SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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26–438PDF
2006
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD
IRAN—NEXT STEPS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 8, 2006
Serial No. 109–183
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
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JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
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ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
HILLEL WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel
JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State
The Honorable Robert Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State
John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation
Michael A. Ledeen, Ph.D., The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
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Mr. Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
Abbas William Samii, Ph.D., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Nicholas Burns: Prepared statement
The Honorable Robert Joseph: Prepared statement
John C. Hulsman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement
Michael A. Ledeen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement
Mr. Gary Milhollin: Prepared statement
Abbas William Samii, Ph.D.: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN—NEXT STEPS
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2006
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House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:23 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman HYDE. Iran presents perhaps the most difficult national security problem confronting the United States. Should Iran's clerical regime acquire nuclear weapons, as is its evident aim, it would be able to foment mischief in its region or beyond without fear of regime threatening retaliation other than from another nuclear power.
In a suicidal mode, it could well lash out at Israel, Europe or at American forces in the region. Inevitably, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear powers of their own so that they will not have to rely on others to secure their survival. Were Iran not in such an important location, its behavior might be of marginal concern, even though we would reprove it for its abysmal human rights record and especially its record of religious intolerance. But Iran produces a significant portion of the world's petroleum resources. Moreover, it can threaten from its proximity to the energy fields of the Arab countries, of the Gulf and its ability to close the Straits of Hormuz, much of the world's energy supply. While we are less dependent on Gulf energy than are some of our major allies and trading partners, any disruption in oil supply from the Gulf would, as we have known for decades, present a major economic and national security problem. Given the current lack of non-Gulf excess production capacity, instability in the Gulf would cause world oil prices to spike significantly. Because of Iran's economic importance, it has thus far proven to be hard to isolate or pressure successfully. Japan, for example, derives 15 percent of its energy from Iran and fully 90 percent of its energy from the Middle East. What should a Japanese political leader do if that country is asked to cut itself off from Iranian oil?
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Because of Iran's size and military capacity, it is hard to coerce militarily, and it may prove to be exceedingly difficult to disable its nuclear assets. Any attempt to do so is likely to strengthen the most retrograde political forces there.
Iran's leaders know all this, which is evidently why they have continued to defy the world, breaking agreements and ignoring international standards of behavior with abandon. Iran's internal politics are dominated by a clerical clique that holds power by force, but which also enjoys the active support of a strong minority of the Iranian population and the passive support of a larger share.
Iranian nationalist sentiment can be stirred up easily. At the same time, the United States is popular in Iran, not least because we clearly oppose that regime and support the Iranian people's true aspirations for peace and economic progress.
The Administration has begun reaching out even more strongly and proposed a $75 million public diplomacy program in Fiscal Year 2006 supplemental budget now under consideration. The Administration's approach to Iran in earlier years lacked focus, but for the past year it has found its footing and concentrated on a diplomatic strategy that has borne fruit not in the sense that Iran has been convinced to change its behavior, but in the sense that the world community is more united than ever on the proposition that Iran must change.
This is a remarkable accomplishment for which the Administration deserves great credit. We got Iran to the Security Council not by bullying or sanctioning the IAEA's members, but by persistent and skillful diplomacy. We will move forward the same way.
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We need to keep that in mind as we craft legislation to deal with Iran, although I think the Administration has sufficient tools and ample motivation right now. The next step will require cooperation by states which have a lot to lose in the short term by alienating Iran's regime, so we must be able to show them that it is in their long-term interest to join us in the next difficult phase of this effort.
I now yield to my colleague, Mr. Lantos, for any opening comments he may have.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As we consider the question of United States policy toward Iran today, there is no room for naiveté. We must be as clear-eyed as the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Philippe Douste-Blazy, was 3 weeks ago when he said, and I quote:
''No civilian nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program. It is a clandestine military nuclear program. Now it is up to the Security Council to say what it will do, what means it will use to stop, to manage, to halt this terrible crisis of nuclear proliferation caused by Iran.''
Mr. Chairman, I have not often had occasion recently to applaud statements from the French Foreign Ministry, but in this case I do so emphatically and without reservation.
The Iranians are hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. If any leader any place on this planet still doubts this, he is in urgent need of medical attention. There is no other reasonable explanation for the nearly 20 years of lies and deceptions about their covert nuclear activities.
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We need to come to terms with this fact, and we need to respond with resolve. There are no good options in this situation, Mr. Chairman, and it comes at a time when we confront numerous serious other crises globally.
This week, as we await the conclusion of the IAEA meetings in Vienna and the shifting of the Iran file to the UN Security Council, one thing is clear. The long Kabuki dance between Iran and the EU–3 has run its course. There may be more meetings, but the oil-rich Iranians have decisively and contemptuously scorned Europe's offer of economic benefits as an incentive to end their nuclear program.
As the statement by the French Foreign Minister makes clear, the Iranians gave the European Union a cold dose of reality. Now there is a new Kabuki dance, Mr. Chairman, and many people are pinning their hopes on a proposal to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil, but giving Putin's operatiks control of this process would be putting the fox in charge of the hen house.
Moscow has been the number one enabler, supporter and investor in Iran's nuclear program. It built the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. For over a decade, Moscow resisted United States entreaties to halt its work and to crack down on Russian scientists providing Iran with covert support.
As you recall, Mr. Chairman, sometime back I took a special trip to Moscow to meet with Russian's Minister of Energy on this issue. He gave me a handsome necktie with the logo of the Energy Ministry, but I was as unsuccessful in changing Russian views as was former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and indeed the President.
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Extending discussion of the plan to have Russian enriched uranium for Iran would just bolster Tehran's effort to stall the international community while it secretly pursues its nuclear capability.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that every single Iranian move for a long time now has just been taken to gain time to develop their nuclear weapons, and, willingly or otherwise, Western Powers played along with this phoney charade, which is palpably clear for a child to see.
A recent newspaper headline summed it up well in ''Nuclear Confrontation, Iran Bets that the World will Blink First.'' That is exactly what the Islamic Republic of Iran is betting on, and that is exactly what the Iran Freedom Support Act, H.R. 282, is intended to prevent.
Iran's quest for nuclear arms requires us to do two things: Squeeze Iran's economy as much as possible, and do so without delay. Our legislation, which this Committee will consider next week, will require the United States Government to sanction any company or nation that invests more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector. Current legislation to this end is set to expire this summer. Our new legislation will make it permanent.
The Executive Branch has largely ignored the current legislation. Our legislation will contain provisions that will require the Administration to enforce the law. Moreover, it will require United States-based pension funds to divest themselves of foreign corporations that invest in Iran.
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Mr. Chairman, there is no time to lose. We all know that Iranian nuclear arms would seriously destabilize the region. It would intimidate its neighbors and provoke them to seek nuclear arms as well. We all know that senior Iranian leaders are driven by a blood-thirsty fanaticism that characterize suicide bombers in Iraq and in the Palestinian territories.
We all know that hatred in the heart of the Iranian President who denies the Holocaust, calls for Israel to be wiped off the map and speaks rapturously of a day when America will no longer exist. This state, run by widely irrational terrorists, simply cannot be allowed to possess the ultimate weapon of terror.
I call on all governments and all companies in Europe and Asia not to wait for our legislation. I call on them immediately to suspend and terminate their existing Iranian investments, just as the United States did over a decade ago.
Soon, I hope, the UN Security Council will require UN members to reject all investment and non-humanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear weapons production program. It should declare unambiguously that Iran's 20 years of nuclear deceit disqualified from any right to possess nuclear material production facilities.
We cannot let Iran mock the international communities' nonproliferation regime. If we do, that regime itself will become a joke. We must keep the pressure on our friends and allies who mistakenly believe that continued trade and investment will persuade the Ayatollahs to end their single-minded quest for nuclear weapons.
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We need to avail ourselves of all diplomatic, economic and strategic opportunities to avert a global danger, the nightmare of Iranian nuclear weapons that would irrevocably and permanently change our already crisis-filled world for something dramatically worse. In a word, Mr. Chairman, Iran must not and will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons.
Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
I will now recognize Members if they feel a compulsion to speak for 1 minute. We tried 2 minutes last time, and we consumed an hour and 14 minutes. I would prefer getting to the witnesses as quickly as possible, so we will revert to 1 minute for any remarks a Member chooses to make.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today is International Women's Day, and I am very pleased to recognize some women who will be following me around in my activities today from Iraq and Ireland, so hats off to them. Thank you for supporting women's rights worldwide.
Mr. Chairman, the potential threat to our security and interest is magnified by the fact that Iran is the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. The threat posed by Iranian terrorism became very clear in November 1979 when radicals stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran, took Americans hostage and held them for 444 days.
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Some of these brave Americans who endured 444 days in captivity are in the audience today. I would like to call them by name and have them be recognized. Ambassador Bruce Laingen, Richard Morefield, Kathryn Koob, David Roeder. Please stand up. Charles Jones, Bill Daugherty, Barry Rosen, Rocky Sickmann, Moorhead Kennedy and family members also.
Let us give them a round of applause. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. To this day, Iran has not paid for this crime, and these witnesses to Iranian terrorism will tell you that failure to hold Iran accountable for its actions throughout the last 25 years has only served to embolden the enemy and continue its destructive path.
