early November 1994, the Colombian National Police reinvigorated operations with an aggressive plan to eradicate more than half the opium poppy in Colombia, in the shortest period of time. Nevertheless, total opium eradication was about 50 percent less than in 1993.
1995—The first-ever scientific survey of Colombia's opium poppy cultivation was carried out in 1995. The result indicated that approximately 2,180 hectares were under cultivation, not 20,000 as had previously been estimated. The Colombian National Police reported it sprayed 3,970 hectares of opium poppy during 1995, but this amount could not be verified.
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1996—The Government of Colombia sprayed 6,028 hectares in 1996.
1997—The Government of Colombia sprayed 6,972 hectares in 1997.
1998—Anticipated Goals—informal discussions with the Colombian Government have been underway, however, formal demarches to the government and resulting agreements have not been finalized.
1999—Anticipated Goals—same as above.
FUNDS FOR OPIUM POPPY ERADICATION IN COLOMBIA
Question. How much was budgeted for opium poppy eradication in Colombia in fiscal years 1993–1998, and how much is anticipated to be spent in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. 1993—$5,100,000; 1994—$5,483,000; 1995—$6,080,000; 1996—$6,035,000; 1997—$5,985,000; 1998—$5,985,000—estimated if we only get $30 million of Total Budget; and 1999—Anticipated Funds—$5,985,000.
RESTITUTION TO HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS
Question. The Administration has requested $10,000,00.00 for the Holocaust Victim's Trust Fund for fiscal year 1999. How will these funds be used? What is the authority for this program. How will this program be administered? What other nations are contributing to this effort, and how much has been pledged to date? How many individuals will benefit from this program? What will be the average benefit per person, from contributions by all donors? Where do individuals live that will benefit from this program? How will their identities be verified? How will the State Department ensure that only qualified individuals benefit from this program?
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Answer. On Friday, Feb 13, the President signed S. 1564, the ''Holocaust Victims Redress Act'' into law. The law authorizes, among other things, a U.S. contribution of $25 million dollars to the Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund, an international fund intended to provide relief to aging survivors of the Holocaust, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe who have received little or no compensation to date. The Fund can also be used to support education and other awareness programs related to the Holocaust.
Creation of the Fund was announced at the London Historians' Conference on Nazi gold, held last December. The United States joined with the united Kingdom in encouraging a number of the countries still holding claims with the Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC), voluntarily to donate the amount of these claims to the new fund. To date, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece and Luxembourg have agreed to contribute their claims to the Fund and a number of other claimants are considering contributions as well. Other countries, including those countries that were neutral during the War, or participated in the collection and distribution of these assets, were also invited to contribute.
The Fund is designed to work along the lines of the Combined Federal Campaign, with minimal administrative overhead. Contributors to the Fund will have one year from the time of their deposits to designate an approved non-governmental organization (NGO) to carry out a program consistent with the objectives of the Fund. A list of approved NGOs is included in the Fund documents. Other NGOs can be added to this list with the agreement of the Fund members. No determination has yet been made concerning the application or use of the projected U.S. contribution. This matter is now under discussion.
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BOSNIA ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
Question. Madame Secretary, two years ago I led a Congressional Delegation to Bosnia to review the prospects for peace in that nation, and to determine whether we should support an economic reconstruction effort.
Although I had doubts about our mission in Bosnia, I put my credibility on the line and pledged to support the President's request for $600 million in economic reconstruction funds. I did so with the understanding that $600 million would be the total required from the United States for these activities.
In the past two years, I have met my commitment to the President, and more. Not only have we appropriated every penny of the $600 million for economic reconstruction, we've provided funding for police training, assistance to refugees, contributions for elections, and contributions to the war crimes tribunal. From 1995 through 1998, the Administration has received approximately $1.1 billion from this subcommittee for all aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords.
For 1999, you are asking for an additional $200 million for economic reconstruction, despite earlier assurances that $600 million would be our total commitment.
a. Why are you asking for additional funds?
Answer. The Administration is extremely appreciative of the efforts by the Chairman, other Subcommittee members, and the Committee's staff to provide the necessary resources for the economic reconstruction of Bosnia in this and the past two fiscal years. It is appropriate that there have been few differences between the Congress and the Administration on this, because it is clearly in the U.S. national interest to seek peace and stability in the Balkans. Our engagement and leadership in Bosnia is the right thing for America to be doing.
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We, our allies and, most unfortunately, the people of the former Yugoslavia have paid a terrible price for the rampant nationalism that overcame rational behavior in 1991 and 1992. We must make certain that a lack of engagement in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia by the U.S. and others does not trigger another round of senseless destruction and violence.
We have made a tremendous amount of progress in Bosnia, but the gains we have made these past two years are unfortunately still reversible. To disengage prematurely either militarily or economically would jeopardize our substantial investment in peace and stability in Bosnia and the region.
The reconstruction effort in particular has made good process, in our view. USAID has done an outstanding job with the SEED funding provided by this Committee. USAID's programs have served as models for other donors and spurred increased commitments to refugee return programs, among others. Other donors have done their fair share. But in spite of this good start and broad international support, Bosnia is nowhere near having a self-sustaining economy and will need continued large amounts of external assistance to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
Question. Will other nations, especially European nations, be making additional contributions as well? How much has been pledged by these nations for 1999?
Answer. We cannot give you a precise answer to that, because the European states, like the U.S., are going through their budget processes. We have discussed funding levels with officials of the European Union and a number of significant European bilateral donors, and their intention at this point is the same as our own: to maintain 1999 levels of assistance for Bosnia at roughly 1998 levels. They have indicated that obtaining these levels of funding will be easier politically if the U.S. is able to obtain funding levels at the level of our FY 99 budget request for Bosnia. Accordingly, we believe that there will be no significant change in the patterns of assistance established over the past two years, which have the EU and nations of Europe funding about 50 percent of Bosnia's reconstruction costs and the U.S. share about 15 percent. Other donors, most notably the international financial institutions and the Government of Japan, pick up the rest. In summary, there is a continuing international commitment to share the burden of Bosnia's reconstruction.
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Question. What is the ''exit strategy'' for the phase-out of our economic reconstruction program, and when will this termination occur?
Answer. We have developed criteria and benchmarks for a self-sustaining Bosnian economy which include elements common to the other transitional economies of Central Europe, plus a heavy focus on reconstruction required by Bosnia's unique war-time destruction.
We cannot predict precisely the pace at which Bosnia will reach these benchmarks but, with the change in Governments in the Republika Srpska, the pace has certainly accelerated. The April 10, 1998 announcement in Sarajevo of the successful negotiation, after long delays, of an IMF stand-by arrangement will clear the way for Paris Club settlement and greater private investment in Bosnia. Similarly, we have seen, in the last few weeks, the removal of barriers to real privatization in both entities. Each is now working towards implementation of that key stage of economic transformation.
But many elements necessary for a self-sustaining economy clearly won't exist for a number of years. Industry, which used to employ one out of every two Bosnians, is slow to restart because Bosnia has lost its markets and must replace its old industrial behemoths with more efficient companies. Much key infrastructure, such as the telecommunications system, has yet to be repaired.
The World Bank estimates that Bosnia's economy has the potential to continue to grow at double-digit rates over the next several years if a number of conditions are met. These include substantial reconstruction financing, debt relief from creditors, effective use of external assistance, and good progress in institution building and in implementation of economic reforms. If this growth scenario is followed, Bosnia will recover its relatively low pre-war GDP by the year 2003 or 2004.
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It is too early to predict the economic recovery of the Bosnian economy with sufficient precision to give you a year-by-year estimate of reconstruction assistance and a date certain when Bosnia can move to a normal SEED program which focuses on technical assistance instead of reconstruction assistance. But neither do we believe that U.S. reconstruction assistance at the $200 million plus level will be necessary until the early years of the next century. The job remains a big one requiring the continued combined efforts of International Financial Institutions and other donors.
COLOMBIAN HEROIN—WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Question. Madame Secretary, last year the Congress provided $36 million for the purchase of 3 Blackhawk helicopters for the Colombian National Police. It is intended that these helicopters be used to support the eradication of opium poppy crops at high altitudes in the Andes mountains.
The Huey helicopters currently used by the police cannot operate effectively at high altitudes, which is where the opium poppies are grown. Operating at lower altitudes, closer to the ground, they are more likely to be shot down by drug traffickers. Unlike coca plants, which grow everywhere, opium poppies are grown in relatively small amounts; therefore they are more easily controlled and eradicated.
Heroin has re-emerged as a serious problem in America; the historical estimate of 600,000 heroin addicts in the United States has recently been increased by 200,000. Approximately half of these addicts are in the Northeast, and most of the heroin used by these addicts now comes from Colombia.
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The funding for the Blackhawks was an attempt to address the heroin epidemic in the United States. It provides much-needed support to the Colombian police, who put their lives on the line for us in the effort to stem the flood of cheap heroin coming into the country.
This may not be the only answer, but it was an attempt to address the growing heroin problem. I understand the use of these funds has been frozen.
I would also say I am distressed that the unintended consequence of providing these funds has been a decision by the Administration to reduce funds for Bolivia, despite the fact we've doubled funding for international narcotics control activities in the past several years. I want to work with you to address this shortfall, including exploring the possibility of reallocating monies with the Economic Support Fund that are available due to the decision by Turkey not to accept assistance from the United States. Where do we go from here? How does the Department and the Administration intend to address the growing problem of Colombian heroin?
Answer. Regarding BlackHawk helicopters for the Colombian National Police (CNP); we understand and share your concern regarding the CNP's need for helicopters with greater lift capability at high altitude, primarily to eradicate opium poppy in Colombia. We are reviewing carefully the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act report language and technical issues related to the helicopters.
However, we have a great many concerns. BlackHawks cost $8 million each and are more than twice as expensive to operate as the aircraft currently in CNP's fleet, and due to the need for additional training, they would require considerable time to integrate into the CNP force structure. The cost of procuring and operating the BlackHawks would seriously reduce our ability to support operations against coca and opium in Colombia and elsewhere. The $36 million directed by the report language would shrink our available funding and, as a result, would hit other programs hard, particularly in Bolivia and Peru. The impact upon our Andean source country strategy to fight narcotics trafficking would be significant. Over the past two years, coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru has declined dramatically. As much as 110 tons of potential cocaine production, most of it destined for the United States, has been removed from the pipeline. Now is not the time to reduce funding for these programs which are having such a dramatic effect.
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We are developing a more cost-effective alternative to provide the improved lift capability the CNP needs while still allowing us to meet other critical counternarcotics objectives. Our program to upgrade the existing CNP air fleet, over the next 2 years, will provide significant high-altitude capability at less than one-third the cost of the Blackhawks. In addition, the Colombian Air Force and Army already have BlackHawks, and other heavy lift aircraft, and we are exploring arrangements for their use in direct support of CNP operations.
Colombia accounts for less than an estimated 2 percent of the world's opium production. Persistent eradication has kept Colombia's opium poppy crop from expanding overall cultivation. Cultivation levels have remained stable for the third straight year.
Colombian heroin is a serious threat to our national interests, although the emergence of this threat has not diminished the threat posed by Colombian cocaine. In 1997 eradication of opium poppy improved significantly with assignment of greater aviation resources, despite continued incidents of hostile ground fire. We agree that eradication is the most efficient, but not the only, method for stopping the flow of heroin. Given that opium poppy is grown at high altitudes, improved performance helicopters are necessary to eradicate effectively.
The Colombian National Police participated in the creation of a joint US/Colombian heroin task force that has provided intelligence to effect drug seizures in Colombia and assist in US-based investigations. Overall, Colombian National Police seizures of heroin were higher in 1997 than 1996.
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INITIATIVES FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Question. The 1999 budget includes a number of initiatives of sub-Saharan Africa, including:
$30 million for a trade and investment initiative for Africa;
$25 million for an Africa Great Lakes Initiative;
$2 million for a South Africa Development Community Initiative;
$21 million for a food security initiative;
$26 million for an education initiative; and
$35 million to fully forgive debt owed to U.S. government agencies.
You add these initiatives up, and you reach $139 million—and we have missed a few in our initial review of your budget request. While some of these are to be funded from within base funds, $107 million of this total represents an increase above last year's level.
The only initiative in Latin America is $20 million for something to do with the Summit of the Americas—and only $5 million of that is new money.
What are the details of these initiatives for Africa? Is there some logic and relationship among each of these requests?
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Answer. All of the Africa initiatives emerge from the changing development reality in Africa, what some have called the ''African Renaissance,'' and the new partnership between the United States and Africa. Development Assistance for the Food Security Initiative ($21 million) and the Education Initiative ($26 million) falls within FY 98 base levels. Only the $30 million in Development Assistance for the Trade and Investment Imitative represents an increase over last year's request. Economic Support Funds for the Southern Africa Development Community Initiative ($2 million), the Great Lakes Imitative ($25 million) and the Education Imitative ($10 million) as well as $35 million for the Treasury Department for debt forgiveness also represent an increase over last year, bringing the total increase over FY 98 to $102 million.
These initiatives center on two of the Administration's major foreign policy goals for Africa—bringing Africa into the global economy and reducing the incidence of violence. Three of the initiatives mentioned—trade and investment, food security and debt relief—are connected to the President's partnership for Growth and Opportunity launched in 1997. Along with opening American markets to African exports and creating a new forum for high level discussion of these issues between the United States and reforming states in Africa, these three initiatives are the major elements of this new partnership. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Initiative is designed to provide technical assistance to SADC to assist the organization in achieving regional economic integration, as well as policy coordination on political and security concerns. The Education for Development and Democracy Initiative is built on the recognition that for the fragile political and economic transformations taking place in Africa to be sustained, much more attention has to be paid to African education. Finally, the Africa Great Lakes Justice Initiative is designed to promote the rule of law in the area and to help strengthen judicial institutions in an effort to address the cycle of impunity and bloodshed which the President spoke about in Rwanda.
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These initiatives allow the United States to promote our objectives more fully by expending more resources in a concerted way. The initiative for food security, for example, will help USAID expand its programs in agricultural technology development and agricultural marketing in five countries. Similarly, through the education initiative, we will be building on past successes, particularly in the area of university partnerships, but we will be trying some new ideas as well. Although we have supported rule of law projects bilaterally throughout Africa, under the Africa Great Lakes Initiative we will pursue a more comprehensive, coordinated approach to improving the rule of law and respect for human rights among countries in the central region.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Question. What is industry doing during the Asian financial crisis? Are they assisting or just standing by and watching?
Answer. At the State Department and at our Embassies, we have met with representatives from industry groups such as the International Business Council, the U.S.–ASEAN Business Council and others, along with numerous representatives from individual firms doing business in the region. Industry has provided policy makers important insights, built over years of engagement in Asia and with an eye to doing business in the region over the long term. As the affected countries follow through on their agreed economic reforms, we fully expect businesses to resume investing in the region, demonstrating renewed confidence in the prospects of those countries, and providing the financing for renewed economic growth. Businesses are already exploring such possibilities.
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Question. Who would be taking the lead to organize U.S. business interests, you or Secretary Daley at the Department of Commerce?
Answer. State, Commerce, Treasury and USTR have been working together closely with the White House to address concerns of the U.S. business community regarding the Asian financial crisis. We have an effective interagency process to ensure good coordination.
Question. Why can't we just stand back and hope the crisis will work itself out?
Answer. The financial crisis in Asia has the potential to cause contagion beyond the region. The United States, together with the international financial community, seeks to stem panic, stabilize markets, and restore confidence and growth as quickly as possible. Success is important to the affected countries and to all countries around the world, including the United States. The International Monetary Fund and the other international financial institutions have tremendous expertise and experience to resolve such crises. We cannot leave such matters to chance.
We have a responsibility to our friends and allies in the region to engage through existing institutions. We do so not out of charity, as President Clinton has pointed out, but because these are our customers, our competitors and our allies. We have important national security interests in the region which are best protected by stable, recessions almost certainly would be deeper and their recoveries take longer. That outcome would mean smaller markets for our exports and a weaker global economy. We benefit from prosperity abroad.
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Question. How come the free market system will not self-correct itself in this instance?
Answer. The rationale behind the IMF-led programs in Asia is to work with governments to produce good policies that will be convincing to market participants, and thus accelerate the pace of reform and recovery. Absent such efforts, market forces might lead to the same outcome. There is also a very real danger that the added uncertainty of the free market self-correction option would exacerbate political and social tensions in the region which could produce negative effects and further stall recovery efforts.
Question. Developing countries now account for what percent of United States exports?
Answer. Exports to developing countries accounted for roughly 44% of all U.S. exports in the second quarter of 1997. Forty-three percent of U.S. exports to developing countries went to Asia in the same quarter. It is striking that in 1996 51% of California's exports alone went to Asia. For Oregon and Washington state, and ratios were even higher (57% and 58%, respectively). The fastest growing markets for U.S. exports are the developing countries of Asia and Latin America. (Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, International Monetary Fund).
Question. How much have U.S. firms exported in goods and services to the very poor countries eligible for IDA assistance?
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Answer. According to preliminary figures from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Trade Statistics, U.S. firms exported $6.3 billion in manufactured goods to 53 IDA-only recipient countries in 1997. (Comprehensive figures for services exports are not available.)
Question. How about those countries that are IDA graduates?
Answer. According to preliminary figures from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Trade Statistics, U.S. firms exported $68.8 billion in manufactured goods to the 21 countries which have graduated from IDA since its inception in 1960. (Comprehensive figures for services exports are not available.)
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN PORTER
TURKEY: HUMAN RIGHTS ASSISTANCE
Question. I am cautiously optimistic that the Turkish government is committed to addressing the serious human rights situation and the other internal problems that currently threaten the Turkish state. For fiscal year 1998, this subcommittee worked to make $20 million in ESF funds available to be spent on projects in these areas, but Turkey unfortunately rejected these funds. Given the new willingness of the Turkish government to address these issues, has the Department explored the possibility of using these funds to help implement the human rights, governance, and economic development goals that the Yilmaz government has put forth?
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Answer. Based on my own and the President's conversations with Prime Minister Uilmaz, there can be no doubt of this government's commitment to address the human rights problems it faces.
We do not, however, see a possibility for using the ESF funds for these purposes.
The key to Turkey's human rights problems is not so much resources as political commitment, which we now have from the Turkish government. Even more important is follow- through; we are actively pressing for concrete, significant improvements;
We also regret the Turkish government's refusal of ESF. However, that action was not based on disagreement with the worthwhile goals of the legislation, but on other factors that have not changed; and
In prioritizing assistance funds, the $20 million was allocated to other high priority projects in our budget one the Turkish government rejected it.
We are considering providing assistance, including training, that furthers our human rights and democracy goals at modest cost.
We already provide assistance to the human rights NGO community through programs administered by the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the U.S. Information Agency.
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CYPRUS POLICY
Question. Last year, as in years past, I asked you about the latest ''big initiative'' that was underway with regard to Cyprus. Despite the opportunities created by European Union accession, the situation continues to deteriorate. I am increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of solving this problem, and I believe that bold action is required to break the current deadlock.
(A) What new approaches are being considered by our Cyprus team? How are we working with other players on the Cyprus issue, such as the European Community an the United Nations, to spark innovative approaches to this problem?
Answer. This Administration places a high priority on resolving the Cyprus dispute. Special Presidential Emissary Richard Holbrooke and Special Cyprus Coordinator Tom Miller are focused on resolving the core issues of a Cyprus settlement: powers and authorities of a federal government; territory; property rights; and security issues. During their April 2–5 visit to the region, they discussed with the leaders of both communities some ideas for addressing these core issues. Ambassador Miller will return to the region this month and Ambassador Holbrooke will follow in May.
We work very closely with other key players on the Cyprus issue. Ambassadors Holbrooke and Miller consult frequently with British Special Cyprus Representative Sir David Hannay and other EU representatives and with the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor for Cyprus, Mr. Diego Cordovez.
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Question. What is the current status of efforts to bring the Turkish Cypriot community back into participation in the bicommunal projects?
Answer. We have been pressing Turkish Cypriot authorities to life their suspension of bicommunal contacts from the moment they announced the suspension on December 27, 1997. We have pointed out to them that the suspension is contrary to their interests because it has cut off significant opportunities for Turkish Cypriot individuals and non-governmental organizations to articulate their positions and concerns to Greek Cypriots and others. The suspension, combined with separate measures to impose travel restrictions across the cease-fire line, has also severely limited the freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriot individuals.
Our efforts have had some success. In January the U.S. Geological Survey hosted a bicommunal group of water managers and engineers from Cyprus on a two-week study tour of water management sites in the U.S. During his April 3–6 visit, Ambassador Holbrooke hosted a meeting of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders of the Brussels Group, a bicommunal Group of business people he first brought together in November 1997.
In addition to our approaches to Turkish Cypriot authorities, we have also urged the Turks, EU partners, the UN, and others to us in pressing the Turkish Cypriots to lift the suspension.
CAUCASUS
Question. I am also concerned about reports that State Department personnel have indicated to various officials in the region and to subcommittee staff that the $12.5 million which this subcommittee intended for Nagorno Karabakh will be or should be spent outside of Nagorno Karabakh. Such statements are contrary to the intent of this subcommittee in providing the funds and have served to unnecessarily create conflict and confusion in an extremely volatile region. What is the content of the guidance provided to department personnel regarding this issue?
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Answer. Our guidance is taken directly from the law: that the funds are to be used for humanitarian assistance for ''refugees, displaced persons had needy civilians affected by the conflict in the vicinity of Nagorno-Karabakh''. The Congressional statement of the managers of the appropriation provides further guidance, saying that the Coordinator should ''move forthwith to provide assistance of $12,500,000 for victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict''.
U.S. TROOPS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Question. The President promised on at least three occasions that U.S. forces would be withdrawn by a specific date. However, those dates came and went without a U.S. withdrawal. How long are we going to be in Bosnia? What will it take for the U.S. to be able to pull out of Bosnia? What is the Administration doing to facilitate a peaceful withdrawal?
Answer. The President has decided that the U.S. will participate in a NATO-led force in Bosnia beyond June 1998 and that the Follow-on Force should have a mission and size similar to SFOR, though the number of U.S. troops should decline from twenty-five to twenty percent of the total. The size of SFOR will be progressively reduced based on periodic review of the security situation in Bosnia and the progress of implementation of the Dayton Accords.
While the U.S. has not proposed, and NATO has not adopted, and fixed end-date for the deployment, it will not be open-ended. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines tend to encourage those who would wait us out.
The goal of SFOR is to establish conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a large NATO-leg military force.
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The Administration has developed benchmarks that, once achieved, will allow the peace process to continue without the presence of a major NATO force. The Administration is actively pressing civilian implementation so that the peace process becomes self-sustaining.
Specific examples include working with Bosnian election officials to design and produce an electoral law and model that will permit them to conduct elections without international supervision; working with the parties to develop the joint and central governmental institutions called for in Dayton; working with Federation partners to fully integrate governmental structures and abolish pre-war institutions of governance; working with police structures to bring them into line with democratic norms and practices; working with media to produce a more responsible and less ethnically-driven information system; and, of course, continuing to encourage the parties to deliver on their responsibility to surrender war criminals. All these are steps that will reinforce the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that when our troops depart, we can be sure they will not have to return.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN LIVINGSTON
Question. Haiti has little economic freedom. It remains one of the most repressed economies in the world. While some trade barriers have been reduced of late, there has been little effort to improve their current economic policies. Crime, corruption and bad economic policies still plague the island. What is the Administration doing to ensure that Haiti is taking steps to combat corruption and encourage greater economic freedom?
