SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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29–836PDF
2006
9/11 FIVE YEARS LATER:
GAUGING ISLAMIST TERRORISM
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 7, 2006
Serial No. 109–212
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
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JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
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EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
PETER T. KING, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
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BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director
DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member
EDWARD A. BURRIER, Professional Staff Member
GENELL BROWN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Mr. Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, The Center for Security Policy
Walid Phares, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
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Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, Deputy Director, Transnational Threats Project and Fellow, Center for Stratgic and International Studies
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Peter Brookes: Prepared statement
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.: Prepared statement
Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement
Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement
9/11 FIVE YEARS LATER:
GAUGING ISLAMIST TERRORISM
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International Terrorism
and Nonproliferation,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
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The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:28 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will now come to order. Monday, September 11, 2006, marks the 5-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks launched by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which killed over 3,000 U.S. citizens. On this day, Americans will appropriately remember their fallen countrymen. Inevitably, the question will be asked: Are we safer? Yes, we are, but the unfortunate reality is that the Islamist terrorist threat to our country will endure, perhaps for decades. Today's hearing is meant to gauge progress in the struggle against Islamist terrorism with a view toward policy and educating the American public about this threat.
As President Bush stated this week, and as this Subcommittee has examined, al-Qaeda since 9/11—under the attack by the United States and others—has had to drastically reconfigure. Recently, British authorities disrupted a plot to simultaneously explode up to 10 commercial airliners over the Atlantic Ocean en route to the United States. Although the plot appears to involve several ''homegrown'' British jihadists of Pakistani descent, connections to Pakistan may suggest firmer command and control by ''al-Qaeda central'' than counterterrorism officials previously understood. As summed up recently by a top British official, the threat from Islamist terrorists ''is real, it's here, it's deadly, and it's enduring.''
This summer offered a stark reminder of state-sponsored terrorism, as Iran-backed Hezbollah rained rockets on Israel. I was in Haifa during one of those attacks and I saw the damage. These rockets can only be fired indiscriminately and are used to terrorize civilians. I saw a hospital, Rambam, where there were over 500 people injured by these rocket attacks. Hezbollah is formidable. Prime Minister Olmert suggested to me that the press revelations of intelligence and security methods have hampered their counterterrorism efforts.
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Just as the terrorists have evolved, we as a Government and society must evolve too.
Judge Richard Posner wrote last month:
''To the extent that our laws do handicap us in fighting terrorists, it is one more sign that we do not take the threat of terrorism seriously enough to be willing to reexamine a commitment to a rather extravagant conception of civil liberties that was formed in a different and safer era.''
The overreaction to the Administration's terrorist surveillance program, which aims to intercept al-Qaeda communications, tells me that Judge Posner is on the mark. The desperate need today is to find out who the terrorists are, and we shouldn't shy away from doing so aggressively.
We should learn a few lessons from others who have extensive experience in dealing with terrorism on their soil. One way to do this would be to restart the debate over the creation of a domestic intelligence service without police powers, similar to the British MI5. Criminal prosecution and intelligence collection are vastly different tasks, and to date, several have given the FBI poor marks on intelligence collection. We wouldn't need to consider such steps if the threat weren't all too deadly and enduring.
The challenge is grave. Looking across the map, Islamists have taken control of large swaths of territory in Somalia, and other parts of Africa remain susceptible to terrorist exploitation; our dependence upon Middle East oil funds schools of hate; Iraq's future is at a crossroads; Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons; Afghanistan is showing worrying signs of regression; in the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, a once tolerant Islam, is being radicalized; in Europe, a large, mobile, and educated Muslim population includes some who are attracted to terrorism, and who hold passports that do not require a visa to enter the United States; in the tri-border area of South America, Hezbollah raises funds; the Caucasus, southern Thailand . . . almost nowhere is immune to radical Islamist thought, and all parts of this chessboard are equally urgent. Complacency is another enemy we face, including here at home, where things as elementary as border security have been woefully neglected, as the Subcommittee heard in July field hearings.
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Moving forward, we won't have lasting success against Islamist terrorism until we are able to counter al-Qaeda's ideological appeal. Given the large number of people around the world already sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, this will be a monumental effort. But with proliferating access to WMD knowledge and material, none more important. All means of national power must be harnessed for this effort.
I will close by commenting on the tendency of some to ascribe most every terrorist threat to our Nation. Listening to some would have you believe that there would be no terrorism were it not for supposed shortcomings of Administration policy. They have failed to note that the forces driving terrorism—Islamic radicalism—have been long in the making. Indeed, our Nation was attacked several times before 9/11. Constructive criticism is good, but the bottom line is that we haven't been hit since 9/11, despite facing a determined and resourceful enemy. Homeland and national security policy, while not perfect, deserves credit for this.
I will now turn to the Ranking Member for any opening comments he may have. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. It is appropriate as we approach the fifth anniversary of September 11 that we look at the last 5 years and we look at the global war on terror. And I want to echo your comments that this is not a matter where a change in U.S. foreign policy would do anything more than whet the appetite of those planning every day to kill as many Americans as possible.
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We should point out that when 9/11 was being conceived and planned was the high point of the Israeli-Arab peace process, a time at which Israel was making the maximum level of concessions and when there was minimum violence in the territories. And yet that was the very time that Osama bin Laden plotted his attacks. It is very clear that bin Laden would not be satisfied with a change in the United States/Israel policy. He wishes the destruction of the Saudi Government, and that would only whet his appetite until the Iberian Peninsula was once again returned to Islamic rule, et cetera, et cetera. We cannot appease those who demand one bite of the apple. We would whet their appetite for more.
We most focus on one thing and that is nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian state. I don't think anybody in this room needs me to go through the rendition, but I will point out that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran could be used against Israel, could be smuggled into the United States, or could be used against the Iranian people should there ever be an uprising or an endangerment of this regime.
Now, the Administration has an image in the world as being super aggressive. The decision not to just confront and threaten Saddam, but to invade Iraq, is the one thing that the Administration is known for, and this was an area where they were over aggressive. But with the exception of the invasion of Iraq, this Administration has done little or nothing among the many things it should have done.
Now, we also did invade Afghanistan, but my friend Dennis Kucinich voted for that. It is hard to say the Administration was blazing trails of aggressiveness in its decision to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban. But it is in the area of dealing with Iran where we have been meekest and most ineffectual, and the centrifuges turn as we talk.
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Now, President Ahmadinejad has told us what we should do. He says we should bow down and surrender. Mr. Ahmadinejad, we already have. We have opened our markets to Iranian exports, not oil, but just the stuff they couldn't sell anywhere else and that we don't need. We refuse to apply the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and while there was a time when foreign oil companies would abstain from investing in Iran because they feared that perhaps the United States would actually follow the law, they have learned that this Administration is willing to—I don't know whether it is quite a criminal act, but it is certainly a failure to carry out the law with regard to investments in the energy sector of Iran. And as a result, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act may be extended by this Congress but will be ignored by this Administration.
The Administration acquiesces in well over a billion dollars of concessionary World Bank loans. So I have to go back to my constituents, some of whom, as all of our constituents do, question whether we should have an assertive foreign policy or foreign aid or any involvement. Isolationism has always been a strain in America. And I have to admit to them that while I support foreign aid, a portion of our foreign aid money is going to Tehran, and the Administration let it happen. Of course, the money gets laundered at the World Bank before it actually goes to Tehran.
And then, finally, the State Department decides to give a visa to Iranian former President Khatami. So you have an individual who, for quite a period of years, headed the largest terror organization in the world—namely, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran—who is invited into our country.
But that isn't enough. Unlike every other Iranian, he is not subject to fingerprinting. But that isn't enough. We decide to use taxpayer dollars to subsidize the terrorism tour, the terrorism promotion tour of President Khatami. Yes, our tax dollars are paying for his security. You may wonder what kind of security the Islamic Republic gave to our officials when they were last in Tehran, or you may wonder who pays the security when the Rolling Stones tour America, and then you realize the Rolling Stones aren't promoting terrorism, Khatami is. And you can claim that Khatami wasn't the number one official in the Iranian regime when he had the title of President. Does that matter? Do we invite the number two or the number three or the number 5 official of al-Qaeda to tour our country? No.
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But there is a certain symmetry to all of this. During Khatami's administration in Iran, that government, both before and after 9/11, provided safe harbor and protection to al-Qaeda terrorists and used Iranian taxpayer dollars to do so.
Today, during the Bush Administration, United States taxpayer dollars are used to provide safe harbor and protection for Khatami. So, you see, everything is balanced.
We need an Administration that really places stopping Iran having nuclear weapons as its number one priority, not just in word but in deed. The problem with this Administration is that it has literally hundreds of first priorities. Oh, sure, getting Russian cooperation in the Security Council on the Iran issue is a number one priority. But so is making sure that Russia's influence over Moldova is reduced, and so is trying to prevent Russia from having any influence in Belarus or Chechnya. So we have a circumstance where we will not link in our discussions with Russia anything they care about with what we supposedly link as a first priority.
Likewise, in dealing with China, we never link their currency manipulation and our willingness to turn a blind eye to it with their support for Iran and the Security Council. The result will be either no sanctions or ridiculously weak sanctions.
We will not be able to turn to the Iranian people and point out to them that there is an economic cost and a world relationship cost to the policy of their government to keep the centrifuges turning. And the only bright spot for this Administration is that the Iranian nuclear test will not occur until after it leaves office.
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Ahmadinejad tells us to bow down and surrender. I think a foreign policy that refuses linkage in our discussions with Russia and China, and that admits Khatami for a tour of the United States for him to support terrorism, indicates that Mr. Ahmadinejad's advice is being accepted in the White House. I yield back.
Mr. ROYCE. I understand that two of our witnesses have travel plans. I apologize for our late start because we had a series of votes on the Floor. Perhaps we should go to Mr. Peter Brookes and Mr. Frank Gaffney first. I will briefly introduce the two of you. If you summarize to 3 minutes, and then we could ask you some questions; and then, Dr. Phares, we will go to you and Mr. Sanderson, and we will be back on schedule.
Peter Brookes is a Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. He is the author of the recently published book, A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue States. He was recently appointed by Congress as a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Among his previous positions he has served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and as a staff member on this very Committee.
We also have Frank Gaffney, the founder and president of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC. He is the lead author of War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World. In addition to being a weekly columnist for the Washington Times, Mr. Gaffney has also contributed to a number of national publications. Previously he served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security policy, as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy.
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Gentlemen, we will start with Mr. Brookes.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. BROOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor and privilege to be here with you today and be back in my old haunts when I served under Chairman Ben Gilman.
I also want to commend you for this very timely hearing.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Pull the microphone a little closer.
Mr. BROOKES. Okay. And I also, before I get started here, I also want to say that these views are my own and don't represent the views of my employer, the Heritage Foundation. I will just go ahead and summarize quickly, Mr. Chairman, so we can try to move along as quickly as possible.
I remember where I was on September 11. I happened to be on the taxiway at Dulles Airport while planes were being flown into the World Trade Center and into the Pentagon, and but for the grace of God, I was almost on American Airlines Flight 77 when I was heading out to Hawaii, South Korea, and Japan on official duties. I chose a later flight, but I was out there on the taxiway. And that brush with fate tells me that we really have two—makes me very much in touch with the idea that we have two enemies in the war on terror; one is terrorism and the other is complacency.
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I am really worried about that today. I disagree with many of those who say today that the threat is no longer with us. I think that that is exactly what those who wish to hurt us would like us to believe. I think we have made progress in fighting terrorism, but my view is that this long war is far from over. I am concerned about some recent events such as the stalemate in the war between Israel and Hezbollah and how it may have buoyed the political Islamists and Islamist extremists, and that is particularly troubling to me.
Iran and Afghanistan also continue to be significant and highly symbolic challenges on the terror front. I think a premature withdrawal from either would only embolden Islamic radicals and terrorist extremists in their efforts, leading to more death and destruction for Americans and others. I think we are dealing with a protean or evolving enemy. A lot of these terrorists, as you know, are home grown. They are being radicalized by clerics over the Internet, by terrorist recruiters. Terrorist groups now not only include males, but there are women; there are even pregnant mothers, as we saw in the U.K. plot, and converts to Islam, too.
My view is that al-Qaeda is no longer a terrorist group, as it was on 9/11, but it is a terrorist movement. And I think it has become a worldwide inspiration to terrorist ''wannabes'' around the world, and I think this makes terrorism for us today more diverse geographically. It makes it less predictable overall and more challenging to defeat.
I do believe also that our first line of defense is good, actionable intelligence. That definitely includes the most vigorous collection and analysis of foreign and domestic terrorist-related information that our domestic laws and American values such as civil liberties will permit.
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I support well-crafted intelligent law enforcement programs like the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program, the PATRIOT Act, and the tracking of terrorist-related international financial transactions, among others.
International intelligence and law enforcement operations are a force multiplier in fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. Al-Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve and evolve their operational terrorist techniques and trade craft and are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their handiwork. They are making tremendous use of the Internet, as you well know, for passing operational information, sharing terrorist trade craft information, and recruiting new members and fundraising.
Moreover, while al-Qaeda is crippled, it is not dead, and its ability to inspire other would-be terrorists may be greater than ever. Even more troubling are the growing ties among terrorist groups and their sponsors and between terrorist state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Syria.
While some groups may not seem to be natural allies, divided by sectarian, ethnic, or other cultural divides, they are clearly willing to cooperate with each other in achieving common objectives.
Another issue that I think needs to be looked at, and you mentioned it, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, is safe havens. I am particularly worried about the agreement between Pakistan and some groups along the Afghan border. I think that the Committee really should look into this issue. It is not quite clear to me exactly what we are dealing with here, but I have concerns that al-Qaeda's presence in the Pakistan territorial areas, and also as we press the offensive in Afghanistan, that Taliban members might find refuge or safe haven in Pakistan. So I think that is something that the Committee should look at.
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I am also worried about Indonesia and the Philippines, as you mentioned, as well as Somalia.
The bottom line: While we have made significant progress in securing the homeland and fighting terrorism overseas, complacency about this challenge will prove to be deadly, potentially making the horrors of 9/11 seem minor in comparison.
Our Nation, our citizens, our Nation's interests, are still squarely in the terrorists' cross-hairs. The fact that we haven't suffered a terrorist attack in almost 5 years probably has more to do with their inability to undertake an attack in the post-9/11 environment, due to homeland security measures and improved intelligence, than their desire to strike us. Well-intentioned hopes and wishes that Islamic terror is something that happens overseas, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, the U.K., or Spain, or is limited to the unspeakable horrors of 9/11 nearly 5 years ago, are not based in reality in my view.
We have to continue to be more imaginative and innovative in fighting terrorism, but especially overseas where counterterrorism partners and security may not be as vigilant or as effective as it is here at home. Regrettably, this latest conspiracy in the U.K. may not be the last of terrorist plots meant to occur on or near the fifth anniversary of 9/11 by al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda followers. It certainly won't be the last major terrorist scheme we face in our life as Americans. But, Mr. Chairman, equally dangerous is our own complacency about the safety and security of this great Nation against the Islamic terrorist threat.
Thank you very much.
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Brookes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege to appear before you today to discuss the issue of Islamist terrorism in the shadow of the fifth anniversary of the tragedy of 9/11.
I want to commend you for holding this very timely hearing as there are many questions being asked that should be addressed in a prestigious, open forum such as this.
I am testifying here today as an individual, and my views do not necessarily reflect the views of my employer, The Heritage Foundation.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my remarks and submit my full testimony for the record.
Mr. Chairman, like every other American of a certain age, I'll never forget where I was on the morning of September 11th, 2001.
While planes were crashing into the World Trade Center, I sat on the taxiway at Dulles airport on a United Airlines flight 837 bound for San Francisco, just a few planes behind the ill-fated American Airlines flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon, where I served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.
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Just two weeks prior to 9/11, my executive assistant, Judy Stephens, had offered me the choice of the earlier American Airlines flight—flight 77—as I planned my trip to meet with defense counterparts at Pacific Command in Hawaii, Japan and South Korea.
I chose the later fight, but for the grace of God do I sit here before you today.
That brush with fate—and the continual troubling news from abroad such as the British foiling of a terrorist plot to bring down airliners over the Atlantic—reinforces to me that we have two enemies in the War on Terror: the terrorists themselves and our own complacency.
Just shy of five years since 9/11, even though we have made progress in fighting extremism, the reality is that the ''Long War'' against terrorism appears to be far from over.
The ''stalemate'' in the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, and how it has buoyed not only political Islamists and Islamic extremists, but Iran and Syria as well, is particularly troubling.
