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2006
THE U.S.–INDIA GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 5, 2006
Serial No. 109–179
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
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J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
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BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
DOUG SEAY, Professional Staff Member
JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
C O N T E N T S
WITNESS
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice, The Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri: Prepared statement
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Responses from the Honorable Condoleezza Rice to questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State of California
The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
THE U.S.–INDIA GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:32 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman HYDE. Committee will come to order.
Madame Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you before us once again. Yours has become an increasingly familiar face, and it is most welcome. Your personal involvement regarding the United States-India global partnership testifies to the importance the Administration places on this initiative, a focus which is shared by all Members of this Committee.
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Given the profound nature of this initiative and its potential consequences for good or ill, it is our intention to proceed carefully and thoroughly, but with all deliberate speed.
As part of that process, I would like to take this opportunity not to comment on the merits of the agreement itself, but instead lay out what I believe are some of the principal issues and points of contention on which Members of this Committee will need additional information in order to make an informed decision. I welcome my colleagues to add to this brief list.
In general, this new and multi-faceted initiative with India has been termed a global partnership, and has been widely hailed as a bold and encouraging development. I personally know of no one who is not in favor of improved relations and enhanced cooperation between the United States and India, which, to my mind and that of many others, is long overdue.
Such disagreement as exists on this subject centers primarily on its perceived importance in strategic terms, and on the depth and extent of the anticipated cooperation. Some see a nascent and far-reaching alliance between our two countries that will have a dramatic, perhaps even transforming, geostrategic impact. Others place this new relationship in a more modest context, viewing it as a useful endeavor, but far from heralding a fundamental change in the nature of our relationship, or in the balance of power in Asia.
The same general welcoming attitude extends to the several areas of specific cooperation outlined in the joint statement of July 18, embracing economic relations, promoting democracy, countering terrorism, combating AIDS, enhancing energy resources, and many other worthy endeavors.
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There is some dissent regarding the wisdom of inviting India's participation in the international fusion research project and offering cooperation on space programs, as the first is seen as potentially aiding its weapons program, and the latter its missile program.
But these concerns are not central to consideration of the merits of the initiative as a whole. As all are aware, the principal area of contention by far concerns the proposal to open up civil nuclear trade. Specifically, its possible detrimental impact on U.S. and global non-proliferation policy. This subject is of particular interest to this Committee because it has jurisdiction over the legislation that will be required to allow civil nuclear trade to take place.
Given the centrality of this issue in the debate, and because it is the centerpiece of this Committee's responsibility, I will focus my remaining remarks on it.
To better comprehend the debate, I have found it useful to divide the issues into three sections. The first concerns whether or not the Civil Nuclear Agreement in itself enhances or undermines U.S. and global non-proliferation policy. If one arrives at a positive conclusion, then support of the overall agreement is axiomatic.
If the judgment is negative, then a second question occurs; namely, are these negative consequences so grave that they outweigh the potential benefits of the overall agreement.
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If the judgment is that the asymmetry renders the whole negative, a third question arises; namely, are there changes to the civil nuclear provisions that can be made, that would be sufficient to persuade opponents to support the package as a whole.
Of necessity, the answers to all of these questions are highly subjective, depending upon how one weighs the intrinsic and relative merits of the various provisions, their likely impact, and other considerations. But even subjective conclusions require accurate information and thorough debate if they are to be arrived at responsibly.
I will end my remarks there. I won't offer an exhaustive list of questions, as any observer can easily generate scores of questions on their own. But this briefly-sketched logical progression seems to me to be a good way of approaching the subject that will permit an informed judgment on a subject of great complexity and potentially far-reaching impact.
I now turn to my friend, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Democratic Member, for any remarks he may wish to make.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to add my warm welcome to our most distinguished Secretary of State.
Mr. Chairman, we are at the hinge of history. After decades of coolness and aloofness, punctuated by occasional hostility, there now is a chance to advance a historic geostrategic realignment of India with the United States. This will be of immense importance to world peace, global security, and economic development.
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India and the United States need each other as reliable partners in the war against terrorism, standing shoulder to shoulder in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
With this proposed agreement, we stand at a threshold. The door could swing open toward the new era of cooperation and joint action. Or, if we fail to seize this opportunity, the door could slam shut, and undo much of the good work of two American Administrations, one Democratic, one Republican, to strengthen the bonds between the world's oldest democracy and its largest democracy.
This opening has been years in the making, Mr. Chairman. President Clinton's groundbreaking visit to India 6 years ago redefined what was possible in United States-India ties. His vision was carried forth by the current Administration, and by your very creative and bold actions, Madame Secretary, for which I wish to congratulate you.
It is high time that the world's oldest democracy and its largest one recognize that whatever our differences may have been during the decades of the Cold War, they do not apply in the 21st century. We now have powerful, overriding common interests: Combating violent Islamic extremism, ensuring lasting stability in war-torn Afghanistan, battling HIV/AIDS, and fostering rapprochement between India and Pakistan.
But in order to become a strategic ally of the United States, India must recognize some basic facts. Specifically, some facts with respect to Iran. It is a terrorist state whose current regime strives to develop nuclear weapons.
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At this Committee's first hearing on the proposed nuclear deal, I and others on this Committee made it clear that a business-as-usual relationship with the current terrorism regime in Tehran is unacceptable behavior by any country seeking to be our strategic partner.
Since then, New Delhi has taken welcome, I am prepared to say unprecedented, steps to support United States efforts to isolate and to pressure Iran diplomatically over its decades-long deceitful actions to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.
India's two crucial votes in the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of resolutions condemning Iran's deceit, and ultimately referring Iran to the UN Security Council, were the right action for a great democracy such as India. These votes were welcomed in the democratic world, and they were devastating to the Ayatollahs.
A few days ago I had a serious and substantive meeting with the Indian Foreign Secretary. I told him that India must reassure Congress and the American public that it knows well what it means to be a strategic ally of the United States. Any military cooperation with the present terrorist regime in Iran will certainly derail this deal in Congress, and I hope that will not happen.
Recent reports regarding alleged training of Iranian naval cadets during a port visit to India are a case in point. They have the potential to raise questions in the minds of many of us in Congress regarding India's policies toward Tehran. There can be no equivocation on India's part regarding Iran under its current management.
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Mr. Chairman, as this Committee meets, India already has both nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power plants. So we are not here to debate whether India belongs in the exclusive nuclear club; it is a de facto member already.
The question is whether the agreement before us bringing India's civilian program, under the international non-proliferation regime, represents an improvement over the status quo. It is self-evident that it does.
Some will argue that this agreement would be a death knell of the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I would point out that the demise of the NPT has been predicted many times, yet it still lives. Its health is based on the fundamental tenet that limiting the number of nuclear states produces a more secure global and local environment. The strength of the regime is fundamentally based on the economic and political muscle of the great powers in this world.
The real threat to non-proliferation does not come from democratic India, but from non-democratic states such as Iran and North Korea, and how the great powers decide to handle them. If we waver, if Russia and China and India decide to tolerate a nuclear Iran rather than prevent its emergence, the non-proliferation regime will whither away, a victim of death by appeasement.
We need India on our side in this fight, not standing on the sidelines. And the agreement reached by our Secretary of State helps along these lines.
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Mr. Chairman, it is time we in the United States recognize that India has become a great power, a rising giant of democracy that commands the world's respect. And it is time for India to recognize that its interests lie with the United States and with our allies. India's strength, security, and economic vitality will grow in direct proportion to the closeness of its association with us.
Mr. Chairman, there are many legitimate criticisms of the agreement, and most of them I share. But the task before our Secretary of State was not to come up with a perfect deal; it was to hammer out a compromise that both sides regard as better than the status quo. Every Member of Congress could come up with a more perfect agreement, but we could not sell it to the Government of India. This agreement was a negotiation, which by definition means that compromises were made on both sides.
We have our work cut out, Mr. Chairman, for many months ahead. Let us approach our consideration of the India Nuclear Deal realistically. The Administration will not get all it wants from our Committee, but neither will our Committee get its entire wish list. This is, after all, another negotiation.
And I fully expect that at the end of our discussions, we will have a legislative package that launches a new and exciting era in United States-India relationship. I will do my utmost to bring our two great democracies together.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Heretofore we have been entertaining a 1-minute opening statement by Members. But because of the circumstances today, where we have votes impending to be called on the Floor, and we have the Secretary of State with us, we are going to forgo the opening statements and go right to Members questioning, where you will each, when called, have 5 minutes to ask a question, or otherwise consume the 5 minutes.
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So we will go to the question. I did my best to cut you out, Madame Secretary. [Laughter.]
But staff reminds me that you came here prepared to tell us about this Indian treaty. So without getting into the Members' time, why, you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary RICE. I am sorry, I do have a longer statement that I would like entered into the record. But I know that there are many questions, and so I will just make a few opening remarks.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, other Members of the Committee, thank you very much for allowing me this opportunity to discuss the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. We believe that it deserves your support.
We do understand that it is a path-breaking and complex agreement, and so we also understand that it deserves your full consideration. And we want to be partners as you consider it, as well as should you support it.
