SPEAKERS       CONTENTS       INSERTS    Tables

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2006
THE ENDANGERED CHILDREN OF NORTHERN UGANDA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2006

Serial No. 109–177

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/internationalrelations

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
  Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
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THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas

TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
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GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California,
  Vice Chairman

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
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DIANE E. WATSON, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

MARY M. NOONAN, Subcommittee Staff Director
GREG SIMPKINS, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHERI A. RICKERT, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member and Counsel
LINDSEY M. PLUMLEY, Staff Associate

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

    Mr. Jeffrey Krilla, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State

    Mr. Leonard Rogers, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

    Ms. Grace Grall Akallo, former Abducted Child Soldier for the LRA, World Vision

    Ronald Waldman, M.D., Professor of Clinical, Population and Family Health, Mailman School of Policy, Columbia University
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    Ms. Michelle Brown, U.N. Advocate, Refugees International

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations: Prepared statement

    Mr. Jeffrey Krilla: Prepared statement

    Mr. Leonard Rogers: Prepared statement

    Ms. Grace Grall Akallo: Prepared statement

    Ronald Waldman, M.D.: Prepared statement

    Ms. Michelle Brown: Prepared statement

APPENDIX
    Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

THE ENDANGERED CHILDREN OF NORTHERN UGANDA

WEDNESDAY APRIL 26, 2006,
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House of Representatives,    
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights    
and International Operations,    
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

    Mr. SMITH. The hearing will come to order, and welcome, everybody.

    Due to the fact that there are four votes pending on the House Floor, both Mr. Payne and I hope to give our opening statements, and then we will recess to vote on the Floor and come right back to resume the meeting. I apologize in advance for that delay.

    Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to our hearing.

    When current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni overthrew the murderous regime of the late Milton Obote in Uganda in 1986, many had hoped that their nation would finally emerge from the nightmares of the Obote and Idi Amin regimes. Unfortunately, yet another horror lay ahead for the people of northern Uganda.

    Many in the Acholi community were alarmed at the sudden loss of power when Obote was overthrown, and Alice Lakwena formed the Holy Spirit Movement to fight for the Acholi people. Despite her promises that her followers would have immunity from the bullets of the Ugandan army, they were defeated 2 years later, and she fled to Kenya.
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    Meanwhile, Joseph Kony, believed to be her cousin, took up the battle, forming a group known as the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA. The LRA is often said to be determined to rule Uganda according to the Bible's 10 Commandments. In reality, this group has a philosophy that blends elements of Christianity, Islam and traditional beliefs into the murderous world view that has terrorized Kony's own people and set back development in the north by years, if not decades.

    Over the last 20 years, as many as two million persons—an estimated 90 percent of the population of the Acholi area in northern Uganda—have been forced into internally displaced camps. More than 20,000 children have been forced to serve as either soldiers or sexual slaves for the LRA. Those children who have escaped kidnappings by the LRA are forced into the phenomenon known as ''night commuting,'' in which an estimated 50,000 children walk miles from the rural areas to towns in order to find relative safety in bus shelters, churches, or even in the streets.

    The impact of this war on Ugandans in the north, as reported by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda, is almost unbelievable.

    The rates of violent death in northern Uganda are three times higher than those reported in Iraq following the allied invasion in 2003. Each month nearly 3,500 Ugandans die from easily preventable diseases, extreme violence and torture. Each day, 58 children under the age of 5 die as a result of violence and preventable diseases. Three times more children under the age of 5 die in northern Uganda than in the rest of the country.

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    One quarter of the children in northern Uganda over 10 years of age have lost one or both parents. Half of nearly two million internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are children under the age of 15.

    About a quarter of a million children in northern Uganda receive no education at all because of displacement and the fact that 60 percent of the schools in northern Uganda no longer function due to the war.

    Because of the war in the north, Uganda has developed a lost generation that has grown up in dire circumstances with fear and deprivation as their constant companions. Nearly half of the children in one town are stunted from malnutrition. They likely will never be able to recover.

    There is great concern that the Government of Uganda is insufficiently committed to improving the situation in northern Uganda. On at least two occasions when there appeared to be a chance for peace talks with the LRA—one in 1993 and again in 2004–2005—the Government of Uganda launched offenses that ended any chance of peace and yet failed to end the terrorism of the LRA. More recently, the indictment of top LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court, the ICC, has effectively ended further peace efforts.

    Because of its inability to end the LRA threat, in 2003 the United States Government began encouraging local leaders in northern and eastern Uganda to raise civilian militias to help protect civilians. Unfortunately, according to a study done by the Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine center at Tufts University, these militias were hurriedly recruited, poorly screened, and incompletely trained. Furthermore, known criminals are part of these militias, which also contain boys and girls less than 18 years of age.
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    The Feinstein Center study also reports that there is a widespread perception among individuals and organizations in northern Uganda that the government has malevolent reasons for not ending the war with the LRA. They include revenge against northerners for human rights abuses under previous governments and neutralization of political challenges from the north.

    In Uganda elections held earlier this year, Presidential candidate opponent, Mr. Bessigye, won 80 percent of the vote in northern Uganda——a testimony to the government's unpopularity in the north.

    I would note parenthetically during a recent trip to Uganda, both my staff and I met with Mr. Bessigye and President Museveni, and raised these issues with both of those men.

    Whatever the truth about the Government of Uganda's war effort, it is certainly a fact that not enough is being done to safeguard the endangered children of northern Uganda. With all the attention given to the genocide in Darfur, and certainly all of that is needed, a similar crisis in northern Uganda has been eclipsed in both attention and resources.

    Just as we have a moral obligation to rescue the suffering people of Darfur, we have a similar obligation not to ignore the terrorized population of northern Uganda. If the eyes and ears of the world are focused elsewhere, we must redirect them to Uganda's distressed northern population—especially the children. Uganda's future may depend on our efforts.
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    Regrettably, the phenomenon of child soldiers is not one confined to Uganda or to Africa. It is a global tragedy in which an estimated 300,000 children are involved in as many as 30 conflicts around the world. As in Uganda, children are used by governments or government-supported militias and rebel forces such as the LRA. Utilized for combat, spying, and clearing minefields, these children are often killed or maimed. Even those who escape often find it difficult to reintegrate back into society. They desperately need our help.

    To that end, I and some of my colleagues in the House and Senate are planning to shortly introduce legislation to address the issue of child soldiers. This legislation condemns the conscription, forced recruitment, or use of children by governments or paramilitaries in hostilities and urges the U.S. Government to lead efforts to enforce existing international standards to end this horrendous human rights abuse.

    The legislation, if it were in effect today, would deny U.S. military assistance to at least seven of the 26 nations believed to be using children in their military forces, and hopefully this legislation will receive strong bipartisan support as it makes its way through the process.

    I look forward to our hearing. I am very, very grateful to our witnesses, and we will get into those introductions momentarily, but I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

    When current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni overthrew the murderous regime of the late Milton Obote in Uganda in 1986, many had hope that their nation would finally emerge from the nightmares of the Obote and Idi Amin regimes. Unfortunately, yet another horror lay ahead for the people of northern Uganda.

    Many in the Acholi community were alarmed at the sudden loss of power when Obote was overthrown, and Alice Lakwena formed the Holy Spirit Movement to fight for the Acholi people. Despite her promises that her followers would have immunity from the bullets of the Ugandan army, they were defeated two years later, and she fled to Kenya.

    Meanwhile, Joseph Kony, believed to be Lakwena's cousin, took up the battle, forming a group known as the Lord's Resistance Army or LRA. The LRA is often said to be determined to rule Uganda according to the Bible's 10 Commandments. In reality, this group has a philosophy that blends elements of Christianity, Islam and traditional Acholi beliefs into a murderous world view that has terrorized Kony's own Acholi people and set back development in the North by years if not decades.

    Over the last 20 years, as many as two million persons—an estimated 90% of the population of the Acholi area in northern Uganda—have been forced into internally displaced persons camps. More than 20,000 children have been forced to serve as either soldiers or sexual slaves for the LRA. Those children who have escaped kidnapping by the LRA are forced into the phenomenon known as ''night commuting,'' in which an estimated 50,000 children walk miles from the rural areas to towns in order to find relative safety in bus shelters, churches or even on the streets.
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    The impact of this war on Ugandans in the North, as reported by the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, is almost unbelievable:

 The rates of violent death in northern Uganda are three times higher than those reported in Iraq following the Allied invasion in 2003.

 Each month, nearly 3,500 Ugandans die from easily preventable diseases, extreme violence and torture;

 Each day, 58 children under the age of five die as a result of violence and preventable diseases.

 Three times more children under the age of five die in northern Uganda than in the rest of the country.

 One quarter of the children in northern Uganda over ten years of age have lost one or both parents.

 Half of the nearly two million internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are children under the age of 15.

 About a quarter of a million children in northern Uganda receive no education at all because of displacement and the fact that 60% of schools in northern Uganda no longer function due to the war.
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    Because of the war in the North, Uganda has developed a ''lost generation'' that has grown up in dire circumstances with fear and deprivation as their constant companions. Nearly half of all children in the northern town of Kitgum are stunted from malnutrition. They likely will never be able to recover what this war has cost them.

    There is great concern that the Government of Uganda is insufficiently committed to improving the situation in northern Uganda. On at least two occasions when there appeared to be a chance for peace talks with the LRA—once in 1993 and again in late 2004–2005—the Government of Uganda launched offensives that ended any chance of peace and yet failed to end the terrorism of the LRA. More recently, the indictment of top LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court has effectively ended further peace efforts.

    Because of its inability to end the LRA threat, the Ugandan government in 2003 began encouraging local leaders in northern and eastern Uganda to raise civilian militias to help protect civilians. Unfortunately, according to a study done by the Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University, these militias were hurriedly recruited, poorly screened and incompletely trained. Furthermore, known criminals are part of these militias, which also contain boys and girls less than 18 years of age.

