SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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26–780PDF
2006
COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES IN LATIN AMERICA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 30, 2006
Serial No. 109–181
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
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SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
RON PAUL, Texas
JERRY WELLER, Illinois, Vice Chairman
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
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ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
MARK WALKER, Subcommittee Staff Director
JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DAN S. GETZ, Professional Staff Member
BRIAN WANKO, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Michael A. Braun, Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
The Honorable James F. Mack, Executive Secretary, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Organization of American States
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Ms. Joy Olson, Executive Director, Washington Office on Latin America
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement
The Honorable Anne W. Patterson: Prepared statement
Mr. Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement
The Honorable James F. Mack: Prepared statement
Ms. Joy Olson: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES IN LATIN AMERICA
THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
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Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Dan Burton (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. BURTON. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that all Members and witnesses written and opening statements be included in the record, and without objection, so ordered.
I ask for unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits, and extraneous or tabular material referred to by Members or witnesses be included in the record, and without objection, so ordered.
We have an unusual situation. Henry Hyde, the Chairman of the Full Committee, feels so strongly about the issues we are talking about, he gave me a statement that he would like for me to read into the record.
So I hope that the panel will bear with me. You have to listen to Henry Hyde, the Chairman's statement, and then you have to listen to mine. So I apologize for the duration of these statements, but they are very important. At least, we think so.
This is from the Chairman of the Full Committee, Henry Hyde, on the subject of counternarcotics in Latin America.
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Chairman Hyde had hoped to be with us this morning, but unfortunately he could not be here, and here is what he writes:
''Dear Chairman Burton, I want to thank you for holding today's critical hearing on the struggle against narcoterrorism in our hemisphere. I had hoped that my schedule would have permitted me to attend in person so I could hear from the witnesses that you have invited to testify.
''As a strong supporter of United States counternarcotics efforts throughout the world, I am concerned that our efforts to fight the scourge of illegal narcotics seem to be adrift in our hemisphere. It is my hope that this hearing will serve to right this course, and reassure the American people and their allies in the Andes and in the United States that the United States Government is still standing with them, and will continue to support them in our mutually beneficial war on drugs.
''I request that you have this letter read into the record at the opening of your hearing. During consideration of the fiscal year 2006 emergency supplemental bill, you offered an amendment which would provide additional counterdrug aid to Colombia to support critical operational activities of the Colombian Navy.
''The amendment passed the House on an overwhelming 250 to 172 vote, sending a clear signal to the Administration that Congress continues to demand strong engagement in the very unstable Andean Ridge, where deadly cocaine and heroin are produced and shipped to the United States.
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''After 5 years of Plan Colombia, we are finally seeing success in our war on drugs. On American streets today the price of illegal narcotics is going up, while purity is falling. As a result, we are seeing fewer overdoses and drug related deaths in our communities.
''Unfortunately, these positive results have seemed to have lulled the Administration—and that is you guys—into a false sense of security, causing it to claim a premature victory in Colombia, and turn its attention to the Middle East and elsewhere.
''By doing this, it is likely to turn a winning hand into a losing one by tragically not fully supporting sustained vital assistance to our best ally in the Andean region, Colombia, and its leader, President Uribe.
''This would be unconscionable and we cannot let it happen. We will not let Latin America slip away from its long free and democratic moorings. The Colombians see light at the end of the tunnel under President Uribe, but still need our help to assist him in securing their nation once and for all.
''Unless we provide new and replacement counterdrug air assets and equipment, we will allow the terrorist group, FARC, to reenter the region as the newly demobilized paramilitaries have left, permitting them to consolidate their hold on the drug trade, and continue to destablize the nation.
''It is time for us to recommit ourselves to providing our closest ally in South America the right equipment and training to allow them a chance to prevail against the narcoterrorism that also threatens us. This is especially so, now that the United States has indicted at least 50 FARC leaders on drug trafficking charges.
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''To that end, we need to replace 23 lost CNP aircraft, increase interdiction capabilities by the Colombian Navy on both coasts, and retarget and prioritize the use of the existing air assets in Colombia to pursue the FARC leadership and other High Value Targets, continue the fight against drugs and help President Uribe bring lasting peace and stability to Colombia.
''At a time when United States backed counternarcotics and counterterrorist efforts have helped bring about the demobilization of more than 26,000 right-wing paramilitaries of the terrorist and drug trafficking group UAUC, and when there are nearly 7,000 FARC defectors, now is not the time to cut aid to Colombia and lose the leverage we have gained in helping them fight our battle against drugs.
''All of these matters are in our national interests of saving lives here at home. I have asked for a reprioritization of the United States aid in Colombia in the past, and I do so again today. I hope that someone in the Administration is listening; our drug czar is clearly not. I ask that my letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice of October 5, 2005, on the subject of air asset reprioritization, also be made part of the record. I look forward to continuing to work with you and hope that we can turn around the neglect in the Andean region before it is too late.
''We will regret not standing more closely with our allies in the Andes, especially concerning illicit drugs, where there are players who are not our friends, such as President Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales in Bolivia, who has strong contrary views concerning United States policy on coca production.
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''They and others seek to undo all our efforts of the last 20 years against narcoterrorism, destablize the region, and in some cases, roll back democracy. We cannot let that happen. Sincerely, Henry Hyde.''
I ask unanimous consent that Chairman Hyde's letter to me and to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice be entered into the record, and without objection so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Note: Image(s) not available in this format. See PDF version of this file.]
Mr. BURTON. I am going to enter my statement in the record as well, because I do not want to be redundant. Chairman Hyde says a lot of things that I have said. I have been down there to Colombia. I have met with President Uribe.
I have met with leaders of the other countries down there, and I think what the Chairman said is exactly right. We have problems in other parts of the world, and we have diverted assets to those other parts of the world to fight the war against terrorism.
I think the war against terrorism is very, very important. However, in our own back yard, we have severe problems. President Chavez is getting over $100-million a day in oil revenues, $60-million of it from us.
He has made outlandish statements. I saw one yesterday that I could not believe. Chevez was calling President Bush every name under the sun, and he has called the Secretary of State every name under the sun.
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Now we have Mr. Morales, whom I hope to meet and talk with, and hopefully he will have a different attitude from President Chavez. I have talked to his Vice President, but I want to see Mr. Morales.
President Morales has indicated in some pretty strong language that we are not the best friends of that region. Currently, President Uribe is the guy that is standing alone in that particular area fighting the war against drugs. In addition, President Uribe is working very hard to help the United States, and help the kids of this country, and protect the streets of this country.
We had a request, and the Speaker of the House was supportive of the request, for 23 aircraft. We got virtually no support from the Administration. Now, we were able to get three of the aircraft through the House by the majority that Chairman Hyde spoke about.
I think that was a step in the right direction, and that will give us more eyes and ears to watch some of the transactions taking place and the traffic going through the Caribbean and subsequently through Mexico.
Sixty-five percent of the drugs that get beyond Colombia get into the United States. Two-thirds. Yet, we aren't getting the support that we would like from the Administration in order to deal with this.
Now, I want to ask a couple of questions when we reach the question and answer period, but I have been told that we lost 23 aircraft in the last few years. However, I have some records that indicate that we have lost a lot more than that, and the Administration is not even aware of it.
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Without the proper equipment, we simply cannot do the job and President Uribe cannot do the job. So, I hope that you will take back to Secretary of State Rice, for whom I have the highest regard, and to the drug czar, for whom I have regard, and to the rest of the Administration, let us not forget our front yard or back yard, whatever you want to say.
Let us not forget them, because we had a war down there in the early 1980s, and I don't want to prolong this, but I was down there. I was around Congress back in those days. You guys probably were not here, but I was here.
I saw what happened as far as massive immigration; people losing their property and coming to the United States in droves. You may not know this, but we have a big immigration discussion going on right now in Congress, and if things get out of control in Latin America because of Chavez, Morales, Castro, or Daniel Ortega, we are going to have big problems.
We could have wars down there that would be very bad, and maybe even rival the things that we have faced in the Middle East. The key to stopping that from happening, in my opinion, is to give our friends the assets necessary to deal with the problem now. Do not wait around.
Three aircraft are not going to cut it. It just is not going to solve the problem. We need a lot more than that, and in addition to that, we need other things, like continued trade agreements that will help create jobs and stabilize the region.
You guys are here today to talk to us about the drug problem. I hope that you will carry this message back from Chairman Hyde, Chairman of the Full Committee, and me as Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and my other colleagues, because I think that it is extremely important that we pay attention to this area.
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I would like to ask for unanimous consent to take my written statement and submit it for the record, and without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Engel, welcome as my new Ranking Democrat Member. Mr. Engel replaces Mr. Menendez, who went to the lower body. I have to explain that to you some other time. Mr. Engel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
With vigilance we are making progress in our counter-narcotics programs in Latin America. But there are challenges to keep up the pace and reinforce existing programs. We have lost critical hardware used in the eradication and interdiction of narcotics in the Andean region. We have diverted some equipment to other theaters of operation. There are gaps in our surveillance of key areas of the illicit drug transit zone in Central America and the Caribbean due to declining availability of air and surface patrol craft. These problems need to be remedied.
Last week the U.S. District Court in Washington indicted 50 FARC leaders on charges of sending more than $25 billion worth of cocaine around the world to finance terrorism. The indictment estimates that the FARC supplies more than half of the world's cocaine and 60 percent of the drug that enters the United States. This indictment is the culmination of extensive counter-narcotics cooperation. We need to keep up the pressure on the drug traffickers through close law enforcement coordination. We will hear more about the indictment from our first panel.
