SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1998.
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE
WITNESS
HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
General Statement
Mr. ROGERS. The hearing will come to order. It is a pleasure today to welcome Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her second appearance before the Subcommittee as Secretary of State. In addition, Madam Secretary, you have appeared on several prior occasions in your former position of U.N. Ambassador, so your appearance here is an annual event for us and a happy one, I might add.
When you appeared last year, you had just finished your first trip overseas as Secretary, to favorable reviews, we might add. Now, a year later, you have experienced firsthand the challenges of being responsible for the nation's foreign policy as well as leading a Department that has some 23,000 employees, and 250 embassies and consulates overseas. It seems to me the challenge facing you is to use American leadership to solve crises, not just contain them.
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Over the past year, in addition to travel overseas, you have done some domestic travel, of course, as well, and I think you have discovered that some of the toughest audiences might be here at home.
It is, of course, the fiscal year 1999 budget request for funding to operate the Department of State as well as assessments for international organizations that brings you before the Subcommittee today and it is our job to examine that request in the context of the need to assure a balanced budget.
In addition, there are important developments with respect to Iraq and other areas of our foreign policy that may provoke a question or two, as well, or comments from you.
There is one point I need to bring to your attention. I do not know if you are aware, but your statement was not provided by the Department to the Committee until this morning. Normally, we ask for copies of the statement three days in advance and to try to accommodate special circumstances. The statement, of course, provides members the basis to prepare for the hearing, so we would hope that maybe we could have the statement earlier.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I apologize.
Mr. ROGERS. Madam Secretary, your statement will be made a part of the record, and if you would like to summarize, we would be pleased to hear from you.
[The information follows:]
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Secretary Albright's Opening Remarks
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I believe this is my sixth time that I have had the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee. It is always interesting and almost always fun, and if there were an Oscar or Grammy for diligent bipartisanship, this Subcommittee would be at or near the top of the list.
Mr. ROGERS. I do not think we have anybody here from Ohio State.
FRONT-BURNER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
Secretary ALBRIGHT. We could talk about that.
I am delighted to be here to present the President's 1999 budget request and I do apologize for the fact that my statement did not get here soon enough, but I encourage you to review it because it does deal with some of the vital issues and parts of the world that I cannot include in my oral remarks and still honor your time.
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
Before discussing the specific accounts, Mr. Chairman, let me review with you a couple of front-burner foreign policy issues. First is our effort through diplomacy, backed by the threat of force, to see that Iraq complies with its obligations to the world community. That effort is ongoing. Yesterday, the Security Council was briefed by Secretary General Annan on the agreement reached last weekend and that agreement promises immediate and unrestricted access to U.N. inspectors to sites in Iraq, including those from which they had been previously excluded. I think that is a very important point to note, because it does show that Saddam has reversed course. We attribute the Iraqi commitments not only to our own firmness but to the strong international pressure brought to bear on Baghdad by nations from around the world.
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I am aware that some in Congress have said that we should reject this agreement. We believe the wiser policy is to test the agreement.
In the days ahead, we will be working with the Security Council and the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, to see that the agreement is implemented in a way that reflects the core principles upon which we have insisted, that Security Council resolutions be obeyed, that the integrity of UNSCOM be preserved, and that there be no artificial time tables or linkages that would prevent UNSCOM from doing a full and professional job.
Now, I have spoken to the Secretary General a number of times in the last four or five days and we have had a number of excellent conversations which I think are working towards the clarification of some of the questions that you all have had up here, and let me just give you a few of those now and then maybe you will want to talk more about them.
He assured me of the following points. He has the highest respect for the work of UNSCOM and Chairman Butler, who will continue to lead the commission. Butler will remain very much in charge under the terms of the new agreement and he will continue to be as independent as he has always been.
What is going to happen is that there will be one additional UNSCOM commissioner appointed, bringing the total number under Butler to 22 and the relations of the new commissioner and Butler will be the same as the existing arrangements. The team leader of the Special Group, which will be within UNSCOM—there is going to be a special group for presidential sites—the team leader of that will be an UNSCOM technician. The diplomats that will be going along will be observers only with UNSCOM retaining operational control, and there is absolutely no equivalence between UNSCOM and Iraq and the Secretary General knows that. I would be happy to take more questions on that.
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With our support, we think that UNSCOM will be testing Iraq's commitments thoroughly and comprehensively, and as President Clinton said Monday, our soldiers, our ships, and our planes will stay there in force until we are satisfied Iraq is complying with its commitments.
The events of the past few days have not changed our fundamental goal, which is to end or contain the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to Iraq's neighbors and the world. A solid U.N. inspection and monitoring regime backed by sanctions and enforcement of the no-fly and no-drive zones is our preferred means of achieving that goal, but we retain the authority, the responsibility, the means, and the will to use military force if that is required.
Mr. Chairman, during my visits last week to Tennessee, South Carolina, and most audibly Ohio, I heard two somewhat different but understandable desires voiced by the American people. The first was a strong desire to see the Iraq crisis settled peacefully, the second to see Saddam Hussein removed from power.
Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee a peaceful outcome without opening the door to yet another round of Iraqi cheating, which we will not do. But if we must use force, why not go all the way and remove Saddam from power? The answer is that it would necessitate a far greater commitment of military force and a far greater risk to American lives than is currently needed to contain the threat Saddam poses.
This leaves us with a policy that is, quite frankly, not fully satisfactory to anyone. It is a real world policy, not a feel-good policy. But I am convinced it is the best policy to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies in the Gulf. It embodies both our desire for peace and our determination to fight, if necessary. It takes into account current realities without in any way ruling out future options. It presents the leaders in Baghdad with a clear choice and it reflects principles that are vital to uphold, not only in the Gulf now but everywhere always.
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BOSNIAN PEACE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the recent focus on the situation in Iraq should not divert our attention from other important decisions we must make this year. For example, we will see in Bosnia a major test of our commitment to create a Europe whole, peaceful, and free. Around Christmas, I went to Bosnia with the President and Senator Dole and a number of members of Congress. We found a nation that remains deeply divided but where multi-ethnic institutions are once again beginning to function, economic growth is accelerating, indicted war criminals are being tried, more refugees are returning, and perhaps most important, a new Bosnian-Serb government has been elected that is committed to implementing the Dayton accords.
More slowly than we foresaw but as surely as we hoped, the infrastructure of Bosnian peace is gaining shape and the psychology of reconciliation is taking hold. But if we turn our backs on Bosnia now, as some urge, the confidence we are building would erode and the result could well be a return to genocide and the war.
Accordingly, we have agreed with our allies that NATO will continue to lead a multi-national force in Bosnia after SFOR's mandate expires in June. Without expanding that mandate, we will ensure that the new force has an enhanced capability to deal with the task of ensuring public security and we will review the size of the force periodically as part of our strategy to gradually transfer its responsibilities to domestic institutions and other international organizations.
Mr. Chairman, quitting is not the American way and we should continue to play an appropriate role in Bosnia as long as our help is needed, our allies and friends do their share, and most importantly, the Bosnian people are striving to help themselves. That is the right thing to do and it is the smart thing for it is the only way to ensure that when our troops do leave Bosnia, they leave for good.
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ASIA-PACIFIC COMMUNITY ISSUES
One of our most important foreign policy objectives is to build an inclusive Asia-Pacific community based on stability, shared interests, and the rule of law. To this end, we have fortified our core alliances, crafted new defense guidelines with Japan, and embarked on four-party talks to create a basis for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. We have also intensified our dialogue with China, achieving progress on proliferation, security cooperation, and other matters while maintaining our principles on respect for human rights, and we have been working with the IMF to respond to the financial crisis in East Asia.
Our approach is clear. To recover from instability, the nations affected must reform, and if they are willing to do so, we will help. East Asia is home to some of our closest allies and friends, such as South Korea, whose new President, Kim Daejung, is being inaugurated today. The region also includes some of the best customers for U.S. products and services.
Moreover, since the IMF functions as a sort of intergovernmental credit union, its efforts to assist East Asian economies will not cost U.S. taxpayers a nickel. Still, there are some who say we should disavow the IMF and abandon our friends, letting the chips or dominoes fall where they may. It is possible if we were to do so that East Asia's financial troubles would not spread and badly hurt our own economy and that new security threats would not arise in the region where 100,000 American troops are deployed. This is possible, but I would not want to bet America's security or the jobs of your constituents on that proposition, for it would be a very, very bad bet.
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Even with the full backing for the IMF and diligent reforms in East Asia, recovery will take time and further tremors are possible. The best way to end the crisis is to back the reforms now being implemented, approve the supplemental IMF funding requests submitted by the President earlier this month, work to keep the virus from spreading, and develop strategies for preventing this kind of instability from arising again.
UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PAYING OUR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING BILL
Mr. Chairman, there is much that America can accomplish unilaterally, bilaterally, or in cooperation with close allies. Many problems can best be dealt with through broad international action, and that is why we participate in international organizations, including the United Nations. Last year, as you recall, we worked together to develop a three-year plan to encourage United Nations reform while paying our overdue U.N. bills.
Unfortunately, that spirit of cooperation broke down towards the end of the session when a small group of House members blocked final passage of this and other key measures. I testified before the authorizing committees about my concerns with the tactic used and will not belabor the point here. Certainly, your Subcommittee did its part by appropriating the $100 million called for in the first year, Now we have to find a way to free up that money and to gain approval of funds for years two and three.