Iraq and Afghanistan also continue to be significant—and highly symbolic—challenges on the terror front. In my view, Iraq and Afghanistan still remain the central fronts in the War on Terror. A premature withdrawal from either would only embolden Islamic radicals and terrorist extremists in their efforts, leading to more death and destruction for Americans and others.
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But this latest major terrorist conspiracy in the U.K., described by British authorities as an act to commit ''mass murder on an unimaginable scale,'' calls for us to pay attention to some new—and enduring—lessons as we continue fighting terrorism both at home and abroad.
First: We're dealing with a protean enemy. Today's terrorists are often ''homegrown,'' being radicalized both at home and abroad by terrorist recruiters, clerics and over the Internet. Terrorist groups now include women, pregnant mothers, and converts to Islam. The recent U.K. airline plot and last year's 7/7 London attacks are evidence of these trends.
Al Qaeda—which was a terrorist group on 9/11—is now a global terrorist movement. Much to his frustration, Osama bin Laden is now more of a worldwide inspiration to his terrorist ''disciples'' than an active commander, directing day-day terrorist operations.
Unfortunately, Osama bin Laden's loss of operational control has served al Qaeda's purposes, making Islamic terrorism more diverse geographically, less predictable overall and more challenging to defeat.
Second: Our first line of defense is good, actionable intelligence. That definitely includes the most vigorous collection and analysis of foreign—and domestic—terrorist-related information that our domestic laws and American values, such as civil liberties, will permit.
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The foiling of the U.K. airline plot and other terrorist plots clearly shows the importance—and wisdom—behind well-crafted intelligence and law enforcement programs like the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), the Patriot Act and the tracking of terrorist-related international financial transactions, among others.
Third: International intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation is a force multiplier in fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. The U.S./U.K. collaboration in foiling this terrorist operation is well known, but cooperation with Pakistan proved to be critical in ending the conspiracy. The recent bombing plot against trains in Germany was nipped in the bud by a tip from Lebanese intelligence.
International cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement allows authorities to be proactive, rather than reactive, in fighting the terrorist scourge. Being ahead of the curve means preventing lives from being taken by terrorists instead of investigating how terrorists took the lives after the fact.
A note of caution is also warranted in framing counterterrorism cooperation. When sharing sensitive counterterrorism information, it is critical that the U.S. find ''trusted agents'' within foreign government intelligence and law enforcement agencies that in some cases are penetrated by radicals and or extremists, working against our efforts.
Fourth: Al Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve and evolve their operational terrorist techniques and tradecraft, including becoming increasingly sophisticated in their handiwork. They are already making tremendous use of the Internet for passing operational information, sharing terrorist tradecraft information, recruiting new members and fundraising.
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The recent U.K. plot is a good example of their efforts at innovation: These terrorists reportedly planned to smuggle undetectable components such as ''liquid explosive ingredients and detonating devices disguised as beverages, electronic devices, and other common objects'' aboard the targeted aircraft.
While this looks similar to a mid-'90s al Qaeda operation code-named Bojinka hatched out of the Philippines to bring down 10 or so U.S. planes over the Pacific, these new techniques were meant to evade post-9/11 security scrutiny.
You can't help but wonder whether any airport screeners—in Britain or anywhere else—would have been able to prevent the execution of this sophisticated plot if it hadn't been interrupted before it went into action.
While al Qaeda is crippled, it is not dead—and its ability to inspire other would-be terrorists may be greater than ever. Even more troubling are the growing ties among terrorist groups and their state sponsors—and between state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Syria. While some groups may not seem to be natural allies, divided by sectarian, ethnic or other cultural divides, they are clearly willing to cooperate with each other in achieving common objectives.
Another critical issue is the outcome in Iraq. A failure to defeat terrorism in Iraq will only validate—once again—its use as a deadly, political tool, encouraging others to embrace the ideology and tactics of terrorism.
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Safe havens, more specifically preventing the establishment of terrorist safe havens, are also an important issue. In this regard, I am particularly worried about the islands of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, Pakistan's border with Afghanistan and Somalia.
The bottom line? While we've made significant progress in securing the homeland and fighting terrorism overseas, complacency about the challenge of Islamist terrorism will prove to be deadly, potentially making the horrors of 9/11 seem minor in comparison.
Our nation, our citizens and our national interests are still squarely in the terrorists' crosshairs. The fact that we have not suffered a terrorist attack here in the United States in nearly five years may have more to do with their inability to undertake an attack in the post-9/11 environment due to the homeland security measures we've taken and improvements in intelligence collection and analysis than their desire to strike us.
Well-intentioned hopes and wishes that Islamic terrorism is something that now only happens overseas, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, the U.K. or Spain, or was limited to the unspeakable horrors of 9/11, nearly five years ago, are not based in reality—in my view.
This means that we have to be more imaginative and innovative in our defense of our interests than the terrorists are on offense. We shouldn't only be looking for terrorists under the proverbial lamppost because that is where the light is brightest. We have to continue to be imaginative and innovative in fighting terrorism.
For instance, we need new security procedures, education, technologies and intelligence sources that can detect and prevent terrorist attacks against American interests and citizens—especially overseas—where counterterrorism or security may not be as vigilant or effective as it is here at home.
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Of course, being on the offense against the terrorists—using all of the ''hard''—and ''soft''—instruments of national power, and in cooperation with international partners on intelligence and law enforcement—is our best defense.
Regrettably, the U.K. airliner conspiracy may not be the last of the terror plots meant to occur on or near the fifth anniversary of 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda-wannabes. It certainly won't be the last major terrorist scheme we will face in our lifetimes as Americans.
While the foiled U.K. plot was a clear win in the War on Terror, probably preventing the death of as many—or more than—the number who tragically died on 9/11, equally dangerous to our safety and security at home and abroad is our own complacency about the safety and security of this great nation against the Islamist terrorist threat.
Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Peter Brookes is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Hill staffer, CIA officer and Naval officer, and the author of the book ''A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States.'' (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
CONNECTING DOTS: NSA NEEDS PHONE RECORDS
New York Post Online Edition
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Peter Brookes
May 16, 2006—Gen. Michael Hayden is going to get an early Memorial Day BBQ-ing on Thursday. The CIA director-nominee will appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the senators are sure to go ballistic over the National Security Agency's telephone-calling-record database. Yet, despite the nonsense that the politically motivated mainstream media and the left have been spouting on the NSA program, this critical counterterrorism effort isn't intrusive, illegal—or unnecessary.
Let's start by dispelling some of the more prominent myths perpetuated about the program:
It's intrusive: Wrong. The billions of telephone-calling records voluntarily provided to the NSA by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth are anonymous. This means they're just phone numbers—the caller's names/addresses aren't identified in the calling record.
Moreover, these records include nothing on any of the substance of the phone calls—just the number, the date and duration. This doesn't mean that your phone calls are being monitored by the NSA—or anyone else. That requires a court order.
It's illegal: Wrong. It's perfectly legal for the government to receive this information. These are considered mere business records. In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that the Fourth Amendment (i.e., the right against unreasonable search and seizure) doesn't include phone-calling records.
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In Smith v. Maryland (1979), the court found that the Fourth Amendment doesn't protect calling records because when you voluntarily use the phone, you voluntarily share that info with every telephone company that handles the call along the way to its destination.
It's unnecessary: Wrong. The program is focused on terrorists, especially the al Qaeda threat. While we've made progress in neutralizing al Qaeda, the terrorist group remains dangerous and deadly—and has promised to strike here at home again.
In fact, the decentralization of al Qaeda has made it a more unpredictable (i.e., challenging) target for homeland security. And the bombings in London last July remind us of the increased threat arising from homegrown terrorists.
The most glaring absence in all the uproar is a good example of how this information might be used to prevent a terrorist act right here in the United States.
Suppose the FBI identifies—today—a terrorist suspect (e.g., Terrorist A) located right here in the United States from information received from a foreign intelligence service after a raid on an al Qaeda safe house abroad.
Beyond taking immediate steps to prevent a terrorist attack, one of the first questions that law enforcement is going to want to answer is whether Terrorist A is working alone, or as part of a cell or larger group operating here.
There are a couple of ways of determining this. One method is by looking at how—and with whom—Terrorist A communicates. This is often referred to as ''communications-network analysis.''
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But, while you might be able to identify with whom Terrorist A is communicating by monitoring his phone calls once you've determined his terrorist ties, you still don't know with whom else he communicated with in the past.
That's why the NSA wanted the calling-record database. With it, law-enforcement agents can determine the phone numbers of Terrorist A's previous contacts. Equally importantly, they can find out with whom else Terrorist A's contacts have talked with.
Through analysis of Terrorist A's (and associates') calling patterns using NSA's database and supercomputers, officials can develop a schematic of the terrorist organization's structure, members—even chain of command.
In other words, they can connect the dots.
No telling what a difference such a counterterrorism program might have had in preventing 9/11, if such network analysis had been done on the communications patterns of the al Qaeda hijackers.
Sad to say, we live in a time when we should no longer be shocked at the lengths the mainstream media, or other irresponsible leakers of classified information, will go to advance their anti-Bush political agenda—even if it means harming our national security.
We need to remind ourselves that it isn't by chance that we haven't had a terrorist attack here in the United States in almost five years. It's because we've established a significant counterterrorism program both at home and abroad, including this NSA effort.
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Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Gaffney.
STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY
Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for including me in your deliberations on what I think is the single most important issue of our time; namely, the nature of the conflict in which we find ourselves and what it will take for us to prevail in it.
I understand you are going to admit into the record all of our statements, and I will just very quickly try to summarize key points in mine.
The first is that we do have to be clear about the nature of the enemy we are confronting. This war is not about Iraq alone. It is not even a war on terror. Though we are fighting a war in Iraq, to be sure, and we certainly are confronting the use of terror as an asymmetric weapon, it is a grave disservice, it seems to me, to persist in talking to the American people about this as though those are really what we are up against, when in fact I think it is much more accurate to describe this as a war for the free world, a global conflict against, first and foremost, ideological movement.
Peter has talked about al-Qaeda. I would suggest it is not al-Qaeda's movement. Al-Qaeda is one manifestation of something that I think is properly described as Islamofascism. That is an important way to characterize this because I think it helps describe this as something political and totalitarian, very much of a piece with previous movements of a similar kind and different from the way most Muslims around the world practice their faith. That is critically important for two reasons to make this distinction: One is because to do otherwise is to drive all Muslims into the enemy's hands, something that they aspire to, the enemy, and something that would be a strategic disaster for us.
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The other reason that we need to understand this as an ideological movement is it compels us to adopt ideological tools to counter it.
In my submitted testimony, Mr. Chairman, I have drawn on some of the material that we had in the book that you mention: War Footing. I would just very quickly summarize some of those ideological tools or counter ideological tools, if you would, as born of very much the same sort of mindset that Ronald Reagan used to defeat the last terrible totalitarian movement with global ambitions; namely, Soviet communism. They are, in short, a comprehensive strategy using energy, financial, legal and security measures, and integrating them into what might be called a political warfare program. Its goals should be to undermine and divide the enemy, to split apart and peel away the enemy's base, to deny the enemy the social support infrastructure and, needless to say, the safe havens that shelter its forces, fund its operations and provide its cadre, pitting enemy factions against one another wherever possible, and most especially, discrediting the ideological belief system that legitimizes its cause.
I have in my submitted remarks a number of recommendations. I would only mention a couple very quickly. One is we have got to stop evading this issue out of a sense of political correctness or a reluctance to talk about ideology or buy into claims by some in the Muslim American leadership, about which I will have more to say in a minute, that you can't talk about this ideology and Islam in the same sentence. That is wrong. We need to delegitimize Islamist extremism, first and foremost, in the eyes of Muslims. And there are a number of ways to do that, some of which I think can be very effective indeed.
There is a role for Congress. I had the privilege of serving under Senator Scoop Jackson many years ago, and witnessed the effect that the Jackson-Vanik amendment had in bringing about an end to Soviet communism, a start made before Ronald Reagan came and finished the job.
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We need to use our strengths. This body is made up of experts in the business of political warfare. You and your staff, you and your consultants, you and your campaign managers understand these tools very well. They need to be vectored at our enemies, not just at each other. We need to invest in the tools, the instruments of political warfare.
This Committee, and, Chairman Royce, you in particular, have taken an interest in some of these instruments. I commend you for that. We need to redouble the effort to get our messages out in the variety of media that are available today. We need not least to reinforce and strengthen our friends. This is a point that we lose sight of too much, I am afraid. And one of those, Israel, is in the front lines of this, and I think we need to look hard at whether we are providing it and other allies adequate support.
You asked for a status report on all this, Mr. Chairman. I would just say that I think there have been some steps made in the right direction. I am encouraged by some of the statements coming out of the Administration, alas, very lately, about the character of the enemy and the nature of this ideological movement. But much, much more needs to be done. Specifically, I would suggest we need to get this country on a war footing, to mobilize it as we have in the past when we faced similar kinds of problems. We have to. And I commend Congressman Sherman for this. We have to bring coherence to this effort because whether it is the Khatami visit, or whether it is the notion that we can't negotiate with the bin Ladens of the world, rightly so, but we can negotiate with their Shiia Islamofascist counterparts in Iran is crazy making and, I think, discredits our efforts.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just conclude by saying that one of the things that worries me most, I agree with Peter about the complacency. I also think we are severely disserved by the efforts of those inside our own country who are trying to confuse or obscure or otherwise give comfort to our enemies in this ideological movement. And some of these are people who have been built up over time as an apparatus inside the United States, as elsewhere, for precisely these sorts of political influence or political warfare purposes. And I have mentioned a number of organizations that I think are of particular concern in this regard, many of them funded by the Saudis, our putative allies and friends, but doing real damage to the public's understanding of the nature of the enemy and our mobilization to fight it.
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This is a strategic mistake of the first order, to impute to these self-appointed Muslim American leadership organizations the standing that they claim, let alone relying upon them to do such things as sensitivity training of the FBI and the military about how to deal with Muslims. I think this is a grievous mistake.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that we do indeed face an increasingly complex and dangerous world. It is a matter of time before these enemies secure the weapons of mass destruction that the Congressman has talked about, and wield them against us with devastating effect.
I agree with your assessment. I am glad you quoted Judge Posner who I think is a very thoughtful man on these subjects. We must become more serious about this war. The steps that I have outlined here and that are elaborated upon in the book, are, I think, all going to be adopted. It is a question of whether we do it as a matter of urgency and seriousness before we are attacked again, and potentially far worse than we were 5 years ago, or whether we do it afterwards.
Thank you for your seriousness on the subject, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity to comment on these points.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffney follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY
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Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to be afforded the opportunity to contribute to this Committee's deliberations about what is, arguably, the most important issues of our time: the nature of the conflict in which we find ourselves and what it will take for us to prevail in it.
CLARITY ABOUT THE ENEMY
This war is not just about Iraq, any more than it is simply a ''war on terror.'' To be sure, we are fighting in Iraq and we are contending with the use of terror as an asymmetric weapon. It is, however, a serious misunderstanding of the nature of this war—and a grave disservice to the American people—to confine our thinking about it just to the theater or front that is Iraq and what we ''do'' about it in isolation. The same is true of the characterization that our enemy is ''terror'' or ''terrorists.''
Rather, we are in the midst of the latest in a series of death-struggles between, on the one hand, a totalitarian ideology bent on world domination and the destruction of all who stand in the way of that goal and, on the other, freedom-loving peoples. I call it the War for the Free World.
As President Bush and his senior subordinates have pointed out in recent days, contemporary totalitarians have much in common with their predecessors, the Fascists, Nazis and Communists. For example, today's enemies amount to an ideological vanguard or cadre that constitute a relatively small percentage of a much larger population. Like their forerunners, today's totalitarians seek to dominate the latter through violence, coercion and indoctrination. As ever, propaganda, repression, financial rewards and the prospect of future glory are used to establish and maintain effective control of the base. Once that has been accomplished, our generation's totalitarians will inevitably attempt to conquer other populations and lands, as well.
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There is, of course, an important difference between the current crop of totalitarians and their predecessors: Those that threaten us most immediately cloak their cause, and justify their aggressive behavior, with a patina of religion. For this reason, I believe they are most accurately described as ''Islamofascists'' (or Islamist, for short). President Bush has used a variation on the theme, calling them ''Islamic fascists.''
WHY THE IDEOLOGICAL ASPECT MATTERS
It is imperative to appreciate the ideological character of our enemy for two reasons:
First, recognizing that we are up against a totalitarian political movement permits a strategically vital distinction to be drawn between the vast majority of Muslims around the world who practice their faith in a tolerant, peaceable manner, consistent with the laws and values of civil societies, and the Islamofascists who do not. The latter seek to subjugate such Muslims and non-Muslims alike under a Taliban-style form of repressive religious rule they describe as Shari'a.