India's society is open and free, transparent and stable. Its multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy is characterized by individual freedom and the rule of law. We share common values.
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India will soon be the world's most populous nation, and American exports to India have doubled in only the past 4 years. And of course, India is a rising global power that can be a pillar of stability in a rapidly-changing Asia.
India is, in short, a natural partner for the United States.
For too long during the past half-century, India and the United States were estranged by conflicting domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, our non-proliferation policies were a part of that tangle.
I think it is fair to say that our non-proliferation policies toward India have not fully achieved the purpose for which they were designed. They had no effect on India's development of nuclear weapons, nor did they prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in 1998. They contributed little to the lasting regional tensions which brought India and Pakistan repeatedly to the brink of war.
And all of this resulted in a more isolated India, isolated especially from the standards and practices of the nuclear non-proliferation establishment that has been maturing in the decades since the non-proliferation treaty.
Now, consider the future that we could have instead. This initiative will advance international security and enhance energy security, and further environmental protection, and increase business opportunities for both our countries. All of these benefits must be viewed in the still larger, greater context: How this initiative elevates the United States-India relationship to a new strategic level.
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The United States and India are laying the foundation for cooperation on major issues in the region and beyond, building on and building up a broad relationship between our peoples and governments. That broad relationship is across multiple fronts: Economic, agricultural, cultural. And we will not, however, be able to fully realize the vision of this broad relationship unless we deal with the problem before us—the impediments associated with civil nuclear cooperation, resolving them once and for all.
The initiative also will enhance energy security. India is a nation of over a billion people, with an economy growing at approximately 8 percent each year. It has a massive and rapidly-growing appetite for energy. It is now the sixth-largest consumer of energy in the world.
Diversifying India's energy sector will help it meet its ever-increasing energy needs, and also ease its reliance on hydrocarbons and the unstable sources of oil and gas, including places like Iran. This would be good for the United States and for India.
The initiative would also benefit the environment. Nuclear energy is clear energy. Providing India with an environmentally-friendly source like nuclear energy is clearly an important goal. India's carbon emissions increased 61 percent between 1990 and 2001, surpassed only by China.
The initiative will also create opportunities for American jobs. Nuclear cooperation will provide a new market for American nuclear firms, as well as assist India's economic development. The initiative could add as many as 3,000–5,000 new direct jobs, and about 10 to 15,000 indirect jobs as we engage in nuclear commerce with India. By helping India's economy to grow, we would help our own.
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Finally, this initiative will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, nuclear non-proliferation regime. We face a basic choice: Either continue to isolate India or engage it on these issues.
The initiative is a strong gain for non-proliferation. The custodian of the non-proliferation regime, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, is a strong supporter of this agreement, as are Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac, both of whom have made public statements. The Russian Government is also supportive.
Now, I want just to note that there have been some important criticisms of this agreement. And I would like to take those head-on and give you our view of those criticisms.
First, India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on their nuclear arsenal, though some have suggested that we should have negotiated that. The plans and policies of India take into account regional realities, and no one can credibly assert that India would accept what would amount to an arms-control agreement unilaterally that did not include other key countries—namely, China and Pakistan.
Second, the initiative with India does not seek to renegotiate or amend the NPT. India is not, and is not going to become, a member of the NPT as a nuclear weapons state. We are simply seeking to address an untenable situation.
India has never been a party to the NPT, but this agreement does bring India into the non-proliferation framework, and thereby strengthen the broad non-proliferation regime.
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Third, civil nuclear cooperation with India will not lead to an arms race in South Asia. Nothing we or any other potential international suppliers would provide to India under this initiative would enhance its military capacity or add to its military stockpiles.
Moreover, the nuclear balance in this region is a function of political and military matters. We are far more likely to be able to influence those, the regional dynamics of this important region, from a position of strong relations with India, and indeed strong relations with Pakistan.
Fourth, this initiative does not complicate our policies toward countries like North Korea or Iran. It is simply not credible to compare India to North Korea or to Iran.
While Iran and North Korea are violating their IAEA obligations, India would be making new ones, by bringing the IAEA into the India program, and seeking peaceful international cooperation. Iran and North Korea are closed, non-democratic societies. India is a transparent and open democracy.
In fact, India is increasingly doing its part to support the international community's efforts to curb the dangerous nuclear ambitions of the Iranian regime.
The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative is a strategic achievement. It is good for America, it is good for India, and it is good for the international community. President Bush and I look to Congress as full partners in this initiative.
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Your support is crucial for this legislation, and we ask that you lend it. Together we can seize this tremendous opportunity to solidify a key partnership that will advance an American interest and the ideals of peace, prosperity, and liberty that two great democracies could pursue together.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee. And I am now pleased to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am pleased to discuss with you why President Bush and I think that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative deserves the support of the United States Congress.
On March 2 in New Delhi, the United States and India reached a historic understanding on civil nuclear cooperation. This strategic achievement will advance energy security, further environmental protection, foster economic and technological development in both of our countries, bolster international security, and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. All of these benefits, however, must be viewed in a still larger, still greater context: What this initiative does to elevate the U.S.-India relationship to a new, strategic height.
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Recall for a moment where we were before this initiative. For too long during the past half century, differences over domestic policies and international objectives kept India and the United States estranged. We had a bedeviled relationship, a structural ambivalence between the world's leading democracy and the world's largest democracy. For years, relations between our two countries were constrained, thereby limiting America's ability to shape a productive future for South and Central Asia, which will be one of the most dynamic regions in the 21st century.
Our past nonproliferation policies toward India had not achieved their purposes. They had no effect on India's development of nuclear weapons. Nor did they prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in 1998. They had contributed little to lessening regional tensions, which brought India and Pakistan repeatedly to the brink of war.
These policies also left us with a more dangerous energy future. They effectively forced India to rely on oil and gas from Iran and the Persian Gulf, or on destabilizing competition over waterways to produce hydroelectric power.
All of this resulted in a more isolated India—isolated especially from the standards of the nuclear nonproliferation establishment, prevented from reaping the benefits of a long history of global cooperation. This left India fostering insular and resentful attitudes, protecting a sheltered nuclear industry.
When President Bush came into office, he judged that our relations with India would be central to the future success of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia and around the world. He resolved to transform our relationship with India, and in the past five years, that is exactly what we have done. The world's oldest democracy is now building a global partnership with the world's largest democracy. As the President said in New Delhi: ''India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the United States because we are partners in the cause of human liberty.''
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This partnership is founded on common interests and shared ideals:
Democracy: India's society is open and free, transparent and stable. It is a vibrant, multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracy characterized by individual freedom, the rule of law, and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair elections. It is a positive model in the international community.
Security: India is a rising global power and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. India will continue to possess sophisticated military forces that, just like our own, remain strongly committed to the principle of civilian control, and will in the future help to promote peace in Asia and across the world.
Prosperity: India is committed to economic liberty and strong growth. It has an immense, skilled, and youthful workforce. It will soon be the world's most populous nation, with the world's largest and fastest growing middle class. By 2025, India will most likely rank among the world's five largest economies. American exports to India have doubled in only the last four years.
Developing civil nuclear cooperation with India represents the promise of this new partnership—a partnership that will become one of the most important we have with any country in the 21st century. Recall again where we were with India before we launched this initiative: a conflicted relationship, the wrong energy incentives, and a failed nonproliferation policy. Today, I want to discuss what we can have instead: a strategic partnership, enhanced energy security, greater environmental protections, increased business opportunities, and of course, a more secure future.
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Taken together, the before and after comparison is compelling: This initiative is good for America. It is good for India. And it is good for the international community. So let us move forward with it.
The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
Before I turn to the benefits of our Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, let me first run through the specifics of the initiative itself. The basic agreement is this: India has pledged, for the first time in 30 years, to submit its entire civil nuclear program to international inspection and to take on significant new nonproliferation commitments in exchange for full civil nuclear cooperation with the international community. With this initiative, the world is expecting India to be a full partner in nonproliferation, and India is expecting the world to help it meet its growing energy needs.
Specifically, India has agreed to place all future civil reactors—both breeder and thermal—under permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. India will also place a majority (14 out of 22) of its existing and planned power reactors under safeguards by 2014. Under this initiative, 65 percent of India's thermal reactors will be brought under safeguards, a figure that the Indian government has said could rise as high as 90 percent as India procures more civil reactors in the next 15 years. To put this in perspective, imagine the alternative: Without this initiative, 81 percent of India's current power reactors—and its future power and breeder reactors—would continue to remain outside of IAEA safeguards. The Indian nuclear power program would remain opaque, a nuclear black box.
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Once this initiative is implemented, potential American and international suppliers will be able to invest in India's safeguarded civil facilities solely for energy production and other peaceful purposes. The safeguards required by this initiative are designed to help detect, and thereby help prevent, the diversion to military use of any materials, technologies, or equipment provided to India's civil nuclear facilities. Once a reactor is under IAEA oversight, safeguards will be in place permanently and without any conditions.