Mr. Chairman, I have been discussing the U.N. and America's role in it with this Subcommittee since 1993, as you pointed out, and together, we have helped the U.N. to achieve more reform in the past half-decade than in the previous 45 years. We have seen the U.N. staff cut and its budget brought under control. We have seen assessments for peacekeeping drop by 80 percent. We have seen the Inspector General's office grow from conception to infancy to the development of a full set of increasingly sharp teeth, and we have seen a new generation of leaders take the helm.
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Slowly but surely, a culture of accountability, transparency, and results is taking hold at the U.N., and as you know, Mr. Chairman, this progress has not come easy. We have faced opposition every step of the way and the job is far from finished.
But let me tell you frankly that if we are not able to pay our U.N. arrears soon, our legs will truly be cut out from under us at the U.N. We are told daily by our best allies and friends that U.S. credibility will be sadly diminished and that will hurt America and cost Americans.
Let me just cite one example. Last December, the General Assembly voted on a plan that could have, and I believe would have, cut our U.N. assessments by roughly $100 million every year. Our diplomatic team had worked long and hard to make this possible, but when the U.N. arrears package was killed, support for that proposal disappeared. It took a heroic effort to keep alive the chance for a new vote during the first half of this year, and if we do not seize this opportunity, we will not have another one until the year 2000.
So we have a choice. We can fail once again to act, to undermine our own diplomatic leadership and deprive our taxpayers of savings we might otherwise be able to achieve, or we can pay our arrears, restore full U.S. influence, and make possible a reduction in our assessments that will save U.S. taxpayers money for as long as we are in the U.N. I know this choice will not be made by this Subcommittee alone, but I ask your support for prompt action not tied to any unrelated issue on our supplemental appropriations request for U.N. arrears and I am convinced it is the right choice for America.
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FY 1999 STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATING BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Chairman, there was a time not that long ago when our managers at the State Department could afford to be guided by a just-in-case philosophy. Planning, acquisitions, and training could be based on what might be needed. Today, we are compelled by the pace of change and the tightness of budgets to practice just-in-time management. That requires putting personnel, resources, and infrastructure where they are required when they are required and being prepared to reposition them rapidly and flexibly when they are not, but we still need to make some well-placed investments.
This year, our request for State Department operating funds is $2.2 billion, barely above last year's, but we are also seeking an increase of $243 million in our security and maintenance account to upgrade our facilities, especially in Germany and China.
MOVE OF THE GERMAN CAPITAL FROM BONN TO BERLIN
Next year, the Germans will complete the move of their capital from Bonn to Berlin and we need to make the same move with our diplomatic personnel. Remember that this move is not simply a matter of convenience or geography. It is a reflection of one of the great events of this century, an event in which America played a central role. For behind Berlin's establishment as the capital of a united and democratic Germany is a half-a-century's partnership between the United States and that country, a partnership cemented with the Berlin airlift 50 years ago this summer and which ultimately helped defeat communism and bring down the wall, and it is unthinkable that the United States should not be well represented in the capital of a nation with the world's third-largest economy, which is host to the single largest overseas contingent of U.S. troops, and which is one of our closest friends.
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We estimate the new U.S. embassy in Berlin will cost $120 million. We are requesting $50 million this year and expect to raise the rest through the sale of excess U.S. property.
POSTS IN CHINA
In China, the U.S. presence is large, growing, and vital to our interests. Undoubtedly, as the Department's Inspector General has confirmed, our posts in China are in terrible shape. We have developed a plan to remedy this beginning with new housing in Shanghai and including a full new embassy in Beijing for which I hope very much we will have your support.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
With respect to information technology, our needs are basic. We want to install late 20th century computer technology at every post before the 21st century begins. We need to replace overloaded phone switchboards before they experience what is known as catastrophic failure. We need to implement new information security features and we want to ensure that when the clock strikes midnight on December 31, 1999, our computers do not crash and send us back to the age of quill pens and scribes. So I hope you will support us in acquiring communication systems that are secure, reliable, and expansive enough to meet the demands of the information age.
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
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Mr. Chairman, as Secretary of State, I can tell you that Americans can be very proud of the people, whether Foreign Service, civil service, or foreign nationals, who work every day, often under very difficult conditions, to protect our citizens and our interests around the world. They are great. But if we are to maintain the high standards of diplomatic representation we need, we must continue to emphasize high standards in recruiting, training, and managing our personnel and we must understand how much the world has changed.
I think that, as all of you know, there are a whole set of entirely new skills that are needed by the Foreign Service and we need to be able to train our people in these skills. We also need to make sure that we have diversity in our hiring and we are making progress. I am particularly proud of the large number of women competing successfully to enter the Foreign Service this year, but there is much more that we need to do and we need your help in this.
REORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
We also need to be able to back many of our initiatives in particular countries and regions, such as build prosperity, fight international crime, protect the environment, and work on global terms. I think that we have worked very hard, as you know, to try to develop a plan to reorganize our foreign affairs agencies to reflect that arms control, public diplomacy, and international development belong at the heart of our foreign policy and I hope we will have the Subcommittee's support for early action on reorganization legislation this year.
SUPPORT FOR THE ACDA AND USIA BUDGET REQUESTS
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I think we have to make sure that arms control remains in the center of our foreign policy and ACDA is already, with the Director of ACDA acting double-hattedly, also serving as the State Department's Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. I, therefore, ask your support for the ACDA as well as the USIA budgets.
I think, Mr. Chairman, we have a huge opportunity this year at the 50th anniversary of the time when so many of our post-World War II institutions were started to be able to set up many new types of relationships between a Democratic President and a Republican Congress and I look forward to working with you. Nobody would have ever imagined that in this day and age that our diplomats would be dealing not only with grain and steel but with bits and bytes and movie rights, or even, for that matter, that a female Secretary of State would one day meet with a black president of South Africa. So we have a great deal to do and I am looking forward to working with you as we look at the challenges ahead. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROGERS. Madam Secretary, again, you have demonstrated why you are in the position you are in. That is an excellent statement and we appreciate the fullness of it.
We have a vote on the floor, and I think it might be the best if we took a short recess so that the rest of us can run and vote and return immediately. There is only one vote, if you can bear with us a few minutes.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I would be happy to. Thank you.
[Recess.]
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THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS' AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ
Mr. ROGERS. Madam Secretary, we have apparently a series of votes coming up very shortly, so some of the members, I think, are waiting on that vote, but I think we can proceed for at least a while here and try to save your time.
Madam Secretary, there is one major difference in the relationship between the United States and the U.N. in the 1991 crisis and this one. In 1991, the U.N. helped the U.S. carry out its policy. In 1998, the U.S. is helping the U.N. Secretary General carry out his policy. Can you tell me, did the United States ask the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with Saddam and is this agreement reached between Kofi Annan and Saddam Hussein the agreement that the United States asked the Secretary General to negotiate?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me put the question that you asked in some context. Clearly, the issue of Iraq has been on the table since Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991 and we have been dealing with it, first through the Gulf War and then after it, through a series of Security Council resolutions, the purpose of which were to make sure that Saddam Hussein got rid of his weapons of mass destruction, having set up this commission called UNSCOM to do the job, and our policy has been one of containing Saddam Hussein.
When I was at the United Nations and during these periodic sanctions reviews, we were always looking for ways to keep the international coalition together to keep these sanctions, the toughest sanctions in the history of the world, in place. As you know, sanctions do not really work well unless they are multilateral sanctions.
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Saddam Hussein periodically has tested the commitment of the international community, and every time when we have shown will, he has backed down. This time again, there was the question as to whether he would allow the inspectors to do their job. This is not a battle between the United States and Saddam. It is between Saddam and the world, and therefore it is appropriate for the international community, through UNSCOM, which is the eyes and ears of it, to do the inspection, and for various attempts to be made to resolve the situation peacefully through diplomatic means. I found in my talking with members of Congress as well as out on the road that most Americans would like to see this dealt with peacefully, and so that was what we were doing.
Now, the Secretary General himself felt that it was appropriate for him to take on the role of going to see if he could get some kind of a solution to it. In the course of that, we believed that it was important for him to go with the right guidelines—that is what would be our own guidelines as to what would make a useful agreement.
So he was having discussions on behalf of the international community. He has followed many of our guidelines. We are trying to clarify the extent to which this agreement does, in fact, meet our guidelines, but the most important thing here, Mr. Chairman, is to test whether the agreement works.
So my answer is that he is the Secretary General. We provided him with what would be appropriate guidelines. We are now clarifying and we will test the results.
Mr. ROGERS. The newspaper account, the New York Times account, of this morning, essentially said that you met with him on February 15 at his residence to provide the American requirements if this mission were to proceed, but that over the next several days he insisted that he needed some room to negotiate and would not be a mere messenger. There was some wiggle room that he had, if you will. Is that negotiating room the reason that you have been struggling to get the ambiguities in the agreement clarified to see if it meets American requirements? Is that essentially correct?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. First of all, he did not go with instructions. I mean, he is the Secretary General of an organization and we are, while the most powerful member, not the only one. The other members of the permanent five also had some ideas and the permanent five actually got together to give him advice and he was following that, but he very clearly, and the others agreed, was not just a messenger but he was Secretary General.
I think that what we are trying to clarify are some of the relationships and some of the aspects of the guidelines—that we provided. But as I have said, and as I said in my opening remarks, so far, the clarifications that he has been providing have, in fact, met what we have wanted to see, but the most important point here is to test it. I think Saddam Hussein has been known to agree to things and not fulfill them. This is the first time that he has actually signed this kind of a paper, but I think this is an issue of test and verify. There is no trust involved in this, and so that is what we are about now, testing to make sure that whatever the Secretary General agreed to is clarified.