Answer. We agree with you that economic and political freedom lie at the heart of efforts to improve conditions in Haiti. That is why we have directed USG assistance at building Haiti's fledgling democracy, developing microenterprises, privatizing, providing technical assistance for small holders, and creating an apolitical, professional civilian police force and an independent judiciary.
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Under our democracy and governance program, we support elections, police training, judicial reform, local government development, Parliament, and community-based civic groups. Our assistance also supports economic policy reform, including public administration reform and privatization. One parastatal has been sold and another awaits the signature of a prime minister. Since 1995, the Government of Haiti has made substantial progress in stabilizing the economy. It has reduced its tariff structure from a range of 5 to 50 percent to a range of from 0 to 15 percent as part of its liberalization reforms. Other reforms designed to promote economic freedom are underway. Haiti can now face its future based on a market oriented economy and democratically elected government.
We continue to receive the highest assurances from the Government of Haiti that they are committed to fighting corruption wherever it may occur. The USG has been encouraged by the work of the Haitian National Police's Director General and Inspector General in pursuing investigations against police officials who are involved in illicit activities. These changes are not yet fully institutionalized. We must remain committed to helping Haiti modernize if we are to see permanent change.
UKRAINE
Question. Will you meet with the aggrieved U.S. investors during your visit to Ukraine? And if so, will you meet with them before you meet with Ukrainian officials?
Answer. During my March 6 visit to Kiev, I met with a group representing the U.S. business community in Ukraine, including a number of businesses that have raised complaints with the U.S. Government about problems they are having in Ukraine, such as Gala Radio and R&J Trading. The businessmen reviewed for me both company-specific problems and broader systemic obstacles to doing business in Ukraine.
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This meeting followed my meeting with President Kuchma, at which I raised directly our concern over the treatment of U.S. businesses and investors and the need for action to improve the investment climate in Ukraine.
Question. What are your thoughts on certification? Do you believe there has been substantial progress on the business disputes for which we conditioned aid?
Answer. On April 29, 1998, I decided to certify that the Government of Ukraine has made significant progress toward resolving U.S. investor complaints. We have worked very closely with the Government of Ukraine over the past year to push for resolution of investor complaints, including the twelve specific complaints covered by the legislation. Seven of the cases were resolved or there was significant progress toward their resolution.
Since I announced my decision to certify, the government of Ukraine has continued to work with us to resolve the remaining cases, and we continue to make progress.
We remain concerned, however, about the remaining investor problems, and more generally about Ukraine's poor investment climate and the slow pace of economic reform. In conjunction with my decision to certify I directed the withholding of certain assistance funds to the government of Ukraine in areas where reforms have stalled and such assistance cannot be used effectively. These funds will be redirected to the private and non-governmental sectors in Ukraine unless the Government of Ukraine implements the necessary reforms in these sectors and takes additional steps to resolve outstanding business cases in Ukraine.
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Question. The European Union is currently instigating dispute resolution procedures against Ukraine. This came about because Ukraine ignored both EU and WTO requests and implemented new tariffs on the auto industry that violate trade agreements and treaties they have with the EU. Do you think it is time for the U.S. to take similar action to protect U.S. investors?
Answer. The EU announced on February 20 that it would undertake consultations with a view to using the dispute settlement procedure of the EU's Interim Trade Agreement with Ukraine. More recently, an EU delegation visited Kiev in March to discuss this dispute with the Government of Ukraine. However, we have not been informed that the EU has implemented the dispute settlement procedure. Ukraine is involved in negotiations to join the WTO, and is expected to adhere to WTO principles while it pursues those negotiations. The EU has charged that Ukraine's auto regime violates WTO disciplines, as well as its bilateral agreement with Ukraine. We are examining this issue as well. We have complained to Ukraine about trading practices which contravene WTO rules and we have raised these issues in the Trade and Investment Committee of the Gore-Kuchma Commission, as well as in the context of Ukraine's WTO accession process.
Question. My constituent, Joe Lemire, has been threatened and employees at GALA Radio have been intimidated—without cause—and have been physically harassed and threatened with arrest. What is the Embassy doing to protect U.S. citizens such as Mr. Lemire in Ukraine?
Answer. GALA Radio is one of the investment dispute cases we consistently raise with the highest officials of the Government of Ukraine. The U.S. Ambassador in Ukraine, Ambassadors Morningstar and Sestanovich, and numerous other U.S. officials continue to press the Ukrainian Government to honor the ICSID arbitration process and desist from retaliation or any kind of physical abuse against Mr. Lemire and his employees. I raised the GALA case with President Kuchma when I visited Kiev on March 6. We will continue to press our concerns with the Government.
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Embassy officers have met regularly with Mr. Lemire since he first informed us of his complaint against the Ukrainian government. I understand Mr. Lemire had an in-depth meeting with Ambassador Pifer on May 15. Embassy officers have responded promptly to protests from GALA of alleged harassment by Ukrainian Government agencies. In fact, Mr. Lemire expressed his strong appreciation for the physical presence of Embassy personnel when such events have occurred. In addition, embassy officials have frequently accompanied Mr. Lemire to meetings with Ukrainian officials during efforts to resolve this problems.
While the Embassy is unaware of any direct threats to Mr. Lemire's life, they are keeping a close watch on events. The Regional Security Officer has also been working closely with Mr. Lemire on the recent burglary at his residence.
To the knowledge of Embassy Kiev, no workers for Gala radio have been arrested.
SADDAM HUSSEIN
Question. Secretary General Annan stated that Saddam Hussein can be trusted. Do you believe Saddam can be trusted?
Answer. No, Saddam Hussein can not be trusted. In his March 2 statement to the Security Council, Secretary General Annan said that Iraq's agreement to cooperate with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections must be tested and confirmed. We agree. Accordingly, it is necessary to continue the deployment of military forces in the Gulf at levels appropriate to ensure Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspections.
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IRAQ/UN
Question. Some say the real winner in this latest showdown with the U.S. was Iraq because they were able to defy the U.S. Without a clear policy on Iraq—the UN, Iraq, and Russia were able to set the agenda throughout the crisis. Why did the Administration allow the UN to conduct crucial parts of U.S. foreign policy?
Answer. The United States conducted an active diplomatic campaign centered on the United Nations, designed to compel Iraqi compliance with its own commitments under Security Council resolutions and bolster the central goal of our policy toward Iraq: to make certain that Iraq is not in a position, now or in the future, to threaten its neighbors or U.S. interests in the region. The agreement reached in Baghdad by the Secretary-General is a win-win situation for the United States and the United Nations. UNSCOM has said cooperation from Iraq under the Annan-Aziz MOU so far has been good. If that continues, it will mark an important victory for the international community.
But if Iraq violates the MOU, it will be clear to all that Iraq has reneged once more on its commitments under Security Council resolutions and reneged on the terms of the 1991 ceasefire. And the Council has made it clear that that will have the severest consequences. The United States is prepared to take whatever actions necessary, including military action, to respond to the breach of the ceasefire established by the Security Council.
UNSCOM: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S COMMENTS
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Question. It has been reported in some papers that Secretary-General Annan thought that some UNSCOM inspectors were ''cowboys'' who have thrown their weight around and behaved irresponsibly. Was that the case?
Answer. The Secretary-General described this characterization of UNSCOM inspectors as an Iraqi characterization, not his own.
MILITARY ACTION IN RESPONSE TO PRIOR INTERFERENCE WITH UNSCOM
Question. As Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, I was not formally briefed on the military aspects of the mission until I made a request for such a briefing. To be honest, I was troubled by the timing of the mission. Why was the President not making a stronger case for military action last year when UNSCOM inspectors were first denied access?
Answer. Iraq has interfered with UNSCOM ever since weapons inspections began following the Gulf War. There have been at least seven prior major incidents of interference, one of which required a military response.
Iraq's most recent confrontation with the Security Council occurred in two phases. On October 29, 1997, Iraq demanded the withdrawal of American members of the UN weapons inspection teams. This led to withdrawal of all UNSCOM personnel and a diplomatic effort by Russia to secure Iraq's agreement to UNSCOM's unconditional return.
Iraq then pursued efforts to limit UNSCOM's access to so-called ''Presidential sites.'' The crisis came to a head when UNSCOM Chairman Butler reported to the Council in January that UNSCOM was effectively blocked from carrying out its mandate by Iraq's twin refusal to provide access and information to his inspectors.
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The U.S. approach throughout the crises was to seek a diplomatic solution if possible and to build international support for a recourse to military action if that proved necessary. This approach allowed us to put maximum pressure on Iraq, while rebuilding the coalition of concerned nations that would join us in military action. Our readiness to employ military force was evident from the outset, but it was important—and ultimately effective—to demonstrate that we would pursue all viable diplomatic options first.
IRA AND LIST OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Question. My understanding is that the Administration did not include the IRA on the list of terrorist organizations when that list was promulgated last year. This decision, as I understand it, was made despite a recommendation by the FBI that the IRA be so listed.
a. Is this true?
b. If not, why not?
c. In light of several recent terrorist incidents attributable to the IRA, is the Administration reassessing that decision? If not, why not?
Answer. Last October, we took note of the IRA's cease fire announcement of July 19 and the subsequent decision by the British government that the cease fire was ''genuine in word and deed'', permitting Sinn Fein to join inclusive, all-party talks in Belfast. Under those circumstances, the Secretary, who has authority under the law to designate a foreign terrorist organization, decided not to designate the IRA at that time but to continue to hold the matter under review.
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Since then, the all-party talks resulted in an agreement reached in Belfast in April. We hope that the goal of a democratically-reached peace agreement will be confirmed by the voters.
We deplore the incidences of terrorism in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, acts that apparently were committed by extremist elements on both sides in an effort to disrupt the agreement. We will continue to monitor the situation and review the IRA and any other groups that may have committed violence in the past.
IRELAND/NO. IRELAND: BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND
Question. Why does the United States continue to provide a portion of its limited foreign assistance funds to the International Fund for Ireland?
Answer. The U.S. contribution to the IFI is a tangible and highly visible expression of our desire to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland through economic regeneration. The Fund, established by the British and Irish governments in 1986, receives contributions from the European Union, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as ours.
The Fund has provided support for over 3,500 projects throughout Northern Ireland and the border counties in the areas of urban development, education, tourism, community infrastructure, and assistance to small businesses. Fund projects encourage reconciliation between nationalists and unionists by operating on a cross-border and cross-community basis.
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IRELAND/NO. IRELAND: U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND ONLY AID TO EU COUNTRY
Question. What other members of the European Union currently receive bilateral economic assistance, and what are the fiscal year 1998 and 1999 assistance levels if such aid is provided?
Answer. The U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland is a unique case designed to address the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. The U.S. is committed to assisting in the resolution of the centuries-old conflict there. Other EU members do not receive bilateral economic assistance.
IRELAND/NO. IRELAND: GDP FIGURES
Question. What are the gross domestic product (GDP) figures for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997, and what have been the economic growth rates for both during the same period?
Answer.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN KINGSTON
Question. I continue to be extremely concerned about the proliferation of dangerous and sensitive weapon technology by Russia, China, and others to ''rogue'' states, and I am very Supportive of the Administration's efforts to prevent its continuance. I know the President has not yet made the necessary certification required by last year's act that Russia has ceased this activity to fully obligate their aid. What are the chances of this certification?
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Answer. Every six months, the Administration is required to evaluate whether to certify Russia. We are currently in the process of making the determination required at the beginning of May for Russia. That process is not yet complete and I cannot say whether the certification will be made.
Question. Recently, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin apparently issued a government decree making the unrestricted transfer of dual use technology to other nations illegal. What kind of legal weight does a Prime Ministerial decree have? Have any steps been taken to implement the decree? What, exactly, are the punishments involved for companies which violate the decree?
Answer. On January 22 the Russian government took an important step when then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed an executive order substantial strengthening the Russian export control process. The executive order gives the Russian government new legal authority to stop all transfer of goods and services to foreign missile programs and programs for weapons of mass destruction.
The Russian Constitution gives the Russian government the power to issue such executive orders. This Russian government has taken such steps to implement this order as publication of the order and outreach efforts to explain its significance to Russian industrial organizations. In addition, Russian agencies have conducted investigations based on the new controls. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the executive order is an appropriate vehicle for regulating export controls.
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Putting this legal authority in place was an important step. Now our attention has turned to Russian implementation and enforcement. We are monitoring this closely. Ambassador Gallucci will focus on these issues during his upcoming talks with Russian space agency head Koptev to end cooperation between Russian entities and Iran's missile program. The U.S. and Russia also convened their first meeting on implementation of export controls as agreed to at GCC X and discussed a full range of export controls, including catch all.
EGYPT—FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING
Question. To what extent is Egypt, a primary recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing, obligated to procure U.S.-made equipment? Does FMF provide a near total proportion of Egypt's procurement?
Answer. Egypt is a key U.S. all in the region and the most prominent political player in the Arab world. A strong relationship with Egypt affords us political and security benefits that no Arab state can provide. We share regional and international interests, including the pursuit of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, regional development, international stability and peacekeeping, and the stemming of terrorism. Providing security assistance to Egypt enables to us to pursue our joint interests and reinforces Egypt's stabilizing role in the region and in international peacekeeping efforts.
Egypt's FMF is spent in the U.S. or for U.S. goods and services. FMF-funded direct commercial contracts enable Egypt to purchase U.S.-made equipment and U.S.-provided services. Occasionally, an exception to the ''buy American'' rule is made, such as in conjunction with Corps of Engineers contraction projects, for heavy materials such as sand or cement.
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It is difficult to estimate the proportion of Egypt's total procurement represented by FMF purchases since the Egyptian defense budget is not made public. However, we believe that U.S. FMF represents between 35 and 40 percent of Egypt's annual defense budget. Overall, Egypt has used U.S. FMF to modernize, consolidate, and create an Egyptian defense force capable of interoperating with U.S. forces, as was the case during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Question. I understand that the North Korean government has taken steps to initiate a diplomatic dialogue with South Korea. This is obviously a very significant step. How far has this progressed? Is or will the United States be involved in any capacity if and when talks progress?
Answer. We have long supported dialogue between South and North Korea as key to reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. The United States is also a participant in the Four Party Talks (U.S., PRC, South Korea, North Korea) designed to replace the Armistice and reduce tension on the peninsula. This process, proposed in 1996 by President Clinton and then-President Kim Young Sam, was intended, in part, to facilitate dialogue between the South and the North and is complementary to such bilateral dialogue. If high-level North-South talks are successfully initiated, South Korea would inform, and consult with, the United States, but we would have no immediate direct role.
Recent developments in North-South dialogue include a February 15 announcement on North Korean radio that North Korea had established a registry listing vital information on North Korean citizens who had been separated from family members as a result of the Japanese occupation and the Korean War. According to the radio report, members of divided families will be allowed to apply to the registry for information in order to locate their relatives still living in North Korea and ''abroad.'' It is not clear if all members of divided families (i.e., those living in South Korea or who fled North Korea) would be allowed to apply for information.
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North Korean organizations, clearly at state direction, also invited representatives of non-governmental groups in South Korea to a ''dialogue'' and ''negotiation''. These invitations are similar to previous North Korean offers of negotiations between North Korea and private groups in South Korea, selected by North Korea. All such proposals have failed due to concern that they implicitly questioned the legitimacy of the South Korean government.
President Kim Dae-jung is seeking to broaden meaningful contact with the North, including an exchange of envoys. The South Korean Red Cross has just concluded an agreement with its Northern counterpart on the distribution of South Korean food aid to North Koreans. South Korea also continues to press for the implementation of the 1991 Basic Agreement it signed with North Korea, which would help re-establish high-level dialogue with North Korea.
Question. The severe famine in North Korea is continuing, and the United States has continued to mitigate the disaster through contributions of food for the citizens. How thoroughly has the famine penetrated the population? Is food (I don't mean our assistance here) being rationed by the government in any way, for example by providing for the government and the military at the expense of the citizens?
Answer. North Korea is an opaque society and reliable, comprehensive information is difficult to obtain. The food crisis is clearly severe and deeply affects the society. Certain regions, such as the northern part of the country, appear to be more severely affected, but we have only limited quantifiable information.
Food rationing to the population at large has long been practiced in North Korea. Farmers hand over a certain amount of the food they produce to the Public Distribution System. It is charged with distributing set rations to the non-food producing population, including factory workers, urban dwellers in general, and the military. Rations vary depending on the availability of supplies. This system has always differentiated among age groups and classes of labor. Urban and certain privileged populations, including the military, apparently fare better than others.
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International assistance providers, including UN agencies, foreign NGOs and other international donors, have negotiated the ability to target their aid to vulnerable population groups (such as young children, pregnant and nursing women, and hospital patients). The rations for these individuals are determined jointly by the aid organizations and North Korean authorities.
WEAPONS INSPECTION IN IRAQ
Question. Will the inspection teams be able to reach all the new sites they need to inspect before the U.S. force withdraws to avoid an identical crisis and mobilization a few months down the road? Would it have been possible for Iraq to relocate highly sensitive equipment and documentation during this standoff, making it necessary to start the inspections over from scratch?
Answer. It is important to remember that the Annan-Aziz MOU reaffirms, in writing, that Iraq must provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to all sites in Iraq. The UN is in the process of intensively testing Iraq's commitment to provide such access.
It is important that U.S. forces in the region remain at a heightened state of readiness until Iraq's intentions in this regard are clear. In any event, we will want to continue to maintain a significant military presence in the region—as we have for several years—to protect our vital interests and to deter aggression.
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During the recent standoff, it is quite likely that Iraq was able to relocate sensitive material to new sites. This is the game Iraq has been playing for the last seven years. Neither we nor UNSCOM are under any illusions about the need to continue intensive, surprise inspections until all such material is tracked down, fully accounted for, and, if necessary, destroyed. By making clear that Iraq must grant access to UNSCOM at all sites at any time—including the so-called ''presidential sites'' Iraq previously declared off-limits—the Annan-Aziz MOU should make it more difficult for Iraq to continue its pattern of concealment and deception.
IRAQ/UN
Question. What can the Administration do to ensure compliance with Secretary-General Annan's inspection plan? When will the inspections begin? Is there a timetable for Iraqi compliance?
Answer. The United States conducted an active diplomatic campaign centered on the United Nations, designed to compel Iraqi compliance with its own commitments under Security Council resolutions and bolster the central goal of our policy toward Iraq: to make certain that Iraq is not in a position, now or in the future, to threaten its neighbors or U.S. interests in the region. The agreement reached in Baghdad by the Secretary-General is a win-win situation for the United States and the United Nations. Inspections under the new MOU took place in March. UNSCOM has said cooperation from Iraq under the Annan-Aziz MOU so far has been good. If that continues, it will mark an important victory for the international community.
But if Iraq violates the MOU, it will be clear to all that Iraq has reneged once more on its commitments under Security Council resolutions and reneged on the terms of the 1991 cease-fire. And the Council has made it clear that that will have the severest consequences. The United States is prepared to take whatever actions necessary, including military action, to respond to the breach of the cease-fire established by the Security Council.
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RESULTS ACT
Question. Regarding the layout of the performance plans in the Congressional Presentation, why don't ''objectives'' in each region or program always address all aspects of the ''strategies''? For example, on page 380 of the Congressional Presentation, the strategy says, '' Press governments to respect land rights of indigenous people, freedom of religion, and remain alert for any signs of religious persecution,'' yet none of the objectives reflect that part of the strategy. And then, likewise, there don't always seem to be indicators to clearly address each aspect of the overall strategy and each listed objective. And finally, it seems that in many cases the indicators are simply restatements or rewording of the strategies and goals. Are there more specific reports available that clarify these area?
Answer. The application of strategic planning and performance measurement to foreign affairs is an extremely complex undertaking. It involves the activities of multiple U.S. Government agencies and the range of Function 150 programs to achieve dozens of objectives organized around the 16 strategic goals of the International Affairs Strategic Plan in over 150 countries. This is going to take several years and enormous effort to get right.
The Regional Program Plans contained in the FY 1999 Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations represent our first effort to link Function 150 resources to our international affairs goals. Much needs to be done to improve the technical rigor of these plans. The case cited on indigenous rights is a good case in point. The identification of performance indicators for many international affairs goals remains open. This is particularly true for those that are not exclusively defined by program activities and are not inherently quantifiable, such as promotion of democracy and human rights. In addition, it was not possible to include in the Regional Plans country-specific objectives for every strategy. For the FY 2000 Congressional Presentation, our intention is to provide more specific performance information on priorities and resources at the country level, along with a more fully developed set of performance indicators.
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
Question. How can the United States take a more constructive cooperative approach to the international anti-drug effort?
Answer. Cooperation is the hallmark of our approach towards international antidrug efforts. We base it on the need for countries to adhere to and comply with broad international agreements, such as the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. We provide leadership and financial contributions to a wide range of multilateral antidrug institutions in the UN, OAS, and elsewhere and we continue to provide substantial bilateral narcotics control assistance—training, equipment, and economic and technical support—to the major drug producing and transit countries.
We are intensifying our efforts within this framework. For instance, the Latin American and Caribbean countries have endorsed our Summit of the Americas proposal to develop and implement a multilateral counternarcotics monitoring and evaluation process as part of Western Hemisphere alliance against drugs. We are also working to create a multinational counternarcotics center in the hemisphere and we are in the process of establishing International Law Enforcement Academies around the world to provide antidrug and crime training for investigators and prosecutors. Finally, we are seeking greater levels of foreign counternarcotics assistance for the most important drug producing and trafficking countries that demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with us.
We use certification judiciously but effectively to ensure that governments have the political will to abide by their international commitments and use the assistance we provide effectively. We have taken several steps in recent years to make the certification process increasingly transparent including identifying specific certification objectives for the governments of every major drug producing and transit country with whom we have relations and providing them a mid-term report on their progress. Our goal has been to give cooperating countries a greater sense of ownership for our common counternarcotics objectives and improve international cooperation.
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Question. What are the specific requirements or standards used to determine whether a country's cooperation merits certification? What are the measurable ''indicators'' for that determination? are they uniform country to country and region to region? If not, why? Where are these requirements spelled out?
Answer. The Standards for determining whether a country's cooperation merits certification are set forth in a federal statute: Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (''FAA''). That law establishes that the country must have fully cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the ''Vienna Convention''). The determination of whether a country has ''fully cooperated'' is based on that country's record of compliance with the requirements of the Vienna Convention, of bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the United States, and measures taken to combat corruption.
The ''fully cooperating'' standard can be a potentially broad requirement; its vagueness raised concerns by some countries that the United States was ''moving the goal posts'' from year to year. To overcome these concerns, the United States has taken several steps to make certification a more transparent and joint process. For instance, we now identify through demarches, meetings, and other contacts with major producer and transit countries, the counternarcotics areas and objectives we consider most important for certification. These objectives, such as crop eradication, criminal investigations, and drug interdiction, vary from country to country depending on their roles in the drug trade and the capabilities of their antidrug institutions. We also provide these countries a mid-year progress report that alerts them to any potential certification problems.
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The certification standard is fair. Countries are not asked to achieve more than they are capable of achieving. They are judged on the basis of their cooperation with the United States on common objectives and their willingness to abide by international agreements to which they are parties.