But that is not all. The Indian government will negotiate and sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and it will work with the United States to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. India has also agreed to create a robust national export control system that includes harmonization with and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. Finally, India will continue its unilateral moratorium on testing and refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them. Just last June, as part of our ongoing discussions on civil nuclear cooperation, India's parliament passed a landmark WMD export control law that significantly upgraded and improved India's ability to counter the proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction. This law makes such proliferation a crime in India, just as it is in the United States.
For this initiative to go forward now, both parties must meet their obligations. For our part, President Bush is committed to work with the U.S. Congress to amend relevant domestic laws—the Atomic Energy Act of 1954—and to seek agreement within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to accommodate this cooperation. The United States will also negotiate an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, which we will submit to the Congress, and seek to assure the reliable supply of nuclear fuel to India through multiple avenues and instruments.
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India has commitments as well, and it is already acting on them. In fact, the Chairman of India's atomic energy commission is traveling to Vienna this week to begin negotiations with the IAEA on both a safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol. India has delivered to us a list of specific reactors to be placed under safeguards and a general timeline for doing so. Under this plan, all 14 reactors will be offered for safeguards by 2014. In addition, India will place associated upstream and downstream facilities under safeguards and has declared nine research facilities as civilian. India has also provided initial verbal comments on our draft agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
In the coming months, we hope that India will also take a number of additional measures to further strengthen its commitment to global nonproliferation. In addition to adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, as India committed in the July 18 Joint Statement, these additional measures include, for example, announcing its intention to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and harmonizing its export control lists with the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. We are in constant discussion with our Indian counterparts and will continue to press these and other nonproliferation measures through the course of our strategic partnership.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, implementing this initiative will require a carefully orchestrated series of events involving the coordination of not only the two governments, including the U.S. Congress, but also the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is our vision and our hope that progress can be achieved on several fronts simultaneously.
Once implemented, this initiative with India will benefit the United States in five important and linked ways:
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First, the Initiative will deepen our strategic partnership.
This initiative is a key element of our growing strategic partnership with India: we believe it will help make India one of our most valuable global partners and help make possible significant achievements in many other areas of cooperation.
More than two million Indians, many of them now U.S. citizens, live in the United States. More Indians study in our universities than students from any other foreign country. India is the largest source of skilled temporary workers coming to the United States and the second largest source of legal migration. The United States and India have committed to doubling bilateral trade within three years.
The explosive growth of private ties between our peoples is magnified by new initiatives between our governments. Last summer's historic summit between the President Bush and Prime Minister Singh embodied the strategic achievements of the first four years of our nations' new relationship. The President's recent visit to India has shown how much more can be accomplished. Both leaders committed themselves to fostering a second Green Revolution in agriculture, to advancing space exploration, and to establishing a new science and technology partnership. They pledged to increase democracy promotion efforts, to invest in energy security, and to double bilateral trade within three years. And they decided to expand defense cooperation through a new maritime security initiative.
In other words, the United States and India are laying the foundation for cooperation on major issues in the region and beyond, building on and building up a broad relationship between our peoples and our governments. We will not fully realize this vision, however, unless the impediments associated with civil nuclear cooperation, which have complicated all efforts to improve bilateral relations during the last thirty years, are resolved once and for all. The structural ambivalence must be resolved. This initiative is the key that will unlock the progress of our expanding relationship.
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And imagine, Mr. Chairman, what would happen if this initiative were defeated, or changed in a way that fundamentally alters its substance. All the hostility and suspicion of the past would be redoubled. And think of Prime Minister Singh, who has braved the shouted dissent of his anti-American critics. We would hand the enemies of this new relationship a great victory. We would slide backward when we should be striding forward.
Second, the Initiative will enhance energy security.
The global search for new and stable sources of energy is now a defining issue in all aspects of international life. Civil nuclear cooperation with India will help it meet its rising energy needs without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and gas, such as nearby Iran. Diversifying India's energy sector will help to alleviate the competition among India, the United States, and other rapidly expanding economies for scarce carbon-based energy resources, thereby lessening pressure on global energy prices.
India—a nation of over a billion people, with an economy growing at approximately 8 percent each year—has a massive and rapidly growing appetite for energy. Huge population growth, expanding industrial production, economic development, urbanization, and increased motor vehicle ownership are all driving this insatiable energy demand. Between 1980 and 2001, demand increased by 208 percent. By contrast, China, often thought of as the next big energy consumer, saw a 130 percent increase over the same period. In 2003, India was the sixth largest consumer of energy in the world behind only the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and Germany.
To meet its mounting power demands, the Indian government plans to double its capacity to produce electricity within the next eight years. With Congressional endorsement of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, a large proportion of that growth would be in clean nuclear technology.
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Currently, over 50 percent of India's total energy, and 70 percent of India's electric power generation, is derived from coal. Of the remaining 50 percent, nearly 35 percent is derived from oil; seven percent from natural gas; five percent from hydro-electric power; and about one percent from renewable sources like solar and wind. Only two percent of India's total power generation comes from nuclear energy. To put this in perspective, even the United States, which has historically limited nuclear energy use, derives over 20 percent of its power from nuclear energy. Japan derives 30 percent, and France roughly 78 percent.
India's operating civil nuclear power plants currently have approximately 3,310 megawatts of installed capacity. Given the opportunity, India plans to invest quickly in additional civil nuclear reactors so that, by 2020, its capacity to produce electricity from clean nuclear technology would reach 20,000 megawatts—a six-fold increase. Under this plan and further long-term objectives, approximately 20 percent of India's total energy production would eventually be met by nuclear technology, thus significantly decreasing the growth in its reliance on fossil fuels.
Since the historic March 2 announcement, senior officials in India's atomic energy establishment have indicated their desire to exceed the 20,000 megawatts target through the accelerated import of high-unit capacity foreign reactors to further reduce their dependence on dirty coal and fossil fuels. This decrease will be welcome, as India's demand for oil and natural gas is immense and will only increase as its economy grows and industrializes. In 2005, India's net imports of oil totaled approximately 1.7 million barrels per day. Even with conservative estimates, these imports are predicted to grow to 2 million barrels per day within only the next four years. Much of that oil is imported from unstable sources. As part of the newly launched, U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, the United States has committed to help India secure other stable sources of energy. The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative is one significant element of that commitment.
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Third, the Initiative will benefit the environment.
Civil nuclear cooperation, along with the deployment of cleaner fossil fuel technologies, will not only help India meet its energy needs, but it will do so in an environmentally-friendly way. India's heavy dependence on coal and oil for electricity generation has another negative side effect: high levels of carbon emissions, which have made India a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change. Between 1990 and 2001, India's carbon emissions increased by 61 percent, a rate of growth surpassed only by China. Extrapolating from these trends, scientists expect that this will only get worse. According to the Department of Energy, between 2001 and 2025, India's carbon emissions will grow by 3 percent annually, twice the predicted emissions growth in the United States. Air pollution and growth in greenhouse gases is a visible and significant fact of life in India's major cities.
India's dependence on its domestically-produced coal raises many other environmental concerns. Indian coal is extremely energy inefficient. It produces about twice as much ash and particulate matter as American coal. And it emits far more nitrogen oxide (an element in photochemical smog) and carbon monoxide (a poisonous gas) than American coal does. Power plants are also the main source of Indian emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas. In addition, mercury emissions from India's inefficient coal-fired plants can enter the food chain.
These high emissions, along with emissions from other sources, have made all four of India's largest cities—New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata—among the most polluted in the world. Emissions from power plants are thought to be the prime contributor to the Atmospheric Brown Cloud now hovering over the Bay of Bengal and polluting many coastal areas. If this cloud grows and moves overland, as is currently expected, the resulting effects on public health would be disastrous. The health risks associated with India's pollution are thus negatively affecting not only the Indian population, but the population of the entire region.
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While the United States is working with India to integrate cleaner, more efficient, coal-burning technologies into its power plants, a rapid expansion of India's coal-fired generating capacity, just to meet basic energy needs, would make that work much more challenging. Slowing this expansion will help us achieve our aggressive objectives for slowing the growth in Indian pollution.
To the extent that India expands its use of cleaner energy technology, the result will be reduced air pollution locally, regionally, and globally. Nuclear plants do not emit greenhouse gases. While some opponents of nuclear energy point to the problems associated with disposing of spent nuclear waste, the technology is readily available to store nuclear waste safely for thousands of years and prevent it from contaminating the surrounding environment. India's commitment to a closed cycle also permits it to manage its nuclear waste far more effectively while simultaneously utilizing the energy potential of its feedstock far more effectively.
Of course, the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative alone will not fully address Indian emissions of air pollution and greenhouse gases. It does, however, take a sizeable step in the right direction. Civil nuclear cooperation will advance the goals of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and is also an important piece of our Energy Dialogue, which aims to address India's energy needs from every perspective. As a critical step in reducing the growth of India's heavy dependence on coal and its greenhouse gas emissions, our civil nuclear initiative would be one of the greenest parts of India's new Green Revolution.
Fourth, the Initiative will create opportunities for U.S. business.