CLARIFICATION OF DETAILS IN THE U.N. IRAQI AGREEMENT
Mr. ROGERS. So these matters that are now being clarified were matters that he did not have clearance before he went with the five Security Council members, is that accurate?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that there were details that he probably did not have. As I said, he did not have instructions. Plus, I have to tell you, frankly, our guidelines for this are the toughest. We and the United Kingdom are the ones that are being the toughest on this and we are asking for these guidelines and clarifications.
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But it is very hard, Mr. Chairman. He is a respected Secretary General of the U.N. and I think that a lot of the details also are the kinds that ultimately experts have to work out. So I think our sense on this is that we are glad—I mean, we welcome the fact that he went on this mission. We felt that he needed some guidelines. We appreciate what he has done, but we are not swallowing it hook, line, and sinker. We are asking for clarifications and the most important thing, as I said, is to make sure that as these relationships are worked out, that UNSCOM will be able to do its work that it has done so very well up until now in an independent and unconditional and unfettered way and that we test it.
Mr. ROGERS. Now, who will provide the clarifications?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. They are coming as a result of discussions between the Secretary General and Chairman Butler. We are asking questions. The Secretary General appeared before the Security Council yesterday. He was very, very tired. He had been on the road negotiating, so I think there are additional discussions going on in New York today.
Mr. ROGERS. So you are attempting to clarify from the Secretary General what was meant by provisions that are in the agreement, is that generally correct?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, yes, and the experts have to work out the details. This is not a negotiation with Saddam Hussein. I mean, this is basically a way that this group is going to work.
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Mr. ROGERS. What I am trying to get at is the clarifications that we are trying to work on now. Who is a party to ironing out those details? Are the Iraqis involved in that process?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. No. No. No, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. Just the U.N. and——
Secretary ALBRIGHT. The U.N. and the various other countries, but mostly us. We are pushing to clarify the relationships between UNSCOM and the diplomats and various parts of this and to make absolutely clear that when it says unfettered, unconditional, that that is what it means and these presidential sites, the maps and all those things. But there are no negotiations with Iraq on this.
Mr. ROGERS. When do you anticipate our final decision?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that we will see when the inspectors go. I mean, our sense here, Mr. Chairman, is that the inspectors need to go as soon as possible and test it.
Mr. ROGERS. When will that be?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. As soon as possible. I cannot give you a date on that.
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Mr. ROGERS. Will you wait for clarification, the clarifications you have mentioned on the final details, before they are dispatched?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that they need to have some clarification, yes, I do, but I think this is all happening very rapidly.
Mr. ROGERS. So can we expect them to go in the next couple of days?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I cannot give you a specific time. We want them very much to go soon, and as the President said, our forces will remain on high alert throughout this time.
Mr. ROGERS. I do not need to tell you, but time is of the essence here, and I am sure you agree. We do have considerable forces on station at great expense and at some cost in the other parts of the world where we have been drawn down to accommodate this buildup. If Saddam is not going to live up to the agreement, we will not know it until the inspectors go back and we cannot send them back until the final clarifications are done, so time is running here. Do you agree that time is of the essence?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Absolutely, but let me just say that I am thinking about where we were a week ago. There was a sense of inevitability about using an air strike where we were building up a coalition, but as you know, there were many who were opposed to what we were doing. We now have what we believe is a good basis for going forward, and if, indeed, Mr. Chairman, the inspectors are not able to do what they want to do or Saddam breaks his word in any way, then we are much better off internationally and domestically, frankly, I believe, to then follow through on a military force option. But I do agree with you that time is of the essence and we are working it very fast.
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Mr. ROGERS. How much time will be required to test the agreement, do you think?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I cannot speak to that. I think that we have to allow the inspectors the independence to work their professional way on this. We are asking the other members of the Security Council to allow Richard Butler and UNSCOM to determine the pace as well as the location of future inspections, and I can just assure you that he is a very determined chairman of UNSCOM.
Mr. ROGERS. My fears have been confirmed. We do have another vote in process with only about four minutes remaining, and then we have, I think, maybe a couple more quick ones.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. That is fine. I am okay.
Mr. ROGERS. I apologize for taking the time, Madam Secretary.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I understand.
[Recess.]
ACCESS TO ALL IRAQI SITES
Mr. ROGERS. Madam Secretary, we deeply appreciate your abiding as we carry our other responsibilities.
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The standard set by the President for the agreement is that it would have to assure free, unfettered access by the U.N. monitoring team. What we have seen thus far is, one, that there is a special procedure for eight of the presidential palaces where diplomats will be appointed, and specific procedures for inspection of these sites remain to be worked out, presumably with Iraq.
Two, no one seems to know how many buildings are considered to be part of the eight sites.
Three, according to the U.N. spokesman yesterday, Iraq will continue to be able to declare sites sensitive, which is the mechanism that Iraq has used in the past to carry things out the back door while the inspectors waited at the front door.
And four, where the Secretary General himself has said that inspectors will have to be less pushy and more respectful of Iraq.
Are these generally accurate assessments and how does that meet the test of free, unfettered access?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, let us be clear about something. For many years, Saddam Hussein has not allowed access to all places and what this agreement, if we decide that it is properly tested, does, in fact, is allow access to all sites, which we have never had before. So it is a step forward in that way.
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We do not yet, as I said earlier, have the survey maps of what these presidential sites are like. That is something that they were working on today and I have not been in touch with New York this afternoon to know what exactly they have gotten, but that is one of the issues.
There have been previously a variety of arrangements that UNSCOM has found satisfactory. But the special arrangements have to be worked out, not with Iraq but it is UNSCOM that is going to have to decide how the operational control of this is going to work.
I just have to tell you that as far as the United States is concerned, we are not going to accept an agreement that does not suit the purposes of unfettered, unconditional access and the proof of this will be in the testing and that is what our next steps are on this. As I said, if we do not find sufficient answers for this, we still will have the option of using force.
So all this has done is to allow there to be the possibility of dealing with this issue by using UNSCOM, and UNSCOM, frankly, has been more successful than the Gulf War was in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction, so we will see.
Mr. ROGERS. Are there any places or sites or locales in Iraq that under the agreement are off limits, that we cannot get in?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. No. There are none, the way this is set up now.
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Mr. ROGERS. The Presidential palaces supposedly are all open?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. They are, as far as this agreement is concerned, they are a part of this. That would be what this group does. And this is all very technical, and I can take a lot of time explaining this to you, but basically, UNSCOM itself has a group of experts that work for Butler. They themselves have been divided into groups already, those that are experts on chemical weapons, on biological weapons, and they operate in groups.
So what is now going to happen is that there will be another group under UNSCOM whose job it will be to do these presidential sites. What has to now be worked out are the procedures for this.
Mr. ROGERS. Procedures?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Procedures for how this group works. But it will be Chairman Butler and the people that are part of the group. The lead inspector of this group—I talked to the Secretary General this morning—will be an UNSCOM inspector. So there will be diplomats that are going along, but they are observers. They will not have any role in inspecting and they will not have the capability of in any way undermining or lessening or diminishing the role of UNSCOM.
Mr. ROGERS. But to clarify, there is no place in Iraq that is, under the agreement, that we cannot go in and inspect?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. According to this agreement, all sites are open for inspection, but there are different procedures for them, and that has been the case up until now, generally, that there has been a division between sensitive sites and regular sites. But this is the first time if, and this is a big if, as the President said, if this works where all sites are now open in an unconditional and unfettered way.
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Mr. ROGERS. The agreement has language that the U.N. will ''respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.'' What does that mean, and can that be used to impede inspections?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. That has, Mr. Chairman, been in previous language used by the Security Council. We ourselves have said that we respect the territorial integrity of Iraq because we want it to stay as one country. It is our understanding that that language in no way impedes the access.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THE IRAQI AGREEMENT
Mr. ROGERS. What would constitute a breach of the contract, the agreement?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. If they do not allow these inspections to take place.
Mr. ROGERS. Unfettered, uninhibited.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Right.
Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Mollohan.
PAYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS ARREARAGES
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Mr. MOLLOHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, welcome to the hearing today as we review the State Department's budget request for fiscal year 1999, including a 1998 supplemental to pay off our debts to the United Nations.
I agree that it is time to reassert U.S. leadership in the U.N. and quit the role of the U.N.'s biggest debtor nation. I have always been supportive of paying the U.N. what we owe as a member nation. However, Madam Secretary, I do question the mechanism of using advance appropriations to accomplish that goal.
Your budget for fiscal year 1999 in the aggregate is almost eight percent more than the 1998 appropriation. I am happy to see that this amount provides for overdue restoration to your infrastructure, for inflation and other mandatory increases, and for the beginning of construction of the new embassies in Berlin and Beijing. U.S. facilities in China are in deplorable condition, so I am pleased that this funding request addresses that problem.
In addition, this budget request includes funding to proceed with the modernization of your information systems. It is absolutely critical that the computer systems that tie Washington to U.S. embassies all around the world make the change to the 21st century without crashing.
In addition to your 1999 budget of $2.2 billion, you have requested advance appropriations of $475 million for fiscal year 1999 and $446 million for fiscal year 2000, totaling $921 million for the payment of the arrears to the United Nations and related agencies.
