SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 1 TOP OF DOC
30–142PDF
2006
UNITED STATES–REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE: AN ALLIANCE AT RISK?
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
Serial No. 109–231
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
DENNIS HALPIN, Professional Staff Member
JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State
Mr. Richard P. Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs—Asia Pacific, United States Department of Defense
Balbina Y. Hwang, Ph.D., Senior Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Joshua Stanton, Esq., former United States Army Judge Advocate Assigned to United States Forces Korea (1998–2002)
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa: Prepared statement
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York: Prepared statement
The Honorable Christopher R. Hill: Prepared statement
Mr. Richard P. Lawless: Prepared statement
Balbina Y. Hwang, Ph.D.: Prepared statement
Mr. L. Gordon Flake: Prepared statement
Joshua Stanton, Esq.: Prepared statement
UNITED STATES–REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE: AN ALLIANCE AT RISK?
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.
This is quite probably our last meeting as a Committee for this Congress, and I want to express my profound respect and admiration for the Members of the Committee, both Democrat and Republican.
This Committee is an important one that deals with important issues, and every Member has been serious and made a contribution, especially Mr. Lantos, the ranking Democrat, who someday maybe in the future will make a great Secretary of State. I hate to anticipate him changing parties, but—he would be welcomed. But he has been a great asset to this Committee, and all of the Members have. And so I want to thank you for your cooperation and your contribution. This Committee has been a custodian of democracy, and I am very proud of it.
Let me offer a warm welcome to our expert witnesses today, and sincere congratulations to the people of South Korea as they prepare to celebrate next month's National Foundation Day, and their Chusock Thanksgiving Day holidays.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
There are few alliances that have stood the test of time through such a series of major transitions as that of the United States and the Republic of Korea. Born of blood ties of shared conflict, matured in a tense period in the Cold War, having transited through the birth of democracy in South Korea, further forged in Vietnam and Iraq.
The alliance now faces new challenges. Seoul's concern for its downtrodden brethren in the North and for maintaining the peace on the Korean Peninsula must be balanced with Washington's heartfelt concerns over Pyongyang's egregious human rights abuses, and, in a post-September 11th environment, overproliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a dictatorial state.
I am by nature an optimist, and my recent visit to Seoul, in addition to a meeting this month with the South Korean President in Washington, lead me to believe that the differences we face are just bumps in the road on the path to a more mature equitable alliance.
The Congress can certainly take concrete steps to enhance this alliance. These will include ratification of a free trade agreement with Seoul, once it is negotiated, which promotes both free and fair trade. In addition, Members can urge the Departments of Homeland Security and State to include South Korea in the Visa Waiver Program as soon as it meets all of the legal requirements.
While accentuating the positive, we must remember that significant challenges exist in the alliance and they cannot be papered over. A recent article published by the Council on Foreign Relations, entitled the ''Fragile U.S.-South Korea Alliance'' underscores this.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Some of the issues to be addressed today involve basic nuts-and-bolts matters; the resolution of these, however, will be key to the resiliency of this alliance. The first involves the relocation of United States Forces-Korea out of Seoul and a reduction of America's highly visible footprint in South Korea.
I received a very encouraging letter in this regard from the Governor of Kyunggi Province, which will play host to new the USFK headquarters. The Governor pledged his full cooperation and support in this endeavor. Observers of the alliance, however, are fully aware that the target relocation date of the end of 2007 cannot be realistically met and that there are burden-sharing issues that have not yet been adequately addressed.
The second issue involves the provision of a training range for our Air Force pilots stationed in Korea. They have had to travel as far away as Thailand for training, due to the lack of provision for an adequate range in South Korea. I am happy to report that President Roh assured our congressional delegation last month that this problem would be satisfactorily addressed. Recent South Korea news reports indicate that the training issue is now resolved. I hope our witnesses can confirm this.
A third issue involves operational control of South Korean forces in wartime. As I stated during my visit to Seoul, I have concluded that enough time has passed for Seoul to be up to speed in terms of providing for its own defense. I support a transfer of wartime operational control of the forces of the Republic of Korea to their own command at the earliest possible moment. The American people welcome Seoul's expressed desire to take charge of its own defense in wartime.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
President Harry Truman certainly never suspected that over half a century after the Inchon landing, Americans would still be playing the leading role in the defense of South Korea. After more than half a century of preparation under an American command, the South Korean military is ready to leave the nest and fly high into the heavens. As I mention Inchon, where I laid a wreath this summer, I note that the September 15th anniversary of that heroic landing has just passed, and I hope we can recall favorably those who fell to preserve South Korean sovereignty.