    The Feinstein Center study also reports that there is a widespread perception among individuals and organizations in northern Uganda that the government has malevolent reasons for not ending the war with the LRA. They include revenge against northerners for human rights abuses under previous governments and neutralization of political challenge from the North. In the Uganda elections held earlier this year, President Museveni's main opponent Kizza Bessigye , won 80% of the vote in northern Uganda—a testimony to the government's unpopularity in the North.
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    Whatever the truth about the Government of Uganda's war effort, it is certainly a fact that not enough is being done to safeguard the endangered children of northern Uganda. With all the attention given to the genocide in Darfur, a similar crisis in northern Uganda has been eclipsed in both attention and resources.

    Just as we have a moral obligation to rescue the suffering people of Darfur, we have a similar obligation not to ignore the terrorized population of northern Uganda. If the eyes and ears of the world are focused elsewhere, we must redirect them to Uganda's distressed northern population—especially the children. Uganda's future may depend on our efforts.

    Regrettably, the phenomenon of child soldiers is not one confined to Uganda or Africa. It is a global tragedy in which as many as 300,000 children are involved in as many as 30 conflicts around the world. As in Uganda, children are used by governments or government-supported militias and rebel forces such as the LRA. Utilized in everything from combat to spying to clearing minefields, these children are often killed or maimed, and even those who can escape often find it difficult to reintegrate back into society. They desperately need our help.

    To that end, I and some of my colleagues in the House and Senate are planning to introduce legislation shortly to address the issue of child soldiers. This legislation condemns the conscription, forced recruitment or use of children by governments or paramilitaries in hostilities and urges the U.S. Government to lead efforts to enforce existing international standards to end this horrendous human rights abuse.
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    This legislation would deny U.S. military assistance to seven of the 26 nations believed to use children in their military forces: Burundi, Columbia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Paraguay, Sudan and Uganda. We hope today's hearing will provide further information to help make this legislation as effective as possible in saving and rehabilitating so many innocent victims.

    Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for us having this important topic that we have been advocating for some time about the severity of it to have a formal hearing, and I think the title is correct; endangered children of northern Uganda, and the situation has been there for a long time.

    I want to start from the outset to talk about the region in general, and why this hearing is so important because it focuses on one of the forgotten crises in the world. The truth is that the crisis in northern Uganda is one of the worst humanitarian crisis that exists in the world today.

    I want to start my comments though today on another forgotten tragedy, the Rwandan genocide. Twelve years ago this month the murderous militia and their allies in Rwanda began their brutal campaign genocide of killing and maiming the innocent children, including women and elderly. More than a million people were murdered in 100 days while the international community looked the other way. The United Nations Peacekeepers sent to Rwanda to keep the peace left at the height of the Rwandan genocide, leaving behind helpless civilians to be murdered, to be hacked to death.

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    We are once again reminded of the suffering of the innocent people, as the Chairman even mentioned, in Darfur, Sudan. Shamefully, we have done very little to stop the suffering, the rape, the killing of the innocent.

    In January 1994, the commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, General Delair, wrote to his superiors that the militias in Rwanda intended to kill large numbers of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and informed the United Nations Peacekeeping Department that he intended to seize the arms and ask for the United Nations protection.

    On January 12, 1994, General Delair was told by the United Nations Headquarters that the mandate did not give him the authority to seize the arms cache, and would not provide protection to the informants, and instead he was ordered to provide the information to the President Habyarimana at that time, and the Ambassadors of Belgium, France, and the United States.

    Three months later the genocide, the general war began. A month into it the Clinton Administration refused to use the word ''genocide,'' and on April 28, 1994, the Security Council deliberately omitted the word from a resolution to avoid its legal and international obligation. It was a shameful time in the history of this country and of the world.

    We said it was important to remember that what happened in Rwanda would never happen again. We never would make the same mistake. But we have heard never again before. We heard it after the Holocaust. We should have heard it after the Armenian genocide. We should have heard it about Cambodia. We should have heard it about Darfur.

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    Well, let us remember today's victims in Darfur, and those who would be killed or raped as we debate what to do for them, what type of protection should we do, what sort of sanction should we have. As we met today to discuss the tragedy in Uganda, the victims of Darfur are being portrayed in Abuja, by what is being referred to as the final agreement proposal.

    As we have witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilians in Rwanda and Darfur, the LRA has been consistent in its brutal campaign against innocent civilians. The LRA has abducted over 20,000 children, maimed, raped and brutally murdered innocent civilians over the last two decades. I seriously doubt if the LRA ever knows or cares about any government in the Uganda or as any other political agenda. The fact of the matter is that those who are being killed and maimed are innocent civilians, not just in Uganda but also in southern Sudan.

    It is not surprising that the protectors and friends of the LRA are the same people committing genocide in Darfur, the National Party of the Government of Sudan.

    I understand I have 1 minute left to vote, so I suppose—I am not sure what vote it is, but it may be a critical vote, so I will leave and complete my statement when the Committee reconvenes in about 10 minutes or 15 minutes.

    [Recess.]

    Mr. PAYNE. We will call the meeting back again. In order to save time, since the Chairman—why don't we all just stay. Those who are standing in the back just stand until the Chairman comes, and then we can decide what his decision is. I understand those standing were asked to leave, but just stand on the side as long as you don't fall on someone.
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    As I was indicating before, as I sort of reviewed the situation that occurred in Rwanda, and I will just start again saying as we have witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilians in Rwanda and Darfur, the LRA has been consistent in its brutal campaign against innocent civilians.

    The LRA has abducted over 20,000 children, maimed, raped and brutally murdered innocent civilians over the last two decades. I seriously doubt if the LRA even knows or cares about any government in Uganda, or has any political agenda. The fact of the matter is that those who are being killed and maimed are innocent civilians, not just in Uganda but also in southern Sudan.

    It is not surprising that the protectors and friends of the LRA are the same people committing genocide in Darfur. The government, National Part of the Government of Sudan, the same ones that are perpretrating the disorder.

    I am not suggesting that the exit option from this tragedy is the military option. The vast majority of the LRA soldiers are those that abducted children. They are focusing on these innocent, vulnerable people. The leadership of the LRA and those responsible for this tragedy must be held accountable. We cannot allow people to continue to perpetrate this kind of terror on people, and we have to have the special court as we had for Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone, a special court, the National Criminal Court, someone must holder the leaders of the LRA accountable. They must be brought before justice.

    I first traveled to Uganda in 1972. It was shortly after the—actually, it was in February 1973, shortly after the expulsion of the Asians in Uganda. You may recall that on Christmas eve of 1972, Idi Amin, the brutal dictator of Uganda, ordered every Asian to leave the country immediately. It was one of the first exodus of a group of ethnic people anywhere in the world.
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    I went and met with him, and condemned him because at that time I chaired the World Refugee Committee, and these refugees ended up in London, Great Britain, some went back to India. However, we made it clear that this was wrong, and that it was—and actually, we should have taken, the world community should have taken stronger actions at that time. I happened to be simply Chairman of the World Refugee and Rehabilitation Committee out of Geneva, and did not have any enforcement, but made it very clear that this was wrong.

    So I have been involved in Uganda for many, many years, long before coming to the Congress. Back in 1993, I went to Gulu, and met with the former LRA abductees. I met with children back there 12 years ago, 13 years ago, children who had escaped the nightmare but still lived in fear, margionalized in their communities.

    We drove from Gulu all the way to southern Sudan, and then met with Dr. John Gurang and the SPLA, the long route, the same route that abducted children of northern Uganda are forced to take on foot, and it was a very, very difficult trip in a vehicle, and can you imagine what these children have to do on foot.

    We cannot ignore the victims and engage in a policy of appeasement in order to secure an agreement. We must do more to protect the people of northern Uganda, especially the children both in the IDP camps and in their homes.

    We have seen the pictures of the night commuters. No child should go through that. No parent should have to make the decision to send their children alone into a city at night in hopes that they will be safe from attack and abduction so that they can come back home the next day. This is unheard of in the new millennium, in the 21st century.
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    No child should be forced to kill anyone, not another child, another family member, or anyone. It is simply unconscionable.

    I asked John Prendergast to be our witness for this hearing. Unfortunately, he has to attend a family matter. However, we received a short testimony from John, a long-time peace advocate, and mediator Betty Bigombe who was currently in Uganda to help bring this tragedy to an end. According to John and Betty, with a tiny fraction of the resources now being spend in northern Uganda, new initiative with a real prospect of success can now be undertaken. Such an initiative requires a targeted carrot-and-stick strategy with an exit option for the LRA leadership if their calculations to leave the battlefield can be significantly altered.

    The decision of the LRA commanders to leave the bush and defect are greatly influenced by the post-defection livelihood opportunities that await them, while amnesty already exists for all non-inducted LRA and small reintegrated packages are provided to ex-combatants. What remains is to develop a more substantial incentive package for the remaining 50 or so top and mid-level non-indicted LRA commanders. It would also create space between the indicted and the non-indicted commanders.

    The top commanders must be indicated. However, if we can give an incentive for the others to go out. As we know, it is a part of the country that has been ignored by the central government which showed in the recent elections, then perhaps we can move in the right direction.

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    And so the LRA has found a new sanctuary in Garamba National Park in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, still receives support from elements of the Sudanese military intelligence, and unless a reasonable military plan is negotiated and implemented, the LRA will be able to reorganize, to retrain, reequip itself just as it did in 1994, when conventional wisdom similarly held that its days were numbered, only to see it strike back with a vengeance.

    There are two primary options for enhancing military pressure. Option one, agreements between the governments in Conchasa, Juba, Conchasa and Campala, and Khartoum and Juba, Conchasa and Compala, to allow for a joint coordinated and cross-border military operation against the LRA positions could be brokered with help from the United Nations or a combination of core group countries. Somehow we have to surround them and get agreements from those governments.

