SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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20–917PDF
2005
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 27, 2005
Serial No. 109–34
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
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EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats
ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
PETER T. KING, New York, Vice Chairman
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
DARRELL ISSA, California
TED POE, Texas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
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GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director
JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member
PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member
BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Mr. Peter Bergen, Fellow, The New American Foundation
Mr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Mr. Lorenzo Vidino, Deputy Director, The Investigative Project
Mr. Claude Moniquet, President and Director General, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
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The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats: Prepared statement
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Prepared statement
Mr. Peter Bergen: Prepared statement
Mr. Matthew Levitt: Prepared statement
Mr. Lorenzo Vidino: Prepared statement
Mr. Claude Moniquet: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
Responses from Mr. Lorenzo Vidino to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
Response from Mr. Matthew Levitt to question submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2005
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House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. GALLEGLY. I call to order the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats. Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on the growing problem of Islamic extremism in Europe.
Let me say at the outset that the title of the hearing does not in any way suggest that Islam lends itself to extremism or that most Muslims, whether they live in Europe or anywhere else in the world, support terrorism or hold extremist views toward the Western society or the United States.
However, we must face the fact that a small but growing number of people in Western Europe have joined jihadist groups. These groups pose a serious threat to the United States, U.S. interests in Europe and Europe itself.
This hearing will examine the nature and extent of this threat. I am particularly interested in assessing which European countries face the greatest threat from Islamic extremist groups, the causes of religious extremism, the ties of groups in Europe to al-Qaeda and other Middle East and North African terrorist groups and the ability of these groups to carry out attacks.
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I view the cooperation between the United States and Europe as one of the bright spots in the transatlantic relationship. But I believe that we can and must do more, especially with respect to the sharing of intelligence on extremist groups, curtailing the travel of terrorists and the cutting off of their fundraising capacity. I also support a top-down review of the visa waiver program and on our border security program to make sure that the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security and the airlines are doing everything they can to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.
In this regard, last year as part of the National Intelligence Reform Act, I included several provisions that were aimed at making it more difficult for terrorists to enter the United States. Two of these provisions—expanding pre-inspection by DHS at foreign airports and placing DHS agents at foreign airports to assist airline personnel in the detection of fraudulent documents—were designed to stop terrorists, including those who might be coming from Europe, from even boarding flights bound for the United States. I believe that the immediate implementation of these two provisions is something our Government can do right now to help keep America safer.
Finally, I would also like our witnesses to discuss the potential of extremist groups in Europe to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction. Given the continued problems in securing our border with Mexico and Canada, I am concerned that dangerous weapons originating in Europe can pose a direct threat to our homeland.
With that, I would now defer to my good friend from Florida, the Ranking Member, Mr. Wexler.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS
Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on the growing problem of Islamic extremism in Europe.
Let me say at the outset that the title of the hearing does not in any way suggest that Islam lends itself to extremism or that most Muslims, whether they live in Europe or anywhere else in the world, support terrorism or hold extremist views toward Western society or the United States.
However, we must also face the fact that a small but growing number of people in Western Europe have joined jihadist groups. These groups pose a serious threat to the United States, U.S. interests in Europe and Europe itself.
This hearing will examine the nature and extent of this threat. I am particularly interested in assessing which European countries face the greatest threat from Islamic extremist groups, the causes of religious extremism, the ties of groups in Europe to al Qaeda and other Middle East and North African terrorist groups and the ability of these groups to carry out attacks.
I view the cooperation between the United States and Europe as one of the bright spots in the transatlantic relationship. But I believe we can and must do more, especially with respect to the sharing of intelligence on extremist groups, curtailing the travel of terrorists, and cutting off their fundraising capacity. I also support a top-down review of the visa waiver program and our border security system to make sure that the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security and the airlines are doing everything they can to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.
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In this regard, last year as part of the National Intelligence Reform Act, I included several provisions that were aimed at making it more difficult for terrorists to enter the United States. Two of these provisions—expanding pre-inspection by DHS at foreign airports and placing DHS agents at foreign airports to assist airline personnel in the detection of fraudulent travel documents—were designed to stop terrorists, including those who might be coming from Europe, from even boarding flights bound for the U.S. I believe the immediate implementation of these two provisions is something our government can do right now to help keep Americans safer.
Finally, I would also like our witnesses to discuss the potential of extremist groups in Europe to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction. Given the continued problems in securing our border with Mexico and Canada, I am concerned that dangerous weapons originating in Europe can pose a direct threat to our homeland.
I will now turn to Mr. Wexler for any opening statement he may wish to make.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses, and thank you for being so patient. I will be brief.
I do not think there could be any more timely discussion than we are having today. When I was in France visiting with some of the leaders of the Islamic community there, I was overwhelmed with the sense of alienation that the Muslim community feels. Is this rightfully so or not? My understanding of a recent poll of European Muslims is that 80 percent of European Muslims feel victimized by discrimination and harassment. Whether that is an accurate portrayal of the conditions in which European Muslims live or not, it is obviously significant if that is the perception that those residents have.
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I was struck by the fact, if I understand it correctly, that a strategic decision was made—which I believe is shared by most, if not all, of the European countries—that there be no training of Islamic clerics within France or within Europe and that most, if not all, of the religious leaders in those communities are imported in. Therefore, the hope that there would emerge a moderate clerical base educated and brought up in France or any other western European country seems to have not materialized. I would be curious if you could address that aspect of what the problem is in terms of Islamic extremism.
Could you also expand on whether there is any tie to be made in terms of Turkey's entrance and negotiations regarding the European Union? Is there any connection between Turkey's entrance into the European Union and the process that will be undertaken and Islamic efforts of assimilation and/or then ultimately leading, if there is no assimilation to extremism? Or is the Turkey experience just entirely separate from Moroccans or Algerians or anyone else that may feel that they have been discriminated against? I would be very curious to hear what the speakers have to say.
If I could conclude with this; what role does the United States have, if at all, in helping, assisting, and/or commenting with respect to the failure, at least in many respects of the Muslim community, to be adequately assimilated into the European nations? What role do we have?
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing and giving me this opportunity.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on Islamic extremism in Europe. I would also like to thank our distinguished guests for joining us today.
Despite significant policy disagreements between the Bush Administration and some European allies surrounding the Iraq War, transatlantic cooperation in the war against terror has deepened, and is certain to grow stronger in the months and years ahead. As shared victims of terror, the United States and Europe must stand united in formulating a joint response.
Events, such as the Madrid bombing; the 2003 suicide bombing in Israel by two British citizens; the 2003 arrest of Richard Reid; and the recent assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, all demonstrate that terrorist organizations in Europe remain active. This has significant implications for America because the most pressing threats from groups like Al Qaeda stem from affiliated organizations in Europe and European individuals, organizations and cells.
European governments must do more to address the alienation of Islamic communities, where over 80 percent of European Muslims feel victimized by discrimination and harassment according to a recent poll. This, in turn, provides fodder to those who exploit Islam to promote their narrow political goals. The result has been increased support for terror, and rising anti-Americanism, anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism in Europe commensurate with ongoing violence in the Middle East.
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This is most clear in France—home to Europe's largest Jewish and Muslim populations—where Islamic extremism has been cited as a root cause of increased anti-Semitism in the past five years. I have previously commended the French for steps taken to curb anti-Semitic hate crimes, though I am deeply concerned about recent studies indicating that anti-Semitic incidents have increased by more than 50% in France in 2004.
Last year, I met with the head of the Muslim community in Paris to discuss this and other related matters. In our meeting, he outlined factors contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism, such as the influx of foreign imams preaching fundamentalism in the mosque and inadequate government assistance to the community as whole. These problems are indicative of a larger issue surrounding some European governments' handling of rapidly changing demographics. It is clear that the threats emanating from isolated Muslim communities may decrease through enhanced integration of Muslims into Europe—including the accession of Turkey to the EU.
Mr. Chairman, despite some success in the war on terror, the United States and Europe remain vulnerable to impending security threats. Europe served as the nerve center for Al Qaeda prior to 9/11 and is still used as a haven for affiliates of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Ansar-Al-Aslam. As such, the EU and individual Member States must take a stronger stance against terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, which—according to Palestinian sources—poses the greatest threat to the tenuous situation in Gaza and the West Bank. In the past month alone, the House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist and the EU Parliament passed a similar resolution recommending that the EU Council take ''all necessary steps to curtail'' Hezbollah given its ongoing support of terror. Despite such action, the EU has failed to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list, leaving operatives and finances freely flowing throughout the EU. At this precarious time in the Middle East, I hope the EU will heed the calls of Congress and the EU Parliament and add Hezbollah to its terrorist list, which—in my mind—is long overdue.
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I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as they outline the scope and severity of this global threat and present options for eradicating Muslim extremism in the future.
Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
At this point I would like to introduce our witnesses. Our first witness is Peter Bergen, who is a Fellow at The New American Foundation where he researches and writes on international terrorism and the al-Qaeda network. He is also Adjunct Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins. Mr. Bergen is CNN's Terrorism Analyst and author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. In addition, Mr. Bergen has written articles for such numerous publications including the New York Times, Washington Post, The Washington Times and Foreign Affairs.
The second witness is Matthew Levitt, who is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Terrorism Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Levitt has also worked as an FBI Analyst for counterterrorism operations. In that capacity Mr. Levitt earned letters of commendation and five awards in recognition of superior service. Mr. Levitt currently serves on the Council of Foreign Relations focusing on terrorism financing issues.
Our third witness is Lorenzo Vidino, who is the Deputy Director for The Investigative Project. Mr. Vidino is an expert on terrorism in Europe and al-Qaeda. His articles on terrorism and Middle Eastern affairs have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, National Review On-Line, The National Interest and several European newspapers. Mr. Vidino has also been a commentator on terrorism issues on MSNBC, Fox News and NBC.
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Our fourth witness is Claude Moniquet, who is the President of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a think tank based in Brussels specialized in counterterrorism, intelligence and international security issues. Mr. Moniquet has also had considerable experience covering terrorism as a journalist for over 20 years and is a Reserve Intelligence Officer in the French Army. Mr. Moniquet has written several books on religious extremism and terrorism and has worked as an Intelligence and Terrorism Consultant for CNN.