A fourth alliance issue involves the environmental cleanup of bases previously occupied by American forces. This issue has been underscored in the South Korean public's mind by Seoul film makers. They produced a film called The Host, which was this summer's South Korean blockbuster, drawing over 13 million viewers from a population of 50 million, in a loose take-off of the traditional monster movie, Creature from the Black Lagoon. The plot involves a hideous monster who emerges from the Han River to run amok in Seoul, devouring women and children, but this time the creature is painted with the stars and stripes. The source of its incarnation is given as pollutants poured into the river by the United States military.
Artistic freedom is a wonderful thing. In promoting our alliances in the Second World War, however, Hollywood film makers understood it was vital to present our allies—Great Britain and free China—as the good guys, and the German Nazis and the Imperial Japanese as the bad. This very basic premise seems to have been lost by those in Seoul who seek a quick profit by stirring up blatant anti-American feelings.
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I have now come to the heart of the matter: An alliance must be based on two peoples' shared interest, of course. More importantly, however, the two peoples must share good feelings toward each other. Without that, an alliance is just an empty piece of paper.
As I noted last month when I visited General MacArthur's statue in Inchon, I am well aware that there are those in South Korea today who take a different view of this battle site and this monument. I ask the people of South Korea to recall what the statue of General MacArthur symbolizes. It stands for more than just one man, great though he was. It stands for fidelity. In times of war and in times of peace, the American people have stood with you. In times of tension and in times of calm, in times of want and in times of plenty, fidelity is the key to an enduring alliance.
I turn now to my good friend, Mr. Lantos, for his opening remarks.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I say a few words on the subject of the hearing, I would like to say on behalf of all Members of this Committee and all Members of the Congress, and indeed on behalf of the American people, our deepest thanks for an extraordinary lifetime of unique public service. We are deeply in your debt, sir.
Mr. Chairman, as I read some articles discussing the demise of the United States-South Korea alliance, I am reminded of Mark Twain's quote: ''Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.''
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Washington and Seoul may no longer be best friends, but the myriad economic, political, and security ties we share and the range of common interest between us remain very much alive.
Just 2 weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, you and I had the opportunity to meet with the President of South Korea, to discuss the future of the South Korea alliance. Our encounter was serious and substantive, and I remain convinced that far more unites two nations than what divides us.
Our mutual commitment to freedom and democracy is unshakable. South Korea has become one of our country's largest trading partners, and we are exploring areas for yet greater economic cooperation.
Seoul dispatched troops to Iraq, despite public opposition. And tens of thousands of American troops are in Korea, standing ready to defend the Korean people should there be a crisis. And not least, Mr. Chairman, the United States and South Korea share the common goal of a denuclearized North Korea at peace with its neighbors.
Without question, the United States-South Korea alliance is in a period of transition. American forces in the South are being realigned. South Koreans are increasingly desirous of their government maintaining foreign and defense policies independent of the United States. And perhaps most importantly, the South Korean Government has a fundamentally different vision on how to obtain a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. While we favor diplomacy coupled with intense pressure in the North, the South prefers a lighter touch: Negotiations with liberal economic sweeteners for Pyongyang.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Despite these differences, the Bush Administration must make every effort—including at the highest levels—to coordinate new North Korean initiatives with all of our partners in the Six-Party Talks, including South Korea; otherwise, our key allies will blame the United States for the talks' failure, should it come to that, instead of the real and enduring source of difficulties: North Korea.
With the North Korea missile test in July still fresh on everyone's mind, and amid the current debate in Washington over how to respond to these destabilizing tests by Pyongyang, this is precisely the moment to demonstrate to Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow that we are capable of working and playing well with others.
Despite our hopes for a tougher resolution from the UN Security Council, we did manage to achieve a resolution that strongly condemned the North Korea missile test and called for a new missile and WMD-related sanctions on Pyongyang. This was a good first step. In the eyes of the world, it is now the North Koreans who have rejected peaceful negotiations in favor of destabilizing acts.
There have been reports that the Administration is contemplating a new round of sanctions against North Korea as a belated response to the missile test. In particular, some have argued for reimposing the trade and investment ban on North Korea, lifted by President Clinton in 1994.
Unlike the Japanese reaction to these tests, these new American sanctions would be far beyond anything authorized by the recent Security Council resolution. My message to Ambassador Hill today is simple: Let the Administration think long and hard before taking this dramatic step. If the South Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese will not follow suit, a unilateral United States trade and investment ban will be ineffective and counterproductive to the prospect for a negotiated solution on the Korean Peninsula.