    Option two could be a unit which could be inserted into Manuk in the DRC or UNMIS in southern Sudan for a specific time period with a specific limited mandate, focusing on operations against the NRA positions. Applying both the carrot-and-the-stick simultaneously would disrupt the LRA's ability to regroup further, reduce the material conditions of the combatants and provide greater incentive for the non-indicted commanders to defect.

    However, as long as the five indicted LRA leaders are still in the bush, a grave threat to the people of the three countries will continue to exist.

    Therefore, a specific diplomatic initiative aimed at removing them from the battlefield should be a part of any expanded strategy. Options here are challenging and require creative thinking about trade-offs between justice and peace.
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    According to John and Betty, the U.S. role in an expanded strategy is clear. President Museveni needs a partner in the search for peace, and a more focused effort by the United States on ending the LRA conflict would provide that partnership. The U.S. has the most leverage to bring to the table great expertise in these matters, and a new Ambassador with a commitment to addressing this issue. The United States also has a major investment in helping to consolidate peace in southern Sudan and is the largest contributor to the largest peacekeeping mission in the world in the Democratic Republic of Congo financially.

    The U.S. should therefore name an envoy to work regionally on all aspects of an enhanced strategy and should help lead the effort to craft their reintegration effort for non-indicted LRA commanders.

    I would like to thank John and Betty for their tireless effort and encourage them to continue to fight for peace and justice as they do throughout Africa.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne.

    Mr. Fortenberry.

    Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this hearing today to address a longstanding tragedy of child abduction and enslavement in northern Uganda.
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    In our review of excerpts of the Human Rights Watch account of children abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda prior to this hearing, one cannot find the words to express the horror and shock at the perpetrators of this rebel movement and what they have done to innocent children. It is bad enough to learn about the brutalities forced upon child soldiers and slaves in northern Uganda, and it is utterly a tragic to realize that those fortunate enough to escape from this infernal nightmare often return orphan to ravaged, desolated villages.

    I want to commend first and foremost the non-governmental organizations that are working in Uganda to provide support to the victims of LRA atrocities, and I also note with deep sadness that humanitarian workers in Sudan and Uganda have lost their lives in the effort to help displaced populations which continue to suffer the wanton lawlessness that prevails in northern Uganda.

    Mr. Chairman, I look forward to learning more about the role of Sudan in this humanitarian crisis, and to understand what points of leverage we may employ to help the Government of Uganda stop these atrocities which have permanently scarred the lives of tens of thousands of children. In particular, I want to commend and thank Mrs. Grace Akallo for her courage to appear before this Subcommittee to help guide us toward an end to this dreadful war on children.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, and my understanding is that you have a group of Georgian parliamentarians with whom you meet, so we thank you for coming because I know they are waiting for you.
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    Let me now welcome our two very distinguished witnesses, beginning with Mr. Jeffrey Krilla who joined the U.S. Department of State in January 2006, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human rights and Labor. Prior to joining DRL, Secretary Krilla served as Regional Director for Africa at the International Republican Institute.

    In addition, Secretary Krilla also served as a senior aid and attorney in the U.S. Congress for 8 years. During that time he worked, among many other things, for the U.S. House of Representatives and Fill Their Shelves Program, which provides children of southern Africa educational tools.

    We will then hear from Mr. Len Rogers who is Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

    Prior to this assignment, Mr. Rogers had oversight for the Office of Food for Peace. Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Rogers served in the United States Army in Vietnam.

    Secretary Krilla, if you could proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. KRILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this very timely hearing on the endangered children of northern Uganda.
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    Before I summarize my remarks, I would ask that my remarks be submitted into the record in their entirety.

    Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered.

    Mr. KRILLA. Thank you.

    I would like to also start by acknowledging my wife and daughter who have come in today. As a fairly new father, I think today's topic I view through a new lens, and can only now appreciate fully the depths of the horror that the children undergo in northern Uganda. So thank you again for holding this.

    Chairman Smith, you recently returned from a trip to Uganda, and Mr. Royce and Mr. Payne I know, and many Members of the Subcommittee have also traveled to the region and know these issues firsthand. Clearly, you do not make a trip to a country where the lives of children are so heavily impacted and return home the same. For that matter, you cannot listen to the moving NGO testimony on northern Uganda or see a movie like Invisible Children and remain the same.

    We recently held a screening of the film Invisible Children in my bureau, and I understand that there may be screenings of the film up on Capitol Hill. For those Members of the Subcommittee who have not seen this movie, I would commend this film to your attention.

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    The film is educating many people around the world about this conflict and its lasting effects on the children. This issue has understandably struck a cord with the American people. I understand that on the night of April 29 groups of American plan to gather in 136 cities across the country for what is being called ''The Global Night Commute.'' This is a profound act of solidarity on behalf of the children of northern Uganda.

    I am new to the State Department, and this is my first official appearance before this Committee as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. However, I have had a longstanding interest in Africa and care deeply about the conditions of the people on the continent.

    Prior to joining the department, I served for 5 years as the Regional Director for Africa at the International Republican Institute where I coordinated election observation missions, political party development programs, and civil society programs in Africa. My work in Africa extends back even further to my time as a high school teacher in the segregated Lebowa region of South Africa during the last years of the apartheid rule.

    My experiences in Lebowa where I witnessed firsthand the potential resiliency and eventual triumph of the South African people in the face of brutal oppression continued to influence my work with the people of Africa today.

    Mr. Chairman, as you know, the people of northern Uganda continue to suffer under a 20-year reign of terror imposed by Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army. Without question, those who suffer the most from the LRA's cruel tactics are the children.

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    In the 2005 country report on human rights practices for Uganda, something produced by my bureau, we reported on the LRA's sexual exploitation of children, the use of child soldiers, the plight of the night commuter, children who travel long distances from their homes in search of protection from the LRA, and the overall deplorable conditions of the IDP camps in which over 80 percent of approximately 1.5 million occupants are women and children.

    I have recently met with the new Ugandan Ambassador to the United States, Perezi Kamunanwire, and the new United States Ambassador to Uganda, Steven Browning, to discuss these very issues. I look forward to close cooperation with them as we work to improve the security and living conditions for the people of northern Uganda.

    In February, a member of my staff traveled to Gulu to monitor a DRL-funded project that focuses on building a coalition of civil society organizations in the north, to lobby the local and national government more effectively for their myriad needs.

    As you know, Uganda is one of the three countries in which the U.N. has agreed to pilot a new approach to ensuring both more predictable and more robust protection and assistance for internally-displaced persons. That will bring in the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in a protection role, and hence our department's Bureau for Population Refugees and Migration, or PRM.

    P.R.M.'s Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Saulray also recently traveled to Kenya and Uganda to study refugee conditions, and the nexus with IDP issues. USAID, PRM and my bureau are all coordinating our efforts.

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    This summer, I and members of my staff plan to travel to the region for meetings that will address the regional dimensions of the LRA threat as well as what more the international community can do to improve the situation in northern Uganda.

    The living conditions in northern Uganda are stark and deserve international attention. Uganda has the third largest IDP population in the world, approximately 200 camps house 1.5 million or more IDPs. Estimates indicate that approximately 1.2 million of these IDPs in the districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader.

    The IDP camps are heavily congested and some house in excess of 60,000 people. Resources have proven insufficient to provide adequate security, water, sanitation facilities, or health care services to the people who live there. Consequently, the IDP camps have high mortality rates, roughly three times the national average.

    Civilians freedom of movement outside of the camps is extremely limited by the LRA threat as well as Ugandan Government policies.

    The 2005 country report on human rights practices for Uganda stated approximately 38,000 children have been abducted by the LRA during the past 20 years and forced into roles as soldiers, laborers, and sex slaves. An estimated 85 percent of LRA captives are children, and most are between the ages of 11 and 16.

    These children are forced to fight as rebels and participate in the killing of civilians, including other children. We know that children suffer higher casualties in battle than adults, and often emerge from conflicts with greater physical and psychological challenges.
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    In September 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Kony and several of his commanders on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including enslavement and sexual enslavement, and enlisting children into armed forces and cruel treatment of civilians.

    The U.S. Government has also designated the LRA has a terrorist organization.

    Last year Rory Anderson of World Vision reported having met an 11-year-old boy in Gulu in the World Vision Center for Children of War who was forced to bite to death and swallow the blood of a fellow child who attempted to escape from the LRA. He was forced to perform this heinous act as a warning so that he himself would not attempt to escape. Truly this is a deeply disturbing story, and yet this is one of thousands of deeply disturbing stories that reflect the lives of the endangered children of northern Uganda.

    Due to the threat of LRA abduction, one time as many as 30,000 night commuters traveled from conflict areas or IDP camps to spend the night in shelters, churches or balconies in urban centers with greater capacity to protect them. Recent assessments, including one by the State Department, revealed that due to a decrease in LRA attacks, the number of night commuter children has declined dramatically in the past 6 months to 19,000 or fewer.

    However, for even one child to be subjected to nightly separation from his or her community and forced to commute long distances under the threat of violence, abduction or sexual assaults is one child too many.
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    The United States places a high priority on assisting child victims of conflict throughout the world. In northern Uganda, it is clear that the key to assisting child soldiers and child victims is to continue to focus our diplomatic and programmatic assistance on three key areas: Humanitarian assistance, military assistance to help defeat the LRA, and build the capacity and professionalism of the UPDF and political pressure to urge the Government of Uganda to reach out to the Acholi people and support reconciliation efforts.

    The United States is a leading source of humanitarian and other aid for the people of northern Uganda. We provided $78 million for bilateral assistance in Fiscal Year 2005. The United States was the source of more than 50 percent of the total World Food Program assistance in Uganda in 2005. The U.S. also funds critical program that address the deep psychological wounds of former child soldiers and child abductees by providing these children with a psycho-social counseling, medical care, vocational training, and opportunities to reintegrate themselves into the local community.