Gentlemen, I know that there is a lot that you would like to present today to provide us with a wealth of information, but in the interest of time I would ask unanimous consent that your entire statement be made a part of the record, and if you could condense and limit your statements to as close to 5 minutes as possible, I would appreciate it.
With that, Mr. Bergen, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BERGEN, FELLOW, THE NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION
Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to testify. In my view, the greatest threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups come from Europe today. There are four strands to this argument. One, we have not really seen much evidence of real al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the country since 9/11. The second strand is the significant terrorist attacks we have seen in the past decade have had a European dimension to them in this country. Thirdly, we have seen, with the Madrid attacks and also the recent terrorist plots uncovered in London, that there is a serious group of sleeper cells in Europe who have the capacity and the motivation to attack us in the United States. Finally, this threat will increase over time. We have the unfortunate confluence of rising Muslim immigration into Europe, a certain amount of European racism and a certain amount of Muslim alienation.
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This problem is going to increase over time because Europeans have very expensive social welfare retirement programs, and they are basically going out of business. I mean, Italians as a group are not reproducing fast enough to replace themselves. They are going to have to import a lot of labor to pay for their programs and to do their jobs, so this feeling of alienation is going to increase very strongly.
There were only 1 million Muslims in Europe in 1945. Now there are as many as 20 million. There were no Muslims in Spain under Franco. Now there are a million. There were no Muslims in Germany until after World War II. Now there are 5 million. These people are not integrating. As Congressman Wexler indicated, there is a real feeling of alienation.
In my presentation I am focusing on Britain, where there is a 28 percent unemployment rate for people between the ages of 16 and 24. When you ask the question, ''What is the war on terrorism?,'' 80 percent of British Muslims say it is a war against Islam. When you ask the question, ''Would you be in favor of another attack by al-Qaeda against the United States or an al-Qaeda-like organization?,'' 13 percent of British Muslims say that they would approve of that. That is a pretty astonishing figure.
My presentation will largely focus on Britain because I think the problem there is particularly high. I also have some personal experience, having grown up there.
I think you will see, if you look at the cases since 9/11, who has actually attacked us in any meaningful way. Richard Reid was not an American sleeper cell, he was a British citizen; the so-called ''Shoe Bomber'' who got a case of cold feet on the American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami. His colleague was recently also charged in London, another British citizen, a week ago who is going to serve 13 years for his part in the shoe bomb plot.
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Omar Sheikh, who kidnapped and murdered Danny Pearl in Pakistan, is a British citizen who went to London's School of Economics; a highly educated guy.
We have also seen recently in Britain some very serious plots. One example is the ammonium nitrate plot. Half a ton of ammonium nitrate, the very material that was used in Oklahoma City and also in the Bali attack, was found near Heathrow Airport. This indicated a serious attack. An attack in London, by the way, is not only an attack on the English, it is an attack on us. If you blew up a significant bomb in the City of London in the financial center, that would have a devastating effect on global markets and, of course, the American economy. If you detonated a radiological device—the Chairman was interested in the WMD question. A readily simple dirty radiological bomb in the City of London would basically close down world markets.
We do not need to be concerned about it just being a European problem: (A) We have seen that it is the Europeans, and particularly British, that have done a lot of these attacks; and (B) A certain kind of attack in Europe would have a devastating effect in the United States.
I just wanted to mention a couple people by name as being indicative of the problem that Congressman Wexler talked about, the fact that so many of the religious figures in Europe are not coming out of some European system. They are imported from other countries.
Abu Hamza was the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque where both Zacarias Moussawi and Richard Reid worshipped. He has finally, after many years, been arrested both on an American extradition warrant and also the British finally got around to their own charges against him. He is indicative of the kinds of extremist mullahs and imams that we have seen in England. Unfortunately, there is another one who has not been arrested as yet, Omar Bakri Muhammad. He is implicated in the ammonium nitrate plot I just described, and he is also implicated in the Mike's Place attack in Tel Aviv, which I think is very significant. Two second-generation British middle-class people go into Mike's Place, an Israeli jazz club, blow themselves up; a suicide attack. This is the very first time a Brit has ever been involved in a suicide attack. If a British person can do a suicide attack in Israel 2 years ago, they certainly can do one here.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BERGEN, FELLOW, THE NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION
The greatest threat to the United States from al Qaeda, its affiliated groups, or those animated by al Qaeda's ideology, emanates today from Europe. There are four strands to this argument which will be amplified in my testimony. The first, is that there is little or no evidence of American ''sleeper cells'' found in the US since the 9/11 attacks. Secondly, the most significant Islamist terrorist plots in the United States in the past decade have generally not involved ''sleeper cells,'' but rather terrorists who have come into the U.S. from abroad, often from Europe. Third, in 2004, we saw with the Madrid attacks and the disruption of serious terrorist plots in London that there are European sleeper cells that have the ability and motivation to carry out major terrorist operations, and even, perhaps, to attack the United States itself. Fourth, the European threat from militant jihadists will likely increase over time as declining European populations are replaced by rising Muslim immigration into Europe, a combination of circumstances that is generating, and will continue to generate, rising Muslim alienation in many European countries, and a significant amount of backlash against Muslim immigrants in countries such as the Netherlands.
Since the 9/11 attacks we have seen little evidence of US sleeper cells. The terrorism cases that American officials have prosecuted since 9/11 have often followed the trajectory of an initial trumpeting by the government only to collapse, or to be revealed as something less than earth shattering, when the details emerge months later. Remember Chaplin James Yee the ''spy'' at Guantanamo who turned out to be cheating not on his country, but on his wife? Or, the unfortunate Oregon lawyer who was busted for his role in the Madrid bombing attacks, but was, in fact, thousands of miles from Spain at the time of the bombings? Or how the Justice Department held a press conference to announce the disruption of a Buffalo, New York ''al Qaeda terrorist cell,'' when in reality those arrested had made the dumb mistake of lying to federal investigators about briefly attending a Taliban training camp? There was no evidence that that those arrested in Buffalo were involved in terrorism of any kind, or had ever been part of al Qaeda.
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Indeed, an authoritative survey by NYU's Center on Law and Security released in February found that of the hundred and twenty criminal cases that the Bush administration has pursued under the rubric of the war on terrorism since 9/11, ''the courts have indicted relatively few individuals on the charge of direct acts of terrorism and convicted only one (Richard Reid),'' the so-called shoe bomber who, of course wasn't a ''sleeper cell'', but a British-Jamaican who tried to blow up an American Airlines flight he boarded not in Paris, Texas, but in Paris, France. (Since the NYU report was published, French citizen Zacarias Moussawi has also pled guilty to planning to attack the White House.)
The American sleeper cell phenomenon has been exaggerated by both US officials and overheated stories in the media, but that is not to say that such sleepers have not existed in the past. Ali Mohamed, a member of al Qaeda who played a role in planning the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Kenya, for instance, was a US Army sergeant in the late '80s who married a Mexican-American woman, and was working as a computer network specialist in California when he was finally arrested after the Kenya embassy attack, fourteen years after he first settled in the States. However, since 9/11 there has been no evidence of sleepers like Ali Mohamed operating in the U.S. At a certain point these sleeper cells are either so asleep that they are effectively dead, or they simply don't exist. The onset of the Iraq war and the presidential election both offered perfect symbolic occasions for the supposed cells to strike, but nothing happened. The 9/11 Commission concluded, building on the work of the largest criminal investigation in history, that the hijackers did not plug into a support network in this country. This fact, taken together with the tiny number of real terrorism cases post-9/11 and the absence of terrorist attacks in the US over the past three and a half years, leads one to surmise that there are no American sleeper cells. And support for this view came from an unlikely quarter in March 2005: The FBI, in a leaked report, concluded that ''US Government efforts to date also have not revealed evidence of concealed cells or networks acting in the homeland as sleepers.''
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That's the good news. But is that the real problem, anyway? There have indeed been a small number of terrorist sleepers that have embedded themselves in American society for many years such as Ali Mohamed, but the real threat from Islamist terrorism in the U.S. has historically come from visitors to the country. That was the case in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the mastermind of which, Ramzi Yousef, arrived from Pakistan intent on attacking American targets, and it was also the case of the 9/11 attackers. And it was also true of Ahmed Ressam, who was stopped at a Canadian border crossing in December 1999 on a mission to bomb Los Angeles airport, and of the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, and also of Zacarias Moussawi.
Today, the Islamist terrorist threat to Americans largely emanates from Europe, not from domestic sleeper cells or, as is popularly imagined, the graduates of Pakistani madrassas who can do little more than read the Koran and so do not have either the linguistic or technical skills to make them a serious threat. Omar Sheik, for instance, the kidnapper of Wall Street Journal reporter, Danny Pearl, is a British citizen of Pakistani descent who graduated not from a madrassa, but from the academically rigorous London School of Economics. Richard Reid is also British, as is Saajid Badat who last week pled guilty in London to training in Afghanistan to use a shoe bomb similar to Reid's to blow up a transatlantic flight in late 2001. (Badat got cold feet and bailed out of the plot). Similarly, al Qaeda member Zacarias Moussawi is French; Ahmed Ressam became radicalized in Italy, and the 9/11 pilots turned to the most militant form of Islam while living in Hamburg. Indeed, last month, at a conference marking the first anniversary of the Madrid bombing, Robert Leiken, of the Nixon Center, presented his study of 373 radical Muslim terrorists arrested or killed in Europe and the United States from 1993 through 2004, of which an astonishing 41 percent were Western nationals, who were either naturalized or second generation Europeans, or were converts to Islam. Leiken found more terrorists who were French than the combined totals of Pakistani and Yemeni terrorists!
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Future terrorist attacks that will be damaging to American national security are therefore likely to have a European connection. Citizens of the European Union who adopt al Qaeda's ideology can both move around Europe easily and also have easy entrée into the United States because of the Visa Waiver Program that exists with European countries. European members of al Qaeda, for instance, could either come to the US to launch a significant attack on the scale of what took place in Madrid last March, or they could launch a major terrorist strike in Europe—such as a radiological 'dirty' bomb attack in the City of London, a key financial center—that would have a devastating effect on the global economy, and by extension the American economy.