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Unless we in fact consort with our allies, the United States will lose the moral high ground on North Korea. Pyongyang will undoubtedly cite these new sanctions as evidence of hostile intent and strengthen its refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks. The focus will turn from Pyongyang's destabilizing missile tests to Washington's unilateral sanctions.
This shift in focus and blame will further complicate the already difficult job of managing relations with our key allies in the region, including South Korea and Japan, particularly in the court of public opinion.
New sanctions will not even hurt Pyongyang. Having traveled to North Korea on two occasions within the past 20 months, I am confident in saying that the United States has almost no trade and investment in North Korea, so this is not much of a leverage. I would urge caution at this juncture, Mr. Ambassador, not out of any love for Pyongyang, but out of a deep-seated conviction that the Administration must continue to make every effort to bring about a negotiated solution with North Korea, in cooperation with the other participants in the Six-Party Talks.
Mr. Chairman, the United States and South Korea do not see eye to eye on North Korea. There is no point in trying to pretend that we do. But there is also no point in dwelling on the differences. We share the goal of ridding the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons, and America's diplomats should be working over time with their counterparts in Korea and throughout the region to find new and creative ways to achieve that common objective.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman HYDE. At the last hearing we had, we tried something where we gave every Member time for an opening statement. That consumed 2 hours and was quite a burden on our witnesses. I am loath to repeat that. On the other hand, some have asked for time to make an opening statement, and so if you don't mind, we will compromise at a 1-minute statement, and then we will get to the witnesses.
So, first, Mr. Leach for 1 minute.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I have a long opening statement that I would like submitted for the record. I would only like to assert at this point one total agreement with the attitude of this Committee and appreciation for your leadership.
Secondly, extraordinary, agreement with the statement of Mr. Lantos about the danger of sanctions. I can think of nothing more foolhardy or dangerous at this time or more counterproductive to the United States' national interest.
My statement is about a relationship with South Korea, which is of a very different nature. But thank you very much.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I welcome today's timely hearing on relations between the United States and our esteemed ally, the Republic of Korea.
The people of South Korea are deservedly proud of their nation's emergence as a global actor in recent years—economically, militarily, and culturally. The United States not only welcomes those changes without reservation, we celebrate them together with the Korean people. Perhaps uniquely in the world today, America is committed to a strong, independent, reunified Korea. Having sacrificed blood and treasure in defense of freedom for the people of South Korea, we understand that freedom necessarily implies independence of judgment.
But in wanting to assert psychological independence, Seoul would be wise not to casually eschew alliance structures in the 21st Century, especially when those structures have proven so critical to developing South Korea's political and economic stability in the 20th Century. There may always be short-term political gain to any government's distancing itself from another government in the name of self-reliance. But whether this is wise long-term policy or a thoughtful relational approach in general is open to question. Alliances, after all, involve the profound self-interest of societies and are designed to precede and supersede particular administrations. Indeed, strong alliances do not infringe national sovereignty; they presuppose strengthening it in the most elemental sense.
These cautions hold parallel lessons for the United States. One of the issues of the last several years that has caught Washington off-balance is the growth in critical South Korean attitudes toward the United States. We should have been more cognizant that real or perceived expectations of gratitude for past acts sometimes lead to social friction. With respect to both Koreas, there is also an historical concern for big-power chauvinism, whether from its neighbors China, Russia and Japan, or even from across the Pacific. Ironically, attitudes about American policy may be more generous today among the youth of former enemies, Japan and Vietnam, than among those of historical allies, South Korea and France.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In this context, it must be admitted that the emergence of differing national security priorities, generational change of political leadership in the South, contrasting attitudinal judgments toward North Korea as well as other countries in the region, and rapid shifts in America's global defense posture have led some in both countries to question the future viability of our alliance.
I emphatically reject this view. While tensions do exist, as long as leaders in the Blue House and the White House are able to balance the political immediacies of the present with attention to long-term national interests, issues of concern can and should remain eminently manageable.
Here it is perhaps worth restating why the US–ROK alliance remains profoundly in America's national interest. In broad terms, of course, our two vibrant democracies remain tightly bound through a deep and long-standing security relationship, ongoing political and cultural affinities, extensive economic bonds, and extraordinary people-to-people ties, cemented in many instances by a common educational experience and led by the million-and-a-half strong Korean-American community here in the United States. It should be underscored that the United States is extraordinarily proud of its Korean population, which is the largest in the world outside of Northeast Asia.
It should also be noted that despite substantial public controversy, the government of South Korea was one of the early contributors to the U.S.-led operations in Iraq and currently has about 2,300 troops in country. As I am often reminded by my constituents, while the American people are divided as to the wisdom of our Iraqi intervention, they are united in deep appreciation for the assistance the United States has received from others in this endeavor to bring stability and to help forge a new democracy.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
More concretely, the US–ROK alliance helps deter North Korea and preserve a free and open society in the South; it reduces the prospect that other powers will once again compete for undue influence on the peninsula; and it lays the basis for regional economic and security cooperation.