Question. The Congressional Presentation refers to the importance of human rights in several places in the International Narcotics Section for Latin America. In fact, improving respect for human rights is mentioned prominently in several of the overarching strategy statements. If this is a major foreign policy goal for the region even within the context of our anti-drug programs, shouldn't our certification requirements include indicators of human rights? For example, if we are going to exert full court pressure on these governments to ''cooperate fully'' with us to stop drug activity, shouldn't we also make clear our expectation that their cooperation include fair, independent, timely, and uncorrupted adjudication? If it is a major part of the objective (as the CP states it is) do you believe we should add indicators for human rights to the certification process?
Answer. Improving respect for human rights and the rule of law is an integral part of our international narcotics control program. The program includes and expectation, articulated explicit frequently through our embassies, that counternarcotics operations should take place within a timely, independent and uncorrupted administration of justice is a necessary component of an effective counternarcotics program. For that reason, we fund justice sector reform programs in many of the countries which receive our counternarcotics assistance, offering training to judges prosecutors and public defenders.
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The State Department already has a highly effective mechanism for evaluating the human rights performance of host nations in our annual Human Rights report. This report is comprehensive and covers the performance of all government entities involved in counternarcotics efforts. Through it, end-use monitoring mechanisms, and our ongoing human rights dialogue, we believe we are already adequately monitoring and providing feedback to host countries on human rights performance.
Question. To build on the previous question, unfortunately, the message we may be sending through the INL programs may seem inconsistent to the countries we work so hard to influence. I think there are inherent conflicts of interests in our efforts. Not only do we insist on the highest levels of cooperation thought our strategy (p. 376, CP) to strengthen the political commitment of host government to counter-narcotics efforts,'' but we are also actively working with them to ''enact and improve'' their counternarcotics legislation. (p. 376, CP) I am concerned that that may present very clear expectations when it comes to the judiciary, especially when one of the indicators for success (p. 377) is the number of narcotics sentences. (To illustrate this point I can tell you that in Ecuador, for example, it has been found that up to 80 percent of prisoners have not been sentenced according to a New York Times article on August 22, 1997. The average waiting time for a trial is over 400 days, while Ecuadoran law places definitive (and short) time limits on time allowed to elapses before sentencing. About half of all prisoners there are held on drug-related charges.) Will you please respond to this concern about conflicting efforts?
Answer. We see no inherent contradiction between a strong committment to an effective and aggressive counternarcotics law enforcement effort and respect for due process in implementing that effort. We continue to urge nations cooperating with us on counternarcotics to arrest, prosecute, and sentence drug traffickers and money launderers to sentences commensurate with the seriousness of their crimes. We also work with those nations to improve the effectiveness of their criminal laws against traffickers and launderers by strengthening, modernizing, and removing loopholes in their substantive law. Equally, we work with them to improve their codes of criminal procedure, to ensure that they conform to internationally recognized norms of legal and human rights.
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Question. I believe the United States should be very assertive, open, and unmistakable in communicating to countries that participate in our International Narcotics Control Program that protection of legal and human rights is equally important (to other aspects of cooperation) in the prosecution process. In fact, report language to that goal was included in last year's Foreign Operations Act at my request. I have been told directly by various Latin American officials that U.S. pressure to be tough on drugs is absolutely pervasive. However unfounded this view may seem to us, we seem to be dealing with a dangerous perception that we demand arrests and convictions above all other considerations. The perception may be much more influential than the reality. What steps has the Department of State taken since the enactment of the FY 98 legislation to make such clarifications on human/legal rights? Will the U.S. assert to ''host'' countries that we never have predisposed expectations on verdicts and sentencing (even though it is used as an official indication of success)?
Answer. Section 570 of the FY 98 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (FOAA) contains language similar to the human rights-related limitations on International Narcotics Control (INC) funds contained in the FY 97 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. However, Section 570 applies to all FY 98 funds, not just INC funds.
In implementing the legislation, U.S. missions abroad were instructed to establish specific and detailed procedures for reviewing reported incidents of human rights violations by ''host nation'' security forces, correlating that information with INC programs, and reporting all such information to the Department of State in order to ensure compliance with the law.
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In March of this year we directed U.S. missions abroad with such procedures already in place to ensure that they apply to all FY 98 FOAA funds, in addition to FY 97 INC funds. We also directed all other missions to develop such procedures.
U.S. missions in the drug producing and transit countries emphasize three mutually reinforcing goals: promoting democracy, advancing human rights, and fighting illegal drugs. Our expectation is that such ''host nations'' will prosecute offenses vigorously within the bounds of the law and the rules of due process, and such expectation is communicated frequently to such nations' officials. However, we have always sought to make clear to ''host nations'' our concern that the rule of law should govern in all prosecutions, including those of drug traffickers and money launderers. We will remain alert for cases in which our goals are not understood and use diplomatic contacts, rule of law training programs, and other technical assistance to promote a better understanding.
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
Question. I have reviewed some of the State Department's country reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 which outline the concerns I have about many Latin American judicial systems more specifically than I have here. What specific programs does the State Department/USAID implement to increase judicial independence in countries we work with through INC? What are the indicators of success for this? How have those programs helped alleviate the concerns about respect for legal and human rights which your reports describe?
Answer. The State Department and USAID, often with the support of the Department of Justice or representatives of the Judicial Conference of the United States, are engaged in numerous activities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen the administration of justice (AOJ), including the independence of judiciaries. While some of these projects are implemented with INC funds (e.g., USAID AOJ projects in Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico), most are funded directly by USAID or, in the case of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), by the Department of the State.
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Over the last ten years, approximately $300 million has been invested throughout the region in projects of all kinds. With regard specifically to the issue of judicial independence, trends in the region that we have supported include the establishment of new and more open methods of judicial selection, strengthening of court administration to enable judiciaries to manage their own budgets and otherwise cease to depend upon executive agencies for administrative support, and the creation of judicial schools to provide training for judges and judicial personnel.
USAID and ICITAP are working together in an increasing number of countries to bring together judges, prosecutors, police investigators and public defenders to improve the handling of investigations. An overall goal is to change the current police practice of first arresting a suspect and then beginning the investigation. If police worked instead with prosecutors to develop cases, and arrested suspects only when sufficient evidence existed to charge them with crimes, there would be a substantial drop in the number of pretrial detainees throughout Latin American jails.
Indicators of success are required for each individual project. Examples of indicators currently in use are: citizen perception of fairness in the justice system, access to legal information/services in the criminal justice system, favorable rating by polls of due process under law, new judicial codes adopted by national assembly, percentage of judges reappointed on the basis of merit by the new judicial council, and number of cases handled by public defenders throughout the country.
DRUG REPORT TO CONGRESS
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Question. The FY98 act also included bill language requiring a report from the Department of State containing a list of all countries in which the United States carries out international counternarcotics activities, the number, mission and agency affiliation of U.S. personnel assigned to each such country, and all costs and expenses obligated for each program, project or activity by each U.S. agency in each county within 60 days of enactment. This report is about seven weeks overdue. When will that report be submitted to Congress?
Answer. The report was completed and delivered last month (March 1998) to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee. Please let us know if you need another copy from the State Department.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Congresswoman Pelosi
GLOBAL AIDS
Question. Many experts who focus on infectious diseases, particularly AIDS, are encouraged by recent reports that access to drugs and new technologies can, at a relatively low cost, make inroads into [reducing] the transmission [rate] of infectious diseases around the world. Does the State Department coordinate its efforts and activities to fight infectious diseases, including AIDS, with other U.S. agencies and departments including the Agency for International Development, the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and the Department of Defense? How can we ensure that our domestic and international efforts to develop effective and accessible technologies to fight epidemics are coordinated and taking advantage of the initiatives on which each agency is working?
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Answer. The Department of State has made the reduction of diseases one of its strategic foreign policy goals and coordinates the efforts of the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in enhancing global preparedness in prevention, detection, research, surveillance and response to disease worldwide. In December 1997, I issued the first-ever statement by a U.S. Secretary of State on the World AIDS situation. In 1996 for the Lyon Summit, the Department of State successfully negotiated the inclusion of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases onto the global economic agenda in the G–7 (now G–8) forum. Discussion of these issues was a centerpiece of the Denver Summit hosted by President Clinton last summer, and will continue to be important to our international discussions with leadership.
The Department of State also chairs a U.S.-EU Task Force on Communicable Diseases which has developed a prototype network for the international reporting of foodborne diseases, and which we soon expect to be expanded to each of the other continents. Under the leadership of the Department, all major bilateral initiatives have a health component which focuses on HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases. The Department of State continues to support international organizations such as the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, and the World Bank, whose participation in addressing these issues is critical in the battle against these diseases and to our U.S. International Strategy for reducing the spread of diseases worldwide.
The USG through the US Agency for International Development is one of the largest international donors for HIV/AIDS, providing nearly $1 billion since 1986 to fight HIV/AIDS around the world. Over the last 10 years, HIV/AIDS projects have been established in 42 countries, and have helped more than 600 private voluntary organizations implement HIV prevention programs that have reached more than 22 million people. In addition, more than 200,000 educators, counselors, and clinicians have been trained.
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With funding of $50 million recently made available to work on infectious diseases worldwide, USAID has developed a new strategy which concentrates on TB, malaria, antimicrobial resistance, and surveillance and response. This approach is consistent with the Department of State's International Affairs Strategic Plan and will complement USAID's on-going activities to improve child survival and the health of women worldwide. The strategy was developed in coordination with key partners such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Defense, and the Department of State. In addition, the implementation of USAID's strategy will be coordinated with these agencies' own infectious disease efforts.
MEXICO
Question. The U.S. is reportedly currently training large numbers of Mexican military personnel in counternarcotics techniques. Mexico is also a nation with at least two significant insurgent groups, the Zapatista Army and the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army). Some areas of the country, like the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrerro, have both insurgent activity and narcotics trafficking. What assurance is there that the soldiers who we have trained and are training do not use their new skills for counter-insurgency purposes? Is there any end-use monitoring of training?
Answer. In responses to Mexico's interest in improving the skills and capabilities of military personnel being assigned to newly-created counter-drug units, the U.S. arrange for training by the U.S. Army Special Forces. This training has emphasize skills and discipline useful for personnel engaged in counter-drug activities. The Mexican Secretariat of National Defense selects personnel for U.S. training who are most likely to be assigned to counter-drug units, or to units which regularly perform counter-drug missions.
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Some of the Mexican states that have recently experienced insurgent activities are also major drug-trafficking and producing states. Therefore, it is likely that some of the personnel who receive U.S. training will, at some point, be assigned to units or missions in those states. However, we do not intend to attempt to direct the Government of Mexico where in its territory individual officials should be assigned.
Recipients of U.S. Special Forces training are given thorough grounding in internationally-accepted concepts of protection of human and civil rights, the rule of law, and appropriate interaction between military forces and civilian populations in conflictive situations. A key aspects of such training is knowing when to refrain from use of force.
The U.S. Government attempts to conduct post-training assessments or evaluations to determine the impact of the training and to be able to make changes in curriculum or training methods to make it more effective in the future. We are also very interested in ascertaining if personnel receiving specialized U.S. training are assigned to positions where they can make use of it. This will affect where we invest limited training resources in the future. We are not able, however, to follow up on each and every individual around the world who receives U.S. training.
Question. On December 8, 1997, Mexico and the European Union signed the so-called ''democracy and human rights clause'' as a part of their growing commercial relations. The clause establishes democratic principles and respect of human rights as the cornerstone of the EU-Mexico relationship. How would you characterize the place that democracy and human rights have in U.S.-Mexico relations? Are we willing to make promotion of democracy and human rights a centerpiece of our relationship with enforceable standards?
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Answer. Promoting democracy and protecting human rights are major components of our Mexico policy. These issues were major themes during the President's May 1997 visit and our August 1997 high-level human rights consultation with the GOM. Our continuing dialogue on democracy and human rights is a visible manifestation on the breadth, depth, complexity and maturity of our relationship as well as of our ability to deal with issues in a cooperative manner. This continuing dialogue also demonstrates the importance of human rights in our bilateral relationship, as do our similar high-level human rights dialogues with Canada, Russia and the EU.
Question. Over the last three years there has been an alarming growth in paramilitary groups like the one that carried out the December massacre of 45 peasants in Acteal, Chiapas. Leading Mexican non-governmental human rights organizations have reported collaboration between the Federal Army and these vigilante organizations. In its January 4, 1998, edition, the magazine ''Proceso'' published what it claimed was an Army document outlining a strategy to ''create and support paramilitary groups.'' The Army has vehemently denied these assertions and claims the published document is a sophisticated fake. Clearly, however, any evidence of linkage of Army support for these groups would be a matter of grave concern for the U.S. What evidence does the U.S. have regarding these serious charges?
Answer. The evidence we have seen does not support the allegations that paramilitary groups in Chiapas were created or supported by the Mexican military. Many of these groups appear to have originated as ''self defense'' groups connected to one side or another in the multiple conflicts that divide Chiapas. The most recent interim report of the Mexican Attorney General's investigation of the Acteal massacre describes how local political leaders and public security officials—not the Mexican military—collected weapons and provided them to these ''self defense'' groups. It was one such group, using weapons acquired legally and illegally as well as some home-made weapons, that carried out the Acteal massacre.
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CONGO AND RWANDA (HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICA GROWTH ACT)
Question. The Africa Growth and Investment Act, the centerpiece of the Administration's new Africa policy, was strengthened by Reps. Gilman and Smith who amended the bill to require that participating countries must respect the rule of law and that they would be ineligible to participate in programs or receive assistance or other benefits if the President determines that they engage in gross violations of human rights. Has the Administration endorsed this link between human rights and trade benefits in Africa? If not, why not?
Answer. The Administration endorses the link, and we strongly support the bill as it was approved by the House of Representatives on March 11. As amended, the bill states:
''It is the sense of the Congress that a sub-Saharan African country should not be eligible to participate in programs, projects, or activities, or receive assistance or other benefits under this Act if the government of that country is determined by the President to engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.''
A country must also observe the existing statutory criterion on internationally-recognized worker rights as a condition for eligibility for duty-free benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences program.
BOSNIA—NEED FOR RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING
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Question. The Administration has based the renewal of the SFOR mission in Bosnia on a series of benchmarks, where continued U.S. and NATO troop involvement revolves around the benchmarks being met. Most of the benchmarks involve the reconstruction funds approved by this Subcommittee, such as establishing an effective judiciary and police, independent media, conduct of free and fair elections, free market reforms and cooperation in prosecution of war criminals. You are seeking $225 million for the continued reconstruction of Bosnia. Please comment on the need for these funds in relation to the benchmarks.
Answer. The funding already provided by this Subcommittee, and that which we are requesting in FY 99, is critical to achievement of the benchmarks which will permit the departure of NATO forces from Bosnia. SEED programs in Bosnia, administered through USAID, Treasury, Justice, and USIS, give the U.S. the means to lead on police and judicial reform, reform of the media, the holding of free and fair elections, economic transition to a self-sustaining market economy, minority returns, and the resolution of Brcko. U.S. assistance has contributed significantly to the political success of moderate leaders in the Republika Srpska, leaders who have demonstrated their willingness to implement Dayton commitments, such as return of refugees and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
This funding is important because it also permits us to leverage money and support from other donors for key U.S. goals, including achievement of the benchmarks we have established. The U.S. provides only 17.5 percent of the total funding pledged for Bosnia's reconstruction. But our example helps prompt other donors to commit over four times as much money to these priorities as does the U.S.
You identified in your question several of our most important benchmarks. Here is a brief update on the progress being made in each:
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War Criminals. Since March of 1997, the number of publicly-indicted war criminals in the Hague has gone from 8 to 31. Three are dead, and 32 remain at large. The U.S. is a major provider of funding to the Tribunal to insure that it is able to give those charged speedy and fair trials.
Police Restructuring and Reform. In the Federation, 10,000 of the 12,000 authorized police have been certified by the International Police Task Force. In the Republika Srpska 7,000 out of the 8,500 police have been certified. In areas where police have undergone the certification process, human rights complaints against the police have dropped dramatically.
Judicial Reform. In the Federation, a new criminal code has been drafted which contains clear human rights safeguards. It is expected that this law will go into effect before the end of June and we and other donors will train judges and prosecutors how to apply the new law. The RS has asked for similar assistance in redrafting its criminal code.
Conduct of Free and Fair Elections. The OSCE has supervised three sets of elections and will supervise a fourth set of elections for most major national and entity offices this Fall. With each set of elections has come increased democracy, as evidenced by the steady losses of the former nationalist political parties. In the November, 1997 RS Assembly elections, the Pale hard-liners lost their Parliamentary.
Development of Independent Media. Considerable progress has been made in the development of independent media and media standards. Extremist nationalist broadcast media have been taken off the air, an FCC-type licensing and standards board is being established by the Office of the High Representative with U.S. and other donor funding. State-run T.V. is being severed from party control. The Open Broadcast Network, the only truly independent cross-entity television station which is supported by the international donor community, is increasing its footprint over the next several weeks to reach 80 percent of the country, and recent polls show that it has become one of the most trusted sources of news in Bosnia.
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Privatization and a Free Market Economy. Agreement has been reached between the IMF and the Government of Bosnia which will shortly provide funding to back a single Bosnian currency which will serve to unify the economies of the two Entities. The IMF Agreement will open the way for Paris Club settlement, which will pave the way for full international creditworthiness for Bosnia. With considerable U.S. technical assistance, the Federation has prepared and passed all major privatization laws and could begin privatizing small state enterprises this summer. The RS has scrapped its flawed privatization law and should pass the necessary Entity laws on privatization this summer.
BOSNIA—LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITION ON HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
Question. Last year, Congress again prohibited the use of our funds for housing reconstruction in Bosnia, with some exceptions. How has this prohibition affected our reconstruction efforts? Should the restriction be lifted?
Answer. The Administration has consistently opposed this restriction on the use of SEED funds. It limits our ability to lead on this issued, which is one of the keys to large-scale returns of refugees and displaced persons. The damage to housing in Bosnia during the war was extensive, with nearly half of all housing either severely damaged or totally destroyed. This lack of housing greatly exacerbates ethnic tensions and prevents return of refugees and displaced person to their homes. In FY 1996, prior to the imposition of the legislative restriction, USAID put together an innovative program, working through NGOs, to repair over 2,500 private houses in Bosnia. It was an enormously successful program implemented ahead of schedule and under budget.
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At that time, no other donor was willing to tackle private housing repair, due to the difficulties caused by ethnic cleansing, which meant that much of Bosnia's housing was occupied by families other than owners (privately-owned housing made up 80 percent of the pre-war housing stock in Bosnia). USAID, by requiring the agreement of the local authorities, the current residents and the legal owners before agreeing to fund repairs, established a model for dealing with ownership problems. By showing the way, the U.S. program spurred other donors to tackle the housing problem.
In a few crucial areas, such as Brcko, the legislated restriction has probably delayed progress by some measurable amount. It is critical to restore Brcko to a multi-ethnic city, but it took the U.S. precious time to find other donors willing to repair housing there. Even now, there is a serious problem with a lack of transitional housing for Bosnian Serbs, which would permit ethnic Croats and Muslims to return to their homes in Brcko city. It has been difficult to recruit individuals to serve in the multi-ethnic city government, in the absence of this housing. We have, over time, been able to work our arrangements with other donors for them to repair housing while we repair related infrastructure, such as water and electricity.
BOSNIA—KRAJISNIK VETO
Question. What is the role of Bosnian Co-President Momcilo Krajisnik and representatives of the Pale government in determining where any portion of international financial institution loans of other economic assistance goes within Republika Srpska? What is the statue of the so-called ''Krajisnik veto,'' which allows Krajisnik to dictate that a certain portion of all loans to the RS goes to Karadzic-controlled towns?
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Answer. Details of the Entity component for IFI loans are negotiated with the respective Entity Prime Ministers, usually accompanied by their Finance and other relevant Ministers. While in theory any member of the Tripartite Presidency, including President Krajisnik, could block World Bank or EBRD loans out of dissatisfaction with the location of projects, they have never done so. We have never been able to confirm the exercise of the ''Krajisnik veto.'' The World Bank, which certain human rights non-governmental organizations allege was subject to this type of coercion, vehemently denies that such attempts were ever made. The Bank insists that the municipalities in the Republika Srpska which have benefited from Bank assistance were chosen solely on the basis of objective economic or humanitarian criteria. The NGOs who insist that Krajisnik has dictated that a certain portion of all loans to the RS go to Kraradzic-controlled towns have never presents any evidence to support their claim.
ASSISTANCE FOR PALESTINIANS AND MENABANK
Question. The Administration has requested an increase in assistance to the Palestinian Authority, from $75 million to $100 million, along with $52 million for the first U.S. contributions to the Middle East Development bank. Why is this increase needed? Is the Middle East Development bank ready for funding, and what priority does it occupy for the Administration?
Answer. The Administration is requesting an increase from $75 million to $100 million for USAID assistance programs in the West Bank and Gaza because economic development for the Palestinians is key to building peace in the Middle East. Neither the current $75 million nor the contemplated increase involves direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority or to the PLO.
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The increase in USAID funds would maintain the aid level established when the U.S. pledged $100 million per year to the international donor effort for the Palestinians for 1993–98. The original five-year pledge comprised $75 million per year for USAID activities in West Bank/Gaza and $25 million per year for OPIC project finance and loan guarantees. Unfortunately, the OPIC component has been underused by American business, and, for this reason, the Administration seeks to replace it with expanded USAID assistance.
The additional USAID funds would be used for water projects and private sector activities. These initiatives will help build a constituency for peace in the Middle East while maintaining American leadership in the international donor effort for the Palestinians.
The Middle East Development Bank (MENABANK) is ready for funding; it is a high priority for the Administration.
Over the last year, an international transition team in Cairo has completed most of the work necessary to get the bank up and running. The team has prepared operational and financial policies and identified an impressive pipeline of potential projects.
With other members looking to the U.S.—by far the largest shareholder in the bank—to fund its first year of capital contributions, the Administration is seeking the money necessary to enable MENABANK to meet key regional economic needs. The bank will provide capital—and political cover—for important regional projects, thus creating a forum for regional economic dialogue and cooperation. MENABANK will offer equity and loans for undercapitalized sectors, resulting in the creation of new jobs and promotion of economic growth.
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NEW INDEPENDENT STATES
Question. The Administration is requesting an increase of $155 million for the NIS. Most of the increase would go for Russia, which would go from $129 million this year to $225 million in 1999. What is the rationale for an increase of this magnitude?
Answer. The straightforward rationale for increased assistance to Russia is that our national security is dramatically enhanced if Russia is a market-based democracy; our engagement with Russia is among the highest foreign policy priorities of this Administration. Beyond our diplomatic contacts, our assistance activities help us stay engaged with Russians as they continue the generational, historic and difficult transformation of their society.
Congressional earmarks for other parts of the NIS in the last three appropriations have resulted in dramatic underfunding of our assistance to Russia and Central Asia. Last year the NIS appropriation was so low and the earmarks so high that assistance to Russia was the same as to Armenia. Per capita assistance to Armenia this year is $25 per Armenian; per Russian it is 86 cents. It is this anomaly that we are trying to remedy with our FY99 request.
Further, we have restructured our assistance to Russia to focus nearly exclusively on Partnership for Freedom activities: exchanges, partnerships, support for non-government organizations, emphasis on small business, trade and investment, grass roots activities that build support for economic and democratic reform from the bottom up. We have begun an important effort to encourage investment and economic growth in the regions of Russia, away from Moscow, in Novgorod, Samara and Khabarovsk. Through these activities, we seek to build lasting and healthy relationships between Russians and Americans so as to enhance our national security and pursue our national interests.