    The U.S. has funded child reception centers for children rescued from LRA captivity. U.S. assistance has also supported several overnight shelters where children stay to be protected from LRA abduction. My USAID colleague, Leonard Rogers, is here to discuss our assistance programs in greater depth.

    We have provided the UPDF with more than $5 million in non-lethal military assistance to combat the LRA, including communication equipment and trucks. We also provide training for the UPDF in the areas of human rights, civil/military relations, military justice, and professional military education, and we continue to urge the Ugandan Government to reach out to the Acholi people through dialogue to support the reconciliation process.
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    The United States continues to support efforts to promote a dialogue of peace and reconciliation among civilians in northern Uganda. We urge the Ugandan Government to coordinate with the neighboring Governments of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo to end the spread of LRA terror into these countries.

    One of northern Uganda's most pressing needs is increased and adequate security, and protection for civilians in these IDP camps and surrounding areas as well as protection for the brave, local and international humanitarian aid workers who risk their lives to provide basic needs. Both the Ugandan People's Defense Forces and the local defense units, or LDUs, which are local militia units composed of volunteers, are assigned to protect IDP camps, and this protection regrettably is inadequate.

    The United States continues to urge the Government of Uganda to provide effective protection for civilians by adequately deploying UPDF troops in the region, particularly to enhance the protection of these IDP camps against LRA attacks, and in addition the United States strongly urges the Government of Uganda to investigate and prosecute all violence against civilians by security forces and focus efforts on providing human rights training along with security training to deployed personnel in the region.

    The U.S. Government and the international community pay a close attention to human rights abuses by the UPDF and the LDUs. We have documented these abuses, including rape of women and girls by UPDF and LDU security forces, acting with impunity in our recent 2005 annual human rights report.

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    As I stated earlier, the U.S. provides funding to training UPDF in the areas of civil/military relations, military justice, and human rights in an effort to curb these human rights abuses.

    In 2002, the Ugandan Government ratified the optional protocol to the convention of the rights of children, which the State Department worked hard to negotiate. This protocol prescribes minimum ages for military recruitment and participation in conflict. Ugandan law prohibits service in the military by persons under 18 years of age.

    In October 2005, the UNICEF Uganda representative, Martin Nogwanja, stated that the UPDF regular force has no child soldiers, and though the UPDF appears to be making a concentrated effort to comply with the protocol, the LDUs continue to have high child recruitments purportedly due to collusion of local officials and lack of doctors present to test the age of LDU recruits.

    In another critical area of concern is the NGO registration amendment bill that was approved recently by the Ugandan parliament. The Uganda parliament's passage of this NGO bill is troubling, and sends the wrong message to the international community about the country's commitment to address the problems in the north. It requires NGOs and evangelical churches to renew their registration permits annually. Controversial clause allows representatives of the Ugandan internal and external security forces to be members of the NGO board, and the bill gives the NGO board powers to register or deny registry to NGOs opposed to government policy.

    Uganda enjoys a vibrant civil society that serves as a mechanism for checks and balances on the government. We will continue to press the government to allow wide latitude in its implementation so that the important work of NGOs in the region is not unduly hampered.
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    Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this critical hearing on the deeply troubling situation of the children in northern Uganda. Thank you for the invitation to testify. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor wants to work with this Subcommittee in the weeks and months ahead to help the children of northern Uganda.

    We are working with partner organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, Save the Children, World Vision and the International Rescue Committee to provide vital humanitarian assistance. In northern and western Uganda we work with over 70 local and national NGOs to provide counseling, to provide conflict resolution, and encourage economic development in areas affected by conflict.

    Through our partnership with NGOs and their humanitarian assistance, through continued dialogue with the Ugandan Government and other governments in the region, and through continued non-lethal military assistance and training, the U.S. Government will continue to develop and implement policies and programs focused on resolving the humanitarian and human rights crises facing children and the general population in the region, and of course work on strategies to resolve peacefully the LRA conflict itself.

    Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Krilla follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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    Chairman Smith, Members of the Subcommittee,

    Thank you for holding this timely hearing on the endangered children of northern Uganda. Chairman Smith, you recently returned from a trip to Uganda, and Mr. Royce and Mr. Payne and many Members of the Subcommittee have also traveled to the region and know these issues first-hand. Clearly, you do not make a trip to a country where the lives of children are so heavily impacted and return home the same. For that matter, you can not listen to the moving NGO testimony on northern Uganda or see a movie like Invisible Children and remain the same. We held a screening of the film Invisible Children in my bureau recently and I understand that there may have been screenings of this film on Capitol Hill. For those Members of the Subcommittee who have not seen Invisible Children, I commend this film to your attention. This film is educating many people around the world about the conflict and its lasting effects on the children. This issue has understandably struck a chord with the American people. I understand that on the night of April 29th, groups of Americans plan to gather in 136 cities across the country for what is being called the Global Night Commute. This is a profound act of solidarity on behalf of the children of northern Uganda.

    I am new to the State Department and this is my first official appearance before this Committee as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. However, I have had a long-standing interest in Africa and care deeply about the African people. Prior to joining the Department, I served for five years as Regional Director for Africa for the International Republic Institute (IRI) where I coordinated election observation missions, political party development programs and civil society programs in Africa. My work in Africa extends back even further to my time as a high school teacher in the segregated Lebowa region of South Africa during the last years of Apartheid rule. My experiences in Lebowa, where I witnessed firsthand the potential, resiliency and eventual triumph of the South African people in the face of brutal oppression, continue to influence my work with the people of Africa today.
 Page 36       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC

    Mr. Chairman, as you know, the people of northern Uganda continue to suffer under a 20-year reign of terror imposed by Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Without question, those who suffer the most from the LRA's perverse tactics are the children.

    In the 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Uganda, we reported on the LRA's sexual exploitation of children, the use of child soldiers, the plight of the ''night commuter'' children who travel long distances from their homes in search of protection from the LRA, and the overall deplorable conditions of the IDP camps, in which over 80% of the approximately 1.5 million occupants are women and children.

    I have recently met with the new Ugandan Ambassador to the United States, Perezi Kamunanwire, and the new U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, Steven Browning, to discuss these issues. I look forward to close cooperation with them as we work to improve the security and living conditions for the people of northern Uganda.

    In February, a member of my staff traveled to Gulu to monitor a DRL-funded project that focuses on building a coalition of civil society organizations in the north to lobby the local and national government more effectively for their myriad needs.

    As you may know, Uganda is one of three countries in which the UN system has agreed to pilot a new approach to ensuring both more predictable and more robust protection and assistance for internally displaced persons. That will bring in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in a protection role and hence our Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. PRM Assistant Secretary of State, Ellen Sauerbrey, also recently traveled to Kenya and Uganda to study refugee conditions and the nexus with IDP issues. USAID, PRM, and we are all coordinating our efforts.
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    This summer, I and members of my staff plan to travel to the region for meetings that will address the regional dimensions of the LRA threat as well as what more the international community can do to improve the situation in northern Uganda.

    The living conditions in northern Uganda are stark and deserve international attention. Uganda has the 3rd largest IDP population in the world. Approximately 200 camps house 1.5 million or more IDPs. Estimates indicate that approximately 1.2 million of these IDPs are in the Acholi districts of Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader. The IDP camps are heavily congested, and some house an excess of 60,000 people. Resources have proven insufficient to provide adequate security, water, sanitation facilities, or health care services to the people who live there. Consequently, the IDP camps have high mortality rates (1.54 per 10,000 per day); roughly three times the national average (based on January to July 2005 estimates of 35,000 deaths in Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader). Civilians' freedom of movement outside of camps is extremely limited by the LRA threat as well as Ugandan government policies.

    The 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Uganda stated approximately 38,000 children have been abducted by the LRA during the past 20 years and forced into roles as soldiers, laborers, and sex slaves. An estimated 85 percent of LRA captives are children and most are between the ages of 11 to 16. These children are forced to fight as rebels and participate in the killing of civilians, including other children. We know that children suffer higher casualties in battle than adults, and often emerge from conflicts with greater physical and psychological challenges. In September 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Kony and several of his commanders on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including enslavement and sexual enslavement, enlisting children into armed forces, and cruel treatment of civilians . The U.S. government has also designated the LRA as a terrorist organization.
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    Last year, Rory Anderson of World Vision reported having met an 11-year-old boy in the Gulu World Vision Children of War Center who was forced to bite to death and swallow the blood of a fellow child who had attempted to escape from the LRA. He was forced to perform this heinous act as a warning, so that he himself would not attempt to escape. I am a father, and this is a deeply disturbing story. And yet, this is just one of thousands of deeply disturbing stories that reflect the lives of the endangered children of northern Uganda.

    Due to the threat of LRA abduction, at one time as many as 35,000 child ''night commuters'' traveled from conflict areas or IDP camps to spend the night in shelters, schools, churches or balconies in urban centers with greater capacity to protect them. Recent assessments, including one by the State Department, reveal that due to a decrease in LRA attacks the number of night commuter children has declined dramatically in the past six months to 19,000 or fewer. For even one child to be subjected to nightly separation from his or her community, and forced to commute long distances under the threat of violence, abduction or sexual assault, is one too many.

    The U.S. places a high priority on assisting child victims of conflict throughout the world. In northern Uganda, it is clear that the key to assisting child soldiers and child victims is to continue to focus our diplomatic and programmatic assistance on three key areas: humanitarian assistance, military assistance to help defeat the LRA and build the capacity and professionalism of the UPDF, and political pressure to urge the Government of Uganda to reach out to the Acholi people and support reconciliation efforts.