American critics of the US–ROK alliance should perhaps ask themselves whether U.S. nonproliferation and counterterrorism policies in Northeast Asia would be more effectively advanced if our security relationship with Seoul were in tatters. Likewise, South Koreans who advocate a fully self-reliant national defense posture must ponder whether a traditionally conflict-prone Northeast Asia, in which great power interests have often clashed in the past, would be more stable and peaceful without U.S. security guarantees. Indeed, is it likely that any country other than the United States would be prepared to defend South Korea's strategic interests?
From a Congressional perspective, America's commitment to South Korea has to be steadfast and our alliance unquestioned as the unpredictable unification process with the North proceeds. The North must not be allowed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea. The United States must take the long view, and the tone of our public and private diplomacy must give voice to our inner conviction that, as a vibrant democracy committed to economic and personal freedoms, the Republic of Korea is a nation the dignity of which deserves our deepest respect.
If our policies are informed by that spirit, there is every reason to be confident that Washington and Seoul will succeed in forging a new strategic framework for the alliance, not only for the purpose of managing a range of complex contingencies related to North Korea, but to cement a common democratic partnership well into the 21st Century.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
A good place to start a revitalized relationship is to advance a free trade agreement and complement it with a flexible visa waiver approach.
Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos we have heard from. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me first echo Mr. Lantos' expression of admiration for you. Indeed, it has been a great honor to serve with you in the Congress and especially on this Committee. We thank you for your many years of service.
Mr. Chairman, 5 years into the Bush Administration I can only conclude that the President is not simply mismanaging policy toward South Korea, but is actually pushing a close ally away. The Administration's unresolved internal conflict on how to deal with North Korea has made it impossible for the United States to have a consistent policy toward either North or South.
The President's schizophrenic policy began with the public humiliation of former President Kim Jong Il in a 2001 meeting and has continued up until the most recent summit, which avoided actual public humiliation of President Roh but left some of us asking, where is the kimchee.
Further evidence of the Administration pushing away our Korean friends and allies comes with the proposed redeployment and drawdown of United States forces, as well as the change of command structure. Again, these changes make some policy sense, but in the context of the Administration's policy toward South Korea, it looks more like punishment than a mutually agreed decision arrived at by allies.
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman HYDE. Your time has expired.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would ask unanimous consent to put my entire statement in the record.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. And I thank you for your warm remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Chairman, five years into the Bush Administration I can only conclude that the President is not simply mismanaging policy towards South Korea but is actively pushing a close ally away.
The Administration's unresolved internal conflict over how to deal with North Korea has made it impossible for the United States to have a coherent, consistent policy towards either the North or the South. The President's schizophrenic policy on Korea began with the public humiliation of former President Kim Dae Jung during their 2001 meeting and has continued up until the most recent summit, which avoided actual public humiliation of President Roh, but left some of us asking, where's the kimchi?
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Similar schizophrenia was on display last fall when the Administration imposed sanctions on Banco Delta Asia in Macau. While a legitimate law enforcement move, the sanctions gave the North Koreans an additional reason to continue their boycott of the six party talks. I have the distinct impression that the timing and potential impact on overall Korea policy of imposing sanctions was simply not discussed within the Administration, or worse, that resulting continued derailment of the six-party talks was, in fact, the desired outcome. Now, there are press reports that the Administration wants to reinstate the sanctions regime as it was before the Agreed Framework.
The practical effect would be largely symbolic, but in this context the symbolism is precisely the point. In neither instance, is South Korea supportive of U.S. policy.
Further evidence of the Administration pushing away our Korean friends and allies comes with the proposed redeployment and draw down of U.S. forces as well as the change in command structure. Again, these changes may make some policy sense, but in the context of the Administration's policy towards South Korea it looks more like punishment than a mutually agreed decision arrived at by allies.
I'm left wondering where the good news is in this relationship. Where's the close coordination that should accompany an alliance that is a cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia?
Unfortunately, we have an indication of the outcome of the Administration's incompetence when it comes to South Korea. Just look at the trade statistics. At a time when we are negotiating a free trade agreement with South Korea, China has displaced us as Korea's largest trading partner. And when it comes to policy towards North Korea, Seoul is closer to Beijing than to Washington.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I think its time to try and put U.S.-South Korea relations back on a sound footing and I can think of no better way to start than to expedite South Korea's entry into the Visa Waiver Program. I know there are still some issues to work through, but I can think of no clearer way to send a message of support to good friend and an important ally.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It was my honor to visit Korea with you as part of a delegation recently and just watch you as you placed a wreath at the foot of Douglas MacArthur, in appreciation for the struggle of Americans to keep Korea free.