As the eminent French scholar, Gilles Kepel, has pointed out: ''The war for Muslim minds around the world may turn on the outcome'' of how European Muslims deal with Islamist militancy in their midst, and the extent to which European Muslims can be truly integrated into their host societies. This will not be something that can be achieved quickly. First, there is the matter of numbers. France alone is host to some five million Muslims, about as many Muslims as live in the United States. And while only a handful of American Muslims have proven susceptible to al Qaeda's ideology (in this instance, the American Dream seems to really work) that is not so with a substantial minority of Europe's Muslims, many of whom are relatively recent arrivals. In 1945 less than one million Muslims lived in Europe. There are now as many as 20 million, a good number of whom are having problems integrating into their host countries because, by and large, Muslims in Europe are more discriminated against than Muslims in the United States. Algerians in France and Pakistanis in Britain, for instance, are often treated as second-class citizens.
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A survey of Islamist militant groups and Islamist extremism in Europe would merit a book in itself, so my testimony will focus on the threat emanating from Britain, a country that illustrates many of the features of the wider European problem, and where the threat from Islamist extremists is especially high. In 2004 Sir John Stevens London's former Metropolitan Police Commissioner warned that an Islamist extremist attack in London was ''inevitable,'' while a government report estimated that between ten and fifteen thousand British Muslims are supporters of al Qaeda or related groups. The estimate was based on intelligence, opinion polls, and a report that eight thousand Muslims last year attended a conference held by Hizb-ut-Tahir, which the Home Office describes as an extremist organization. British authorities believe that between three and six hundred British citizens were trained in al Qaeda and Taliban camps in Afghanistan. And several hundred men are believed to have fought in Kashmir and returned to Britain in the 1990s. In March, Sir Ian Blair, the present Metropolitan Police Commissioner, told a radio interviewer ''I agree with the Prime Minister's assessment . . . that there are hundreds of people who came back from the [Afghan training] camps and are now in the United Kingdom, and that is a very dangerous issue.'' Indeed, Sir Ian recently cautioned that terrorists could see the upcoming British general election on May 5th as ''a real opportunity.''
Most British Muslims are young and many are poorly integrated into society and therefore vulnerable to extremism. Seventy percent of them are under thirty years old, compared to forty-five percent for the UK as a whole. The unemployment rate among the British Muslim community runs ten percentage points above the national average of 5%. In the case of 16–24 year old Muslim men the unemployment rate is 28% And, unsurprisingly, a sense of anger shows up in polling data among British Muslims. Eight out of ten believe that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam, while a poll conducted last year under the auspices of The Guardian newspaper found a surprising 13% who said that further attacks by al Qaeda or similar organizations on the United States would be justified. This sort of sentiment can be found in a rap video that surfaced last year called ''Dirty Kuffar'' the lyrics of which included the following verse, ''OBL [bin Laden] pulled me like a shining star! Like the way we destroyed them two towers, ha-ha!''
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London—known for these purposes as Londonistan—has attracted a wide range of Islamist militants in the past decade who are inspired by the actions and rhetoric of bin Laden. One of the most well known is the one-eyed cleric, Abu Hamza, who until 2003 was the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque, where both Zacarias Moussawi and Richard Reid worshipped. Serious Arab opposition figures in London regard Abu Hamza as a self-publicizing joke, as he is neither a profound scholar of Islam, nor an important political figure. But, as we shall see, sometimes jokes can turn deadly serious. And the story of Abu Hamza is also emblematic of how young British men are incited to acts of terrorism, and the somewhat slow response of the UK authorities to clamp down on those who abuse its honorable tradition of tolerating dissident views.
In late 1998, after Abu Hamza had called for the killings of ''non-believers'' in Yemen, a group of eight second-generation British Muslims of Asian and Middle Eastern parentage, several of whom had ties to Abu Hamza, responded to that call. One was his son, Mohammad; another was his son-in law. The eight Britons, aged between 17 and 33, grew up in the Midlands or the London area. Most of them had gone to school for courses in business studies, computers or accounting, and those who had jobs, worked in unexceptional lines of work like the insurance business. They told those who asked that they were on vacation to Yemen to visit family members, or pick up some Arabic. But a routine traffic stop by a Yemeni cop near Aden on December 24, 1998 unraveled a far more interesting tale. Inside the car were three of the Brits who sped away, only to be quickly arrested. Their arrests led the Yemeni government to a house where they found a trove of items not normally associated with a quiet vacation: mines, rocket launchers, computers, and encrypted communication equipment. The Yemeni government said that the Brits were planning a veritable festival of Christmas bombing attacks in Aden, directed at a church; the British consulate, and an American demining team working in the area.
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Five days after the Brits were arrested, eighteen tourists from the United States, Britain, and Australia vacationing in Yemen were seized by a group of jihadist kidnappers who were hoping to spring their British colleagues from jail. The leader of the kidnappers was in touch by phone with Abu Hamza during the operation. A botched rescue effort by the Yemeni army led to the deaths of four of the tourists. It took six years until Abu Hamza was finally arrested in the spring of 2004 on extradition charges from the United States on the grounds that he had provided recruits to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and that he was involved in the 1998 Yemen attack. Last August, British authorities also belatedly brought charges against Hamza for inciting racial hatred.
Another flamboyant, London-based Islamist militant is Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, a Syrian who styles himself the judge of his own sharia court. In 1997, Bakri founded Al-Muhajiroun, an organization that attracted much media attention before its official disbanding in October 2004. Just as Abu Hamza influenced some impressionable second-generation British Muslims to try and attack western targets in Yemen in 1998 so too Bakri seems to have been a spiritual mentor for two second-generation, college-educated, middle-class men of Pakistani heritage who, on April 30, 2003, walked into Mike's Place, a busy jazz club near the US embassy in Israel, on a suicide mission. Once inside the club, the younger of the two men succeeded in detonating a bomb, killing himself and three bystanders, while the other man fled the scene. Bakri told the Daily Telegraph that he knew one of the Mike's Place attackers, Omar Sharif, ''very well and he used to attend regularly at my sessions. He was my brother and I am very proud of him and any Muslim who will do the same as him.''
The Mike's Place bombing was highly unusual; it was the first time that a UK citizen had committed an act of suicide terrorism in Israel. If such an attack can happen in Israel it can also happen in the United States. The Mike's Place attack demonstrates that the US might be vulnerable to suicide attackers who are British or are nationals of other European countries.
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Omar Bakri has also been connected to a recent significant terrorist plot; the alleged plan by a group of young Islamic men to use half a ton of ammonium nitrate stored near Heathrow to blow up targets in the UK. Ammonium nitrate was the material used in the Oklahoma City bomb that killed 168 people and also in the attack on the discothèque in Bali that killed 200 tourists. In March 2004, nine suspects were arrested in Luton, west London and Sussex in raids on twenty-four homes, following two months of surveillance. Eight of the nine arrested are of Pakistani descent. All were born and raised in Britain, and many are middle class. The uncle of two brothers charged in the plot told reporters that it had been Bakri's Al-Muhajiroun that had radicalized his nephews. The trial of five of those arrested is due to start in September 2005.
Also in 2004, police arrested twelve other terrorist suspects, aged nineteen to thirty-two, including senior al Qaeda operative, Issa al-Britani. Many of the suspects were British citizens of Pakistani descent, and some had fought in Kashmir in the 1990s. Raids were conducted in north London, Watford, Luton, and Blackburn, and police seized an estimated $360,000 worth of equipment, including one hundred computers and two hundred mobile phones. The U.S. accuses al-Britani of casing financial targets in New York and Washington between August of 2000 and April of 2001. Those targets included the IMF, the World Bank, the Prudential building in Newark and the New York Stock Exchange. Al-Britani's arrest resulted in the Department of Homeland Security elevating the threat level to orange this past summer.
Al-Britani, age thirty-two, was born in Britain or moved there when he was young. He fought in Kashmir in the 1990s after converting to Islam (from Hinduism) in his twenties, instructed militants in al Qaeda's Afghanistan camps, and later wrote ''The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.'' The book details strategies for conducting jihad, including the use of ''germ warfare.'' The 9–11 Commission concluded that Al-Britani traveled with Tawfiq bin Attash, one of bin Laden's bodyguards, to Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. This visit occurred several days before the Kuala Lumpur meeting where the September 11 attacks were discussed. From interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) U.S. investigators believe that bin Laden told al-Britani through KSM to conduct surveillance of financial and Jewish targets in New York and Washington in 2001. British investigators also believe that al-Britani began planning to attack a British target in January 2000, potentially the Heathrow Express, which connects Heathrow airport with downtown London.
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Since 9/11 British citizens have planned the kidnapping-murder of American journalist Danny Pearl, attempted to bring down U.S. airliners with shoe bombs, contemplated additional attacks on financial landmarks in New York and Washington, and have carried out suicide operations in Israel. This record demonstrates that Islamist militant groups in the United Kingdom, as is the case in several other major European countries, represent a threat not only to their own homelands, but also to the United States.
Mr. BARRETT [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bergen. I appreciate that.
Mr. Levitt, welcome. I am excited to hear your testimony today.
STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. LEVITT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here.
The rise of global jihadist movements in Europe is alarming not only because of the threat such movements pose to our European allies, but because Europe has served as a launching pad, as Peter noted, for terrorist operatives planning attacks elsewhere; not only for those behind 9/11, Richard Reid and other individuals, but other groups as well. I would like to highlight the non-global jihadist groups because you have before you, in my colleagues here, some experts on the global jihadist movement.
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Hezbollah operatives have launched attacks against Israel from Europe. Hamas operatives have plotted and funded suicide and other attacks against civilians in Israel from Europe as well. While terrorist groups remain the central structural unit in international terrorism, terrorist groups today are better described as networked groups tied together by individual relationships than as clearly defined organizations that are structured and discrete.
The relationships between individual terrorists affiliated with different groups are paramount, especially when operating in Diaspora communities like Europe and, for that matter, the United States. This crossover, this cross-pollination, facilitates cooperation among groups, including operational cooperation, but even more so interconnectivity at the logistical and financial support levels, including among groups that are not part of the global jihadist movement.
It is important to highlight a few themes. First, there is a common ideological and theological jihadist foundation and world view among groups that belong to al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates and even groups like Hamas. Consider someone like Muhammad Zouaydi, who is one of the heads of the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid. On top of financing the Hamburg cell and several of the individuals who are now on trial in Spain, he was also sending money in at least two instances to Hamas.