    The U.S. is a leading source of humanitarian and other aid for the people of northern Uganda and we provided $78 million in bi-lateral assistance in fiscal year 2005. The U.S. was the source of more than 50% of the total World Food Program assistance in Uganda in 2005. The U.S. also funds critical programs that address the deep psychological wounds of former child soldiers and child abductees, by providing these children with psycho-social counseling, medical care, vocational training, and opportunities to reintegrate themselves into the local community. The U.S. has funded child reception centers for children rescued from LRA captivity. U.S. assistance has also supported several overnight shelters where children stay to be protected from LRA abduction. My USAID colleague, Leonard Rogers, is here to discuss our assistance programs in greater depth.
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    We have provided the UPDF with more than $5 million in non-lethal military assistance to combat the LRA, including communication equipment and trucks. We also provide training for the UPDF in the areas of human rights, civil/military relations, military justice and professional military education.

    We continue to urge the Ugandan government to reach out to the Acholi people through dialogue to support the reconciliation process. The U.S. continues to support efforts to promote a dialogue of peace and reconciliation among civilians in northern Uganda. In addition, the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) is an American initiative that addresses a peaceful solution to the ongoing civil conflict in the region and seeks to engage the Government of Uganda and the LRA in talks, with the goal of achieving peace and support for national reconciliation.

    We also urge the Ugandan government to coordinate with the neighboring governments of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to end the spread of LRA terror into these countries.

    One of northern Uganda's most pressing needs is increased and adequate security and protection for civilians living in IDP camps and surrounding areas, as well as protection for the brave local and international humanitarian workers who risk their lives to provide basic needs. Both the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and the Local Defense Units (LDUs)—which are local militia units composed of volunteers—are assigned to protect IDP camps. The protection regrettably is inadequate.

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    The U.S. continues to urge the Government of Uganda to provide effective protection for civilians by adequately deploying UPDF troops in the region, particularly to enhance the protection of IDP camps against LRA attacks. In addition, the U.S. strongly urges the Government of Uganda to investigate and prosecute all violence against civilians by security forces, and focus efforts on providing human rights training along with security training to deployed personnel in the region.

    The U.S. government and international community pay close attention to human rights abuses committed by the UPDF and LDUs. We have documented those abuses, including rape of women and girls, by UPDF and LDU security forces acting with impunity in the 2005 annual human rights report. As I stated earlier, the U.S. provides funding to train UPDF in the areas of civil/military relations, military justice and human rights in an effort to curb these human rights abuses.

    In 2002, the Ugandan government ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Children, which the State Department worked hard to negotiate. The protocol prescribes minimum ages for military recruitment and participation in conflict. Ugandan law prohibits service in the military by persons under 18 years of age. In October 2005, the UNICEF-Uganda Representative, Martin Nogwanja, stated that the UPDF regular force has no child soldiers. Though the UPDF appears to be making a concentrated effort to comply with the protocol, the LDUs continue to have high child recruitments, reportedly due to the collusion of local officials, and lack of doctors present to assess the age of LDU recruits.

    Another area of concern is the NGO Registration Amendment Bill that was approved recently by the Ugandan Parliament. The Ugandan Parliament's passage of the NGO Bill is troubling and sends the wrong message to the international community about the country's commitment to address the problems in the north. It requires NGOs and evangelical churches to renew their registration permits annually. A controversial clause allows representatives of the Ugandan Internal and External Security Forces to be members on the NGO board, and the Bill gives the NGO Board powers to register or deny registry to NGOs opposed to government policy. Uganda enjoys a vibrant civil society that serves as a mechanism for checks and balances on the government. We will continue to press the government to allow wide latitude in its implementation so that the important work of NGOs in the region is not unduly hampered.
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    Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing on the deeply troubling situation of the children in northern Uganda. Thank you for the invitation to testify. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor wants to work with this Subcommittee in the weeks and months ahead to help the children in northern Uganda. We are working with partner organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, Save the Children, World Vision and the International Rescue Committee to provide vital humanitarian assistance. In northern and western Uganda, we work with over 70 local and national NGOs to provide counseling, provide conflict resolution, and encourage economic development in areas affected by conflict.

    Through our partnerships with NGOs and their humanitarian assistance, through continued dialogue with the Ugandan government and other governments in the region, and through continued non-lethal military assistance and training, the U.S. government will continue to develop and implement policies and programs focused on resolving the humanitarian and human rights crises facing children and the general population of the region, and of course work on strategies to resolve peacefully the LRA conflict itself.

    Mr. SMITH. Mr. Krilla, thank you very much for your testimony. I would now like to turn to Mr. Rogers.

STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD ROGERS, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

    Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before the Subcommittee today. If I might, I would also like to submit a written statement for the record.
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    Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered.

    Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

    For over 20 years, the people of northern Uganda have suffered the brutal atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army. An estimated 1.5 million people have been driven from their homes by LRA terror. Families are now forced to live in squalid displacement camps. These camps rarely meet minimum humanitarian standards. As a result, mortality rates are unacceptably high.

    The most reliable study we have shows mortality rates among the displaced population average 1.54 deaths per day per 10,000 people. This is over 50 percent higher than the threshold we use to declare an emergency, and more than triple the normal death rate in non-emergency communities in sub-Sahara Africa.

    It is tragic that children are especially victimized in northern Uganda. Mortality rates in the camps for children are more than double those of adults—3.18 deaths per day per 10,000 children. But even worse than life in the camps, the LRA's atrocities have had a devastating impact on these children.

    Over the course of the conflict UNICEF estimates that 25,000 children have been abducted by the LRA. They are forced to serve as LRA shock troops, and the smallest are porters and the girls are sex slaves for LRA commanders. Children are forced to kill other children as part of the LRA indoctrination process.
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    As the reality of what happens to those abducted by the LRA has become known, other children in the community have understandably become terrified. Parents are terrified as well. To protect their children, an estimated 19,000 are sent as so-called night commuters to live in the protection of special camps in the cities of the north. These children hike many miles to and from home each day just to be safe at night from the LRA. This has had a devastating impact on their family life and their schooling.

    The United States Government has worked closely with the Government of Uganda to address this crisis. We have been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to address the many needs of the LRA's victims. We have also worked with the Ugandans in a variety of ways to finally bring this nightmare to an end.

    In Fiscal Year 2005, USAID provided $78 million in relief and development programs to northern Uganda, and we expect to provide a somewhat larger amount during Fiscal Year 2006.

    Our Office of Food for Peace provided 79,000 metric tons of U.S. food to the World Food Program to help feed nearly 1.5 million displaced people.

    Our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provided nearly $12 million, most in support of desperately-needed water and sanitation projects in displacement camps. USAID's mission in Kapala is significantly increasing HIV/AIDS and anti-malaria programs in the north where malaria and AIDS rank as the two leading causes of death.

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    However, we have always recognized that more must be done to break the cycle of LRA-led violence and displacement. The Government of Uganda believes the only realistic solution lies through the military, and the United States has provided modest military assistance to the UPDF. We have also encouraged and supported in a variety of ways keeping open options for peaceful resolution of the conflict. The government's amnesty program which allows LRA fighters to return to society has proven successful, and we believe should be strengthened.

    It is important to understand, however, that there has never been any concrete evidence that the LRA senior leadership is interested in peace. Now they appear to be on the run with their leaders reportedly forced out of Sudan and into Congo. We believe now is the time to redouble efforts to end this conflict, and we intend to work closely with the Government of Uganda to do so.

    For USAID, we intend to pursue the following course:

    First, we will reorient our development assistance programs to focus more on the north, especially for malaria and HIV/AIDS programs, and we will continue to play a leading role in providing humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced.

    Second, we will work with and support the Ugandan Government in providing improved protection for the internally displaced, including strengthening accountability for UPDF performance around the camps, expanded freedom of movement for the displaced so that they can farm, and voluntary and assisted return of the IDPs to their homes as security permits.

    Third, we will work with the United Nations on improving coordination and U.N. performance in the displacement camps. This will require early agreement with the Government of Uganda on appointment of a new U.N. humanitarian coordinator and rapid implementation of a new system to designate lead U.N. agencies for specific responsibilities such as camp management.
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    Fourth, we will seek ways to further support the Government of Uganda's program for LRA fighters who seek amnesty. This would include strengthening reintegration programs and expanding livelihood opportunities.

    Fifth, we will continue to work with the Government of Uganda, the U.N. and non-governmental organizations to assess health and nutritional conditions among the internally displaced so our aid can be properly targeted to address priority problems.

    Sixth, we strongly believe non-governmental organizations remain critical to the successful implementation of many humanitarian and development programs in northern Uganda. We will work to ensure open communication with the government and the NGOs, and we trust that all sides can work to resolve issues constructively.

    Finally, we will strongly support what we hope will be a transition to peace and security in northern Uganda over the coming months and years. We believe elimination of the LRA and reconciliation between the Acholi people and the Government of Uganda will allow Uganda to fully realize its democratic and economic potential.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD ROGERS, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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INTRODUCTION

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. Northern Uganda remains one of the world's least publicized humanitarian emergencies with 1.5 million or more persons internally displaced by ongoing conflict. I have seen first-hand the situation in Northern Uganda, and I can assure you that this is a conflict that merits the close attention of this Subcommittee. Thank you for convening this hearing.

    My testimony on behalf of USAID today seeks to summarize key aspects of the humanitarian emergency and our response to it.

LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

    The United States National Security Strategy specifically refers to the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a regional challenge that demands attention. The Strategy accurately states that ''In Uganda, a barbaric rebel cult—the Lord's Resistance Army—is exploiting a regional conflict and terrorizing a vulnerable population.''