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Two weeks ago the Burton Amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 passed with bipartisan support in the House. Our Amendment offers $26.3 million in assistance to Colombia for the purchase of three new DC–3 fixed-wing aircraft to serve as Marine Patrol Aircraft (MPA) for Colombian Navy drug interdiction efforts. The aircraft will help the Colombian Navy locate and stop illegal narcotics shipments both onshore and immediately off the Colombian shoreline, thus making overall interdiction efforts more effective.
It has been reported that if drug traffickers make it to the coasts of Colombia, they have a 65 percent chance of getting their shipments into the United States. In our on-going efforts to protect our homeland, it is essential that we cut off this toxic pipeline before these drugs make it onto our streets and communities. If we can prevent these drugs from leaving Colombia, we help cut back on regional violence, limit the bloodshed on the U.S.-Mexican border and protect our children from harm.
The strategic objective of this hearing is to provide Subcommittee members with insights to the Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, an assessment of funding levels and performance indicators for strategies including eradication, interdiction, surveillance and other aspects of the drug war.
We are pleased to have Assistant Secretary Patterson with us to testify on our counter-narcotics strategy in Latin America. Your testimony today will help provide the Subcommittee with an update on trends in major illicit drug producing, drug transit, source, precursor chemical and money laundering countries.
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I am interested to hear your views on how we can improve cooperative partnerships in Latin America in combating narcotics production and trafficking to the United States.
The International Narcotics Strategy Report, is published annually by the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The report provides a useful snapshot of the progress and challenges we face in the Drug War.
The progress in Colombia is significant. In 2005, kidnappings were down 51 percent and homicides by 13 percent. Last year with U.S. and international support, Colombia destroyed 170,000 hectares of illegal coca through aerial and manual eradication programs. I received an update earlier this month from the State Department that Colombia's military and police forces captured a record 223 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base. The amount of cocaine that was kept off the streets of the United States totaled 378 metric tons with an estimated street value of $38 billion. In 2005, an all-time high of 134 people were extradited from Colombia to face charges in the U.S. Mexico extradited a record 41 criminals and expelled other fugitives last year.
Aggressive aerial spraying is forcing drug traffickers to move shop, and they are on the run replanting in other parts of Colombia and crossing borders into Ecuador and Peru. This balloon effect must be tamped down.
Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of coca. Bolivia is the world's third-biggest producer of cocaine, after Colombia and Peru. We have witnessed mixed signals from the new President. One day he says he wants to work together to fight drugs, the next day he appears in front of a banner reading ''Long live coca. Death to the Yankees.'' Clearly our relationship with the new government in Bolivia is changing and will depend upon the policies they adopt on a wide range of issues, including counter-narcotics.
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Another key relationship in the region is under strain. Venezuela was de-certified last year after failing to adhere to obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements. The Venezuelan Government effectively suspended cooperation to reduce illicit cultivation, interdiction, law enforcement cooperation, extraditing drug traffickers, and taking legal steps and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption that facilitates drug trafficking or impedes prosecution of drug-related crimes. We have received reports from investigations of smuggling activity that led to the arrests of Venezuelan authorities, and this is especially troubling.
In order to balance our security and commercial interests in the Andean region, many of us believe it is essential to consider the important role that licit industries in these countries have played in supporting U.S. policy goals. The promotion of sustainable licit substitute crops can be an engine of economic growth for rural development and to communities ravaged by violence. There is a link between lawlessness, drugs and poverty in Latin America. The Administration has shown a serious commitment to tackle these problems. Our security policies and our commercial policies require constant inter-agency coordination. If we are trying to promote alternative crop development for coca growers, by all means we should be offering viable commercial incentives as well.
I also support multilateral initiatives like the OAS's Inter-American Commission Against Drug Abuse (CICAD) which is conducting multilateral evaluations and offering recommendations to the 34 OAS member countries, including the U.S., on how to strengthen and better coordinate counter-narcotics programs. We need a comprehensive regional strategy to go after the links between drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorist financing and illicit arms trafficking.
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Drug traffickers are constantly on the lookout for weaknesses in the firewalls that we build in cooperation with countries in the region. The international community must not disengage or ease back in the drug war. Multi-ton seizures of cocaine were once rare in Europe, but they are increasing in number and yield. European criminal organizations and terrorist groups are trafficking in drugs from the Andes to Spain and the rest of Europe. Later this year we will be looking closely at European contributions to the Latin America Drug War.
I look forward to continued vigilance in the months and years ahead, to better coordination, and to working together to reinforce the progress we have made. I now recognize the distinguished ranking member from New York, Eliot Engel, for any statement he may wish to make.
Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, colleagues, and friends. Before I turn to the topic of counternarcotics, I want to first of all note that today marks my second Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearing, though my first one with you, Mr. Chairman, and I am glad that you are resting that voice and feeling a little bit better, although I hear that you have a little ways to go.
As I shared the last time, I am honored to join you as the new Ranking Member, and I especially look forward to working with you on our Subcommittee. I have heard wonderful things about how you run the Subcommittee, and have already appreciated our collaborative efforts relating to the region.
I also look forward to working on a bipartisan basis with all of my Subcommittee colleagues to raise the Western Hemisphere's profile, and help ensure that its numerous pressing issues receive appropriate attention.
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I note that Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen is here, and with whom I have collaborated on many different things on this Committee. Also Congressman Delahunt, who probably is one of the most knowledgeable people in this Congress about the Western Hemisphere. I look forward to working with all of you on this Subcommittee.
Moving on to the issue before us, Mr. Chairman, I think it is most appropriate that you have called this Subcommittee hearing on counternarcotics strategies in Latin America.
This is a vitally important topic that affects us all. The trafficking of illegal drugs and its accompanying criminal activity are obviously serious threats that simultaneously target both our external and internal interests.
Throughout the United States, we can see narcotrafficking's corrosive society impact in the eyes of our drug-addicted children, in the streets of crime in neighborhoods, in the families destroyed by drugs, in the schools, and in the work force.
I see such harm in my district as you see it in yours, and as we all see it in our districts. The list goes on. Last week's Department of Justice indictment of 40 leaders of the FARC on charges of importing more than $25-billion worth of cocaine into the United States and other countries is both a law enforcement achievement and a wake-up call to the dangers that we face from the region.
If drugs can have such a devastating and wide ranging effect on the United States, imagine the impact on fragile democracies with struggling economies. Illegal drug trafficking generates billions of dollars that finance black market arms traffickers, fueling violence, and socially destablizing criminal activity throughout most of the Western Hemisphere.
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The United States faces not only a threat from the illicit drugs on our streets, but also from the increasing instability brought on my insurgent guerrilla organizations that are fueled by the drug trade.
I cannot think of one issue that is more important to the stability of our region than this. It ties in with all the things that we are concerned about, terrorism and what not.
It is in our interest to be surrounded by stable democracies, with strong economies, not governments penetrated by the corrupting influence of drug money. The United States continues its two-pronged approach to this issue, first tapping the United States domestic problem of illicit drug consumption; and second, fashioning an effective United States plan to address the flow from source countries.
In this latter regard, few can deny that there is a narcotics crisis in the hemisphere, but since we have been at this for some time, we must ask what progress have we made, and at what costs, and where do we go from here.
This hearing is an opportunity for us to address questions of eradication, alternative development, counter drug bastions, human rights, the environment, and governance in a region undergoing much political and social transition.
Some of the issues affected by the drug crisis include democratic institution building, judiciary sector reform, and social welfare. These fundamentally, interconnected issues are at the heart of the matter, and we ignore them at our own peril.
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America has good friends in many countries to our south, and we should continue to work with them to find strategies to reduce the source of the illegal drug trade. Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by stating that I am dubious that our efforts on the supply side of the narcotics trade alone can eliminate the cash incentive from the drug trade over the long term.
According to the DEA, the United States has 25 million drug users within its borders. We just do more to drive down demand at home through drug prevention, treatment, and education. If we reduce demand, narcotics growers, traffickers, and dealers, will increasingly be driven out of the business by economics alone.
On the supply side, I note that many of my colleagues, myself included, are concerned about our efforts to work seriously at sustainable development issues within the hemisphere.
Over 40 percent of the people in the Western Hemisphere live below the poverty level. However, I am dismayed to note that the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request slashes core developmental assistance, namely child survival and health funds, as well as development assistance by 22 percent from fiscal year 2005.
Twenty-two percent is a large amount, and it is simply unconscionable, inexcusable, and undermines our efforts to roll back the drug trade. I know that Mr. Burton expressed some of his dismay at the fact of the budget and the Administration for not putting forth the money to do the things that we know need to be done.
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If you want to diminish coca growing, and if you want to reduce illegal immigration, if you want to lessen the spread of diseases, if you want to preserve bio-diversity, we must do something more than simply trade with our neighbors to the south.
Sustainable development is also very important, and I hope that we will focus on cooperative efforts to encourage coca farmers to take up other crops as we also seek to ensure that interdiction, eradication, and other ways of curtailing the supply are pursued.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to working with you on this important matter, and during the testimony today, and as I mentioned before, I look forward to working with you very closely on a number of matters.
We have been good friends in my 18 years in Congress, and I look forward to continuing and enhancing that relationship. Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Engel. It has been 18 years?
Mr. ENGEL. It is hard to believe isn't it?
Mr. BURTON. We look so young.
Mr. ENGEL. We are young.
Mr. BURTON. Let us see. Oh, our good friend, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important and timely hearing on the United States counternarcotics strategies in Latin America, and for your ongoing leadership on this issue.
This issue as we have heard is particularly important to our Chairman, Mr. Hyde, and we value his contribution on this issue. Given the strategic location of my congressional district of South Florida, seen by many as the gateway to the Americas, this issue is of great personal and local concern to my constituents.
According to the State Department's 2006 international narcotics control strategy, 14 of the 20 major drug producing, or drug transit countries, are located in Latin America or in the Caribbean.