Consider Sheikh Muhammad al-Moayad, who was recently convicted in a court in Brooklyn following a joint operation with the Germans. Allow me to quote from one of the transcripts entered in that case. Asked by a cooperating witness who was posing as a jihadist financier if the money he was purportedly going to be giving would go to Hamas or al-Qaeda, because he really wanted it to go to fighting, not just to social services, Sheikh al-Moayad said, ''Look, any organization. Anything. Hamas, al-Qaeda or whatever. As long as it is for jihad.'' The jihadists themselves do not make the distinctions that we sometimes make between al-Qaeda and Hamas.
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Sheikh Abdullah Azam, for example, was not only one of the first Palestinian terrorists to have a world view of a major jihad against Israel, but of course teamed up with Osama bin Laden to create the Maqtabol Kidma, the backbone of what became al-Qaeda.
Second, it is just a small step from justifying terrorism in some circumstances, terrorism against Israel or terrorism that is perhaps ''resistance'' to justifying it in other scenarios. Consider the Saudi experience of tolerating jihad abroad, which created an atmosphere that bred jihad at home. Consider also Khalid Sheik Muhammad, who we now know was extremely motivated by the Palestinian question in particular, but chose to express that by attacking the United States.
Third, the EU, as a member of the Quartet, has a special obligation. Beyond whatever threat groups like Hamas or Hezbollah pose directly in Europe or whatever threat they pose by creating a jihadist environment in Europe, they have a special obligation to stop any financial support, certainly operational activity in Europe that can undermine the peace process.
Just in the past few weeks not America, not Israel, but the Palestinians have complained to the Europeans that Hezbollah and certain Palestinian groups are the greatest potential threat to the peace process, and that is something that we need to pay attention to, especially in light of the case of Mike's Place, that Peter just highlighted.
Finally, such groups do pose threats to Europe as well. In the case of Hezbollah, almost every international cell has direct ties to Iranian intelligence. Cells are multi-tasking. To quote a U.S. intelligence official that I interviewed for a project I am working on, almost all Hezbollah cells he knows of he said are ''a bit operational.''
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If we could put those slides that I gave you up on the screen for a minute? I would like to highlight from a case here in the United States that you cannot necessarily identify Hezbollah or Hamas operatives by someone who wears a headband on their head. Here you are looking at a picture of three members of a Hezbollah cell in Canada.
Next slide, please. Here you are looking at members of the Charlotte Hezbollah cell that came into the United States via Cyprus, which granted is at the periphery of Europe, but Europe nonetheless.
Next slide, please. Here you are looking at the leader and one of the members of the Charlotte cell posing outside the White House. You know, people blend in, and if we do not pay very close attention to the presence of such groups in the United States, in Europe, we are going to have a problem especially in the case of Hezbollah if they are in fact all ''a bit operational.''
There is a history of Hezbollah conducting operations in Europe and elsewhere. I go into them in my written testimony. Germany is currently concerned over the presence of some 800 Hezbollah members there. Hezbollah has used Europe as a launching pad for operations in Israel.
In the case of Hamas, Bank al-Taqwa headquartered out of Europe has been known to finance Hamas and several global jihadist groups. The al-Aqsa International Foundation headquartered in Germany with offices throughout the world, including Yemen, where it was headed by Sheikh Moayad, who I just mentioned, financed Hamas and al-Qaeda. In the case of Ismael Elbarasse in the U.S., the FBI highlighted its concern that al-Qaeda, lacking mid- and senior-level operatives, has begun to recruit trained Hamas operatives. I guarantee you that if that is what they are doing in this country, we need to be concerned about it happening in Europe as well.
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Finally, failure to pay attention to all terrorist groups that are based on a global jihadist's ideology is a critical barrier to effective international counterterrorism cooperation. It is like being in a rowboat with two holes and only plugging up one of them. There are so many overlapping relationships, especially at the logistical and financial support levels, that if we do not look at the macro picture we are going to fail to wrap up all the necessary cells to bring greater security to our citizens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The rise of global jihadist movements in Europe is alarming, not only because of the threat such movements pose to our European allies but because Europe has served as a launching pad for terrorist operatives plotting attacks elsewhere. As the 9/11 trial just begun in Spain highlights, the 9/11 hijackers and their logistical and financial collaborators plotted and planned their operations in Europe. Similarly, Richard Reid's failed shoe-bombing of a U.S. airliner was plotted and launched from Europe; Hezbollah operatives have launched attacks against Israel from Europe; and Hamas operatives have plotted and funded suicide and other terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel from Europe as well.
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While terrorist groups remain the central structural unit in international terrorism, terrorist groups today are better described as networked groups tied together by individual relationships than as clearly defined organizations that are structured and discrete. The relationships between individual terrorists affiliated with different groups are paramount, especially when operating within Diaspora communities in places like Europe and the United States. This crossover and pollination facilitates cooperation among groups, including operational cooperation but far more often interconnectivity at the logistical and financial support levels. Such links exist even between groups that do not share similar ideologies, leading to cooperation between religious zealots and secular radicals; between ideologically- or theologically-driven terrorists and criminal entities (as has been the case in several terrorist attacks in Iraq, where criminal elements played critical roles in return for monetary compensation); between Sunni and Shi'a groups; and between individuals whose person-to-person contacts require no agreement between their respective headquarters.
As such, it should not surprise that several investigations into al-Qaeda operatives in Europe and elsewhere revealed significant crossover to terrorist elements tied to Hamas. A particularly interesting example is the Madrid Al-Qaeda cell, perhaps the most important cell broken up since 9/11. Around April 2002, Spanish authorities searched the home and offices of Muhammad Zouaydi, a senior al-Qaeda financier in Madrid. Investigators found a five-page fax dated October 24, 2001, revealing that Zouaydi was not only financing the Hamburg cell responsible for the September 11 attacks, but also Hamas. In the fax, which Zouaydi kept for his records, the Hebron Muslim Youth Association solicited funds from the Islamic Association of Spain. According to Spanish prosecutors, ''the Hebron Muslim Youth Association is an organization known to belong to the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas which is financed by activists of said organization living abroad.''(see footnote 1) Spanish police also say Zouaydi gave a total of almost $6,600 marked ''Gifts for Palestine'' to Sheikh Helal Jamal, a Palestinian religious figure in Madrid tied to Hamas.(see footnote 2)
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The al-Taqwa banking system—with offices in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Caribbean—also facilitated the financing of multiple terrorist organizations, including Hamas. Bank al-Taqwa was added to the U.S. Treasury Department's terrorism list in November 2001 for ''provid[ing] cash transfer mechanisms for Al Qaida,''(see footnote 3) and European intelligence services confirm ''al-Taqwa used Hamas funds in the late 1990s.''(see footnote 4) Subsequent investigation has determined al-Taqwa was established in 1988 with financing from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, ''$60 million collected annually for Hamas was moved to accounts with Bank al-Taqwa.''(see footnote 5) Al-Taqwa shareholders include known Hamas members and individuals linked to al-Qaeda.(see footnote 6) Ghalib Himmat, noted for his ties to the International Islamic Charity Organization (IICO), another charity suspected of financing Hamas, is also an executive of the al-Taqwa banking network. Moreover, a 1996 report by Italian intelligence further linked al-Taqwa to Hamas and other Palestinian groups, as well as to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya.(see footnote 7)
Beyond the presence in Europe of global jihadists tied to the al-Qaeda network, the activities of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah also pose significant national security risks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, these risks are not limited to the terrorist attacks these groups plot against Israel, they include risks to the countries in which they are operating and to the United States as well.
HEZBOLLAH IN EUROPE
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Highlights of Hezbollah's record of terror attacks include suicide truck bombings targeting US and French forces in Beirut (in 1983 and 1984) and U.S. forces again in Saudi Arabia (in 1996), its record of suicide bombing attacks targeting Jewish and Israeli interests such as those in Argentina (1992 and 1994) and in Thailand (attempted in 1994), and a host of other plots targeting American, French, German, British, Kuwaiti, Bahraini and other interests in plots from Europe to Southeast Asia to the Middle East.
According to U.S. authorities, concern over the threat posed by Hezbollah is well placed. FBI officials testified in February 2002 that ''FBI investigations to date continue to indicate that many Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the capability to attempt terrorist attacks here should this be a desired objective of the group.''(see footnote 8) Similarly, CIA Director George Tenet testified in February 2003 that ''Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [al-Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable organization.''(see footnote 9) To be sure, Hezbollah is highly qualified, and capable of carrying out attacks not only in the U.S.—where it has never carried out operations before—but in Europe as well—where it has been active in the past.
US intelligence officials have also expressed concern over possible links between Hezbollah and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, highlighting the ad hoc tactical relationship brewing between Iran's shi'a proxy and the loosely affiliated al-Qaeda network. In September 2003, when US authorities designated Zarqawi and several of his associates as 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist' entities, the Treasury said that Zarqawi not only had ''ties'' to Hezbollah, but that plans were in place for his deputies to meet with both Hezbollah and Asbat al-Ansar (a Lebanese Sunni terrorist group), ''and any other group that would enable them to smuggle mujaheddin [sic] into Palestine.''(see footnote 10) To this end, Zarqawi received ''more than $35,000'' in mid 2001 ''for work in Palestine,'' which included ''finding a mechanism that would enable more suicide martyrs to enter Israel'' as well as ''to provide training on explosives, poisons, and remote controlled devices.(see footnote 11)
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Similarly, while the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah had advance knowledge of the September 11 plot, the commission's report does note that Iran and Hezbollah provided assistance to al-Qaeda on several occasions. For example, al-Qaeda operatives were allowed to travel through Iran with great ease. Entry stamps were not put in Saudi operatives' passports at the border, though at least eight of the September 11 hijackers transited the country between October 2000 and February 2001. The report also noted a ''persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al-Qaeda figures'' and drew attention to an informal agreement by which Iran would support al-Qaeda training with the understanding that such training would be used ''for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States.'' Indeed, al-Qaeda operatives were trained in explosives, security, and intelligence on at least two occasions, with one group trained in Iran around 1992, and a second trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley in the fall of 1993.(see footnote 12)
In the final analysis, whether suspected ties between Hezbollah and global jihadist elements such as Zarqawi and the 9/11 plotters are proved or not, Hezbollah warrants being designated a terrorist group of global reach on the merits of its own activities.