Today at 5:30 in Rayburn Room 2200 we are going to have a reception and a video presentation of the ''First War on Terror,'' which is a short documentary film that examines United States and Iranian relations over the last 25 years. Welcome and welcome.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Berman of California?
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Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just briefly, the Administration seems to have invested a great deal in this Russian effort to try and establish an agreement with Iran. I have no idea whether Iran is likely to accept what the Russians are proposing, but what I am curious about and hope the testimony elaborates on is if in fact Iran was to accept the Russian proposal just what is the specific nature of it related to the suspension of conversion and enrichment of the parallel military programs, of grabbing the materials that have already been converted in Iran, of continued inspections both of the programs we know about and the programs we suspect that exist.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. And whether or not were they to accept that agreement we in fact would have stopped the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith of New Jersey?
Mr. SMITH FROM NEW JERSEY. Mr. Chairman, alluding to your admonition——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. SMITH FROM NEW JERSEY. Let me just finish.
Chairman HYDE. Just a moment, Mr. Smith.
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Who is seeking recognition?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HYDE. Is that Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Indeed.
Chairman HYDE. What is it, Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like very much for you to please reconsider your position of allowing Members only 1 minute to speak and prefacing it by saying if you feel compelled to say anything.
The people here on this Committee, with all due respect, are very interested in policy issues, and to give them first an admonition if they wanted a meager 60 seconds and then limit them to that is rather insulting to the intelligence of people who come here to discuss policy and have no other opportunity but to do that when the Chair decides to call a long overdue hearing on an issue.
I think that Mr. Smith and Mr. Berman and everybody else deserve to at least be able to finish a coherent sentence and maybe to get out a thought or two before the gavel is rapped upon them.
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I respectfully ask, especially if a hearing is held where a Subcommittee has not held a hearing, to at least allow 2 minutes.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Wait. If the gentleman would yield?
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would be happy to yield to the Chairwoman, who had 2 minutes.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ranking Member of our Middle East Subcommittee, we have held numerous hearings on the issue of Iran, which you have attended and made opening statements as long as you wanted to, and I would be glad to give you a list of those hearings. Perhaps you have just not remembered them.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Reclaiming my time, I remember very well, and I just said in those instances——
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But you said that we have not had the hearings.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No. I said in those instances where there are no hearings to allow the Chairperson such as yourself, who was allowed 2 minutes, and the Ranking Member, who obviously will not be allowed 2 minutes, to have 2 minutes if their Subcommittee does not have a hearing on the subject that is called.
There have been quite a few hearings that have fit that definition, Mr. Chairman. I just respectfully on behalf of all of the Members on this Committee, Democrats and Republicans, make that request in the interest of policy that we are here to seriously discuss to further the interest of the United States, something we all care jointly about.
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Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. The Chair notes with interest what Mr. Ackerman says, always notes with interest what Mr. Ackerman says, and when you are Chairman, Mr. Ackerman, you may give each Member as long as they want prior to hearing the witnesses.
For myself, I choose to hear the witnesses, not a debate among ourselves, which we can have any time, any place we want. We have brought witnesses here to instruct us on the subject under discussion, and the purpose of the hearing is to get to the witnesses, not to hear each other.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HYDE. At least that is my narrow interpretation of the function of the Committee.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I respect that deeply, and I have a tremendous amount of respect for you, your intellect and the contribution you have made to this Congress and to our country.
Chairman HYDE. Then you would understand.
Mr. ACKERMAN. With all due respect, you being here to hear the witnesses and you and the Ranking Member take up as much time as the entire Committee making opening statements, and some of us would like to just get our toe in the water.
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Chairman HYDE. I understand that, and I appreciate your position. When you are Chairman I am sure that will happen, but until then I prefer getting to the witnesses with great——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Does that mean that the Chair will limit himself to 1 minute as well?
Chairman HYDE. The Chairwoman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. The Chair. Would the Chair limit himself to the same rules as the Members are limited to if that is what you are here to do?
Chairman HYDE. No. The Chair is the Chairman——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE [continuing]. And expects to use that prerogative in the most efficacious way to get to the witnesses, which I am not doing a good job right now.
Mr. SMITH FROM NEW JERSEY. Mr. Chairman, in light of your superb statement, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Berman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.
Chairman HYDE. I did not hear you, Mr. Ackerman, but Mr. Lantos as the Ranking Member gets special treatment. The Chairman gets special treatment. The power of recognition rests with the Chairman, and I intend to use it.
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Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Is this to respond to what the Chairman said or for my 60 seconds of contribution?
Chairman HYDE. I prefer your 60 seconds of contribution.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last month Secretary Rice announced a significant shift in our policy toward Iran. She is proposing to spend $85 million to reach out to the Iranian people. While most of this money will be spent on broadcasting, I am concerned about the $10 million identified for empowering Iranian civil society.
My concern is not in principle since I think whatever we can do to foster effective opposition to the mullahs inside Iran is to the good. It is the effective part I am worried about, and our track record in this regard is not good.
First we tried the sort of approach with Iraq only to find out that the Administration's favorite exile, Ahmed Chalabi, took our money, gave us bad information and ultimately had no political support inside of Iraq, so I will be very curious to hear from the Administration whom we have identified to receive this new money and what sort of work they will carry on inside of Iran.
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Second, I think we have great difficulty identifying successful recipients of this money because, frankly, our intelligence in Iran is not particularly good. Iran is opaque to us. We do not see their decision making process well.
We do not understand Iranian society well and so we are handicapped in our ability to discern how decisions get made and who makes them. It means our ability to develop a policy or set policies that will produce the desired outcome is extremely limited.
Lastly, the Secretary's proposal is about the long term, while we should be thinking and acting in accordance with our long-term interests. We do not have a more urgent short-term crisis on our hands. We seem to lurch from deadline to deadline with Iran while they drag out its negotiations with the EU–3 and the Russians.
I fear diplomacy may be producing legitimacy for Iran, but doing little in the way of stopping its nuclear programs. As I said at our hearings a year ago, in order for our diplomatic partners to believe the Iran question is urgent, the Administration needs to convince them that they believe it is urgent.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Paul of Texas?
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Mr. PAUL. Thank you. I turned my mic off on purpose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very quickly, I want to make a point or two. Yesterday, our Ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad, announced that this turned into a Pandora's box of ethnic and sectarian strife. He also said that we have to be there to protect oil supplies. The Chairman today even mentioned how instability in Iran could contribute to a problem with the flow of oil.
Of course, since we have been in Iraq, oil went from $30 to $60. I am just wondering whether our policy now of confrontation with Iran might not take oil from $60 to $120.
ElBaradei just this week said, ''We have not seen indication of diversion of material to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices,'' which we should take note, and also Iran has never been ruled in violation of its international nuclear nonproliferation obligation, which I think we should take note.
More importantly, I think our policy is not exactly in line with international law. The Administration told Iran on Tuesday that any enrichment of nuclear fuel in Iranian territory was unacceptable, and yet the Nonproliferation Treaty says, ''Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all parties to the treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.''
We should pay attention to those comments.
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Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just associate myself with the contribution of my friend from New York, Mr. Ackerman . I share the same concerns, and I would yield whatever time I have remaining to him if he so chooses to utilize it.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher of California?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
First and foremost let us remember through all of this kibitzing that we are at war, and Americans are losing their lives as we speak. We are at war with radical Islam. This is a very serious, not a political, issue, a serious national issue.
If we win the allegiance of moderate Muslims who want their country to live at peace with the West, we may win this war and save millions of lives. If we do not, and if the Iranian mullahs end up the dominant force in that region and indeed in the Muslim world, we are in for real trouble. We are in for historic catastrophic incidents, especially if that is coupled with the Iranian mullahs getting their hands on nuclear weapons.
What we are talking about today is deadly serious, but let us remember that we can combat this threat, the threat posed by these murderous mullahs in Iran, through tough policies—that is pressure from without—but also by supporting the internal reformists, the internal people in Iran who want to live at peace with the West, Iranians who want to have a democratic government, live in a decent country.
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As we discuss this issue, let us not forget our points of leverage—not only pressure from outside, but supporting those moderates on the inside.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne of New Jersey?
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
In order to hear our witnesses, unless Mr. Ackerman would like to use my time. If you have a point? I yield my time to Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no desire to use the time of other Members of the Committee. I was just fighting for the right of everybody to be able to say what they want to say.
Chairman HYDE. As you know, Mr. Ackerman, you get to strike the last words at the end of the testimony, and I do not recall you ever being shut off from that process, so you will have a chance to express yourself fully.
Mr. McCotter?
Mr. MCCOTTER. I have nothing to say, but it is okay.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Blumenauer?
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Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too am eager to get into the discussion. I hope at some point the notion that you reference to the role that Iran plays because of its energy resources might reflect back on our urgency to do something about our dependence on those. A sound, solid energy policy reducing our dependency would I hope filter into that discussion at some point.
Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. I suggest it is one of the major issues confronting us.
Mr. Royce of California?
Mr. ROYCE. You are right, Mr. Chairman. We should hear the witnesses. We should listen, and then we should speak. I withdraw.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Ms. Berkley of Nevada?
Ms. BERKLEY. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Poe of Texas?