In our own hemisphere, United States counternarcotics programs represent a vital front on the war on terrorism. In countries such as Colombia, the source of 90 percent of all cocaine entering into the United States, there is a clear connection between the drug trade and the financing of foreign terrorists organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC.
United States-backed counternarcotics efforts are necessary to cut off this critical source of funding for violent narcotrafficking and terrorist organizations. Along with the support of terrorism, illegal narcotics undermine the stability and the rule of law throughout the region.
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The drug trade spreads corruption and money laundering. It erodes the institutional capacity of Latin America's relatively new and fragile democracies. The United States counternarcotics programs in the region are therefore crucial in helping our partners and our friends eradicate the cultivation of illegal narcotics, build law enforcement infrastructure, prosecute traffickers, and seize their assets. I thank the Chairman for his ongoing leadership on this issue, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Delahunt, the silver fox from Massachusetts.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I want to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Engel. It clearly reflects, I think, a sensible approach, a balanced approach, and one that I am confident that we all embrace.
I also agree with you, Mr. Burton. As you know, I supported your amendment to increase funding for specifically maritime interdiction. I think the issue that we have got to address, however, is that we have been supporting Plan Colombia.
You know that I have supported that early on, and was involved in the negotiations over Plan Colombia, but at some point in time this has to be assumed by the Colombian Government.
I say this in a very positive way: Under the leadership of President Uribe, their economy is doing pretty well. More of the burden should be assumed by the Colombian Government if we are looking for that particular balance.
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So, I agree with you in terms of assets if we are to continue to sustain this effort, and the results apparently are trending well, but that is Colombia. We do have issues surrounding the so-called ''balloon effect'' in other Andean nations, but again, the American taxpayers have stood up here, and they have stood tall to support Colombia.
Again, their economy has improved considerably in the past 5 years. I guess I would pose a question to Secretary Patterson, in terms of how the Government of Colombia rates in terms of enforcement of its tax laws.
Tax compliance is a problem that I have, in terms of Latin American nations, where they don't, as a group, seem to do as well as the United States in terms of insisting full compliance in securing the tax revenue that is necessary. With that, I yield back.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt. I appreciate that. Mr. Mack, before I introduce you, I want to thank you very much. I had a very bad illness, a cold, which had me in bed for about 10 days, which is unusual, and you took over and conducted the energy hearing for me, and I want to thank you publicly. I hear you did a great job.
Mr. MACK OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. With that, Mr. Mack, you are recognized.
Mr. MACK OF FLORIDA. Thank you, and I will be brief as well. Thank you for holding this hearing today, and I want to thank the panel in advance for being here to talk about this important issue.
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The United States, through Plan Colombia, and foreign aid, has made a lot of progress. Yet, there is still a lot of work to be done. The work is not only in Colombia, it is in all of Latin America, and it is no secret that I have been a critic of President Hugo Chavez, and believe that he is a destablizing factor in our hemisphere and in the world.
He is someone that cuts across what people in America are looking for, which is freedom. He is someone, whether it is through the increased trafficking of narcotics, purchasing of military weapons, or just completely taking the hopes and dreams—my belief of the hopes, and dreams, and aspirations of the people of that country away from the ideals of freedom and democracy, and toward a dictatorship.
I am very concerned about Hugo Chavez, and what his influence in the region will ultimately mean to us here in the United States. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing.
I look forward to hearing from the panel, and I also look forward to working with you in making sure that we can handle the issues that we have in our back yard so that Americans can feel more secure in their homes. Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Mack. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and I will be very brief, too. I am glad that you are well and back in the saddle again. However, there were others who wish you were still out. That is private, too.
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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Payne, is this because of the garage in your district that we saw?
Mr. PAYNE. No, as we have discussed before. But let me just say that it is a very timely hearing. I associate myself with the remarks by the Ranking Member, Mr. Engel, and certainly have seen the fact that there has been record amounts of spraying, and seizures, and so forth.
However, it seems that there is only minimal evidence that we have a reduction in the availability. I know that it is a tough battle, but we need to evaluate the effectiveness of the program.
I also would just like to mention briefly that as we all know, a tremendous amount of financial support goes to the military, and there is some question about the behavior of the military in other areas.
We have seen IMET funds, and for example, in Ethiopia, the Chairman of that Subcommittee is talking about withholding funds for IMET in Ethiopia, where Ethiopia has the largest number of peacekeepers in the world because there is some question about some human rights abuses, which should not occur anywhere.
We need to have parity in some of our policies as it relates to our support for the military, but we must hold them accountable. Finally, the spraying, and certainly this round up spray, this chemical is having a negative impact on the environment, on people, and on livestock, and we need to be careful that we are not throwing out the baby with the bath water, attempting to eliminate the coca growth, but we are also impacting on the health.
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Many people in the area are Afro-Cubans, and so the Colombians are Afro-Colombians, and the fact that the people who are treated the worst with the government, with the military, and then when this program of spraying also impacts on these Afro-Colombians, it is something that I think that we need to really evaluate. So once again, Mr. Chairman, I certainly commend you for calling this very important hearing.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Payne. My good friend, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would like to associate myself with the comments made by my good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey, and your leadership in not only calling this hearing this morning, but the fact that you certainly have a firm commitment in looking through what should be our policies toward this important region of the world.
I make no apologies for making this statement, Mr. Chairman. It seems that Latin America has always been our neglected neighbor if you will, and the problem is not whether it is a Republican or Democratic Administration. This has been the course that we have had for all these years.
Latin America always seems to be the sick child that never seems to really—we have really never seriously made an honest effort in being not only as a good neighbor, but we seem to spend more time and more worries about the drug trafficking issues that come out of this region of the world than trying to develop serious economic trade relationships.
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The fact that there is some 400 to 500 million people living in that region of the world, and we never seem to consistently pursue a more positive policy in how we could really help our neighbors in the south.
So this very issue itself, counternarcotics, and now that we have a new trend, if you will, of the kind of leaders that are being duly elected by some of these countries in Latin America, as I have always earnestly tried to bring to the forefront, at least a little sense of visibility about the fact that the indigenous populations of these countries have always been—it is almost like reading a road map of what we have to deal with native American communities in our country.
I think we really seriously need to look at our counternarcotics policies that we have enunciated for all these years, and if there really have been positive results. I seriously would like to work closely with you, Mr. Chairman.
Also, I offer my personal welcome to our newly-elected Ranking Member of our Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning. Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Today on our first panel, we have two very distinguished people. Ann W. Patterson was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, on November 28, 2005.
Recently, she served as deputy permanent representative, and then as acting permanent representative at the United States Mission to the United Nations from 2004 to 2005.
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Ms. Patterson has had a distinguished career in the foreign service, including posts as Ambassador to Colombia from 2000 to 2003, and Ambassador to El Salvador from 1997 to 2000. It is good to have you with us, Ms. Patterson.
Special Agent Michael Braun is DEA Chief of Operations, and is responsible for leading the worldwide drug enforcement operations of the agency across the United States and in 58 countries.
He is one of the principal directors of national drug intelligence management and national drug strategy on our Nation's war on terrorism. We are pleased to have you with us again, Mr. Braun. Would you both rise so I can swear you in, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. BURTON. We would like to get to as many questions as possible, and so if you can make your comments brief, we would appreciate it. We will try to be as tolerant as we can. Secretary Patterson, you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Burton, Congressman Engel, and other distinguished Members of this Subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today.
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This is a timely opportunity to review the progress being made in the Americas to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. My written testimony includes a regional overview, but I would like to focus on some of the successes that we have achieved and challenges that we face today.
Returning to these issues after some years away, I was struck by the maturing of inter-American cooperation in the western hemisphere, not just against drug trafficking, but also against transnational crime.
Nowhere has progress been more pronounced than in Colombia. Under the leadership of Presidents Pastrana and Uribe, Plan Colombia has been a dramatic success. In 2005, Colombia destroyed 170,000 hectares of illegal coca, and helped to cease 223 tons of cocaine.
ONDCP recently announced that these efforts may have led to an increase in United States street prices and a reduction in purity. Plan Colombia has also achieved results that we did not fully anticipate. Today, all 1,098 of Colombia's municipalities have a police presence. Kidnappings are down by half, and homicides are down by 13 percent.
In 2005, Colombia extradited a record 134 fugitives to the United States, including FARC leaders and high level drug traffickers. Still, major challenges remain.
Narcotraffickers aggressively replanted nearly as much coca as was destroyed in last year's record setting aerial eradication campaign. We are evaluating now how to counter this replanting, including stepped up aerial spraying. In Colombia, much of the coca is grown in remote, inaccessible areas, where the FARC and other illegal armed groups are mostly free to operate.
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Success in eradication and interdiction depend on air mobility. INL is supporting Colombia with over 140 aircraft, plus assistance in training. INL's critical flight safety programs seek to upgrade and maintain many of these aging assets to enhance pilot and crew safety, extend the aircraft's operational life, and to reduce long term maintenance costs by making them commercially supportable.
While our long term goal is to nationalize the helicopter program, we must do so at a pace that Colombia is able to sustain in order to protect the huge investments that we have made to ensure flight safety and to keep the programs focused on eradication and interdiction missions.
I recently visited Joint Interagency Task Force South, JITFS, and discussed maritime interdiction with Rear Admiral Jeff Hathaway. The decline in availability of maritime patrol aircraft reduced our ability to detect, monitor, and target go-fast boats leaving Colombia.
Nonetheless, JIAFT-South coordinated a record seizure of 254 tons of cocaine in 2005 due in large part to markedly improved operational intelligence from such sources as Operation Panama Express.