My father was one of those who came there six decades ago to help save Korea. Unfortunately, the Korean Government to date, South Korean Government, does not seem to appreciate that sacrifice, and I took that very personally. The South Korean Government doesn't even bring up the issue of human rights when discussing issues with North Korea, nor will they even try to help the people who are escaping the dictatorship in the North. I think that is a betrayal of the blood that was shed by Americans six decades ago, and I would hope that the people of Korea who do not support that will stand with America and make you sure that we stand together for freedom and liberty for all, and that will bring about peace. That is the conference that will bring about peace.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Unfortunately, we are again hearing criticisms of our current Administration in our inability to solve the problems that were handed to us by the last Administration.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Other than saying that I can actually think of things more foolhardy than sanctions on North Korea, I agree with the comments of the Chairman in both the Full Committee and the Subcommittee and our Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It has been a privilege serving with you, Chairman Hyde. Sad that it is going to be our last Committee hearing under your leadership. Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. This sounds like it was all arranged. Thank you very much.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. Chandler.
Mr. CHANDLER. I just want to echo what everybody else said, Mr. Chairman, about you.
Chairman HYDE. I am prepared to give you a lot of time.
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. There is a radio commentator that has his callers shorten their opening comments that are laudatory by saying, dittos. And so, Mr. Chairman, dittos.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE OF ARIZONA. The same.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Boozman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, I want to echo what an honor it has been to serve with you.
One point in regard to the relationship with Korea. I have had the extraordinary opportunity, as Congressman Lantos, to visit Pyongyang, to visit Seoul. I have never been so impressed by visiting a country as the Republic of Korea. What wonderful people live—and you are able to live freely in democracy in Korea. I can't even imagine how there can be differences between South Korea and the United States. There should be a great affinity, and there certainly is on the part of my constituents, a great love and an appreciation for the people of Korea who have fought with us in every war since the Korean War.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I just want to say that one of the greatest honors that I had in the 12 years that I served in the U.S. House of Representatives has been the 6 years serving under your leadership as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and the many important things that were accomplished during those 6 years, and then to have been able to serve under you for 6 years on this Committee, International Relations Committee. And those 12 years under your leadership will be ones that I will treasure for the rest of my career, wherever it is that I am involved, whether it is here or elsewhere.
So thank you very much for allowing me to serve under you, Chairman Hyde. You are truly a great American and will be long remembered not only in this institution, but by this Nation. So thank you.
Chairman HYDE. Well, I am very moved, and I thank you very much.
Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill was a career Foreign Service Officer who served as Ambassador to Poland and to Macedonia and as Special Envoy during the Kosovo crisis. He was part of a diplomatic team which negotiated the Dayton Peace Accord in the 1990's which ended the war in Bosnia. Ambassador Hill served as a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon before joining the Department of State.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. Richard Lawless became the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs in October 2002. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, he is responsible for the formulation of United States security and defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
We thank you for joining us today, Mr. Lawless.
Prior to his current position, he worked at the U.S.-Asia Commercial Development Cooperation and the CIA.
Ambassador Hill, would you proceed with with a 5-minute summary of your prepared testimony? Your full statement, of course, will be made a part of the record.
Ambassador Hill.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. HILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the Committee, I am very pleased to have been invited here to testify before the Committee to give you an overview of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
First, Mr. Chairman, I hope it will not seem presumptuous of me as a witness to join your colleagues in wishing you the best in your future endeavors. You are a World War II combat veteran from the Pacific theater, serving in the House of Representatives, and you have brought a unique and important level of insight and understanding to our relations with East Asia.
I know your colleagues have benefited greatly from your lifetime experiences. And in fact, I read very carefully the speech you recently gave at the MacArthur Memorial at Inchon. Indeed, I read it again this morning, and I believe that really should be required reading for anyone working on South Korea.
You know, an Inchon landing today refers to what happens every couple of minutes when a 747 arrives at the Inchon International Airport. But what the Inchon landing meant that September day, some 56 years ago, was really quite different. And it behooves us all to remember it, think about it, and pass it on to future generations. So I thank you for doing that.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, the Republic of Korea is a key friend and a key ally of the United States and Asia and around the world. Like us, the Republic of Korea is dedicated to maintaining regional security, to promoting peace and stability. There is no better example of this commitment than the fact that Korea deploys some 3,000 troops in Iraq, the third largest foreign contingent. It is an important contribution to the Global War on Terror, and it reflects a clear recognition by Koreans that Korea, as the 11th largest economy in the world, should be part of all international efforts.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
As we construct a new partnership, however, it is important that we not lose sight of the cornerstone of our alliance over the years, which is the security of the Republic of Korea. North Korea remains a very real threat, with over a million troops, possibly several nuclear weapons, and a propensity to export danger and instability.