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Question. How much of the $900 million you have requested for the NIS will go for programs for Health, Population and the Environment and what level of increase does this represent? Given the vast needs in this area, particularly in the family planning area, why have these programs occupied such a low priority in the past? And, to what extent will health, population and environment programs be a priority if Congress only provides $770 million for the NIS program, the same as in FY 98?
Answer. Assuming Congress approves our budget request of $925 million for the NIS in FY 99, we have budgeted $149 million for health, population and environment, which represents an increase of $50 million or 51 percent over the FY 98 budget of $99 million (which is itself up from the $80 million budgeted in FY 97).
We agree that the needs are vast in these areas, and that is why we have increased the amounts budgeted for these programs over the last two years. USAID's reproductive health programs in the NIS, for example, are trying to address problems ranging from poor quality of services and inadequate client counseling to limited choice of family planning methods and ignorance of how to avoid sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. One of our major goals is to reduce the high rates of abortion—and the associated maternal deaths, infertility and other physical damage to women—in the NIS.
If Congress does not approve the $925 million request for NIS assistance in FY 99, budgeting for these programs would have to be reduced, as it would for all other programs. That said, we will continue to support activities in these areas because we believe they can have an important impact at the grassroots level, which is central to the goals of the President's Partnership for Freedom initiative. Our support for these programs was highlighted recently during the First Lady's trip to Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia, where she paid particular attention to programs in the health and family planning sectors.
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UKRAINE
Question. I understand that you will travel to Ukraine soon to discuss the status of economic reform and the treatment of American investors there. What can you tell us of this situation and do you anticipate being able to certify by April 30, 1998 that the government of Ukraine has made significant progress toward resolving the complaints of American investors, as required by law?
Answer. We remain very concerned about the slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine and about its poor investment climate. During my March 6 visit to Kiev, I met with a group representing the U.S. business community in Ukraine, including a number of businesses that have raised complaints with the U.S. Government about problems they are having in Ukraine, such as Gala Radio and R&J Trading. The businessmen reviewed for me both company-specific problems and broader systemic obstacles to doing business in Ukraine. This meeting followed my meeting with President Kuchma, at which I raised directly our concern over the treatment of U.S. businesses and investors and the need for action to improve the investment climate in Ukraine and the pace of economic reform.
As you know, on April 29 I announced my decision to certify that the government of Ukraine had made significant progress toward resolving U.S. investor complaints. We have worked very closely with the Government of Ukraine over the past year to push for resolution of investor complaints, including the twelve specific complaints covered by the legislation. Seven of the cases were resolved or there was significant progress toward their resolution.
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Since I announced my decision to certify, the government of Ukraine has continued to work with us to resolve the remaining cases, and we continue to make progress.
We remain concerned, however, about the remaining investor problems, and more generally about Ukraine's poor investment climate and the slow pace of economic reform. In conjunction with my decision to certify I directed the withholding of certain assistance funds to the government of Ukraine in areas where reforms have stalled and such assistance cannot be used effectively. These funds will be redirected to the private and nongovernmental sectors in Ukraine unless the Government of Ukraine implements the necessary reforms in these sectors and takes additional steps to resolve outstanding business cases in Ukraine.
INDONESIAN LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN
Question. Has Muchtar Pakpahan's case been raised with President Soeharto during U.S. bilateral discussions with President Soeharto? If not, why not? If so, to what result?
Answer. President Clinton and Secretary Albright raised Pakpahan's case with President Soeharto and Foreign Minister Alatas, respectively, at the November 1997 APEC Leaders Meeting in Vancouver, and urged that he be permitted to receive medical treatment overseas. Foreign Minister Alatas gave Secretary Albright explicit assurances that a Canadian medical team would be allowed to examine Pakpahan and, if the doctors recommended it, Pakpahan could be treated overseas. In December the team of Canadian doctors examined Pakpahan and concluded that Pakpahan's treatment in Indonesia was adequate for his condition.
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Ambassador Roy and the American Embassy in Jakarta are active in their support for Pakpahan and regularly raise the issue of his imprisonment with senior Indonesian officials, up to and including Foreign Minister Alatas and Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Feisal Tanjung. Embassy officials regularly attend Pakpahan's weekly trial sessions and are able to communicate with him and his supporters. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth has also met with Pakpahan during his visits to Indonesia. The Embassy's Labor Attache discusses the Pakpahan case in frequent meetings with Ministry of Manpower officials, the Red Cross, and other embassies in Jakarta.
THAILAND
Question. Please describe the new bilateral aid package to Thailand.
Answer. U.S. assistance to Thailand will be worth $1.7 billion and involves nine U.S. agencies. We hope it will strengthen business confidence and demonstrate our support for the Thai people.
To increase bilateral trade flows, the U.S. Export-Import bank (EX–IM) has announced its intention to increase short-term trade financing by up to $1 billion.
The United States also is seeking to assure that other official export credit agencies, including those of the G–7, remain open to Thailand.
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The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation also will provide $400 million in support of two Thai electric power projects and will make available $45 million in OPIC guarantee investment funds for equity investment in Thai companies.
The U.S. Trade Development Agency (TDA) will finance feasibility studies for State Railways of Thailand and provide technical assistance to upgrade communications networks. The TDA also will afford technical assistance to Thailand's National Electronics and Computer Technology Center to assist in developing a nation-wide, high capacity information network for government services.
The United States will relieve the Thai government of its remaining financial liability for the 1996 contract to purchase eight F/A–18 aircraft.
The United States will provide scholarships for 165 Thai students to come to the United States for university studies.
The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) will enhance its Fulbright program in Thailand.
The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will relax its rules to temporarily permit students from Thailand (and other countries affected by the economic crisis) to finance their studies through employment in the United States.
The United States will provide immunization shots for children and assist in the operations of rural health programs in Thailand.
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The United States will consider favorably a Thai request for the United States to join the humanitarian de-mining program along the Thai-Cambodian border.
In cooperation with the Thai government, we are prepared to help establish an international law enforcement academy in Bangkok to enhance regional cooperation on legal assistance matters, extradition and the administration of justice.
The academy will be open to law enforcement officials from throughout the Southeast Asia region and will offer programs to train officials to combat transnational crime, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other financial crimes, counterfeiting, firearms trafficking, vehicle theft, and alien smuggling.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN YATES
SWISS BANK HOLOCAUST FUND RESTITUTION PAYMENTS
Question. Are you aware of the February 6 Washington Post story that the Swiss banks' Holocaust Fund is paying 400 elderly Jews, out of 19,000 eligible, about $400?
Answer. The major commercial Swiss banks, together with other private sector firms and the Swiss National Bank, have so far contributed nearly $200 million to a Special Holocaust Fund to assist needy survivors. Representatives of prominent Jewish organizations are on its board. Since November of 1997, the Fund has been making initial distributions to victims in Latvia and Hugary.
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Since February 6, the pace of distribution has accelerated. By now, assistance has been provided to around 15,000 Holocaust survivors, primarily in Latvia and Hungary. As many as 20,000 Hungarian survivors may eventually be eligible for assistance. The Fund expects to grant many victims about $1,000 each. The Fund's priority was to take care of ''double victims''—Nazi victims who have lived behind the Iron Curtain. Now the Fund is poised to start making payments to American survivors as well.
INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR HOLOCAUST VICTIMS
Question. Can you tell me what State is doing, if anything, to help the rightful owners recover lost art or collect benefits on insurance policies?
Answer. The State Department attaches great importance to the restitution of property to rightful owners. We have encouraged states to restitute property swiftly and in a non-discriminatory manner. We have also encouraged all countries to open their archives covering this period. This is an on-going effort.
The Department of State will co-host, with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, an international conference on Holocaust assets next fall that will focus attention on both art restitution and Holocaust related insurance issues. We are in close contact with a number of expert groups and regulatory agencies on these issues.
RESTITUTION TO HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS
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Question. Are you working with other departments and international institutions?
Answer. Under Secretary Eizenstat has led an interagency effort, which includes the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the NSC, the National Archives and the Holocust Memorial Museum, to declassify and publicize materials in the U.S. archives pertaining to Holocaust-related assets, including art and insurance. There has also been close consultation on this with Senate and House principals and staff.
ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Question. Can you envision a role for the Department of State and the whole United States Government?
Answer. The State Department will remain engaged in pursuing the just restitution, including compensation and reparations, for Americans and others who suffered egregiously from the Holocaust. We will continue to address the art restitution and insurance issues within this framework.
SUGGESTION ON HOW TO PROCEED
Question. How would you suggest we proceed in this matter?
Answer. Our principal strategy has been to focus attention on restitution issues and to encourage opening of archives and full disclosure regarding the disposition and handling of Holocaust-related assets. The upcoming Washington Conference on Holocaust Assets will provide an important opportunity for us to advance these objectives. We must recognize, however, that coming to terms with these issues is a difficult and painful process for states which have only recently emerged from years of communist rule and are still going through both political and economic reform. Countries in the West also have great difficulty in coming to terms with this difficult period in their history.
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G–7 INVOLVEMENT
Question. Because we have enormous influence on banks in our bill, is it not an appropriate subject for the major banks or the G7 members themselves to get involved? Can the G7 get involved?
Answer. Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Stuart Eizenstat has sought to engage the parties in the Swiss banking dispute in constructive discussion on a possible settlement. We believe that further sanctions or threats of sanctions are not appropriate at this time when the parties to the dispute are seeking in good faith to reach a settlement. We have encouraged all parties and entities to closely review their role during this period and to provide full disclosure regarding dormant accounts, insurance claims, or other asset questions. These issues are best dealt with through bilateral relations that take into account the specific situation in each country.
HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS
Question. I would think that, just as the United States wants to bring some help to these people who suffered these insufferable pains and discrimination at the hands of the Nazis, that there ought to be pressure brought by all U.S. Government agencies as well as by the Department of State? What do you think?
Answer. Our objective continues to be to bring a measure of justice and assistance to the Holocaust survivors in this country and elsewhere. We believe that the best approach is one that recognizes the complexities of the issues and the difficulties that each country must face in dealing with this tragic period. Our best role is to encourage these countries to address Holocaust-asset related claims in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.
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POST-AIR STRIKE PLANS
Question. Let's assume that United Nations Secretary General was unable to reach an agreement with Saddam Hussein. We would have launched air strikes to reduce Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. What would we do then?
Answer. Active diplomacy and the credible threat of force were the key factors in persuading Saddam to agree to cooperate with UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors, so we achieved our goals without the necessity of launching air strikes. If Iraq had continued to violate its obligations and we had launched air strikes our further actions would have depended, to a great extent, on how Saddam responded to the air strikes. He could have responded in innumerable ways. We considered his options and identified a variety of military and other options open to the coalition, depending on his response.
POST-AIR STRIKE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Question. I assume Saddam Hussein would not allow UNSCOM to come back into Iraq and keep looking for these weapons. What would be the diplomatic tack that you and the Administration would take?
Answer. I am reluctant to speculate about actions we would have taken if Saddam had continued to defy the international community, if we then launched air strikes and if Saddam then refused to permit UNSCOM to continue its work. Iraq has, in fact, agreed to cooperate with the weapons inspectors. The UN is now testing that agreement. We were prepared to use force had Iraq not so agreed. The goals of air strikes would have been to diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and reduce Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors. We cannot assume that Saddam would have refused to permit UNSCOM to return to Iraq following air strikes.
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POST-AIR STRIKE SYMPATHY DIVIDENDS FOR IRAQ
Question. Wouldn't air strikes play into the hands of Saddam Hussein, because of the sympathy generated throughout the world? Plus, he could then continue his weapons program without having to be concerned with UNSCOM.
Answer. The goal of the air strikes would have been to diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and to reduce Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors. Air strikes would have significantly reduced Iraq's capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and threaten its neighbors. We cannot assume that Saddam would have refused to permit UNSCOM to return to Iraq following air strikes. Air strikes might have generated some publicity adverse to the coalition and favorable to Saddam, but Saddam appears to have decided that the cost to him of military action outweighed any such advantage.
ONGOING AIR STRIKES
Question. Would we be committed to continuing revolving air strikes against Iraq?
Answer. I am reluctant to speculate about our military options had we launched air strikes against Iraq. In fact, we did not have to because Iraq agreed to cooperate with weapons inspections. Had we commenced air strikes we would not have been committed to continuing them indefinitely, but neither could we rule it out. Our subsequent actions would have depended, in large part, on the Iraqi government's reaction to the initial strikes.
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Our goals, obtaining Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspections and reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors, would remain the same. If we determined that continuing air strikes were necessary to achieve those goals, they might have continued.
NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Question. During the Gulf War it was stated that, ''it is the position of the U.S. that if any country uses chemical weapons against the US they will be met with a prompt and overwhelming response.'' I know that was our public position, but does that remain our response today?
Answer. Yes, that remains our position today.
If any nation were to attack the U.S., our allies, or our forces with chemical or biological weapons, our response would be swift, devastating, and overwhelming.
We have worked hard to fashion non-nuclear responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to give military commanders and the President a range of options from which to choose.
Question. Would you assess the effectiveness of this policy as a deterrent. How has this type of possible response been applied toward Iraq?
Answer. Effective deterrence depends on a combination of our ability to respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons (CBW) against U.S. or coalition forces with a devastating retaliatory blow, and our ability to carry out military operations successfully, even in the face of widespread enemy CBW use.
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In deterring the threat of CBW use against U.S. or coalition forces, we depend on military forces that are trained and equipped to operate effectively in a CBW environment, and on a powerful, flexible force employment capability. Effective counterforce combined with improving active and passive defenses can deny the tactical, battlefield advantages than an adversary might otherwise perceive it could gain by employing chemical or biological weapons. We have worked hard to make available to military commanders and the President a broad spectrum of credible force options. From these we can choose the appropriate option for delivering a devastating and overwhelming response to NBC use against us.
We have made it clear to Iraq and the rest of the world that if it used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against our forces, we would deliver a response that is overwhelming and devastating.
NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Question. How can we assist our allies in deterring ''rogue nations'' from developing chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. We currently engage in a variety of activities to help our allies deter rogue states from developing chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. In particular, we:
Work with our allies to encourage all nations to join all multilateral agreements related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, with a view to establishing international legal norms and isolating the few who wish to maintain such options;
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Work with our allies to develop comprehensive and effective export controls to prevent proliferators from acquiring dual-use materials and technology for WMD programs;
Work through regimes like the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime to harmonize export controls on sensitive dual-use materials and technology;
Inform allies about transactions of concern, to enable them to take appropriate action to prevent items from reaching WMD programs;
Share information on trends in proliferation, procurement networks, and procurement practices; and
Work through entities like the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) to employ scientists in civilian fields to dissuade them from providing their technical know-how and expertise to countries or programs of concern.
Question. What is our first, last, and best line of defense in dealing with the proliferation of chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. There is no single, simple counter to the proliferation of chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our primary objective is to prevent countries from acquiring WMD, and to make their procurement efforts harder, more expensive, and more time consuming.
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We encourage countries to adopt responsible nonproliferation policies and practices by joining arms control and nonproliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Australia Group.
Through export controls we seek to deny proliferators key materials and technology needed to acquire or advance their WMD program. The international harmonization of these controls—through the Australia Group, for example—helps achieve this goal.
Finally, the availability of accurate and timely information about procurement activities and programs of concern is invaluable to all our nonproliferation efforts.
RUSSIA
Question. Although the former Soviet Union signed and ratified the 1972 biological weapons ban, it has been reported by the New York Times on 25 February, 1998, that the one time second in command of the Soviet Union biological Weapons program, Kenajtan Alibekov, who defected to the United States in 1992 and now goes by the name Ken Alibek, believes that the Russians are continuing to develop new biological weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry has stated that the Russian Government was ''strictly'' fulfilling all its obligations. Even as the United Nations inspectors have uncovered circumstantial evidence that there is a connection between the Russian and Iraqi weapons program. Can you answer these claims.
Answer. Dr. Alibek, who came to the U.S. in 1992, was last actively engaged in the Soviet program in 1991 when he was Deputy Director of BioPreparat. His statements are personal assessments—he has no direct information pertaining to current Russian activities.
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Regarding the alleged connection between the Russian and Iraqi weapons programs, we have no information indicating that Russia entered into an agreement to provide either technical knowledge or equipment that would advance the Iraqi biological warfare program.
Question. Why did the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs make a point that they are ''strictly'' fulfilling their obligations?
Answer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responding to allegations made, including in the U.S. press, that the Russian Government has been involved in activities contrary to the Biological Weapons Convention.
Question. Is there wiggle room in the 1972 Treaty which could allow them to continue an offensive biological weapons program under the guise of defensive policy?
Answer. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is clear: State Parties are committed not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons (BW) for offensive purposes.
However, the BWC currently provides no mechanism to help detect and deter cheating. Since 1995, the U.S. has been involved in negotiations to develop a compliance and transparency mechanism to the BWC. In January 1998, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would seek to conclude the framework of a protocol by the end of 1998. Such a protocol could assist in detecting and deterring violations of the BWC.
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Question. What are we doing to safeguard our people from the continuing threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction?
Answer. We are engaged in a variety of activities to deter states from developing chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to safeguard U.S. citizens from the threat of WMD. In particular, we:
Work with our allies to encourage all nations to join all multilateral agreements related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, with a view to establishing international legal norms and isolating the few who wish to maintain such options;
Work with our allies to develop comprehensive and effective export controls to prevent proliferators from acquiring dual-use materials and technology for WMD programs;
Work through regimes like the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime to harmonize export controls on sensitive dual-use materials and technology;
Inform allies about transactions of concern, to enable them to take appropriate action to prevent items from reaching WMD programs;
Share information on trends in proliferation, procurement networks, and procurement practices;
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Work through entities like the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) to employ scientists in civilian fields to dissuade them from providing their technical know-how and expertise to countries or programs of concern;
Educate our personnel throughout the world and teach them how to respond to WMD attacks; and
Work with other agencies to prepare our medical and emergency personnel to address threats in a prophylactic manner.
Question. What is the Administration's position with regard to President Yeltsin's outspoken opposition toward our policy in Iraq and his statements that military action could trigger World War III?
Answer. While we differ over tactics, senior Russian officials have assured us that Russia shares our goals of keeping Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction. In February, the United States and Russia were able to come together on a set of principles that UN Secretary General Annan could take with him to Baghdad. Both Russia and the United States, along with other members of the UN Security Council, supported the agreement Secretary General Annan worked out with Iraq officials, and called upon Baghdad to comply with the terms of that agreement.
However, Russian officials, including President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov, publicly stated their opposition to the use of force against Iraq. They stated the Russian view that no country or countries has the authority to use force against Iraq to bring about Iraqi compliance with UNSCOM without a new review and authorization by the Security Council.
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The U.S. does not share Russia's interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR's) and the need for a new review by the Security Council. The U.S. believes strongly that resolutions already in effect authorize the use of force. The use of force might prove necessary now or in the future, if Iraq's failure to comply with UNSCR's intended to impede Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction and to compel Iraq's full compliance with all Security Council resolutions would constitute a serious violation of the cease-fire agreement. Frankly, we do not agree that military action taken against Iraq to secure its compliance with relevant UNSCR's would trigger a world war.
IRAN: NONPROLIFERATION
Question. Has Iran acquired weapons of mass destruction and does it have the missile technology to deliver them?
Answer. Iran continues its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability, but has made little progress to date due to the reluctance of most nuclear suppliers to provide any assistance to Iran. Multilaterally, through the Nuclear Supplier's Group and bilaterally through discussions with supplier governments, notably Russia and China, we are working to end cooperation with Iran's nuclear programs. We object to any nuclear cooperation with Iran on the grounds that any cooperation, even for peaceful, civilian uses, will add to the pool of Iranian knowledge and experience and provide Iran with commercial access to more sensitive nuclear technologies that the Iranian government may draw on to further its weapons program. China informed the U.S. in October 1997 that it would not engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, had terminated assistance to Iran on a uranium conversion facility, and would complete work on its two remaining Iranian nuclear projects—neither of which raises proliferation concerns—in a relatively short period of time. We continue to encourage Moscow and other suppliers to terminate nuclear cooperation with Iran.
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Iran continues to develop its chemical and biological weapons programs. We believe these programs have progressed much further than the nuclear program. Through the Australia Group, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, we seek to limit Iran's access to the components, equipment and technology necessary to develop these weapons. The Administration uses other tools, such as sanctions to combat proliferation. Most recently, in May 1997, the U.S., in accordance with the Chemical and Biological Weapons and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctioned seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for knowingly selling CW-related materials to Iran's CW program.
Iran is pursuing a multi-track effort to develop both liquid—and solid—propellant missile systems. We believe Iran possesses an extensive inventory of 300-kilometer range and 500-kilometer range Scud missiles. Iran purchased Scud missiles and related technology from North Korea and is probably close to achieving Scud production capability, if it has not already done so. Iran also is developing a medium-range ballistic missile. Once Iran's indigenous missile production capability is fully developed, Iran would pose a new proliferation risk if it were to begin to export Iranian produced Scuds and production technology.
Question. Does the Administration support the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act as passed by the House?
Answer. No, the Administration does not support this legislation. Current law provides an adequate basis for the United States to impose sanctions on foreign entities that contribute to Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. The Administration is committed to fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the transfer of missile technology to countries of concern, such as Iran. We believe, however, that the bill in its current form would weaken the U.S. ability to persuade the international community to halt such transfers to Iran. Because of the bill's requirement to impose sanctions based on an unworkable, low standard of evidence, its broad scope of covered transactions and lack of a meaningful waiver provision, we believe the President would be required to impose sanctions worldwide in a manner likely to undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals and objectives. We believe the bill would be counterproductive in convincing foreign governments to control missile-related trade with Iran. For example, the standard of evidence is so low it could result in the imposition of an untold number of erroneous sanctions on individuals or business entities. Imposition of erroneous sanctions on a large scale could dissuade foreign governments or persons from cooperating with the U.S. to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran and harm U.S. foreign policy goals and U.S. commercial interests with other nations.
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Although the proposed sanctions law is of global scope, it is intended to deal with Russian entities involved with Iran's missile program. We have made progress with the Russian government on key aspects of its companies' cooperation with the Iranian missile program. Then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed an executive order on January 22 substantially strengthening the Russian export control process, providing new authority to stop transfers of dual-use goods and services to missile programs and programs for weapons of mass destruction. We have been discussing with the Russians steps necessary to implement the order and ideas for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the development of export control systems. We have received assurances that the new government will honor Chernomyrdin's commitment. Some concerns remain and we will continue to press our case at the highest levels of the Russian government.
EUROPEAN MOVES TOWARD IRAN
Question. The European Union moved to normalize relations with Iran. Is this move seen as an attempt to challenge our policy toward Iran?
Answer. There is general agreement among the industrialized nations on the need to change Iran's unacceptable policies, but we differ on how to reach this goal.
Until the Mykonos verdict in April 1997, the EU pursued a policy of limited engagement, through continued trade and the ''Critical Dialogue.'' In the wake of Mykonos, the EU suspended the Critical Dialogue; reiterated its commitment to banning arms sales to Iran; suspended official bilateral ministerial visits; and agreed to work together to curtail Iranian intelligence presence in EU states. This year, the EU lifted its ban on bilateral ministerial visits and decided to initiate an official dialogue with iran at the sub-ministerial level. The Iranian government has not yet agreed to have an official dialogue with the EU. Other measures remain in effect.