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This is a time of renaissance in the Indian-American relationship, punctuated by our tremendous growth in trade. In the past year alone, Boeing announced a $13 billion sale to India, and Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft all made major investments in India's high-tech sector. In July, when Prime Minister Singh visited Washington, he and President Bush announced the most ambitious strategic leap ever undertaken by our two governments, illustrated by joint ventures in 18 different fields, including the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.
At its core, our initiative with India is not simply a government-to-government effort. It was crafted with the private sector firmly in mind. Because it will fully open the door to civil nuclear trade and cooperation, this initiative is good for American business.
India currently has 15 operating thermal power reactors, with seven under construction, but it intends to increase this number significantly. Meeting this ramp-up in demand for civil nuclear technology, fuel, and support services holds the promise of opening new business opportunities for American firms, which translates into new jobs, new incomes, and new markets for the United States. Indian officials indicate they plan to import at least eight new 1,000 megawatt power reactors by 2012, as well as additional reactors in the years ahead. Preliminary private studies suggest that if American vendors win just two of these reactor contracts, American industry estimates it may add 3,000–5,000 new direct jobs and about 10,000–15,000 indirect jobs in the United States.
At the same time, participation in India's market will help make the American nuclear industry globally competitive, thereby benefiting our own domestic nuclear power sector. This legislation, and the associated bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement now being negotiated, will permit U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and growing Indian market—something they are currently prohibited from doing.
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An expanded Indian civil nuclear power industry will also help to take the pressure off the long-term global demand for energy. Increasing demand for natural resources causes our own energy prices to rise as well. To the extent that we can reduce the demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer.
Furthermore, this initiative will also significantly help India's economic development. Human development and economic growth depend on the reliable, affordable, and environmentally-friendly supply of energy to allow for the full production of goods and services. India is struggling to keep up with its energy demands, with many urban areas currently subject to unscheduled black-outs and routine daily interruptions of power. In 2005, there was an average electricity shortage of 10 percent and a peak excessive power demand of 15 percent. These shortages are expected to become more severe, thus preventing India's growing business and industry from functioning effectively. Such unreliability is detrimental to India's economic growth and its prospects for greater foreign investment. The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative would provide India access to a privatized and more efficient nuclear energy market, enabling its economy to grow to its full potential. Needless to say, as India grows, it provides an ever bigger market for American exports. So by helping India's economy, we are in turn helping our own.
Finally, the Initiative will enhance the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Mr. Chairman, let me address the issue that has received the most attention since this initiative was announced: nuclear nonproliferation. I will start by saying unequivocally that this initiative is a net gain for global nonproliferation efforts. We better secure our future by bringing India into the international nonproliferation system, not by allowing India to remain isolated for the next thirty years the way it has been for the last thirty. We are clearly better off having India most of the way in rather than all the way out.
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There are some who doubt this, and I would now like to discuss some of the questions that have been raised about this initiative.
First, I must address the belief that somehow this initiative could have been used to force India to accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. has achieved an important strategic objective by obtaining India's commitment to work toward a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. But India's plans and politics must take into account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that India would accept an arms control agreement that did not include the other key countries, namely China and Pakistan. Therefore trying to use American leverage to get India to make this unilateral move is an idea that is certain to fail. It is a poison pill to kill any possibility for change.
Second, some have expressed concern that civil nuclear cooperation with India will weaken the NPT, or undermine global nonproliferation efforts. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA—the agency responsible for applying safeguards—does not share this concern. Just the opposite. Dr. ElBaradei publicly praised the initiative the day it was announced, stating that it will ''bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime. . . . It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the nonproliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.'' Four of the five NPT-defined nuclear weapon states have also endorsed the initiative. In fact, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac even released public statements in which both refer to the benefits that this initiative has for international nonproliferation efforts.
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The global nonproliferation regime is a remarkable diplomatic achievement. Since its inception, the NPT and related international mechanisms have helped keep the number of nuclear-armed states to a minimum while spreading the benefits of civil nuclear technology to all who joined the treaty. We want India to participate more fully in sharing this global responsibility. This initiative aligns India more closely with international nuclear nonproliferation standards.
Our initiative with India does not seek to renegotiate or amend the NPT. India is not, and is not going to become, a member of the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. Nothing we are proposing would violate our NPT obligations that we not ''in any way assist'' India's nuclear weapons program. We are seeking to address an untenable situation: India has never been a party to the NPT. It did not cheat. It simply developed nuclear weapons outside this context, a long time ago, finishing a program that was well underway before the NPT had been signed. India then found itself frozen for a generation in this anomalous state. It now faces substantial energy needs ahead that can be partly met through nuclear energy.
Despite India's strong nuclear nonproliferation export record, its continued existence outside the global nonproliferation regime undermines the regime's interests and U.S. security goals over the long term. The real choice is this: do we want a state that intends to expand significantly its civil nuclear power production in the years ahead to remain outside the international nonproliferation regime? Or do we instead want it to adopt global nonproliferation practices while increasing our insight into its civil nuclear program? President Bush has made his choice, and it is the correct one.
Third, others have asserted that this initiative permits India to expand its nuclear arsenal significantly. This is just not the case. The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production, but nothing under this initiative will directly enhance its military capability or add to its military stockpile. India could already build additional weapons within the limits of its capabilities if it so desired, with or without this deal. But the Indian government has repeatedly confirmed in public that it intends to expand its civil nuclear energy capability.
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Fourth, we believe that civil nuclear cooperation with India will not lead to an arms race in South Asia. In our view, the prospects for such an arms race will be determined by bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, not the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. It should be noted that these relations have been consistently improving for the past three years. The ongoing Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan has significantly reduced tensions and built confidence on both sides. Just last week, Prime Minister Singh spoke of the desirability of a treaty of peace, security, and friendship between India and Pakistan, which Pakistan immediately welcomed.
To further improve relations and ensure strategic restraint on both sides, the United States is prepared to intensify significantly our diplomatic effort with both India and Pakistan. Continuing to improve our relations with both India and Pakistan will allow us to promote peace and counsel restraint in their military procurement plans.
Fifth, some have argued that the initiative with India will undermine our efforts to curb Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, because it creates an alleged ''double standard.'' This is simply not credible, because comparing India to the North Korean or the Iranian regime is not credible. India is a democracy, transparent and accountable to its people, which works within the international system to promote peace and stability and has a responsible nuclear nonproliferation record. The regime in Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, with a long record of cheating on its nuclear obligations to the international community, and it is violating its own nuclear obligations at present. North Korea is the least transparent government in the world, which threatens its neighbors and proliferates dangerous weapons. While Iran and North Korea are violating their IAEA obligations, India is making new ones and seeking peaceful international cooperation. So we do indeed treat India differently from the way we, and the international community, treat Iran and North Korea.
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France, the United Kingdom, and Russia support our initiative with India, and we are all working closely together to curb the dangerous nuclear ambitions of the Iranian regime. India is increasingly doing its part to support the international community's efforts. Recall that India not once, but twice, stood with the United States and other nations against illegal proliferation by voting in the IAEA to find Iran not in compliance with its obligations and, later, to report Iran's nuclear violations to the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Singh faced down his anti-American critics at home to take these actions.
It's important to keep in mind that this initiative was not easy for Prime Minister Singh, though he has won support for it across India's major parties. But it is worth thinking about why this was tough for him. It was not because of the concerns mentioned here. The opposition in India wants to keep more distance from America. It wants to keep India's industry sheltered and protected. Surely those are not our goals. Surely Congress will not want to inadvertently miss this opportunity to make this strategic leap forward.
Seizing Our Opportunity with India
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lantos, for introducing H.R.4974, which represents President Bush's proposed legislation to facilitate authorization of civil nuclear cooperation with India. This legislation asks Congress to amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. This will let American firms provide nuclear goods and services to India's civil nuclear program, something that is prohibited by current law. In addition, we will ask the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make a special exception for India to allow for full civil nuclear cooperation.
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Congressional action on this legislation is critical in our efforts to secure broader international support for this new relationship with India. Foreign governments are looking to Congress to determine whether the United States stands solidly behind a new relationship with India. Prompt Congressional action will ensure that there is a solid basis for reliable, long-term cooperation with India. It will also assure U.S. industry of a solid framework for civil nuclear trade with India, at no competitive disadvantage with other nations.
Mr. Chairman: During his speech in New Delhi last month, President Bush spoke of his desire to ''strengthen the bonds of trust between our two great nations.'' As we forge this bond, President Bush and I look to the Congress as a full partner in this initiative. Your support is crucial for this legislation. And we ask that you offer it. Together, we can seize this tremendous opportunity to solidify a key partnership that will advance American interests, and the ideals of peace, prosperity, and liberty for which we stand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and Distinguished Members of the Committee. I would now be eager to respond to your questions.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Madame Secretary. Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What a surprise to be first.
Madame Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. I particularly appreciate your efforts to promote a better relationship with India.
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I had the great fortune of serving in the last Congress with Congressman Crowley of New York as Co-Chair of the India Caucus, the largest caucus on Capitol Hill, reflecting the appreciation by Members of Congress of the importance of India and Indian-Americans.