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This amount, plus the $100 million in the 1998 appropriation, will pay off the over $1 billion in debts to the U.N. and put the United States back in good standing. As I said, while I am not convinced that advance appropriations are the only way to do it, I am convinced that these arrears need to be paid.
At a time when the Security Council of the United Nations is playing a vital role in, hopefully, averting the U.S. bombing of Iraq, it seems to me that the least we can do is to pay our debts to the U.N. In addition, I noticed that over half of this debt is for peacekeeping operations throughout the world, many operations of which have been undertaken at our request.
Madam Secretary, the Administration has been negotiating with Congress for some time an agreement with regard to U.N. arrearages. Would you please advise the Committee of the status of the administration's negotiations with the Congress regarding these arrearages and U.N. reforms?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes, Congressman, and thank you very much for what you have said in terms of the importance of paying up our U.N. arrears.
First of all, let me say that what we have tried to do is make sure that the United Nations reforms—even those of us that are very supportive of the U.N., believe that it needed some very serious reforms. I know also that there have been a number of you that have felt that we should not be paying our arrears if we do not get the appropriate reforms. So we are trying to balance those two needs. The U.N. has, in fact, already undertaken some reforms. The Inspector General is one that is working well. There have been cuts in staff. We are able to get a cap on the budget that has never happened before. Secretary General Kofi Annan has put out a whole reform program that has worked administratively and we can provide you with all the details of that.
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We now have a problem because one of the reforms that we were trying to achieve was to get a reduction in our assessment rate. As you know, the U.S. has been paying 25 percent of the regular budget and we have agreed that it would be good to get that down to 20 percent. One of the reasons, Congressman, that we wanted to have the advance appropriation is that it is kind of a bone fide that we will pay our arrears. The payment out of them is conditioned on a set of benchmarks and reforms, but in order to get a lower assessment rate, which it is a three-year negotiation, it would have helped our negotiation with other U.N. members in order to get that reduction.
The fact that we were not able to do that last year means that we were not able to negotiate a new assessment rate and one of the benchmarks that has been asked for in the bill cannot be met because we are not able to get the money in advance.
So we are stuck. That is the problem. Our leverage in getting more reforms is dependent on the fact that they know that we will ultimately pay.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. What is the status of this agreement in the Congress? Have you achieved bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate on the reforms?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes, sir. We had a bill where there was a bipartisan agreement in both houses, frankly, and what happened was that at the end of the session, this was held up by language to do with Mexico City.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. Can I suggest to you that there have been some expressions of concern on the House side, at least, by the authorizers that they were not really a part of that agreement and did not agree with some of the reform provisions?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that they were part of the discussions. There are some members who believed that we were asking too much of the U.N. in terms of reform and believed that we were undercutting the United Nations. So for the most part, the objections to it from the authorizers were that they felt that we were unduly harsh about the United Nations.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. Are you communicating with those authorizing members who expressed those concerns and trying to address them?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. We have been trying, yes. But I tell you that it is not easy, given the fact that the preponderance of opinion is on the other side.
IMPLEMENTED REFORMS AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Mr. MOLLOHAN. How many of the so-called reforms are already being implemented at the United Nations?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, a huge amount of them——
Mr. MOLLOHAN. And how many are not?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Pardon?
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Mr. MOLLOHAN. And how many are not?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I cannot give you an exact list at the moment. We will provide you with a list. But what I can tell you is that——
Mr. MOLLOHAN. You have made significant progress?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Absolutely. There is no question that they have worked their way through a large proportion of the reforms and Kofi Annan himself has been one of the leaders in making this happen. So they have worked their way through it, but they have not been able to do some of the ones that are dependent on our providing money, such as the assessment rate.
REQUEST FOR ADVANCED APPROPRIATIONS TO FUND U.N. ARREARAGES
Mr. MOLLOHAN. What about this advance appropriation you are requesting as a part of the agreement scheme, if you will? You did not get it last year. The Congress was not very receptive to the idea last year. What makes you think that it might be more receptive to an advance appropriation this year?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that what we are hoping is that the members will understand the validity of what we are doing and understand——
Mr. MOLLOHAN. Can I rely on your persuasive powers to come up here and convince them?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do believe that the U.N. is fulfilling an important role and that the possibility that it is there for us will become more and more evident. Also, the fact that we have lost now about $100 million a year to our taxpayers as a result of not having been able to appropriate arrears the money might be persuasive, because I think that there are many reforms we need, but one that would really be very evident would be a cut in our assessment rate and we cannot get that.
What we managed to do, Congressman, was to, by dint of sheer force, keep the issue of assessment rates somewhat open so that we can re-vote on that in New York this year. But if we do not have any money in our pocket, then it is going to be very difficult to do that. So we need that money, and as you know, in the legislation as currently set up, it is not just paid out automatically. They have to meet a bunch of benchmarks before the money can be paid out.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. We know that you have a lot of problems with this legislation, the legislation that is carrying this agreement, or you hope will carry this agreement. Aside from that, if you do not get this advance appropriation, are you prepared, are you thinking of another way of dealing with the assurances to the U.N. that they are going to get paid?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, except for our good word, I do not know how to do that. I mean, we have been——
Mr. MOLLOHAN. Will our good word carry?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Pardon?
Mr. MOLLOHAN. At the end of the day, will our good word be enough?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, we are losing steam. I mean, I can tell you from when I was ambassador there, it was difficult. I am sure that if you ask Ambassador Richardson, it is very difficult every day to be faced by other countries up there who are basically saying, you want us to reform, you want us to jump through these various hoops. Where is your money? And even our best friends, the British, are making those points to us, and it is very hard to get what we want. It is like in any system, these are not bills, Congressman, they are dues. It is like being in a club and simply deciding that you are not going to pay the dues.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. I am on your side with paying them. I think we need to, perhaps with regard to the method, think of another scheme.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARDS IRAN
Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Regula.
Mr. REGULA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary, even from Ohio.
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. We have a lot of people here from Ohio today.
Mr. REGULA. You know, Columbus is used by most major companies as a test market.
It is supposed to be a microcosm of America.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, they are loud.
Mr. REGULA. That probably depends on the issue.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. It was great. It was great.
Mr. REGULA. You all did well. I watched it.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
Mr. REGULA. The policy on Iraq, as we wait to see if Saddam Hussein will abide by the U.N.-Iraq agreement, in addition to the military presence that will remain in the Gulf, there will be other measures taken by you and other administration officials to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein to force compliance with the U.N. directives on weapons inspections. In particular, I am interested in any efforts that are being made with regard to recent overtures by the new president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, who appears to represent a more moderate political wing within Iran. Washington and Teheran appear to be in agreement in urging Saddam Hussein to fully comply with U.N. resolutions. Is it time to build upon this apparent agreement of views and move toward a relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and Iran?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Congressman, we have been very interested and intrigued by the election of President Khatami. It clearly is a departure in terms of the way that they have been operating. President Clinton when he was first elected made that point. President Khatami made a statement in which he made a number of points. President Clinton responded in a way. He sent a message at the end of Ramadan to Islamic countries and then had a particular paragraph directed to Iran indicating also our respect for their history and in some ways mirroring some of what President Khatami had said. As you know, our wrestlers have just been there and we are looking at how to look at various possibilities of some exchanges.
Our problems are that the Iranians have been supporting terrorism, trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and they have not been supportive of the Middle East peace process. We have wanted to have a government-to-government dialogue, because while the people-to-people things are good, ultimately, the only way to solve problems is government-to-government dialogue. In the message that the President sent, he indicated that the best way to overcome these three problems, was by engaging in government-to-government dialogue.
But we are following this very, very closely because we are very interested in what is going on, and I am very glad to see that you are interested in this.
IMPACT OF USIA BROADCASTS TO IRAQ
Mr. REGULA. I think it is an intriguing set of circumstances, and I noted in your opening remarks that you said very positive remarks about our relationship with Germany, which in my day and age was not quite that good. So I think there are always possibilities.
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The isolation of the Iraqi people, it appears that the people are isolated and receive most information through a media controlled by Saddam Hussein. I understand that USIA has been broadcasting into Iraq in both Arabic and English six hours a day and this has been increased by one half hour during the crisis. Do you have any idea what impact the U.S. broadcasts have had and what other measures could be used to communicate directly with the Iraqi people?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Congressman, Dr. Duffy is going to be coming to testify and he can give you more detailed accounts of this, but we do believe that it is important for USIA to do what it is doing. One of the ideas that people are circulating is about the possibility of supporting a radio free Iraq. These and a number of other ideas, we are also looking into.
I think that there is no question that the people of Iraq do not know enough about what is going on because they are totally controlled, and when Saddam can bring people out into the streets or make them human shields or contemplate making them human shields, it is a sign of a society that does not know what its leaders are doing. So I think that Dr. Duffy can address more closely for you what you asked, but we believe that we need to do whatever we can to let the people know what is going on.
STATUS OF NATO EXPANSION
Mr. REGULA. My last question, where are we in the process as far as NATO expansion to the three countries, and as part of that, there has been a confusing estimate of costs. NATO says it is between $1.3 and $1.5 billion over ten years. The Administration's estimate is $27 to $35 billion over roughly the same period. The previous CBO estimate was a range between $60 and $125 billion. It is quite a confusing range. I just wondered, where are we procedurally and how do you address this great variance in cost estimate?