We and our allies are looking for ways to overcome this problem. For example, we are working on an initiative to use average denial aircraft for air and maritime detection, and monitoring along Colombia's Pacific and Caribbean coasts. We will be consulting with your Committee soon on this concept.
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Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of coca.
Mr. BURTON. Excuse me just one moment.
[Pause.]
Mr. BURTON. I couldn't listen to two women at one time. Excuse me. Pardon me, Secretary, that was not meant to be disingenuous. I apologize.
Ambassador PATTERSON. Let me just back up and say that we are going to be consulting with your Committee soon on a concept to use average denial aircraft currently in Colombia for maritime patrol.
Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of coca, and we saw increases in cultivation there in 2005. In Peru, the policies of the government, to be elected on April 9, will obviously have a significant bearing on the counternarcotics effort.
Our relationship with the Morales Administration in Bolivia will depend upon the policies it adopts on a wide range of issues, with counternarcotics a key component. Mexico is one of our most critical partners.
Some 90 percent of United States bound cocaine shipments transit the Central America-Mexico corridor, and Mexico remains a major drug producing country and base of operations for trafficking groups.
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We are also concerned about the production and trafficking of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals. I traveled to Mexico City earlier this month to learn more about what Mexican and United States personnel are doing to confront the methamphetamine problem.
I was pleased to see that the concrete progress that Mexico has made in a short time to curb precursor imports. At last week's binational commission, Mexican and United States officials agreed that methamphetamine is a top law enforcement priority.
Central America is a region of particular concern. The expansion of gangs has been devastating there, and has emerged as one of the serious problems in many communities across the United States.
I.N.L. is working closely with other agencies and with partner nations to promote a balanced, multidisciplinary approach to the problem. We intend to include anti-gang and cultural lawfulness training in our international law enforcement academy in El Salvador as part of our regional anti-gang strategy.
On drug interdiction, the Central American governments are committed partners, but they lack capacity and resources. Improving interdiction capacity in the region will be difficult due to the high cost of helicopter assets, and the increasingly competitive budgetary environment that we face.
I look forward to working with other United States agencies and Congress to address this issue. In conclusion, progress is being made in the western hemisphere, but there is a long way to go. The important partnerships that we have forged have kept hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin off our streets.
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United States law enforcement now has more professional and better equipped partners in many countries. I am optimistic that with the continued strong support of Congress that we will be able to build on these successes and overcome the challenges that lie before us. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Patterson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. The Department of State welcomes this hearing as a timely opportunity to review the significant progress being made in the Americas to combat illicit drug production and trafficking, as well as to discuss the challenges and opportunities before us.
INCSR
On March 1, the Department of State released the 23rd annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), a global report on international efforts to curb cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs. While it is drafted and coordinated by the Department of State, it is reviewed by the entire USG law enforcement community—including the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and Treasury, as well a DEA, the Coast Guard and ONDCP. The companion Money Laundering Report is, in fact, drafted by an interagency group of experts. The assessments and recommendations reflect interagency consensus.
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While there are many acute concerns and daunting challenges in the Western Hemisphere, it is helpful to begin by stepping back and comparing where we are now compared with a decade ago. Returning to the counternarcotics world after some years away, I am struck by the overall progress that has been made in this hemisphere—not just by individual countries, but by countries working together. Report after report in the INCSR provides evidence of maturing policies, modernizing institutions, and stronger cross-border, sub-regional and international cooperation. Countries are seizing more drugs, extraditing more fugitives, participating in more cross-border operations, and rooting out and punishing corruption. Many are making broad-sweeping changes to their legal systems to better confront modern forms of organized crime—and seeking to harmonize their legislation with neighboring states to prevent criminals from simply shifting from tougher to weaker jurisdictions.
When the first INCSR was published, Latin American narcotics-producing countries were just reporting the first signs of drug abuse in their own countries, while the United States was in a full-blown crack epidemic. Today, U.S. cocaine consumption has leveled off and casual use is down substantially while drug abuse is growing in throughout the hemisphere. The inter-American dialogue on drugs has changed accordingly, with less finger pointing and a greater sense of shared responsibility and cooperation.
This didn't happen overnight—nor by happenstance. It was the result of long-term U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance efforts to promote democracy and to strengthen democratic institutions—including the justice sector and law enforcement. It was the result of sustained encouragement and support by the U.S. Government—including the leverage exerted by the U.S. narcotics certification process—as well as multilateral engagement through the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas. It was also the result of the explosion of the myth in other countries that drug abuse was an American problem, not theirs.
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The international community also recognizes the links of the drug trade to money laundering, terrorist financing and organized crime and has been working together to confront the many challenges. The United States plays an important leadership role, but is no longer alone in pressing for effective action. Mexico and Colombia are staunch allies—multilaterally as well as bilaterally. Costa Rica emerged as a leader in promoting the development of a Caribbean regional maritime agreement. El Salvador stepped forward to host the new International Law Enforcement Academy for the Americas. Nicaragua has advanced the cause of combating weapons trafficking.
All around the Americas, countries are taking a fresh look at what it costs to cling to old sovereignty sensibilities when there are real and menacing threats to be faced, and many are opting for creative ways to work with their neighbors. The Central Americans are working together to strengthen regional security. El Salvador and Guatemala mount joint patrols along their border—as the U.S. now does with Canada. The countries of the Eastern Caribbean were pioneers in this kind of collaboration through the Regional Security System (RSS). The U.S., Mexico and Canada have launched the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), which seeks, among other goals, to develop a North American security perimeter. The Organization of American States' drug commission (CICAD) is mobilizing regional and sub-regional cooperation across the full range of anti-drug efforts, from demand reduction to chemical control.
All understand that only through common cause will we be able to contain and diminish the threats of drugs and organized crime, which are impediments to political and economic freedom and prosperity.
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The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has been at the forefront of these diplomatic efforts and reform efforts—with the invaluable partnership of DEA and other agencies and the sustained generous support of the U.S. Congress. INL has brought problems to light through the INCSR report, used diplomatic engagement to build the will of partner nations to make needed reforms, and then provided them with the technical and material assistance they need to be more effective.
Let me highlight just a few of the important developments included in this year's INCSR:
The seven ACI countries made good progress in interdicting drugs and eradicating opium poppy cultivation.
Andean countries, Central American states and Mexico reported seizing 365 metric tons of cocaine worth tens of billions of dollars on the street.
Mexican authorities, employing INL-provided screening equipment at several airports, uncovered over $40 million in currency hidden in cargo bound for Colombia.
In the Western Hemisphere, U.S. and international support assisted Colombia in aerially eradicating 139,000 hectares and manually eradicating another 31,000 hectares of illegal coca.
Peru manually eradicated twelve thousand hectares of coca and seized eleven tons of drugs.
Mexico eradicated over 20,000 hectares of opium poppy and over 30,000 hectares of marijuana, and seized 30 tons of cocaine, over 1,700 tons of marijuana and nearly a ton of methamphetamine.
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In 2005, Colombia extradited 134 people to face charges in the U.S.—an all-time high. Mexico extradited a record 41 fugitives and expelled or deported 146 additional fugitives.
U.S. and Canadian law enforcement have worked closely to attack and dismantle cross-border trafficking organizations, including a large criminal ring engaged in trafficking and producing ecstasy.
Mexico moved to restrict the importation of methamphetamine precursors, notably pseudoephedrine, and tightened internal controls to prevent their diversion to illicit drug manufacturing.
Budget Issues
In our Fiscal Year 2007 budget proposal, pressing demands elsewhere in the world—notably Afghanistan—have forced us to make difficult choices. There are cuts in bilateral anti-drug aid to many Latin American countries, although we realize there are real needs, particularly in the Transit Zone programs in Central America and the Caribbean.
COLOMBIA
Nowhere has progress been more pronounced than in Colombia.
In 2000, U.S. and Colombian officials developed a joint, highly-focused and aggressive strategy to target illicit drug production and trafficking. During that first year, while we were building up the infrastructure for ''Plan Colombia,'' coca cultivation reached an all-time high, and only 47,000 hectares of coca were eradicated. In 2005, the U.S.-supported Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate (DIRAN) sprayed a record 138,775 hectares of coca during the year and 1,624 hectares of poppy. The Government of Colombia reported that manual eradication accounted for the destruction of an additional 31,285 hectares of coca and 497 hectares of poppy. This stopped a potential of billions of dollars of cocaine from reaching U.S. streets. In addition, Colombian forces helped interdict 223 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base. Recent preliminary analysis indicates that these efforts may have led to an increase in the U.S. street price of cocaine and heroin and a reduction in purity for both.
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Under the leadership of Presidents Pastrana and Uribe, ''Plan Colombia'' has been a success—more than I expected when I was sent there as Ambassador in 2000. It has benefited Colombia in ways we did not anticipate, such as in establishing security in the countryside and contributing to a renewed self-confidence in the country that is evident in many areas. Public safety has improved. Today, for the first time in the country's history, all 1098 of Colombia's municipalities have a permanent government presence. Colombia's ongoing transition from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial criminal justice system with oral trials is well underway and in those districts where the transition has already occurred, the new system has proved to be enormously more efficient and effective and has gained the confidence of the public at large. Kidnappings are down 51 percent and homicides 13 percent, and the World Bank considers Colombia an attractive investment climate with legitimate economic development that is replacing illicit drug production. Who would have thought that possible even a few years ago?
Another measure of progress is the extradition to the U.S. of organized crime leaders. Extradition is one of the legal tools most feared by drug traffickers. Major drug traffickers extradited to the U.S. last year included FARC leaders and Cali Cartel leader Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela. In 2005, a record 134 people were extradited from Colombia to the U.S.