Clarity on this point is made more difficult by three factors: 1) the concerted efforts of some to obscure this distinction (about which I will have more to say in a moment); 2) the fact that Islamofascists find in some passages of the Koran and certain traditions in Islam justification for their behavior; and 3) by the success the Islamofascists have had in suppressing public expressions of opposition from Muslims who do not subscribe to their Islamist creed. For the moment, however, such a distinction clearly does exist and it behooves us to help Muslim opponents of the Islamofascists survive and prevail over our common foes.
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Secondly, recognizing that we are up against a totalitarian ideology is essential to the adoption of instruments of warfare appropriate to defeating its adherents. The U.S. military and our homeland defenders have important roles to play in carrying the fight to the enemy and protecting us against their predations here. They must be equipped with the wherewithal to do so.
For the former, this requires a substantial and sustained ramp-up in defense spending, sufficient personnel and training and the steady support of the American people for the troops and their mission. The latter must be given intelligence, law enforcement and civil defense tools of sufficient quality, utility and flexibility to meet the dynamic threats of today and tomorrow. I would put in this category measures like those contained in the Patriot Act, the recently disclosed Terrorism Surveillance Program and bank transaction monitoring effort.
These steps while absolutely necessary, are not likely to be sufficient. In the final analysis, though, this war will be won or lost at the political and ideological level.
HOW TO WAGE IDEOLOGICAL WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMOFASCISTS
In our recent book entitled War Footing: Ten Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World (www.WarFooting.com), my colleagues and I described how President Reagan waged political warfare against the last horrific totalitarian movement seeking world domination—Soviet Communism. To summarize, these involve:
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. . . Marshal[ling] an array of energy, financial, legal, and security measures [and] ''integrat[ing them] within an overall strategy of political warfare, a form of war that specifically attacks the ideological and psychological factors that motivate our enemies.
Political and psychological warfare strategies are designed to undermine and divide the enemy: splitting apart and peeling away the enemy's support base; denying the enemy the social support infrastructure that shelters its forces, funds its operations, and provides its cadres; pitting enemy factions against one another; and discrediting the ideological belief system that legitimizes its cause.
In War Footing, we offer a number of specific recommendations about how America could implement such strategies at this juncture. They include the following:
1. Stop evading the issue. No government strategy to date for the so-called ''War on Terror'' has included political warfare as an element of the American arsenal.
2. Devise, staff up, and begin executing a political warfare strategy. Countering the Islamofascist ideology must be its principal focus.
3. De-legitimize Islamist extremism in the eyes of Muslims, and especially its potential supporters. We need to show that, although violent Islamism is certainly a problem for us in the West, it is a vastly greater problem for the Muslim community.
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Challenge the Islamists on religious grounds. Many Muslim leaders teach the message of civility and tolerance, and their voices need to be amplified. We can help call attention to contradictions between Islamism and the Koran, on such matters as prohibitions of violence against Muslims; relations between Muslims and ''people of the book'' (Jews and Christians); the ban on compulsion in religion; the doctrine of jihad; the rules of war; killing of innocent civilians, prohibition of suicide, and so forth.
Expose economic disaster. There is ample evidence that Islamism, and its imposition of Shari'a law, results in crippling limitations to economic development, and thus to the socioeconomic well-being of Muslims. Relevant cases are Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria.
Celebrate educational opportunity. Radical Islam has a strongly negative effect on educational standards, due to its narrow emphasis on Koranic instruction which fails to equip graduates with any practical job skills, destining them for jihad or unemployment. Where Islamists hold sway, an erosion in quality similarly afflicts what had been secular educational systems. There is evidence, moreover, that with the proliferation of madrassa education, functional illiteracy is spreading, and literacy rates for women are stagnating. Any serious effort at political warfare must emphasize the huge costs to societies that do not fully use the talents of half of their population.
Emphasize progress. Shari'a-ruled countries exhibit a strong bias against science and technology education, to the huge detriment of their economic development. The 2004 UN Report on Arab Human Development shows that the Arab world has yet to join the Industrial Revolution—let alone the Information Revolution—and that it neither produces much scientific literature nor carries out real research. A successful political warfare strategy must highlight this key failure by documenting the numerous religious prohibitions and restrictions on scientific and technological pursuit imposed by Islamist ideology.
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Enshrine human rights. The regular and officially sanctioned abuse of basic human rights in Shari'a-dominated countries is yet another glaring Islamist misdeed that needs to be exposed. Such abuse includes the widespread judicial and customary discrimination and outright mistreatment of women, from uncivilized practices such as forced marriages to truly inhumane treatment such as genital mutilation and ''honor'' killings. Virtually all of these extreme Islamist tenets and practices stand in direct contradiction to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights—an international human rights standard to which all of the Shari'a-dominated countries nominally adhere.
4. Use legislative vehicles for political warfare. Congress has an important role to play. The groundbreaking 1972 Jackson-Vanik Amendment made favorable trade relations with the Soviet Union contingent on its permitting free emigration. Under the leadership of the remarkable Senator Henry M. Jackson, this legislation proved to be a powerful congressionally created political weapon, one that was used to decisive effect in de-legitimizing totalitarian Soviet Communism. Sanctions legislation and assistance to democratic opposition movements can serve a similar purpose in the War for the Free World.
5. Use our strengths. The good news is that Americans are among the world's experts at political warfare. The bad news is that we mainly use it against each other: After all, the strategies and tactics of any hard-fought election campaign are precisely the stuff of applied political warfare. The talent, creativity, ingenuity, and, yes, ruthlessness of top-flight political campaign strategists of both parties should be mustered for the purpose of fighting our enemies and helping our friends rather than fighting each other.
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The model for such an effort is the ''dollar-a-year man,'' the highly skilled private-sector leaders who volunteered their services to the government to assist in the World War II effort. With this kind of help, we could quickly be well on the way to building a national political warfare capability.
6. Invest in the instruments of political warfare, including public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, intended to influence perceptions, attitudes, and actions abroad, must be viewed as a form of political warfare. We have been dramatically underfunding an important area of natural American expertise and capability: multimedia communications aimed at foreign audiences. As part of our War Footing strategy, we must stop nickel-and-diming our international broadcasting operations. All too frequently in recent years, we have increased transmission to one region at the expense of reducing it to another.
An immediate and sweeping ramp-up of our international broadcasting capabilities is needed to provide high-quality programming:
Voice of America; ''free radios''; new services like Radio Sawa and Al Hurra; and support for the extremely effective private-sector broadcasts (for example, those beamed into Iran from Los Angeles and more innovative, sometimes covertly sponsored forms).
A range of formats (television, satellite, AM/FM or shortwave radio or both, and the Internet).
Operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, where appropriate.
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Serving every country currently or potentially under assault from Islamism.
The cost of such an ambitious undertaking—though appreciably greater than the stingy investment we are making in international communications today—pales by comparison with the costs of military warfare. The investment will be well repaid if it helps us protect and expand the Free World against the Islamists and their friends, without resorting to further use of military force.
7. Use the Internet as a tool of political warfare. In particular, the power of creative Web sites,Webcasting, and blogging should be aggressively exploited.
8. Strengthen the CIA clandestine services, and authorize and fund them for long-term strategic political warfare.
9. Grant the Department of Defense the primary responsibility for political warfare. Just as the State Department leads in public diplomacy, the ''warfare'' side of communications is legitimately a Pentagon function and must not be assigned to our diplomats.
10. Don't forget political warfare in non-Islamist areas. The United States must combat adversarial political warfare wherever it arises, even in countries traditionally considered friendly. Despite their differences, the United States and Germany continue to have strong political, economic, cultural, and military ties. Yet the Socialist/Green coalition ruling Germany during the first years of the war went out of bounds in its differences with U.S. policy—to the point of deliberately undermining American security interests for the sake of political gain in domestic elections. When politicians cross the line between opposition and sabotage, the United States must have capabilities to battle them politically.
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11. Reinforce and strengthen our friends. By demonstrating that there are not only consequences for opposing us, but also real and tangible benefits from supporting us, we can maximize the chances of our success. Critical in this regard is the American commitment to the continued survival of one of the most exposed countries of the Free World: Israel.
A STATUS REPORT
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that much needs to be done in all of these areas. I commend President Bush for the courageous way in which he has begun to talk about the Islamic fascists and the totalitarian ideology they seek to use to justify the destruction of anti-Islamist Muslims and non-Muslims, alike. This is an absolutely essential precondition to other vital steps.
Yet, as the foregoing list suggests, unless the President's rhetoric is backed up with decisive actions—that is, putting the country on a true war footing, involving among other things, devising the requisite political warfare strategies and applying proven techniques to execute them—it will neither deserve nor receive the needed support from the American people, let alone translate into victory.
It is imperative, moreover, that U.S. policy be coherent and that still is not always the case. For example, it was striking that, in his excellent speech before the Military Officers Association of America on September 5th, President Bush forcefully explained why it is not possible to appease or negotiate with Islamofascists like al Qaeda and its allies. He then proceeded to show convincingly that the behavior and ambitions of such Sunni extremists are shared by their Shia counterparts led by Iran. Yet, his State Department is actively promoting the notion that we can safely and successfully engage in negotiations with Islamofascists like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the ruling mullahs in Tehran.
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Friends and foes alike are affected in ways harmful to our interests by such a manifest lack of consistency and principle. (One case in point is the recent, increasingly aggressive behavior of Iran, both directly on the nuclear issue and in Iraq and through its proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. Another is the deal recently struck by our putative ally, Pakistan with tribal leaders in its western territories, affording what amounts to a safe haven there for al Qaeda.) The same applies to the American people.
THE ENEMY WITHIN
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that America's current totalitarian foe enjoys an advantage of which its forerunners could only have dreamt: Thanks in large measure to an investment by Saudi Arabia going back three decades and costing many tens of billions of dollars, there is in place in this country an apparatus that is at best sympathetic to the Islamists, and at worst an incipient Fifth Column.
This apparatus has a substantial organizational footprint all across the United States. Its elements include: mosques and associated religious schools (madrassas), by some estimates 80% of which have their financing provided by Saudi Arabia; indoctrination efforts on college campuses; recruitment programs run under the guise of prison and military chaplain programs; and front organizations responsible for political influence operations aimed at professional, ecumenical, media and governmental targets.
The Bush Administration, the Congress and the press must be alive to the danger posed by such entities and their activities. This is especially true insofar as these organizations have realized that, by cloaking themselves as adherents to a religion rather than an ideological movement, they can exploit civil liberties afforded by tolerant liberal democracies to undermine them.
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Yet, to an astonishing degree, nearly five years into the active phase of this War for the Free World, we continue to treat many of these organizations—notably, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim Students Associations and others associated with and/or funded by the Saudi-directed Muslim World League—as though they are what they purport to be: legitimate leaders of the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities and both necessary and valued interlocutors with those communities.
In my view, such organizations do not represent the majority of this country's Muslims or Arabs. It is a strategic mistake of the first order to legitimate their bid to do so by: having senior U.S. government officials meet with and seek the counsel of their representatives, allowing such groups to shape—let alone dictate—policy or entrust to them such tasks as ''Muslim sensitivity training'' for the FBI, military or other agencies.
The Islamist footprint in America places a special premium on having robust intelligence sources and methods and effective cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Since U.S. soil is also a theater in the War for the Free World, it behooves us to ensure that the Commander-in-Chief's inherent powers to intercept and monitor battlefield communications remains unencumbered, even when at least one of the parties to such communications is in the United States.
CONCLUSION
In short, Mr. Chairman, we confront a complex, multifaceted and increasingly dangerous world. Islamofascists are on the march. They benefit from the state-sponsorship of oil-rich regimes that subscribe to one strain or another of this totalitarian ideology. Such wealth and the determination to destroy us that is a central purpose of our enemies makes it—all other things being equal—just a matter of time before their attacks on us and/or our allies are inflicted with weapons of mass destruction.
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To make matters worse, governments that are not themselves Islamist (such as that of Vladimir Putin in Russia, the Communist Chinese, Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea and Hugo Chavez's in Venezuela) are aiding and abetting the Islamofascists.
This combination of factors leaves us no choice but to get far more serious about this war than we have been to date. Serious in terms of the nature of the enemy. Serious in terms of what it will take to defeat it—from a vastly larger investment in our military to the mobilization of our people, resources and energies. And serious about adopting the policies and programs, including counter-ideological political warfare-related ones, necessary to ensure that we prevail in this War for the Free World.
I hope that my observations today will help this Committee and the Congress play their respective, indispensable roles in achieving that level of seriousness.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Gaffney. We will go to a quick round of questioning here from our panel, starting with Mr. Sherman and then going to Mr. Poe and Congresswoman Watson. After that we will go to Dr. Phares and Mr. Sanderson.
Do you have any questions at this time?
Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I would point out that one of the big questions is why we haven't been hit so far. I would point out that the Islamic terrorists have learned something. When they carried out a successful attack against the United States on 9/11, it rallied America to undertake action, some of it poorly planned, against them. When they attacked Madrid, it mobilized that country to withdraw from Iraq and to some extent the war on terrorism in general. So I wonder, have the terrorists decided that the way to use terrorism most effectively is to attack Europeans and/or flights between the United States and Europe on the theory that that, by picking off our allies one at a time, that that will be an effective strategy, and/or have they determined that attacks on American soil are counterproductive to their efforts?
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Mr. GAFFNEY. I don't think any of us know the answer to that question. My guess is that this movement is sufficiently inchoate, that there is probably not any direct, you know, command and control that is saying let's attack now or let's not attack now or let's attack them or not attack the others. The truth is I think we are seeing evidence that people are trying to attack us. So I think part of this is a function of the law enforcement and intelligence authorities doing their job, having the tools they need to do the job, thank God, doing it successfully. I think, frankly, part of this is providence. But I must tell you also, Congressman, I worry that part of this is, to the extent that there may be deliberation going on here, that there is a decision that has been made to try to hurt us in a very substantial way, rather than in piecemeal fashion that might simply have the effect of reenergizing this country, perhaps getting the adoption of this war footing that I am talking about. There are ways that it is clear that a very very catastrophic effect could be achieved by these people, and I worry that they are working toward that rather than using more isolated and less consequential attacks to provoke us.
Mr. SHERMAN. I would like both you and the other witness who were testifying earlier to answer this in the context of Timothy McVeigh demonstrated that you don't have to be a rocket scientist to blow up a building in America. The recent arrests in London have shown that if you try to carry out an operation of 9/11 proportions, that that is difficult to do, particularly in a post-9/11 world.
Why is al-Qaeda not hitting us one building at a time? Are they really incapable of blowing up any building anywhere in the United States, or have they decided that they just don't want to do something of a modest scale?
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Mr. BROOKES. Mr. Sherman, I think they would do it if they could. I think we have put up significant barriers to them using intelligence, law enforcement, legal mechanisms, taking the fight overseas. I think they would definitely do it. I think that we have just gotten in their way as they have seen us as the biggest obstacle to achieving their global ambitions. I think we have done the same thing here.
Mr. SHERMAN. You think we have got them disempowered in the United States to the point where they are not as powerful as Timothy McVeigh?
Mr. BROOKES. I would say that that is the case, although I—gosh, knock on wood, right? But I think that that is the case. I think we have put a lot of barriers in their way and it is extremely difficult for them to undertake an act of terrorism here in the U.S. But that doesn't undermine their desire to do so.
Mr. SHERMAN. I believe my time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe.
Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both of you made comments about the fact that our Government is evading the issue. We have complacency. That is kind of the general attitude. I would like to just be specific about that. What do you mean? Either one of you.
Mr. BROOKES. Well, there have been a number of commentators, journals, magazines, academics opining about why we have not had an attack; that this scourge is beyond us, that it happened on 9/11, it is not going to happen again. And I am very concerned that we will let down our guard. And if we do, then I think, just as I said to Mr. Sherman, that we are going to see some sort of terrible event either happening here, or, what I am really worried about is overseas where some of our counterterrorism partners and the security isn't at the levels that we see here in the United States.
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Mr. GAFFNEY. Congressman, I would say that evidence of complacency that worries me is the misunderstanding that we can afford defeatism with respect to any aspect of this conflict. The notion that we can safely withdraw from Iraq, for example, because it has turned out to be hard and messy, is, I am afraid, evidence of people who are not approaching this with the appropriate seriousness. It certainly doesn't equate to an appreciation that we will find ourselves emboldening these Islamofascists were we to yield to them anywhere, let alone in a major place like Iraq where we have tried so hard to have things come out differently.