I also am glad today to hear the bipartisan comments of Congressman Lantos. He and I are in constant competition to see who is the most optimistic. And I will be darned if he didn't win again today, pointing out correctly that this is the hinge of history. What we are working on, and again in a bipartisan manner, has been achieved, promotes world peace, security, development.
And so, Congressman, thank you for your efforts.
I really have an appreciation of India, because my dad served there during World War II. As I was growing up I heard how hard-working the people of India are, how entrepreneurial. And now, with the victory in the Cold War, the fruition of our relationship can truly come together.
You really have jumped ahead. Your opening comments answered my questions of how, working with colleagues, we can explain how this promotes non-proliferation. And I look forward to getting these comments, along with Congressman Crowley, to all of our colleagues.
Additionally, you have also answered the questions that I was going to ask about economic benefit. And indeed, you pointed out the doubling of our trade relationship last year, a 30-percent increase in exports from the United States to India, how this helps us with mutual energy independence, even a cleaner environment.
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You further, though, have indicated that this agreement is an essential step toward our goal of transforming America's partnership with India.
To what extent of the relationship that we have between the United States and India would our relations be set back if this agreement is not reached?
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think it would be a significant setback to our efforts to deepen and broaden our relationship.
If you think about this from the perspective not just from the non-proliferation regime, although I think it does help considerably to broaden and deepen that overall regime. The two key things here are to be able to engage in energy and technology cooperation with India that is good for our economy, good for their economy. And so it is at the core, in many ways, of making life better for Indians, and ultimately for Americans.
It is also at the core of environmental cooperation, because we are currently unable to work with the Indians on civil nuclear technology, and on next-generation civil nuclear technology.
All of us want to use a diversification of energy to get us out of the business of chasing hydrocarbons. I can tell you that I have been in many ways even surprised, as Secretary of State, by how really warping of diplomacy the mad rush for energy supplies has become. People are just, the appetite for energy is so great. And many of those resources are held by countries with which we have a lot of problems politically.
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And so on the energy side, on the environmental side, on the economic side, this agreement unlocks cooperation that is key to all of those elements, and therefore is much more important to the overall relationship than just the title civil nuclear cooperation would suggest.
Mr. WILSON. And in my recent visit to India, I saw the great need of infrastructure. And basic to that would be electrical energy production.
And so not only would our trade be enhanced by, as you just identified, but overall in terms of roads and water/sewer, and the basic infrastructure of the country.
And again, thank you for all that you are doing. We are so proud of your efforts to promote a better relationship between India and the United States.
I now defer back to the Chairman.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Lantos of California.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Secretary, since I told you both privately and publicly that I intend to support the agreement, if you will allow me, I would like to raise a question about another subject.
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You have indicated that you will look into reports that Russia provided Iraq, prior to our invasion, with secret military plans. Are you able to give us some indication as to where your study is at the moment, and what we have found out?
Secretary RICE. Of course, Congressman Lantos. I have talked personally with the Russian Foreign Minister, first to request that they look into it, and then I saw him recently when I was in Berlin. He passed to me a letter that the Russian Government does not believe that these contacts took place.
They have talked to the Ambassador at the time. He told me that he believes that any such contacts would have been highly inappropriate for an Ambassador of Russia to have engaged in with Iraq.
Of course, we will continue to look into the matter. We are looking, of course, at the document itself, and trying to ascertain how really reliable it is. But that is the report that I have thus far from the Russian Government.
But obviously, because we would take very seriously any suggestion that a foreign government would have passed information that might have endangered our troops on the eve of war, we will continue to hunt for information. And if we turn up anything else, we will give that to the Russian Government. But that is the answer that they have given us thus far.
Mr. LANTOS. As you well know, a number of us, both in this body and in the Senate, are singularly concerned about the scheduled summit of the G–8 in St. Petersburg. And a number of us are considering the possibility of suggesting to our Administration and to the other G–7 that a meeting prior to the G–8 take place that would bring together the true democracies in this grouping before meeting with Russia in St. Petersburg.
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This information concerning the possibility of Russia providing secret military information to Saddam Hussein's regime would be very helpful and a very necessary part of our decision-making. We would be very grateful if you could make it available to us as soon as possible.
Secretary RICE. I will do that. I will respond formally by letter.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Barrett of South Carolina.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Madame Secretary, thanks for being here today.
In my office, Madame Secretary, we have received a good bit of correspondence on the impact of the non-proliferation treaty, and you have touched on that somewhat. But I want to just ask a couple of questions.
The partnership itself, again, you went into a little bit. But what about the relations that we have with, say, a China? Or say, a Pakistan? I mean, what type of effect is it going to have on the relationships with some of these countries?
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And I guess the other question is, what is India's plan for nuclear weapons? Did you all discuss any of that? And if you could go into that a little bit, I would appreciate it.
Secretary RICE. I am sorry?
Mr. BARRETT. India's plan for nuclear weapons.
Secretary RICE. Yes. Thank you. In terms of relations with other countries, there is, first of all, the matter of the nuclear suppliers group, where four of the five permanent nuclear powers support this agreement.
China has reserved, at this point, on it. They have not said that they do not support it; they have said they have some questions. I would just note that of course China and India do have an improving, but still not a completely satisfactory, relationship, and I would just note that.
But we are making available to all the members of the nuclear suppliers group the supporting documentation as to why we think this is a good deal.
In terms of Pakistan, we were in Pakistan the day after this agreement was announced. We had a very serious conversation with the Pakistanis. I think Pakistan knows that it is not, for reasons of history, of its nuclear history, in a position to have something similar to this. They effectively know that the proliferation concerns that we have with Pakistan are quite unlike the proliferation record of India.
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Moreover, we are discussing with Pakistan other sources of energy diversification, including renewables. And so that is a healthy discussion that is going on.
In general, my view, and the view of the Administration, is that this is a path-breaking deal. And so people will stop to ask questions, as you are doing, as others are doing. But increasingly, when they look at it, they come to the conclusion that Prime Minister Howard did in Australia, which is that it is a good deal. And what its implications are for Australian policy is a different matter, but it is a good deal.
And I think that as we have a chance to talk about it, as this debate goes on about the legislation, you will see more and more people understanding how important it is that we finally resolve this anomaly in the international system. We have a state in India that is not a part of the NPT, but that has been a responsible actor with its nuclear technologies.
Now, as to India's nuclear weapons program, clearly this agreement does not constrain India's nuclear weapons program. That was not its purpose, though we raised it with the Indians. Neither, however, as some critics have suggested, does it enhance India's capability to build nuclear weapons.
India has about, by most estimates, 50,000 tons or so of uranium in its reserves. That means that the very small percentage of that that would be needed for military program they could get certainly without this agreement.
But what this agreement does is it takes a situation in which now very few Indian reactors are under any kind of safeguard, it puts two-thirds of India's reactors under safeguards, it puts all future civilian reactors under safeguards. Because of the pressures for India to expand its civilian programs, the Indians estimate that this could, within a decade or so, put as much as 90 percent of their reactors under safeguards.
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And as Mohamed ElBaradei has noted, because it brings the IAEA finally into sustained contact with the Indian program, it opens up this program in ways that it has currently not been opened up. But I think those are the values to the non-proliferation regime that others are beginning to see.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Berman of California.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
To use your testimony as the framework for my questions, I find the first four arguments for the support of this agreement to be quite compelling, particularly the arguments about the strategic partnership and energy security.
Where I would like to push back a little bit is on the fifth, the contention that the initiative will enhance the international nuclear proliferation regime. So I would like to ask you several questions, and maybe I will do them all. It will help to at least get my questions in, if not your answers.
All five nuclear weapons states have halted the production of fissile material. This deal does not limit India's production of fissile material.
The reason I raise the issue about whether it enhances or not is that many argue that it significantly expands India's production capability because it allows India to import uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear plants, thereby freeing up what I am told—which I gather you may disagree with, but what I am told—is essentially a scarce domestic uranium supply. That they can now put all of that into weapons production.
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The July 18 statement says President Bush and Prime Minister Singh note that India is prepared to assume the same responsibilities and practices, and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries who have advanced nuclear technology.
Isn't there a fundamental contradiction between this statement and India's unwillingness to freeze the production of fissile material, as the five nuclear weapons states have done?
Along those lines, in the negotiations we sought to provide IAEA safeguards to all but two reactors, which, in practice, would have limited India's production of fissile material to an amount sufficient for approximately five nuclear weapons a year.
As detailed in recent press reports, the Administration ended up conceding on nearly each of the points we came in negotiating, and the Indians got almost everything they wanted in this deal. Why did that happen?
Third, does it really make sense to have a specific legal carve-out for India? Can't we achieve all the purposes that you testified to, particularly those first four, by establishing a set of—India is not going to give up the bomb, you are right. And it is silly to hold onto some construct that makes no sense in terms of the real world. And India is different than Iran and North Korea; I agree with that, as well.
But doesn't it make sense to establish a set of objective criteria that would have to be met by non-NPT members to qualify for U.S. nuclear cooperation? So thereby you avoid the appearance of doing a special favor for a friend, which is only to be avoided because it will then keep other countries from wanting to emulate that same special exception for their friends? I heard China and Pakistan mentioned earlier.