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Mr. POE. The United States can make a bold statement by supporting freedom of the Iranian people from their oppression. The State Department in their supplemental request is asking for $5 million for educational outreach. According to the State Department, this funding will build bridges between the people of our nations.
I support democracy through this educational exchange idea, but the United States must use common sense as we identify foreign students for enrollment in our universities. Just last week an Iranian graduate at the University of North Carolina calmly drove his truck through a campus meeting place at Chapel Hill, injuring nine people.
He performed this despicable act to avenge what he called crimes against Islam. This is yet one more act of radical Islam extremists in our country. It is interesting to note he made sure he got his degree before he committed this crime.
We must do our best to ensure that students who receive opportunities to study in America do not use that chance to commit political crimes against us. We already have a Taliban student at Yale, and we must not allow further infiltration of our universities by those who would do destruction to the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff of California?
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
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In addition to the questions that have already been posed by my colleagues, I would love to hear you comment on China. I think a lot of focus has been on Russia, and understandably so, but I am equally concerned about China and their willingness to confront Iran over its nuclear program.
In particular, I think China will view this as an economic decision, and unless we make it very plain to China that there are economic consequences in terms of United States markets there will not be anything in the other balance for them to consider.
If this is truly the top national security issue facing us as the Chairman alluded, and I think it certainly ranks up there, we should be prepared to use our economic leverage. I would be interested to know if you have considered that and how you intend to employ that technique.
Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Issa of California?
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for setting the tone with your opening remarks. I come here with questions, not answers, and I want to hear the speakers so I yield back.
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Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson of California?
Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for coming.
I want to expressly thank Ambassador Burns for taking time to come to the Hill. Your presence tells me that you understand that Congress is not an obstacle to the Executive Branch on foreign policy. Rather, when fully informed we can be the most valuable ally even on delicate issues such as this.
To confront Iran, the United States has assembled a global diplomatic coalition, and we have employed diplomacy to great effect, but the successes we have had have depended on our defense of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We must not forget this.
If our actions elsewhere around the globe weaken the NPT at the very moment that we are relying on it to confront Iran over nuclear weapons, we risk undoing all of our efforts, and on the issues of Iran's nuclear program the stakes are too high for us to accept an American failure.
We are looking forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you very much.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chandler of Kentucky?
Mr. CHANDLER. I yield, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee of California?
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome and thank the witnesses for being here.
I also am extremely concerned with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. Especially, I have grave concerns regarding the threat that a nuclear Iran poses, but I believe that we must increase and enhance our diplomatic means to disarm Iran. We must take an active role in diplomatic engagement.
I think that we must decide whether there is an opportunity to engage the United States in bilateral talks with Iran rather than seeking only to support negotiations of the EU or the efforts of Russia to control the reprocessing of nuclear materials to the satisfaction of the international community.
Yes, Iran must be held to international standards and must disarm. I believe, however, Mr. Chairman, that we will not be well served by another military venture into the Middle East and neither will the cause of nonproliferation, so I think it is about time we enhance and elevate our diplomatic efforts.
Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. I want to thank the Committee for your cooperation. We now can proceed to the witnesses.
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We are privileged to have before us today two high ranking and expert witnesses on the situation in Iran. Our first witness will be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Nicholas Burns. Ambassador Burns has had a long and illustrious career in the Foreign Service in postings throughout the world.
As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Burns currently coordinates all U.S. diplomacy and State Department foreign policy efforts and has taken a special interest in dealing with the situation in Iran.
Dr. Robert Joseph is the current Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Joseph is the principal State Department officer for non- and counterproliferation matters, as well as for arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations and security assistance.
Previously, he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense at the National Security Council.
Gentlemen, without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record. I ask that you limit your oral presentation to about 5 minutes, give or take, as is customary so we may have as much time as feasible for you to respond to questions from Members of the Committee.
Secretary Burns?
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your invitation to Under Secretary Joseph and myself to be with you this morning. Thank you to Mr. Lantos and all the other distinguished Members of this Committee.
I have submitted testimony for the record. I shall not read it in the interest of time. I just have a couple of points that I thought I should make in response to some of the opening comments by Members, but first may I say how much I want to second Representative Ros-Lehtinen's welcome to the American hostages.
Ambassador Bruce Laingen and his colleagues who are here today have gathered from across the United States to come to this hearing and to come over to the State Department this afternoon—I look forward to meeting them—to give us their views on Iraq, and I for one am intensely interested to hear their perspective. They are American heroes.
There were 53 of them taken hostage in November 1979, held unjustly for 444 days, and the fact that they have come out of that experience and contributed so much to our country is a source of great satisfaction to us. Three of them continue to serve in the American Foreign Service, and we are very, very proud of them. I just wanted to mention their presence and thank them for coming today.
Mr. Chairman, the threat posed to the United States by Iran is as great, in our judgment, as any foreign policy challenge that our country faces. The Iranians have issued, in essence, four challenges to our country's interests in the Middle East and globally.
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The first is the clear pursuit of Iran of a nuclear weapons capability.
The second is the fact that Iran is the leading director and chief central banker of the major terrorist groups in the Middle East that have killed Americans and killed Israelis and Lebanese, and which stand in direct opposition to peace in the Middle East.
The third is the attempt by Iran, particularly under the regime of President Ahmadi-Nejad, to exert a dominant role in the Middle East itself and to make Iran into the most powerful country in the Middle East.
The fourth, of course, is the repression of the people of Iran by this autocratic regime. That in essence, in our judgment, represents the totality of the threat that Iran poses to American interests, as well as those to our friends and allies around the world.
What we have attempted to do over the past year in particular is not to have a go-it-alone policy of trying to confront Iran ourselves, but to create a large and diverse international coalition of countries on each of these issues designed to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and to roll back its support for terrorism and to influence the people of Iran who we see as victims of the regime and to assert a comprehensive and aggressive American foreign policy to counter Iran on all of these issues.
My colleague, Bob Joseph, and I have worked very closely together on all of these issues. He is our chief official responsible for nuclear policy, and he will go into some detail on our analysis of their intentions, but suffice it to say that the greatest immediate threat that we face is that Iran is clearly trying to create a nuclear weapons capability.
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I made 11 trips to Europe and to the Middle East in the last year on this issue, and in the hundreds of conversations that I had with Russians, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, not a single person, not a single official from any of those governments, ever said that they doubted that Iran was trying to seek a nuclear weapons capability.
There is no international difference of opinion. There is no debate around the world about the essential fact of what Iran is trying to do, and that does inform our diplomacy and our national strategy.
What we have tried to do is to support those who would try to roll back the Iranians, engage them in negotiations and have them suspend their nuclear activities, so just a year ago this week Secretary Rice announced that we would support the European 3—Britain, France and Germany—in their efforts to negotiate with the Iranians, and we did that for 6 months until the Iranians walked out of the talks with the Europeans, walked out unilaterally and said they were not interested in dealing with the Europeans.
Then we worked throughout the autumn because of that result to create a larger coalition of countries designed to block the Iranians. Secretary Rice went to Moscow in October with President Bush, met President Putin in Asia in November, and we began to assemble this coalition of Russia and China—India had already decided to be with us—which resulted in the historic vote of the IAEA on February 4, where more members of the nonaligned movement voted against Iran than with Iran and where Russia and China and India and Brazil and Egypt and Sri Lanka, as well as Europe and Japan and Australia, voted with us to block the Iranians.
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Secretary Rice had a very important gathering of the foreign ministers of the permanent five countries of the United Nations Security Council about 5 weeks ago, and all of those countries, led by the United States, decided that we would try to block Iran at the IAEA, but give them 30 days to reflect on their isolation.
The 30 days are up, and we believe that next Monday or Tuesday the United Nations Security Council will begin a very active debate about Iran's nuclear ambitions. That debate will be designed to shine a very large and intensive spotlight on what we believe to be a clear Iranian program.
We will likely see a Presidential statement of the Security Council designed to condemn Iran. We would like beyond that to entertain the possibility of a Chapter 7 resolution designed to isolate it and hopefully influence its behavior, but beyond that if Iran does not respond to words and resolutions then we believe that the world community should entertain the possibility of sanctions against Iran.
Now, our country, of course, has had sanctions in place for decades. It is across the board. There may be more that we can do as a country to try to hit against those in Iran via sanctions who build these nuclear programs and design them and who lead the government's efforts, but it is going to be incumbent upon our allies around the world and interested countries to show that they are willing to act should the words and resolutions of the United Nations not suffice.
Mr. Chairman, on terrorism we will be happy to respond to questions on this, but Iranian support for terrorism of course affects every vital American interest and American lives in the Middle East and throughout the world.
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Iran is supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We have noticed the emergence of a nexus of these terrorist groups with Iran and the Syrian Government just over the last 5 to 6 weeks, and President Ahmadi-Nejad had a summit meeting with President Assad of Syria and all these terrorist groups just recently, several weeks ago. It is of great concern to us, and we are working actively to try to turn back that terrorist challenge that Iran poses to us.
On democracy and human rights, the Iranian Government has locked up dissidents. It has jailed journalists. Last month bus drivers went on strike for better wages. The Iranian Government sent armed thugs to beat them up.