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We have stressed to the EU at the highest levels the need to coordinate a multilateral approach toward Iran. We continue to meet with the EU and Canada to explore ways to harmonize our policies toward Iran. We generally agree on the areas of concern; we are working on identifying additional measures to constrain WMD and counter-terrorism policies.
MIDDLE EAST: IRAN
Question. Has the Administration decided if the $2 billion gas development deal between France and Iran is sanctionable under current law?
Answer. The issues raised by the Total deal are complex and require careful and thorough consideration. It would not be appropriate to speculate when our review will be complete. However, it is important to note that we are investigating the impact of the Asia financial crisis on the continued viability of the Total deal. We will factor the findings of that investigation into our ultimate determination of this case.
KHATAMI'S DESIRE FOR DIALOGUE WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE
Question. The Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, recently spoke on CNN of his desire for an open dialogue with the American people. Have you seen any tangible proof of this?
Answer. Yes. While private exchanges among Americans and Iranians have taken place for the past ten years, the Iranian government has taken a more active role in orchestrating academic, athletic and cultural exchanges since the election of President Khatami. For example, in February, the Iranian government hosted the U.S. national wrestling team in Tehran for an international tournament, and a group of American Scholars and ex-officials for a conference on Gulf security. Both visits went well. The U.S. wrestling team is due to return to Iran in the fall for the World Cup tournament. The Iranian wrestling team and several Iranian scholars have visited the United States. The Iranian wrestling team will return to the United States in July.
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FRACTURE BETWEEN KHAMENEI AND KHATAMI
Question. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has continued his anti-American rhetoric. Is there any sign that there is a fracture in relations between Khamenei and Khatami?
Answer. It was apparent from the conflicting messages Khamenei and Khatami delivered at the Organization of Islamic Conference Summit in Tehran in December that there are differences between the two, particularly regarding Iran's relations with the West. The divergence between the fractions they head was most recently seen in the arrest of the mayor of Tehran, a supporter of Khatami, by the head of the judiciary, who supported Khatami's conservative opponent in the presidential elections last year.
KHATAMI'S POWER TO REDIRECT IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Question. Assuming that President Khatami wanted to, is there proof that he can redirect Iranian foreign policy?
Answer. No, there is no proof that Khatami can redirect Iran's foreign policy, particularly in the sensitive areas of relations with the United States and Israel, which remain under the control of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei.
There are, however, signs that Khatami and his Foreign Minister are attempting to exert greater control over foreign policy in other areas, and have had some success. For example, one of Khatami's foreign policy goals is to improve Iran's stature in the international community and reduce tensions with neighboring states, particularly the Gulf monarchies. To this end, the Iranian government worked hard to ensure that the summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference held in Tehran in December would be a success, and has initiated several high-level official visits with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf governments.
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IRANIAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Question. is there any sign that Iran is not supporting and exporting terrorism?
Answer. No, the government of Iran continues to sponsor terrorism.
The Iranian government conducted at least 13 assassinations in 1997, mostly in Northern Iraq against members of the regime's main opposition groups.
Iran supplies training, funding and other means of support to violent opponents of the Middle East peace process, including Hamas. Iran provides similar assistance, as well as weapons, to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Lebanese Hizballah.
We are working to convince the international community to focus pressure on Iran to end its support for international terrorism.
IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS, HIZBALLAH AND ISLAMIC JIHAD
Question. Does Iran still provide support to Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad? If so, what kind of support?
Answer. Iran supplies training, funding and other means of support to violent opponents of the Middle East peace process, including Hamas. Iran provides similar assistance, as well as weapons, to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Lebanese Hizballah.
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GENERAL FOREIGN AID
Question. The purpose of American foreign policy and the purpose of our investments in USAID programs is to keep America strong and respected. Our goal is to protect the interests of our citizens in an age when national borders are porous, markets are global, and many of the threats to our security cannot be dealt with by any one nation acting alone.
How have these programs improved the security of our allies, our partners in the Middle East Peace Process, and our friends in the states of Eastern Europe and throughout the world?
Answer. Deadly conflict and crisis within countries represent the main threats to security in the post Cold War era. Foreign assistance programs have improved security by successfully addressing some of the factors that increase the likelihood of deadly conflict and crisis. Aid programs have promoted economic, social, and political progress. They have attempted to strengthen institutions and enhance human resources, so that countries can better deal with internal conflicts without falling into crisis and deadly conflict.
In the Middle East, where conflicts are indeed deep-seated and bitter, our aid has contributed to significant economic, social, and political progress. For instance:
According to the Fraser Institute, economic freedom increased between 1975 and 1995 in Israel (from 2.2 to 4.2); in Egypt (2.7 to 4.4); and in Jordan (4.3 to 4.8). The improvements for Israel and Egypt were relatively large compared with other countries. These higher scores represent significant strengthening of policies and institutions, in many cases supported by foreign assistance.
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Both Israel and Egypt achieved clearly positive average annual growth in real per capita income over the 1985–95 period (2.5 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively). While per capita income growth for Jordan was negative over the same period, real gross domestic product has increased at a rapid rate (8 percent annually) since the Gulf War. This sort of economic progress does not guarantee security and stability, but it surely helps.
On the social side, there have been major improvements in life expectancy, and sharp declines in infant mortality and fertility in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. More generally, people's well-being in terms of health, education, status of women, and other social dimensions has clearly improved on average in each of these countries.
On the political side, Israel has long been classified as ''Free'' by Freedom House, and its ratings within that category have improved. Jordan has made significant progress, from ''Not Free'' to ''Partially Free.'' Egypt has remained classified as ''Not Free.'' For Jordan and Egypt, Internal threats posed by fundamentalists have undoubtedly contributed to limits on political freedom.
Similarly, in Eastern Europe foreign assistance is supporting economic, political, and social progress, including more effective institutions. While most Eastern European aid recipients are relatively advanced by development standards (looking at per capita income and social indicators), they are undergoing a profound institutional transition, which challenges their capacity to manage conflict. In most cases we are seeing significant improvements in economic growth performance, democracy, and in the performance of underlying institutions.
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Helping Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, the Central Asian states and other states of the former Soviet Union become fully stable market democracies continues as much in the U.S. national interest as it was when the Soviet Union disintegrated. We are helping these nations create democratic societies and market economies which are increasingly based on Western values, and linked to us through trade and investment and through people-to-people, grassroots relationships.
In some cases, particularly parts of the former Yugoslavia, avoiding deadly conflict and crisis will take considerably more than the broad economic, social, and political progress that foreign assistance aims to support. Nonetheless, there and elsewhere this sort of progress will enhance security by improving the odds that conflict and crisis can be avoided.
U.S. foreign assistance programs have improved the United States' ability to function in the world by promoting economic and political freedom; by supporting economic and social progress, and by helping to foster a more cooperative global order.
Question. The purpose of American foreign policy and the purpose of our investments in USAID programs is to keep America strong and respected. Our goal is to protect the interests of our citizens in an age when national borders are porous, markets are global, and many of the threats to our security cannot be dealt with by any one nation acting alone.
In general, how do these programs support freedom, security and strengthen the security of the United States of America?
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Answer. Deadly conflict and crisis within countries represent the main threats to security in the post Cold War era. Foreign assistance programs have improved security by successfully addressing some of the factors that increase the likelihood of deadly conflict and crisis. Aid programs have promoted economic, social, and political progress. They have attempted to strengthen institutions and enhance human resources, so that countries can better deal with internal conflicts without falling into crisis and deadly conflict.
While successful development does not guarantee security, it significantly improves the odds of avoiding deadly conflict and crisis. Within the traditional developing world over the past decade,, almost all of the countries that have fallen into crisis are least-developed countries where development progress has been at best sporadic and uneven (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, Zarie, Burma, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Ethiopia). Conversely, almost all of the countries that have reached middle-income or advanced status, as well as most poor countries that are making steady development progress (e.g., India, Bangladesh, Ghana and Uganda since the late 1980's) have largely avoided crisis and deadly conflict.
A well-publicized study of failed states sponsored by the CIA reported that high infant mortality and low levels of openness to foreign trade were the most reliable predictors of state failure. We believe that these indicators are best seen as proxies for low levels of development. The implication is that with broad economic and social progress, the odds of state failure diminish.
U.S. foreign assistance programs have improved the United States' ability to function in the world by promoting economic and political freedom; by supporting economic and social progress, and by helping to foster a more cooperative global order.
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First, USAID and other foreign assistance programs have successfully promoted economic and political freedom. Of 66 aid recipient countries covered by the Fraser Institute survey of economic freedom for 1975 and 1995, economic freedom clearly improved in 50 countries; was substantially unchanged in 6; and clearly declined in only 10. Of 86 aid recipient countries covered by the Freedom House surveys of political freedom for 1975 and 1996, freedom clearly improved in 40; was substantially unchanged in 23; and clearly declined in only 13. For both economic and political freedom, the average change over all of the countries surveyed has been significantly positive.
These sorts of improvements mean that the global community in which the United States operates is increasingly one of shared values where private markets and democracy are concerned.
Second, USAID and other foreign assistance programs have successfully promoted economic and social progress. USAID recently reviewed the development performance of 90 aid recipients, a group that absorbed the bulk of U.S. (and other) foreign assistance over the 1965–90 period and which today includes over 3 billion people. Forty-one countries, accounting for over two-thirds of the group population, achieved significantly positive economic growth over the 1965–90 period (Looking at the more recent 1985–95 period, another sixteen countries join that group). Progress in terms of social indicators (infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and fertility) has been nearly universal.
Question. The purpose of American foreign policy and the purpose of our investments in USAID programs is to keep America strong and respected. Our goal is to protect the interests of our citizens in an age when national borders are porous, markets are global, and many of the threats to our security cannot be dealt with by any one nation acting alone.
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How has our foreign assistance improved our ability to function in the world?
Answer. Deadly conflict and crisis within countries represent the main threats to security in the post Cold War era. Foreign assistance programs have improved security by successfully addressing some of the factors that increase the likelihood of deadly conflict and crisis. Aid programs have promoted economic, social, and political progress. They have attempted to strengthen institutions and enhance human resources, so that countries can better deal with internal conflicts without falling into crisis and deadly conflict.
While successful development does not guarantee security, it significantly improves the odds of avoiding deadly conflict and crisis. Within the traditional developing world over the past decade, almost all of the countries that have fallen into crisis are least-developed countries where development progress has been at best sporadic and uneven (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Burma, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Ethiopia). Conversely, almost all of the countries that have reached middle-income or advanced status, as well as most poor countries that are making steady development progress (e.g., India, Bangladesh, Ghana and Uganda since the late 1980's) have largely avoided crisis and deadly conflict.
U.S. foreign assistance programs have improved the United States' ability to function in the world by promoting economic progress, and by helping to foster a more cooperative global order.
First, USAID and other foreign assistance programs have successfully promoted economic and political freedom. Of 66 aid recipient countries covered by the Fraser Institute survey of economic freedom for 1975 and 1995, economic freedom clearly improved in 50 countries; was substantially unchanged in 6; and clearly declined in only 10. Of 86 aid recipient countries covered by the Freedom House surveys of political freedom for 1975 and 1996, freedom clearly improved in 40; was substantially unchanged in 23; and clearly declined in only 14. For both economic and political freedom, the average change over all of the countries surveyed has been significantly positive.
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These sorts of improvements mean that the global community in which the United States operates is increasingly one of shared values where private markets and democracy are concerned.
Second, USAID and other foreign assistance programs have successfully promoted economic and social progress. USAID recently reviewed the development performance of 90 aid recipients, a group that absorbed the bulk of U.S. (and other) foreign assistance over the 1965–90 period and which today includes over 3 billion people. Forty-one countries, accounting for over two-thirds of the group population, achieved significantly positive economic growth over the 1965–90 period (Looking at the more recent 1985–95 period, another sixteen countries join that group). Progress in terms of social indicators (infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and fertility) has been nearly universal.
These sorts of improvements mean that the global community in which the United States functions is not only freer, but also significantly healthier and better educated, with higher incomes and less widespread poverty. As articulated in the International Affairs Strategic Plan, this clearly serves U.S. national interests.
Finally, U.S. foreign assistance programs are part of a larger donor effort that developed under U.AS. leadership, and has represented a major, unprecedented example of voluntary global cooperation. The idea that rich countries as a group would provide aid to poor countries represented a major step forward for the global community in the early 1960's. While the Cold War helped stimulate and justify development cooperation then, President Kennedy made it clear that the U.S. was providing aid (and was encouraging other countries to do the same) because it was the right thing to do.
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Since then, the number of donors has increased rapidly (including some 13 countries that have been aid recipients), as has the share of overall aid provided by donors other than the U.S. This unprecedented example of voluntary cooperation under enlightened U.S. leadership (including aid to formerly communist countries) has surely made an important contribution to a global order that functions increasingly as a cooperative community of nations. It has enhanced the ability of the U.S. to function in the world as a global leader. Returning to the premise of the question, foreign assistance has helped build a more cooperative international order under U.S. leadership.
Question. How has our foreign aid improved our ability to function in the world? More specifically, how has it helped us in our recent troubles with Saddam Hussein?
Answer. During the Iraq crisis, we forged a coalition of like-minded nations determined to see the UNSC's resolutions enforced and to counter the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Not one country reversed its commitment to us. Our allies understood that our combined resolve and steadfastness brought us to the point of agreement. U.S. foreign assistance plays a role in maintaining strong, comprehensive, and mutually beneficial relationships with key regional partners. Foreign assistance helps enable our partners to participate in international peacekeeping efforts, as well as combating terrorism.
Question. Did our former coalition allies and recipients of security assistance reduce the drain on our own resources, physical and financial, during the recent build up in the Arabian Gulf?
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Answer. Eighteen countries offered military assets for the coalition and another twelve offered basing and overflight rights. More than 70 governments spoke out about the need for Iraq compliance with the obligations they accepted at the end of the Gulf War as part of the UN cease-fire resolution. With our coalition partners standing by, the robust force currently deployed in the region will stay in place until we are confident that Iraq will comply fully with its obligations.
Question. Could we depend on Egypt, Jordan and other Middle East nations or was our access limited?
Answer. Our Middle East partners played an important role in the Iraq coalition. We worked closely with Bahrain both in the region and on the UN Security Council to address the threat to the security of the Gulf and the authority of the United Nations posed by Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. King Hussein of Jordan called repeatedly for full Iraqi compliance with all relevant UN resolutions. Egypt provided timely critical assistance in providing Suez Canal transit, overflight clearances, and refueling services. We consulted closely with the Saudis during the Iraq crisis and were confident of their support. We have a cooperative defense relationship with Qatar and several other regional partners.
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' TRUST FUND
Question. Could you explain what the $10 million in the Holocaust Victims' Trust Fund will be used for?
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Answer. The ten million dollars represents the second tranche of a three-year commitment by the U.S. to the Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund. The Fund is tasked to provide relief to the aging survivors of Nazi Persecution. The Fund can also be used to support education and other awareness programs related to the Holocaust.
Question. How did you arrive at the sum of $10 million?
Answer. Congress authorized a total U.S. contribution of up to $25 million in the ''Holocaust Victims Redress Act,'' which was signed by the President in mid-February. Given the complexity of this new program, a multi-year funding stream is a prudent and realistic estimate of the rate of implementation and expenditure.
ORIGIN OF TRUST FUND CONTRIBUTION
Question. Where did you get this money from? Did it come out of another account?
Answer. Money for the U.S. contribution has been identified within the Economic Support Fund (ESF). $4 million has been identified in FY 98, $10 million has been added to the President's budget for FY 99, and we expect to request an additional $10 million from FY 2000.
DEBT RELIEF FOR POOREST COUNTRIES
Question. Will the Administration take action to relieve the debt burden of the poorest of the poor countries? Would it be appropriate for the Department of State to use its influence with the other nations that make up the G–7?
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Answer. The Administration recognizes the importance of reducing to sustainable levels the debt burdens of poor countries that are implementing economic reforms. Acting with the other creditor governments that make up the Paris Club, we have reduced the burden of government-to government debts of some of the poorest countries by up to 67%. We have also been a strong advocate of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, through which reforming countries receive reductions of up to 80% of their debts to Paris Club governments and, for the first time, relief on their debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other international financial institutions. Both of these efforts are aimed at reducing countries' debt burdens to manageable levels.
Our FY99 budget contains funding for continued debt relief for the poorest countries through the Paris Club. It also contains funding for us to forgive the concessional (low-interest-rate) bilateral debts owed to the U.S. by those African governments undertaking strong economic reforms. The two funding items will allow us to reduce debt with a face value of up to $1.6 billion. Our debt relief efforts benefit countries that are reforming their economic policies, because debt relief alone will not lead to sustainable growth and development unless governments implement responsible economic policies.
The Administration is continuing to work with our G–7 counterparts, who participate in the Paris Club, on debt relief. We are encouraging those who have not done so to join us in forgiving bilateral concessional debts owed by reforming African countries. We plan to discuss continued efforts on debt relief with our counterparts at the upcoming Birmingham Summit.
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DEMINING PROGRAM INCREASE
Question. Demining is an area of utmost importance to many of us on this subcommittee. The removal of landmines is a major challenge requiring a very long term commitment. It is, indeed, one of the most important initiatives in the world today. The United States recently failed to sign the international agreement banning landmines, which was very disappointing to me and many of my colleagues. However, the Administration's request for demining programs has been increased from $20 million last year to $50 million for FY'99. Would you please comment briefly on why the United States failed to sign this agreement, and explain the increase for the program.
Answer. The United States is committed to the elimination of anti-personnel landmines (APL). In September 1994, President Clinton became the first world leader to publicly call for a global ban on landmines. The U.S. UNGA resolution on APL, passed overwhelmingly in 1996, has consistently been cited by Ottawa Process supporters and others as the basis for their work in establishing an APL ban. In 1996, the United States led negotiation of the Amended Mines Protocol (Protocol II) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), including creating the requirement that unmarked APL self-destruct and self-deactivate. On January 17, 1997, the President announced that the United States would observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APL. Also in 1997, the United States worked vigorously to establish negotiations for an APL ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the preeminent multilateral forum for arms control negotiations. Unable to achieve hoped for progress in the CD at that time, we attended the Oslo Conference in September 1997 determined to make every effort to negotiate an effective, comprehensive global APL ban that would also address the security concerns of participants. At Oslo, we attempted—and failed—to negotiate two changes that would have allowed us to sign the Ottawa Convention:
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A nine-year transition period to phase out the APL (not including anti-personnel submunitions in mixed anti-tank systems) we now use to protect our troops, giving us time to devise alternatives; and
A provision permitting continued use of our mixed anti-tank munitions systems. (These systems have self-destructing anti-personnel submunitions which protect anti-tank munitions from being easily breached, but which are deemed APL under the treaty.)
Our self-destructing, self-deactivating mixed anti-tank munitions systems are the safest anti-tank systems from the perspective of protecting civilians. They are also the most militarily effective. They are set to self-destruct in as little as 4 hours, at most in 15 days. The mechanism is extremely reliable: in more than 32,000 tests, all except one destroyed itself on schedule or earlier; one was one hour late. Self-destruction leaves these mines completely harmless after hostilities have ceased. At the same time, these weapons are essential to protect American forces where they may be greatly outnumbered and facing attack by enemy armored forces. We estimate our casualties to be as much as 30% higher if we are denied the use of these devices.
Despite our best efforts to negotiate an exemption for our self-destructing mixed anti-tank munitions systems, we were unsuccessful, even though the Ottawa Convention permits continued use of non self-destructing mines (anti-tank mines with anti-handling devices) which will explode upon contact with a human being and are a humanitarian problem. Rather than expose our troops and the civilians they may be sent to protect to additional risk by banning self-destructing mixed anti-tank munitions that do not cause a humanitarian problem, we have not signed the Ottawa Convention.
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(Part II: Demining) As President Clinton, the Canadian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and the United Nations Secretary General have said, a ban on anti-personnel landmines is only a first step. The critical task before us is to remove the mines currently emplaced and threatening innocent civilians. Even if an international ban takes effect today, landmines will continue to remain in the ground in some 60 countries worldwide. These hidden killers need to be removed in order for the land and infrastructure to be returned to peaceful civilian use and economic development and progress. For that reason, the Secretaries of State and Defense announced on October 31, 1997, the President's Demining 2010 Initiative, designed to accelerate global humanitarian demining operations, including landmine survivor assistance, to eliminate the threat of anti-personnel landmines to civilians by the year 2010. Working with others, the U.S. aims to create an effective international coordinating mechanism to ensure that sustained public and private resources for demining are directed, in an organized and rational manner, to programs in the mine-affected countries. We have requested $50 million for FY 99 to expand the program into additional countries, and to enhance and sustain ongoing indigenous demining efforts in nineteen countries, including the five countries added to the program in FY 97 and FY 98.
Question. What is the next step?
Answer. In addition to our extensive efforts in demining, the United States has taken many steps toward ending the APL problem. The CCW Amended Mines Protocol, a treaty which ensures responsible use of APL, was submitted in January 1997 to the Senate for advice and consent. The major historical APL producers and exporters who have the majority of the world's APL stockpiles and have not participated in Ottawa have approved adoption of this protocol. The President announced on September 17, 1997 that we would redouble our efforts to establish serious negotiations for a global APL ban in the CD. We will start by seeking an export ban on APL to capture the major mine producing countries in order to stop the spread of landmines which are causing the humanitarian problem. The President also directed the Department of Defense to develop alternatives to APL (not including anti-personnel submunitions in mixed anti-tank systems) so that by the year 2003 we can end the use of these weapons outside Korea. As for Korea, the objective is to have alternatives to APL ready by 2006.
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In addition, in January 1997, the President announced that the United States would observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APL and would cap its APL stockpile at current levels in May 1996, the administration announced the destruction of non-self-destructing (NSD) APL not designated for the defense of Korea or for training. Since May 1996, we have now destroyed 3 million such weapons and are expected to destroy the remaining stocks by the end of 1998.
Question. How can we get a truly effective global ban on landmines? How do we negotiate a realistic ban?
Answer. We share a common goal with Ottawa Process supporters: the elimination of landmines worldwide. While the Ottawa Process is to be commended for the progress it has made, there is much left to be done.
A truly effective global ban on APL would have to capture both those states who are most affected by the scourge of APL and the principal producers and exporters of APL. We hope to make progress toward this end in 1998 by negotiating an export ban on APL in the CD. It is our belief that the CD offers the best possibility of capturing those major APL exporting and producing states who have not signed the Ottawa Convention. In order to stem the supply of APL worldwide, not just to states but to non-state parties in civil conflicts, it is critically important to bring in the major producers and exporters.
The U.S. was also a leader in negotiating the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Mines Protocol. Once it enters into force (possibly this year), it will address the humanitarian problem caused by APL by strengthening restrictions on landmine use and transfer and by also capturing key landmine states that are not party to the Ottawa Convention. Specifically, CCW mandates that one self-destructing APL—the true ''hidden killers'' which are responsible for civilian casualties worldwide—must be marked and monitored wherever they are used. Those who willfully violate and cause death to civilians will be subject to penal sanctions and/or extradition. CCW also bans the transfer of APL to non-state parties—who make up a large proportion of the humanitarian problem in zones of civil conflict—and carries strict proscriptions against the use of non-detectable mines. The CCW Amended Mines Protocol goes directly to the heart of the humanitarian problem associated with APL. It is certain that if it had been observed by all the key states for the past 40 years, the number of post-combat civilian casualties from the indiscriminate use of APL would be very dramatically reduced. The CCW Amended Mines Protocol was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification in January 1997.
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Question. Does the United States intend to commit to working for a global ban on landmines?