On top of its efforts to cripple the peace process, Hezbollah warrants European attention for its operations there. In the 1980s Hezbollah operatives carried out bombings in France and assassinations in Germany, and killed French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. But the group continues to operate out of Europe today. Consider some of Hezbollah's operations in Europe:
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In 1989, Bassam Gharib Makki, a Hezbollah operative and student in Germany, collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets in Germany. In 1989 and 1990, authorities apprehended a Hezbollah cell operating in Valencia, Spain. The cell was caught smuggling weapons in a ship from Cyprus so that they could be pre-positioned and cached in Europe. After tracking that shipment, authorities found additional explosives that had already been stashed in Europe. It was determined that the cell had been targeting US and Israeli targets in Europe. In 1997, Hezbollah was found to be collecting intelligence on the US Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. During the same period, members of a Hezbollah cell in Charlotte, North Carolina, paid indigent Americans to travel to Cyprus at Hezbollah's expense and engage in sham marriages so additional operatives could get visas to come to America.(see footnote 13) Throughout the mid- to late-1990s, Hezbollah recruited Palestinian students studying in Russia, and collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets there.
Today, German intelligence estimates that 800 Lebanese Hezbollah members live in Germany. The organization publishes a weekly newsletter in Germany, al-Ahd, though it scaled back its overt presence there after September 11, fearing a clampdown. An investigation in the summer of 2002 led German authorities to monitor the activities of an organization in Berlin suspected of being tied to Hezbollah and of establishing a ''training center.''(see footnote 14)
Over the past few years, Hezbollah has used Europe as a launching pad from which to infiltrate operatives into Israel to conduct surveillance and carry out attacks. In 1996 Hussien Makdad left Lebanon for Europe where members of a Hezbollah logistical support network provided him with a stolen British passport which he used to enter Israel on a flight from Switzerland. A few days later Makdad was badly injured in an explosion in his East Jerusalem hotel room where he was assembling a bomb made of RDX explosives. In 1997, Hezbollah operative Stephan Smyrek, a German convert to Islam trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, left Lebanon for Europe and then flew from Amsterdam to Israel on his own German passport. He was tasked with photographing prospective targets for attacks but was arrested at Israel's Ben Gurion airport. In 2000, Hezbollah dispatched Fawzi Ayub, a Canadian of Lebanese decent, to infiltrate Israel from Europe. He traveled from Lebanon on his own Canadian passport, and then sailed to Israel on a forged American passport he received in Europe. Ayub is described as a hardened Hezbollah operative, and is believed to have been sent to conduct attacks in Israel. And in 2001 Hezbollah operative Gerard Shuman, a dual British-Lebanese citizen, flew from Lebanon to Britain on his Lebanese passport and then on to Israel on his British passport. Arrested in Israel, Shuman is believed to have been sent to conduct surveillance operations.
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In some of these cases, the authorities have determined that the operatives entered Israel to conduct operations, while in other cases it remains unclear whether they entered Israel just to collect pre-operational surveillance, assist other operatives already there, or conduct attacks themselves. Significantly, each of these operatives relied on European logistical support networks to carry out their missions. Moreover, each is also believed to have been trained by elements tied directly to Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah's chief operations officer.
In at least one case, Hezbollah's European operations and the group's efforts to undermine the peace process intersect. In mid-2003, Israeli forces arrested Ghulam Mahmud Qawqa, a member of an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades cell tied to Hezbollah, for his role in several al-Aqsa bombings in Jerusalem. According to information discovered after his arrest, Qawqa was in the process of engineering attacks on Israeli interests in Europe and Asia on behalf of Hezbollah. In late 2002, Qawqa tasked a Lebanese woman he knew in Germany to photograph the Israeli embassy in Berlin from multiple angles for a possible attack.(see footnote 15)
The above is just a sampling of Hezbollah activity in Europe. Intelligence experts maintain that Hezbollah operatives are located throughout the European continent, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Perhaps what should concern European officials most is the fact that one of the most significant modus operandi that runs through all Hezbollah global activities—financial, logistical and operational—is that at some level all Hezbollah networks are overseen by and are in contact with senior Hezbollah and/or Iranian officials. Moreover, Hezbollah cells are adept multi-taskers, responsible for a variety of logistical, financial and operational duties. They raise funds, recruit new members, conduct preoperational surveillance, provide logistical support, procure weapons and dual use technologies (for both Hezbollah and Iran), and conduct operations.
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Investigators in several countries have concluded independently that security services should avoid looking for cells that are strictly engaged in fundraising, logistical support or terrorist operations. Indeed, cells known only to have raised funds have later been found to have played active roles in terrorist operations, as was the case, for example, in the 1992 and 1994 suicide bombings in Argentina. In the words of one U.S. intelligence official, ''Hezbollah cells are always a bit operational.''(see footnote 16) They are always in contact with senior operatives. For example, Hezbollah operatives in Charlotte, North Carolina, responded directly to Sheikh Abbas Haraki, a senior Hezbollah military commander in South Beirut. At the same time, Hezbolllah procurement agents in Canada who coordinated with the Charlotte cell worked directly with Haj Hasan Hilu Laqis, Hezbollah's chief procurement officer who operates closely with Iranian intelligence.(see footnote 17) Similarly, in Southeast Asia, members of the Hezbollah network behind a failed truck-bombing targeting the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994, as well as a series of other terrorist plots in the region throughout the 1990s, were intimately tied to Iranian intelligence agents. Comprised almost entirely of local sunni Muslims, the network was led by Pandu Yudhawitna who was himself recruited by Iranian intelligence officers stationed in Malaysia in the early 1980s.(see footnote 18)
Hezbollah uses charities and front organizations to conceal its fundraising activities worldwide. Take, for example, the al-Aqsa International Foundation, a terrorist front organization banned by the United States, Germany and Great Britain (though not the European Union). While al-Aqsa primarily served as a Hamas front organization, Sheikh Moayad, the head of the the al-Aqsa office in Yemen, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United States for providing financial support to al-Qaeda. Moayad proudly told an undercover FBI informant that he not only funded Hamas but also raised millions of dollars, recruited operatives, and provided weapons to al-Qaeda. According to one report, one of the foundation's offices in Europe also raised funds for Hezbollah.(see footnote 19)
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According to a research report based on declassified Israeli intelligence Hezbollah receives funds not only from Iran but from charities that are radical Islamist organizations and donate to Hezbollah out of ideological affinity, even if they are not themselves run by Hezbollah operatives. ''Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called 'charity funds.' Some of these are extremist Islamic institutions that, while not directly connected to Hezbollah, support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.''(see footnote 20) The report cites many such charities worldwide, including four in the Detroit area alone: The Islamic Resistance Support Association, the al-Shaid Fund, the Educational Development Association (EDA) and the Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO). Also cited are the the al-Shahid Organization in Canada, the Karballah Foundation for Liberation in South Africa, the Lebanese Islamic Association and al-Shahid Social Relief Institution in Germany, and the Lebanese Welfare Committee, The Help Foundation and The Jam'iyat al-Abrar (Association of the Righteous) in Britain.
The United States and Israel have long pressed their European allies to take action against Hezbollah, but France in particular has refused to follow America, Israel, Canada and Australia in banning Hezbollah, ostensibly for fear of upsetting the domestic political balance in Lebanon where members of the group hold seats in Parliament.
The issue of banning Hezbollah in Europe—where the EU is a member of the peace process Quartet—is now back on the table, this time at the request of Palestinian officials. ''We know that Hezbollah has been trying to recruit suicide bombers in the name of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to carry out attacks which would sabotage the truce,'' stated one Palestinian official. Indeed, just hours after the most recent ceasefire announcement, al-Aqsa members fired on a car near an Israeli settlement in the West Bank and then attacked the army unit sent to investigate the shooting. Another PA official cited intercepted email communications and bank transactions indicating that Hezbollah has increased its payments to terrorists: ''Now they are willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation whereas in the past they paid $20,000, then raised it to $50,000.'' Indeed, in a late January meeting in Beirut, even as ceasefire negotiations were well underway, Hassan Nasrallah and Khaled Mishal, the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively, declared that resistance against Israel was the only option until ''all of Palestine'' was liberated. A Palestinian official concluded, ''Hizbullah and Iran are not happy with Abbas's efforts to achieve a cease-fire with Israel and resume negotiations with Israel. That's why we don't rule out the possibility that they might try to kill him if he continues with his policy.''(see footnote 21)
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Despite this, Hezbollah remains markedly absent from the European Union's list of banned terrorist organizations. On May 3, 2002, the EU added eleven organizations and seven individuals to its financial-blocking list of ''persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist acts.'' The action was significant because it marked the first time that the EU froze the assets of non-European terrorist groups. But in an effort to maintain a distinction between terrorist groups' political and charitable activities on the one hand, and their direct terror wings on the other, the EU placed several individual Hezbollah terrorists on its list, but not the organization itself. The decision implied Hezbollah operatives are somehow independent of the group that recruits, trains, and funds them.
At the time, the EU decided not to ban the social-welfare or political wings of Hamas either. But in August 2003 the EU reversed its decision, recognizing the entirety of Hamas as a terrorist organization and banning its political and social wings as well. Despite this history of whitewashing Hezbollah terrorist activity, there are small signs that change may be in the offing. While visiting Israel in February 2000, then-French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin referred to Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. ''France condemns Hezbollah's attacks, and all types of terrorist attacks which may be carried out against soldiers or possibly Israel's civilian population,'' he said.(see footnote 22) Jospin was stoned by Palestinians in Jerusalem and received grief at home for his comments. Reverting to its traditional position, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier stated in February 2005 that ''Hezbollah has a parliamentary and political dimension in Lebanon. They have members of parliament who are participating in parliamentary life. As you know, political life in Lebanon is difficult and fragile.''(see footnote 23)
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But both France and Germany have taken recent action against Hezbollah, suggesting the possibility that European officials may seriously consider the Palestinian request to ban Hezbollah, though likely not until after Lebanese elections. In December 13, 2004, after a year-long debate, France's highest administrative court ordered France-based satellite provider Eutelsat to discontinue all broadcasts of the Hezbollah's satellite channel, Al-Manar.(see footnote 24) The ban was finally instituted after a guest asserted there were Zionist attempts to spread AIDS among Arabs.(see footnote 25)
And in January 2005, a German court upheld a lower court's deportation order against a Hezbollah representative who had lived in Germany for some 20 years. The Dusseldorf court denied the Hezbollah member a visa saying he ''is a member of an organization that supports international terrorism.'' In a statement, the court said that ''Hezbollah is waging a war with bomb attacks against Israel with 'inhumane brutality' against civilians.'' The court also ruled that Germany should not be bound by the absence of Hezbollah from the EU terrorism list.(see footnote 26)
Now that the PA has joined the chorus of those calling on Europe to take action against Hezbollah, Washington should press the EU collectively, and its constituent members individually, to add Hezbollah to the EU terrorism list. While some Europeans point to Hezbollah representation in Parliament and resist banning the group, the fact is that Hezbollah operatives are active throughout Europe and pose a security threat to Jewish, Israeli, American and European targets as well.