    It is clear that Northern Uganda's population continues to live in abject fear of continued attacks by the LRA, whose utter brutality against civilians is well-documented and well-known by this Subcommittee. The LRA has committed widespread serious abuses and atrocities, including the abduction, rape, maiming, mutilation and killing of civilians, including children. The LRA uses children as soldiers, holds children and others in slave-like conditions, and subjects female captives to rape and other forms of severe sexual exploitation. The LRA has abducted some 25,000 children during the course of the conflict, according to UNICEF; other estimates are even higher. Although LRA activities in Northern Uganda have diminished during the recent dry season, LRA combatants reportedly remain in the vicinity of many displacement sites, and residents are fearful that random LRA attacks and atrocities could resume.
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    The LRA is a sub-regional issue that must be addressed. The LRA now threaten regional stability not only in Uganda, but in the volatile regions of southern Sudan and eastern Congo. The latter two countries are emerging, we hope, from long periods of warfare with heavy US investment in securing a peace. In particular, it threatens the fragile political situation in Sudan and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Overall, LRA activity in Northern Uganda and southern Sudan limits humanitarian access; blocks trans-border market and logistics routes; and limits agricultural production and trade.

HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS

    Most of the estimated 1.5 million persons displaced during Northern Uganda's conflict continue to live in deplorable conditions, scattered among more than 200 camps. With more than 90 percent of the population pushed from their homes in several districts, population density in Northern Uganda's overcrowded camps is virtually unprecedented even by international emergency standards.

    The international relief community depends on measurements of mortality rates to obtain essential information about how well the affected population is surviving and what more needs to be done. Therefore, it was highly significant when a much-anticipated study of mortality levels in Northern Ugandan camps in 2005 found that mortality rates among the displaced population averaged 1.54 deaths per day per 10,000 people, significantly above the commonly used emergency threshold of 1 death per day, and more than triple the normal expected death rate in non-emergency communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Among children under age five, mortality rates in Northern Uganda's conflict zone were even more tragic, averaging 3.18 deaths per day per 10,000 children. These mortality rates translate into more than 900 excess deaths per week among displaced Ugandans.
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    It is important to note that this mortality data is the product of a study conducted in 2005 under the auspices of the Ugandan Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Population Fund, and the International Rescue Committee. Health experts within the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) with vast experience in health surveys have examined the Northern Uganda mortality study and have concluded that the survey is methodologically sound and arrives at credible conclusions. A USAID health expert in Uganda earlier this month further examined health conditions in the North, closely reviewed Government of Uganda concerns about the study's approach, and has also concluded that the mortality survey was conducted according to standard practices. Regular measurements of basic health indicators, including mortality rates, are a fundamentally important component in mounting a well-informed, well-calibrated humanitarian response in crisis situations.

    I am sorry to report that these grim mortality measurements tend to confirm what USAID has known for some time—that seriously substandard conditions at displacement camps have exacted a deadly toll on Northern Uganda's population. Even when compared to other humanitarian emergencies, Northern Uganda's camps are woefully deficient in the provision of water for drinking and bathing, latrines for adequate sanitation, and basic living space for physical and mental well-being. The uprooted population, deprived of any semblance of normal life, is overwhelmingly dependent on relief deliveries. More than 70 percent of displaced households in Northern Uganda have absolutely no income or earn negligible amounts equivalent to less than $6 per month, according to a comprehensive survey conducted last year with support from USAID.

    These conditions clearly indicate the challenges confronting the Government of Uganda, international donors, and the United Nations.
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PROTECTION ISSUES

    Mr. Chairman, as you may know, USAID has made a concerted effort in recent years to be more mindful of the serious protection problems confronting many of the needy populations we serve. We know from experience that displaced populations worldwide are particularly vulnerable to physical abuse, sexual exploitation, and other violations of their basic rights. USAID adopted an official policy on assistance to internally displaced persons in 2004 that explicitly acknowledges USAID's responsibility to devise programming strategies within its mandate to try to help vulnerable populations better manage the security risks they face.

    In line with this USAID responsibility, we have conducted two on-the-ground assessments of protection issues in Northern Uganda during the past year, including an assessment last month led by the USAID/OFDA Senior Advisor on Internal Displacement and Protection. The United States Government also participated in a recent multi-donor/multi-agency assessment of displacement, under the leadership of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to refine the international community's approach to internally displaced persons.

    USAID's two protection assessments in Northern Uganda found that while displaced Ugandans express appreciation that government soldiers and government-supported local defense units offer some security from LRA attacks, mistreatment of camp residents by some of those same Ugandan government security personnel remains a continuing problem. Citizens in Northern Uganda complain frequently of mistreatment by security personnel, and say that neither the Uganda Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) nor the judicial system offers an adequate mechanism for addressing these complaints. The UPDF has taken strong measures against some perpetrators, and has even executed soldiers convicted of these offenses. However, in other cases there has been no effective action against those responsible.
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    In the three Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, where most displacement is concentrated, Ugandan government restrictions limit residents' movements outside the camps to a few kilometers during daylight hours. While tight controls on civilian movement are meant to protect the population and hamper the LRA, many Northern Ugandans report that as a result they are unable to engage in livelihood activities such as farming and trade. Some 40 percent of camp occupants report that they are afraid to use their camp's water point. More than 40 percent state that living in a camp is as dangerous, or more dangerous, than returning to their home.

    USAID will work closely with Ugandan officials at all levels to support greater freedom of movement to the displaced population in accordance with the Government of Uganda's national policy on internal displacement, which states that ''freedom of movement is a fundamental human right of all Ugandans, including internally displaced persons.'' Easing restrictions on movement would allow more displaced families to engage in agricultural activities that would improve food security and household incomes, lessen the population's pervasive sense of entrapped dependency, and embolden a percentage of displaced persons to begin returning voluntarily to their nearby homes if and when security conditions permit.

    USAID welcomes the Government of Uganda's plans to establish ''Civil-Military Coordination Centers'' and ''Subcommittees on Human Rights Promotion and Protection'' to monitor, report, and resolve protection problems and facilitate accountability. USAID will work with the Government of Uganda to help implement such plans effectively. Improved protection and disciplined behavior by government security personnel should be achievable and would build confidence within the displaced population, reduce tensions in camps, increase access to livelihood opportunities, and would serve as an important step forward in fostering reconciliation between the northern population and their national government.
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USAID ASSISTANCE TO NORTHERN UGANDA

    Mr. Chairman, Northern Uganda has an enormous ongoing need for emergency humanitarian relief as well as long-term development assistance. During the many years of conflict and massive population displacement in the North, the government of Uganda and the international humanitarian assistance community as a whole have failed to respond commensurate to the needs on the ground. USAID realizes that more needs to be done to help the people of Northern Uganda.

    That is why the USAID Mission in Uganda, working closely with USAID/Washington, during the past year has developed an action plan for the North which is being institutionalized into a core strategic objective to mitigate the causes and consequences of conflict and will channel additional USAID staffing and financial resources to the affected area. The USAID Mission in Uganda will seek to focus more strategically on increasing access to essential services, enhancing the protection of individuals from physical and psychological violence to the extent possible, advancing peace and reconciliation processes, restoring food security and basic economic activity, and help displaced families voluntarily return home and reintegrate when safe and appropriate to do so. The Agency is determined to make a more significant dent in the miserable human conditions that dominate the daily existence of Northern Uganda's people.

    State Department support of the International Committee of the Red Cross (through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration) benefited the internally displaced persons; earmarked funds for that purpose reached $4 million in FY 05. USAID also provided $78 million to relief and development programs in Northern Uganda during FY 2005 and hopes to provide a similar or larger amount during FY 2006. The largest component of USAID assistance is food aid. USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) provided 79,000 metric tons in FY 2005 valued at $47.6 million and continues to work through the World Food Program (WFP) in FY 2006 to deliver food to nearly 1.5 million displaced persons and more than 160,000 refugees and other vulnerable persons in the North. USAID/FFP has provided 26 percent of the total funding and metric tonnage requested by WFP for 2006, nearly twice the amount provided by the next three largest donor nations combined. In addition to food for general distributions, supplementary and therapeutic feeding, school feeding, and HIV/AIDS programs, USAID/FFP this year will work with WFP to supply three-month return rations to families planning to return home voluntarily from camps, primarily in Northern Uganda's Lira district. USAID/FFP anticipates that food dependency will decline somewhat as more displaced households gain access to farm land to meet a larger proportion of their own food needs.
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    The second-largest component of USAID assistance to Northern Uganda is non-food humanitarian assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, which has steered the bulk of its support in recent years toward desperately needed water and sanitation projects in displacement camps, as well as health and nutrition programs. In FY 2006, USAID/OFDA has also begun to support small-scale food security programs that will enable camp residents to produce limited amounts of food. USAID/OFDA provided $11.8 million to Northern Ugandan programs during FY 2005. USAID/OFDA is currently planning a response of $6–8 million in FY 2006 depending upon circumstances and needs in other countries.

    The USAID Mission in Uganda is significantly increasing its support in FY 2006 for HIV/AIDS programs and anti-malarial projects in the North, where malaria and AIDS rank as the two leading causes of death. Through the President's Malaria Initiative, USAID is distributing insecticide-treated mosquito netting to 85 percent of the dwellings in displacement camps. USAID is also funding HIV/AIDS programs targeting the North, as part of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. This includes funding for the start-up of a $30 million, five-year program focused on delivery of services for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and Orphans and Vulnerable Children in conflict-affected districts of Northern Uganda.

    In addition, USAID is supporting programs ranging from strengthening of governmental decentralization and teacher training, to infrastructure support and long-term agricultural development focused on increasing opportunities for food security and income generation through effective use of food and cash crops. USAID's Northern Uganda Peace Initiative continues to provide technical assistance to promote conflict resolution and reconciliation at local and national levels.
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    Mr. Chairman, I know that this hearing and indeed this entire Subcommittee has a special interest in the plight of Northern Uganda's endangered children. USAID has initiated a Community Resilience and Dialogue program in recent years that includes assistance for formerly abducted children and adults who have escaped the LRA to reunite with their families. USAID's Displaced Children and Orphans Fund and its Victims of Torture fund have contributed toward these efforts during the past six years.