That is the complacency that I worry about, and we see it in a lot of polls that people think, oh, this doesn't have anything to do with the war on terror, as well as confusion about whether, as Peter says, there really is a war on terror.
Mr. POE. What do you see—you said the global mission of terrorists. I am from Texas so keep it simple. What is the global mission that you see of terrorists?
Mr. GAFFNEY. The global ambition, I think, is what I was trying to get across, that I am referring to, is to create a worldwide Islamist government; caliphate, some call it. Some have other names for it. But the idea is to compel all Muslims, as I say, many of whom do not want to go there, as well as all non-Muslims, to subject themselves to this form of government. That is the totalitarian ambition of a political character, which is really quite reminiscent to that of others that preceded it, Nazism, communism, except this has got that overlay that it is God's will to have it be this way.
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Mr. POE. One quick question. The two bombs that were found in suitcases in Germany in the last 2 weeks that did not detonate, I think the jury is still out on why they didn't detonate. Who do you think is responsible for that?
Mr. BROOKES. It appears to come from Lebanon. And in fact as I mentioned the importance of international cooperation, the Germans from my understanding received a tip from Lebanese intelligence about this. And it appears that the would-be terrorists were somewhat bunglers as well in terms of their trade craft and in terms of their ability to put these weapons together. But the fact is that it certainly could have been a tragedy on the scale of what we saw in Madrid or even in London.
Mr. ROYCE. The answer from the terrorists was that the Danish cartoonists were responsible because they were responding to the Danish cartoons and thought that they would take their battle for some reason to the German civilian population in response. That was their quote.
Congressman Diane Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Much of what I am going to say I am directing toward Mr. Gaffney. I was listening very intently and reading over your remarks. I find them very contradictory. You talk about we must use the tools of ideology, and then you talk about a war on terrorism. Well, if terrorism is an ideology, who are you pointing your guns at?
You talk about defeatism. You talk about not pulling our troops out of Iraq. Who is the enemy in Iraq? I have not been able to identify is it the Sunnis; is it the Shiites; is it the Kurds; is it the Iranians?
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Now I hear the Administration trying to say the war on terrorism is on the fields in Iraq. I want to quote something Martin Luther King said: ''An eye for an eye leaves everyone blind. A tooth for a tooth leaves everyone toothless. A body for a body will leave everyone dead.''
How have you won the war on terrorism? If it is an ideology, then what is victory in Iraq? Why do we have to have guns pointed and ammunition if we are trying to win a movement? I don't even think we ought to call it a war. It is a movement against, I think, terrorism; is it not? You can respond in just a minute.
And then, too, of course, I am antiwar. Do you think we will ever evolve to the level where we don't have to use a gun or other weapons to fight terrorism? How do we win the hearts and the minds of people who want to do us harm and who hate us? Do we actually go on foreign soil and shoot everyone in sight that we think might be?
I am very confused. If you say we must use the tools of political warfare against terrorism, and then we talk about Muslim ideology, they seem to think it is a global war against Islam. And so how do you separate it out, you know, the shooting war and the war for the minds and hearts? And how do we show we have won it in Iraq? When is victory declared? The President says when they stand up, we will stand down. What does that mean?
And we have had more of our people killed since they declared mission accomplished. I thought our mission was to go in, find the weapons of mass destruction, get Saddam Hussein, put him on trial, and give justice. We are still fighting. And I don't understand what it is. They have an elected Parliament. I don't understand what victory is in Iraq. Can you explain, please?
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Mr. GAFFNEY. I will try to do justice to as many of those questions as I can in the short time.
Ms. WATSON. I have personally eschewed this term, war on terror, because, as I said in my statement, I think it confuses people as to the fact that terror is not an enemy. It is not an enemy in Iraq, it is not an enemy in London, it is not an enemy in New York.
Terror is a tool used by people, most of whom at the moment are adherents to this ideology. The ideology I call Islamofascism is about totalitarian political goals. It is true, I think, in Iraq, although not all of the people engaged in that struggle are necessarily Islamofascist. There seems to be some remnants of the Ba'athists who are supposedly secular. But many of them are Sunni Islamofascists or Shiite Islamofascists. We are fighting them there, I believe, today in the hope that we will help the Iraqi people who have exhibited a desire not to live under a kind of regime like the Taliban imposed.
Ms. WATSON. Can you tell me who they are? It is kind of a faceless enemy, correct?
Mr. GAFFNEY. Well, I mean, there are faces that have been associated with it. Some of them are like Zarqawi, for example.
Ms. WATSON. No. No. Who are the current—who is the current enemy in Iraq? Who do you want to kill? Who do you want to stop? Who is our target?
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Mr. GAFFNEY. Let me come to that question, if I may. I think there are people like Sadr and his ilk who are people we are fighting today. But my point in the testimony and particularly in the book, Congresswoman, is we cannot win this war by using just military means. We don't have the military means to win this war globally if it comes to that. The point of my testimony is to lay out a whole series of nonmilitary means. And, indeed, we talk in the book about a comprehensive strategy that is out of 10 steps, only 1 of them has to do with the military.
So my feeling is, not unlike yours, that we all should be antiwar. We shouldn't have to wage war against people unless it is absolutely necessary. I personally believe that it was against Saddam Hussein. I believe it will probably be against some of these Islamofascists. But the trick is going to be and our success will hinge upon our application of this strategy, to use these other tools where we can, to strengthen those Muslims who do not want to go the way the Islamofascists would take them, and to help make common cause against these guys to defeat them nonmilitarily wherever possible, but using force where absolutely necessary.
Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask one question, if I could, of Mr. Brookes. In December last year, the New York Times disclosed the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which aimed to interdict al-Qaeda communications. Could you please walk us through this program, and, in your opinion, how detrimental to our efforts was this revelation? I shared in my opening statement the comment that the Prime Minister of Israel, Prime Minister Olmert, made to me about his feeling about how detrimental this was.
Mr. BROOKES. Well, you touched on two things, Chairman. And I am not briefed into the Terrorist Surveillance Program, but from working on the outside here, and having worked in the Navy in cryptotology, and worked with NSA, I have some understandings of it.
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You touched on two points. One is the leaks. These hurt us, there is no doubt about it. If you talk to people in the Intelligence Community, and we know how important intelligence cooperation is with international partners, that these leaks really hurt us. Not only are they embarrassing, in some cases there are some countries where the populace is not fond of Uncle Sam, the United States, and they really don't want their cooperation with us known even though that cooperation is important to both sides. So sometimes it is embarrassing. It also can endanger field operatives. It can also disclose important sources and methods of intelligence.
It is really a tragedy. It is not only a crime, it is also a tragedy, and it undermines our efforts, especially of those brave men and women in the intelligence field and in the military, who are doing their best to protect us.
But in terms of the program, what this is is simply network analysis. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me from the lawyers I have spoken to that this is not an illegal program. It allows us to track terrorist communications. It allows us to create a network, if we have a known terrorist or a terrorist suspect, of who they are communicating with, that is critically important to us foiling plots.
The President hasn't been completely forthcoming about operations because of the sensitivity of the program or the successes of this program, but it seems clear to me that it has; it is an important tool in our tool kit for dealing with terrorism, and it is important to our security, and it seems to me that it is really indispensable in fighting challenges of terrorism today.
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So my view is that, really, not only the leaks hurt us and the leak of a sensitive program like this, because it tells the terrorists exactly what they might do to evade our detection, but it also ultimately hurts us in trying to defend this country. Intelligence is our first line of defense, and without it I think we are actually fighting or trying to undertake this effort with one arm tied behind our backs.
Mr. ROYCE. We had an opportunity in two field hearings that I held, one in Laredo, Texas, to hear from one local sheriff who told us they are concerned that the border with Mexico is being used as the front door to this country and that the terrorists are already in our back yards. As the sheriff said, many of the illegal immigrants from countries of special interest are apprehended along the southwest border. To avoid apprehension, we feel that many of these terrorists attempt to blend in with persons of Hispanic origin when entering the country. Any thoughts on that?
Mr. GAFFNEY. I think that is a very distinct possibility. We recommend that we put a fence across that border. Unfortunately the reality is that we have already let a lot of folks into this country, and I am sure that some of them have already been insinuated in who are in this category.
Mr. ROYCE. Fortunately, the brother of one of the Hezbollah operatives was apprehended in Detroit. But he came in in the trunk of a car across the border and then was subsequently caught in a scam raising money for Hezbollah in Detroit.
Mr. Brookes, any thoughts?
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Mr. BROOKES. I have heard the same sort of thing. I think that is something we have to be very concerned about as well as our northern border. I don't think it is just the southern border. I have some concerns about Canada's immigration policy. And so I don't think it is just the southern border, and I share your concerns.
Mr. ROYCE. Gentlemen, watch your clocks. You might feel lucky to get out to Dulles before your flight is out. But I am going to go now to Dr. Walid Phares and Mr. Sanderson.
Dr. Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies as well as the European Foundation for Democracy. He has authored eight books on terrorism in the Middle East, the most recent being, Future Jihad, which I am currently reading. He also leads the Foundations of Future of Terrorism. He is a terrorism analyst for MSNBC. Dr. Phares is frequently consulted by European commissioners, European Parliament members, and legislators, officials, and diplomats.
We also have Mr. Thomas Sanderson. He is the deputy director and fellow in the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. He is also the codirector of the Multilateral Terrorism Intelligence Sharing Project and the Private Sector Advisory Group. He has served as a defense analyst with the Science Applications International Corporation, where he conducted extensive studies of terrorist groups for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Office of Counterterrorism Analysis. Mr. Sanderson is a terrorism course instructor, lecturer, and a consultant for the U.S. Government, for the private sector, and for media and academic communities. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson.
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Dr. Phares.
STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. PHARES. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Congresswoman Watson, thank you very much for inviting me. It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss this very important issue. My contribution is titled ''Projecting Future Jihadi Terrorism Five Years after 9/11.'' The full text of my remarks have been submitted to your office. You could have access to them.
I have worked on understanding the mind of those who I call and define as jihadists with all the various schools of thought they have for the last 25 years. I have analyzed their strategies, plans, thinking process; met with some; exchanged articles; published articles in various languages including Arabic; and followed through the way they have evolved for about a quarter of a century before the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, and, of course, leading into 9/11.
The first point I would like to raise quickly is about, as my colleague mentioned before me, Mr. Frank Gaffney, who is the enemy? And in Congress and elsewhere, the same in the European Parliament, are beginning to engage in debate with the first point, who is that enemy? And is it really only a terrorist organization? Does the terrorist organization express a tip of the iceberg which is much bigger, much deeper? Who makes a terrorist? Usually is it the school? Is it a network? So on and so forth.
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There are two quick points in the issue of defining the enemy. One is the name. Two, who are these organizations? With regard to the name, I do suggest, strongly suggest, that the U.S. Government and democracies around the world really cross that line and begin officially to define the identity of these organizations and movements. Yes, we have heard that officials here and across the Atlantic have used a variety of names, including Islamofascism, Islamoterrorism, terrorism, Islamists, and there has been many, many debates about it because of the link to religion. The terrorists themselves, those who attacked us on 9/11, we continue to battle with in the Sunni Triangle, those who have linked themselves to Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Algeria to the Horn of Africa to all over the world, they call themselves—they have a name for themselves. It is the al jihadiyun, the jihadists. The National Socialists of Europe, Fascists of Italy, have called themselves with names that were used until the end of that war.
So I move to suggest that the countries involved in the war on terror would finalize and define, and the legislative branches are very important in this process, the name of that enemy with the name that the enemy uses for itself; that is, the jihadists.
The jihadists are of two ideological trees. It is very important in order to project into the future to understand that these are two different trees. One is the Salafists, those who include all sorts of groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah. They have one vision of the world, one vision of the future of that world. And the other tree are the Khomeinists, the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini.
And I think the United States and its allies for the last 25 years have been dealing with two trees, meaning with two type of strategies. Sometimes they do converge, and other times they are diverging, and we need to look at both scenarios. When those are fighting at the same time, against the same enemy. When one of them is stopping, the other is moving forward.
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I do think that our counterterrorism strategy, our defense strategy in the war on terror at least after 9/11 should a little bit reform in the way of thinking and the way of recapturing the whole picture of that war waged against the United States. And Congress should do a great job in refining this and teaching actually the public, because we do have a massive confusion Madam Congresswoman spoke about, and that has to be dealt with if we want to be successful in the outcome of the so-called war on terror.
Quickly, the jihadi wars against the U.S. leading to 9/11 should lead us to understand what were the projections for the wars against the U.S. after 9/11 and, of course, into the future, which is the theme that, Mr. Chairman, you assigned us with.
It is strategically important to reassess the campaigns against America leading to 9/11. We have seen different things, different groups doing different battles against us for the last 25 years. The Jihadist Khomeinist followers of Iran, Hezbollah and others engaged the United States from 1983 at least—if you want to call 1980 with the crisis of the Embassy, that would be fine as well—but engaged us violently from 1983 to 1990. They stopped in 1990. They converted their strategy into solidification of their power in the Middle East, engaging Israel, engaging other forces in the region, preparing for the future engagement with the United States that we may be looking at very seriously if we decide to adopt a different policy with Iran if Ahmadinejad's regime would like to acquire those weapons of mass destruction, let us call them nuclear, no matter what the U.N. Would have to decide.
In the 1990s then, something else happened. The Salafists, jihadists who were not engaging the United States in the 1980s, but preparing for their attack 10 years after, were basically engaging against a variety of battlefields, Kashmir, Sudan, Palestine, Chechnya. I mean, these are facts that should be factored into the strategic analysis of how they move. What do they really want? A group among them that formed al-Qaeda—and I hope that our Government will begin a good perception of why did al-Qaeda decide to do 9/11. Some part of it has been discussed and debated in the 9/11 Commission proceedings 2 years ago; some other aspects have still to be addressed, and I will address at least one point of these issues.
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On that point, Mr. Chairman, the major strategic failure of the U.S. and of its allies was the inability to identify or to counter the jihadi penetration and action both internationally and nationally before 9/11. That is—before 9/11. That is a major lesson. And the 9/11 Commission final report of 2004 covered a significant aspect of these historical failures, no doubt about it, throughout the 1990s, but missed two major ones. First, the fact that the U.S. and its allies did not identify the ideology of jihadism as the producer of terrorists and terrorism. If we don't identify that, we are going to continue that war against the terrorists, but not against the factory. And, second, the fact that the jihadists strategic penetration, ideological penetration of the homeland here and of the other democratic nations elsewhere was a threat to national security. The ideology that produces a jihadist is the one that basically is responsible for the acts of terrorism.
Since 9/11—allow me, Mr. Chairman, now to answer quickly some of the questions that your Committee has put forth for us. Is there a progress in the struggle against Islamic terrorism, I would call it jihadism? My answer summarizes as, ''Yes, but.'' Internationally, al-Qaeda lost a regime. That is important to keep in mind. And, more important is the fact that they were not able in the following 5 years to produce another regime. So they lost the regime. They certainly have been able to recruit larger numbers of militants, but from Islamist pools—from Islamist fundamentalist pools that have been produced for the previous 20 years. But in return, the fact that a number of societies have been able—have been unable, actually, to access to freedom have been able to produce anti-jihadist energies by people who were freed, that has to be taken into consideration. And the results of the societies that have been freed even partially is not going to be seen immediately, because those civil societies who have been freed are not going to use the Kalishnikovs and counter terrorism with explosives. They are going to produce the next generation, which is going to cut off the oxygen, the ideological oxygen, to the fundamentalists.
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If the American public doesn't understand that the current confrontation is not going to bear fruit in terms of finding weapons of mass destruction or finding Osama bin Laden somewhere; it is about finding the next generation with whom we in the West or the international community could work for a better future with no weapons and no confrontations in the future.
To summarize it, before 9/11 the jihadists were fighting a downhill battle against us. Since 9/11, we are fighting an uphill battle against them. We haven't yet reached the tipping point where we will be fighting a downhill battle against them. And that is very important in our assessment in the U.S. and elsewhere about that war.
Within the United States totally, al-Qaeda lost one thing we need to be aware of. They lost the ability for a surprise war against the United States, but not the ability for surprise attacks against the United States. There is the difference between breaking down national security, as was the case, for example, in Madrid. And in Madrid, what al-Qaeda won was to break down the will for engagement of the jihadists in Spain. In the United States and in Great Britain, that didn't happen. And this is a very important difference that we need to look at.