Still, the United States and Colombia understand that major challenges remain. Narcotraffickers have undertaken to more aggressively replant coca that was destroyed in last year's record-setting aerial eradication campaign.
The U.S. and Colombia are evaluating tactics to counter this rapid replanting, including stepping up the aerial spray program. We are also helping to build Colombian capacity to take over the program in the future.
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Narcotraffickers continue to shift routes and methods to avoid detection and interception, and—while our detection and monitoring capacity has improved—there are simply not enough USG or host nation assets available to respond to all of the actionable targets.
Success in both interdiction and eradication rely on air mobility—the support of safe and dependable helicopters. Colombia is approximately the size of California and Texas combined, with an almost Texas-sized area lacking passable roads for much of the year. This remote area is where much of the coca is grown, and where the FARC and other illegal armed groups are most free to operate. Helicopter support is thus essential to enable the Government of Colombia—and especially the Colombian Army and National Police—to effectively confront drug cultivation and counter illegal armed groups.
Helicopters, however, are very expensive assets to operate and maintain and require investments in lengthy aviator and maintenance personnel training. Although the Colombia Army has its own UH–60 Black Hawk fleet, INL is supporting it with over 70 USG-owned and supported helicopters. We are also providing technical assistance and training in conjunction with the Defense Department. Each year there is a marked improvement in the quality and number of Colombian helicopter pilots, mechanics, and support personnel. While the U.S. is working to ''Colombianize'' the helicopter program, we must do it at a pace that the Colombian government is able to assimilate, protect the large investments we have made, ensure flight safety, and keep the program's focus on the highest priority missions—interdiction and eradication.
Upgrading aircraft under INL's Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP) is another essential element for continued effective aviation support of Colombian counternarcotics activities. Many of the aircraft within the INL Air Wing fleet are excess defense articles that are no included in the Department of Defense's support system. A great number are over 40 years old, with airframes reaching the limits of their useful lifetimes and have not received major depot level maintenance. In many cases, aircraft have been grounded due to evidence of severe structural weakness. INL has planned and requested funds for the CFSP to repair, upgrade, sustain and replace aircraft needed for eradication, interdiction and counterterrorism programs. Over 60% of the FY 2006 funding will go to support our fleet in Colombia, with the remainder benefiting other Latin American programs. CFSP funding is essential for eliminating the safety and mission availability risks for these critical aviation assets.
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The State Department coordinates the Colombian Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program. Since it was reinitiated in 2003, Colombia has established air sovereignty throughout the majority of its territory. This has led since 2004 to a 56 percent decrease in suspect trafficker flights, a 75 percent increase in law enforcement ground endgames, and a reduction in the total drug flow by air to the United States to seven percent or less. The program has forced traffickers to change their smuggling tactics by flying shorter distances. The number of air events and air intercepts have decreased significantly, and we are now largely in a deterrence mode.
More than 93 percent of cocaine destined for the United States is smuggled by maritime transport. Our interagency interdiction community has been striving to get additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) assets for the last two years. Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) coordinated the seizure of a record 254 MT of cocaine in 2005 despite the shortage in assets—both MPA and surface vessels. Even with excellent operational intelligence from such sources as Operation Panama Express, the lack of MPAs limits our ability to detect, monitor and target go-fast boats leaving Colombia.
Mitigating strategies include continued outreach to our allies, who continue to show strong support for the counter-drug mission. This year the Government of the Netherlands will be contracting with a private firm for two maritime surveillance aircraft to operate out of Curacao. These will fall under JIATF-South tactical control and provide much needed MPA support in the Caribbean. Likewise, DOD and Coast Guard are working to add additional aircraft to the effort. We understand that the FY 2006 Coast Guard budget includes additional funding for C–130 flight hours, which will also help close the MPA gap. Colombia and Central American countries have few, if any, MPAs or interdiction vessels. It would take a long time and significant new resources for these countries to develop this type of maritime interdiction capability.
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We are also working on an initiative to use Airbridge Denial aircraft for both air and maritime detection and monitoring in the littoral waters off the Colombia's Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Ambassador Wood and I are exploring ways to get even a better return on our successful ABD program investment while increasing the effectiveness of our bilateral interdiction program. We hope to implement this initiative immediately since the assets are already in place.
In addition, we have now arrived at a point in this process where we are turning greater attention to the democracy programs, the so-called ''soft side'' of our support. We need to be able to meet that commitment in order to ensure that Colombia will indeed be the free-standing, able partner that we envision for the future.
OTHER ANDEAN COUNTRIES
Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of coca. In 2005, both governments faced growing resistance from drug-cultivating farmers, which slowed eradication efforts and contributed to an increase in estimated coca cultivations.
In Peru, the most recent USG survey detected increased coca cultivation, some of it in areas not surveyed before. Farmers were encouraged by high prices for coca leaf and temporary constraints on eradication. The government has now dedicated more resources than ever to eradication and goals were surpassed, but it will take time to wipe out the increase. The policies of the new government to be elected this April will obviously have significant bearing on the future of Peru's counternarcotics effort.
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The new recently-elected Morales Administration in Bolivia has displayed a lackluster commitment to coca reduction. Our relationship with the new government will depend upon the policies it adopts on a wide range of issues, with counternarcotics a key component of our bilateral relationship. The U.S. will continue to try to maintain good relations with the Bolivian government and help it to sustain the enormous progress made there in the past ten years.
We want to work closely with President Morales. Our Ambassador and Mr. Shannon, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, have met with him a number of times. Secretary Rice met with him at the recent inauguration of President Bachelet in Chile. I will be traveling to Bolivia next month as well to urge Bolivian cooperation against drug trafficking. We hope to continue the productive partnership we have enjoyed with Bolivia.
While not major drug-producing countries, Ecuador and Venezuela play critical roles in drug trafficking because of their long, largely unguarded borders with Colombia. In Ecuador, cocaine seizures reached a record 45 metric tons 2005. But the government has allocated insufficient resources for its security forces to consistently and effectively thwart cross-border incursions by Colombian narco-terrorists, and refuses to condemn such groups, espousing neutrality in the Colombian conflict. Ecuador's security forces have conducted effective operations in the field given constraints on resources and capabilities. However, we are deeply concerned with the dramatic increase in the use of Ecuadorian-flagged vessels by drug trafficking organizations over the past 18 months. We are certain that this troubling phenomenon arises from the success of the maritime law enforcement agreement between Colombia and the United States. Because of the hundreds of seizures and U.S. prosecutions facilitated by this agreement, drug trafficking organizations are using Ecuador as a ''safe haven'' from U.S. prosecutions.
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There appears to be a trafficking shift from air to overland transport of drugs into Venezuela, but we are still very concerned about flights into the country from Peru, Bolivia and Brazil, as well as flights to Hispaniola. The Venezuelan government's willingness to cooperate with its neighbors and with the U.S. is obviously critical to the regional strategy. However, as the INCSR report illustrates, Venezuela's counternarcotics performance over the past year has been, at best, mixed. The President decertified the Government of Venezuela in September 2005 because of what the USG viewed as its failure to cooperate on a range of counternarcotics issues and also because of threats against Drug Enforcement Administration personnel. With the recent surge in production in the region, Venezuela constitutes a hole in our counternarcotics strategy in Latin America. Given Venezuela's excellent record for cooperation in the past, we hope to see a return of that cooperative spirit in the coming year.
Southern Cone and Tri-Border: The Southern Cone remains vulnerable to exploitation as a transit zone for narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime. The Tri-Border Area, shared by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, in particular, has long served as a venue for illicit activity including drugs and arms smuggling and money laundering. These countries are used as transit routes for over a hundred metric tons of cocaine. INL is actively engaged in enhancing the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies in Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil to enable them to act more effectively against narcotics trafficking, other transborder crime and international terrorism. In Paraguay, we are creating a Trade Transparency Unit, modeled after the successful unit in Colombia. It will enhance greatly the capability of our countries to prevent and combat money laundering, terrorist financing, stem official corruption, and support economic development through enhanced revenue collection.
MEXICO
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Combating drug trafficking from and through Mexico is an enormous challenge. In many ways, it is the principal counternarcotics challenge. Mexico is the principal transshipment route to the United States for South American drugs, a major source of heroin and the key supplier of methamphetamine. It is the principal placement point in the international financial system for proceeds of crime from the United States, and thus critical in terms of combating money laundering. Mexican-based trafficking groups are now the major foreign criminal threat we face here in the U.S. Beyond drugs, broader security interests and the recent surge in armed violence along the US-Mexico border are of gravest concern.
Against this sobering backdrop, there are ample reasons to be optimistic about what can be done. Ten years ago, there were many divisive issues between us and Mexico, not least of which were the apparent impunity enjoyed by the Mexican drug cartels and the Government of Mexico's refusal to extradite drug fugitives. Yet, in 2005, Mexican forces took forceful action against a number of the drug cartels—most of the leadership of the Arellano-Felix Organization, for example, is now behind bars. The Mexican government extradited 41 fugitives to the United States in 2005, including a number of Mexican nationals, and the Mexican Supreme Court re-opened the way to extradition of fugitives facing the possibility of life imprisonment—which for several years was one of the principal legal barriers to the extradition of drug traffickers. We still await the extradition of a major drug trafficker, and we would like to see closer cooperation in some important areas such as maritime interdiction, but we recognize that the Fox Administration has done a great deal to make that more possible in the future. Mexico has come a long way in recent years on many critical issues.