Looking more broadly, developments in the U.S.-ROK military alliance could also evolve toward a new cooperative structure of security in Northeast Asia. The ultimate destination is not yet clear, but it could be a formal institution or perhaps a set of informal relationships.
I believe that there may be opportunities to create new multilateral mechanisms in Northeast Asia that would help promote cooperation among the countries there, and such a mechanism requires that the United States and the ROK move very—work very, very closely together.
At the core of assuring regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has been to confront the security threat posed by North Korea, the DPRK. The Republic of Korea has been a critical partner in this effort to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and of course the ROK's relationship with its neighbors is an exceptional case.
But our concerns about the behavior and attitude of the Pyongyang regime extend well beyond just denuclearizing. The DPRK's economic failures, its totalitarian behavior, create another set of problems. The United States has sought to address the plight of North Korean refugees, to implement the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, and in doing so we have an active dialogue with the Republic of Korea on what are the most effective ways to assist.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The ROK has resettled some 8,700 North Korea asylum seekers, including just 1,387 asylum seekers last year. We are continuing to work with the ROK.
In addition, the United States and the ROK are focused on the conditions faced by North Koreans inside North Korea. In particular, we remain concerned about serious human rights abuses in North Korea. The Republic of Korea worries about the situation facing North Koreans in North Korea, but while it shares the same goal of freedom in the North, its approach to the issues has at times differed with ours, and we need to keep working with the ROK.
In other areas, we are currently working with the Government of the Republic of Korea to negotiate a free trade agreement that would be the largest United States trade agreement in more than a decade. Korea is already our seventh-largest partner. I know that USDR is consulting closely with Congress on these negotiations, and we need your support and your input to assure that we reach a solid agreement that meets both our needs.
In addition, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the idea of a Visa Waiver Program. South Korea has become a leader in developing modern border controls. It is developing a new prototype biometric passport that when it is issued to its citizens will be one of the most advanced type of passports in the world. In addition, we work very closely, our law enforcement officials work very, very closely with the South Koreans, we share data, we cooperate regularly. And meanwhile, the refusal rate, that is the number of South Koreans that who are not eligible for visas, has fallen precipitously in recent years, it is now on the order of three and a half percent. In short, Korea is very close to where we could consider having Korea enter the Visa Waiver Program. And as President Bush assured President Roh just 2 weeks ago, we will work together to see if we can't get this issued resolved as quickly as possible. This will help bring Korea and the United States even closer together. It will help us; it will help Korea.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Of course there are anti-American sentiments sometimes in Korea, but I think it is worth understanding that all opinion surveys continue to show a vast majority of Koreans support the alliance with the United States. A vast majority of Koreans continue to support close relations with the United States. And I think we can see in Koreans, we can feel with Koreans a kindred spirit and a closeness that we need to maintain.
I think in particular we need to work with the new generation of Koreans. We need to remind them of the past, but we cannot just inspire them by the past, we need to reach them by focusing on the future of the relationship, how it is changing, how it is going to meet the needs of our two countries. Korea is a technologically sophisticated society, and Koreans in fact have a great deal of confidence about their future. Our message should be to them that we also share in this confidence. Our Embassy in Seoul is working very hard to get that message out, and we believe that we can have a very good relationship with Korea as we move forward.
Finally, our relationship with the Republic of Korea is one with a very long and honorable past, but more important or as importantly, an even more promising future. It is blossoming into a mature global partnership, and we are at a point where we can start to translate those exciting ideas into actions that will benefit both countries in a close relationship. I look forward to working with you to seize this opportunity. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador Hill.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am very pleased to have been invited to testify before the Committee again to give you an overview of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).
First, Mr. Chairman, let me wish you the best in your retirement. As the last World War II combat veteran from the Pacific theater serving in the U.S. House of Representatives you are taking with you into retirement a valuable and important perspective on our relations with East Asia. I know your colleagues have benefited greatly from your substantial experience as have so many of us at the Department of State.
I would like to focus my remarks on the U.S.–Korean Alliance; on the many important issues which we have been able to make essential progress as we update it for the 21st Century. An alliance as important as this one is really a living and growing entity that needs tending and nurturing.