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, procedurally, what has happened is that the President has submitted the protocols of ratification to the Senate, and yesterday, Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, and I testified to that. The countries were invited. We are now waiting for Senate ratification on this. There are two countries in Europe that have already ratified them and all members of NATO have to, through their parliamentary procedures, also agree to it.
The countries themselves are already very actively participating through Partnership for Peace activities with us, and it should be noted that when the three foreign ministers were here a couple of weeks ago and I spoke to them about Iraq and the necessity of us all being together, they did, in fact, immediately say that they wanted to be of assistance and they consulted with their governments and in various ways they were allies even before they were allies really. So they have been helpful, and we hope that the Senate will advise on the ratification sometime next month.
As far as the budget numbers, the confusion came from the following problem. Originally when the Defense Department set up its numbers, they had talked about having four countries in NATO, new countries, and a number of other variables that then turned out to be quite different.
What then happened was that NATO itself has had a procedure whereby they have analyzed how much it would really cost. They sent out questionnaires to the countries. It is a very complicated procedure. They then came back with some numbers and we now have what people think is a definitive number, which is about $400 million over ten years.
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Mr. REGULA. That is per year or a total of $400 million?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. A total of four hundred million additional. I mean, there is a chart which explains what is part of the common budget.
But the other part, Congressman, that I think is very important is the countries themselves, those three countries have upped their own defense budgets to make themselves viable. They have already done a number of things in terms of having interoperability. So I think that it is moving quite well.
Mr. ROGERS. The Secretary's staff has indicated that she has to leave about 4:15, so we only have about 20 minutes. Can we live with five minutes apiece for the remaining members?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I will make my answers briefer. I am sorry.
Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Skaggs.
ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF MEXICO CITY POLICY
Mr. SKAGGS. We have got almost 20 minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I probably owe you royalties because in discussion of the U.N. dues issue at home, I frequently recall your quip about interactions with the Brits in which they accuse us of representation without taxation—I am not even sure that was original with you, but——
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. No, it was with them.
Mr. SKAGGS. But I heard it from you. Anyway, I hope we can improve on that.
Pertinent to that, I was at a dinner a few weeks ago in which the speaker was asked about why we cannot get this solved. I want to be fair and accurate in representing his answer, but it was essentially, well, if the Democrats in the Administration would relent on a relatively trivial concern about this population policy, we could have IMF and the U.N. and everything else on the floor tomorrow. I thought it would be important to give you an opportunity to explain more fully why this is not a trivial matter when we are talking about the Mexico City policy and the disagreement that I know the Administration and many of us on our side have about this.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. Thank you very much. I think, clearly, this is an issue that has to do with family planning and questions of whether one is pro-life or pro-choice. This is a very basic issue that the Members of Congress and the American public have a lot of questions about. I think it is not a trivial issue. It has to do with a question that this country is seized with.
I have said that I happen to be on one side and Congressman Chris Smith, who is so interested in this, is on the other, and I in no way dispute his right to have his view. I think there are an awfully lot of very good people on both sides of this issue and people think we ought to compromise about it.
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I do not think it is possible exactly. First of all, I think there is a lack of clarity on something. There are no Federal funds used for performing abortions or lobbying for that. There is a misunderstanding about that.
What we were asked to do was to limit what lobbying could be done. Now, lobbying is such a broad term that it meant that organizations, international organizations that even attend conferences at which there is a discussion of their abortion laws, whatever country they are in, they could not be there. So it is basically an international gag order and limits the abilities of these organizations to function, despite the fact that they do not use American taxpayer funds.
I think it is hard to compromise on an issue of such importance. It is a really important issue. Why do we not have a debate and a vote up or down—that is the democratic way—and separate it from what is national security legislation. What is happening here, Congressman, is this is shutting down our foreign policy.
INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS THAT ALLOW THE U.S. TO INITIATE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ
Mr. SKAGGS. Thank you for your comments on that.
I wanted to talk about the Iraq situation, but perhaps with a slightly different twist to it. I think it is very important for the United States to be as firm an adherent of the rule of law in these circumstances as we are able to be, and so I am concerned both about the international law and the domestic constitutional law questions with regard to the adequacy of authority for the United States to initiate a major military action against Iraq. I would assume that as to the international law issue, anyway, your Department would be the authoritative source of analysis for the United States Government.
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I do not know whether you also wish to tackle the constitutional law issue or pass that one on to one of your colleagues—this is not really to ask you to make a comment orally this afternoon. I think we need a level of precision and written concreteness to be adequate to the task and I just hope that the Department, whether the legal advisor or other appropriate authority could supply for the record a definitive statement of the government's position on these two questions.
[The information follows:]
OFFSET FOLIOS 183 TO 184 INSERT HERE
Secretary ALBRIGHT. If I could just say generally, though, as far as the United Nations is concerned, we believe that we have the authority in existing resolutions to use the force that we need to, and while it would be nice to have an additional Security Council resolution, we do not need it. Our sense is also that the President does have constitutional authority within our own system to do so, and again, it would be nice to have a resolution of support.
Mr. SKAGGS. Many of us hold up a different point of view on both of those questions and I hope we can take some of the time that is now made available to us to really get that straightened out. Thank you.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. We will do that.
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ORGAN HARVESTING EFFORTS IN CHINESE PRISONS
Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you again for your indulgence and your time today. In the country report that the State Department released last year, there was reference made to the government of China and the positive actions that the Department believes have been accomplished in human rights, particularly that there has been some movement in human rights.
I just wanted to touch on an issue that I know is one that has come up over the last several years. Harry Wu particularly, the human rights activist, and Amnesty International have played a large role in trying to expose the so-called organ harvesting efforts that are going on in some of the Chinese prisons. It is most poignant because just yesterday, I think, a Federal undercover operation in New York City revealed that two Chinese nationals, one claiming to be a former Chinese prosecutor, were involved in the actual sale of organs, kidneys, corneas, and other organs, and that, in fact, this has been going on for quite a while, and notation being made of some 50 of 200 prisoners who have been executed, their organs have been involved in something of this nature.
I know there was a report from the Chinese central government that was released in 1990—I guess it goes back to 1984—that acknowledges that there is this activity, and I know that you have been asked about this before and expressed some frustration on the difficulty in trying to get the Chinese government to clamp down on this most heinous activity.
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I just bring it to your attention again because I think that the State Department has made some positive movements, as you said, in human rights and some other areas and had some influence with the Chinese government. We see by what happened yesterday, the revelation in New York City of the sale of these kinds of organs. I would ask if you have some plans for the Department to take a more aggressive posture in clamping down on the sale of these organs that are apparently coming from prisoners who are executed, and as I understand it, the culture in China just would not suggest that—they would not approve of this and there has been no evidence that any prisoners have actually approved of it. I would ask and plead with you, frankly, that the State Department take a more aggressive posture on this issue.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Congressman, you have stated everything clearly, that there were two Chinese citizens that were arrested for these alleged violations and the Chinese government was notified of those arrests on February 23, in accordance with our consular obligations. We are still trying to ascertain more facts about this and it is an ongoing investigation, so the U.S. Attorney's Office has really been working on this.
But basically, as you know from our human rights report, we do consider this practice abhorrent and we have been very concerned about all of this. I can also tell you that we are taking these allegations seriously. We have repeatedly raised this issue in meetings with senior Chinese officials and we have asked for results of any investigation in the matter.
The Chinese have responded that there have been no criminal charges filed or cases opened. Therefore, as far as we know to date, there are no Chinese investigations or reports of arrests for illegal trafficking by the People's Liberation Army in human organs or anyone else in China. But I can assure you that we will continue to pursue these issues with the Chinese authorities, because it is an abhorrent practice.
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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Mr. FORBES. Thank you. I just had one final question. Is the United States planning to offer its own peace plan to get the Middle East peace process moving? Are you planning to offer some kind of plan to Arafat and Netanyahu to try to get this moving?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. We have spent a great deal of time. I have to say, 1997 was not a great year for the peace process, and I met with both leaders a number of times already this year. We have been in touch with both of them. They had envoys here last week, where, I am afraid, that not a great deal was accomplished. We believe that, as I have said to them individually, the U.S. can act as a catalyst and as a mediator and as an honest broker, but ultimately, they are the ones that have to make the hard decisions and that is what we keep pushing them to do. We are in the midst of a process of going back and forth between them to try to make that happen.
ADEQUATE MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CARVING OUT FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Latham.
Mr. LATHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to see you again and have you back before the Committee.
Madam Secretary, as you know, the President has now committed more than 35,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen to the Persian Gulf region. In addition, the United States maintains a force of more than 35,000 troops in South Korea, 40,000 in Japan, 45,000 in Germany, and 13,000 in Bosnia. In fact, according to the Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, the U.S. Army is deployed in 100 countries throughout the world. Actually, I think it may be more than that. If you count some details to embassies, it is up around 135 countries right now.
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That being said, do you think we need to seriously question the Administration's foreign policy, which seems to be that unlimited military resources are at their disposal and yet the resources that the Administration provides for national defense, they actually decline, and some would say are certainly inadequate. Are there enough military resources available and coordinated well enough for the foreign policy commitments that you have, and are you concerned that the Administration may be overextending the military personnel and undermining, really, our credibility as far as enacting your foreign policy?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Congressman, I sat yesterday with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton as they were asked about readiness and various issues and they obviously have concerns and will be discussing that with their appropriate committees. My own sense is that the partnership between diplomacy and the use of force and even the military is working very well. The budget for the State Department is quite small, frankly, less than one percent of the entire Federal budget.