During my trip to Mexico City earlier this month, I met with senior Mexican officials on a whole range of issues—but focused on the emerging threats, such as methamphetamine production and trafficking. I was pleased to see how much the Government of Mexico has done in a relatively short time to curb the importation of precursor chemicals. Mexican authorities have dramatically reduced the legal imports of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine during the past two years—by over 40 percent—after determining that imports exceeded needs for medicines containing such ingredients. The National Commission Against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) cancelled many import permits and revoked import licenses, including the licenses of the seven largest distributors. It now requires importers to transport such substances in escorted armed vehicles. As a result of these changes, however, we anticipate that traffickers will attempt to circumvent the controls. Methamphetamine trafficking and production figured prominently in last week's Binational Commission meeting here in Washington, with both governments pledging to intensify action against this threat.
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Institutional development and reform in Mexican federal law enforcement have been far reaching, resulting in a higher level of professionalism and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and other foreign partners. Because of the Fox Administration's own orientation toward reform and institutional modernization, INL's Mexico program is one of our most innovative. Traditional INL programs, like eradication, have been nationalized in Mexico for some years now, allowing INL resources to focus on capacity building activities, such as modernizing Mexico's federal police force, the Federal Investigations Agency (FBI equivalent). Our programs are very much tailored to facilitating effective partnerships between U.S. and Mexican counterpart agencies. We have also devoted considerable energy and resources in strengthening border security capacity in northern Mexico, complementing parallel work by the Department of Homeland Security on the U.S. side of the border, in support of the Border Partnership Accord.
There is a tremendous amount of work still to be done in Mexico. Reforms and professionalization efforts at the federal level have not been replicated in all key federal agencies or at the state and local level. A key objective must be to support law enforcement reform and modernization at the state and local levels, including effective anti-corruption reforms. INL's FY 2007 budget request includes programs focusing on state and local levels as well as continuing support for the Culture of Lawfulness program, which promotes rule of law at the school, community and government levels.
Mexican law enforcement and military actions have disrupted criminal organizations, as we have seen in the past two years against the Arellano Felix Organization based in Tijuana, but efforts must be sustained over time to dismantle them. New restrictions on the importation of key chemicals will help to make it harder for methamphetamine traffickers to obtain these precursors, but parallel measures must be taken to prevent diversion from legitimate sources or to preempt a shift to clandestine smuggling.
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Another major challenge that defies easy solutions is border violence. This was a recurring theme in many of the Working Groups at last week's U.S./Mexico Binational Commission. Secretary Rice personally raised U.S. concerns about border violence at that meeting; this message was reinforced by Attorney General Gonzales and Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff. Both sides pledged to make this a top priority. INL, along with other USG agencies, will redouble programmatic and operational efforts to assist Mexico to improve public safety.
The Department of State is confident that—regardless of the outcome—the next Administration in Mexico will realize that it is clearly in Mexico's interests to cooperate with the U.S. on security and combating crime.
CENTRAL AMERICA
Central America is particularly vulnerable to drug transshipment and international organized crime. Approximately 90 percent of U.S.-bound South American cocaine and a large quantity of heroin transit the region as a whole, primarily over maritime trafficking routes. Their criminal justice systems are antiquated, inefficient and inadequately resourced. Corruption is a pervasive problem. The rise of highly-organized and violent criminal youth gangs is devastating Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala—and governments have been struggling to find the best way to devote their limited resources to the problem. Sadly, U.S. attention in the region has ebbed and flowed, preventing us from being as effective a force for change and reform as we might have been.
The gang problem reaches beyond Central America and affects us directly in the United States as these groups expand their international networks. Enforcement-oriented ''hard line'' (''mano dura'') approaches implemented in some governments have demonstrated that law enforcement alone is not enough. A balanced, multi-sector approach that addresses crime prevention, rehabilitation and social reintegration is clearly called for.
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As we have looked at how to improve—or in some cases restore—interdiction capacity in the region, it is clear that the needs are so great that the rather modest funding currently available will have very little impact.
In Guatemala, for example, I sent a team down to look at what it would take to restore a modest five-helicopter mobility package. The estimated cost to do this was six times higher than INL's intended FY 2006 budget for Guatemala. With maritime smuggling the dominant trafficking method, we would also like to expand maritime interdiction capacity, but this cannot be done—or done right—in the present budget climate. I will continue to explore this idea, but will have to find less expensive alternatives.
Overland trafficking along the Pan-American Highway is also a threat. INL has assisted each country in strengthening its border inspection stations, particularly at key chokepoints and worked with DEA to establish Mobile Inspection and Enforcement Teams. Through the Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System, U.S. Southern Command provides data on suspect air and maritime movements to partner nation authorities to support their tracking and interdiction efforts.
Central American governments also wrestle with trafficking in firearms, alien smuggling, and money laundering. Many also face serious domestic criminal problems, including criminal youth gangs, while struggling with underlying poverty, devastating natural disasters, and pervasive corruption. We see genuine commitment at the presidential level in most of the countries in the region and will work to reinforce that commitment. INL programs seek to modernize criminal justice sector institutions, especially federal police and prosecutors and to enhance interdiction capacity. While only a small percentage of illicit drugs moves by air, we have provided some limited support to governments, such as Guatemala, to restore some of their diminishing air mobility.
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INL funding for transit zone support is limited by budget constraints and competing priorities, such as Andean production. However, I am committed to finding ways to assist our excellent partner nations in the region. For example, by establishing the new International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador, the countries of Central America will benefit not only from training, but also from enhanced regional cooperation and information exchange.
THE CARIBBEAN
Countries in the Caribbean region are largely poor, developing nations with weak justice sector institutions which are ill equipped to combat sophisticated drug or crime cartels. Corruption is another common challenge. Our programs focus on capacity building, maritime and air interdiction, port security and money laundering. To address border security issues, we are funding a regional database that will gather data on movement of people throughout the region. Known as the Regional Information and Intelligence Sharing System (RIIS), the database will link the 24 countries and territories that are members of the Association of Caribbean Chiefs of Police. The database will also permit the vetting of arrivals and departures of passengers on cruise ships and airlines and will be linked to INTERPOL and other international watch lists. We expect the RIIS to become operational in the coming months.
MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS
In the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission—known by its Spanish acronym ''CICAD''—within the Organization of American States has promoted a common framework for anti-drug policies, laws, and cooperation. Through the Summit of the Americas process, CICAD was given a mandate to develop a hemispheric anti-drug strategy as well as a peer review system for assessing the efforts of each member of this anti-drug alliance. The resulting ''Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism'' (known as the ''MEM'') provides each of the 34 governments with an evaluation of its counter-drug efforts and recommendations for improving them. The CICAD Executive Secretariat, using funding from INL and other donors, provides training and other technical assistance to governments to promote compliance with the MEM recommendations. This system, while not yet as hard-hitting as the United States and other countries would like, still provides an objective, technical review that clearly results in governments making needed changes. It requires governments to take a more systematic and clinical look at themselves, particularly their own drug consumption and production trends. It is a valuable complement to the unilateral U.S. certification process.
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EMERGING THREATS
As we look to the future, INL will work to confront emerging problems or threats rapidly. Among the most pressing threats are synthetic drugs and youth gangs.
Synthetic drugs—Today, we are particularly concerned about synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine and ecstasy, which present major medical, social and law enforcement challenges for the United States and the rest of the world. We are working at home and internationally, especially on border controls with Canada and Mexico, to ensure that laws and law enforcement can deal with illegal production, trafficking and diversion of precursor chemicals used to make these drugs. We must be vigilant in controlling precursor chemicals, especially ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, that are readily available and easily used to produce synthetic drugs in small toxic labs. We are working closely with Canada, Mexico and producer/exporter countries to control the movement of these precursor chemicals.
Criminal youth gangs—Criminal youth gang activity has a devastating affect on both public safety and lives of young people drawn into gangs. According to the Department of Justice's 2006 national drug assessment, many street gangs have evolved into well-organized, profit-driven criminal enterprises that participate in the smuggling and sale of drugs. The largest of these, including Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street gang, are now recognized as full-blown international criminal organizations.
The Department of State is working closely with other countries, especially in Central America, to confront the social and security problems posed by youth gangs. It is a very complicated policy issue and cannot be solved strictly through law enforcement action. INL will encourage partner nations to take a comprehensive, integrated approach that includes crime prevention, social reintegration, and juvenile justice reform. While many of INL's gang-related project activities are subsumed in broader training or enforcement programs, I intend to give this area special attention in the coming year.
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We recognize that such a complex issue requires the involvement of many sectors of society, not just governments. We are partnering, for example, with non-governmental and international organizations, such as the Washington Office on Latin America and the Organization of American States. They have organized seminars and workshops to bring governments, private groups and other stakeholders together to develop better approaches to the problem.
IMPACT OF U.S. EFFORTS ON THE UNITED STATES
ONDCP figures show that the use of illegal drugs by teenagers in the United States has dropped by nearly 20 percent since 2001. From 2003 to 2004, the purity of heroin in the U.S. decreased by 22 percent while the price rose by 30 percent. Since February of 2005, a similar, albeit preliminary, pattern has been seen with cocaine, although these drugs are still readily available. However, we believe overall demand has begun to stabilize.
I firmly believe that if the United States was not supporting counternarcotics programs in the Americas the situation here at home would be dramatically worse. Without a concerted effort to eliminate the drugs at their source, we would have rising addition rates because more drugs would be available at lower prices. The impact on the United States of the progress being made around the Hemisphere is, admittedly, less dramatic than what we are seeing in Colombia or even Mexico, but it is there. Unquestionably, the eradication and interdiction efforts of our partner nations have, with U.S. support, kept hundreds of tons of cocaine, heroin and marijuana out of our country.
In conclusion, we have a huge amount of work to do. It is both a ''war'' to be fought and won, and an ongoing effort to protect our country from foreign criminal threats. In my view, that is best done through strong partnerships, bilateral and multilateral. And, nowhere in the world do we have greater solidarity and shared sense of purpose and responsibility than right here in our own Hemisphere.