Mr. Akbar Ganji, who has been held for many years as a journalist, may be released last week, but he is a celebrated human rights figure who deserves the support of all of us. I know he has the support of the Congress, as well as the Administration, but we are concerned about the repression of the Iranian people.
As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, the great irony of this situation as we face this Iranian threat is that a majority of Iranians in public opinion polls have a favorable view of our country. They like American democracy. They want to study here. They want to have exchange programs.
They do not particularly all support, a great number of them, the actions of their own government and so as we go on to the next issue, Mr. Chairman, that is how can we influence Iran and how can the Congress and the Administration work together, we hope the Congress will support Secretary Rice's and the President's $75 million supplemental request, which is designed to open up our ability to connect with average Iranian citizens.
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We would like to use $50 million of that money to expand our TV and radio broadcast through Voice of America and Radio Farda into Iran. We would like to work with some of the private American radio and TV stations from the State of California and New Jersey and the Washington, DC, area to help them get the American message into Iran itself.
We would like to use some of the money, and Congressman Ackerman referred to this, to try to do a very difficult job. Congressman Ackerman, I agree with you. This is a high hill to climb, but to see if we can work through non-governmental organizations around the world and with some of the European NGOs to try to plant some roots of democracy, of independent journalism, of civil society into Iran.
It is difficult to do. In an open hearing we cannot say everything that we are intending to do obviously, but we do hope the Congress will respond to the request for $10 million in funding.
Finally, a number of the Members spoke about exchanges. We want to connect with the Iranian people. We do not want to be so blunt in our approach that we penalize innocent Iranians for the sins of their government and so we would like to bring Iranian high school and university students to this country. We would like to have exchanges among union officials, among teachers, among average citizens.
There was a time before the Iranian revolution when there were several hundred thousand Iranians studying in the United States. Today it is just 2,000 people. It is part of the longer-term effort that goes along with the shorter-term policy that Under Secretary Joseph and I are talking about today.
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My final comment, Mr. Chairman, would be to say this. The presence of our hostages reminds us of how ill-equipped we are as a government to understand Iran, to have officials who can speak Farsi and to engage Iranians around the world.
Since our hostages were taken and since they were released, of course, our Embassy has been shuttered in Tehran. We do not intend to reopen that Embassy anytime soon.
We have a policy of trying to isolate Iran, but it is important that we understand it, understand the country, and so, Secretary Rice has directed that we undertake a series of measures designed to bolster our capability within the State Department to be smart about Iran and so, for the very first time since 1980, she has just created in the last 2 weeks a new Iran desk in our Bureau of Middle Eastern Affairs in the State Department. It is up and functioning.
She has also directed that we establish an American presence post, a diplomatic post, in Dubai, which will be solely concerned with Iranian affairs. We will put about 10 diplomats in Dubai by this summer, and they will watch Iran. They will talk to Iranian dissidents and travelers from Iran and understand that country in a way that we have not been able to do before.
Last, Secretary Rice has directed that we expand significantly our Farsi language training at the Foreign Service Institute and that we try to produce a new generation of Foreign Service officers who understand Iranian history, culture and language who can be deployed to Embassies and Consulates outside of Iran, but in the neighborhood, to do in essence what we did, Mr. Chairman, in the 1920s when we had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
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We sent young diplomats like George Kennan to Riga, and we created Riga Station. That station watched the Soviet Union from a close distance. A lot of those diplomats went on to have illustrious careers in the State Department.
We have lost the expertise that the generation of Bruce Laingen, who is here today, represented. Secretary Rice now wants to recreate that, and we do so because Iran represents a generational challenge to American foreign policy, and we must defeat Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of terrorism and its subjugation of the people of Iran and hope that better days will come for those people who deserve freedom and democracy in that great country.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lantos and distinguished Members of the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the United States' policy toward Iran.
Let me begin by noting that this Committee is surely right to focus on U.S. policy toward Iran at this time. Successive U.S. administrations have recognized that Iran's regime poses a profound threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and more broadly across the globe. Over the past six months, however, since the August 2005 inauguration of President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, this threat has intensified as Iran's approach to the world has become even more radical. Today, the Iranian leadership is actively working against all that the U.S. and our allies desire for the region—peace in Lebanon, peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and an end to terrorism. In fact, no country stands more resolutely opposed to our hope for peace and freedom in the Middle East than Iran.
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Iran's leadership directly threatens vital American interests in four distinct and grave areas:
its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability;
its role as the ''Central Banker'' in directing and funding terror;
its determination to dominate the Middle East as the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf region; and finally,
its repression of the democratic hopes of the Iranian people.
Crafting an effective response to this Iranian threat is as important as any challenge America faces in the world today. It is critical that we succeed. The endurance of the Iranian regime and its extremist policies and the alarming stridency of its leaders, who have spent more than a quarter-century leading chants of ''Death to America,'' mean that inaction or failure is simply not an option. For this reason, President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed the highest priority on opposing Iran's policies across the board in the greater Middle East region.
The dangers posed by the Iranian regime are complex and diverse, and they necessitate an equally multi-faceted and sophisticated American response. We have constructed a new and comprehensive policy that is designed to prevent Tehran from achieving each of its objectives—and as the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions moves this week to the United Nations Security Council, it is clear that we are on the right track.
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As Secretary Rice reported to this Committee two weeks ago, our policy toward Iran is clear and focused. We seek to work within a broad international coalition of countries to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability; to stop its sponsorship of terrorism in the region and around the world; to coalesce with Arab governments, our European allies and friends from across the world to blunt Tehran's regional ambitions; and finally to extend support to the Iranian people, especially the millions of young Iranians who suffer due to the regime's repression and economic misrule and crave opportunities to connect with the wider world. I will review each of these essential components of our policy, and finish by offering my thoughts on the ways in which Congress can enhance U.S. efforts to oppose the Iranian regime.
IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The greatest immediate threat posed by the Ahmadi-Nejad government is Iran's clear desire to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
Around the world, there is simply no substantial difference of opinion about what Iran's nuclear program is intended to achieve. Iran's actions—its history of deception and continuing efforts to avoid full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency—have convinced leaders of every political persuasion, in every corner of the globe, that Iran's leaders intend to acquire nuclear weapons. In my last twelve months of countless discussions with officials from Europe, Russia, India, China and other countries, I have not encountered a single person who has found the ritualistic public denials of the Iranian leadership convincing. Not a single one has disputed the danger posed if Iran were to succeed. In short, there is no international debate about Iran's aims—it is universally agreed that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. With the possible exception of Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela, no other country wants to see Iran succeed.
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This widespread international concern represents a tremendous asset for our efforts to counter Iran's nuclear ambitions. Our diplomatic activities over the past year have been designed to assemble an ever-wider coalition of countries to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. This coalition has grown in number and strength. We have taken over the past 12 months a series of steps to blunt Iran's ambitions and isolate it.
In March 2005, Secretary Rice announced our support for the EU–3's diplomatic negotiations with Iran, which was intended to halt Tehran's nuclear ambitions. This was a significant step forward for U.S. policy. The EU–3 offered a proposal that would grant Iran far-reaching economic incentives, including access to and assistance with peaceful nuclear reactors. The United States offered its own incentives—we agreed to consider licensing the sale of spare parts for Iran's aging civilian airliners and dropping our prior objections to Iran's bid to join the World Trade Organization. Last August, Iran rejected the EU–3 proposal, unilaterally broke off negotiations with the Europeans, and resumed uranium conversion in violation of the Paris Agreement.
This began a new and more demanding phase of our diplomatic campaign. After Iran's provocative actions, we and the Europeans worked for months and succeeded in creating a broad international coalition to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear program. In October 2005, Secretary Rice traveled to Moscow to convince Russia of the importance of cohesion on this issue. I made eleven trips to Europe in 2005 to consult with our European allies, Russia, China and India on Iran. In November, President Bush offered public U.S. backing for a Russian proposal to supply Russian fuel for Iran's peaceful nuclear reactors in exchange for a permanent suspension of enrichment activity within Iran itself. The Iranian regime had every opportunity to change course and agree to suspend nuclear activities, but rejected the proposal and insisted on its right and intention to carry out enrichment activities on its own soil. Iran tried throughout 2005 to divide the U.S. from Europe and then Russia, China, India and other countries. But its leaders miscalculated our ability to construct a strong international coalition.
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In response to Iran's difficult and confrontational approach, in late January 2006 Secretary Rice successfully persuaded all five permanent Members of the UN Security Council to vote together at the IAEA to report Iran to the UNSC. On February 4, the Permanent Five, along with a massive global coalition comprised of countries as diverse as India, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Egypt, and Yemen, spoke with one voice: These countries, all represented in the IAEA Board of Governors, adopted a resolution to report Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council. We agreed to give Iran thirty days to reflect on its isolation.
The thirty days is now up. Iran has not met the conditions of the IAEA. We will therefore start a new phase of diplomacy—action by the UN Security Council starting next week. The UN Security Council is the right place to intensify the international debate on Iran's nuclear ambitions. We plan a concerted approach at the UN that gradually escalates pressure on Iran. We will shine a bright spotlight on Iran's nuclear program. We intend to participate in a vigorous international debate about Iran's nuclear ambitions. The Security Council will consider a Presidential Statement, or a Chapter 7 resolution. If after all those steps were taken Iran has not acceded to the wishes of the international community, then of course we would have to look at possible targeted sanctions, which a number of countries are already beginning to explore. Any sanctions we would consider will be specifically targeted to pressure the regime and Iran's nuclear and missile programs, rather than hurting the great majority of innocent Iranians.