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Moreover, Israelis and Palestinians agree that the organization represents the single most dangerous threat to the peace process. Hezbollah is the only so-called political party that finances suicide bombings and has an arsenal of 13,000 rockets; its terrorist operations must not be forgiven for its parallel political activities. As a member of the Quartet, and in light of calls throughout Europe for more proactive attention to the peace process, the EU should do everything in its power to ensure that the ceasefire holds. Banning Hezbollah would go a long way toward facilitating Israeli-Palestinian peace.
HAMAS
Hamas front organizations in Europe started to receive increased attention in 2003, in large part due to the fact that in April of that year two British Muslims of South Asian descent from Derby and Hounslow carried out a Hamas suicide bombing in Tel Aviv after being recruited by the global jihadist group al-Muhajiroon in Britain and instructed by Hamas leaders in Syria. The following month, U.S. and British authorities both froze the funds of the al Aqsa International Foundation. But the U.S. alone listed Hamas front organizations such as Britain's Interpal, France's Commite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP), Switzerland's Association de Secours Palestinien, and Austria's Palestinian Association. The fact that groups like Hamas run charities in Europe should not surprise: a 1996 CIA document widely reported on in the press reveals that authorities were aware even then that Hamas fronts like Human Appeal International and Human Relief International were operating offices in London.
At a 1994 Hamas planning meeting in Philadelphia, one participant stressed that the U.S. ''is a secure place for the movement'' and noted that ''Europe also can play the same role.''(see footnote 27) To be sure, similar Hamas support networks are indeed active across Europe.
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For example, over the course of 2003, authorities in the United States, UK, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland took action against the al-Aqsa International Foundation (also referred to as the al Aqsa Fund or the al Aqsa Charitable Foundation), a Hamas front organization operating throughout Europe, South Africa, Pakistan, and Yemen that ''raised millions of dollars a year.''(see footnote 28) The organization had already been outlawed in Israel in 1997 and declared a terrorist organization there the following year. According to a statement issued by Britain's Treasury Ministry in May 2003, ''strong evidence from international law enforcement agencies links al-Aqsa Foundation with terrorist activity.''(see footnote 29) A Canadian intelligence report also lists al-Aqsa as a charity providing ''fundraising and propaganda activities for Hamas.''(see footnote 30) In January 2003, the head of al-Aqsa's Yemen office, Shaykh Mohammad Ali Hassan al-Moayad, was arrested in Germany. According to court documents filed in support of his arrest warrant, Moayad offered an FBI informant a receipt showing that he had transferred $70,000 to Interpal, the Hamas front in London, as proof of his ability ''to get money to the Jihad.'' Moayad also told FBI informants he had provided $3.5 million to Hamas and $20 million to al-Qaeda.(see footnote 31) A Palestinian intelligence document dated July 2000 and seized by Israeli authorities two years later included the al Aqsa Charitable Foundation in a list of foreign institutions that support Hamas.(see footnote 32) Documents seized from the offices of Hamas charities in the West Bank revealed significant funding was received from the al Aqsa Foundation.(see footnote 33) While some documents refer to otherwise innocuous donations such as ''food packages'' and ''holiday packages,'' many specifically note ''The project of assistance to the families of the martyrs, the wounded and those who sustained damage.''(see footnote 34) In one case, a document found at the al-Islah Charitable Society in Bethlehem documented donations for thousands of dollars earmarked for the families of martyrs from the al Aqsa offices in Germany, Holland, South Africa, as well as from Interpal (which also coordinated the donations).(see footnote 35)
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One of the clearest pieces of evidence tying al Aqsa and its most senior officers to Hamas comes from the 1993 interrogation of Abd al-Hakim Muhammad abd al-Fatah Abd al-Rahman, a Hamas activist from the Palestinian village of Bir Naballah near Jerusalem. Abd al-Rahman revealed that before he left for Germany to pursue his studies, he approached Sheikh Jamil Hamami—a senior Hamas leader in the West Bank—about joining Hamas. Hamami instructed Abd al-Rahman to contact Mahmoud Amru, the head of the al Aqsa Foundation in Germany, who Hamami described as a senior Hamas activist in Aachen, Germany. Abd al-Rahman contacted Amru though the local Islamic Center, and continued to be in touch with him throughout the course of his studies in Germany. Amru served as his contact with other Hamas activists in Germany, provided him with ideological materials, and helped him contact Hamas activists in Jordan.(see footnote 36)
The al Aqsa International Foundation, like many European charities tied to Hamas, has operated in close cooperation with Interpal, a designated Hamas front in London. On August 22, 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department added Interpal and Hamas front organizations in Austria, France, Switzerland, and Lebanon to its terrorism list. The other charities were the Commite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP) in France, the Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP) in Switzerland, the Palestinian Association in Austria (PVOE), and the since defunct Sanabil Association for Relief and Development in Lebanon.(see footnote 37) On November 21, 2003, Australia followed suit and listed these same Hamas fronts, along with six Hamas leaders, as terrorist entities and seized their funds.(see footnote 38) The Canadians also cited Interpal (Palestinian's Relief and Development Fund) and the Comite de Bienfaisance et de Soliarity avec la Palestine, a charity in France, as Hamas fronts.(see footnote 39) Interpal has been linked to a host of Hamas front organizations in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, not only through receipts found in Hamas charities, but also via telephone intercepts introduced in the case of Sheikh Raed Salah, an Israeli-Arab leader charged with funneling money to Hamas. Transcripts reveal Salah engaged in conversations with Interpal officials and other Hamas financial supporters throughout Europe.(see footnote 40)
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Despite extensive public evidence of its ties to Hamas, on September 24, 2003, Britain's Charity Commission for England and Wales gave Interpal a clean bill of health. While the Commission came to the same conclusion after investigating Interpal in 1996, the group has since been widely recognized as one of largest Hamas front organizations operating in the West. For example, already in 1996, authorities determined that the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), both humanitarian organizations involved in funding global jihadist groups, were funding Hamas through Interpal. In documents confiscated at the time, recipient Hamas organizations were asked to send thank-you letters directly to the IIRO and WAMY rather than Interpal. Authorities now know the trend continued after the Charity Commission last cleared Interpal of charges linking it to Hamas in 1996. Interpal featured prominently in the index of documents seized by Israeli forces from Hamas charity committees across the West Bank in April 2002. Donations from fronts like Interpal came in droves, usually transferred through local branches of Middle Eastern banks.
It was just a few weeks before the Charity Commission's decision to clear Interpal, on August 22, 2003, that the United States announced its designation of Interpal and several other groups with which it is affiliated as ''Specially Designated Global Terrorist.''(see footnote 41) Against this backdrop, and coming on the heals of the European Union's long overdue decision to include Hamas on its list of banned terrorist groups, a decision it finally took on September 6, 2003, the Charity Commission's ruling to unfreeze Interpal's accounts was a particularly unwelcome setback to the international effort to sideline Hamas and resurrect the peace process.