The Republic of Korea is a key ally of the United States in Asia and around the world. Like us, the ROK is dedicated to maintaining regional security and to promoting peace and stability around the globe. But our alliance represents more than a defensive balance of power. It is also a positive force for progress. We now have a historic opportunity to transform our alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st century—including both traditional and new security, economic, and transnational challenges. We are working very closely with the Department of Defense, including my colleague Richard Lawless, to adapt our partnership with the ROK to meet those challenges on the Korean peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the globe.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The mature global partnership we are forging together now reflects the combined capabilities we bring to bear not just in the military sphere, but also in the political, economic and cultural areas. Today, we view that partnership as a chance to pool our shared goals in the face of new challenges and opportunities, from terrorism to the tsunami relief efforts to HIV/AIDS to our new Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.
We want to look ahead and begin to identify further ways in which our two countries can work together to realize our goals and face shared challenges based on the strong bonds of friendship, common political values and economic interdependence.
SHARED SECURITY CONCERNS
As we construct a new partnership, however, it is important we not lose sight of the cornerstone of our alliance over the years: the security of the Republic of Korea. North Korea remains a very real threat—with over a million troops, possibly several nuclear weapons, and a propensity to export all kinds of dangerous things.
But how we do these things is undergoing a tremendous change. For one thing, it is no longer solely the U.S. that dictates the terms of this relationship. It has evolved into a more balanced partnership. Working in concert with Seoul, we are realigning our troops, consolidating our bases, and shifting more responsibility to the ROK's armed forces—all while enhancing our capacity to defend the Peninsula in time of crisis.
We continue to face a number of challenging issues in our military alliance, which I know my colleague, Deputy Undersecretary Lawless, will discuss in greater detail. Our military partnership is no longer the dominant feature of our bilateral relationship but it still remains an important foundation.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The current issue animating both our political and military relationship, one which I am sure Mr. Lawless will cover in greater depth, is the question of transitioning the operational control of Republic of Korea forces in war-time to an independent command structure in contrast to today's Combined Forces Command arrangement. This stems from a key platform position President Roh Moo-hyun promoted during his campaign for President in 2002. We are now working out the details to fulfill that request, because it makes sense in the context of our 21st Century partnership.
This is an issue that has excited a number of public protests and engendered press comment. I realize that for many Koreans contemplating the end of this arrangement is difficult. It is important for Koreans to understand that it is the United States' enduring commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea—not a military headquarters—that has safeguarded their country for more than fifty years. At the same time, we don't accept the view that this arrangement, which has worked well, has somehow diminished the ROK's sovereignty or made it less of a country.
There has also been significant discussion on the timing of the transfer. When President Bush and President Roh met at the White House on September 14 they agreed that it should not become a political issue. Decisions about the placement of our troops and the size of our troops will be made in consultation with the South Korean government. We will work in a consultative way at the appropriate level of government to come up with an appropriate date. We will also be looking to the government of South Korea to provide an adequate share of the extra costs associated with stationing U.S. troops there.
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
While I am discussing our security strategy in the context of our modernizing alliance, I think it is also noteworthy that the ROK's national security strategy is consistent with the U.S. effort to pursue strategic flexibility in the region. We respect the Korean position that it won't be drawn into a conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people. In turn, Korea has demonstrated its respect, given the range of challenges from the war on terrorism to humanitarian operations in response to natural disasters, for U.S. forces to be flexibly deployed across regions and different parts of the globe.
Looking further into the future, these developments in the U.S.-ROK military alliance could evolve toward a new cooperative structure of security in Northeast Asia. The ultimate destination is not yet clear; it could be a formal institution, or perhaps just a series of informal relationships. However, I believe that there may be opportunities to create new multilateral mechanisms in Northeast Asia that would help promote cooperative relations among China, Korea, Japan, and the United States. Such a mechanism could also help address the inevitable regional frictions that can and will arise and provide a forum for improving mutual understanding.
The six-party talks have demonstrated that when there are common interests, the major players in Northeast Asia can work together to address problems. I believe this framework has the potential to develop into a mechanism that can cooperatively manage change on the Korean Peninsula, as well as usefully address a range of functional issues in the sub-region from energy and environment to economic and financial cooperation.