The rise of homeland security, although not perfect—I would say very imperfect—by itself engaged the resources of the United States, both government and civil society, to actually understand that there is a threat. Before 9/11, we were blind. We were culturally blind, ideologically blind, politically blind, not as an Administration or previous Administrations, in my sense, but as a Nation, to the whole—to the fact that we have been targeted by the jihadists for a simple reason. I have been a professor for 14 years, and I have seen many, many classrooms. If we are not taught and explained by our own academic establishment that this Nation basically is facing a threat of the kind of national socialism, fascism, or Bolshevism, or racism, or other, then certainly our times are not going to be engaged in the resistance against that part of terrorism.
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The second question, was Islamic terrorism weakened? I would say yes. However, the international coalition thrusted into the areas of where the jihadists are coming from. It opened a space for anti-jihadist forces to engage. But it did not really help very much those societies to tip the balance. On the other hand, the jihadists have further infiltrated democracies, not just the United States, but elsewhere, have lost the ability for a first generation of jihadists. We are not going to see much of Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah kind of jihadists who are going to cross the Atlantic and attack us. They may, but who they are counting on are U.S. citizens born here, speaks the language, no accent, having the citizenship, and yet being touched by this ideology.
This leads me to the conclusion that the enemy for the future is going to be the capacity of al-Qaeda to instill the ideology in the mind of young people, including within the United States, and they on their own will be more lethal because they are part of this Nation, and that could cause us tremendous trouble.
There are plenty of other comments I would like to make. I will just summarize that my points would have been, yes, we do have three deficiencies in the war on terror. I could expand on that. Yes, they are drawing support from pools that already exist within the Nation. Americans by instinct are understandable of the fact that we are at war, but the debate they see—and I am going to be very honest and direct about it—make them undecided as to what are the next stage of that war on terror.
And I conclude by saying that one recommendation: We need to win the battle of identifying the enemy. We need to win the battle of at least intercepting the terrorists before they act, but before they become terrorists as well. We need to intercept the jihadists before they become terrorists. And, finally, it is very important to understand that in order to defeat this ideology, and I think this goes straight to the code of Congress, of any legislative branch, we need to address that ideology and see if an ideology that calls for violence, directly calls for violence, could be legal in a democracy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Phares.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
''PROJECTING FUTURE JIHADI TERRORISM FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11''
Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Members of the Committee,
It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the theme ''9/11: Five Years Later, Gauging Islamist Terrorism.'' My contribution is titled: ''Projecting Future Jihadi Terrorism, five years after 9/11''
1. Who is the enemy?
The first question to be addressed is the identification of the enemy. Who are they and how do we identify them? For one analytical mistake made at this level would send the United States and its allies fighting either the wrong war or against the wrong enemy: America's efforts may be derailed by an enemy deflecting our attention from the real objectives, or deflected from engaging the enemy's most vital assets he has against us.
a. The issue of the name:
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The enemy who flew airliners against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the one the US defeated in Tora Bora and are still engaging in the Sunni triangle in Iraq; and that enemy which is still striking against Democracies and allies around the world has a name for itself: Jihadists (al jihadiyun). It uses an ideology with a name, Jihadism (al jihadiya); it recruits with a very specific set of doctrines and operates under ideologically-grounded strategies: Hence, the U.S needs to be specific in calling the enemy with its real name. U.S leaders shouldn't be vague in their description of the enemy as Terrorists-only or to be dragged into the enemy's trap as to alleged distortion of ''what Jihad could mean.'' U.S leaders can surely use a variety of descriptions, such as Islamists, Islamo-Fascists, Islamic-Terrorists, but the US Government and the allies in the War on Terror should define the enemy officially as Jihadists.
b. The two trees
The Jihadists are of two ideological types: Salafist, who are radicals who developed within Sunni societies, and Khomenists, who are radicals who developed within Shiia communities. The Salafists have various ideological and political branches: Wahabis, Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi and others. From this ''tree'' came al Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya, Salafi Combat Group, and dozens of smaller groups around the world. The Khomeinists are the radical clerics in control of Iran. They have created Hezbollah in Lebanon, and along with the latter expanded cells around the world. The head of Salafi Jihadists today is al Qaeda; the head of Khomeinist Jihadism is the Iranian regime.
2 The Jihadi wars against the US leading to 9/11
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It is strategically important to reassess the history of the Jihadi campaigns against America leading to 9/11. The first Terrorist engagement against U.S presence was by Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah as of 1983 in Beirut. The Khomeinist direct Terror campaign lasted till 1990 before it entered a second stage of regional expansion, and strategic penetration and preparation worldwide and within the United States for the future. The Salafi Jihadists before 1990, were concentrating on the Soviet Union, but preparing against America and the West. Since 1990, they refocused on the US, on its allies and within the Arab World.
During the 1990s, the Salafi Jihadists waged Terror in multiple countries, including in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Russia, Kashmir, Sudan, the Philippines, and beyond. Their international network, al Qaeda concentrated on the United States. Al Qaeda and its allies penetrated Democracies and America since the 1990s. The major strategic failure of the U.S and of its allies was their inability to identify or to counter the Jihadi penetration and action both internationally and nationally. The 9/11 Commission Final Report of 2004 covered a significant aspect of these historical failures throughout the 1990s, but missed two major ones: First, the fact that the U.S and its allies didn't identify the ideology of Jihadism as the producer of Terrorists and Terrorism; and second, the fact that the Jihadi strategic penetration of the Homeland was in fact a threat to national security. A ''September 11'' was possible because the enemy counted on the poor perception by the Government, little mobilization by the public, and more importantly, the possibility that the Jihadi factory within America will be able to produce Future Terrorism.
3) War with Jihadism since 9/11
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a) Is there a progress in the struggle against ''Islamic Terrorism?''
There has been a significant progress in the conflict with Jihadi-Terrorism, both internationally and within the U.S Homeland.
Internationally: al Qaeda lost the one regime that provided a state-sponsoring of its worldwide activities, Afghanistan. It wasn't able to reclaim any other regime yet. While it has recruited larger numbers of militants from the Islamist pools around the world, anti-Jihadist energies were also freed in many countries such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as in other areas. More countries are putting minimal energies against the rising Jihadi efforts, which is a better global situation than before 9/11. This is progress in the war but the turning point—in either direction—didn't occur yet.
Within the US: Al Qaeda lost the ability of a strategic surprise war since 9/11, but not its ability for strikes yet. By creating the Homeland Security Structure and maintaining a minimal mobilization of the public, the US Government has been making progress on the domestic front, in comparison with regression before 9/11.
But this progress, both internationally and domestically, is hanging on the ability of the United States and its allies to move forward, faster and with a strategic mutation in the next stage of the War with al Qaeda, while also preparing for the possibility of the engagement by the ''Khomeinist'' threat abruptly. If the US stops, waiver, or confuse its vision of its enemies and their plans, the entire progress can be reversed to the advantage of the Jihadi Terrorists.
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b) Was ''Islamic Terrorism'' weakened?
In summary: The Islamists have been weakened in ways they haven't understood yet, but they would soon realize and act accordingly; but at the same time they have empowered themselves in the US in ways Americans haven't fully grasped yet, but they can still reverse. By thrusting into their areas of production and spreading, the US-led coalition opened spaces for counter-Jihadi forces to rise. Al Qaeda and its allies, and the Iranian regime and its allies feel the danger but they can't assess the long term challenge they will be facing. Unfortunately, the international coalition also doesn't seem to realize that with few more initiatives, it can turn the tide on the Jihadists. However a number of strategic shortcomings are stopping the coalition from turning that tide. If the US-led campaign is not given the opportunity to redirect some of its resources into engaging the War of Ideas successfully, the future of this War on Terror is at risk. The Islamists-Jihadists have also penetrated Democracies, including the US, in ways that aren't fully comprehended yet among the public and large segment of Government. They have been weakened in their pre-9/11 classical abilities to infiltrate. But their second generation is growing in recruitment and thus in Terrorism potential, until a higher level mobilization takes place in America.
c) Are there deficiencies in the struggle against ''Islamic Terrorism?''
Yes there are three types of deficiencies:
1. A war of ideas is still been waged against the American strategic perception of the enemy. Ideological efforts are ongoing to blur the vision of Americans in general, media and Government in particular with regards to the identity of the enemy, its aims, its strategies and the strategies needed to defeat it.
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2. One result of the misperception of the enemy is granting the Jihadists more time and capacity to further infiltrate and penetrate the country.
3. Another result of the misperception of the enemy is failing to empower potential allies in the Greater Middle East, particularly civil society entities.
d) How has Jihadism evolved since 9/11
Inside the US and its allies in Europe, the Jihadist movement is absorbing the counter terrorism pressures, analyzing the measures and is mutating to bypass them. It has designed two stages in its warfare: One is the development stage. It covers the spread of the ideology, the recruitment from the indoctrinated pools of militants, and the penetration of the national systems. The second stage occurs when the strikes are prepared and launched. U.S systems are countering them only at the final stage that is, in their preparation for Terror activities.
e) From where are they drawing support?
The Jihadists inside the United States are drawing their support from the reality that their space of indoctrination, recruitment and mobilization is not under legal or public sanctioning or pressure. They can operate up to 90% of their strategic growth under the current laws.
f) Are Americans complacent in considering the terrorist threat?
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Since 9/11, the subsequent conflicts, and the Terror horrors around the world, the American public in general is developing a greater concern regarding the Jihadi Terror threat. Most Americans, by instincts and through images, understand that the threat is real and great. But the public is submitted to diverging final analysis on the War on Terror on behalf of its officials, politicians, media and academics. Thus the full talents of society are not mobilized yet.
g) What does the recent Hezbollah/Israel conflict mean for the broader struggle against terrorism?
Hezbollah's initial trigger of the War with Israel in July 2006, regardless of the current consequences, indicated that the Iran-Syria axis has reached a point of non return with the international community and has decided to wage a wider Terror war to deflect the immediate pressures: The UN Nuclear crisis with the Ahmedinijad regime and the UN investigation in the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri regarding Syria. In fact the greater concerns of Tehran and Damascus are the democracy experiments in the region and across their borders, from Afghani and Iraqi elections to the Cedars Revolution in Lebanon. The course of events in Lebanon and Iraq shows, despite the UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, that the intelligence-Terrorist apparatus of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, of Hezbollah and other organizations including Hamas and PIJ, are moving to position themselves to act not only to confront Israel, but to renew the Terror war in Lebanon, increase Terror involvement in Iraq, trigger additional Terror action from Gaza and the West Bank, and threaten moderate Arab countries. A more dangerous move on behalf of this regional axis would be to use its assets and networks around the world and within the US for Terror activities, when decision in that sense is made. But the most dangerous threat to be faced by American and Western security, if not international security, would be in the next five years, actions taken simultaneously by both ''trees,'' even without direct coordination, and eventually using unconventional weapons.
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4: General recommendations
Five years after, learning from the road to 9/11, and reading in the strategies of the Jihadists from both ''trees,'' I would offer the following recommendations, some of which I have advanced in my book Future Jihad.
A: The U.S and its allies must deliver and win the battle of identifying, defining and naming the enemy. Legislative branches in America and within Democracies worldwide must have the political courage, the right knowledge and the wisdom to address this challenge. The current state of national and international laws is not able to provide a historic basis for Governments, media and public to mobilize fully against an enemy living and thriving within these societies.
B: Counter Terrorism strategies must be designed to intercept the Jihadists before they engage in Terror acts, and intercept the ideological threat before it produce the Jihadists. To do so, the public must be granted the knowledge and provided with the right information. With a higher level of national talents, Homeland Security's capacities will meet the growing challenge before it reaches irreversible trends.
C: From other countries one could learn from components of successful experiences: Jordan and Morocco in the Muslim confrontation of Islamist extremism, the UK and Australia in their counter Terrorism tactics; but also learn from the resistance of civil societies to Terrorist ideologies in the Greater Middle East.
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D: The nation is facing the challenge of what is being described as a choice between Civil Liberties and National Security: It is a false choice that shouldn't be imposed on the citizens of America and Democracies worldwide. For by educating, informing and preparing citizens, legislators, judges and public servants regarding the nature of the enemy, a common understanding of its ideology, plans and tactics, would bring together the various components of US national security and justice, without even having to weaken liberties. A better informed judge (known as Counter Terrorism Judges in Europe) would work faster and easier with Law enforcement, and better informed citizens wouldn't feel that the choice is even to be made between security and rights. From that perspective ''Monitoring'' will be directed at the Terrorists and citizens would be excluded systematically from discrimination. The real resistance against Terrorism will be achieved when citizens will be part of that effort to isolate the Terrorists.
C: To better ''attack the ideology fueling Terrorism'' the United States must first pin it down, explain it, name it and expose it. The US Congress, representing the American People must enact laws that would equate the Jihadism of al Qaeda and Hezbollah with racism and Terrorism. Once the public at home and civil societies overseas can see the ideology of the enemy, then they can isolate it and reject it as is the case of Fascism, Nazism and Racism. Salafist and Khomeinist Jihadism are the pillars of Jihadism. They should be denounced and rendered illegal: Militant ideologies, that renders segments of humanity vulnerable to violence, murder and genocide cannot be allowed to recruit within civil societies.
In conclusion, the United States and its allies are delivering an up hill battle against an enemy that has prepared for and declared a universal war against free societies and democracy, decades before America decided to respond. However to reach the turning point in the War on Terror, the War of Ideas has to be won: The American public has to be granted real knowledge of the enemy and civil societies overseas have to be granted real support. This is how Jihadi Terrorism can be defeated historically.
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In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony today. I look forward to responding to any question that you might have.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Sanderson.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT AND FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and Ranking Member Sherman and Congresswoman Watson, for this opportunity to testify today.
I won't go much into my opening statement. A lot of that has been covered. So what I would like to do is just address briefly the specific questions that were offered today: Has Islamist terrorism been weakened? I think in short the answer to that question appears to be no, despite some tactical victories. I think—I am happy to see that people have identified that this is about an ideological movement and a violent Islamist extremist movement, and not about terrorism itself. That is a tremendously important distinction.
There is little recognition that what we face is a widespread struggle within Islam, and that by definition U.S. Western or non-Muslim forces are on multiple levels not able to confront and ultimately vanquish Islamist extremism. The movement's components are part ideological, part religious, part social, and part political. We don't understand what those components are. We can identify them, but we cannot understand them without tremendous help on the ground. It is a local battle.
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The solutions include, first and foremost, working with and supporting local Muslim and Arab leaders, while at the same time shifting emphasis away from our largely military-led response, very good in Afghanistan, ill-advised in Iraq. But at this point so many other components are needed, and until this becomes—this understanding and this shift becomes a core component of our strategy, we will continue treading water.
Is the American public complacent? Yes, I believe so. And no matter which side you are sitting on, whether you support a robust military-led intervention or a multifaceted approach that includes all elements of power, I think that Americans are complacent about this. People still want to believe that they are safe, despite the fact of what happened on 9/11, and that is pretty frustrating.
Who supports violent extremist movements and engaging terrorism? Clearly, a wide variety of people. States have always supported it. That has been reduced. One of the positive aspects of the war in Iraq is that it has certainly put countries on notice that there is no safe harbor. If you are going to support terrorists, you are no different than the terrorist groups themselves, and you will be targeted.
Individuals, charities, business people, families, travel groups. The negative side of the Iraq war has really expanded the number of supporters and the variety of supporters, I am afraid to say. Young Muslim men and some women continue to fill the ranks of established and recently rising homegrown groups. As you know well by now, New York's Muslim population offers fertile ground for recruitment, planning, and support. And many Muslim and Arab countries' support comes from similar youth who often sit idle for lack of opportunity, but they also have access to satellite television, to the Internet, to DVDs, to traveling jihadists, folks who go around the world supporting these ideas. They have great access to information, but few outlets.
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How has violent extremism evolved in the last 5 years? You have heard ad nauseam, it has gone from al-Qaeda central to a networked, franchised movement. We have no fears that soon after the successful toppling of the Taliban, that is where it went.
The emergence of self-starter groups dominates the landscape now, but it is not the only thing. I still believe that al-Qaeda remains capable of conducting attacks—not conducting attacks, but of planning, and certainly of inspiring attacks. Instructions can pass from bin Laden or from Zawahiri through a maze of human couriers and eventually show up on videophone via videophone, fax, e-mail, CD, DVD, Web sites, or through individuals. There is no inability for them to get that message out and for them to get instructions out. And, besides, we have Aljazeera playing tapes, and we know that these signal people to take any plan off the shelf and put it into action. He said, attack at will.