Though the Charity Commission claimed U.S. authorities failed to provide evidence to substantiate their charges, a senior US Treasury Department official testified before the US Congress the day after the Commission's decision that the US provided definitive proof of Interpal's financial ties to Hamas.(see footnote 42) Moreover, evidence of Interpal's terror connections comes from a variety of open and classified sources and from several countries, not just the United States.(see footnote 43) Additionally, the Charity Commission's failure to account for the plethora of open source evidence linking Interpal to Hamas was only half the problem. The Commission did not investigate whether Interpal funded Hamas charities or organizations, only whether Interpal was linked to the group's ''political or violent militant activities.''(see footnote 44) The Commission concluded that, ''in the absence of any clear evidence showing Interpal had links to Hamas' political or violent military activities'' its accounts deserved to be unfrozen.(see footnote 45) Though the Commission found that Interpal received funds from The Al Aqsa Foundation in the Netherlands, banned as a Hamas front by several countries—including Britain—it excused the transaction because ''the funds received were in respect of humanitarian work already carried out by Interpal and then invoiced to The Al Aqsa Foundation.''(see footnote 46)
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Clearly, a major factor that inhibited Commission action against Interpal was the popular and alluring though erroneous theory that one can distinguish between the charitable, political and military ''wings'' of terrorist groups like Hamas. In fact, Interpal is tied to Hamas political and violent activities. But even were it not, its support for the group's social service infrastructure—which itself supports Hamas terror—should have been reason enough to ban Interpal as a Hamas front. Consider, for example, a Palestinian General Intelligence report entitled ''Who Finances Hamas?,'' written in the late 1990s, which estimated that Hamas' annual income was between $60–$70 million. The report estimated that of this total, $12 million came from Britain.(see footnote 47)
Hamas operatives in Europe have also played hands-on roles in the groups' terrorist attacks. Mohammed Qassem Sawalha, a Hamas activist and longtime Muslim leader in Britain, was appointed a trustee of the radical Finsbury Park mosque in London in February 2005. The mosque was closed in 2004 because it had come under the influence of Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical Islamic cleric arrested in Britain and charged of some sixteen ofenses, including incitement to murder and possessing a document that would be useful to someone plotting terrorism, among other counts. The mosque was shut for a period after al-Masri's arrest, and Sawalha was named one of five trustees to lead the mosque when it was reopened in early 2005.(see footnote 48) Sawalha's appointment, however, marked little if any improvement upon al-Masri's leadership given Sawalha's own history of supporting Hamas terrorist operations for well over a decade. An August 2003 indictment against Hamas activists in the United States named Sawalha as a co-conspirator and a Hamas activist who provided assistance to those indicted for racketeering and conspiracy, among other charges.(see footnote 49) The indictment, in the case of United States of America v. Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook et al., states that before Sawalha moved to London in the early 1990s he was ''a Hamas leader in the West Bank'' and goes on to cite several cases in which Sawalha conspired with others to support Hamas terrorist operations.(see footnote 50)
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For example, while in London Sawalha met and conspired with Mohammad Salah (one of the defendants) and Mohammad Jarad (another co-conspirator) who were passing through London on route to Israel. According to the indictment, Sawalha provided the two men with instructions on ''Hamas-related activities they were to carry out while in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.'' The indictment further explains how, in August 1992, Sawalha met with Marzook and Salah to discuss the need to ''revitalize Hamas terrorist operations in the West Bank.'' At that meeting Sawalha suggested specific Hamas members in the West Bank who Salah and Jarad could rely on to help revitalize Hamas's terrorist activities. Less than six months later, in January 1993, Sawalha and Salah met yet again in London. At this meeting Sawalha specifically directed Salah to ''provide money to various Hamas members in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.''(see footnote 51)
The presence of Hamas operatives in Europe is especially disconcerting given the extent of the financial, logistical and even operational links Hamas maintains to a wide array of international terrorist groups. For example, a Hamas delegation participated in the 1995 Islamic People's Congress in Sudan where they met Osama bin Laden and representatives of Algerian, Pakistani, Tunisian and other groups.(see footnote 52) In Pakistan, the leader of a jihadi organization there openly admitted to having ''person-to-person contacts'' with other groups, adding, ''sometimes fighters from Hamas and Hezbollah help us.'' Asked where contacts with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are held, the Pakistani answered, ''a good place to meet is in Iran.'' Offering insight into the importance of interpersonal relationships between members of disparate terrorist groups, he added, ''We don't involve other organizations. Just individuals.''(see footnote 53)
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In another sign of the group's global reach, in 2002 Romanian intelligence was reportedly investigating seventy-three Hamas supporters there, mostly on university campuses. Hamas operatives in Romania were said to operate there ''under the screen of the Islamic and Cultural League in Romania.'' According to their investigation, Romanian intelligence concluded, ''Hamas benefits from the logistics of the Islamic and Cultural League.'' Romanian intelligence feared Hamas posed a ''potential threat'' in Romania, ''fueled by the possibility of [Hamas] carrying out attacks on Israeli and U.S. interests or objectives worldwide.''(see footnote 54) Similarly, U.S. officials noted in May 2003 that the Islamic League in Norway sent funds, gold and jewelry it raised to the al Aqsa International Foundation offices in Sweden ''to be provided to Hamas.''(see footnote 55) Unlike many other Hamas fronts whose leaders are publicly circumspect about the final destination of the funds they solicit for Hamas, the Islamic League openly acknowledged such funds were intended to support terrorism. At its May 2002 annual conference, the League's secretary general called on ''all Muslims to provide support and to participate in continuing the suicide operations against Israel.''(see footnote 56)
Finally, there are increasingly disturbing signs that elements within Hamas are seriously considering conducting attacks targeting Western interests. In some cases Hamas operatives are being recruited into al-Qaeda; in at least one case Hamas trained a Palestinian living in Canada to conduct operations in North America. This activity, though focused on North America, must be assumed to parallel Hamas activity in Europe as well.
In its August 2004 affidavit for a warrant to search Ismael Elbarasse's car, the FBI noted that while Hamas does not typically target U.S. interests, a 1993 plot to bomb New York landmarks was carried out by conspirators from several jihadist groups, including Hamas. It also noted that ''al Qaeda commanders and officials stationed in western countries, including the United States, have recruited operatives and volunteers to carry out reconnaissance or serve as couriers.'' The post-9/11 crackdown on al-Qaeda has produced ''a renewed emphasis by al Qaeda to find confirmed jihadist supporters in the United States by trying to enlist proven members of other groups such as Hamas to make up for the vacuum on the field level.''(see footnote 57)
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In at least one other case, Hamas members themselves plotted potential attacks against Western targets. Jamal Akal, a Palestinian with Canadian citizenship, was charged by Israeli authorities with using the ruse of visiting family in Gaza to be trained by Hamas for operations in Canada and the U.S. According to an Israeli press release, Akal admitted he was trained in explosives production and taught to use an M–16 by recently recruited Hamas operative Ahmed Wahabe.(see footnote 58) Wahabe tasked Akal to return home and ''gather information (via the media) on a senior Israeli official who was arriving in the U.S. Wahabe instructed him to then monitor the senior Israeli official's movements and attempt to assassinate her in a sniper attack. Wahabe also asked Akal to attack members of the US and Canadian Jewish communities, either by shooting or by bombing their homes and/or cars.''(see footnote 59) Akal's lawyer, Jamil al-Qhateb, confirmed Akal was approached by Hamas and underwent small arms training in Gaza, but insisted Akal never agreed to conduct attacks in Canada.(see footnote 60) According to information released by Israeli authorities, ''Wahabe told Akal (inter alia): 'New York is an easy place to find Jews'.''(see footnote 61) In a statement issued by the Israeli Embassy in Ottawa an Israeli official confirmed that Akal was to use his Canadian passport to ''cary out terrorist attacks in North America against Israeli and Jewish targets . . . Some of the scenarios for those terrorist attacks were assassinating a high-level Israeli official during his visit to North America, booby-trapping cars that belong to Israeli officials—diplomats—and killing a Jew who would come across Mr. Akals's way.''(see footnote 62)
Akal was specifically instructed to draw on the support of Hamas sympathizers in Canada to fund his attacks. In typical dawa tradition, Akal was told to approach people in the mosques he frequents in Canada and ''raise funds, ostensibly for the families of suicide bombers, which he would actually use for purchasing a weapon and financing his expenses in monitoring his prospective targets and in perpetrating attacks.''(see footnote 63) In another sign of the link between Hamas political and military leaders, at the time of Akal's arrest he and Wahabe were reportedly awaiting approval from the Hamas political leadership to conduct the attacks under al-Qaeda's name, not Hamas, in an effort to evade the potential blowback of conducting such attacks in the West.(see footnote 64)
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CONCLUSION
The foreign funding of subversive domestic organizations linked to designated terrorist groups poses immediate dangers to the national security of the United States and our European allies alike. This much is clear: should Western democracies fail to adapt the culture of our law enforcement and intelligence communities, to enact appropriate laws and procedures, and to commit the necessary resources and resolve, we will find the war on terror that much harder to fight, lasting that much longer in duration, and exacting that much higher and tragic a cost in human life.
Counterterrorism is not about defeating terrorism; it is about constricting the environment in which terrorists operate—making it harder for them to do what they want to do at every level: conducting operations, procuring and transferring false documents, ferrying fugitives from one place to another; financing, raising, and laundering funds. It is about making it more difficult for terrorists to conduct their operational, logistical, and financial activities. Only with greater international coordination will authorities succeed in targeting Hezbollah's international financial support network and constricting the operating environment in which this designated terrorist organization currently thrives.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Levitt. We really appreciate that.
Mr. Vidino, welcome to the Committee today.
Mr. VIDINO. Thank you.
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Mr. BARRETT. We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. LORENZO VIDINO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ''THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT''
Mr. VIDINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the situation in Europe.
The March 11, 2004, train bombings that killed almost 200 commuters in Madrid shocked most Europeans as the attacks represented the first massive strike by Islamist terrorists on European soil. The bombings nevertheless did not surprise security officials on both sides of the ocean as the intelligence community was well aware that it was just a matter of time before Europe would become a target.
Over the last 10 years, in fact, Europe has seen a troubling escalation of Islamist terrorist and extremist activities on its soil. This disturbing phenomenon is due to a combination of several factors and chiefly to: Lax immigration policies that have allowed known Islamic radicals to settle in Europe, the radicalization of significant segments of the continent's growing Muslim population, and thirdly, the European law enforcement agencies' inability to effectively dismantle terrorist networks due to poor attention to the problem and/or the lack of proper legal tools.
Given this premise, it should come as no surprise that almost every attack carried out or attempted by al-Qaeda before and after 9/11 has some link to Europe, and, as we all know, the effects of 9/11 themselves were partially planned between Germany and Spain. Investigations in these cases reveal that different cells operating throughout Europe were involved in the planning. The European-based Islamists also play an essential role in raising or laundering money, supplying false documents and weapons, and recruiting new operatives for the global Islamist network. It is therefore not farfetched to speak of Europe as a new Afghanistan, a place that al-Qaeda and others have chosen as headquarters for their operations.
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The foundations for this security disaster were laid in the 1980s when many European countries either granted political asylum or allowed entrance to hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists, many of them veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets.
Europeans mistakenly thought that once in Europe these committed radicals would have stopped their violent activities. To the contrary, as soon as they settled on European soil most Islamic radicals exploited the continent's freedoms and continued their efforts to overthrow Middle Eastern governments, and it was in Europe that Islamic radicals from different countries forged strategic alliances. Originally intending only to fight the secular regimes of their own countries, top members of various terrorist groups joined forces in European radicals' mosques where bin Laden's vision of a global jihad came to life. Moreover, the mosques and networks established by radicals who had been given asylum played a crucial role in what can be considered Europe's biggest social and security problem, the radicalization of its growing Muslim population.
Europe is facing a monumental problem in trying to integrate the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants who have come to the continent since the 1960s. For many of them, radical Islam has become a vehicle of protest against their problems of unemployment and discrimination. While Europe needs to face its social problems, it also needs to address the inefficiencies of its legal systems in effectively fighting Islamic terrorism. The excellent work done by European intelligence and law enforcement agencies has often been squandered by the courts, first to enforce laws with the insufficiently banished individuals who associated themselves for terrorist purposes or imposed extremely elevated evidentiary requirements. Germany's inability to convict Mzoudi and Motassadeq, the two Moroccans who provided support to some of the 9/11 hijackers, is just the most known example of a series of failures to convict terrorists or terrorism sympathizers throughout Europe.
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The high threshold that has to be met in order to make an arrest or even monitor a known fundamentalist has recently created painful consequences. Some of the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombings had been known to Spanish intelligence as radical Islamists since 1999. Some of them had had their phone conversations intercepted and their apartments searched, but no charge could be brought against them since they had committed no crime. Similarly, Mohammed Bouyeri had been monitored by Dutch intelligence for more than a year before he assassinated Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Even though he had posted death threats against members of the Dutch Elite on the Internet and was associated with known terrorists, Dutch authorities had no legal power to detain him. Hundreds of Islamist terrorists carry European passports either by birth or through naturalization and can therefore enter the United States without a visa. It is not a coincidence that the three men, who have been charged just 2 weeks ago for their role in a plot to attack various financial institutions in the United States, were all British citizens from al-Qaeda, dispatched on several surveillance missions to the States, counting on the fact that their British passports would have made their entrance into the United States easier.