So while the military is vital to us and I applaud it and we need to work with it and we do, I am very concerned about my own budget and hope very much that we can get full funding for that.
But let me also make very clear that if this particular agreement meets all the tests that we are putting down for it, then it will be a result of what is a classic case of diplomacy and the threat of the use of force working together. I have been a professor. If this works, this will be a brilliant case study because it is doing exactly what it is supposed to do. I am very proud always to be able to stand by it and to have the military with us on these kinds of issues.
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Kofi Annan himself said diplomacy is fine, but when it is backed by the threat of the use of force, it is better. The Russians have made that clear. All the countries that I have dealt with now in the last 48 hours, while they might have not wanted us to use force, certainly understand the value of that partnership, and I hope that we can continue that without actually using it.
Mr. LATHAM. Did the fact that we have limited resources available and the reality, as far as if we were to go into Iraq, that we do not have the personnel available to occupy the country, did that limit the options that you had as far as negotiation or as far as our policy, the fact that we simply do not have enough resources?
I have got an Army National Guard unit who could not go to mandatory training exercises because they did not have enough gas in the budget for the buses. I mean, it is to the point where I think it really does affect your ability to carry out foreign policy.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say that on the Iraq question specifically, the options that we had on this particular issue were to do nothing and let this go forward, to have an invading army, the role of which would be to overthrow Saddam Hussein——
Mr. LATHAM. Did we have that option?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think we decided, all of us, that when there were half a million American troops there in 1991, the decision was made not to do that and that there is no way of proving, even with that number, that you could have achieved that result. So I do not think, sir, that——
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Mr. LATHAM. I am just questioning, excuse me, is that option available.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. But I do not think that the problem here was not enough resources. I think it is more a policy question of wondering whether even a large number could do the job or whether that was the right national security decision, because our national interest on this is to try to diminish his weapons of mass destruction threat and his threat to his neighbors. While this position may not be aesthetically pleasing, it is strategically sound. And I have also said that we are ready to deal with a post-Saddam regime, but I do not think, sir, that it has to do with the lack of resources.
Mr. LATHAM. I would also like to submit some questions to you for the record.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST PROCESS
Mr. LATHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Could I clarify something, Congressman Forbes, on the Middle East? We do not have a plan. We have ideas that we are working with in terms of trying to get them to make their own decisions, but there is no such thing as an American plan for the Middle East peace process.
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Mr. FORBES. Will there be one?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do not think so. I think the important point here is for the parties themselves. They are the ones that have to make the hard decisions.
U.S. AUTHORITY TO DECLARE A BREACH OF THE U.N. IRAQI AGREEMENT
Mr. ROGERS. We are going to try to get the Secretary out of here momentarily because she does have other engagements, as difficult as that is for us to believe.
Madam Secretary, the agreement, I assume at some point in time, will be submitted to the Security Council for resolution of approval, is that correct?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. They are, as we speak, working on a resolution that would embody parts of the agreement.
Mr. ROGERS. And assumedly, that then would contain all the clarifications that you have spoken of earlier?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I am not sure that they will be in the resolution itself, but there will be a way for us to assure ourselves of the clarifications. But it is the testing of them that is the clear point here.
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Mr. ROGERS. Now, the question arises, suppose we, the U.S., decide that there has been a breach or a non-compliance with the agreement. Do you have to go back to the Security Council to have them declare breach or can you unilaterally, can the U.S. unilaterally declare there has been non-compliance or a breach and proceed with whatever actions you wish to take?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do not have the President's words in front of me, but he did say when he appeared to discuss this that the decision was going to be ours and it would be at a time and place of our choosing and we were not waiting for anything. We believe we have authority, as I said to Congressman Skaggs, so we are not waiting for anything.
But I do think, sir, that it is very important for us to test whether this system works, and it is not something that is going to be able to be determined in one single test. It is very hard. I think we are going to have to make sure that this system works, and if it does not work, we will make the decision, which is in America's national interest.
WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN RECEIVED FROM U.N.-IRAQI AGREEMENT
Mr. ROGERS. The question is, what did Saddam get out of this deal? He had to get something in order to come to the agreement. Did he get something in return?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that the record of Saddam is that he has changed his mind a number of times when there has been determination and unity, and what he did was reverse course and allow this unfettered access. I think that my sense of what he got out of it was some attention, basically, from the world, and there are those who believe that sanctions ought to be lifted. We do not believe that.
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LIFTING OF U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
Mr. ROGERS. Well, what he wants eventually, I assume, is the lifting of sanctions. Is there anything in the agreement or in the understandings or in the clarifications that relate to the lifting of the sanctions?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do not have the exact words—but basically it calls for bringing to the attention of the Security Council the fact that sanctions ought to be lifted. Now, I can tell you again from my experience there that somebody brings that to the attention of the Security Council every time there is a sanctions review, and every time that that review comes up, the British and the Americans and sometimes others will say he has not fulfilled his obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and we will not lift sanctions. That continues to be our position, that he has to fulfill the relevant Security Council resolutions.
Mr. ROGERS. But he does have a fairly powerful voice now speaking for lifting the sanctions in the Secretary General, is that not correct?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. No. I think previous Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had the same opinion, so there is nothing different in that. And believe me, we do have a veto in the Security Council and this is an issue that we are watching very carefully.
Mr. ROGERS. The Secretary needs to leave forthwith. Does the gentleman have a quick question?
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Mr. OBEY. I have just one comment and one question. With respect to Columbus, I would simply say that as a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, I deeply resent that anybody even mentions Ohio State. They beat us 17 straight times at Columbus. And so if I were you, I would deny I ever was in Columbus.
Mr. ROGERS. Madam Secretary, let me just say, in response to that, I am sitting between Ohio State and Wisconsin here, but I am just going to tell you, if you will come to Lexington, to Rupp Arena, we will be real quiet.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. I will be happy to.
Mr. OBEY. I just wanted to say, Madam Secretary, that I am happy with the way things turned out in Iraq. As you know, I had some concerns about long-term consequences of our engaging in an air attack on Iraq. I think it is obvious that the Secretary General would not have come away with anything significant had the administration not sent a substantial military force to the area, and I think that was a very useful thing to do.
I am somewhat amused by those who seem to say, well, the administration ought to raise its targets and have a more ambitious and expansive plan for dealing with it. I think those who are blithely saying that we ought to raise our goal to simply get rid of Saddam ought to be frank enough to say that what they are talking about is injecting 200,000 or 300,000 troops into the area. It is nice to mouth the soft language, but people need to understand what it would take to actually accomplish that.
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I would simply say with respect to U.N. arrearages, I hope that the Congress supports the Administration request because I think that, especially at a time like this, it would be very useful. I know how I would feel if I were a member of the club and somebody else had not paid up their dues and yet they were trying to tell the club what we ought to be doing on a day-to-day basis as the big guy on the block. I think I would have minimum high regard for that reaction and I think we unnecessarily handicap ourselves in the United Nations if we do not finally take care of those obligations. I thank you for coming.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Congressman, it is absolutely true and one feels it every day up there, and I think the fact that the United Nations is working effectively for us in many ways, and especially on the Iraq issue where the Secretary General has at least provided the possibilities of dealing with this in a diplomatic way.
As I have said to the Chairman and others here, this is not over. We have to test this, and I have been asked by others whether I feel relieved. Not particularly. I mean, I am taking this one step at a time and I think we have to test it, and there is no question that our force presence there has made a difference. But I think we have to try to clarify what has been agreed to and test it and we always have that option.
As for a large ground force, there was a large ground force there and it did not proceed. There is no guarantee even that a large ground force could accomplish this.
Mr. OBEY. Right.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. So I think we are doing the right thing. I do think that we have to continue to test it and, Mr. Chairman, on the question of sanctions and the Secretary General, he is not himself calling for lifting of sanctions. What he has said is that he would raise the issue in the Security Council, and others have done that. So that is something that is not his to be decided. It is to be decided by the member states.
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Mr. ROGERS. In wrapping up the hearing, in a timely fashion, let me attempt to close here briefly.
The counterweight to the argument that we are on the right path here is a fear that, as captured in the recently-released CIA paper on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs of February 13, which the President referred to in his address at the Pentagon, ''Saddam's strategy in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged. He is actively trying to retain what remains of his weapons of mass destruction programs while wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions.''
This agreement could very well play right into that strategy, leaving Saddam in place until he again can test the coalition again that we had so much trouble holding together in this crisis. He has not been punished. He has been encouraged. He has been treated like a world leader. And now he has the Secretary General as somewhat of a counterweight to our willingness to bring the issue of the end of sanctions to the attention of the Security Council.
So Saddam, a threat to the world, remains even more firmly in place as a result of this agreement. In fact, one could argue he has been somewhat strengthened by this process. You can comment if you would like.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that he has been strengthened by it. I think that what he has done is allowed, if we test it, unfettered, unconditional access to all sites, something that we never had before. And my own sense about this is that UNSCOM has done a great job in the seven years, but they clearly were getting close to things that he wanted to hide. He has now submitted to the fact that those sites will be open for inspection by, and this is what we have to assure ourselves of, a professional group of experts under the direction of UNSCOM, this same group. So we have to test that.
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So I do not think he is strengthened. I think that he will play it. Obviously, we were talking about the fact that he has control of media and I think that he will play that to the hilt. There is no question about that. But in my mind, he has not been strengthened, and if he does not change his behavior, we will act. We are no less intent on acting than we were a week ago, but I think that it is useful for this diplomatic opportunity to work to get a peaceful resolution. If it does not work, it will be evident to the entire world that this person who signed an agreement with the Secretary General who represents the international community, has reneged and it will give us even more validity in acting, not that we needed it, but it will, I think, do that.