Going forward, we will do everything we can to maintain the widest possible international consensus on the steps Iran must take, and continue to keep Iran isolated on this issue. Iran's leadership must realize that its only available choice is the one that serves its people's true national interests—a strategic decision to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
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While we make it clear that no option is off the table, the U.S. strongly supports a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem. That is why we supported the EU3 process, and will continue to work with all our allies through the UN to change Iran's behavior.
Our message to Tehran is clear: recommit to the Paris Agreement, return to full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and return to negotiations.
IRAN'S TERRORIST SPONSORSHIP AND REGIONAL AMBITIONS
A second critical dimension of the threat posed by the Iranian regime is its role as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world today. Iranian leaders consider extremism and terror to be legitimate tools of propagating their influence domestically and regionally. Ultimately, our concern is focused on not simply the tool, but also the objective—Tehran's aspiration to assert influence over its neighbors and frustrate democracy and development in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East.
Across the region, the record of the Islamic Republic is one of violence and radicalism. This places Iran in direct opposition to each of America's most important interests in the region.
In Iraq, we have worked tirelessly and at great cost over the past three years to help Iraqis develop a pluralistic, democratic, federal, and united Iraq, which is stable and at peace with its neighbors. This is a historic effort, and one that is ultimately led by Iraqis themselves. The Iranian people—who were among the greatest victims of Saddam Hussein's brutality—would benefit from a secure and successful Iraq. However, for their part, the Iranian leadership has played a provocative and problematic role. They have interfered in Iraq's internal affairs by supporting sectarian militias and extremist groups and assisting anti-Coalition forces in Iraq by supplying weapons, training and explosives. As Secretary Rumsfeld said yesterday, Iran's activities are ''harmful to the future of Iraq.'' Tehran is responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition attacks in 2005 by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
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Iran has also come into direct confrontation with our regional interests with its campaign to undermine the fragile progress toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Iran's leadership has made no secret of its hostility toward Israel—President Ahmadi-Nejad rightly earned severe international condemnation for his outrageous vow to wipe Israel off the map. We take his words seriously. Tehran provides money, weapons, and training to HAMAS and other Palestinian rejectionist groups. Iran's support for these groups fuels terrorist violence in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. It is intended to subvert the efforts of the international community to advance the prospects for lasting peace and security between Palestinians and Israelis. Alone among all other governments, Iran is championing the hateful language in the HAMAS covenant and encouraging HAMAS leaders to ignore the requirements of responsible leadership and the conditions articulated by the Quartet to ensure the continuation of international aid to the Palestinian Authority.
Closely related to its destructive approach to peace between Israelis and Palestinians is Iran's long-time relationship with Hizballah in Lebanon, which is responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization apart from al-Qaida. More than a year after the brutal assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the momentous Cedar Revolution, Lebanon has made great strides. Iran's ongoing and extensive support to Hizballah runs in direct contradiction to the clearly articulated desire of the Lebanese people for sovereignty and democracy.
Iran is working within a coalition of rejectionists in Lebanon. Members of Lebanese Hizbullah have received explosives training in Iran arranged by the Iranian government's intelligence services. In January 2006, Ahmadi-Nejad again visited Syria and met with the leaders of Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP–GC pro-Syrian faction). We continue to work closely with the UN and key allies to urge Lebanon to implement fully UNSCR 1559, which calls for the dismantling of all armed militias in Lebanon, including Lebanese Hizbullah.
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We are also deeply concerned about Iran's unwillingness to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members who are wanted for murdering Americans and others in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings and for plotting to kill countless others. Iran has refused to identify these senior al-Qaida members in its custody on ''security grounds.'' Iran has also resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of these individuals to the U.S., their countries-of-origin, or third countries to face justice. Iranian judiciary officials claimed to have tried and convicted some Iranian supporters of al-Qa'ida during 2004, but refused to provide details.
Just as with its nuclear ambitions, Iran's support for terrorism and regional agenda requires a determined American approach and a global alliance. We have sanctioned Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and called for the regime to abide by the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, and to affirmatively take steps to prevent terrorist acts by providing early warning to other states by exchange of information.
We are also devoting significant effort to ensure that Iran's efforts to sow instability among Palestinians will not succeed. Working with the Quartet, we have clearly articulated the conditions that the elected Hamas leadership must meet to ensure true international support for the Palestinian Authority and fulfill the Palestinian people's desire for a better life. At the same time, we are mindful of avoiding a humanitarian crisis and working to redirect our assistance to avoid any deterioration that might benefit Iran's radical ambitions.
We also continue to urge other governments to press Iran on its support for and sponsorship of terrorism, and on its threatening behavior towards its neighbors. Just two weeks ago, Secretary Rice met with leaders in Cairo, Riyadh, Beirut, and Abu Dhabi, and with the Gulf Cooperation Council. She highlighted the destabilizing effects of Iran's hostile foreign policy, including its support for terrorism and desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The Arab countries should not wish to see Iran contribute to nuclear proliferation in the region. We intend to work closely with the Arab governments to thwart Iran's support for terror and counter its destabilizing influences across the region.
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STATE OF IRANIAN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As we work to end the threat posed by the Iranian regime's nuclear ambitions and sponsorship of terror, we also wish to support the Iranian people in their aspirations for freedom. Some in the West watched with hope and anticipation over the course of the late 1990s, as Iranians voiced their clear desire for a government that pursued their interests in a better life, free from state harassment, ideological impositions, and isolation from the world community.
Sadly, we know the outcome of these efforts—newspapers were shuttered and journalists jailed, student demonstrators were beaten and imprisoned, and activists from all walks of life found their efforts to promote political change stymied and repressed.
The hard-liners in Iran mounted an all-out defense of their hold on the regime and its people, culminating in last June's election of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad as its president. The election itself was deeply flawed :
A small group of clerics prevented hundreds of declared candidates, including all the women, from running for President. Only a handful whose loyalty to the regime seemed assured were permitted to run.
Hard-liners undertook a concerted, last minute campaign through their networks of influence in the mosques, the military, and the Revolutionary Guard to mobilize support for Ahmadi-Nejad.
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The polling was reportedly rife with manipulation and fraud.
From this inherently flawed process came the ascent of Ahmadi-Nejad.
Some Iranian citizens may have voted for Ahmadi-Nejad with the sincere hope that he represented change from the corrupt, old guard of the regime. If so, they have been sorely disappointed. Many who had hoped for a break from the corrupt past have been appalled by the rhetoric and policies of the new president and have seen him do nothing to improve their standard of living. The Iranian people deserve better.
His repeated denial of the Holocaust and his threats to ''wipe Israel off the map'' have earned the legitimate outrage of the international community, and have deeply shamed a country that—until its revolution 27 years ago—had a unique history of tolerance and a large Jewish community.
Just as his comments and actions have isolated Iran internationally, Ahmadi-Nejad has tried to turn the clock back for Iranians at home. The regime issued edicts banning Western music and demanding that Iranian television broadcast fewer programs about women's issues. He has put forward a budget that would make Iran more dependent than ever on oil revenues, and make its economy even less competitive in attracting domestic or foreign investment.
Ahmadi-Nejad may be its most public face, but he is by no means the only hardliner or radical in the Iranian regime. Although the Islamic Republic is a complex system with multiple power centers, today, all of the levers of power in Iran are in the hands of hard-liners. These men reject the basic notion that the governed should determine their leaders and their nation's course and who use religious faith to justify perpetuating their absolute hold on power.
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Perpetuating the survival of the regime remains the highest priority for the Iranian leadership and has empowered an increasingly repressive approach to the Iranian citizenry. The regime's poor human rights record worsened throughout 2005, including summary executions, disappearances, extremist vigilantism, widespread use of torture, solitary confinement, and other degrading treatment. Juvenile offenders were executed, and sentences of stoning continue to be handed down.
Discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minority groups, including Jews, Sunnis and Sufi Muslims, persists. The Baha'i community has faced particular harassment. In December 2005 the longest held Baha'i prisoner died in prison of undisclosed causes.
Just as the Middle East is beginning to open to greater political participation and economic reform, it is especially disturbing to note the intensifying repression of the Iranian people. Protesters have been arrested and tortured. Journalists and web-bloggers continue to be arrested and mistreated for daring to publish their opinions. In February the Iranian regime answered the pleas of Tehran bus drivers for better working conditions by sending paid thugs to beat them. Journalist and political activist Akbar Ganji has spent nearly six years in prison for his reporting on the murders of Iranian dissidents and his advocacy of a secular Iranian republic. Having endured solitary confinement, a hunger strike, and reported torture, Ganji is due to be released next week, but it is unclear whether the Iranian regime will indeed release him.
We have worked cooperatively with a range of other countries to highlight the situation of Ganji and the many other Iranians who have been imprisoned unjustly or otherwise punished by the regime for expressing their views. At the UN General Assembly, for the third year in a row, we co-sponsored and helped ensure passage of a Canadian resolution condemning Iran's human rights abuses. This sent an important signal to the Iranian people and their government of continued international concern at Iran's mistreatment of its citizens.