Assessing the threat policy priorities. The recent announcement by President Bush that the top operational leaders of the September 11 attacks will be brought to trial is an important step. For too long the U.S. has been crippled by the widespread perception that we do not hold ourselves to the highest legal standards. But it takes much more than PR and even deeds at home such as bringing these individuals to trial. Subtle but strong pressure on Muslim and Arab to enact genuine social and economic and political reforms are vital.
The Israeli-Palestinian problem deserves a robust and determinative attention. I heard before from before Congressman Sherman clearly that at the height of our best work on that is when these acts were being planned. But, of course, these acts and these attacks were being planned based on grievances that go back for a tremendous amount of time. But, nonetheless, take away as many items from their extremist agenda as possible.
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There also remains a longstanding threat to our security, and, in fact, the world security, and that is Russian tactical nuclear weapons. They continue to be relegated to the back burner of policy priorities. If our leaders don't want the next smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud, then why have we not made more progress in securing the thousands of remaining tactical nuclear weapons?
Weapons of mass destruction demand immediate attention. After all, if our primary motivation for going into Iraq was WMD, why aren't Russian loose tactical nuclear weapons a top priority? That is a very fair question to ask. While the probability of nuclear weapon use is low, the consequences go far beyond our imagination.
How do we measure success and failures? In such a multifaceted transnational problem about which the U.S. only understands part and can only make a certain amount of impact, metrics cannot be reliable, but there are some measurements that can offer us an indication of trends and of our own securities or trends toward security. The numbers of remaining Russian tactical nuclear weapons are one of them. The degree of that security, that hopefully steadily reducing number of those, is one metric.
Public opinion in the Muslim world, not a perfect indicator, but certainly one measure.
The degree of social, political, and economic reform in countries that produce many of these extremists could also serve as an indicator of the broader struggle to reduce numbers in power, in reach of these movements.
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A reduction in the number of madrassas or reform in the number of these madrassas, these Koranic schools that you are familiar with that produce young men who hate India, hate Israel, hate the United States, hate the West, reforming them or reducing those numbers would be a metric that would be encouraging, but, again, not the end-all.
Finally, a drop in terrorist incidents and the number of people killed can serve as an indicator, but we have to be very careful here. That factor cannot be relied on, because while small actors and less ambitious plans may be foiled, future spectaculars likely to be attempted by al-Qaeda, which I do believe they are thinking about doing, and other groups, will be years in the making and could surprise us just as we think the trend is turning positive.
Are government agencies properly structured to combat international terrorism? It will come as no surprise to you to hear me say that I think we are in deep trouble in this regard. A lot of my contacts throughout the national security community report mixed messages about the structure and restructuring of our agencies. Seventy-five percent I would say are negative, with most of it directed toward DHS and the FBI. In a recent report that we did that just came out this week, you have a copy of it up there, with a fair assessment of six different areas, we refer to the DHS as a holding company and not as an integrated department.
There is also disbelief and discouragement over the role of the Office of Director of National Intelligence and its increasing size. But, most of all, it is the Pentagon's trump card over the DNI that causes most people to shake their heads. As you well know, a late addition to the legislation creating John Negroponte's office was that the authorities granted to the DNI respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of heads of departments of the United States Government. This obviously is a problem and is contradictory to the will to put Ambassador Negroponte in charge of all intelligence capabilities.
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What is the proper balance between civil liberties and aggressively checking terrorism? Terrorists are using technology that at times exceeds our surveillance capabilities and countermeasures, and which exploits our rules governing investigations and monitoring. We should not fail to change these laws and respond to the enemies' tactics as soon as possible. But because we are a Nation of laws, and importantly because Congress has the constitutional role in formulating or amending them, any changes should be made with your full participation.
Are Iran and Hezbollah more of a threat than al-Qaeda? Very difficult to say, but there is no doubt a profound threat. Iran's apparent interest in attaining nuclear weapons upsets the balance of power in the region. In addition to Israel's reaction, which will be forceful, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may feel compelled to sharply increase their military capabilities and to possibly pursue nuclear weapons, which would not be good.
Before al-Qaeda's September 11th attack, Hezbollah killed more Americans than any other terrorist groups. They are lethal, highly skilled, whether they are dug in in southern Lebanon or conducting operations overseas, where they have scored some pretty impressive strikes and operations. We know about them in Argentina, in Australia, recruitment in the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa dealing with the diamond trade, in North Carolina with the cigarette smuggling case. They are good, and they can do basically anything. Highly skilled.
What could be done to better attack the ideology fueling Islamist terrorism? That has been covered, so let me skip that in the interest of time.
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Your last question was, in 2011, what will we see? I think that a lot of American citizens and leaders are not happy where we are today, and 5 years came pretty quickly, and I think 2011 is going to arrive just as quickly, and serious thought needs to go into our plans and policies to make sure that we don't feel as insecure then as I think people do now.
Some of the things we will ask: Why didn't we take control of more loose Russian nuclear weapons, which should be one of our number one top priorities? How did we allow Afghanistan to be retaken by a combined Taliban/al-Qaeda force? They are amassing in numbers of 500 and 600; just a couple years ago in bands of 5 and 6 people. Opium production, over 6,000 tons. This will fuel and swell the coffers of terror groups. I mean, this is a huge problem.
We might also ask how is it that Hezbollah gained control of most of Lebanon? And how did we allow the emergence of a mini-Iranian protectorate in southern Iraq in control of a lot of revenues? Why are soldiers still in Iraq? Why have we spent $400 billion?
Some of the positive questions we may be asking if we do the right things: How did America help local Muslim and Arab leaders successfully confront Islamist extremists in their countries? How were Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri finally killed, and where were they living? Why didn't we begin a highly successful 2007 Bush plan, a version of the Marshall Plan, that invested money and time in the massive, widespread provision of social and economic services to Muslim countries that put us in a great light? So much of it, again, is about hearts and minds. You have heard that ad nauseam, but that remains to be true.
A brief conclusion. Administration officials are, in fact, speaking of the struggle against violent Islamist extremism as a long war. And it is true that the enemy's proven abilities to successfully adapt to countermeasure signals that several more cycles of action and reaction will dot the horizon. But there is much that other nations and the United States have to do before this struggle's outcome is no longer in doubt.
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During the Cold War, the U.S. and our allies built tremendous intelligence, academic, economic, and other capabilities to confront and eventually prevail against the totalitarian adversary. Today we boast few of those capabilities. We do not speak radical Islam's language, understand their culture and history, nor can we pretend to solve their problems with military or other means. The role to be played by Muslim and Arab leaders in countries where these struggles within Islam and with secular leaders are taking place will be paramount. As soon as the United States begins this wholesale shift in emphasis, the sooner we will be reopening all those American culture centers that we have closed over the last few years.
Thank you very much for your time.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT AND FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Introduction
After five years of tremendous effort and expense rendered by the United States of America and our allies in the ''global war on terror,'' there has been some progress made in preventing follow-on terror attacks. Tactical victories have been secured by means of killing or capturing major terrorist planners and operators. Major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown mixed results on terror threat. While the U.S. has ''deprived al Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan,''(see footnote 1) the failure to commit sufficient troops and other resources now has the country heading back towards instability. A massive increase in opium production will increase finances for the Taliban and al Qaeda, while the reconstitution of the Taliban military capability has been a deeply unwelcome development. In Iraq, the U.S. executed what many will argue was the single most harmful act since September 11. While the invasion has put other nations on notice that any inkling of terror support will lead to its destruction, the war has provided terrorists with a major propaganda victory, a real-world training camp for terrorists and insurgents, while also dramatically altering the once-solid moral reputation of the United States.
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Has Islamist terrorism been weakened?
In short, the answer to that question appears to be no. But more importantly, we need to recognize that it is not the right question to ask. One of the most significant shortcomings in our strategy for the ''long war'' continues to weaken us by misdirecting our resources and attention. There is little recognition and resulting policy that what we face is a widespread struggle within Islam, and that by definition the United States and Western forces are ill-equipped on multiple levels to confront and ultimately vanquish violent Islamist extremism. Terrorism is the tool used by these movements, and pursuing the actors, their sanctuaries, finances, and their weapons only treats the symptoms of a much larger problem for which we can only provide one small part of the solution. The movement's components are part ideological, part religious, part social, part political.(see footnote 2) The solutions include, first and foremost, working with and supporting local Muslim and Arab leaders while at the same time shifting emphasis away from our largely military-led response. Until this becomes a core component of our strategy, we will continue treading water.
Support for terrorism
When you consider that extensive polling of foreign attitudes by the Pew Foundation shows record lows for respect and approval of the United States and our policies, it takes little convincing to claim that support for violent extremist groups and terrorism is easy to come by. In addition to be relatively inexpensive to plan and conduct a terror strike, the means of raising, laundering, and transferring that money are myriad. The informal banking system known as hawala alone suggests that we will never stop more than a fraction of the funds transferred between violent extremists and their supporters. The nexus between terrorism and crime has also narrowed. Terrorists are dominant in all manner of transnational crime, and the record opium crop in Afghanistan is a very sobering reminder of how hard the struggle is.
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Europe has emerged as a major hub for violent extremist activity. Young men and some women among Europe's 15–20 million Muslims offer fertile ground for recruitment, planning, and support. In many Muslim and Arab countries, support comes from similar youth who ply neighborhoods where unemployment is high despite quality education. Compounding these economic conditions is the deterioration of traditional social structures, and the failure realize promises of political and social reform. Repression from leaders in Egypt, Uzbekistan and other nations is a major underpinning of the street-level support. Overall, sources of support have shifted from states to individuals, charities, business people, families, and tribal groups. Much of the support, as the hawala example shows, has gone underground in part because of strong finance measures and the threat of sanctions led by the United States.
The evolution and status of transnational terrorism and al Qaeda
It is well known at this point that violent extremism has spread significantly since September 11, and that the original core threat of al Qaeda has transformed from a central organization into a global, politico-religious, ideological movement. The emergence of self-starter groups has dominated the landscape of terrorism. They are inspired and motivated by events and the apparent confirmation of their ''world view'' that Islam is under attack and that they have a direct role in defending it. Al Qaeda, I believe, is still able to direct attacks. Al Qaeda may be reduced as a core, combat capable unit, but its planning and guidance functions remain, and its ideology is ''mobile and potent.''(see footnote 3) There is little evidence to date that the August 2006 London aircraft plot had direct al Qaeda control, but what is clear is that those arrested were inspired by Osama Bin Laden's agenda. It also appears to be the case that self-starters in Europe and elsewhere feel compelled to make a journey to Pakistan or Afghanistan—not so much for training as for spiritual and moral support from those in or close to al Qaeda Central. This trend in and of itself is something to exploit.
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Whether direct or indirect, bin Laden and his remaining confederates in ''al Qaeda Central'' are likely still able to develop and send details for attacks. Video and audio releases by al Qaeda's leadership remind followers that they are supported and expected to do their part in the global war against the ''infidels.'' Instructions or the simple spiritual support for terrorist actions by widely scattered ''self-starters'' can be passed through a maze of human couriers, none of which is likely to betray bin Laden or the broader movement. These messages can then find their way to those who need it by phone, fax, email, CD/DVD, websites, or through traveling extremists and supporters. The options are numerous, and the countermeasures few.
To be certain, there is some notable progress against extremist groups. In Indonesia, we have seen significant progress against the group al-Jemaah al-Islamiya (JI). Thanks in large part to Australian assistance, Indonesia has sent 200 suspects through a speedy, transparent and increasingly fair justice system.(see footnote 4) The JI threat has diminished, making Indonesia one of the bright spots. This case is a good example of the right approach: it must be local in nature, and involve empowering and assisting local leaders.
Addressing terrorism: policy priorities
The recent announcement by President Bush that the top operational leaders of the September 11 attacks will be bought to trial is an important step. For too long the U.S. has been crippled by the widespread perception that we do not hold ourselves to the highest legal standards of due process, right to counsel, and guaranteed minimum human rights. The flow of young men and women into the ranks of violent Islamist extremist organizations has continued unabated over the last five years in part due to this sinking moral image of the United States. The well-worn concept of ''winning hearts and minds'' is repeated for a reason: it is a core, indispensable part of the solution. But there is an important caveat here: we can never advertise out way out of this immense problem, we need our Muslim partners to lead the way. That will include subtle but strong pressure on leaders to enact genuine social, economic, and political reforms. Minimizing the appearance of outside direction or control is vital, it is too easy for extremists to make hay of American meddling. For too long we have been seen as the ''power behind the power'' in places such as Egypt, Jordan and Israel.
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Top Middle East and terrorism expert Anthony Cordesman reminds us that what we confront are violent extremist movements that most often have a cause confined to a particular state. There is no overarching global, connected campaign against the U.S., but rather local battles that need to be treated on an individual basis. The factors that make up these struggles are ones with which the U.S. is unfamiliar and lacks significant understanding. They include social, religious, cultural, historical and ideological elements that Muslims and Arabs have an inherent understanding of. So if we hope for success, we must act in concert with our partners, and allow them to lead.
Some of our polices have been short-changed. There continues to be the widespread perception that the U.S. approach to the Israeli/Palestinian question has never been fair or intended to elicit real solutions. While untrue in many ways, perception is reality to those who support and take part in terror strikes. Equally as pressing as giving the Israeli/Palestinian problem our robust and determined attention, there remains a long-standing threat to our security, and in fact the world's security. Russian tactical nuclear weapons continue to be relegated to the backburner of policy priorities. If our leaders ''don't want the next smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud,'' then why have we not made more progress in securing the thousands of remaining tactical nuclear weapons? Weapons of Mass Destruction demand immediate attention. After all, if our priority motivation for invading Iraq was to remove WMD, why are we not moving with dispatch to secure the thousands of known, functioning, transportable weapons in Russia that could fall prey to theft or smuggling? Some of our enemies are implacable and are driven by apocalyptic visions of this confrontation. For them, nothing we do will matter. If given the opportunity to strike with WMD, they will do so.
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What degree should ''metrics'' play in our strategy?
In such a multifaceted, transnational problem about which the U.S. only understands parts of, the use of metrics simply cannot be reliable. But there are some measurements that can offer us an indication trends and our security. In returning to the previous issue of Russia's ''loose nukes'' we could look at a decreasing number of available tactical warheads as encouraging. Nothing could change our way of life and the global economy more than the use of WMD, so their numbers and location should be monitored assiduously.
While not an entirely accurate barometer, it is clear that we will derive a good sense of where we figure in the struggle by monitoring public opinion in the Muslim world.(see footnote 5) While hard to quantify, the degree of social, political and economic reform in countries that produce many Islamist extremists would serve as an indicator of how the broader struggle to reduce the numbers, power and reach of these movements. Also, a reduction in the numbers of madrassas (Koranic schools) in Pakistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere would also be encouraging. Finally, a drop in terrorist incidents and the numbers of people killed can also serve as an indicator. But this factor cannot be relied on too heavily. While smaller actors and less ambitious plans may be foiled, the future ''spectaculars'' likely to be attempted by al Qaeda and other groups will be years in the making, and could surprise us just as we think the trend was turning positive.
Are government agencies properly structured to combat international terrorism?
A comprehensive assessment would be necessary to determine this, and I am doubtful that a successful one could be carried out. Competing interests that could lose influence and resources in still-needed restructuring will make many positive changes elusive. A review of law enforcement and regulatory agencies' transnational capabilities would provide insight and answers to this question. Jonathan Winer, an intelligence and money-laundering expert and attorney, who served previously as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement, believes that measuring the degree to which the CIA, State Department, Pentagon and other relevant agencies are ''now functioning on a trans-border basis as well as on a country basis''(see footnote 6) could indicate if restructuring has been successful. The failure to halt the attack narcotics trade in Afghanistan is also one metric that suggests that the U.S. government is paying insufficient attention to some of the most important issues.
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In the recent report by the staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) asserts that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ''is a holding company, not an integrated department.''(see footnote 7) There are very few people who would argue that DHS has enhanced America's overall security. Contacts throughout the national security and law enforcement community relay mixed messages about the structure of our agencies. I believe 75% of the comments I hear are negative, with most of it directed towards DHS and the FBI. There is also disbelief and discouragement over the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and its increasing size. But most of all, it is the Pentagon's trump card over the DNI that causes most people to shake their heads. A late addition to the legislation creating that office provided that ''the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence . . . respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments.'' Many intelligence experts and officials felt this dealt a crippling blow to the DNI's authority and ability to manage the 16 member intelligence community to the degree necessary for real change and effectiveness.
Some reforms of the intelligence community are still underway, and thus it is very difficult to measure their progress. CIA analysts indicate that morale is low as they lose staff to the National Counterterrorism Center, which according to several people is ''winning'' that internal struggle.