So I think that this is not the end. We are going into a very intense period here now where I will continue to work diplomatically. Our forces will stay there and the inspectors will test, and I am sure that we will have lots more questions about it. I do believe that the Secretary General performed a useful function. It is now our time, as members of the Security Council, to do our job and for the United States to remain ever vigilant that the tests are properly carried out and prepared to act if they are not.
Mr. ROGERS. In that respect, I think you will find unanimity in the Congress, as well.
Thank you very much for your time and your attention.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
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Mr. ROGERS. Let me say to you in closing, we are still under the same spending caps that we were under last year. The budget agreement tells us what we can and cannot spend in terms of numbers. We are still squeezed, even though there is talk of surplus out there on the horizon somewhere.
I am very much concerned along with you that the State Department has been shortchanged for the last dozen years. This current year, we attempted to begin to rectify that problem. I know how it hurts and we are very much aware of your needs and we are going to do all that we can to help you.
I am very much also aware of the need for embassy facilities both in Berlin and Beijing, among other places. I am somewhat concerned about the dollar figures that we have seen on those projects. We have had a preliminary discussion with your staff. We will have more. We want to work with you on trying to rectify those problems, among others. But there may come a time when it will be necessary, hopefully, for you to discuss a matter or two with the government of Germany about the project in Berlin. Nevertheless, we will be working with you from here on those projects and we assure you we will in good faith try to help to resolve the difficulties.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate not only what you have said but the way that we have been working together on all this. You are the best friends we have and I really appreciate it and I look forward to working with you throughout the session.
Mr. ROGERS. Godspeed to you.
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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
Wednesday, March 18, 1998.
STATE DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WITNESSES
BONNIE R. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT
RICHARD GREENE, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
Mr. ROGERS. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today we have with us Bonnie R. Cohen, Under Secretary of State for Management of the Administration of Foreign Affairs. She has established a good track record of supporting both the resources necessary to project our diplomatic presence around the world and the reforms that can be made to make the Department a better and more efficient operation.
We would expect that you bring an outsider's perspective to the Department with an ability to look at what is, and ask why, and to look at what could be, and ask why not?
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Secretary Cohen, this is your first appearance before this Subcommittee. We look forward to working with you. I would expect that all of us will have a good working relationship with you.
Before we turn to you for your statement, I just wanted to take a moment to recognize the person at the table with you, Rich Greene, Chief Financial Officer of the Department. We are told that Rich might be soon moving on to another assignment after many years of fine service. He has been helpful to this Subcommittee, to our staff, and to all of us for many years now. We wanted to congratulate him and wish him well in his future endeavors.
Mr. GREENE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Cohen, we will make your written statement a part of the record and invite you to summarize it if you would like.
Under Secretary Cohen's Opening Statement
Ms. COHEN. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank you and Congressman Skaggs and the rest of your Committee for the support that you have shown the State Department, especially for your support of the budget in FY 1998. In fiscal year 1998, for the first time in five years, the Department's financial picture brightened. We already see positive results which I want to share with you today. I seek your support now for the Department's FY 1999 budget request.
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Three weeks ago before this Committee, Secretary Albright outlined the foreign policy challenges that lay before us today, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Indonesia, the Great Lakes of Africa, and the Middle East. We face an array of foreign policy issues that call for American participation and leadership. The accounts funded by this Subcommittee provide the diplomatic tools to keep our citizens safe, uphold our values, advance our interests, and protect our borders. To achieve our goals, we need a trained, skilled, flexible workforce, timely and accurate information, and secure operational facilities.
As you have said, I am an outsider to this agency.
During my six months at the State Department, I have been struck by the scope and complexity of our operational requirements. We have provided you some data on this chart here.
[The information follows:]
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
To carry out our global responsibilities, the Department of State maintains, as you have said, over 250 diplomatic and consular posts. It employs a workforce of about 14,000 Americans, and 9,000 foreign nationals in more than 140 different personnel systems worldwide. It does business with world leaders in over 60 foreign languages. In 1997, the Department processed over 8 million visa applications, issued 6 million passports, and sent and received 9 million pounds of mail.
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However, over the past few years, cost cutting has had serious consequences for our ability to carry out our mission well. For example, the Department has more than 300 vacancies for American positions worldwide, especially in critical areas like information management and consular operations. The gaps result in an over-worked and an insufficiently trained staff.
The Department processes 3 million cables and 40 million electronic mail messages per year but as you are well aware, our communications systems in the majority of posts are slow at best, and often break down. While we have begun to turn the corner with your help, we still have a long way to go. Overseas, approximately 50-percent of our telephone systems, 50-percent of our radio equipment, 70-percent of our classified computers, and 35-percent of our unclassified computers would have been obsolete by 2000 without your help.
Americans would be surprised, if not appalled, at the disrepair of many of our buildings overseas. For example, our posts in China are overcrowded, technologically starved, and seriously in need of improvements in safety and security. At our embassy in Beijing, sewer gas leaks through the building. Yet, in the past year, American staffing from all U.S. Government agencies increased by 15-percent in China. It is likely to increase more.
Thanks to your support in 1998, we have been able to undertake several initiatives to improve our operations.
For instance, our fiscal year 1998 hiring plan allows us to fill vacancies by hiring to, not below, the attrition rate, for the first time in years. Even this modest effort will have a positive impact on our staffing needs.
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With the doubling of our information technology investments in fiscal year 1998, we have installed modernized computer systems at 53 posts abroad, and are on target to complete the installation of the remainder by the end of 1999.
Work is also underway to replace, convert, or repair our 78 mission-critical systems to be year 2000 compliant. We hope for it to be completed on schedule, though, we, like every other government agency and private corporation, will not know how successful we are until we test the revised systems.
With your support, we have consolidated information technology programs under the leadership of the Chief Information Officer and have intensified our efforts to recruit qualified information management specialists.
Computer training at the Foreign Service Institute increased by 30-percent in FY 1997. Internet comes to the State Department building this month.
REAL PROPERTY
Last year, we sold $112 million of real property overseas. With proceeds from property sales, we are planning to design and construct new facilities in Shanghai, Abuja, and Sofia, for example.
The Real Property Advisory Board is fully operational. We have segregated the accounting for sales as GAO requested, and we are in the middle of a study with the Harvard Business School bench-marking our disposal practices against the best of U.S. multi-national private industry to see where we can improve.
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In addition, we have signed an MOU with the Inspector General's Office to have them independently verify surplus property overseas on a scheduled basis for each post.
BORDER SECURITY
Border security is obviously an important issue. Every visa issuing post now can perform automated name checks with the MRV system. We now process half of our total non-immigrant visa applications with modernized systems. We are on track to install year 2000 compatible systems in 100 posts in fiscal year 1998, and in additional posts in fiscal year 1999. We want to thank you for your foresight and support in continuing our ability to retain these critical fees.
In Mexico, we are also implementing, beginning in April, in cooperation with the INS, the Border Crossing Card Program mandated by Congress. In FY 1999, the Department expects to receive more than 1.5 million applications for either first-time cards or re-adjudicated cards. This project will continue for several years as we re-adjudicate the estimated 5.5 million Border Crossing Cards now held by Mexican citizens. This requires significant expansion of our consular facilities. All costs will be recovered from fees charged to the applicants.
U.S. citizens' passports fees have been reduced from $65 to $60 for first-time applicants and from $55 to $40 for renewals.
SECURITY
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The security area is obviously of concern to us all. Americans have a right to assume that our first priorities in security are their safety, the protection of sensitive information, and the safety of those who travel overseas or choose to work for the government. We have undertaken specific initiatives to improve computer network safety, including security network monitoring, which we will be glad to share with you at a separate meeting.
We also plan to establish an Anti-Terrorism Emergency Fund that would be used for extraordinary, unbudgeted security requirements. I want to thank you and your colleagues for supporting these security improvements.
Ultimately though, security is an individual responsibility. We will be increasing training for all staff of the State Department in this key area.
OVERSEAS STAFFING
We are implementing the overseas staffing model, using its results to guide decisions about the Department's hiring plan and the distribution of positions.
ICASS
With the strong leadership of you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee, we are in the first full year of the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services, or ICASS, system at 162 posts. ICASS provides an equitable and transparent system for distributing the costs to all agencies involved. We have now started to analyze the data to improve service delivery. This will be a very valuable planning tool.
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CONSOLIDATION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES
As part of the reorganization effort, the Department has been working closely with ACDA and USIA to plan for consolidation. Progress in this area continues in ACDA under ACDA Director, John Holum, who is also our State Department's Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
We are not as far along with the integration of USIA, although we are cooperating in administrative areas. Much work was done last year under the guidance of the reorganization steering committee to prepare. Significant future progress depends, however, on the passage of legislation. Your support of this proposal is very important.
FY 1999 BUDGET REQUEST
Let me now highlight the major elements of our budget request. We are requesting an additional $101 million to fund mandatory pay raises and to cover overseas and domestic inflation. That represents an increase of about 4.8-percent.
We must continue to improve our information technology infrastructure and work towards year 2000 compliance, and we must deal effectively with information security. Our budget request seeks an increase of $32 million in information technology investments from $86 million to $118 million.