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Thank you. And I would be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We have one or two votes, and I would like to inform my colleagues that if we only have one vote, I have asked Mr. Weller to run over, vote, and come back so that we could continue on.
If you want to run and vote, and try to come back, that is fine. We will try to keep the hearing going so that we don't have all this testimony waiting. Mr. Braun, do you want to go forward?
TESTIMONY OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. BRAUN. Thank you. Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration's administrator, Karen P. Tandy, I thank you for the opportunity to testify on the drug trafficking situation in Latin America, and DEA's bilateral operations.
As you know, Latin America is the source of all cocaine, most of the heroin, and significant amounts of marijuana consumed in the United States. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru remain the primary centers of production, with Colombia producing around 90 percent of the cocaine reaching the United States.
Non-existent 10 years ago, heroin produced in Colombia now supplies over 50 percent of the heroin market in the United States. Recent political developments in Venezuela and Bolivia create special challenges for the DEA.
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In the past year, DEA Caracas has been in a precarious situation. Some reports in Venezuela portray DEA negatively, and entrusted counterparts were replaced with employees considered loyal to President Hugo Chavez.
Despite these handicaps, DEA manages to work within Venezuelan established parameters, and maintains a presence in the country. DEA has been working with the United States Department of State to create an agreement with the Government of Venezuela which will return DEA agents to their normal status.
The election of Evo Morales as Bolivia's President also poses new challenges. DEA continues to operate bilaterally with its Bolivian counterparts. However, the relationship with the Morales Administration is in its infancy and it is too early to predict what impact the change will have on DEA's operations.
Notwithstanding the political developments in Latin America, and the corrupting influence of drug trafficking organizations on Central American governments, DEA, along with other United States agencies and our host nation counterparts, are mounting an attack on all levels of the drug trade, denying safehaven, transportation routes, precursor chemicals, and drug proceeds to leaders of these organizations.
While DEA has evidence that some terrorist groups are involved in the drug trade, the trade continues to be dominated at all levels by traditional drug trafficking organizations.
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The clearest connections between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations exists in Colombia. We continue to make great strides against FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, as exemplified by the recent Federal indictment naming 50 of the top level FARC leaders as defendants.
This action is the first indictment of an entire leadership of a foreign terrorist organization involved in narcotics distribution to the United States. On a separate integrated front, DEA, JIAFT-South, other Federal law enforcement agencies, working in concert with counterparts throughout Central America, Mexico, and South America, have implemented a drug flow prevention strategy.
Operations are conducted in Mexico, and Central, and Latin America transit zones, and consist of innovative, interconnected, multiagency operations designed to disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals.
Two other noteworthy programs are Operations Firewall and Operation Panama Express. These projects combine investigative and intelligence resources to interdict the flow of cocaine from the northern coast of Colombia, and have resulted in combined total seizures of 410.9 metric tons of cocaine as of December 31, 2005.
Successful interdiction operations are contingent upon cooperative agreements. No maritime agreements presently exist between the United States and the Governments of Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, or Peru. Without such agreements, the United States cannot board any flagged vessels by these nations in their territorial waters.
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And for boardings on international waters, these nations also can demand and do demand often that the crew, drugs, vessels, and evidence be returned for adjudication to their respective countries. Rest assured that the Colombian syndicates exploit this vulnerability.
We know that controlled chemicals are camouflaged and clandestinely imported into Colombia, and despite positive law enforcement initiatives in cooperation with Colombian counterparts, traffickers are able to obtain vast quantities of essential chemicals.
The policing of diverted raw products and precursor chemicals is challenging because of differing chemical laws in each country. To counter money laundering in Latin America, the DEA has established its bulk currency initiative, which provides financial interdiction and investigation training, and promotes information sharing.
The DEA provides assistance to its counterparts through interagency coordination and agreements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Of note, Arab drug trafficking organizations based in the tri-border area are using the region for cocaine smuggling operations to Brazil, Europe, and the Middle East.
There are reports of cocaine proceeds entering the coffers of Islamic radical groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The profit margin for a kilogram of cocaine in European and Middle Eastern markets can be as high as $144,000 per kilogram, giving an initial investment of less than $6,000 in Latin America.
At the core of the DEA's efforts to identify, target, disrupt, and dismantle these groups will be our financial investigations. The longstanding bilateral law enforcement relationships in Latin America have proven to be key to the DEA's success.
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Formalized agreements necessary for working relationships and non-politicalization of one of the world's most noble endeavors, the elimination of the illicit drug trade, will bring the United States and the nations of Latin America closer to this objective.
Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and will be happy to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Administrator, Karen P. Tandy, I want to thank you for your continued support of the men and women of DEA, as well as for the opportunity to testify today on the drug trafficking situation in Latin America and DEA's bilateral operations and approach to disrupt and dismantle organizations responsible for the drug trade.
LATIN AMERICAN DRUG PRODUCTION THREAT ASSESSMENT
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Seven of the 20 countries designated by the President as major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing nations are located in Latin America—Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The strategic deployment of approximately 38 percent of DEA's foreign workforce to Latin America is testament to the important role the region plays in feeding America's appetite for drugs.
Latin America is the source of all cocaine, most of the heroin, and significant amounts of marijuana consumed in the United States. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru remain the primary centers of cocaine production, although DEA remains concerned about the production potential of other countries in the region. Cocaine continues to be produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in vast quantities to supply the United States' and world's demand. Non-existent 10 years ago, heroin produced in Colombia now supplies over 50 percent of the United States' heroin market.
Bolivia
Bolivia's coca cultivation expanded from 24,600 hectares in 2004 to 26,500 hectares in 2005—an increase of 8 percent. That total hectarage equates to 70 metric tons of pure cocaine base that could be manufactured. Although a modest increase is noted, it represents the fourth year in a row of increased cultivation. More coca means that more cocaine can be produced. DEA's interdiction efforts directly complement USG support for Bolivian coca eradication operations in the Chapare region. Bolivia's primary counternarcotics challenge, however, remains the Yungas region. It is by far the largest coca growing area in Bolivia, with severe topography, and a long history of traditional coca cultivation and resistance to eradication. Alternative development activities in the area will be critical to strengthening local support for reduction of illegal coca; but even when combined with effective interdiction, cannot counter the long-term trend line in Yungas without the eradication component.
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For several years we have observed Mexican drug traffickers purchasing Peruvian cocaine suggesting that Mexican drug syndicates are attempting to supplement their Colombian cocaine sources by expanding their contacts with the Peruvian traffickers. Likewise, some Mexican traffickers also have increased their presence in Bolivia and are exploring their options in the Bolivian cocaine market. Bolivia's persistent political unrest, systemic political corruption, nonexistent border controls, and lack of aerial radar coverage are all contributing strategic factors that magnify the drug threat from Bolivia.
Colombia
Colombia currently produces around 90 percent of the cocaine HCl reaching the United States, with an average purity of 84 percent at the wholesale level. While United States Government (USG) cocaine production estimates for 2005 in Colombia will not be available until early April, Colombia potentially produced 430 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2004—7 percent decline from the 460 metric tons of pure cocaine potentially produced in Colombia during 2003. Colombia's 2004 potential cocaine production represents approximately 67 percent of the world's potential cocaine production, which is a dramatic trend, considering Colombia only produced about 25 percent of the world's cocaine base as recently as 1995. Accordingly, Colombian traffickers have become less dependent on Peruvian or Bolivian cocaine base sources of supply. Through intelligence sharing, DEA supports the eradication efforts coordinated by the State Department throughout Latin America, and in particular Colombia, which are critical components to stamping out drug production in this region.
Not unexpectedly, Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) remain the dominant players in the international cocaine trade as they are increasingly more self-sufficient in cocaine base production, have a firm grip on Central American and Caribbean smuggling routes, and dominate the wholesale cocaine markets in the eastern United States and in Europe. Colombian opium poppy cultivation and heroin production have also increased significantly in recent years, and nearly all Colombian heroin is believed to be destined for the United States' drug market. Colombia is also a stable source of marijuana—with approximately 5,000 hectares cultivated annually. In recent years, Colombia has also become a major supplier of marijuana to the European market.
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Peru
Peru was once the largest worldwide cultivator of illicit coca and producer of cocaine base. As a result of effective and sustained interdiction and eradication efforts, Peru is now a distant second to Colombia. For 2005, Peru's potential pure cocaine base production was estimated to be 165 metric tons—a 14 percent increase from 2004 production levels. Additionally, USG surveys indicate an increase of approximately 38 percent in cultivated hectares from 27,500 in 2004 to 38,000 in 2005. This increase includes approximately 4,000 hectares not assessed in 2004.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Recent political developments in Venezuela and Bolivia have created special challenges for DEA operations in Latin America. Venezuela serves as a major transit country for Colombian cocaine. While some cocaine is transported into the country via a variety of air, river, and land-based smuggling routes, the predominant shipping method relies upon vehicles to transport cocaine along traditional land routes. Primarily destined for markets in the United States and Europe, the cocaine leaves the country either by commercial sea freight, non-commercial ships (including ''go-fast boats''), or airplanes.
In the past year, DEA in Caracas has been in a precarious situation. Some press reports in Venezuela portrayed DEA negatively, and trusted Venezuelan counterparts, who had good working relationships with DEA, were replaced with employees considered more loyal to President Hugo Chavez and who have a negative history with DEA. For example, President Chavez appointed General Morgado as the head of the Anti-Narcotics unit of the National Guard. Shortly thereafter, General Morgado disbanded the DEA Vetted Units manned by personnel from the Venezuelan National Guard and Cuerpo de Investigaciones, Criminalistas Penales y Cientificas (CICPC).