As the effects of 9/11 have painfully shown, events that occur overseas can have a direct impact on the security of this country and its interests abroad. It is therefore crucial for the United States to follow carefully the events taking place in Europe and to closely cooperate with European counterparts.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vidino follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LORENZO VIDINO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ''THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT''
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice-Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the threat posed to Europe by Islamist extremism.
The deadly train bombings that killed almost 200 commuters in Madrid on March 11, 2004, shocked most Europeans, as the attacks represented the first massive strike by Islamist terrorists on European soil. The Madrid bombings, nevertheless, did not surprise security officials on both sides of the ocean, as the intelligence community was well aware that it was just a matter of time before Europe, one of the terrorists' favorite bases of operations, could become a target.
Over the last ten years, in fact, Europe has seen a troubling escalation of Islamist terrorist and extremist activities on its soil. This disturbing phenomenon is due to a combination of several factors and chiefly to:
lax immigration policies that have allowed known Islamic radicals to settle and remain in Europe,
the radicalization of significant segments of the continent's burgeoning Muslim population, and
the European law enforcement agencies' inability to effectively dismantle terrorist networks, due to poor attention to the problem and/or the lack of proper legal tools.
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Given these premises, it should come as no surprise that almost every single attack carried out or attempted by al Qaeda throughout the world has some link to Europe, even prior to 9/11. A Dublin-based charity provided material support to some of the terrorists who attacked the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Part of the planning for the thwarted Millennium bombing that was supposed to target the Los Angeles International Airport was conceived in London. False documents provided by a cell operating between Belgium and France allowed two al Qaeda operatives to portray themselves as journalists and assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, the commander of the Afghan Northern Alliance, just two days before 9/11. And, as we well know, the attacks of 9/11 were partially planned in Hamburg, Germany, where three of the four pilots of the hijacked planes had lived and met, and from where they received extensive financial and logistical support until the day of the attacks.
After 9/11, as the al Qaeda network became less dependent on its leadership in Afghanistan and more decentralized, the cells operating in Europe gained even additional importance. Most of the planning for the April 2002 bombing of a synagogue in the Tunisian resort town of Djerba that killed 21 mostly European tourists was done in Germany and France. According to Moroccan authorities, the funds for the May 2003 Casablanca bombings came from Moroccan cells operating between Spain, France, Italy and Belgium. And cells operating in Europe have also directly targeted the Old Continent. Only after 9/11, attacks have been either planned or executed in Madrid, Paris, London (in at least 4 different circumstances), Milan, Berlin, Porto and Amsterdam.
However, while investigations in all these cases revealed that different cells operating throughout Europe were involved in the planning of the operation, the role of these cells extends beyond the simple planning or execution of attacks. European-based Islamists raise or launder money, supply false documents and weapons and recruit new operatives for a global network that spans from the United States to the Far East. Within the last decade, their role has become essential to the mechanics of the network. It is, therefore, not far-fetched to speak of Europe as ''a new Afghanistan,'' a place that al Qaeda and others have chosen as its headquarters to direct operations.
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Origins and developments of Islamist terrorism in Europe
The foundations for this security disaster were laid in the 1980's, when many European countries either granted political asylum or allowed the entrance to hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists, many of them veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets facing persecution in their home countries. Moved by humanitarian reasons, for decades countries like Britain, Sweden, Holland and Germany have made it their official policy to welcome political refugees from all over the world. But blinded by their laudable intentions of providing protection to all individuals suffering political persecutions from autocratic regimes throughout the world, most European countries never really distinguished between opponents of dictatorships who wanted to spread democracy and Islamic fundamentalists who had bloodied their hands in their home countries with heinous terrorist acts. As a consequence, some of the world's most radical Islamists facing prosecutions in the Middle East found not only a safe haven but also a new convenient base of operation in Europe.
Many European governments thought that, once in Europe, these committed Islamists would have stopped their violent activities. Europeans also naively thought that, by giving the mujaheddin asylum, they would have been spared their murderous wrath. All these assumptions turned out to be completely wrong. In fact, as soon as they settled on European soil, most Islamic radicals exploited the continent's freedom and wealth to continue their efforts to overthrow Middle Eastern governments, raising money and providing weapons and false documents for their groups operating in their countries of origin.
And it was in Europe that Islamic radicals from different countries converged and forged strategic alliances. Originally intending only to fight the secular regimes of their own countries, top members of various Islamist terrorists groups, drawn to the radical mosques of Europe, joined forces with their colleagues who all adhered to the same Salafi/Wahhabi ideology and shared the common dream of a global Islamic state. It was between London and Milan, for example, that the strategic alliance between Algerian and Tunisian terrorist groups was conceived. Europe, along with al Qaeda's Afghan training camps, was the place where Bin Laden's project of ''global jihad'' came to realization, as various Islamist groups progressively abandoned their local goals and embraced al Qaeda's strategy of attacking America and its allies worldwide.
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Moreover, the mosques and networks established by radicals who had been given asylum played a crucial role in what could be considered Europe's biggest social and security problem, the radicalization of its growing Muslim population. Europe is facing monumental problems in trying to integrate the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants who have come to the continent since the 1960s. Dangerously high percentages of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants live at the margins of European societies, stuck between unemployment and crime. While they hold French, Dutch or British passports, they do not have any attachment to their native land, feeling like foreigners in their home countries.
''After things didn't work out with work, I decided to devote myself to the Koran,'' explained an Islamic fundamentalist interviewed by the German magazine Der Spiegel. As they perceive themselves with no economic future, trapped in a country that does not accept them and without a real identity, many young European Muslims turn to their fathers' religion in their quest for direction. While some of them find solace in their rediscovered faith, others adopt the most belligerent interpretation of Islam, embarking on a holy war against their own country. According to a French intelligence report, radical Islam represents for some French Muslims ''a vehicle of protest against . . . problems of access to employment and housing, discrimination of various sorts, the very negative image of Islam in public opinion.''
Whether this troubling situation is due to the European societies' reluctance to fully accept newcomers or on some Muslims' refusal to adapt to new customs is hard to say. Nevertheless, given the burgeoning numbers of Muslim immigrants living in Europe, currently estimated between 15 and 20 million, the social repercussions of these sentiments are potentially explosive.
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While it is true that the situation in the immigrant suburbs of many European cities is dramatic and that it is difficult for the children of Muslim immigrants to emerge in mainstream European society, the popular paradigm that equates militancy with poverty is simplistic and refuted by the facts. An overview of the European-born Muslim extremists that have been involved with terrorism, in fact, shows that many of them came from backgrounds of intact families, with financial stability and complete immersion in mainstream European society. The example of Omar Sheikh—the British-born son of a wealthy Pakistani merchant who attended some of England's most prestigious private schools, led a Pakistani terrorist group and was jailed for his role in the beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl—shows that the causes of radicalization are deeper for many individuals.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that young, disaffected Muslims living at the margins of European societies are the ideal recruits for terrorist organizations. The recruitment takes place everywhere, from mosques to cafes in Arab neighborhoods of European cities to the internet. As in the US, European prisons are considered a particularly fertile breeding ground for radicalism, a place where young men already prone to violence can be easily turned into terrorists. In France, for example, where unofficial estimates indicate that more than 60% of the inmates are Muslims (while Muslims represent only 10% of the total French population), authorities closely monitor the activities of Islamic fundamentalists, aware of the dangers of the radicalization of their jail population. Officials, who estimate that 300 militants are active in the Paris prisons alone, have seen cases of radicals who seek to get arrested on purpose so that they can recruit new militants in jail.
Similarly, in Spain, where one in ten inmates is of Moroccan or Algerian descent, Islamic radicals have been actively recruiting in jail for the last ten years. In October of 2004, Spanish authorities dismantled a cell that had been planning a bloody sequel to the March 11 Madrid bombings, intending to attack the Audiencia Nacional, Spain's national criminal court. Most of the men, who called themselves ''The Martyrs of Morocco'', had been recruited in jail, where they had been detained for credit card fraud and other common crimes and had no prior involvement with Islamic fundamentalism.
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Current trends of terrorism financing in Europe
If the European criminal underworld provides an excellent recruiting pool, crime also constitutes a major source of financing for terrorist organizations. Islamic terrorist groups operating in Europe have resorted to all kinds of crimes to finance their operations, including robberies, document forging, fraud and the sale of counterfeited goods. But more alarming is the fact that Islamist groups have built strong operational alliances with criminal networks operating in Europe.
Over the last few years, Islamic terrorists have been actively involved in one of Europe's most profitable illegal activities, human smuggling. The GSPC, a radical Algerian Islamist group operating in the desert areas of North Africa, is actively involved in smuggling large groups of Sub-Saharan migrants across the desert and then to Europe, where the group can count on an extensive network of cells that provides the illegal immigrants with false documents and safe houses. In 2003, German authorities dismantled a network of Kurdish militants linked to Ansar al Islam, the terrorist group led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi that is battling US forces in Iraq. The Kurdish cells had organized a sophisticated and profitable scheme to smuggle hundreds of illegal Kurdish immigrants into Europe, raising hundreds of thousands of dollars. Considering that, on average, a migrant pays about $4,000 to his smugglers and that around 500,000 illegal immigrants reach Europe every year, terrorist groups have all the reasons to get involved in the human smuggling business.
Likewise, the terrorists' use of drug trafficking is also considered a particularly serious problem by European authorities, which believe that terrorist organizations have infiltrated around two thirds of the $12.5 billion-a-year Moroccan hashish trade. Evidence from recent terrorist operations reveals that profits from drug sales have directly financed terrorist attacks. According to Spanish authorities, Jamal Ahmidan, a known drug dealer and one of the operational masterminds of the Madrid train bombings, obtained the 220 pounds of dynamite that were used in the attacks in exchange for 66 pounds of hashish. And Ahmidan also flew to the island of Mallorca shortly before March 11 to arrange the sale of hashish and ecstasy, planning to use the profits for additional attacks. The schem