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As President Bush has said, it is important that the Iranian people know we will stand with them in their struggle. We are trying to do a great deal more to help Iranians who are trying to bring about peaceful democratic change. In the face of their difficult internal conditions, the people of Iran regularly give the world reason for hope about the country's future. Iranians know that their government may punish them for voicing their views on the Internet or in the newspapers, and yet journalists continue to write provocative pieces, and thousands of other Iranians post their thoughts to web-blogs every day. They gather on the streets to demand better pay and working conditions although the forceful reaction of the regime's thugs is a bitter reality. Iranians have found ways to endure in a system that strives to deprive them of their basic rights and culture—and we are confident that they will also find ways to change that system.
WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS CAN DO
Here, I would like to suggest how the U.S. Congress can help to support change and reform in Iran. The first and most important action that Congress can take is the appropriation of funding requested last month by Secretary Rice for an additional $75 million to expand our effort to reach out to the Iranian people. This funding will build upon the $10 million provided by Congress in FY 2006 to support the cause of freedom and human rights in Iran. The supplemental request would support an ambitious program of activities that will promote peaceful change and democratization in Iran.
Fifty-five million dollars, the largest portion, will be dedicated to communicating our message to the Iranian people, offering them unbiased information. Funds will be used to greatly expand our television broadcasting in Farsi into Iran to penetrate Iran's government dominated media. We will use tools we already have through the Broadcasting Board of Governors while supporting the development of competitive and independent Farsi television and radio. We intend to work through U.S. Government sponsored media, such as the Voice of America and Radio Farda, as well as broadcasting organizations in the private sector. We will seek to develop civic education campaigns that increase understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democracy through written publications and new technologies such as pod casting, SMS messaging, and the Internet.
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We plan to utilize $15 million of the supplemental request—in addition to the $10 million that Congress has already appropriated—to empower local activists and thus further human rights, support and strengthen civil society, help Iranians acquire the skills of citizenry and advocacy, support alternative political centers of gravity, improve justice and accountability, and increase tolerance and freedom of speech, assembly, and other basic rights for the Iranian people.
Finally, we will expand our outreach to young Iranians who have never experienced democracy. We will spend $5 million on Iranian student education and international exchanges, providing scholarships as well as creating professional, cultural, sports and youth exchanges designed to build bridges between our two nations. If Iranians are banned from playing Mozart in Iran, we will help them to do so in our country.
We are also working to better ensure that we streamline the process for expeditiously awarding and allocating our grants. To this end the Department of State is working with the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and others to secure the necessary licenses and waivers for our grantees to do their work.
RE-AUTHORIZING ILSA
As you can see, the Administration entirely shares Congress' deep concerns about Iran—its pursuit of nuclear weapons; its role as the ''central banker'' and leading state-sponsor of terrorism, including support for groups that oppose Middle East peace with violence; its destabilizing role in Iraq; and its oppression of its own people.
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The House has already taken a very helpful step by giving overwhelming support to a resolution authored by Chairman Hyde and introduced by Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Lantos that condemns Iranian nuclear policy and calls for a strong response by the Security Council.
As the Secretary has said, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (or ''ILSA'') has been ''useful to us as a tool.'' In particular, the existence of the law has underlined the depth of our concerns about Iran's pursuit of WMD and support for terrorism, and has provided a platform for continually raising those concerns with others.
We very much welcome the interest of the House and this committee in working with the Administration on legislation relating to Iran. We are particularly encouraged by those provisions of HR 282 that provide support for democracy in Iran. We would also support a reauthorization of ILSA for Iran (excluding Libya) for a further five-year term.
At the same time, we are concerned with those provisions of HR 282 that would strain relations with our close allies whose help we need to change Iran's behavior. Since ILSA's original enactment and the subsequent extension of the law, there has been a paradigm shift on confronting the threats posed by Iran: increasingly, other governments share our views and concerns, and are working cooperatively with us to make their weight felt. Iran is working very hard to divide the Permanent-5 members of the UN Security Council, and we believe that some of the provisions in ILSA would make it easier for Iran to succeed at this game. We believe it is essential to strengthen the unprecedented coalition we currently have in place and would be concerned about any step we might take that could complicate our diplomacy.
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Further, we believe that some provisions in the bill could constrain the administration's flexibility, just when we need to be able to maintain all of our policy options for dealing with Iran. I am sure this is not the intention of those sponsoring legislation.
Finally, we must take care not to jump to conclusions about what kinds of sanctions might be appropriate. We are confident that—if it becomes necessary—like-minded states will be able to agree on measures that will have a significant effect on Iran's economy.
We entirely share Congress' concerns about Iran and look forward to working closely with you as we move forward. We want to keep the focus on Iran's misdeeds, not create friction and division in the camp that is confronting Iran.
STATE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES
Beyond our legislative agenda, let me update you on an important initiative that the State Department has undertaken as part of Secretary Rice's global repositioning to support Transformational Diplomacy. For more than a generation, the U.S has had no diplomatic contacts with Iran—a unique state of affairs replicated in no other country in the world. We have not trained Foreign Service Officers to speak Farsi or established a significant effort to follow Iranian developments. This left a serious divergence between our capabilities and the profound challenges before us concerning Iran.
Secretary Rice directed us to address this disparity. During the last month, the State Department has created a new Office of Iranian Affairs within the Bureau for Near East and North African Affairs (NEA). We will add a significant number of diplomats to focus solely on Iran in this office, as well as adding new positions to our Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau to coordinate and expedite programming for Iran. We will also create by this summer a new office focused on Iran at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. In addition, we will increase the number of officers working on Iran at other diplomatic posts in the region. We will expand our Farsi language training to train a new generation of American diplomats in Iranian history, culture, and language.
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As all of you are aware, since Iran seized our embassy and held 52 of our diplomats hostage for 444 days, we have not stationed a single diplomat in Iran or trained many officers in Farsi. We do not intend to re-open our Embassy any time soon. But we do plan to put more people, better trained, on the job of watching Iran both in the region on Iran's doorstep and here in Washington—so that we can block its destructive policies and so that we can communicate more effectively with the people of Iran. These enhancements are a key part of Secretary Rice's Global Diplomatic Repositioning initiative to shift our people to where they are needed most.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by thanking the Congress for the effort and interest that you have devoted to Iran and for your support for our policies. As we move forward, we will need your help on a variety of fronts:
to reach out the Iranian population with approval of our $75 million supplemental request;
to re-authorize ILSA in a format that facilitates the strengthening of the broad global coalition that is already achieving real progress in addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions; and
to continue to support the Administration as we seek to stop Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons, its support for terrorism, its harmful meddling in the affairs of the region, and end its repression of its own citizenry.
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It may be a long struggle to block Iranian ambitions in each of these areas and to roll back their dangerous policies, but it is necessary for achieving a better, more democratic future for the Middle East and greater security for U.S. interests across the world. The problem of the Iranian regime has become entrenched over the course of an entire generation, and it may require a generational struggle to address it, but we have no choice but to do so in a serious, committed and effective way.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador Burns.
Under Secretary Joseph?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT JOSEPH, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. JOSEPH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you today with my colleague, Under Secretary Burns, to discuss what Iran is doing in terms of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and what we are doing to blunt that effort.
I have submitted a written statement. What I would like to do with your permission, Mr. Chairman, is simply summarize some of the main points.
I begin from the premise that Mr. Lantos has articulated, and that is that a nuclear armed Iran is intolerable. Let me outline the reasons.
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First, a nuclear armed Iran could embolden the leadership in Tehran to advance its aggressive and expansionist ambitions in and outside of the region, both directly and through the terrorists that it supports.
Today, even with an Iran that does not have a nuclear weapons capability, we are confronted by it and its surrogates in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Lebanon and by Tehran's efforts to undercut peace between Israel and the Palestinians. If Iran possessed nuclear weapons, those confrontations would be sharpened and expanded.
Second, a nuclear armed Iran would represent, in my view, a direct threat to United States forces and allies in the region, to the greater Middle East, Europe and Asia and eventually to the United States itself.
Iran would be more likely to use force, perhaps even chemical and biological weapons, which it is also pursuing, if it believed that a nuclear shield protected it from retaliation. At a very minimum Iran could seek to use nuclear weapons for intimidation and blackmail.
Third, as you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lantos, pointed out, a nuclear armed Iran could engender further proliferation and a re-evaluation of security requirements across this vital region, undermining the very integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Fourth, a nuclear armed Iran would represent an existential threat to the State of Israel. President Ahmadi-Nejad has repeatedly stated his goal of wiping Israel off the map. Many in Israel believe that he means exactly what he says, and I believe for good reason. He is a true believer.
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Finally, Iran is at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. If it has fissile material or a nuclear weapon, the likelihood of their transfer to a third party would increase either by design or by diversion.
For these reasons, I believe we must not concede the inevitability of a nuclear armed Iran, but rather pursue determined diplomacy and defensive measures to preclude such an outcome.
Let me just turn very briefly to Iran's nuclear program. Today we are challenged by a determined Iranian effort. Iran is pressing ahead on the centrifuge enrichment technology. It has since January put both feet on the accelerator.