Answer. Again, the United States is and has long been committed to working for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines. Since 1994, when President Clinton called for the comprehensive global elimination of APL at the United Nations, the United States has been at the forefront of active efforts to ban them. The United States led efforts to adopt the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Mines Protocol (Protocol II). The U.S. UNGA resolution urging states to pursue an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines passed overwhelmingly (155–0) on December 10, 1996, helped set the Ottawa Process in motion. On September 17, 1997, President Clinton committed the United States to redoubling efforts to establish serious negotiations for a global APL ban in the CD, beginning with an export ban.
It is important to note that U.S. APLs are not causing the humanitarian problem. Long before the Ottawa Process began, the United States developed and began using self-destruction, self-deactivating short-duration mines in order to eliminate residual casualties from emplaced APL. These U.S. mines self-destruct within 4 hours to 15 days after activation with a reliability rate better than 99.99%. On May 16, 1996, the President banned U.S. use, production, and export of non-self-destructing APL (the type which can last for decades and which is almost exclusively responsible for the humanitarian problem) worldwide except for training purposes and for the Korean Peninsula, where NSD APL are imperative to the security of U.S. and Korean forces. Since then, we have unilaterally destroyed 3 million such weapons and are expected to destroy the remaining stocks by the end of 1998.
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On January 17, 1997, the President announced that the United States would observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of all APL (including even self-destructing/self-deactivating APL) and would cap its APL stockpile at current levels.
On September 17, 1997, the President directed the Department of Defense to develop alternatives to APL (not including anti-personnel submunitions in mixed anti-tank systems) so that by the year 2003 we can end even the use of our self-destructing APL outside of Korea. As for Korea, the objective is to have alternatives ready by 2006.
In 1997, the U.S. actively pursued a comprehensive and global APL ban in the CD. Also in 1997, the U.S. was a leading sponsor of a UNGA resolution calling on the CG to ''intensify its efforts'' on APL. We are continuing these efforts during the current CD session, working to establish a mandate for negotiation of an export ban.
Question. How far off in the future do you expect such a ban could take place?
Answer. It is difficult to predict how long it would take to establish an effective comprehensive global ban. The CD has agreed to establish a Special Coordinator for APL for the '98 session, and we hope to begin negotiations for an export ban this year. The CCW Amended Mines Protocol requires 20 nations to ratify in order to enter into force and may reach 20 within a few months (it has been submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification).
A principal reason the U.S. is not signatory to the Ottawa Convention is that it prohibits U.S. mixed anti-tank systems, which are necessary to protect our forces and which pose virtually no risk to non-combatants. We have made clear that the U.S. reserves the right to use mixed systems indefinitely. However, this could change if we find a viable and affordable concept for replacing these systems with an alternative that is comparable in terms of military effectiveness, safety of use, and minimal risks for non-combatants. As of now, we have not identified any operationally viable concept. We will keep Congress informed as administration policy develops in this area.
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Question. To follow up on my initial question, wouldn't it have been easier for the United States to sign the Treaty and work from the inside, that is if we are trying to reach the same goals
Answer. Our nation has unique responsibilities for preserving security and defending peace and freedom around the globe. As Commander-in-Chief, the President will not send our soldiers to defend the freedom or our people and the freedom of others without doing everything he can to make them as secure as possible.
For that reason, the United States insisted in the treaty negotiations in Oslo that two provisions be included in the treaty. First, we needed an adequate transition period to phase out the APL we now use to protect our troops, giving us time to devise alternative technologies. Second, we needed to preserve the self-destructing mixed anti-tank munitions systems we rely on to slow down an enemy's armor in a battle situation. In neither case was there a willingness on the part of the Ottawa process nations to accept these provisions.
If we have become a party to the Ottawa Convention, from that moment on we would have been unable to use self-destructing mixed anti-tank munitions and our troops would have been exposed to additional risk despite the fact that self-destructing mixed anti-tank munitions do not cause a humanitarian problem. Despite our best negotiating efforts, the United States could not sign the Ottawa Convention. In the Oslo negotiations of the Ottawa Convention, we went the extra mile and beyond in an attempt to negotiate an effective agreement that would protect our forces. As the President has said, there is a line that simply cannot be crossed, and that line is the safety and security of our men and women in uniform. The offer we made at Oslo remains on the table.
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Question. It is my impression that some of the embassies are not taking the ''Leahy Language'' seriously. For example, in Bolivia. The State Department's Bolivian section of the ''Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997'' raises questions about the U.S. Embassy's human rights reporting and its implementation of the amendment. The report states that ''* * * 14 civilians were killed in the course of law enforcement operations that encountered armed resistance. The precise causes and circumstances of these deaths have not been officially determined, but it appeared that some resulted from the use of excessive force by authorities.''
I would like to know what was the Embassy's conclusion about these deaths?
How were these 14 people killed?
What information did the U.S. Embassy use to evaluate and reach its conclusions?
Were any of those security forces receiving U.S. counternarcotics aid?
It is my understanding that there is credible evidence regarding human rights violations and abuses provided to the Bolivian Embassy by the Andean Information Network, an NGO on the ground in Bolivia.
This is very important to note, because our ambassador to Bolivia has moved on to Colombia, a country where this committee has expressed its grave concerns in the past with regard to human rights violations, and if this policy is not fully embraced on the ground then the will of Congress, as expressed in the ''Leahy Amendment,'' is being disregarded.
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Madame Secretary, could you please investigate this and report back to this committee at the earliest possible chance.
Answer. Nine of the 14 civilians, and one police officer, were killed in December 1996 after police and military forces were ordered to the Amayapampa area in Potosi department to dislodge miners who have seized a privately owned mine in a dispute with the mine's management. The Bolivian Government requested an investigation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR reported that five civilians died of gunshot wounds, one from a crushed skull, one bled to death from an untreated bullet wound and the other two deaths were not explained.
The IACHR concluded that some of the civilians killed in the Amayapamapa area were not active in the conflict. It called upon the Government of Bolivia to complete a full investigation, punish those officials responsible and make fair compensation to the victims or their survivors.
The U.S. Embassy reviewed the IACHR and police reports, had conversations with government officials and reported this information to the Department. In a February 1997 meeting with the Bolivian Minister of Government, Assistant Secretary Gelbard raised the potential implications of unresolved investigations of human rights abuses and echoed Ambassador Kamman's concerns over the Bolivian government's handling of the Amayapampa incidents. None of the police or military units involved in the Amayapama violence receive U.S. counternarcotics aid or funds appropriated under the FY–98 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, nor are we considering providing such assistance to these units. As such, no further actions were necessary under either the Leahy Amendment or section 570.
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The remaining five of 14 civilian deaths occurred at the time of clashes, which began on April 17, 1997 in the Chapare region, between coca farmers and Bolivian government coca eradication units. A 300-man force from the Ecological Police and UMOPAR (the specialized police unit that enforces counternarcotics laws) was ambushed by a mob of about 1,500 peasants, wielding firearms, stones and dynamite. Three civilians and one policeman died of gunshot wounds. Justice Ministry human rights investigators found that the fourth civilian death, which had initially been attributed to gunfire, was caused by the victim falling from a roof. The fifth civilian death, that of an infant allegedly overcome by tear gas fumes, was attributed to a severe infection, undernourishment, and dehydration.
The Embassy used police reports and conversations with government officials and the Andean Information Network to investigate this case. From this information it appears that the Chapare deaths were a result of the police protecting themselves in the course of a legitimate law enforcement operation from a coca growers' ambush and that the police did not use excessive force. There are no neutral or objective eyewitness accounts of this incident and we have encouraged the Bolivian government to carry out a thorough and professional investigation. The Ecological Police and UMOPAR receive U.S. counternarcotics aid.
These incidents were reported to the Department, and we have pressed the Government of Bolivia to more thoroughly investigate this and any other such incidents. Pending receipt of any further information developed in this case as a result of the GOB's or our own investigations, the Department concurs with the Embassy's conclusion. We note that the information initially received in this case was not processed strictly in accordance with established procedures. The Department has since established a committee for the purpose of regularizing the mechanism for review of such incidents.
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LATIN AMERICA
Question. What part of these funds goes to training and what for equipment?
Answer. The funds identified for the military will go primarily for training, fuel and POL with some monies for minor repairs, aviation and boat spare parts and operational support. The support provided to the police will mostly fund commodities, air support costs, Training, telecommunication equipment and operational costs.
Question. During the past two fiscal years, which countries benefited from INL Interregional aviation programs? How much equipment was used in each country?
Answer. INL interregional aviation programs benefited the countries of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala during the past two fiscal years. The number of INL owned aircraft used in each country was as follows:
Colombia: Early in the period in question, seven T–65 aircraft and one Cessna 208 were employed in Colombia. This has expanded to where today there are 8 T–65s, 2 Casa 212's, 5 OV–10's, one Cessna 208, 6 Bell 212's and UH–1's in Colombia being supported by the INL contract.
Peru: 16 UH–1 helicopters.
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Bolivia: In FY 97, there were 22 UH–1 helicopters employed in country, As of FY 98, this number has been reduced to 16.
Guatemala: Previously 5 Bell 212 helicopters were employed in Guatemala, but these have since been relocated to Colombia.
Question. Could you please provide the funding levels for the INL interregional aviation programs by country?
Answer. The following approximate amounts are provided for FY 1998. Please note that these amounts include a prorata share of Main Operating Base (Patrick AFB) costs which are all incurred for the ultimate benefit of overseas country programs.
Question. Much of our military assistance to Mexico is for counternarcotics training. How do we know that those troops that we help train for counternarcotics are not used instead for counter-insurgency?
Answer. In response to Mexico's interest in improving the skills and capabilities of military personnel being assigned to newly-created counter-drug units, the US arranged for training by the US Army Special Forces. This training has emphasized skills and discipline useful for personnel engaged in counter-drug activities. The Mexican Secretariat of National Defense selects personnel for US training who are most likely to be assigned to counter-drug units, or to units which regularly perform counter-drug missions.
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Some of the Mexican states that have recently experienced insurgent activities are also major drug-trafficking and producing states. Therefore, it is likely that some of the personnel who receive US training will, at some point, be assigned to units or missions in those states. However, we do not intend to attempt to direct the Government of Mexico where in its territory individual officials should be assigned.
Recipients of US Special Forces training are given thorough grounding in internationally-accepted concepts of protection of human and civil rights, the rule of law, and appropriate interaction between military forces and civilian populations in conflictive situations. A key aspect of such training is knowing when to refrain from use of force.
Question. Is there any ''End Use Monitoring'' of the counternarcotics training programs?
Answer. The U.S. Government attempts to conduct post-training assessments or evaluations to determine the impact of the training and to be able to make changes in curriculum or training methods to make it more effective in the future. We are also very interested in ascertaining if personnel receiving specialized U.S. training are assigned to positions where they can make use of it. This will affect where we invest limited training resources in the future. We are not able, however, to follow up on each and every individual around the world who receives U.S. training.
FMF PIPELINE
Question. Why is there still so much old money in the pipeline for foreign military financing?
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Answer.
We define ''pipeline'' as being uncommitted funds, that is, the amount of monies not programmed for a specific defense article or defense service. Since the early 1960's, a total of $96.279 billion in FMF has been apportioned among 141 countries and international organizations. Of that amount, $751 million (or) .78% remains uncommitted to date, and only $427 million (or) .44% represents funds apportioned in FY96 and prior. Moreover, $288 million of the $427 million in prior year uncommitted funds relates to loans apportioned for Greece. We do not believe a program that has been over 99% committed is under-utilized. A total of 23 countries/organizations have not received any new FMF apportionments since FY85 and five countries are restricted from using FMF (e.g., Brooke Sanctions).
Question. Is that money ever transferred from other sources and what are those uses?
Answer. Legally, the money could be transferred to another account/agency as long as the funds were uncommitted, undisbursed (meaning bills have not been paid from the FMF account) and were apportioned within five years of the transfer date (ref: Sec. 632 FAA and 31 USC 1551). In practice, however, funds have not been transferred to other accounts. Moreover, the transfer of FMF funds among countries has occurred only once: in FY94, $2.190 million of FY90 funds were deobligated from Guatemala and reobligated to Bolivia. We are currently prohibited from exercising ''deob-reob'' authority (ref: sec. 510, P.L. 105–118).
Question. Can you please supply this Committee with a new estimate on FMF monies still in the pipeline?
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Answer. A report identifying current uncommitted FMF monies is attached.
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP)
Question. Please explain the extent of our military assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary?
Answer. Since the beginning of PfP funding in FY1995, the USG has provided $98.6 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Since FY1991, we have also provided approximately $19 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to these three countries. The total for direct military assistance to these three countries is just under $120 million.
These countries have used FMF primarily for the purchase of defense equipment and training to improve their militaries' interoperability with NATO forces. For example, funds have supported the Regional Airspace Initiative, English language labs, Search and Rescue Equipment, NATO-standard mapping equipment, tactical field radios, navigation and safety aids and similar uses. IMET funds have provided training for officers, NCOs, and civilians from these countries at U.S. military education institutions in the areas of defense resource planning, doctrine, civil-military relations, language, leadership, and other core military science disciplines.
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In addition, we have offered these countries low-cost loans under the Central European Defense Loan (CEDL) program. Although none of the three took advantage of the loan program in FY1997, they have expressed interest in the program and we will offer them loans again in FY1998. We obligated $18.24 million in FY1997 subsidy for loans to Poland and the Czech Republic and have set aside $20 million for the program in FY1998.
The above levels do not include DOD programs and funding in support of Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Because most of these programs are open to all Partners, DOD is unable to provide country-specific costs for the participation of the three states invited to join NATO. Examples of the DOD programs include the Joint Contact Team Program, which puts military liaison teams in Partner country MODs; the Partnership Information Management System (PIMS); the Defense Resource Management System (DRMS); Marshall Center programs; Exercise Support Funds; and other programs designed to maximize interaction between Partner militaries, U.S., and NATO forces, as well as to promote familiarity and interoperability with NATO forces.
Other USG programs, such as cooperation between the militaries of these three countries and National Guard units in the U.S., have exposed thousands of Central European soldiers to U.S. military personnel, procedures, and perspectives. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have taken only limited advantage of the Excess Defense Articles program, largely due to the cost of transporting, upgrading, and maintaining EDA equipment.
Question. What is the out-year plan for our military assistance?
Answer. The President's budget requests $80 million for FY1999 to support the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Of this, we plan to allocate $25.0 million to assist Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in achieving NATO standards and improving their interoperability with NATO forces as they prepare for membership. We are also requesting $4.45 million in IMET funds for these three countries to continue U.S. military training opportunities for an expanded number of military and civilian personnel. Finally, we are requesting a $20 million in loan subsidies to support the Central European Defense Loan (CEDL) program, which will allow those countries to address deeper infrastructure needs.
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Beyond FY1999, we intend to continue providing FMF grants to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary at reduced levels to facilitate their integration with NATO.
We regard to IMET, we intend to maintain current levels for the next several years to ensure that critical training needs are met.
Question. What is the status of military loans to these countries and what are they being used for?
Answer. The Central European Defense Loan (CEDL) program was designed to assist creditworthy Central European nations in improving their NATO interoperability by providing low-cost loans to remedy military infrastructure deficiencies.
Fiscal Year 1997 was the first year of the CEDL program. We offered loans to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Both Poland and the Czech Republic stated their desire to take out loans of $100 million and $80 million, respectively, to finance procurement of advanced radar, air defense systems, and safety and navigation upgrades for military airfields. However, last-minute problems in gaining parliamentary approval in the Czech Republic and a sensitive political climate in the lead-up to the Polish parliamentary elections prevented both governments from signing a loan agreement before the end of FY97. Hungary withdrew its request for loan assistance in August 1997.
We intend to use the remaining FY97 funds, in conjunction with the FY98 funds, to offer comprehensive loan packages to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. A joint State Department/Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) team will visit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in April 1998. The team will brief the governments on the CEDL program, alert them to changes in the program (specifically a decrease in the loans' interest rate), and answer technical questions on procurement procedures and financing under the program. We are optimistic that these countries will find the CEDL program a sound mechanism to help themselves prepare for NATO membership.
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Question. Explain the reasons for the military grants to the PFP countries. What purposes are these funds used for?
Answer. The State Department provides grant Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds to support the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program under the President's Warsaw Initiative, which has enjoyed strong, bipartisan support in Congress. PFP's primary objective is to establish strong, enduring security ties between NATO and all its PFP Partners, and to assist those Partners interested in joining NATO to meet the obligations of membership. PFP strengthens the forces of Partner countries, and thus their contributions toward our common goals of securing peace and stability throughout Europe, deterring aggression, preventing, defusing and managing crises, and supporting the new democracies in Central Europe and the NIS.
State's FMF program funds the purchase of defense articles, services, and training to assist Partners in improving their compatibility with and understanding of NATO practices and terminology, strengthening democratic control of the military, and improving defense planning, structure, and budgeting processes. It facilitates military preparedness, and provides critical English language training—the baseline requirement for functioning in a NATO environment—for thousands of soldiers. Additionally, PFP has:
Helped Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic prepare for NATO membership through the purchase of equipment, services, and training to improve interoperability with NATO;
Provided continued support for the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion;
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Helped the newly created Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (Centrasbat) gain crucial experience and equipment;
Prepared and equipped national forces to participate in PFP exercises and NATO peace support, humanitarian, search and rescue, and peacekeeping operations;
Taught partners how to participate more actively in European security matters, including new operations or crisis management efforts;
Trained PFP states to become active and engaged partners with the United States and other NATO Allies on critical issues of Euro-Atlantic security;
Funded the Regional Airspace Initiative in the NATO selectee countries, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Baltics;
Increased the size, depth and complexity of PFP and ''in the spirit of'' exercises, leading to interoperability and even deployability with NATO forces;
Trained partners for real life operations including IFOR/SFOR/SFOR II and the Iraq Deployments; and
Provided the technical wherewithal for cooperation (such as tactical radios, search and rescue equipment) that permit NATO interoperability for exercises and real world operations.
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GEORGIA: RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
Question. What can you tell the Committee about the recent assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze of Georgia in terms of who might be responsible?
Answer. The evidence indicates that the assassination attempt was perpetrated by supporters of former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia and Chechen mercenaries.
On March 19, Russia extradited to Tbilisi Guram Absnadze, a former Georgian finance minister under Gamsakhurdia. Georgian authorities are currently holding Absnadze, who is accused of organizing and financing the February 9 terrorist act against President Shevardnadze, as well as assisting the infiltration of terrorist groups into Georgia. Others involved with the attack are also under detention.
Question. With regard to the recent assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze on March 2, 1998, President Schevardnadze assured his countrymen that recent assaults on him and UN officers had failed to disrupt or, diminish Georgia's reliability as a transit route for Caspian oil. My staff tells me that in discussions with groups from the Caucasus region that their impression is that Mother Russia was involved in order to assure that oil pipelines head north to Russia instead of west toward Europe.
As you know, the committee vastly increased resources to Georgia last year partly to help them bolster border security. What is the status of these programs.?
Is the United States exploring other ways to help the Georgians with their security?
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Answer. In FY 1998, under the FREEDOM Support Act, the U.S. Government will allocate up to $20.1 million for programs to enhance Georgia's border security, law enforcement and export control capabilities by providing equipment, training, and services to Georgia's Border Guards, Customs Service and other law enforcement officials. The priority objectives of this assistance program are to:
Assist Georgia in gaining control of its seacoast, particularly the Poti Port; establish a transparent land border regime, focusing on the Azeri and Armenian borders; and then on the Russian and the Turkish borders;
Enhance the Georgian Border Guard and Customs export control capabilities to prevent, deter, and detect potential weapons of mass destruction smuggling;
Improve capabilities of the Georgian national law enforcement and legal authorities to investigate and prosecute internal and translational criminal activity; and
Develop the law enforcement, legal and regulatory infrastructure in Georgia to help establish a society based on the rule of law and respect for individual human rights.
The Special Georgia Border Security and Related Law Enforcement program will be implemented through two program elements. First, the United States Customs Service will implement the majority of the program including almost all equipment procurement, delivery, support and related training, with policy oversight by the Department of State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs Arms Transfer and Export Controls office (PM/ATEC) and the International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Bureau (State/INL) respectively, subject to overall coordination by the U.S. NIS Assistance Coordinator (S/NISC) to ensure no duplication of programmatic efforts. The Coordinator will rely on the Department of State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, and other USG agency experts for guidance as appropriate. Other U.S. Government programs that focus on assisting Georgians with their security include:
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The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the U.S. is purchasing two patrol boats for Georgia (delivery expected in mid-1998) to help the Georgian border guards patrol the Black Sea coast and independently assume more control of Georgia's maritime borders. Georgian officials also participated in a Nuclear Defense Fund funded legal, regulatory and enforcement forum organized by the Department of Commerce.
The DOD/FBI Counterproliferation program will focus on training law enforcement officials including the police, judiciary, procuracy, customs officials, appropriate parliamentary entities, defense and foreign affairs officials. Georgian officials are expected to be invited for a two-week basic course on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) smuggling issues, probably at the Budapest International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).
The DOD/Customs Counterproliferation program plans to provide training to assist Georgia's customs service and border guards over the next two years. The program includes training, both in-country and in the U.S., as well as provision of appropriate equipment to enhance Georgia's border security.
The Department of Energy/Export Control is working with multilateral partners to develop a regional workshop which will focus on nuclear export control issues in the region, including Georgia.
The Department of State/Export Control assistance plans to provide an automated export licensing system which will improve the abilities of export licensing officials to control the transit and export of strategic materials from the territory of Georgia.
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Questions for the Record Submitted by Congresswoman Lowey
GAZA AIRPORT
Question. I have received reports that Yasser Arafat is blocking a final agreement on the establishment of an airport in Gaza, yet has had continued to point to the lack of a resolution on this issue as one on which the Israelis have not fulfilled their commitments under the Oslo Accords. Perhaps he believes that leaving this issue unresolved will increase external pressure on Israel. Can you comment on this matter? Have we indicated to him that such a strategy will not work?
Answer. Although there has been a significant narrowing of differences between the Palestinians and Israelis on matters related to an airport agreement, outstanding issues remain over some details of airport operations. The items of concern apply to both sides. The U.S. has made clear to the negotiating parties that it will work to ensure that their flexibility yields workable outcomes with regard to all issues in the peace process. Our practice is to avoid a scorecard approach affixing blame on specific aspects of the negotiations.
JERUSALEM AS PLACE OF BIRTH IN U.S. PASSPORTS
Question. I am disappointed that passports issued to U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem still list their place of birth as Jerusalem only without listing a country of birth. Is it the position of the USG that an American born in a hospital in West Jerusalem is born in disputed territory and not in Israel?
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Answer. The practice of entering ''Jerusalem'' only in the passport is a long-standing one. This is a very difficult issue. However, given the agreement by Israel and the Palestinians themselves to leave discussion of Jerusalem to the permanent status talks and our determination not to take steps that could undermine permanent status negotiations between the parties, we do not believe that this is an appropriate time to change that practice.
ISRAEL'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WEOG
Question. Israel is the only country in the UN that is denied access to a regional grouping—the mechanism by which UN member states are chosen to sit on powerful committees, including the Security Council. What is holding up Israel's efforts to gain admittance to the Western Europe and Others Group? What are we doing to correct this situation?
Answer. The United States strongly supports Israel's bid for temporary membership in the WEOG and will continue to do so. Israel, like all others members of the United Nations, should have the right to belong a regional grouping, which enables members to participate fully in all activities of the UN.