What constitutes victory in the ''GWOT'' and what is a reasonable timeframe for success?
Success will be determined in many ways. A reduction in the number of recruits to carry out violent action in support of extremist ideologies stands as one of the most important. But getting there will be tremendously difficult. We will have to rely on some degree of internal dissolution as this movement is too complex and resilient to die U.S. hands alone.
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The term war is debilitating. Yes, in the first few days it was helpful in rallying the U.S. public and some of our allies, but it now hinders our response. It is an abrasive term for allies who don't see the threat as existential, and whose publics know a very different reality of war. The ''war'' is off-putting to many Americans who believe it allows for an open-ended timeframe and too much latitude for U.S. government responses on our own soil and overseas. Others feel it is totally appropriate and support it wholeheartedly. There is clear evidence that being on a war footing has weakened our cause: witness our posture towards battlefield prisoners, Abu Ghraib, secret prisons, Guantanamo. This caused deep and widespread damage to our reputation, and motivated huge numbers of people to join the fight against America.
When Muslim and Arab leaders are fair and responsive to their populations, we can expect an increased chance of peace and security. Whether a war or a campaign or a long struggle, we are in it and it will take a long time to arrive at a sense of victory or at least security . . . if ever. Internal forces and actors will determine the duration of this battle, and less so U.S. actions. It merits repeating that the U.S. can only hasten the dissolution of Islamist extremism to a small degree—the burden is on Muslims and the capabilities are with the local political, religious and intellectual leaders from Arab and Muslim nations.
To many of the actors we confront, the U.S. represents a target's bulls eye. We are the ''far enemy'' with the highest point value. But the battles are to be won country by country and by an array of moderate forces and influences within national borders. Outside influence, especially if driven by the U.S. military or government, will fail if not conducted with the utmost care and respect. Osama Bin Laden believes America will be the second domino to fall after the Soviet Union, and that he and his movement are significantly responsible for this. They think America can be defeated.
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What is the proper balance between civil liberties and aggressively checking terrorism?
Jim Fallows, National Correspondent of the Atlantic, notes that America's biggest threat is not what al Qaeda can do to us, but what we will do to ourselves in response to the threat. There is certain truth to this, and I believe that we have suffered as a country when actions were taken in haste or without the participation of Congress.
There can be no doubt that terrorists are using technology that at times exceeds our own surveillance capabilities and countermeasures, and which exploits our rules governing investigations and monitoring. We should not fail to change these laws and respond to the enemy's tactics as soon as possible. But because we are a nation of laws and importantly because Congress has a constitutional role in formulating or amending them, any changes should be made with its participation, even if kept secret from the general public. As of now, and due to the secret and complex nature of intelligence, it is unclear whether the current tradeoff between civil liberties and security is even knowable or quantifiable. And there are a number of different opinions on this subject. There does seem to be room for compromise. Many people I have spoken to on both sides of the issue agree on two basic points: changes have to be made to our laws, but they must be done through proper channels and with sufficient consideration of their long term effect.
Attorney Jonathan Winer fairly asks ''what is the evidence that any particular reduction in civil liberties has led to any reduction in the terrorist threat?'' With regard to the NSA wiretapping controversy, little evidence appears to support the notion that court orders were not necessary. On the issue of torture and in reflection of U.S. human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, it is widely known that prisoners offer false testimony simply to stop the torture. Ultimately, Mr. Winer believes that ''civil liberties do not have to be infringed to check terrorism. Traditional military and law enforcement and regulatory techniques, updated to reflect technological changes, are sufficient.''
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Are Iran and Hezbollah more of a threat than Al Qaeda?
Recent hostilities in the Middle East serve as a sober reminder that Hezbollah and its state sponsor Iran pose serious threats to the region and possible to the United States. Iran's apparent efforts to build a nuclear arsenal is an ominous development. Combining Iranian President Ahmadinejad's threat to ''wipe Israel off the map'' with Israel's well known policy of preemptively striking core national security threats, there is trouble not far over the horizon.
Iran clearly presents a number of problems for the United States, our allies and nations the Persian Gulf region. Others, though believe that Iran is simply acting in its own interests and that such moves do not constitute a fundamental threat. In so far as Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons upsets the balance of power in the region, this is clearly another issue. In addition to Israel's reaction, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may feel compelled to sharply increase their military capabilities and to possibly pursue nuclear weapons.
Before al Qaeda's September 11 attack, Hezbollah killed more Americans than any other terrorist group. Hezbollah's relative success during the recent fighting in Lebanon is a problem for the U.S. and for states around the world. The terrorist group's ability to stop the Israeli army and to sustain withering air strikes provided it with real legitimacy by demonstrating the power of transnational, sub-state movements. Any strike on Iran is likely to be met with the unleashing of Hezbollah on U.S. targets throughout the region and possibly the world. Hezbollah's far flung global operations, led by Imad Mughniyah, have been found in Argentina, Europe, the U.S. (North Carolina), Australia, and Africa's Gulf of Guinea, among other places.(see footnote 8) Iran's (and Syria's support of Hezbollah is common knowledge.
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What could be done to better attack the ideology fueling Islamist terrorism?
Returning to the insights of Anthony Cordesman, the threat of Islamic extremism is a national phenomenon that can best be met through local forces on a country-by-country basis, and not through a ''globally connected effort.'' Cordesman notes
. . . the real war on terrorism can only be won within Islam and at a religious and ideological level. This does not mean that improving every aspect of counterterrorism at the national, regional and global level is not important. It does mean that no amount of outside action by the United States, Europe or non-Islamic states can do more than partially contain the violence. It is only the religious, political and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities, particularly in the Arab world, that can successfully engage and defeat Islamic extremism at a religious, intellectual, political and cultural level.(see footnote 9)
Recognizing that insight, there are nonetheless a number of actions the United States can take, and actions we can avoid. With costs for the Iraq war running at $5 billion per month, the U.S. can certainly spend a fraction of that to improve social services to Muslims in a number of countries, and thus rebuild the foundation of goodwill. Imagine what the construction of 10 U.S. hospital ships similar to the USNS Mercy would do to the U.S. standing. These ships would be staffed with, among others, Muslim doctors from around the world, to provide thousands of people with free access to vital medical care. A lot of news is made of individual Iraqi children who are flown to the U.S. for special medical procedures, so imagine the impact of placing these hospital ships on rotation the world over. The ships would become iconic, and the U.S. would be remembered for its generosity as it was in post-war Europe and as we are now in post-tsunami Indonesia.
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Another helpful policy can include promoting tolerant Muslim leaders in any country they are found, and arresting those who spew intolerant hate speech and support terrorist operations. One major component of U.S. efforts to counter extremist ideologies has been to promote democratic rule. This is a risky and sometimes ineffective policy for a number of reasons. First, Western values, however wonderful we believe and know they are, are often unwelcome and not transferable to many people. It may be a disappointing reality, but a reality nonetheless. In places with a history of democracy or a willingness to consider it, it has to be preceded by political reform to help adjust cultural and social attitudes and civic structures. As with medicine, improper dosage can be harmful.
Greater efforts to partner with Muslim and Arab countries on a range of scientific, medical, cultural, technological, business and academic initiatives can do much to reduce the widespread sense of Muslim loss and disrespect. In addition to bringing leaders from these fields to the United States, we in turn should make every effort to enable American students and scholars to spend time in those same countries. Not only will these exchanges build goodwill and understanding, but we will also establish a generation of people with the cultural awareness and language skills needed in the event of future hostilities (too Machiavellian?) ;)
Five years from now, what will we see?
2006 arrived very quickly, and I don't think many America citizens or their leaders are very happy with where we are. 2011 will arrive just as quickly, and serious thought and effort needs to go into plans and policies to make sure we don't feel as insecure then as we do now.
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Some of the more ominous questions we may be asking include
1. Why didn't we make loose Russian nuclear weapons our core, number one priority?
2. How did we allow Afghanistan to be retaken by a combined Taliban/al Qaeda force?
3. How is it that Hezbollah gained control of most of Lebanon?
4. How is it that we allowed the emergence of a ''mini-Iranian protectorate'' that wound up controlling much of Iraq's oil revenues in what emerged as the independent, free Islamic State of Iran?
5. Why did we think the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a moderate force in Egypt once they took control of the country and the military following the deposing of President Hosni Mubarak?
6. And how could we have possibly failed to block a fundamentalist takeover of Saudi Arabia by neo-Salafi/Wahabbi clerics?
7. With Iran in possession of nuclear weapons and sufficient ballistic missile capabilities, what leverage is there against their emboldened theocracy and clerical leadership that provides support for Islamist extremist movements across Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Northern Africa, Canada, Latin America?
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8. ''Why are our soldiers still in Iraq? And what do we have to show for $400 billion and 5,000 Americans dead?
9. Why did we trade our cherished, hard-won civil rights for an ill-defined level of security?
10. Why are our traditional allies no longer our friends, and why are our new allies the kinds of countries we confronted during the Cold War?
11. Why did we not pressure secular, one-party Muslim regimes to reform?
12. Why didn't we put all of our energy into the extremists' number one recruitment issue: the Israeli/Palestinian problem?
13. Why are there so few Americans in foreign countries, and why are so many openly attacked when they are there?
14. Why have we closed so many embassies?
15. What more could we have done to keep Pakistan from being taken over by pro-Islamist generals?
More encouraging questions may be
1. How did America help local Muslim and Arab leaders successfully confront Islamic extremists in their countries?
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2. How were Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri finally killed and where were they living?
3. Why didn't we begin the highly successful 2007 ''Bush Plan'' that invested money and time into massive, widespread provision of social and economic services to Muslims in at risk nations?
4. What other nations might become relative success stories like Afghanistan?
5. How many more American Information Centers will we re-open on Muslim countries this year?
6. On which day this year will the 100,000th foreign Muslim student begin school in America, and when will their American counterpart arrive in their country?
Conclusion
Administration officials are in fact speaking of the struggle against violent Islamist extremism as the ''long war.'' And it is true that the enemy's proven ability to successfully adapt to our countermeasures signals that several more cycles of action/reaction will dot the horizon. But there is much that other nations and the United States have to do before this struggle's outcome is no longer in doubt. During the Cold War the United States and our allies built tremendous military, intelligence, academic, and economic capabilities to confront and eventually prevail against a totalitarian adversary. Today, we boast few of these capabilities. We do not speak radical Islam's language, understand their culture and history, nor can we pretend to solve their problems with military or other means. The role to be played by Muslim and Arab leaders in countries where these struggles within Islam and with secular leaders are taking place will be paramount. As soon as the United States begins this wholesale shift in emphasis, the sooner we will be re-opening those American Cultural Centers.
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Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do need to leave soon, but I want to ask a few questions.
First, I would like this panel, particularly Dr. Phares, to comment on the question I raised earlier. And that is, why hasn't there been a Timothy McVeigh-style truck full of fertilizer blowing up of a building anywhere in the United States? Is this because the forces against us don't even have one or two guys that can rent a truck? Or is it because they just don't see it as a good idea to engage in moderately destructive activity?
Mr. PHARES. A very complex question. The easiest way to answer it would be reading the mind of the jihadist and see why wouldn't they start a Hamas-like, Islamic jihad-like series of attacks against buildings using trucks, or a Hezbollah-like attack in 1983.
It has to do with two levels. Number one, al-Qaeda central, meaning those individuals who are trained to cross countries or are at the service of al-Qaeda, they act on behalf of a strategic view, not just of hatred. They see a building, I have a truck, and I will do it. Al-Qaeda central will not, in my humble assessment, engage the little or limited assets that they have below the level of acquiring a capacity of 9/11 kind of attacks. So if we didn't have them, it doesn't mean we won't have them; it means that the planning strategy of al-Qaeda is to have at least as much as 9/11.
Mr. SHERMAN. Is this because of their ego or their desire to achieve superstar status among their potential supporters?
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Mr. PHARES. That could be one psychological element. The other element is they think like us strategically; they have commanders and troops, what we call assets. What they have in the United States accordingly linked to al-Qaeda are in the dozens. Would they use those dozens with the possibility of being arrested? Look at what happened in the case of the U.K. One person was able to dismantle a whole network of probably 25 people.
The more concerning is that the second level al-Qaeda, second generation, are those who are born here who have connected with al-Qaeda. Those, the future attacks by these, are still ahead of us. It didn't happen yet. Many of these cells have been dismantled.
Mr. SHERMAN. What we have also seen in Britain is that the homegrown terrorists grew up in Britain, had friends in Britain, and were therefore more likely to disclose and allowed to leak their plans. It is certainly a lot easier to infiltrate a mosque in my district than it is—or any other Islamic group in my district, most of whose members are going to be patriotic Americans, than it is to infiltrate a small group of al-Qaeda operatives sent into our country.
Mr. Sanderson, I know you have pointed out the nuclear, loose nukes. I couldn't agree with you more. We have proven an ability as a society to survive a 9/11 attack. I don't know whether the West can survive and go on if we are faced by a nuclear attack. And that is why my greatest fears are the Iranian program and, of course, the loose nukes.
And the witnesses who spoke earlier spoke of complacency. There is no great—there are two kinds of complacency. One is sloth. Americans are not slothful. The other is distraction. You do a lot of stuff, but you are so arrogant and complacent about one threat that you feel you can deal with everything else.
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During World War II, it was real clear. We had to beat the Nazis; we therefore cooperated with Stalin. In contrast, right now we are waging a little miniwar against Russia. And, trust me, Putin is no Stalin, but we feel that we have got to weaken Russian influence over Moldavia, for example. Well, if you have to do that, you have to do at least 100 other things that I don't have time to name. And if you have to do 100 things, then you are not going to get your key things done.
Likewise, we are so complacent about terrorism and the Iranian nuclear threat that we feel that we can deal with China on the currency issue independent of what China does on Iran. We just want to indulge ourselves and do whatever we feel like doing with regard to China's trade issues, and respond to the contingencies and care about them, and we don't have to trouble ourselves to try to get China's support on Iran because, after all, we care about hundreds of things including Chinese currency, and no one of them is actually more important than anything else.
The question I have for you, and this is a bit of a diversion from the comments I just made, is you have these madrassas that you referred to, and Dr. Phares commented that these could be the sources of new terrorists. To what extent are the Saudis funding madrassas in the United States? And are they funding madrassas that are religious institutions that we can all be proud of, or are they funding teachers who teach hate?
Mr. SANDERSON. I am sure Dr. Phares will have more to say on this than I do, but my understanding is that the Saudis are funding schools in the United States, they are funding the reading materials that come into prisons in the United States, and that they are funding——
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Mr. SHERMAN. And what do these materials say? Because if they are funding copies of the Koran in English translation or in the original Arabic, that might be just fine. Have you found—and I will ask Dr. Phares as well—materials paid for by the Saudis or probably paid for by the Saudis that are jihadist in nature?
Mr. PHARES. Certainly. There are several reports that could be made available to you and to the members of the commission on Saudi funding over 20 years. We are not talking about Saudi funding over a few years only. And that is on two levels. So the funding that goes to religious institutions, which are also educational madrassas, goes to the managements of these organizations.
Now, the problem is that the appointment of managers to these institutions is done in accordance with the radical clerics who are very influential in Saudi Arabia. I don't want to go into the inside of Saudi Arabia, but there is an orange, and there is a red. The Saudis in general are favorable to Wahhabism, but inside that state you have radical clerics who are very militant about it. So it is a Saudi problem. The end product is, yes.
Mr. SHERMAN. If I am going to confront the Saudi Ambassador, it is going to have to be with something more specific. The Saudis may be funding mosques in the United States. The best way to get at this is to look at the written materials that they pay for printing, or the written materials used in institutions where they are paying to keep the lights on and paying to keep the buildings open. What materials do you have used in Saudi-funded institutions or printed by with Saudi money that are a departure from normal Islam and reflect a terrorist or jihadist view?
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Mr. PHARES. Well, we can open the textbooks that are being used by these institutions, these madrassas, funded by the Saudis, and that is open information, and look at those textbooks. Certainly 80 percent of the textbooks have to do with regular teaching of religion and of issues with religion. But there is a 20 percent or so, I am trying to quantify, of this information which is a direct call to Wahhabism, not so different from what the Salafists and the jihadists are defining as their enemies in Iraq or another part of the world.
For example, I will give you one example. When you distinguish in one community between those who go by these teachings and those who do not go by these teachings and call them the kuffar, it is an Arabic word for infidels, and then you prescribe that these kuffars are the enemies of the right path, this is equivalent in our cultural, political culture, of discrimination and the isolation of part of society. That alone is a problem in democracies, and that is part of the educational curriculum that we have seen and we could provide information about.
Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I hope you provide that information and indicate who paid for the printing of each document or textbook, and/or at least some of the mosques in which that book is used, because it is not enough to just wave around a book. There has to be a connection between that and either Saudi paying for the printing of the book or the Saudi paying for the institutions that employ it.
I see the other witness also has a comment.
Mr. SANDERSON. I would just say, I don't have any evidence myself, but I have heard anecdotal evidence as to the content of some of the publications that have come into United States prisons and into schools at the hands of the Saudis in the past, but personally have not seen it.
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Mr. SHERMAN. The other point I will make is that it is just absolutely wrong for us to allow these materials into prisons. The first amendment has limits in prisons. Prisoners are not accorded most of the civil rights, like the ability to live where you want to live. They are prisoners. And we need to—we can't let material into prisons just because the cover says that it is a religious text.
Mr. ROYCE. I think Freedom House has a pretty good document with some of the specific evidence that was funded from Saudi sources, and we will share that with the Committee Members.
We will go now to Congresswoman Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to sincerely thank you for this hearing. These two gentlemen who have been on those hot seats all of this time probably have presented to us the most thoughtful and insightful discussion of where we are now. And I have been saying this for a long time. So I am going to thank you for indulging us with this.
I am going to throw some concepts out at you, and either one of you or both of you I would hope would comment.
Mr. Phares, you talk about the long war. I think—or is that Mr. Sanderson? Let me see whose paper I have in front of me.
Mr. SANDERSON. I did reference it in my conclusion.
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Ms. WATSON. Okay. And then I would like to hear some talk about the long war versus the Cold War and a civil war in Iraq. But you are raising issues that I think we have been complacent about. Mr. Brookes says America is complacent. I hear patter coming from the policymakers about this war on terrorism in Iraq, and as an Ambassador, I become thoroughly confused, because one thing you learn when you go out to your post in a foreign country: You had better understand something about their customs, their traditions, and their ways of thinking, or you are not going to succeed at your mission. And I could read everything they put in front of me at the State Department. I had 6 years to do it. But nothing replaces the experience and living in a foreign country and knowing that, regardless of what we say according to our principles and values, our provisions—I was in Micronesia—that it is the land marquis or the high chief that calls the tune. So I am actually elated for the two of you bringing these issues up, because that is the real world.
And you said today, we boast few of these capabilities. We do not speak radical Islam's language, or we do not understand their culture and history, nor can we pretend to solve their problems with military or other means. And I am wondering, you know, we support Israel. We are one-sided with that support. But are we ever going to solve the problems for them between the Palestinians and Israel? Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel, longstanding issues.
Can America in our isolation and our feeling that we are pretty safe here—and then all of a sudden we get hit with 9/11. But you are the first two that have really started us on a path of thinking differently, and I want to commend you for that.
I would like to hear you, Dr. Phares, come back and do some lecturing and some teaching. I heard you say you have been a professor.
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Mr. Sanderson, I would like to have you come and reiterate what you feel are the tools that we are going to have to need if we are going to succeed with anything.
I want to think—I have been with our Chairman, and I know he gets it, because I have been with you. We went into Sudan; and he said, you know, something is going on here beyond guns and bullets. Something is going on. Until we get to that, we cannot make much—so we came back and said, let's get our State Department staff over there. We have got to deal with what is happening, genocide.
So thank you for awakening these thoughts and the content.
I want to end by saying if you want to comment on the long war versus the Cold War, the Civil War and these wars; and I hope we can move from thinking that it has to be a war. It ought to be a movement based on some understanding of who these enemies of our American, Western democracy way of life are. And I think we have been complacent. I don't think we have dealt enough with that.
With that, I end what I have to say; and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Watson. I will give you a copy of Dr. Phares book when I finish it. It is really interesting.
Mr. PHARES. Congresswoman, I am overwhelmed by your words. I am pretty happy that we are engaging in this dialogue. Let me be brief in making a few comments about both of the things you raised.
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Number one, the war issue. Had we in the United States and in democracies—I always link the entire international community—believed in the same views we had, one, the previous war of ideas, when the Soviet Union collapsed and it engaged at that time, not 10 or 11 or 12 years after, in finding who are our partners among those civil societies in the greater Middle East, in the Muslim world, in Africa, probably the war on terror either would not have happened or it would have happened in a very limited way. And I will explain myself.
You just mentioned Sudan. I myself have published, wrote about Sudan, was a voice in the wilderness in the early '90s about raising the issue of Sudan and was always wondering why is it that the international community would be so vivid in intervening everywhere, in Latin America, with the European dissidents. We have gone twice to Yugoslavia, rightly so, to help people who are in need. And 1 million Black Africans have been killed in a war basically with the jihadists, the same ones that visited us on September 11, and yet we haven't even intervened for so many years or invited some of those victims in the United States. And yourself, you are aware how devastating that problem in Sudan is. And now we have a situation in Darfur where it has been qualified finally not just by the United States but by even the United Nations as a genocide.
The problem that I see as happening in the war on terror is because we have not been aware of these crises and the rise of these fundamentalist radical views which do not represent the majority neither in the Arab world nor in the Muslim world, but a minority which is armed, which is strong, such were the social nationalists in Germany after the collapse of the Weimar Republic was. Certainly they could carry the force of representation of these societies.
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The other example, Madam Congresswoman, comes from Lebanon, since you just mentioned it. At the first opportunity, the international community, thankfully, the United States, France, Europeans, Arab moderates, worked together on the issue of Lebanon, issue resolution 1559 in 2004, regardless of our political debates inside this nation.
The very first moment the Lebanese were given the opportunity to express themselves freely, what did they do? We have been hearing about Lebanon for 20 years as the land of Hezbollah and the land of radicalism. We saw 1.5 million people, not armed, men, women, children, taking to the streets of Beirut in the Cedars Revolution. An overwhelming number of Lebanese do not want war, any kind of war, including holy war. They want normal peaceful times.
The first elections in Lebanon you have a majority of people who believe in the same way. The problem is that violence and terrorism obstruct the democratic process.
Sometimes we find ourselves—I am talking about myself as an American today—in the way of putting efforts. We put effort to bring down the Apartheid regime in South Africa. We didn't have to do war. We did economics.
We threatened a regime in Haiti which was oppressive of the people of Haiti. We sent an aircraft carrier. Thankfully, we didn't have to do more than that.
In other cases, in Yugoslavia, we had to engage because of the difficult equation that existed there.
In Lebanon, not one shot and we had seen the Lebanese deploy.
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My point is, for the future, there is a war of ideas that has to be won so that the war on terror will be won as well. That is why in most of my points I am quoting for engaging those dissidents, the democracy forces, the women's movements, the students' movement, minorities in the greater Middle East. Actually, the majorities walk with us. We need to reach out and find them, Madam.
Mr. SANDERSON. Congresswoman, thank you for your comments. I appreciate them.
Let me share two points with you. I was recently in Indonesia on a State Department international visitors trip. I went to about six different cities, and there was a Foreign Service Officer there named Paul Berg, who is now at the Army War College for a year. He was so impressive you could not believe it. His skills in Bahasan Indonesian language were phenomenal. Everywhere we went he garnered tremendous respect. Everyone loved him. He could walk in any door, any government office.
That is just what we need. We need a cadre of people who have that level of experience and the cultural understanding for the good that it does in a Machiavellian but realistic way so that when we do have a confrontation or things do go sour with a country we have people who understand those people. Now, it may be a dark way to look at it, but that, in fact, is a reality. But we have to prepare for that. It was so impressive. A little goes a long way, and he had a lot, and, boy, he just changed minds left and right. And he was alone, basically, in Atjeh, in Medan as the counsel general, and he felt totally safe because he was one of them, and it was really impressive.
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The long war. We invested 12 to $13 trillion to fight the Soviets. The Soviets, characterized with a known language and we had hundreds of people that understood it within the CIA and other departments; it was a bounded threat; it was a hierarchical threat; it was symmetrical to us. And with that money we developed intelligence capabilities to penetrate that threat.
The current threat, radical Islamists: Languages that few of us know, cultures that we do not know, an unbounded threat, no hierarchy, and few intelligence capabilities designed to penetrate that threat. We have got a long, long way to go.
And you know what? In the Cold War, we were basically omnipotent. We had everything we needed almost. But now we need to go to our friends. It is a local battle. There will be times when it is a war, where we will be fighting, but this is so comprehensive and so much more multifaceted than our confrontation with the Soviets, and we really need to build the tools. 9/11 we reached into that quiver to pull out the arrows we had there for the Cold War. They are blunt and devoid of nuance. We need new skills.
Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask a question of Walid. What does the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah mean in terms of the wider war against Islamic terrorism?
As I mentioned to you, I was there in Haifa. I had an opportunity to see part of that. How do you see Lebanon playing out?
And then I would ask Tom a question about his statement that the growing Muslim communities in western Europe are a cause for concern. Most of these countries enjoy the status of being a participant in the visa waiver program with the United States. I am thinking about the news we got about those who are looking to take a flight to the United States with the intent to take down those 10 jetliners. Is this something Congress should be reevaluating in terms of that visa waiver program under these circumstances?
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Also, how concerned are you, Tom, about Europe as a sanctuary? I am thinking about some of the things Walid said earlier. We have got a mosque there in London in which, as we talk about recruitment, is a cause of real concern. We see some of the words of radical call to action, call to jihad that go on there in that main Finsbury Park mosque; and I just wonder how we tackle that.
So, Dr. Phares, if you would like to start.
Mr. PHARES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
One remark before I address the issue of the Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran, Israel, Syria conflict. There is a big difference between what the peoples of the region want if you give them that freedom to express themselves and what that either regimes or radical organizations want. I see many, including my students or compatriots in America and in Europe, confused about why do people hate each other?
It is not that nations hate each other. Every time we have an opportunity for a civil society to express itself without being under a regime of hate or threatened by an organization that hates, then you are going to have different perspectives.
The majority of the Lebanese in this case, since we were talking about Hezbollah, showed the whole world, the cameras 1.5 million people in the Cedars Revolution that all they want is the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the Israelis, of course, from the south, that all militias are disarmed. It is not normal to have a militia which want to wage wars at its own timing that exists in a country which needs peace and stability.
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The decision by Secretary General of Hezbollah to wage that first operation on July 12, 13 is not just a local decision by Hezbollah. It has been proven by statements both in Iran and also in Lebanon that there is a regional understanding between the Iranian regime of Mr. Ahmadinejad, the Syrian regime of Mr. Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah, who feel that they are threatening their own interests to deflect the international community from dealing with these interests.
And I will tell you quickly what I think these interests are: To direct Hezbollah to inflame the situation with Israel, a matter that Hezbollah could have done since 2000. Why is it on July 12, 2006, 6 years after the withdrawal of the Israelis, they waged that war?
Three reasons, Mr. Chairman. Number one, we all know the regime of Iran is in trouble with the international community on the issue of the nuclear. The Syrian regime of Mr. Bashar al-Assad is in trouble with the same United Nations—not talking about America or Israel or France; I am talking about the Security Council of the United Nations—on the issue of the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri of Lebanon, and the results were about to be rendered. Hezbollah is in trouble with the majority of the other Lebanese political parties on the issue of this army.
So three interests coming together thought that by reigniting a war with the Israelis, a war that most of the societies in the east do not want—most of the Arabs do not want wars. They have been shocked enough by what has happened in Iraq, what has happened in terms of terrorist wars around the world.
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My concern is that a decision has been reached at the level of the two regimes and Hezbollah, meaning Tehran, Damascus and Hezbollah, to confront the international community. They drew red lines in the sand saying that they are not going to stop on the project of nuclear for a variety of reasons, that they are not going to comply with the United Nations rendering the sentence or the results on the Hariri assassination.
Syria's regime, its President, made a couple of statements, very important, on the fact that they would not relinquish their influence on Lebanon, and Hezbollah will not want to disarm.
Having said that, it has consequences. It has been mentioned by the members of panel and yourself that if a regime wants to confront an international community and has access to nuclear weapons, we are talking about a serious threat. If Hezbollah wants to refuse the disarming by any means—and Hezbollah has cells not just in Lebanon but also around the world, including in the United States—I would move to consider this as a very concerning matter for ournational security. And I move to say that we have not finished the war with the al-Qaeda, and the Hezbollah may consider a confrontation if Iran would order them to do so.
So we may well have to—our national security would have to consider to deal with the possibility, the scenario, as dark as it is, that both organizations and both movements would be striking, not necessarily in coordination, against the United States and democracies around the world.
Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Doctor. And Tom.
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Mr. SANDERSON. Congressman, I am afraid that Europe presents a huge problem; and I think you are well aware of that. Let me just describe the environment and a common demographic.
You have got between 15 million and 20 million Muslims in Europe. They are not well assimilated. Many of them disenfranchised. You have second and third generations, young men and some women whose parents came to Europe from Algeria, from Morocco, from a host of nations. So those young men do not have allegiance to their host country, nor do they have direct connections to their parents' home country, making them highly susceptible in this environment where they are disrespected, humiliated, disenfranchised and, even in the middle class, still kept out of choice neighborhoods, so therefore susceptible to the 3,000–4,000 pro al-Qaeda Web sites. The extremists, imams who seek refuge in those countries from repression in the Middle East, from returning jihadist fighters from Iraq, Chechyna, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and from CDs and DVDs and from their friends. I mean, a tremendous swirl of influence around people who lack an identity, lack an allegiance, and therefore are highly susceptible to this.
Think about the influence of a young Army soldier who comes back home to New Hampshire and meets with the local high school, the inspiration that he or she is from having fought in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere. Imagine that same fighter coming back from Iraq meeting with these kids who are not integrated in society. A huge problem.
Visa waiver also a problem. Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups are tremendously savvy. They are looking at every countermeasure we put out there in developing their countermeasures. They will penetrate the borders of the United States. I believe they are here. I am not an alarmist, but I am a realist. I think they are here.
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Okay, so we ban liquids from being brought on airplanes. Well, what do they do? They mimic drug traffickers and start to swallow condoms filled with plastic explosives or put them in other places. These are the kind of innovations that people who are true believers and see the destruction of the United States as necessary will do. These are things that are not beyond the realm of the possible. And I think that Europe does present a problem.
There are debates over what direction that Muslim community is heading, and the Economist had a good cover story called Eurabia a few months back. It is a good read; and, in fact, I am meeting with the primary author of that. There are some positives and negatives, but, nonetheless, that is fertile ground. And they are got going to be dumb enough to choose Mohamed Atta again to leads these fights. They are going to get converts. We saw a woman go from Belgium who blew herself up in Iraq. That is a trend that will increase.
Mr. ROYCE. Some of that we have already seen quite of bit of in the prisons, but we have also seen it in my home district in Garden Grove. We had a convert whose family was Jewish. He was converted. Now he is with al-Qaeda and is making statements on tapes and you can hear him on Aljazeera or on CNN.
Well, I want to thank both of you for your testimony. You have been very patient, and our audience has been very patient. Thank you all.
I think we heard some very important testimony which Congresswoman Watson and I and the other Committee Members really appreciate.
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We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
(Footnote 1 return)
''Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments and Continuing Challenges,'' A reference document produced by the staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. September 1, 2006.
(Footnote 2 return)
Anthony H. Cordesman, ''Winning the 'War on Terrorism:' The Need for A Fundamentally Different Strategy,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies. Draft version, September, 2006, P. 3.
(Footnote 3 return)
Sydney Jones, International Crisis Group. New York Times video interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 4, 2006.
(Footnote 4 return)
Sydney Jones, Ibid.
(Footnote 5 return)
Interview with attorney Jonathan Winer, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement. September 4, 2006.
(Footnote 6 return)
Jonathan Winer interview, September 4, 2006.
(Footnote 7 return)
''Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment,'' CSIS Press, September 1, 2006
(Footnote 8 return)
Lebanese brothers Chawki and Mohamad Hammoud were convicted of selling cigarettes purchased in North Carolina and sold over state lines in Michigan and Maryland and then using the proceeds to purchase night-vision goggles, mine detection equipment, laser designators, GPS equipment, and blasting caps. This ''material support to terrorists'' made its way to the Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives, with the support of Iran, were responsible for the 1992 and 1994 bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Hezbollah has also been active in the ''blood diamond trade in West Africa. And in Australia, Hezbollah has recruited members from the region and raised money from an often unwilling Lebanese immigrant community.
(Footnote 9 return)
Cordesman, ''Winning the 'War on Terrorism:' The Need for A Fundamentally Different Strategy'' P. 3