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What is wrong with that generic approach, which would still allow the nuclear cooperation, but apply to people who met the test, to show that they are not India, Iran, or even Pakistan?
And then my final question is, in that same statement India commits to working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty. Are those just words? Is the Administration serious about negotiating such a treaty? If it is not, then the Indian statement doesn't have much value.
And given that the Administration opposes any verification mechanism in such a treaty as inherently unworkable, why is that more than just words, that neither India nor the United States is serious about pursuing such a treaty?
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congressman Berman.
First of all, in terms of the fissile material cut-off treaty, and I think it relates to the issue of the unilateral moratoria that are in place on the production of fissile material, yes, we will continue to encourage India to participate in such. But of course, India's strategic context is different than the five major nuclear powers, and I think we have to understand that. There is a regional context here which involves the relationship with Pakistan.
I would note that we do not believe that the constraint on India's nuclear program is the availability or absence of nuclear material. With 50,000 tons of uranium available to them, only a very small percentage of that would be needed for a military program.
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But of course, for a civil nuclear program, one needs a considerable and continuous supply of nuclear material and fuel. And that is why we believe that we can assess that the incentives are all on the civilian side. To get fuel to fuel a large civilian nuclear program does take a lot of material. It really takes not very much material at all to have a military program.
The constraint, it seems to us, on the Indian nuclear program is rather the politics and the regional politics, military and other, the security situation in the region. And I think most experts would agree that the Indian program has been pretty restrained. It is not a large program. I don't want to go into numbers, but it is not a large program.
And we are of the belief that in this region, the politics, the diplomacy of the region is moving in a direction in which the underlying political tensions and adversarial relationship between Pakistan and India is, indeed, abating, making even less necessary a sort of fueling of the arms race.
Now, we have talked to the Indians and to the Pakistanis about our desire to see them engage more in discussions about the strategic relationship that they have; not just the political relationship, but issues like confidence-building measures about their nuclear program.
So the constraint is not the absence of material or the presence of material, and this agreement will not enhance or constrain their nuclear program. That was not the intention. The constraint, we believe, or the lack thereof would be the nature of the relationships in that region, on which we have now the kind of relationship with India and with Pakistan that we think we can make a positive contribution.
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As to what we sought in the agreement. We did start talking with the Indians about putting more reactors under safeguards; they started talking about putting a lot fewer under safeguards. And we came to a position of 14 of 22; that is two-thirds. It closes down, for instance, Sirus, which has a particularly bad history. It also, as the Indians decommission some and bring on new civilian reactors, those will be under safeguards, and so those numbers will go up.
But the key to our negotiation was that we were insistent that these safeguards be permanent. And that was not something that the Indians wanted or sought. In fact, it was the last point of negotiation, and it was the point on which I said to our negotiators the night before if they are not permanent, we will have to walk away. Because we believed very strongly that these had to be permanent safeguards.
In terms of a kind of standard that states ought to be judged against, in some ways de facto, this is the beginnings of the establishment of those kinds of standards. What have the Indians agreed to do? They have agreed to adhere voluntarily to the nuclear supplier group guidelines. They have agreed to adhere to the missile control technology regime guidelines.
They have a proliferation record that is really quite good, very good, and the protection of those materials. They have a law, as of 2005, that criminalizes, in a comprehensive way, either individual or company behavior that aids and abets the trade in weapons of mass destruction.
They are agreeing to a civil nuclear program where the fuel supply will be from the international community, rather than generated at home. I think that is the beginning of a very good set of standards.
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And just to note, Iran, for instance, were it willing to accept a civil nuclear program that did not require the fuel cycle on Iranian territory, they could have that deal. The problem is they haven't been willing to accept that.
And so I do think that and some other things that we would like to see the Indians do—for instance, on the proliferation security initiative, we are working with them. They have also told us that they would like to consider joining the Wassenaar Group—there are a number of pieces that are still to be done. But it is a pretty good list for behavior in order to have this kind of deal be acceptable.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Mack of Florida.
[No response.]
Chairman HYDE. Is he here? Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No comments at this time.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach of Iowa.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Secretary, you have made a very thoughtful case. We have to decide as a Congress, because a change in law is required, whether it is a compelling one. And so I would like to ask several questions of a skeptical nature to try to ascertain how the Administration is thinking.
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Prior to the President's trip we had good discussions with the Executive Branch and this Committee and Subcommittee about the possibility that a powerful step forward in the United States-Indian relations might relate to United States support for India being on the Security Council. Instead, the Executive chose an approach it frankly had not discussed with Congress in advance. And that is one of the reasons why there is a lot of hesitancy to jump as rapidly as the Executive might want.
What is your stand on the Security Council issue, for one?
Two, all of us recognize India is a democratic and responsible country. And if the world were fairly simple, this kind of exception might be almost de facto compelling.
But when the United States takes a position with regard to any international agreement that we have the exceptional right—and this is what is implied here—to go outside the agreement, without consultation in advance with anyone, by the way, it certainly implies that other countries might assert that they have the exceptional right to go outside the agreement.
And so you have a circumstance where, presumably, pressure will be put on China to make an exceptional case about Pakistan, conceivably, although doubtfully, with North Korea. Certainly pressure will be placed on Russia to make an exceptional case for Iran. Maybe even France would be under that kind of pressure.
You have a situation where there are other countries in the world that might be considered comparable to India—let us say, Brazil—where all the nuclear weapons states might want to make further exceptions. So you really opened up a Pandora's Box in terms of pressure on others to act in similar ways, as well as psychological, maybe, desires to match United States exceptionalism. And so I would like your response.
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And the third one, and the last one for the moment, is, there have been new developments in technology. One relates to a fuel called thorium. Did the Administration consider some sort of thorium option, helping India with a reactor approach that has never really been developed yet, but one which has the advantage of not spinning off plutonium as a byproduct? Was this ever part of anyone's consideration?
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman Leach. On the Security Council, we, of course, as other Administrations, support Japan for permanent membership, or membership as a permanent member of the Security Council.
It has been our view that going beyond that at this point and trying to debate the politics of who gets onto the Security Council would indeed retard the broader reforms within the United Nations. And it happened last summer, frankly. Everybody got so spun up and active about who would be on the Security Council that we really didn't make the progress on some of the core reforms—Management Forum, Human Rights Council, Peace-Building Commission—that we thought necessary.
Obviously, we have been trying to talk with others about the kind of criteria that we would think of for a permanent seat, or for a Security Council seat at all. And responsible democracies that have acted well on behalf of international peace and security obviously meet that criteria. But we have been reluctant to commit to any other state, other than the long-time commitment to Japan, because we think within the context of the UN, Security Council reform will simply overtake broader reforms of the United Nations.
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As to the exceptionalism that the U.S. is exercising by proposing this civil nuclear agreement, I think the way to think of it is yes, the United States is taking the lead in trying to address what is really an anomalous situation in the international system. And that is a state that is not a member to the NPT, but has really adhered to most of its guidelines, despite developing a nuclear weapons program, and to resolve that anomaly so that the nuclear non-proliferation regime can broaden beyond just the NPT, to begin to have states signed on to various norms of behavior.
And India signing on to those norms of behavior, many of which it has always observed, we think is a very big step forward. So we have taken the leadership in doing that.
But I will say that it has been welcomed by the IAEA Chief. It has been welcomed by a number of other members of the NSG. And what is more, it is still subject not only to legislative review or legislative amendment by the Congress, so that is the first check—the Congress has to agree on amendment to the legislation—secondly, the IAEA, of course, has to negotiate safeguards. And that would have to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. And third, the nuclear suppliers group has to agree to this arrangement.
And so while the United States has taken the lead, by no means is the United States able to unilaterally deliver this resolution of the anomalous situation.
I don't think that any of those steps would be successful if you were talking about a deal with North Korea, or Iran, or frankly even with Pakistan, where the proliferation behavior and histories are really quite different.
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As to countries like Brazil or others that wish civil nuclear cooperation, and in the case of Brazil, has had a small enrichment and reprocessing program that has been there, civil nuclear cooperation ought to be open to any state that is prepared to live up to certain rules and certain safeguards.
The President made a proposal at the National Defense University that there be some kind of assured fuel supply for states that are prepared to forgo enrichment and reprocessing capability. That is something that has been offered to Iran. Mohamed ElBaradei himself, and we have been working with him, is talking about some kind of assured international fuel bank for states.
So I don't think, by any means, this is just a unilateral U.S. move. First of all, we need the assent of others. Secondly, we are working with others in the international community to make civil nuclear cooperation possible for states so that there is not such great proliferation risk.
And finally, on the reactors that produce no plutonium byproduct, both fast-breeders and even further advanced technologies, the President proposed a program for global nuclear energy cooperation. And this initiative we are talking about with a number of states.
But we have been very clear with the Indians that until we are more certain about the nature of what they intend to put under civilian safeguards in terms of their breeder reactors, we can't say much about their ability to cooperate in what we call GNEP, the President's Global Nuclear Initiative.