One point of contention among current WEOG members is concern over what impact Israel's membership will have on WEOG members' electoral prospects within UN bodies. Israel has offered various guarantees to allay these concerns. We believe those guarantees should be sufficient. We will continue to seek every opportunity to make our views clear to WEOG members, and we will press the case of Israeli membership in WEOG in all appropriate UN and other fora.
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ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON IRAN
Question. I am pleased that Iranian President Khatami has made more conciliatory comments about Iranian-U.S. relations than his predecessors. But other clerical leaders in Iran, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, continue their hostility to the United States and to policies that would allow Iran to be accepted in the international community. I am deeply concerned by statements from some members of the foreign policy community calling for a more moderate U.S. stance toward Iran. Iran continues to be the world's leading sponsor of terrorism and is actively pursuing dangerous nuclear and ballistic missile technology. Now is not the time to be moderating our position on this international pariah. Could you update us on the Administration's position regarding Iran? What effect, if any, has the ongoing crisis with Iraq had on your thinking about Iran?
Answer. The United States objects to Iranian policies in several keys areas, particularly its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, its support for terrorism including the violent opposition to the Middle East Peace Process, and its abuses of the human rights of its citizens.
Our strategy aims to induce the government to change these policies by exerting steady pressure—through economic sanctions, diplomatic efforts with our allies and our military presence in the Gulf. This pressure is designed to make Iran realize that its interest is not served by continuing these policies. It is also designed to make it as difficult as possible, in the interim, for Iran to carry out those policies.
The Iranian government has publicly called on Iraq to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions. There are signs that Iran stepped up enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq. In December, Iran refused to allow a Russian aid flight to overfly Iranian territory without obtaining prior permission from the UN Sanctions Committee. In March, Iran stepped up enforcement of sanctions against smugglers of Iraq gasoil. We welcome these developments.
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IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS, HIZBALLAH AND ISLAMIC JIHAD
Question. Does Iran still provide support to Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad? If Iran is successful in gaining nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, it could change the face of modern terrorism. Is it possible that Iran will use these weapons in terrorist attacks?
Answer. Iran supplies training, funding and other means of support to violent opponents of the Middle East peace process, including Hamas. Iran provides similar assistance, as well as weapons, to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Lebanese Hizballah.
We have no evidence suggesting that Iran intends to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in terrorist attacks.
Question. Despite the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese activists, the Indonesian government continued its widespread violation of human rights in East Timor last year. The State Department's 1997 Human Rights Report for Indonesia lists an atrocious array of abuses in East Timor, including murder, torture, and disappearances. This is absolutely disgraceful. And, frankly, our continued support of President Suharto as he thumbs his nose at our demands for improvements in his human rights and economic policies, is unacceptable. What are you doing about this?
Answer. The Administration remains committed to finding a just, equitable, and peaceful solution to the situation in East Timor, and the current economic crisis in Indonesia has in no way diminished our efforts on behalf of that goal. We strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and those of the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative Amb. Marker in facilitating direct talks between Indonesia and Portugal. On February 6, Deputy Assistant Secretary Aurelia Brazeal traveled to New York to meet with Amb. Marker, and on March 12, Amb. Marker met with Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth in Washington.
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From President Clinton's discussion of East Timor with President Soeharto at the APEC summit in November on down, all levels of the administration have been engaged on this issue. In just the past two months, State Department officials have had a number of meetings which dealt with our concerns on East Timor. Those meetings include:
My March 7 meeting with Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama,
Under Secretary Pickering's March 19 meeting with Foreign Minister Gama,
Assistant Secretary Roth's February 27 meeting with Nobel Laureate José Ramos Horta,
Assistant Secretary Roth's February 3 meeting with Indonesia Foreign Minister Alatas, and Assistant Secretary Roth's meeting with the Portuguese Special Envoy for East Timor, Ambassador Fernando Neves on March 11.
Our Embassy in Jakarta of course continues to closely monitor the overall and human rights situations in East Timor with frequent visits and is in regular contact with the Government of Indonesia on East Timor. When there are reports of abuses in East Timor, our Embassy is quick to raise them with Indonesian authorities. Additionally, the U.S. delegation at the current session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva is actively engaged with the governments of Indonesia and Portugal and with European Union representatives on this issue.
The Administration is also very concerned with the humanitarian situation on the ground in East Timor. Over the years, we have been the largest international aid donor to East Timor. Our aid programs are designed to improve the lives of average Timorese, while helping them achieve more control over their own lives.
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Question. I would like to pose a question about the fundamental benefits of the International Military Education and Training Program: The Administration has testified time and again that the IMET program, and especially the Expanded IMET component, is intended to teach human rights, civilian control of the military, and democracy building. We have been providing IMET and Expanded IMET to Indonesia for many years, but that country's military is still categorized by atrocious human rights violations. When will we see this supposed pay-off for our military assistance? When can be expect the millions of dollars we have put into IMET to result in a greater respect for human rights in Indonesia? And I might add that Indonesia is just one of several countries that this question can apply to.
Answer. In general we would note that greater respect for human rights, professionalism, and proper conduct are among the many benefits that we have seen flowing from the IMET program. While it is impossible to quantify the human rights ''pay-off'' from IMET, we believe that engagement with the Indonesian military through IMET has produced some progress in this regard.
IMET has provided the opportunity for Indonesian military personnel to be educated in the United States, to observe our commitment to rule of law and American values, and to acquire additional skills. IMET graduates are more professional, more committed to improving their own armed forces, and more likely to be at the forefront in reforming their own services. Indonesian IMET graduates return home with an understanding of what we Americans stand for and what we stand against. IMET graduates have been prominent in investigating and punishing the failures of discipline that cause human rights abuses.
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We would also note that an example of IMET's pay-off in providing access to the Indonesian military was their prompt response to our recent request for security to protect the evacuation of Americans from Jakarta.
Question. I was extremely disappointed at the Administration's decision last year to lift the twenty-year-old ban on high technology arms sales to Latin America. This ban has served U.S. interests well in Latin America by helping promote stability and democracy in the region. Now is not the time to flood that region with expensive weapons systems that will divert scarce resources from poverty eradication and provoke a regional arms race. I have introduced legislation to codify this ban, but it is not too late for the Administration to reverse its ill-advised decision to lift the ban. What is the current status of this policy? What potential arms sales are currently being discussed and what is the timetable for these sales?
Answer. On August 1, 1997, the Administration decided after a two-year review of security policy in Latin America to establish a process for case-by-case consideration of requests for advanced arms transfers. That process is in place today.
This decision puts U.S. arms transfer policy toward Latin America on par with the rest of the world and reflects the significant political, economic, and military transformation that has occurred in the region. It also reflects the new level of maturity, cooperation and dialogue we have reached in our partnership with the countries of the region. Our former policy of presumption of denial on advanced arms transfers to Latin America, while appropriate and successful for its time, is, in the Administration's view, no longer the right policy for today's situation in the hemisphere.
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Nonetheless, restraint remains the fundamental principle of U.S. arms export policy. In considering arms transfer to Latin America we take into consideration our guiding goals of strengthening democracy (including civilian control of the military), encouraging concentration of resources on economic and social development, avoiding an arms race, supporting transparency and confidence-building, and ensuring that responsible defense modernization occurs in a manner appropriate to each country's legitimate security requirements.
Our change in policy has not resulted in a significant increase in advanced arms sales to the region to date. The only significant sales of advanced weaponry currently under consideration are the possible sale of fighter aircraft and associated weapons systems to Chile and of two used F–16B models to Venezuela to replace lost aircraft. The Government of Chile has yet to decide if it will choose a U.S. fighter (F–16 or F/A–18) over competing Swedish and French aircraft.
The current modernization plans underway in some Latin American countries are a result of aged and obsolete inventories of weapon systems. We do not believe the decision by some civilian elected leaders in South America to modernize their defense forces represents the beginning of an arms race nor do we believe that a unilateral U.S. ban on advanced arms transfers would alter modernization plans as non-U.S. suppliers are ready and eager to sell.
MICROCREDIT FUNDING
Question. One of the reasons why there is such wide-spread support for microcredit in Congress is its effectiveness and cost-efficiency at giving the poorest people the means to help themselves out of poverty. I would like to see the Administration invest further in microcredit, and I am concerned that despite the fact that this Subcommittee and this Congress has prioritized this program, funding for microcredit within USAID declined between 1994 and 1996 from $137 million to $111 million (the last year for which we have numbers available).
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Last summer, USAID projected that it would spend $120 million for microcredit in 1998. This is $15 million less than the $135 million Congress recommended for 1998.
Is the Administration planning to invest the full $135 million, with half to the poorest, which Congress recommended for microcredit in 1998?
Answer. USAID is currently completing its analysis for its microenterprise programs for FY 1997. As expected, the funding level is significantly higher than reported in FY 1996—$161 million in FY 1997 compared to our reported $111 million for FY 1996. Due to delayed passage of the FY 1996 appropriations bill, some funding budgeted for FY 1996 was obligated in FY 1997. On average, these two funding years keep USAID's microenterprise funding at approximately $134 million, which is just below what we are planning for FY 1998 and FY 1999.
In its July 1997 Statement of Renewal of the Microenterprise Initiative which was signed by USAID Administrator Atwood, First Lady Hillary Clinton and many Members of Congress, USAID committed itself to a target of $120 million for FY 1997 and FY 1998. It also set a target of providing half of the funds directed at microcredit for poverty lending, as agreed to with the Microenterprise Coalition, an association of microenterprise practitioners.
Subsequently, in an effort to be responsive to congressional directives for FY 1998, USAID has committed itself to reaching $135 million goal. We expect that half of the funds for microcredit will be targeted towards poverty lending.
For FY 1999, USAID is again planning an $135 million level, but these levels will necessarily depend on the availability of funds. In general, microenterprise programs work best where there are complementary USAID programs involving economic reforms and development. Cuts in these complementary programs can temper the potential of microenterprise programs, therefore, USAID must maintain a balance among all.
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Question. One of the reasons why there is such wide-spread support for microcredit in Congress is its effectiveness and cost-efficiency at giving the poorest people the means to help themselves out of poverty. I would like to see the Administration invest further in microcredit, and I am concerned that despite the fact that this Subcommittee and this Congress has prioritized this program, funding for microcredit within USAID declined between 1994 and 1996 from $137 million to $111 million (the last year for which we have numbers available).
Last summer, USAID projected that it would spend $120 million for microcredit in 1998. This is $15 million less than the $135 million Congress recommended for 1998.
Is the Administration planning to invest the full $135 million, with half to the poorest, which Congress recommended for microcredit in 1998?
Can you tell me if USAID is planning to significantly expand investment for microcredit for 1999?
Answer. USAID is currently completing its analysis for its microenterprise programs for FY 1997. As expected, the funding level is significantly higher than reported in FY 1996—$161 million in FY 1997 compared to our reported $111 million for FY 1996. Due to delayed passage of the FY 1996 appropriations bill, some funding budgeted for FY 1996 was obligated in FY 1997. On average, these two funding years keep USAID's microenterprise funding at approximately $134 million, which is just below what we are planning for FY 1998 and FY 1999.
In its July 1997 Statement of Renewal of the Microenterprise Initiative which was signed by USAID Administrator Atwood, First Lady Hillary Clinton and many Members of Congress, USAID committed itself to a target of $120 million for FY 1997 and FY 1998. It also set a target of providing half of the funds directed at microcredit for poverty lending, as agreed to with the Microenterprise Coalition, an association of microenterprise practitioners.
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Subsequently, in an effort to be responsive to congressional directives for FY 1998, USAID has committed itself to reaching $135 million goal. We expect that half of the funds for microcredit will be targeted towards poverty lending.
For FY 1999, USAID is again planning an $135 million level, but these levels will necessarily depend on the availability of funds. In general, microenterprise programs work best where there are complementary USAID programs involving economic reforms and development. Cuts in these complementary programs can temper the potential of microenterprise programs, therefore, USAID must maintain a balance among all.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Congressman Torres
THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO
Question. Madame Secretary, would you please provide this Subcommittee with a status report on the prospects of the US. rejoining UNESCO during this year. Would you also state for the record whether you will be exerting, and exercising your personal leadership to re-affiliate the U.S. with UNESCO?
Answer: We are please with many of the changes that have taken place at UNESCO since we withdrew in 1984, including depoliticization of its work, management reforms and thirty percent reduction in personnel. We also recognize that UNESCO is doing good work in a number of areas that reflect policy priorities of this administration.
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Re-entry into UNESCO will be costly. The cost to the CIO account would be about $67 million annually. Given the severe funding restrictions we face, funds for re-entry into UNESCO would not be available within the CIO account without withdrawal from another major agency.
Nonetheless, as President Clinton stated in his November 1995 letter to Director General Mayor, ''U.S. membership remains on our list of priorities, and we will continue to explore ways to identify the necessary resources to make this wish a reality.''
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
Question. Just this week, the Department of State denied entry visas to Cuban academics, professionals and government officials who were invited by the University of California at Berkeley to a historic academic conference called: ''A Dialogue With Cuba''.
In spite of the fact the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992 encourages legitimate academic and cultural exchanges, the U.S. Department of State rejected the visa requests of Cubans who are members of the Cuban National Assembly and key heads of government departments. These visas were rejected by the Department of State citing Presidential Proclamation 5377, which was issued by former President Reagan.
We understand that the Department has the legal authority, under this Proclamation, to deny these visas, but would like to inquire as to the justification for invoking this law, at this time. Even if these Cuban government officials were to make presentations which were purely propagandistic in content, what is their threat to the U.S.? Doesn't the U.S. have a long, inalienable tradition of free speech which is being compromised by denying the University of California the right to have their invited guests permitted into this country? Are we not acting in the very same manner for which we criticize the Castro government? Would we not be in a stronger position if we permitted the free speech which we claim their government denies? Isn't the Department of State setting itself up for charges of denial of free speech at the very University where the Free Speech Movement began in 1964? Is this wise?
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Answer. Presidential Proclamation 5377 of October 4, 1985 suspends entry to the United States of the following classes of Cuban nationals as nonimmigrants: ''[a] officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba holding diplomatic or official passports; and [b] individuals who, notwithstanding the type of passport that they hold, are considered by the Secretary of State or his designee to be officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba.''
This Proclamation is part of the overall U.S. effort to maintain pressure on the Cuban government for change. It is most useful when enforced against high-ranking members of that government, such as members of the Cuban National Assembly and key heads of Cuban government departments.
All nonimmigrant visa applications received from Cubans subject to the Proclamation are forwarded to the Department. The Proclamation allows the Department to approve exceptions on a case-by-case basis and each case is given careful consideration, but applications from higher-level Cuban officials are given greater scrutiny. In general, Cubans who are rewarded with high positions in the government have demonstrated their political loyalty. They support official Cuban government policy and therefore are unlikely to serve as anything more than mouthpieces of the Castro regime in any setting.
We worked with the organizers of the Berkeley conference and approved the applications of eight of the invited Cuban participants. We suggested that other well-qualified Cubans of slightly lower political prominence could be invited to substitute for those very high-ranking invitees that would not be given visas. We also suggested that the viewpoints of Cuban officials could be effectively shared in a number of ways, such as distributing writings or videotapes from Cuba at the conference, utilizing voice or video teleconferencing with participants in Cuba, or inviting other participants from Cuba. Indeed, the Principal Officer of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., spoke at the conference and several other officials from the Cuban Interests Section also attended.
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We do not want to inhibit the free flow of information. The Presidential Proclamation is a prohibition on travel to the U.S. by certain Cubans who are officers or employees of the Cuban government or Cuban Communist Party, not a prohibition on the exchange of information.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN KAPTUR
HUMAN RIGHTS
Question. What is being done to curb the slave trade in prostitution emanating from NIS countries?
Answer. The U.S. is committed to combating trafficking in women and girls worldwide.
The President's Interagency Council on Women established a senior governmental working group on trafficking to coordinate the USG response on trafficking in women and girls. The group focuses on the areas of prevention, victim assistance and protection, and enforcement. The working group consults closely with NGOs and members of Congress. Theresa Loar, Director of the President's Interagency Council on Women and Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues, leads the working group.
We are working jointly with the European Union, the Group of Eight, and the UN, as well as the Governments of Israel, Italy, and Ukraine.
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As directed by President Clinton in an Executive Memorandum on March 11, 1998, we are responding to the Government of Ukraine's request to jointly develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat trafficking from and to Ukraine. This U.S.-Ukraine cooperation will become a model for combating trafficking in women and girls. The Government of Ukraine requested that we work jointly on this initiative and has actively pursued its development. Secretary Albright discussed the U.S.-Ukraine initiative with the Government of Ukraine during her March 6 Visit to Ukraine. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton also addressed this issue with Ukrainian officials on her last visit to Ukraine. On April 13, 1998, President Leonid Kuchma signed legislation prescribing criminal charges for trafficking in human beings.
The U.S. and European Union are currently sponsoring a joint information campaign to combat trafficking in women and girls and to warn potential victims of methods used by traffickers. The U.S. public awareness campaign is in Ukraine and the European Union supports a similar campaign in Poland. In July 1998, the U.S. will sponsor a workshop in Ukraine to evaluate the effectiveness of the dissemination campaign. If our campaign is deemed successful, it could be adapted and expanded to other critical source and transit countries worldwide.
The State Department developed a brochure which focuses on warning young women about the methods of traffickers and the consequences of accepting their offers. The U.S. embassies in Poland and Ukraine distribute these brochures, which have been translated into Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian, in the consular waiting areas and beyond.
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) allocated FY 1998 funding to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to conduct immigration training to deter migrant trafficking, including trafficking in women and children, in the former Soviet Union, Central America, and South Africa. INL also allocated funding to the INS attaches in Vienna and Moscow to conduct two conferences for immigration officials in the region on migrant trafficking and trafficking in women and children.
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As directed by President Clinton in an Executive Memorandum on March 11, 1998, the President's Interagency Council on Women will organize a conference for governmental and non-governmental representatives from source, transit, and destination countries and representatives from international organizations to call attention to the issue of trafficking in women and girls and to develop strategies from combating this egregious human rights violation. Participants from the NIS will be invited to this conference.
State Department consular presence worldwide works with source, transit, and destination countries to develop strategies for protecting victims and expanding and enhancing anti-fraud training to stop the international movement of trafficked women and girls.
CHINA RESOLUTION AT UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Question. The UN Commission on Human Rights convenes its 54th session next month. Will the Administration use this forum to secure support from other nations to press China on its horrendous human rights record?
Answer. The United States decided not to sponsor a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva this year. We made this decision because of steps China has taken and in anticipation of further progress.
Among the steps taken are: (1) its decision to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which codifies the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; (2) its signature of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights this past fall; (3) the release of a number of prominent political prisoners whose cases we have highlighted to the Chinese government; (4) its invitation to the UN Arbitrary Detention Working Group which visited Chinese prisons, and its agreement in principle to an exchange of U.S. and Chinese prison officials; (5) its agreement to create a U.S.-China NGO forum for discussion of human rights issues.
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The decision to sign the covenant on civil and political rights is particularly welcome, since this will create a multilateral process for scrutiny of China's human rights record.
Our decision does not mean that we accept that China's human rights record is satisfactory; it is not. We continue to speak out publicly about that record including at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, where Ambassador Richardson delivered a strong speech detailing our concerns; we will advocate forcefully through diplomatic channels as well.
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that the funds designated to fight drug trafficking, which we support, are not being used to commit human rights violations in such places as Colombia and Mexico?
Answer. In response to provisions in the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA), our embassies in countries where we provided or are providing 1997 International Narcotics Control (INC) funds have implemented and follow specific and detailed procedures to review reported incidents of human rights violations by security forces, correlate that information with INC-funded programs, and report such information to the Department of State to ensure that INC funds do not reach units responsible for abuse. In compliance with section 570 of the 1998 FOAA which applies to all funds made available by the FOAA (not just INC funds), we have instructed all overseas posts to develop and implement similar procedures. We have also set up a mechanism in the Department of State to provide a thorough review of reports of human rights abuse and monitor the distribution of assistance.
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U.S. counternarcotics aid to the Colombian military is provided in accordance with the provisions of Section 570 of the FOAA, as applicable, and of the ''End-Use Monitoring'' Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) we signed with the Colombian Government August 1, 1997. Under the terms of this MOU, we will not provide assistance to any unit of a Colombian security force if we have credible evidence of gross human rights violations by that unit's members, unless we can determine that the Colombian government is taking steps to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice. In addition, the slightly different requirements of Section 570 are applied with respect to assistance subject to that section.
Our embassy in Mexico City has also developed procedures in compliance with Section 570 of the FOAA. In addition, where required by our legislation, the Government of Mexico has provided us with binding assurances that equipment transferred to Mexico will be used only for the purposes for which it is intended—in this case counternarcotics.
Question. Beyond current policy, what can the U.S. do to stem the continuous uprisings in Chiapas?
Answer. In the final analysis, there is little that the U.S. can do to directly affect the situation in Chiapas. The complex conflict in that state is an internal Mexican affair, which Mexicans will have to resolve for themselves.
The level of violence and polarization in Chiapas has escalated to the point that any resolution of the situation will be a long-term process. A peace and conciliation settlement to which all parties can agree is the first necessary step. We have consistently supported efforts to find such a settlement and opposed continuing violence. Beyond peace and conciliation, Chiapas—as one of the poorest states in Mexico—will require extensive economic development and social restructuring to give all of the inhabitants a greater stake in society, thereby reducing the potential for violence.
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Question. In the Administration's opinion, what fuels this unrest?
Answer. The conflicts in Chiapas are very complex and have a number of overlapping causes. The primary roots of unrest in the state, however, are centuries of extreme poverty and oppression of the indigenous inhabitants by a mestizo minority. Political conflict is also prominent among the causes of unrest, pitting supporters of the historically governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) against the Zapatista rebels and their supporters and/or adherents of the Party of the Democratic Revolution. Other factors, such as land conflicts, religious and ethnic differences, and family feuds, tend to reinforce the major elements and contribute to an atmosphere of polarization and violence.
Question. How significant a role does agriculture play in contributing to instability?
Answer. If by ''agriculture'' one means land conflicts, certainly competition for land and other scarce economic resources contributes to instability and conflict in a poor area such as Chiapas. As we have indicated, however, land distribution is but one of the many factors contributing to polarization and violence in Chiapas. An intensive and long-term program of economic development and social reform—including changes in land distribution and local government—will be required to reduce the instability we see today in Chiapas.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
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Question. We have been fighting the ''war on drugs'' since the early 1980's. Has there been any study or information you can provide on the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics aid?
Answer. The congressionally-mandated International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), produced every year since 1987 by the Department of State, is the most comprehensive assessment of our global antinarcotics program. This document assesses global trends and provides a detailed assessment of the narcotics trade and the effectiveness of antidrug programs in more than 150 countries, including every country to which the United States provides counternarcotics assistance. We publish this report by March 1 every year and send a copy at that time to every member of Congress. The INCSR provides a balanced assessment of our global antidrug efforts. It is clear, however, that our programs have achieved significant gains whenever host nation governments have had the political commitment to support antinarcotics efforts and we have had the funds to sustain these initiatives.
Question. How exactly can these funds be used?