Recently it began to introduce UF–6 gas, the feed material for centrifuges, into a 10 centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium at a pilot plant. This is the beginning of a much larger cascade with hundreds of centrifuges at this pilot facility.
Iran has openly notified the IAEA that this fall it will begin installing the first 3,000 centrifuges at an industrial enrichment plant at Natanz, which is in fact designed to hold tens of thousands of centrifuges.
Iran has already produced approximately 85 tons of feed material, uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for these centrifuges. If this amount of feedstock were enriched to weapons grade uranium, the result would be enough highly-enriched uranium for about 10 nuclear weapons. The only plausible explanation for the expansion and the urgency of the Iranian enrichment program is to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
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There are also disturbing indications that Iran is working on the next step, that is weaponization. The IAEA has uncovered documentation in Iran for the casting and machining of enriched uranium hemispheres, which are directly relevant to the production of nuclear weapons components.
The IAEA is also pursuing information on high explosive tests and on the design of a specific delivery system which clearly point to a military rather than a civilian peaceful purpose.
In short, Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, but we are equally determined to stop it. The President has emphasized that all options are on the table to deal with this threat, but that our strong preference is to do so through effective diplomacy.
Under Secretary Burns has addressed some of our diplomatic efforts. I would just add a few points. The IAEA statute requires that noncompliance with IAEA safeguards be reported to the Security Council.
The IAEA board in November 2003, now over 2 1/2 years ago, decided to put off reporting Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council to allow time for the United Kingdom, France and Germany, or the EU–3, to reach an agreement with Iran that would provide confidence that Iran's activities in the nuclear area were solely for peaceful purposes.
In November 2004, an agreement was reached in Paris between the EU–3 and Iran to suspend all uranium conversion and enrichment activities during the negotiations on a long-term agreement, and the United States supported that effort.
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Russia also has put forward a creative proposal for a joint venture for uranium enrichment in Russia, but in a way that does not allow Iran access to sensitive technology and would not permit Iran to conduct any enrichment related activities on Iranian soil.
While Iran continues to feign interest in such a deal with Russia and very cynically calls for negotiations in compromise, it has refused to agree to stop those enrichment related activities in Iran, which is an essential part of the package, and in violation of this Paris agreement and in defiance of the will of the international community Iran resumed uranium conversion activity in August 2004 and enrichment activities in January of this year.
In September 2005, the IAEA board found that Iran's many breaches and failures to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted formal noncompliance under the state and found that Iran's nuclear activities have given rise to questions within the competence of the UN Security Council.
In early February, the IAEA board by a wide majority instructed the Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, to report his findings on Iran to the Security Council, and he has since done so. We expect that the Security Council will take up action on Iran noncompliance next week. The Council's action will not supplement the IAEA's role, but rather enforce it.
It is imperative that the Council make clear to the Iranian regime that there will be significant negative consequences if it does not step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action to induce Iran to come into compliance with its NPT and safeguard obligations, to suspend all of its enrichment and reprocessing related activities and, finally, to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
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While our diplomacy in the IAEA and the UN Security Council is an essential part of our strategy, we must do more, and we recognize that through the development of a broader strategy. We will work closely with other states to continue and, as necessary, to expand defensive measures to protect ourselves against the WMD threat from Iran, as well as from other proliferant states.
These defense measures require an increasing array of instruments, policies and programs. At one end of that spectrum are programs like the Nunn-Lugar work that helps to prevent Iran, as well as others, from gaining access to enabling technologies and materials, to deny Iran and others a shortcut to a nuclear weapon.
At the other end are capabilities such as missile defense and other counterproliferation capabilities that we need to deploy in order to address the threats, to protect ourselves and to provide assurance and reassurance to our friends and allies.
Other defense measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation, including the President's June 2005 Executive Order authorizing the United States Government to freeze assets and block transactions of proliferators and their supporters.
One of our most important defensive measures is the Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI, which is now expanded to include support from 70 other countries and continues to grow. PSI action has stopped the transshipment of material and equipment for Iran's ballistic missile and WMD programs, including their nuclear program.
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We continue to consider possible new or expanded defensive measures to combat the proliferation threat from Iran. This is—I agree with what has been said—the greatest strategic challenge we will face in the foreseeable future. We must and we will pursue multiple avenues to prevent the emergence of a nuclear armed Iran.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT JOSEPH, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss what Iran is doing to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and what we are doing to counter this emerging threat.
I start from the premise that a nuclear-armed Iran is intolerable. Let me outline some of the key reasons:
A nuclear-armed Iran could embolden the leadership in Tehran to advance its aggressive ambitions in and outside of the region, both directly and through the terrorists it supports—ambitions that gravely threaten stability and the security of U.S. friends and allies.
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A nuclear-armed Iran would represent a direct threat to U.S. forces and allies in the region, the greater Middle East, Europe and Asia, and eventually to the United States itself. The likelihood of Iranian use of force, including possibly chemical and biological weapons, could increase if Tehran believed its nuclear capability protected it from retaliation. At a minimum, it could seek to use nuclear weapons as a powerful tool of intimidation and blackmail.
A nuclear-armed Iran could provide the fuse for further proliferation, engendering a re-evaluation of security requirements across the region, and undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
A nuclear-armed Iran would consolidate the chokehold of the mullahs, making democracy in Iran a more distant prospect.
A nuclear-armed Iran would represent an existential threat to the state of Israel. Not content with his efforts to destroy peace between Israel and the Palestinians, President Ahmadi-Nejad may believe that nuclear weapons are the chosen instrument to achieve his stated goal of wiping Israel ''off the map.'' Despite the resulting apocalyptic costs for Iran itself, the regime could miscalculate, or accept those costs in the cause of martyrdom.
Finally, Iran is at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological programs and actively supporting terrorist movements. If Iran has fissile material or nuclear weapons, the likelihood of their transfer to a third party would increase—by design or through diversion.
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For these reasons, we should not concede the inevitability of a nuclear-armed Iran but rather pursue determined diplomacy and defensive measures to preclude such an outcome. But there is no question that Iran is as committed and determined as we. As a result, stopping Iran is one of the most fundamental strategic challenges we face.
Iran's Nuclear Program
Two decades ago, Iran embarked on a secret program to acquire the capability to produce fissile material—the most critical component for nuclear weapons. Since then, Iran has pursued the goal of large-scale production of both enriched uranium and plutonium, spanning the full range of activities from laboratory experiments to industrial facilities.
Iran pursued two parallel uranium enrichment approaches, a laser process based on Russian technology and a centrifuge process based on technology acquired from the A.Q. Khan network. The Russian government terminated cooperation with Iran on laser enrichment in 2001, following extensive consultations with the United States, and it appears to be no longer active.
Most of Iran's effort in the enrichment area has been concentrated on centrifuge technology, which Tehran is aggressively pressing forward with today. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found that Iran repeatedly violated its IAEA safeguards agreement during an 18-year period of covert development and testing. Currently, Iran is operating a small centrifuge cascade and is conducting research and development work at a pilot facility at Natanz. This is the beginning of a much larger effort with hundreds of centrifuges at the pilot facility, and Iran has notified the IAEA that this fall it will begin installing the first 3000 centrifuges at an industrial enrichment plant also at Natanz. Let there be no mistake that what Iran calls innocent research and development is actually the next step toward achieving a large-scale enrichment capability.
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Supporting this conclusion, Iran is now producing feedstock for centrifuges at a uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Iran has already produced approximately 85 tons of uranium hexafluoride at Isfahan. If this amount of feedstock were enriched in centrifuges to weapons grade material, the result would be enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for about 10 nuclear weapons. Nearby, Iran has dug an underground tunnel for storing uranium hexafluoride. The facility at Isfahan is also capable of converting uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal, the form used in nuclear weapons components.
Iran is obviously moving forward to master the technology of centrifuge enrichment and to commence industrial-scale production as rapidly as it can, in defiance of calls by the international community to suspend all enrichment-related activity. Iran claims that this program is entirely peaceful, for production of fuel for power reactors. The only power reactor Iran will have for at least the next ten years is the one being built by Russia at Bushehr, the fuel for which Russia is obligated to provide for the first ten years.
The only plausible explanation for the urgency of the Iranian enrichment program is to produce fissile material that can be used in nuclear weapons as soon as possible, no matter the international cost. The secret origins, military involvement, acquisition of key technologies from a proliferation network, violation of IAEA safeguards, false reporting to the IAEA, and denial of IAEA requests for access to individuals and locations also belie assertions of peaceful intent.
To produce plutonium, Iran has built a heavy water production plant and is now constructing a large, heavy water-moderated reactor whose technical characteristics are well suited for the production of weapons grade plutonium. In support of this effort, Iran produced small quantities of plutonium in targets inserted into the safeguarded Tehran research reactor and conducted plutonium separation experiments, in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement.
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Because of Iran's incomplete and false reporting and denial of access to its inspectors, the IAEA has been unable to determine the full scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA is pursuing information on what could be another uranium conversion project. Iran has designs for a next generation, more sophisticated centrifuge (P–2), but the IAEA has been unable to determine the complete history of this activity.