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We would like nothing better than the safeguarding of future breeder reactors by India so that they could participate in this cooperation, this global nuclear cooperation. And we believe that that will be an incentive for India to put future breeders under civilian safeguards.
And absolutely, when we can get to reactors that do not produce a plutonium byproduct, we will have done a very good job of significantly changing the proliferation picture that is thereby byproduct.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman of New York.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Madame Secretary, I have been at least among the most vocal supporters of this proposal. I think it recognizes the new realities in the world, and takes a major step forward in dealing with them and making the world a safer place.
At the same time, I have been at least among the most vocal critics of the way this has been presented to the Congress, and the way it has made its debut to the American people, which I think has not been handled as expertly as so many other things get handled.
This was a very difficult sell in India to the Indian people. And the Prime Minister stepped up to the plate, and was able to negotiate through those treacherous waters, and gain broad-based support.
It is my view that this is in trouble here, listening to people and listening to Members of Congress, who would generally be supportive of these kinds of things.
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Will the President make this case to the American people? Is it that important to him, as it is to so many of us, to personally take ownership of this issue, to see if he can get the American people's support, and the support of Members of Congress?
Two: Who at the White House will have personal ownership of this issue, and be responsible for the mechanics of getting it through the Congress?
Three: It is my studied view that this legislation passing Congress will not be the same as was introduced, and there will be conditions that will be added. What conditions that could or would be under consideration do you think would be deal-breakers as far as the Indians go? And does that put you back to square one in renegotiating this after the Congress passes the legislation?
And lastly, I would like to come back to a question that Mr. Berman posed, which is very important. Why is this India-specific? It would be so much more logical to put this to a standards test, because India meets almost all of the standards of our control. It could say any nation that has been a democracy for 15 years, 25 years; any nation that is not a nuclear proliferator; any nation that is pluralistic in its society and approach, and all those good things that we have; and any nation that meets those standards. And there are not many in the category that is developing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons. Why not do it that way? It would be so much easier, and so much more palatable.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman. First of all, the President not only follows this closely, but works for it. He has had some Members of Congress down to talk about it. I think you will see more of his involvement as this goes on.
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But of course he did speak to this when he was in India, both in the remarks that he made with Prime Minister Singh, and in his speech to the Indian people, and indeed to the American people. It is an extremely important initiative for him, one that he personally launched, and one that he is personally watching. And so I am sure you will hear more. But he couldn't be more dedicated to this.
Mr. ACKERMAN. But the question is will he address the American people on the issue.
Secretary RICE. If that is what it takes, absolutely. He has addressed the American people in his speech when he was in India, and in his remarks with Prime Minister Singh. But at any time, I am sure he is prepared to say more. He cares a lot about this initiative.
Secondly, we are working very closely with the White House. Of course, State has the lead, since this is a negotiated agreement. But I am in constant contact not just with Steve Hadley, the National Security Advisor, but we had just recently a principals meetings to review where we are, to review what people could do. The principals of the National Security Council, and that, of course, includes also the Energy Secretary was there. We are all working hard for this. But of course, the National Security Council and Legislative Affairs and the White House would be the points of contact there.
As to conditions. We are prepared to work with the Congress on concerns. This is, as Congressman Lantos said, a tightly-negotiated agreement. It is an agreement on a very sensitive subject, as you, Congressman Ackerman, have said, for Prime Minister Singh. It is putting aside many, many Indian concerns about its program about people's oversight of its programs that are now 30 years in the making. And of course, anything that would suggest that we are somehow turning this into an arms-control agreement would be particularly problematic.
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But I would not want to try to comment on the spot about what might be or might not be acceptable. I think what we should do is work with the Congress. But we can't be in a position of having to renegotiate this agreement. I don't think we will be able to succeed.
Oh, I am sorry, you asked about the standards. As I outlined to Congressman Berman, there are, of course, a number of, if not explicit, implied standards in all of the things that we have encouraged India to accept that they have accepted, and that they were already doing.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No, no. The question that the Congressman and I both posited was, why is the bill written about India, rather than any nation who meets the following standards.
Secretary RICE. Well, I think we felt that we needed to be aware and cognizant of how path-breaking this is. We are dealing with an India which is really anomalous in the international system because it has a nuclear weapons program, a strategic program. And at the same time, we now are going to work with them on a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. And I think it really is, therefore, India-unique and India-specific.
But the point that I was trying to make is that we can draw from the things that India is doing, I think standards that could be used to suggest to states that if they wish to pursue civil nuclear cooperation, these are good things to do.
But a number of the other states that have been mentioned are, of course, party to the NPT, and therefore, standards are already available to them. This is really, in many ways, an anomalous situation.
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Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton of Indiana.
Mr. BURTON. You continue to impress me, Madame Secretary. Dynamite.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. First of all, let me say that I want to concur with my colleague, Mr. Wilson, who went on a trip with me to Indian Pakistan, before too long, Mr. Lantos and the Chairman. I think this agreement has a lot of merit, and I want to congratulate you and the Administration on working so hard to make sure it came to fruition.
I do have one concern, though. And that is, as a person who in the past has been a critic of India regarding Kashmir, and now one who supports very much this agreement, I still have concerns about Kashmir.
I wrote a letter to you, which was answered by Jeffrey Bergner, who is Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. And he said, ''While we encourage both sides to proceed with their historic dialogue and look forward to more progress as the talks continue in the months ahead and years ahead, we do not see ourselves as mediators or taking a direct role.''
The problems in Kashmir have been going on for a long, long time, pretty much since the British left. And there have been an awful lot of horrible things that have happened. There have been human rights abuses, torture, and all kinds of things, which I have illuminated and talked about on the Floor.
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I believe right now Prime Minister Singh and President Musharif want to talk, and have been talking about this. And the border has been opened to a degree, and there have been some progresses made in this area.
I believe since the United States is working with India to help them with their energy issues—and I might add here that I think it is very important we make sure that there is a clear delineation between civilian and military uses, and I know you have worked on that very hard in the agreement. But I think that we could be a very positive force in solving the problem of Kashmir if we use this opportunity right now to do that.
And I was kind of disappointed when I read that he said we do not see ourselves as mediators or taking a direct role. We are going to try to help India. And we want to do that, and I want to be a part of that. And I think most Members of Congress do, as well. But this issue of Kashmir must be resolved.
And I hope that maybe you and this Administration, if not openly, at least behind the scenes, could urge this situation to be resolved. It has always been a flash point. There have been wars started because of it in the past, and it is something that must be resolved. And I think this is a great opportunity at this time to do something about it.
So if you would care to comment about it, I would appreciate it.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congressman Burton. We have encouraged the parties to come to a resolution of the Kashmir crisis. You are right, it is a flash point. It is a place that has sparked conflict in the region. And were there a resolution of it, it would open up the region to, we think, greater prosperity, as well as greater peace. And we have made that very clear.
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We are encouraged by what they have been doing, some very practical things that they have been doing in terms of bus links and the ability of people to move. We are encouraged by the discussions that they are having.
When we say we have not taken on the role of the mediator, that is historically America's position, because we believe that the parties themselves are best suited to try to find a resolution.
But I can assure you that we do actively encourage the parties to find a resolution. And in fact, the President had publicly said this when he was both in India and in Pakistan.
Mr. BURTON. Let me just add one more thing; I don't want to run out of time and go over my time limit.
But President Musharif, when I met with him, and when we met with him, he had a plan which he had presented to Prime Minister Singh during their talks. I thought it had a lot of merit. I don't know if the Administration has taken a hard look at that, and there may have to be some negotiation on what was in that proposal.
But I really hope that the Administration and you will take a look at that. And if you have another opportunity to talk to both Prime Minister Singh and President Musharif, I wish you would talk to them about that proposed agreement, and see if something can't be worked out.
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Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly would like to offer my personal welcome to you, Madame Secretary. It seems like you were only here yesterday.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, first to associate myself with the statement made by our distinguished senior Democratic Member of this side of the aisle, and absolutely support and subscribe to the position that he has taken in support of this proposed treaty, or this proposed agreement.
I, over the years, have always said that, having met recently with the Foreign Minister of India, he told me that you think you are having problems in trying to approve your agreement, we have the most difficult situation even in India. And I think I can understand his concern.
And the fact of the matter is whether it be through Democratic or Republican Administrations, our policy toward India has been either benign neglect, one of indifference, one of passiveness. So I think there is that little sense of leeriness even among the people and the leaders of India, are we serious in negotiating and taking this initiative.
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This is a most profound foreign policy initiative taken by President Bush, and to you, Madame Secretary, to your credit, to show that not only to the largest democracy in the world, but as an example of some of the issues that we have taken that are so important.
Let us talk about the non-proliferation treaty. India stood alone when it first exploded its nuclear device in 1974. At that time, when Rajid Ghandi made an appeal before the General Assembly of the United Nations, if we are really serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons, why don't we start with the nuclear haves. Let us be serious about this. And guess what? Total silence. No response by the nuclear haves in saying are we really serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons. India was the only country that—and it still stands by that position.