    The LRA uses abductions to force children into servitude as fighters, porters, manual laborers in base camps, and—in the case of female abductees—as sex slaves. Many young girls held captive have become pregnant with the children of LRA combatants. These girls and their children face significant challenges trying to reintegrate into communities, a process made all the more difficult by the displacement and destitution still suffered by many of the abductees' families. About 40 percent of the ex-abductees pass through reception centers for several weeks—three such centers are supported by USAID and its implementing partners who provide technical oversight—where programs partially address the traumatized youths' considerable health, nutritional, and psychosocial needs before the children reunite with their families, often aided by family tracing services. Experience has shown that traditional cleansing ceremonies are an important aspect in easing the shame and stigma that many returnees encounter. The USAID Community Resilience and Dialogue program has supported skills training and paid school fees for ex-abductees, provided scholastic materials, and has rehabilitated schools.

    USAID continues to provide support to several ''night commuter'' centers where thousands of Northern Ugandan children walk each evening to spend the night sleeping in safety from LRA attacks. The number of children registering at night commuter centers has declined by about one-third during the past six months, to approximately 19,000. The decline might be a tentative sign that the northern population is gradually gaining a stronger sense of security. However, we know that the numbers of ''night commuters'' can fluctuate significantly depending on events. Therefore the sad spectacle of parents having to send their children several miles away to sleep safely at separate locations each night is a phenomenon that will likely continue. Many relief workers and child experts are increasingly concerned that the ''night commuting'' phenomenon might be producing secondary negative emotional and social effects on some of the children.
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    The efforts by USAID and its implementing partners have helped thousands of ex-abductees. However, these efforts have by no means been adequate considering the large number of abducted children—unprecedented in any other conflict—and the horrific perversities that the LRA inflicted on many of the children, compounded by the instability that continues to make a return to normal life difficult if not impossible even after children and young adults have managed to escape the grasp of the LRA.

THE WAY FORWARD

    USAID is acutely aware that its ability to help bring dramatic improvements to the lives of Northern Ugandans is limited until the LRA conflict ends either by military or political means. Within USAID's mandate, here is our thinking about the way forward.

    Mr. Chairman, more needs to be done in Northern Uganda. In addition to the aid that USAID is providing, other donor countries, UN humanitarian agencies, and the Government of Uganda itself need to do more. Northern Uganda contains, by some independent estimates, the third largest displaced population in the world. It is worth noting that Uganda and its neighboring countries of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo collectively account for nearly four of every ten internally displaced people on this planet. It is also worth noting that the LRA operates in all three of those countries, ruthlessly exploiting the regional instability that it helps to create and sustain. The LRA has ruthlessly earned its place on the U.S. Government's Terrorist Exclusion List.

    First, as mentioned earlier, the USAID Mission in Uganda is making budgetary and staffing adjustments to strengthen its ability to respond in Northern Uganda. USAID must maintain and expand emergency relief efforts while also preparing for a transition to reintegration and long-term development where appropriate. USAID is committed to doing what it can within its budget and mandate. We will be pleased to keep the Subcommittee informed as this process evolves.
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    Secondly, all USAID relief and development programs in Northern Uganda will make a heightened effort to analyze the population's protection problems and integrate those concerns into our programming. We know, for example, that improved water programs can help protect displaced populations by reducing their need to seek water at dangerous locations outside of camps. Basic health programs can do a better job of identifying and treating rape victims. Food rations can be distributed in ways that reduce the risk of theft or exploitation. In addition, we are in regular contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UNICEF as those three agencies become more engaged in monitoring, documenting, and helping to resolve protection and human rights problems in the North. USAID strongly supports UN officials' new efforts to work with Ugandan authorities to secure greater freedom of movement for camp occupants.

    Moreover, addressing the LRA issue is critical to advance U.S. national interests in the sub-region, reintegrate 1.5 million displaced persons, and address the recurring drain on humanitarian assistance funds. USAID believes that efforts to ''push'' the LRA through military and diplomatic pressure should be complemented by stronger efforts to ''pull'' non-indicted LRA commanders away from the LRA by persuading them to defect. Many mid-level LRA commanders choose to leave the LRA when opportunity permits, and experience suggests that such commanders tend to bring, on average, groups of about 20 LRA members with them when they defect. According to a recent study about LRA defectors, rebel commanders tend to be more ready to escape and return home when they are confident that physical security, freedom, and livelihood opportunities await them in civilian life in Northern Uganda. Thorough and accurate information about the Ugandan government's amnesty and reintegration process is the most significant factor encouraging commanders to defect, according to the study entitled ''Opportunities for Peace in Northern Uganda'' conducted by Conciliation Resources and Quaker Peace & Social Witness. Therefore, more effort is needed to disseminate information about demobilization and reintegration programs for LRA ex-combatants, and specialized support is required immediately to improve those reintegration programs.
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    Additionally, USAID and the Department of State Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) have closely collaborated to push the UN to improve its global humanitarian response system to make UN agencies better coordinated and more accountable in response to the needs of the internally displaced. Such UN reforms are particularly crucial in Northern Uganda because of the UN system's weak performance there addressing the needs of internally displaced persons over the years. The UN has appropriately chosen Northern Uganda as a prime location to introduce one of the humanitarian reforms during 2006, known as the ''cluster leads strategy'', which we believe will make the response by the UN humanitarian community more predictable and the UN agencies more accountable. USAID and State/PRM have fielded two joint assessment teams during the past three months to monitor UN reform efforts and help push the process forward. We believe it is absolutely crucial that UN humanitarian agencies become more effective in the Northern Uganda crisis. That will require agreement with the Government of Uganda and appointment by the UN of a strong humanitarian coordinator.

    USAID welcomes indications from the Government of Uganda that it intends to intensify its efforts in the North. The Ugandan government last year unveiled an excellent overall ''National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons'' that largely remains to be implemented in practice. Helping the Ugandan government activate its displacement policy remains a high priority for USAID, the UN and other major donors.

    In March 2006, Ugandan authorities in consultation with bilateral and multilateral partners—including the U.S. Government—prepared an ''Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Interventions in LRA-Affected Areas of Northern Uganda'' and designated a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) to set performance benchmarks. The JMC includes the U.S. Government, the governments of the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, and South Africa, and representatives of the World Bank, the UN, and civil society. The Emergency Plan pledges intensified efforts by the Ugandan government to end the conflict in the North and lay the groundwork for reconciliation and ex-combatant reintegration. The Action Plan commits the Government of Uganda to enhance protection of displaced populations and improve camp conditions. It is noteworthy that the new Emergency Plan commits the Ugandan government ''to increased funding for interventions identified in the Action Plan.'' USAID will work closely with the Government of Uganda to take concrete actions which produce tangible results through the JMC and to fulfill its primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens.
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    In addition, the Government of Uganda in the coming months will finalize a comprehensive National Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan for Northern Uganda which USAID hopes will provide an even more detailed picture of the Ugandan government's plans and commitment to the North.

    Lastly, access to displaced populations for purposes of assessing needs, documentation and analysis of protection problems, design and implementation of assistance programs, and evaluation of projects is absolutely essential to everything that USAID and its implementing partners are attempting to do in Northern Uganda. Therefore, signs of increased tensions between the Government of Uganda and international relief agencies are troubling and will, we hope, be resolved in a manner that best serves the considerable needs of Northern Uganda's large, vulnerable population.

    Plans by the Ugandan military to reduce military escorts for humanitarian relief convoys, for example, are understandable in light of recent security improvements at some locations. However, such decisions should, USAID believes, occur as part of a consultative process that seriously considers the safety concerns of humanitarian agencies in the field, some of whom suffered deadly highway ambushes just five months ago.

    The Department of State's testimony refers to recently passed Ugandan legislation that would impose tighter licensing and permit rules on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has raised concerns among local and international relief organizations that Ugandan officials are seeking greater control over some agencies' information collection and advocacy efforts on behalf of Northern Uganda's conflict victims. USAID believes that the ability to independently collect, analyze and make public information on the humanitarian crisis, subject to principles of political neutrality, impartiality, and accuracy, is essential to providing the most appropriate response commensurate with the scale of the crisis. USAID will work closely with Ugandan authorities to promote a process for strengthening collaboration between nongovernmental organizations and the Government of Uganda, including institutionalized channels of regular communication and adequate representation of NGO viewpoints. The U.S. Government and no doubt other donors would welcome the opportunity to foster dialogue and continued good relations between the Government of Uganda and the organizations working to provide assistance to the Ugandan people.
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    Mr. Chairman, the Lord's Resistance Army has terrorized the people of Northern Uganda for too long. There are signs the LRA is now on the run. The Government of Uganda and the international community need to step up efforts to end the conflict, support the displaced as they remain in camps or as they voluntarily return home, and heal the physical and psychological wounds of this terrible tragedy. Far too many people continue to perish, and far too many survivors are forced to lead a miserable and fearful daily existence. Only the full restoration of peace and security will eliminate the current emergency in the North. Until that time comes, USAID is determined to effectively respond to what remains one of the most overlooked humanitarian crises in the world. Given the complexity of moving forward, we welcome the opportunity to continue working in strong partnership with the Government of Uganda in the future.

    I welcome your questions on my testimony or any others you might have for me at this time.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much as well.

    Let me just begin the questioning, first of all, to Mr. Krilla if I could. Given the ability of the LRA to cross borders between Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo at will, what role do you think a regional approach might take here—particularly with the U.N. and other nations like ourselves who are very interested in working with Uganda?