In addition to its determined effort to put in place the capability to produce fissile material, there are also disturbing indications that Iran is working on the next step, weaponization. The IAEA has discovered documentation in Iran for casting and machining enriched uranium hemispheres, which are directly relevant to production of nuclear weapons components. The IAEA is also pursuing information on high-explosive tests and on the design of a delivery system, which clearly point to a military rather than peaceful purpose.
Last week, in his most recent report, IAEA Director General ElBaradei made clear that Iran has not taken any of the steps the IAEA Board has called for. Iran has not re-suspended enrichment activities, not stopped construction of the heavy water reactor, not ratified the Additional Protocol, and not cooperated fully with the IAEA investigation. None of the outstanding problems have been resolved. In his overall assessment of the current situation, Dr. ElBaradei expressed regret and concern that the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program have not been clarified after three years of intensive IAEA efforts.
Diplomatic Efforts to Stop Iran's Nuclear Program
The President has emphasized that all options are on the table to deal with the threat from Iran, but that our strong preference is to do so through determined diplomacy. A peaceful diplomatic solution to this issue would spare the world from the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran and would benefit the Iranian people with the possibility of fuller integration with the international community. Diplomacy remains essential and, despite the frustrations, is working.
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The IAEA investigation of the Iranian nuclear program began in 2003, following revelations about the enrichment and heavy water programs by an Iranian opposition group in August 2002. In November 2003, IAEA Director General ElBaradei issued a comprehensive report, finding that ''it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.''
The IAEA Statute requires that non-compliance with IAEA safeguards be reported to the United Nations Security Council. The IAEA Board decided at its November 2003 meeting to put off reporting Iran's non-compliance to the Security Council to allow time for the United Kingdom, France and Germany (the ''EU3'') and Iran to reach an agreement that would provide the international community confidence that Iran's nuclear activities were entirely peaceful.
It was essential to the Europeans and to us that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while negotiations on a long-term agreement were undertaken. The EU3 and Iran reached an understanding on this point in Tehran in October 2003, but this broke down over differences whether the agreed suspension covered conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride feedstock for the centrifuge process. In November 2004 a more explicit agreement was reached in Paris in which Iran agreed to suspend all uranium conversion and enrichment activities during negotiations on a long-term agreement.
On this basis, the EU3 developed a comprehensive and ambitious proposal for extensive economic and technical cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Iran, including cooperation on nuclear energy. The United States supported the EU3 effort, including by changing our policies with respect to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and civilian aircraft parts for Iran.
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While the EU3 engaged with Iran, the IAEA continued and expanded its investigation of the Iranian nuclear program, and the result has been a growing number of unresolved problems and concerns. The reports of the IAEA Director General document a long list of unresolved problems, including: discrepancies between Iran's account of its acquisition and use of P–1 and P–2 centrifuge technology and other information available to the IAEA; Iran's possession of documentation on casting and machining enriched uranium into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and refusal to provide the IAEA a copy of this document; discrepancies between Iran's account of plutonium separation experiments and the IAEA's technical analysis; unresolved questions concerning military involvement in the Iranian nuclear program; and failure to fully cooperate with IAEA requests for access to individuals, information, and locations. The IAEA Board has adopted nine resolutions calling on Iran to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and to cooperate fully with IAEA requests.
Russia has put forward a creative proposal for a joint venture for uranium enrichment in Russia, which would not give Iran access to sensitive technology. While Iran continues to feign interest in a joint venture in Russia, and cynically calls for negotiations and compromise, it has refused to agree to suspend enrichment activities in Iran, an essential part of the package for the EU3, Russia and the United States. I want to be particularly clear on this point. Given Iran's 18-year clandestine enrichment program, any solution must provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programs will be solely for peaceful purposes, including complete cessation of all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran. Some have suggested that Iran be allowed small-scale enrichment activities, but even these could enable Iran to master technology critical to making nuclear weapons. Therefore, they would not be an acceptable solution.
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Iran responded to the generous EU3 proposal by calling it an insult. In violation of the Paris agreement with the EU3 and in defiance of the will of the international community expressed in the resolutions of the IAEA Board, Iran initiated unilateral actions that shattered the basis for negotiations, resuming uranium conversion in August 2005 and, following its provocative removal of IAEA seals this January, resumed uranium enrichment activities.
With the negotiations with the EU3 stalled, in September 2005 the IAEA Board returned to the task it had set aside nearly two years earlier, and made two important findings. First, the Board found that Iran's many breaches and failures of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted noncompliance as described in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Second, the Board found that the long history of deception and concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities, and the absence of confidence in Iran's peaceful nuclear intentions have given rise to questions within the competence of the UN security Council.
Both of those findings were cause to report Iran to the UN Security Council, but the Board chose to defer the timing and content of that report to give Iran one final chance to change course, and to restore the basis for a negotiated solution. Iran again chose the course of confrontation rather than negotiation, however, and following Iran's resumption of enrichment activities in January 2006, the IAEA Board by a 27–3 vote, with 5 abstentions, instructed the Director General to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Dr. ElBaradei has done so, and the Iranian nuclear program is now before the Council, the international body responsible for dealing with threats to international peace and security, which this surely is.
We are now moving to a new phase, in which the Security Council can add its considerable authority to the international effort to counter Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. We expect the Security Council to take up action on Iranian noncompliance next week. The Council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it—for example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and to take steps the IAEA Board has identified to restore confidence, and by giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all aspects of the Iranian nuclear effort.
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The Council should make clear to the Iranian regime that there will be consequences if it does not step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. We will continue to consult closely with the EU–3 and the European Union, with Russia, China, and many other members of the international community as this new diplomatic phase proceeds.
Absent even more provocative actions by Iran, we envision a graduated approach by the Security Council, interacting closely with the IAEA. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action, to the extent necessary, to induce Iran to come into complete compliance with its NPT and safeguards obligations, suspend all its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA.
For the first step, we may look to a Statement by the President of the Security Council. Such statements are issued by the Council President, but agreed by all members of the Council. In our view, a Presidential Statement could underline serious Council concern over Iran's nuclear activities and support for the IAEA investigation. In that regard, it could call on Iran to comply with IAEA Board resolutions, including by reestablishing full suspension, halting construction of the heavy water plant, resuming implementation of the Additional Protocol and bringing it into force, and cooperating fully with the IAEA investigation. Further, the Statement could call for a report on its implementation from the IAEA Director General within a short period—a few weeks, not months. We will urge that such a Presidential Statement be issued rapidly after the Council takes up the Iranian dossier next week.
If Iran defies the Security Council Presidential Statement, as it has the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, we will urge a Council resolution to put increased pressure on Iran to comply. The resolution could be grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, given the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear program. In issuing such a resolution, the Council could require Iran, within a specified short period of time, to comply with all elements of the IAEA Board resolutions, as well as with additional Council requirements such as opening up to substantially increased IAEA investigative authority.
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If Iran still does not comply, we will look to even firmer Council action. Our aim is that Iran will be persuaded to reverse course by the obvious resolve of the international community, shown first in the IAEA Board of Governors and beginning this month in the Security Council.
Defensive Measures
In addition to our diplomatic efforts to end the Iranian nuclear threat, we will work closely with other states to continue—and as necessary, expand—our defensive measures to protect ourselves against WMD proliferation and all WMD-armed adversaries, including Iran. Those defensive measures require an increasing array of instruments, policies and programs.
At one end of the spectrum are programs like Nunn-Lugar that help to prevent Iran and other proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and materials that could represent a short cut to nuclear weapons. At the other end is missile defense and other counterproliferation capabilities. These capabilities not only strengthen our strategic posture against the threat we face, but provide another reason to persuade states like Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place.
Other defensive measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation. UN Security Council Resolution 1540—adopted at the President's urging—requires states to adopt and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to export and transshipment that would contribute to WMD programs. Consistent with Resolution 1540, G–8 Leaders have called for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to identify, track and freeze transactions and assets associated with proliferation activities.
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President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this field when he issued last June a new Executive Order, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in proliferation activities, and to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with them. Currently 18 entities—6 from Iran, as well as 11 from North Korea and one from Syria—have been designated under the Order, and we are actively considering designating additional ones.
One of the most important defensive measures undertaken by the Bush Administration is the Proliferation Security Initiative, which shows the close interaction among—and the creative use of—diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat proliferation. PSI countries have put all of these assets to work in a multinational, yet flexible, fashion. The participating countries are applying laws already on the books in innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments, to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations that yield results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active—and proactive—partnership, to deter, disrupt and prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. And PSI is working—including against Iran. PSI cooperation has stopped the transshipment of material and equipment bound for Iran's ballistic missile programs. PSI partners, working at times with others, have also prevented Iran from procuring goods to support its WMD programs, including its nuclear program.
We continue to consider possible new or expanded defensive measures to combat the proliferation threat from Iran. We must and will pursue multiple avenues to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran.
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Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We will now get to questions under the 5-minute rule. I do not usually ask a question, but to give you an opportunity to outline your concerns with H.R. 282 will you tell us if the passage of that bill will help or hurt your efforts and why?
Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to comment on H.R. 282.
We believe that the current legislation in place, ILSA, has been a very effective tool for our foreign policy. Secretary Rice has said that quite often.
We are a country that has had a harder edge to its diplomacy than many others, and som