So I think there is some hypocrisy here. I remember in 1995, President Chirac broke the international moratorium on nuclear testing by exploding six additional nuclear devices in the South Pacific, despite the world's opposition. Even our own country was opposed. Even 60 percent of the French people were opposed to this nuclear testing.
So the nuclear madness continues. And I think the point that India makes is very well taken. If we are really serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons, why is it that the five nuclear powers continue to have nuclear weapons, and then at the same time tell the rest of the world you cannot have it.
And I think this is the reason why we have countries like Pakistan, or North Korea, or Iran, to say hey, if they can have it, why can't we have it?
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So I am trying to factor in this contradiction that I try to follow, Madame Secretary. I might note, also, I appreciate that Under Secretary Nick Burns will be joining the Members of the Congressional Task Force on U.S.-India Trade that will be meeting tomorrow afternoon. I think it will be an important facet to allow Members to meet with Under Secretary Burns so that we can really seriously discuss some of the provisions of the proposed treaty.
Madame Secretary, I know you just came back from Indonesia. My 20,000 constituents that are living in hell, literally, for the hardships that have been created in having to get a visa, by going 2,000 miles to New Zealand just to get a visa. And I think I wrote a letter to you on that; maybe hopefully somebody that you can designate so that we can get some answers and response to this.
And I know this subject matter is not related to what we are discussing this afternoon, Madame Secretary. I am very, very concerned about West Papua, New Guinea. But we will take that at another matter.
One question. What is to prevent India from negotiating a civil nuclear agreement with other countries if our nation fails in this initiative?
Secretary RICE. Well, the real hindrance for India is that in order to safeguard its reactors, it has to do so through the IAEA, which means it has to have the agreement of the nuclear suppliers group, of which others are the nuclear suppliers.
I think that the benefit that we do get—and I appreciate the spirit of the question—the benefit that we do get in having led on this for India is that it is very clear that we believe, as Congressman Lantos has said, that there is a new strategic relationship here. And it is only appropriate that the world's largest and world's oldest democracies, that it would be the United States that would lead us to come together.
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And so the real advantage here to us is that while others might also not ultimately be able to engage in civil nuclear cooperation because of the constraints that have to be removed in the international system, it is a very good thing that it is the United States that is leading on this issue. I think it says to the Indians we don't just take you seriously; we really do believe that the potential for an India that is a strategic partner is a real boon for peace and security, and democracy around the world.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Madame Secretary, as always.
I support the global partnership announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh last summer. I believe that this new initiative aimed at improving relations and enhancing the relationships between our two nations will be mutually beneficial across a number of areas. I look forward to working together with our allies in India to promote democracy, to fight AIDS, to combat terrorism, to deepen our economic ties.
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However, as Chairman Hyde said, our primary area of concern relates to this proposal for civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear trade between our two nations. I have a number of questions that, if time runs out, I would like to submit them for the record, Mr. Chairman.
In addition to the geostrategic reasons that are raised in favor of the nuclear proposal, we have heard proponents say that this issue will help India diversify its energy resources. That said, if India will meet future energy demands with nuclear power, why is it pursuing negotiations with Iran for a proposed natural gas pipeline?
Secondly, given Iran's status as a pariah state, why invest there instead of investing in other oil-rich countries that are not state terrorist sponsors or proliferators?
Also, will India be phasing out or diminishing its reliance on gas and oil once United States nuclear exports and assistance starts flowing into India? We have raised conditions regarding India's growing relationship with Iran. Even a strong promoter of the program, like Congressman Lantos, of this new deal pointed out in his opening statement that just last week there were reports of Iranian Navy personnel training in warship maneuvers in India.
Certainly Prime Minister Singh is a friend, a true ally. However, what happens if there is a change in the government or policy? What mechanisms or safeguards are we requiring as part of the agreement to ensure that regardless of the leadership in India, this agreement does not inadvertently facilitate secondary proliferation?
In principle I support the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India. It is to our benefit. But Iran is the most troubling aspect of this deal. I think most, if not all, of us want to find a way to make this agreement work, and to make it happen. But we need certain criteria or commitments built into the agreement in order to reach the necessary comfort level to vote for the proposal.
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Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
I would like to start by noting that we have been very clear with the Indians when we have had concerns about any of their policies, most especially their policies toward Iran.
I would note that they are not the only country in the world, of course, that has relations with Iran. Italy is Iran's largest trading partner. Japan is a very large trading partner of Iran.
The truth of the matter is that we are the ones that have no relationship with Iran. Most of the world does have relations with Iran.
As Iran's behavior has become clearer and clearer, especially under the more transparent regime of Ahmadinejad, I think you see a lot of countries assessing and reassessing their relationship with Iran. And I would expect that that will continue.
To be fair, the Indians have a long relationship with Iran. They will tell you that it goes back thousands of years. But we have not been shy in talking to them, as we have talked to others. And again, I do not want to single out India here, because there are a lot of countries in the world that have relations with Iran.
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I can't tell you that they will, in fact, phase out the kind of oil and gas dependency on states like Iran. But they certainly will have no chance to diversify away from that kind of dependency if we don't offer alternatives, which is why civil nuclear is so important, which is why it is important to think about renewables. It does give people other options.
I know that what we are saying to people is we are watching oil and gas be used as a weapon, a diplomatic weapon, around the world by a number of states with very dangerous foreign policies. And we would like to see fewer states dependent on those irresponsible states in the international system that are using oil and gas as a weapon.
Iran would clearly be in that category where it threatens from time to time, that it will use the oil or gas weapon if we are not prepared to accept their notion of what a civil nuclear program ought to be.
So it is important that we give people other alternatives, recognizing that other states do have relations with Iran.
Now, as to the two specific issues of the military, the story that was in Defense News. We asked the Indian Government about this. They tell us that this was a port call. They have done port calls from time to time. That these were cadets. That there was no military training involved in this. And we accept that explanation.
I think that we could note that probably one of the constraints on Indian relations with Iran is India happens to have a very close relationship with Israel, which they have noted their concern about the kinds of statements that are coming out of Iran.
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And in the final analysis, when all is said and done, when it came down to that first vote back in September to refer the Iranian nuclear program to the Security Council, a vote that, by the way, other members of the non-aligned movement were not willing to take, India was there. They were there again in February, when it was a somewhat more comfortable vote, because there were others like the Russians who voted.
But back when the Russians abstained and others abstained, India voted with us. I think it shows a growing understanding of India's role as a responsible power in dealing with the threats that a state like Iran brings on the nuclear front.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I agree. Thank you so much, Madame Secretary.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. You bet. Mr. Engel of New York.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Madame Secretary, welcome. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Lantos. And I wish to congratulate you.
I support the agreement. I think that there will be things that will need to be worked out. But I want to announce that I am going to add myself as a co-sponsor of H.R. 4974. Because while I think that there will be things we have to work out, overall I believe the policy as you articulated it is a wise policy.
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For years the United States-India relationship was cool, at best. We found ourselves on opposite sides during the Cold War, many international questions. That is no longer valid. I think that the alliance between India and the United States is an important relationship. We share, as so many of my colleagues have said, so many things in combating terrorism. We share the same geopolitical concerns of that region. It is the largest democracy, and the oldest democracy—they are, and we are. And economics is very, very important.
Some say we should be neutral and have the same position toward all countries, such as North Korea and Iran, regardless of whether they are allies or potential allies or not. And to that I say nonsense. It is in our best interest to have a relationship, a good relationship, with India. It has a huge middle class. It has a market-based economy. And again, we share democratic values, seek an end to terrorism, and a better relationship with Pakistan.
And so I believe that we need to expand all our ties with India, not just diplomatically, but in all other sectors, as well. And I want to personally thank you for your hard work in promoting this idea.
As you mentioned, in recent days we have worked with India in an unprecedented way in the IAEA and in other matters.
So India has a huge and growing appetite for energy, as you mentioned. And I believe that this agreement will help diversify the Indian energy sector, as we ourselves are trying to wean ourselves off of Middle Eastern oil.
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I want to articulate the same concerns that my good friend, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, did, regarding Iran. And I know that you are pursuing that course. But I just want to add my voice to it.
I believe that we have to continue to tell India that we are concerned about any relationships they have with Iran. And I would hope that the Administration, by the way, would also, in conjunction with this, support some of the legislation that Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen and others are developing vis-a-vis Iran.
I know that when we did the Syria Accountability Act, there was initially some hesitation on the part of the Administration to support it. And I think now you would agree, we have discussed this, that it is a good tool to use. I think that some of our legislation vis-a-vis Iran would also be a good tool to use.
So I just wanted to say that. And I have just one question, and anything else you might want to comment on.
In the legislation, Congress is asked to forgo our right, under the Atomic Energy Act, to approve future bilateral framework agreements. And under the Administration's proposal, the United States-India agreement would go into effect automatically unless Congress can pass a resolution of disapproval.
Why do we do it that way, and not the other way? Why can we not approve it by a simple majority? It would seem to me that that is the way the statute reads, and it would be better to do it that way? I am just wondering what the thought was in flipping it.
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Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. And thank you for your support of the agreement.
We consulted quite a bit about how to