    Secondly, on the indictment of Joseph Kony by the International Criminal Court; do you see this as a double-edge sword? I would note that Charles Taylor was indicted with the regional court and the pressure of that indictment certainly helped to bring him to what we hope will be justice. But in the former Yugoslavia, Karadich and Malanovich remain even though we have complete access to the former Yugoslavia, have troops deployed, and international peacekeepers all over the former Yugoslavia. Yet these two individuals have still evaded arrest and done so even though Serbia claims it is cooperating.
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    So my question is, has that indictment perhaps served as a block to a negotiated settlement of some kind? And as far as we know, what was the ICC thinking when they did this without having a viable means of apprehending Joseph Kony?

    It seems to me that when you put out an arrest warrant you better have some realistic possibility of apprehending the suspect, and I am not sure that exists currently. Maybe I am wrong, but if you would spend a moment or two on that.

    Then the issue you mentioned in your testimony that the UNICEF representative in Uganda says that the UPDF regular forces have no child soldiers. The LDUs continue to have high child recruits. If you could define what high is. How many are we talking about? And does our intelligence back up what the UNICEF representative have said, that the Ugandan UPDF forces do not have child soldiers?

    Then if you could, Mr. Rogers, in your testimony you talked about many things, and it is very comprehensive statement and we thank you for it. Both of you have provided very comprehensive statements, but about 40 percent of the abductees pass through reception centers for several weeks, and three of those centers are backed by the USAID. How many centers are there, and how are the ex-abductees tiered?

    Obviously, some are more hardened than others. We know that PTSD and other psychological trauma, in addition to all the physical trauma, is sometimes life-long, and I wonder what kind of massive effort is made for the most hardened of these young people who have been killing and raping themselves? Do they escape, some of them, and again how many are we talking about? And is there a need for us to be funding additional centers?
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    You say we are helping in a partnership with at least three. Are there some that are going underfunded simply because we have not deployed enough resources?

    Then finally on the issue of non-lethal military assistance and training, has that produced positive tangible successes in terms of human rights training for the Ugandan miliary?

    Over the last 30 years that I have tracked this there have been times when military training has not been effective. It has actually been counterproductive, and I can explain it, but how do we gauge this? Is there a good monitoring system to ensure that human rights training really is taking hold?

    Mr. KRILLA. Well, I will start off first with a couple of your questions, and perhaps turn over to my colleague for some of the others.

    Certainly the international role, the role of the U.N., the situation is bigger than just the U.S. Government solution here, and for the U.S. Government to apply pressure and to weigh in in the region would not be nearly as effective without the kind of international efforts that we share the burden with our colleagues not only in the core group that is working in the region, the U.K., Norway and The Netherlands, but truthfully the entire United Nations in examining the greater region and especially inasmuch as it affects Sudan and the DRC, something that Mr. Payne mentioned earlier in his comments.

    In terms of our general strategy of applying—this is in terms of United States Government strategy, and the international aspect of it is applying pressure on the Ugandan Government to reach out to the Acholi people is something that we are doing in coordination with other international—especially the international donors.
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    The second prong being humanitarian assistance is clearly something that we share the burden with other international partners as well.

    Then lastly, the military support through non-lethal assistance and training, although it is something that the United States Government has taken the lead on, certainly in the military coordination the region has done in conjunction with the forces, the MONUC forces in the DRC as well as the UNMIS Forces in Sudan, and I will just touch on that very briefly because Mr. Payne, as I mentioned, did mention it in his opening statement, the idea of trying to coordinate some sort of military response.

    I would say that that is true and that could be effective to a point. Certainly those forces there have to make sure that they respect their own mandates. Earlier this year, in January, the MONUC forces in Congo engaged with the LRA in the eastern part of the country. Unfortunately, they suffered some losses, although generally were considered to be an effective encounter for the MONUC forces. I believe eight Guatemalan soldiers were killed at that time, which is very unfortunate, but at the same time they were fulfilling their mission. They were trying to stabilize the region in the eastern Congo.

    Similarly, they soldiers that are serving in Sudan are maxed out in their capacities and able to just maintain their mandate in Sudan. So I would hesitate at this time to say that we should extend their mandate and expect them to be able to cross over into Uganda, but at the same time having them in the region has been very helpful with an insurgency like the LRA that tends to cross back and forth across the borders as easily as they have.

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    So I think there is an international angle both in terms of humanitarian assistance pressure that can be brought on the government as well as the military forces there. So I think that answers your first question.

    Mr. SMITH. On that first question, Michelle Brown from Refugees International makes a number of recommendations, and if you could just add to that answer. She believes there should be support for an appointment of high-level U.N. envoy on the regional crisis, including northern Uganda, who reports regularly to the Security Council. Is that something the Administration would support?

    And support for a panel of experts to investigate the sources of support for the LRA, which remains illusive as to exactly where are they getting their money.

    Mr. KRILLA. Yes. Well, I will address both of those issues because they are certainly ones that are frustrating us.

    Well, the special envoy I wouldn't say so much frustrating as so much of one of the things that we are considering. I brought up this issue not only with our own Ambassador when he was heading out the door, but it is something that the Africa Bureau and my bureau have discussed as something, a tool that perhaps down the road we could explore.

    Like other donors, we are frustrated at times by the seeming lack of progress in the efforts to bring peace to the people of northern Uganda. I think there are a number of levers that we are using right now, some of the additional humanitarian assistance we have seen in effect, the slight reduction in the night commuters, and the additional security around the IDP camps is something that I believe in the future will bear fruit and will help out the situation there.
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    So in terms of the U.N. special envoy, we are certainly examining proposals, but we haven't come to a final decision on that, a final conclusion, but I will work with you and keep you abreast as they develop.

    The second issue that you just raised, I am sorry, the special envoy and then?

    Mr. SMITH. It was per Michelle Brown, the idea of a panel of experts to look into sources of funding.

    Mr. KRILLA. Yes. I think that is—I, myself, have been very discouraged by the lack of a clear path as to where the LRA is getting their support. Up until last year, up until the comprehensive peace agreement was signed in Sudan, there was a very clear connection between the government and Sudan and the support for the LRA, not only serving as a safe haven for LRA troops within the southern enclaves of the government's safe areas there, but also providing direct financial and military assistance.

    Now, after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, the safe havens were no longer offered, and we have not seen, although it is difficult to judge directly where things are coming from, we have not seen a great deal of continuing support. We haven't seen support from the Sudanese Government to the LRA.

    The one thing I will say is we believe that with the levels of support pre-January of last year being so significant, the arms caches that existed are ones that they can rely on for years to come, which is a very unfortunate situation, and certainly something that we are continuing to monitor.
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    Mr. ROGERS. In terms of the number of reception centers, frankly, I am not sure we have a good count on the number of centers. There is sort of a degree of formality to these things. As I said, we estimate that 40 percent of the people come through the formal centers. I will try and get you the number of how many of those formal centers there are for the record.

    Obviously, as you suggest, there are various degrees of trauma suffered by these children, and some of them are rehabilitated fairly simply. I think, to be frank, many of the most traumatized, and I have seen kids in Lira and Gulu who were severely traumatized; I think it is going to take a long time, if ever, before they get over this sort of thing.

    But having said that, it is amazing to see the capacity of the Acholi people to forgive, and part of the process of helping these kids over the trauma is to go through ritual Acholi cleansing procedures that allow them to see themselves as returning to their society as a worthwhile member, and once they are welcome back into the community, the community helps with the healing process.

    So I think we are reasonably encouraged that these centers actually do serve the children well. I think, as I said in the testimony, I think there is capacity for us to do more. We would like to support more centers. We would like to come up with a more robust program for attracting the LRA fighters to come out, and so we are continuing to try and find opportunities to do that. But I think the centers are very worthwhile institutions doing a good job.

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    Mr. SMITH. Secretary Krilla, did you want to touch on the ICC end of the human rights training?

    Mr. KRILLA. I did. If you don't mind me skipping, going to the human rights training first——

    Mr. SMITH. Sure.

    Mr. KRILLA [continuing]. Because it is something I feel very passionately about.

    Certainly in my bureau, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, we are very supportive of the idea of any sort of professional military training coming, hand-in-hand, coming in conjunction with human rights training as well. We found this to be effective throughout the world as U.S. Government seeks to engage in professionalize militaries and certainly this program which is called the IMET Program, the International Military Education and Training Program, which we provided approximately $250,000 per year for training of the UPDF includes a large component of civil/military relations, military justice, professional military education, and human rights, which we consider fundamental in the training of the soldiers there.

    In terms of the effect, I mean, we have seen this program being very effective throughout the world, and in Uganda, even just in the year or so that this has been up and running, we have been very pleased with the training with the fact that the UPDF is itself a much more professional force, and the trainers that we have used there have been very pleased with the results.
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    But that is something, too, I would like to keep you informed of as we see greater benchmarks for that training.

    Mr. SMITH. If you could, for the record, elaborate on what that training actually entails, and who it is that we train. Is it the colonels, the sergeants, the upper echelon, the officer corps? That would be very helpful for the record.

    Mr. ROGERS. Between the two of us, we will get you that information.

    Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that very much.

    Mr. KRILLA. Well, I would say the training itself is counter-insurgency oriented command and staff training, so it tends to target the higher echelon officers. It is generally non-lethal communications and ground mobility assistance. It is not so much tactics and infantry training as it is communication, command and communications, especially the human rights training that I spoke to earlier, but it tends to directly impact the leadership as they carry out their orders with this ground force.

    Mr. SMITH. Does the human rights training also include a package on human trafficking and sexual exploitation?

    Mr. KRILLA. Yes, that is part of the training as well. And if you would like, even if we can't cover it in its more comprehensive manner right now, I can get you some more written information——
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    Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that, yes.

    Mr. KRILLA [continuing]. In response to your question, sir.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

    Ambassador Watson.

    Ms. WATSON. I didn't see the light on.

    Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I was just reading this story of a young women Acholi, and is she here?

    Mr. SMITH. The fourth from the left there.

    M