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Despite these handicaps, DEA has managed to work within the parameters established by the Government of Venezuela and maintains a presence in the country. DEA has contributed intelligence information related to narcotics trafficking to numerous other DEA offices and in light of the restrictive environment, has still managed to retain a significant influence in investigating narcotics trafficking in this region.
DEA, through the U.S. State Department, is currently reviewing a previously established working agreement with the Government of Venezuela, in which progress has been made. DEA has been working with the U.S. Department of State to create a document that is acceptable to both governments. It is hoped that a mutual agreement will be reached in the near term, which will return DEA agents to their normal status in Venezuela.
The December 18, 2005, election of Evo Morales of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) Party as Bolivia's president also poses new challenges for DEA activities. President Morales rose to power as the leader of the coca growers union, and has established a high-profile opposition to the U.S funded eradication of coca crops. The Morales Administration is currently faced with balancing the need to address cocalero coca farmers' constituency demands to grow and/or de-penalize coca and also meet its counter narcotics obligations to the international community, specifically coca eradication.
But despite some trepidation about what the change in Administration might mean to DEA operations, today the DEA continues to operate bilaterally with its Bolivian law enforcement counterparts. The relationship with the Morales Administration is in its infancy, and it is too early to predict what impact the change in Administration will have on DEA's operations in Bolivia.
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BILATERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT—ATTACKING THE DRUG TRADE
Generically, DTOs are similar in structure and have similar operational needs to legitimate businesses, with both models sharing the goal of deriving profit. Law enforcement disruption at any level within these organizations and denial of support services, such as raw materials and communications, negatively impact their profit margin. DEA is uniquely positioned to attack these vulnerabilities in Latin America.
Disruption and Dismantlement
The leaders of the most significant international DTOs threatening the United States have been identified on the Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list. Today, 38 of the 44 organizations on the CPOT list are based in Latin America. DEA works closely with host nation counterparts to aggressively pursue, locate, apprehend, and extradite the senior leadership of CPOTs to the United States.
While terrorist groups are involved in the drug trade, the trade continues to be dominated downstream from the cocaine production level by traditional DTOs. The DEA does not specifically target terrorist groups, except those that are involved as major drug trafficking or money laundering organizations. Today, Colombia's main guerrilla and paramilitary groups benefit and derive significant organizational proceeds from the drug trade, as well as other illegal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and robbery. The clearest connections between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations exist in Colombia. The United States Department of State has officially designated the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN), and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia or AUC) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, all of which are based in Colombia.
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DEA continues to make great strides against the FARC, as exemplified by the Federal indictment which was handed down on March 1, 2006, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, naming 50 leaders of the FARC as defendants. Three of those charged are presently in custody in Colombia, and the United States will seek extradition of these individuals. In addition, the United States Department of State has also offered rewards ranging from $5 million each for the top seven leaders to $2.5 million each for 17 of the second-tier leaders, for information leading to their capture. It is well-documented by DEA that individual FARC fronts are involved in multi-levels of the drug trade, ranging from coca cultivation and cocaine production, to taxation and providing security at processing laboratories and clandestine airstrips, to international cocaine distribution and transportation. This indictment of the FARC is the first of its kind, where the entire leadership of a Foreign Terrorist Organization was shown to be involved in narcotics distribution to the United States. I believe this further demonstrates DEA's resolve to combat narcotics distribution at the source and to contribute significantly to our nation's war on terrorism.
Interdiction—Transit Zone
One of DEA's strategies is to incapacitate major international DTOs by disrupting and dismantling supporting organizations which provide transportation services. DEA has initiated several extremely successful multi-agency operations to attack the vulnerabilities of the transportation services of these organizations. These programs also disrupt the supply of drugs to the United States and result in multi-ton seizures through targeted operations.
DEA and JIATF-South initiated the Drug Flow Prevention Strategy in 2005. Operations in support of this strategy are conducted in Mexico and Central and Latin American transit zones and consist of innovative, interconnected, multi-agency host country operations designed to disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between the source zones and the United States. This strategy also is supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, several members of the Intelligence Community, agencies of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
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Operation FIREWALL and Operation PANAMA EXPRESS combine investigative and intelligence resources to interdict the flow of cocaine from the northern coast of Colombia to the United States:
— Operation FIREWALL was initiated by the DEA Cartagena Resident Office in conjunction with the Cartagena Tactical Analysis Team and JIATF-South. It is estimated that the major syndicates use several hundred go-fast boats, each capable of transporting between 1.5 and 2 metric tons of cocaine. This program works in tandem with Operation PANAMA EXPRESS and other maritime programs that target CPOTs, as well as Colombian transportation syndicates operating in the Caribbean corridors. Since the July 2003 commencement of Operation FIREWALL, the program has resulted in the seizure in excess of 29.2 metric tons of cocaine. Additionally, Operation FIREWALL provided assistance in Operation PANAMA EXPRESS seizures of 33.2 metric tons, and other foreign countries in the seizure of 25.7 metric tons of cocaine.
— Operation PANAMA EXPRESS, an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) initiative known as PANEX, consists of agents and analysts from DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Coast Guard, and the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Middle District of Florida. This operation has targeted the highest level traffickers responsible for the financing, production, transportation, and distribution of cocaine throughout North America and Europe. Since the February 2000 implementation of Operation PANEX, 356 metric tons of cocaine has been seized, 109.2 metric tons of cocaine have been scuttled, and 1,107 individuals have been arrested. As of December 31, 2005, these two highly successful interdiction programs have resulted in combined total seizures of 410.9 metric tons of cocaine.
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As with counternarcotics operations within the host nations, interdiction operations in the transit zone are contingent upon cooperative agreements. At present, no maritime agreement exists between the United States and the Governments of Ecuador, Mexico, or Peru. Because we have no agreements with these countries, the United States can only board vessels flagged by these nations on the high seas on a case-by-case basis,. Also, because we have no agreements with these countries, it is virtually impossible for the United States to obtain jurisdiction over the vessel and its contents, which is subject to the jurisdiction of the host nation. Rest assured that the Colombian syndicates exploit this vulnerability.
Over the years, Colombian traffickers have exploited the Caribbean corridor, as the region provides them with increased flexibility and anonymity because of its vast geographic territory, numerous law enforcement jurisdictions, and fragmented investigative resources. With few exceptions (notably Costa Rica and Panama), the countries in Central America are ill-equipped to handle the threat of drug trafficking. Many Central American countries are experiencing weak economies, and scarce resources are oftentimes allocated for other pressing problems. Police and other agencies are often under-funded and receive inadequate training. Consequently, some officials are susceptible to the enormous bribes that drug traffickers can offer. The corrupting influence of illicit drug trafficking organizations on the governmental institutions of Central America significantly increases the difficulties of mounting successful drug interdiction efforts.
Precursor Chemical Control
The denial of raw products and chemicals has proven to be a significant disruptive force against DTOs. We know that controlled chemicals are camouflaged and clandestinely imported into Colombia, and many chemicals are also diverted by a small number of employees at large chemical companies in Colombia.
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Unfortunately, despite positive law enforcement initiatives and growing cooperation between the United States and Colombian Governments, traffickers are still able to obtain vast quantities of essential chemicals. The policing of the illegal diversion of raw products and precursor chemicals within Central and South America is challenging because of the different chemical laws in each country. What may be legal in one country may be illegal in another. This vulnerability is being exploited by the traffickers.
However, through Operations Seis Fronteras and ALL–INCLUSIVE, initiatives that promote cooperation among South and Central American nations to interdict the movement of essential precursor chemicals to drug production areas, the participating countries have achieved successful collateral and multilateral-sharing of chemical information. There has been noted multi-lateral success which would not have been achieved without these operations and the multi-lateral agreements.
Financial Investigations
DEA's overall strategic approach is based on the recognition that the major drug traffickers, operating both internationally and domestically, have insulated themselves from the drug distribution networks but remain closely linked to the proceeds of their trade. DEA is mounting several innovative approaches aimed at targeting the flow of money from the streets of America to the leadership of major DTOs. In FY 2005, DEA's asset and currency seizures, excluding the value of drug seizures, were $1.4 billion. In addition, we also made more high-value seizures (those over $1 million) in FY 2005 than in FY 2004. DEA also denied drug traffickers $1.9 billion in revenue in FY 2005, which includes $1.4 billion in seized assets and $477 million in drug seizures.
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Americans spend nearly $65 billion every year on illicit drugs. In its 2005 World Drug Report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated illicit drug revenues generated in the United States, Canada, and Mexico during 2003 at $142 billion. A significant portion of these drug revenues return to the source countries in Latin America primarily through two money laundering methods—the Black Market Peso Exchange (''BMPE'') and bulk currency smuggling.
The BMPE is currently the largest known money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere. Using a ''parallel exchange'' system, drug traffickers are able to sell drug dollars to brokers in exchange for pesos. Brokers then sell the drug dollars to Colombian merchants who purchase goods in the United States and elsewhere. By purchasing drug dollars on the Black Market and not through Colombia's regulated exchange system, the importers avoid Colombian taxes and tariffs, thereby gaining significant profit and a competitive advantage over those who import legally.
Stronger banking laws have forced some DTOs to change their money laundering methods. The transportation and smuggling of drug dollars out of the United States in bulk form is now the primary initial method of money laundering, with the currency being entered into banking systems in countries with weaker banking regulations. In particular, billions of USD are smuggled across our border with Mexico, the majority ultimately destined for Colombian drug trafficking syndicates.
To combat this threat, DEA has established its Bulk Currency Initiative, with the goals of providing training for all law enforcement officers involved in bulk currency interdiction and investigations; increased coordination between DEA and its federal, state, and local counterparts; centralization of intelligence; and the analysis and linkage to ongoing investigations.
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DEA continues to provi