We must maintain an inventory of overseas facilities that are safe, secure, and operationally efficient. We are requesting an increase of $242 million primarily to fund the new embassies for China and Germany.
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As U.S. vital policy interests in China grow, we have an urgent need in Bejing for an appropriate secure workplace with modern infrastructure and communications. As I indicated, the present chancery is overcrowded, poorly configured, and has fire, life-safety, and security problems.
In 1999, the Germans will complete the move of their capital from Bonn to Berlin. We need to build a new embassy for the new capital. The Department is requesting $50 million, in part, to design and then construct and furnish a new Berlin Chancery. We will finance the balance of the $120 million capital costs with proceeds from property sales in Germany.
In closing, I would like to emphasize that effective leadership in foreign policy requires a close connection between the management of resources and the development of policy. If we are going to maintain a world class diplomacy, we need to ensure that our diplomats and our facilities are world class.
Mr. Chairman, we need the Subcommittee's continued support. If you give us the tools we need, we will do the job well. Thank you. I will be glad to answer your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Cohen follows:]
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT
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Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
Let me talk in a general sense quickly here about the Department. This is your first hearing here and you have only been on the job for six months or so.
Do you find the State Department to be a well-managed, efficiently-run department?
Ms. COHEN. I did not have a background in the State Department or its operations before. I can just tell you what I think. Based on these six months, I have been surprised at the extent to which the Department's resources are stretched very thin.
We do not have the information technology resources we need. We have personnel vacancies. Because we have vacancies, we are sending people into positions for which they are not fully trained. As a result, we have morale problems.
I do not see a lot of fat in the State Department, but I see that we are going to have to make, even with your help in additional funding, hard choices.
Mr. ROGERS. I guess what I am looking for here are some very broad management goals that you have set for yourself and the Department. So that a year from now we can measure your progress on your scale of measure. Give us your broad goals.
Ms. COHEN. I have goals in four areas. The first comes from the Secretary and that would be the consolidation of the other agencies with the State Department. That obviously is delayed from lack of enabling legislation.
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PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
I took the first two months after I got here as an opportunity to learn as much as I could. Based on that, I have goals in the following areas. In the personnel area, I have two major concerns that I think are shared by most of the people in the Department and the Secretary. The first is the composition of the workforce. That is, are we recruiting, training, keeping, motivating the people that we need for the challenges in the next century? We are going to be taking a close look at that. We will be glad to report back to the committee on that.
Secondly, I am very concerned with training in the Department. At the support level and in the computer area, we have not had the resources to train people appropriately for the job that we then ask them to undertake. We have to work very carefully to be sure that we provide that kind of training for people.
In addition, as I have traveled, I have heard from mid-level managers, people who came into the Foreign Service for different kinds of jobs, then find themselves in management positions. They have asked for management training.
Those kinds of personnel issues are the ones that I anticipate addressing this year. I think you will see progress in that area.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
In the information technology area, with the resources you gave us, it would be hard not to make progress from where the State Department was. It had obsolete equipment and a structure that, at least from my point of view, had the policy for information technology and the operations separate. With the support of the Committee, we have combined those.
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With the work done by the people in the Department over the past couple of years, we have set standards. We are in the process of getting out modernized equipment. I think that there will be a real difference in the tools available to people in the State Department.
As I have said, we will be providing Internet to the State Department starting this month. I had Internet at the Interior Department, so I was shocked that they did not have it at the State Department where information is their business.
FACILITIES
In the buildings area, which would be my third operational priority, there are not enough resources to do everything, as you all know better than I do. We have to establish priorities and then implement them.
We have begun to do that. We now, with the regional bureas and the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, have established a two-year building and maintenance priority program. We have had joint meetings with the policy side and Under Secretary Pickering to gain their agreement. That, I think, is an important first step because it says to everybody in the Department, these are the resources and this is what we can do. This is what we will have to do later.
So, on an operational basis, I trust that you will see real progress in personnel, information technology, and the buildings area.
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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. ROGERS. Well, those are laudable goals; particularly the information sharing. In an age of CNN with world wide instantaneous public communications, and an age of world wide Internet with instantaneous personal communications, I am almost surprised that we do not see in your budget request sand for ink blotting. Maybe we can get some free for you.
The State Department has a history, and maybe it is the State Department culture, of doing things the old way, which is admirable in one sense, but in this age of instant communications that everybody else has, the State Department is still in the 19th Century, and maybe that is being liberal.
We have thrown money at this for years now from the Subcommittee for computerization and communications in the Department. It just seems to go down a rat hole somewhere. Can you help me out?
Ms. COHEN. Yes. It will not go down a rat hole. For the last year, pre-dating me, people have worked very hard in this area. They are taking very aggressive steps. Just the idea that we now have standards so that people will not be using different systems that cannot communicate with each other is progress.
I, myself, have seen the progress that the consular area has made. I just came back from a trip to Berlin. They can instantly look up a visa applicant in Berlin on a database in Washington and see whether that person has a problem that means they should be denied a visa.
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I think that as the whole Department starts to see what information technology can do for them, we will have more enthusiasm.
VISA EXPIRATIONS
Mr. ROGERS. Now, speaking of that visa record, can you also tell when that visa expires and whether or not the person who was granted a visa is still in the U.S. and have overstayed their visa?
Ms. COHEN. I know the visa exit issue is of concern to the Committee and the Department. We are working with INS on that.
Mr. ROGERS. I have heard that for 13 years. Still, after 13 years and $13 zillion, neither INS or State can tell me that they have some way to detect visa overstays. Consequently, how would you like to have the whole shebang?
How would you like for us to be able to say to you, we are going to give you, State Department, not only the visa application process, but the visa overstay process and all that INS now does with visas? How would you like that?
Ms. COHEN. I think the Administration has heard your offer and is concerned with the operations of that program. We, as an Administration, are going to be working very hard with the INS to improve their ability to do their part of the function.
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Mr. ROGERS. Good luck.
Ms. COHEN. They have, I think, a very good study underway by Booz-Allen. We look forward to seeing those recommendations and working with them.
Mr. ROGERS. I want you to know the Barbara Jordan Commission studied the matter for years and, in a bipartisan way, came up with a recommendation last year. They concluded that INS is unmanageable.
It is no one's fault. It is just an unmanageable bureaucracy with conflicting visions. One of which is to track visas and enforce the overstays, among other things, and to evict illegal aliens.
We could go on all day about this, but it is not working. So, there is a very serious effort to try to remedy the INS problem. I spent 13 years on this Subcommittee. We have tried everything known to human kind; money, pressure, twisting arms, threatening, being nice; everything we can think of. It just gets worse.
I am throwing up my hands. So, I want you to think about this. Think about what you would do if you take over all of these things.
We would not ask you to do the Border Patrol. We have a separate Border Agency run under the Justice Department. Labor would do their job on enforcing the laws against illegal aliens. So, any way, think about it. Mr. Skaggs.
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ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Mr. SKAGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I understand that you all have developed a plan for improving your energy efficiency at the State Department. Not that this is going to change the course of western civilization, but if you have some good news about some cost savings there, I wondered if you would share them.
Ms. COHEN. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about this.
We have given attention to this, particularly under the leadership of Tim Wirth, who had been the Under Secretary for Global Affairs and had been concerned about this for a number of years. We now are working to have our embassies overseas be a platform for the best in energy efficiency.
We have started in Mexico City with a contract similar to the contracts that have been let by the Federal Government domestically, where the company that helps you achieve the energy efficiency shares in the savings. You pay them out of the savings.
We think that is a very positive program that we can operate elsewhere using American contractors and American equipment. We anticipate that we could see energy savings in the 30-percent range.
Mr. SKAGGS. Because you have not been in this position before, you have not been subjected to my annual plea that, through Tim's good offices or otherwise, appears to have taken what you have already described of really getting your colleagues, the Department of Energy and the Department of Commerce, to exploit this opportunity as well, to move into commercial application some of the things that Energy has supported through its renewable and solar programs.
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Through your colleagues at Commerce, perhaps you can enable that technology which has much more attraction in the developing world, really even than in our own, to have a chance to be demonstrated on the ground; that may help our marketing some.
So, I am glad for the news. How is ICASS doing?
ICASS
Ms. COHEN. It is doing very well. I think that it offers great promise. I know this Committee was instrumental in its formation.
It went live the first of October. About two or three weeks ago, I saw the first data out of it. One of the things it does is allow us to collect data across all embassies so that we can make comparisons, very effective comparisons. So, it will be a very useful central management tool.
In the few trips I have taken, I have met with the ICASS Council. Also, ambassadors come in to see me before they go overseas. So that when they go overseas, they can call back up and ask for something. I have said to each of them that where I have seen the ICASS Council be successful, which is three out of four places, it is because the ambassador has taken a personal interest and shown some leadership. That kind of leadership has brought the embassy together to make very good decisions.
I think it will just become more and more useful. Obviously one of the tensions will be when additional resources are required, not just from State. I think it is off to a very good start. I know from other people that you all were behind it.
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Mr. SKAGGS. I am curious about the one in four where it has not played out according to script, given that I would think it would be in every ambassador's enlightened self-interest to fully implement the philosophy behind ICASS. So, what is wrong?
Ms. COHEN. This one place did not have an ambassador. This is my initial impression. It takes some real leadership from the ambassador to say we are going to work together. There are going to be areas where one agency thinks they are over-paying or State is over-charging or some historical tension rises up. When the ambassador is there supporting it, it really seems to work very well.