Answer. Our counternarcotics assistance—$210 million in FY 98—is used to develop and strengthen host nation capabilities to target a wide variety of drug threats. With these funds, we provide equipment, training, technical, and other assistance to create or strengthen police and judicial systems to investigate and prosecute major traffickers; to develop and implement alternative development and eradication programs to eliminate illicit drug crop cultivation; and to promote drug awareness and demand reduction programs to garner increased public and political commitment to narcotics control. We also contribute to multilateral organizations to foster enhanced multilateral cooperation against narcotics trafficking and to support programs by multilateral organization in important drug producing and trafficking areas where U.S. Government access is limited.
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Question. What is the penalty for the misuse of these funds?
Answer. There is a standard provision clause in each Letter of Agreement (LOA) that is signed with a foreign government offering them counternarcotics assistance which states ''Any property not used for the intended purpose will be returned to the USG.'' If warranted, the foreign assistance funds could be frozen and withdrawn, depending on the circumstances of misuse. The embassy also has the right to inspect or audit any portion of the program at any time to ensure that goods and funds are used in accordance with intended purposes.
Question. How do we keep track of the funds given to countries to stop drug trafficking?
Answer. The funds are tracked through two separate financial management systems. The first is operated by the embassy budget and fiscal office and officially establishes the initial obligation of counternarcotics funds and tracks the subsequent spending of these monies. A second Financial Management System, maintained by the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section, prepares quarterly Financial Management Activity Reports which are more descriptive and also keep track of expenditures on an accrual basis.
Question. Given that drug trafficking and cultivation in Colombia has increased, yearly cultivation grew by 10% last year even as it declined in other Andean countries, how effective has our counternarcotics aid to Colombia really been?
Answer. The growth in Colombian coca cultivation this year (18%), occurred almost entirely in areas outside the zone where U.S.-financed eradication efforts have been taking place. In the Guaviare region, where the vast majority of our spray activity has been concentrated cultivation actually decreased by 25%. This demonstrates that the eradication program is effective. Our challenge now is to work with the Colombian government to expand our joint eradication efforts into the new cultivation areas in southern Colombia.
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GREECE, CYPRUS AND TURKEY
Question. The Administration has taken a vigorous, clear and proper stand on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq. However, the Security Council has adopted many unanimous resolutions on Cyprus that have specific provisions for their implementation. Is the lack of a vigorous, clear, and proper stand on these many resolutions detrimental to the credibility of our foreign policy?
Answer. The position of this Administration on the Cyprus issue is clear: we support the UN settlement process and the goal of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. There should be no doubt that this Administration places a high priority on resolving the Cyprus dispute. The President and Secretary are actively engaged. They have assembled a strong negotiating team, led by Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke (Special Presidential Emissary) and Tom Miller (Special Cyprus Coordinator).
Holbrooke and Miller are in intensive contact with the leaders of the two communities, the Greek and Turkish governments, the UN, and other key players, including the European Union. The leaders of both communities have stated repeatedly that the U.S. has a key role to play in resolving the Cyprus dispute.
Question. While you were U.S. Ambassador to the UN, you affirmed the territorial integrity of Cyprus and spoke about the ''illegality of the Turkish army's occupation.'' Do you feel this statement is true today?
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Answer. The U.S. remains committed to the territorial integrity of Cyprus and to UN efforts to reunify the island on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution.
In the context of an overall settlement, it is our goal to see that the security needs of all the people of the island are addressed.
Question. Why had the Administration remained silent regarding Turkey's action in Cyprus and the Aegean?
Answer. The U.S. has not been hesitant to criticize actions by any party in the region, including but by no means limited to Turkey, that we view to be detrimental to regional stability and that might impede efforts to lower tensions.
NATO AND THE U.N.
Question. With future expansion of NATO, can you tell me if our European allies have increased their contributions to aid in this effort?
Answer. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, the NATO allies agreed that the costs of enlargement would be manageable and would be met. At the North Atlantic Council Defense Ministers' meeting last December, all 16 allies reaffirmed this view, stating that ''costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our agreed procedures under which each ally bears its fair share.
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While the U.S. has the largest direct funding of assistance to NATO partners, many NATO allies have their own active programs of cooperation with partners. The Nordic countries have been active with the Baltic states, the Netherlands has a cooperative program with the Czech Republic, Italy runs training and exchange program with Albania and Slovenia, and there are many other examples. NATO has an internal clearinghouse for cooperative programs with partners, but the process does not compare contributions in monetary terms.
Question. What is NATO's purpose, in the next century, since the threat of the old Soviet Union has diminished?
Answer. NATO's purpose is stated precisely in its 1949 founding treaty: to safeguard the freedom of the peoples of the allied countries; to promote stability and well-being in the trans-atlantic area; and to unite our efforts for collective defense and the preservation of security.
Clearly, we are no longer preparing for a Soviet invasion, but threats remain:
NATO must be able to provide political reassurance that we are prepared to defend current and future allies as required by Article V.
It must have the ability to build back up over a period of years in case Europe's security environment changes for the worse.
As agreed in the 1991 strategic concept, NATO should be able to deal with threats, to Allies' security from local or regional instability, as has been the case in Bosnia.
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It must be able to promote others' contributions to coalitions of the willing, together with NATO partners, to respond to crises anywhere that threaten transatlantic interests.
These missions will require a strong and dynamic Alliance with a dedicated membership in the years to come.
Question. Do you foresee a time when the Europeans will be able to defend themselves without our financial contributions to NATO?
Answer. The United States has long maintained that American and European security interests are integrally related. We have repeatedly emphasized that it is in our national interest to remain fully engaged in the European security structure. In fact, maintaining the trans-atlantic link in NATO continues to be one of our major policy objectives. Thus, we do not look for a time when the Europeans will be able to defend themselves without United States support, rather we focus our attention on ensuring that our European allies continue to improve their defense capabilities and that they continue to bear their fair share of the financial costs of trans-atlantic security.
In this context, I can report that our European allies do in fact play a larger role in their own defense than they did in the past. Since the end of the Cold War, American troop levels in Europe have been reduced by two-thirds, and the U.S. pays only approximately 25 percent of the NATO common-funded budgets total costs. Our European allies make up the remaining 75 percent of the common-funded costs, which amounted to approximately $1.3 billion last year.
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Our allies have made considerable progress over the past six years toward building the needed capabilities to accomplish NATO's mission:
The U.K., for example, makes substantial contributions; its troops form the core of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and it has the capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20–25,000 personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario. They recently had an aircraft carrier, the HMS Invincible, deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of U.S. forces.
France is establishing a Rapid Reaction Force designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. With nearly 10,000 troops in Bosnia, France is the third largest force contributor to SFOR after the U.S. and Britain.
Italy is also upgrading its ability to project forces to areas of need as evidenced by their recent leadership role in the Albania crisis.
Germany is also increasing its capability to deploy forces. A 53,000 strong Crisis Reaction Force is being formed and will be fully operational by the end of 1998. It is significant to note that Germany has 2,500 troops in Bosnia, making this the first time since joining NATO, that Germany has deployed troops outside its borders.
Our smaller European allies are also making significant improvements. For example, the Netherlands navy and air force improved their transport and air defense capabilities by procuring air-to-air tankers; acquiring an amphibious-lift ship for their marines; and by upgrading their F–16s and Patriot missile systems.
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European commitment to their own security is clearly reflected with regard to operations in Bosnia, where Europeans comprised more than 90 percent of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) several years before the U.S. participation in the current NATO operation. Even today, our NATO allies and other non-NATO troop contributing nations comprise more than 70 percent of the forces operating in and around Bosnia.
It is clear that more work needs to be done to improve the capability of the European forces for mobility, deployability and sustainability, and senior U.S. officials in Washington and at NATO continuously press allies to make these improvements. We will continue to emphasize the need for these improvements in the future.
IRAQ/U.N.
Question. Would you say that our arrears to the U.N. played any role in our inability to persuade other nations to participate in the continual Iraqi disregard for U.N. Security [Council] resolutions?
Answer. The Security Council has in fact responded firmly to Iraq's violation of its obligations under Security Council resolutions, most recently in its resolution 1154 of March 2, 1998, which made clear that further Iraqi violations of the relevant resolutions would have the ''severest consequences'' for Iraq. This resolution passed unanimously.
Having said that, it is also clear that our ability successfully to conduct multilateral diplomacy of the type necessary to bring about consensus on such a serious issue is complicated by a number of factors, including the arrears situation.
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Question. With the latest United Nations-brokered deal with Iraq, many of our citizens have questioned whether the U.S. has become a subordinate to U.N. policies. Would you comment?
Answer. The United States conducted an active diplomatic campaign, centered on the United Nations, designed to compel Iraqi compliance with its own commitments under Security Council resolutions and bolster the central goal of our policy toward Iraq: to make certain that Iraq is not in a position, now or in the future, to threaten its neighbors or U.S. interests in the region. The agreement reached in Baghdad by the Secretary-General is a win-win situation for the United States and the United Nations. UNSCOM has said cooperation from Iraq under the Annan-Aziz MOU so far has been good. If that continues, it will mark an important victory for the international community.
But if Iraq violates the MOU, it will be clear to all that Iraq has reneged once more on its commitments under Security Council resolutions and reneged on the terms of the 1991 ceasefire. And the Council has made it clear that that will have the severest consequences. The United States is prepared to take whatever actions necessary, including military action, to respond to the breach of the ceasefire established by the Security Council.
BOSNIA
Question. How much money has the United States expended from all accounts for Bosnia-related activities? How much have other nations expended?
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Answer. The set of financial benchmarks used in accounting for expenditures in support of nonmilitary Bosnia-related activities is complex. The World Bank has the most comprehensive database for the international effort. That database is broken out into committed, under implementation, disbursed and expended categories. Under expenditures, by yearend 1997 the United States had expended $347.45 million, approximately 20.3 percent of the international total of $1.7 billion.
For military expenditures, the calculation uses fiscal rather than calendar year, but the numbers are more clear.
The Department of Defense Comptroller reports the FY96 cost for U.S. support operations in and around Bosnia to have been $2.5 billion. The FY97 cost for IFOR/SFOR operations was approximately $2.3 billion. FY98 costs for SFOR are projected to be $2.0 billion.
(Note: The President's $1.5 billion FY98 budget request for Bosnia assumed a reduction from 8,500 to 5,000 in U.S. troops by the end of FY97. Higher force levels were required due to the delay in municipal elections to September 1997. The extension of the 8,500 troop level through June 1998 added $487 million to the projected budget.)
The FY99 estimate to maintain 6,900 troops in Bosnia as a follow-on force is $1.9 billion. This FY99 requirement was identified to Congress as a non-offset emergency budget amendment for FY99.
Calculating the expenditures of other nations' support of IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping activities in Bosnia is problematic. There is little relevant public information on such spending and few of the participating nations use comparable accounting methods.
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Nevertheless, we can state that U.S. troops today comprise less than 25 percent of the international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina overall and that that percentage will decline as our troop strength drops.
Question. What percentage of all troops in Bosnia are U.S. forces? What percentage of troops in Bosnia are deployed by other nations?
Answer. U.S. troops comprise approximately 24 percent of the military force deployed in support of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The balance is provided by the other nations participating in this international effort.
Question. How many US Volunteers are being recruited from a number of experienced or retired Americans of different skills versus younger, less experienced Americans?
Answer. Currently, the average Volunteer is 29 years of age. About 24% are over 29 years old, and 7% are over 50 years old. As health indicators and life expectancy improve in the U.S., the Peace Corps will continue to recruit older Americans who often possess, in relative terms, a more broad range of life skills, education, and expertise.
It should be noted, however, that despite their relative youth, the average Peace Corps Volunteer brings with him/her education and experience that prove essential to successful service. Ninety-seven percent of Volunteers hold bachelor's degrees, and 18% have graduate experience or degrees. Twenty six percent possess one or more years of work experience.
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Question. How will proposals for increased funding either augment or change the profile of current Peace Corps Volunteers?
Answer. Current Profile:
Gender—59% female, 41% male.
Minorities—14% of Peace Corps Volunteers.
Age—Average is 29 years old, median is 25 years old.
Peace Corps will continue recruiting a diversity of skills, ages, genders, and ethnic backgrounds. It will offer increased opportunities to ethnic minorities and older Volunteers, and enhance recruitment of Volunteers who can respond to countries' emerging needs for ''scarce skills'' which include support of nonprofit organizations, environmental protection, and business development. The largest number of new Volunteers will remain recent college graduates.
NONPROLIFERATION
Question. How confident are you with the safety and security of NIS nuclear plants and the material associated with them?
Answer. We are concerned about the security of nuclear materials in the nations of the former Soviet Union, but are making great strides. This continues to be a high priority area for U.S. assistance. We have been working cooperatively with these countries to prevent the loss, theft, and proliferation of nuclear materials since 1992. Together we have already made substantial improvements, and must continue to provide support through completion of these projects several years from now. Several Administration programs are involved.
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The Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A) is working with eight NIS countries at over 50 facilities to implement upgrades to improve security and physical protection of weapons-usable nuclear materials not contained in weapons, as the first line of defense against nuclear smuggling. In FY 1998–98, approximately $250 million was appropriated to support these activities. Upgrades have been completed in Uzbekistan, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia, and completion of the scope of work originally identified in 1994 will be complete by the end of CY 2002.
The DOE also works with NIS countries to improve the safety at Soviet-designed reactors by strengthening the condition of the plants, enhancing host country safety practices, and supporting developing of host country nuclear safety infrastructure. DOE has close working relationships with 15 nuclear power plant facilities and 30 scientific institutes and governmental agencies.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission assists in strengthening nuclear regulatory institutions and practices for countries with Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, including Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. It has trained over 600 regulators since 1992. The NRC also provides MPC&A assistance for safeguarding and elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
The Department of State-administered Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund provides grants that support a variety of efforts, including strengthening export control regimes to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.
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The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program works to enhance the security, safety, control, accounting and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile materials to prevent their proliferation and encourage dismantlement. The CTR program was critical in helping Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine become non-nuclear weapons states. CTR funds have also contributed to DOE's MPC&A effort.
In selective cases where weapons-usable nuclear material has been at particular risk, we have worked with our allies and the NIS government involved to remove the material. In recent weeks, we completed the removal of several kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from a nuclear research reactor site in Tbilisi, Georgia, to the UK for safe storage. Several years ago, we worked with Kazakhstan on Project Sapphire which removed nuclear fuel to the US for storage and reprocessing.
Question. How confident are you with the containment and remediation of the Chornobyl reactor and site?
Answer. U.S. concerns at Chornobyl rest largely with the 20-story steel and concrete ''Shelter'' built to cover the radioactive remains of the destroyed Chornobyl-4 reactor. Built in just seven months, under difficult and hazardous conditions, the shelter was never intended to serve as a long-term solution for the problems posed by the destroyed reactor. The unstable condition of the shelter is now a source of serious concern and requires prompt international attention.
In the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the G–7 and Ukraine on Chornobyl Closure, Ukraine agreed to permanently close the remaining operational units at Chornobyl by the year 2000. To help Ukraine develop a plan to stabilize the shelter over the destroyed reactor, Ukraine and the G–7 nations approved the internationally prepared Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). At the G–7 Denver Summit in June 1997, the G–7 nations pledged to contribute $300 million toward the $760 million SIP project cost. The U.S. share of this pledge is $78 million. Ukraine has pledged $50 million in kind. As of March 23, 1998, countries have agreed to provide over $400 million over the next 5–6 years to implement the SIP. This total is sufficient to initiate work while additional pledges are sought. Public sector fundraising will continue, and the private sector fundraising effort is expected to kick off within a year.
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Bilateral funding by the European Union and by the United States was also provided in 1996 to enable early work on the shelter to take place. U.S. bilateral assistance are focused on improving safety at the site, and include provision of a nuclear safety monitoring system, provision of occupational safety equipment, and provision of equipment for shelter operations. The U.S. is working to strengthen the capabilities of Ukraine's Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which plays an important role in reviewing and approving implementation of the SIP.
In addition to our bilateral activities at the Chornobyl shelter, the U.S. has contributed funds through the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) at the EBRD to construct two facilities (for liquid radioactive waste management and safe spent fuel storage) which will support decommissioning of the Chornobyl plant. The NSA is also funding four small projects to improve the near-term safety of Chornobyl Unit 3 prior to its closure in 2000. As a contributor to the NSA, the U.S. sits on the NSA Assembly of Contributors and has a vote in determining how projects are implemented. The U.S. is also funding completion of a partially-built heat plant at Chornobyl which will support the site during decommissioning activities, after the last Chornobyl reactor is closed.
Question. How confident are you with the safety and security of Newly Independent States (NIS) nuclear power plants built to the Chornobyl design?
Answer. The Chornobyl-style RBMK reactor is a Soviet-designed boiling water, graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactor which contains fundamental uncorrectable safety deficiencies which would prevent these reactors from ever being licensed to operate in the U.S. These deficiencies include a susceptibility to power instabilities; lack of a modern containment system to prevent release of radioactivity to the environment; and inadequacies in the emergency core-cooling systems, fire protection systems, and electronic control-and-protection systems.
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There are a total of 14 RBMKs operating in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine. The U.S. has strongly urged these countries to close them down as soon as possible. In Ukraine, we have seen excellent progress with the closure of Chornobyl Unit 1 in 1996 and Ukraine's commitment to close the remaining operational reactor at Unit 3 by 2000. In Ukraine, Russia, and Lithuania, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is working with the host country to identify safe, environmentally acceptable and least cost options which will permit other RBMK reactors to close. The programs of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reduce the risks of a serious accident at these RBMK reactors and to strengthen the nuclear regulatory authority in the countries continue.
Question. With the many questions of biological weapons proliferation, who has the final say if a country should get the possible ingredients that could be used for military purpose? I asked this question, because I watched one of the news shows and was stunned to hear a former DOD official say that ingredients that were eventually shipped to Iraq, which he had blocked, were overridden by the State Department and the Commerce Department.
Answer. All export licenses for Commerce-controlled dual-use biological weapons-related items are reviewed by the interagency, including the Departments of State, Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Each agency provides the Commerce Department with a recommendation to approve or deny a license application.
Taking into account interagency views, the Department of Commerce determines whether a license should be approved or denied. On those occasions when agencies disagree with the disposition of a license, they may appeal the decision to Commerce-chaired interagency review board.
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A mechanism exists—but it is rarely used—whereby an agency may continue to appeal a license decision to the Export Administration Review Board—which is composed of Cabinet-level officials—and ultimately to the President.
Question. What is the current procedure?
Answer. Licenses for Commerce-controlled dual-use items are referred to the interagency for review. Agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provide the Commerce Department with a recommendation to approve or deny a license application.
Should an agency disagree with the Commerce Department's disposition of a license, it may appeal the decision to the Commerce-chaired interagency review board.
DEMINING
Question. Your budget shows a 700% increase over the last two years for humanitarian demining. I recognize the importance of this work, but can such a rapid ramp-up actually be used effectively?
Answer. Within the last year, we have expanded the program from fourteen to nineteen countries and are seriously examining several additional countries. We are also continuing our support to existing country programs which continue to remove landmines from the ground. Commitments to sustaining existing country programs, and expanding into new country programs, have already utilized the $20 million received for FY 98. The worldwide U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program is managed and monitored by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Humanitarian Demining which ensures effective use of the funds. Actions within the State Department are increasing our oversight and program management which we believe will effectively monitor and manage these resources. In addition, with the announcement of the President's Demining 2010 Initiative on October 31, 1997, we will be working to accelerate all global humanitarian demining operations, including the U.S. program, to eliminate the threat to civilians of anti-personnel landmines by the year 2010.
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Question. What commitments do we have for similar contributions from our allies?
Answer. We estimate that approximately half of all international demining assistance comes from the U.S. with the European Union as the next largest donor. Other major donors include Norway, which has committed $100 million over five years, Japan ($80 million over five years), Canada ($100 million Canadian over five years), Sweden ($23 million in 1998), the United Kingdom (10 million British Pounds per year for the next three years and Finland ($6 million in 1998). The 1998 edition of the State Department report Hidden Killers will include information on international contributions to the worldwide humanitarian demining effort.
With the announcement of the President's Demining 2010 Initiative on October 31, 1997, the U.S. will be hosting a conference in May, bringing together key donor governments and others to create an effective international coordination mechanism to ensure that sustained public and private resources for demining are directed, in an organized and rational manner, to programs in the mine-affected countries, with the goal of eliminating the threat to civilians of anti-personnel landmines by the year 2010. The Demining 2010 Initiative has challenged the international community—public and private sectors—to raise $1 billion annually for global humanitarian demining.
Question. Who administers international demining programs?
Answer. The U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program is administered by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Humanitarian Demining, chaired by State. The Department of Defense designates the Vice Chair. A recent Congressional Report (copy attached) explains the IWG process.
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"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
Question. Do we directly fund demining operations or is the funding funneled through NGOs?
Answer. In most cases, our goal is the establishment of a sustainable, indigenous demining capability to manage and conduct demining operations in a landmine-affected nation, rather than funding ongoing demining operations. The first step is to establish a Mine Action Center, which is an office of the host nation government responsible for solving the landmine problem in that country. U.S. Government assistance is provided in-kind through the host government Mine Action Center. Where a direct, government-to-government military relationship is not appropriate, we have functioned through the United Nations (in Afghanistan and Angola) and through USAID (in Angola and Rwanda). In the future, new funding through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account will provide additional resources and administrative flexibility to consider accomplishing overall objectives through NGOs as well.
Question. Can you please explain to what extent Laos and Cambodia will benefit this year and succeeding years from this program?
Answer. We plan to provide Cambodia with $2.0 million in NADR funds in FY 98 and $3.0 million in FY 99 (out of the $50 million requested). We plan to provide Laos with $2.0 million in NADR funds in FY 98 and the same amount in FY 99. In both cases, the program has successfully established a sustainable, indigenous demining and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance capability in each country. Ongoing funding provides additional equipment to sustain and expand the program.
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Question. How does this compare to the past support?
Answer. In FY 97, we provided both Cambodia and Laos with $1.0 million each in NADR funds. We have increased our support together with increased managerial capability in each country.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN OBEY
UNHCR CHILDREN'S FUND
Question. In the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operation conference report the conferees included report language supporting the establishment of a fund to assist unaccompanied refugee children. The report language states: ''The conferees believe the United States should play a leadership role in helping to establish a fund through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for vulnerable refugee children, particularly those separated from their parents. The conferees recommended that approximately $5,000,000 in fiscal year 1998 funds be made available for this purpose.''
I understand that the Refugee Bureau of State has been moving forward on this fund. Can you tell me when you anticipate the UNHCR will receive this funding?
Answer. We are committed to improving the protection of and assistance to refugee children who make up 50% of the world's refugees. This is a major priority for the USG and we are working closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that programs are designed to recognize and meet the special needs of refugee children.
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We appreciate the strong Congressional support of our efforts to promote greater appreciation of the need to focus programs on the special needs of refugee children. The recommendation in the report language in our 1998 appropriation that some $5 million 1998 fiscal year funds should be made available for the special needs of refugee children in a reinforcement of this commitment.
We are working actively with UNHCR on the programming of this funding to augment UNHCR's programs for refugee children, including implementing the principal recommendations of the Graca Machel study which focused on unaccompanied minors, adolescents, education, sexual exploitation, and children caught up in armed conflict; building up UNHCR's partnership with NGOs to provide further assistance to refugee children; and training both UNHCR staff and implementing partners in the special needs of refugee children.
Last year, PRM provided $1,367,000 to UNHCR to support new regional coordinator positions for refugee children for Central Asia, Turkey, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa, to fund training workshops on the protection and special assistance needs of refugee children, and for a pilot project in peace education.