Meanwhile, we are also working with Koreans as a force for peace in the global community. Koreans have participated alongside Americans in UN peacekeeping missions around the world and Korea has been a reliable partner in the war on terror. With a contribution of 2,300 troops, the ROK is the third largest coalition partner in Iraq. We hope Korea will continue to make a strong and positive contribution toward building stability and democracy beyond its borders. Indeed, we can work in partnership with Seoul to promote new forms of security cooperation in Northeast Asia as a way of dealing with common threats and overcoming historically-based tensions between Korea and its neighbors.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
CHALLENGES TO THE NORTH
At the core of assuring regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has been confronting the security threat posed by both the strengths and weaknesses of the DPRK. The ROK has been a critical partner in the multilateral effort to end North Korea's nuclear program. Of course, the ROK's relationship with its neighbor to the north is an exceptional case. On the one hand, there is the aspiration of the South Korean people to see their nation made whole once again. On the other, they have first-hand experience—beginning with the outbreak of the Korean War through the present—of the threat posed by North Korea's ideological hostility and its considerable arsenal of conventional and—as the North continues to boast—nuclear weapons. The U.S.-ROK alliance was formed as an explicit response to these threats. We remain committed to the fundamental mission of defending the Republic of Korea.
In that vein, as I mentioned earlier, the United States and the ROK have embarked on a major modernization of our alliance that will enhance our ability to fulfill our mission by better exploiting our respective strengths and capabilities. At the same time, we are working with the ROK to end the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. As the U.S., ROK, DPRK, China, Japan, and Russia all agreed in last year's September Joint Statement, North Korea's denuclearization would open the path to a permanent peace treaty on the Peninsula and mark a profound contribution toward a more stable and secure Northeast Asia. We support the ROK's hope that such a peace treaty would lay the foundations for reunification and extend the peace, prosperity, and freedom that the South enjoys to the rest of the Peninsula.
But our concerns about the behavior and actions of the Pyongyang regime extend beyond denuclearization. The DPRK's economic failings and totalitarian behavior create another set of problems. The U.S. has sought to address the plight of North Korean refugees and implement the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, and in doing so we have forged an active dialogue with the ROK on the most effective ways to assist this vulnerable population. The ROK has dedicated significant energy and resources to assisting North Korean asylum seekers. The ROK has resettled more than 8,700 North Korean asylum seekers within its borders, including 1,387 just last year. As you are aware, the U.S. has recently resettled some North Korean refugees in the U.S., and we continue to work with international organizations and countries in the region to look for additional opportunities to assist and resettle North Koreans in need. Even as we move forward with our own program, the ROK will continue to be the primary resettlement destination for North Korean asylum seekers. We will continue to work closely with the ROK on this important Congressional and Administration priority.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In addition to our concerns about North Koreans outside the DPRK, the U.S. and ROK are both focused on the conditions facing North Koreans inside the DPRK. In particular, the U.S. remains concerned about the serious human rights abuses in the DPRK. The ROK also worries about the situation facing North Koreans in the DPRK, but while it shares the same goal of freedom in the North, its approach to the issue has at times differed from our own. We continue to urge the ROK to take a more active stance against DPRK human rights abuses, and to support international measures aimed at addressing the North's abuses.
A COMMON INTEREST IN FREE TRADE
You know well that while we are still military allies, we now have a more mature, multi-faceted relationship that features a healthy and strong economic partnership based on a common interest in free trade. It is that partnership that is becoming the driver of our relationship.
We are currently working with the Government of Korea to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) that would be the largest U.S. trade agreement in more than a decade. Korea is already our seventh largest trading partner. Through July of this year we exchanged more than $45 billion worth of goods, and we have a healthy trade in services as well. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Korea, and Korean investment in the United States is growing rapidly. We have never before been so economically vested in each other's well being than we are today. An FTA would further strengthen this economic relationship, bringing benefits to both countries and providing a new pillar for the alliance.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
These negotiations will not be easy, as no undertaking of this magnitude is. There are powerful interests lined up on both sides. We are trying to bring down both tariff and non-tariff barriers including in Korea's highly protected agricultural markets and in the automotive sector. Polls in Korea show opinion is about evenly split over the FTA. In a way it has become a proxy for attitudes toward the alliance and for Korea's place in the world in general. Opponents assert it will impoverish Korean farmers and turn Korea into a U.S. economic colony. Others see the FTA as a historic opportunity for Korea to undertake needed reforms to modernize its economy and become a dynamic economic hub for Northeast Asia.
President Roh has unambiguously aligned himself with the latter, more confident point of view. I too am confident that in the end, that point of view will prevail in Korea, and our commercial relationship will move to a new level, bringing our societies closer together. A successful US-ROK FTA would also have a regional impact. It could become part of a network of FTAs in the Pacific as we have already concluded agreements with Australia and Singapore and are negotiating with Thailand and Malaysia. It might also spur Japan to begin move in this direction.
I know USTR is consulting closely with Congress on these negotiations, as required by Trade Promotion Authority legislation. We need your support and your input to assure that we reach a solid agreement that meets the needs of both parties and will win approval from both legislatures.
GLOBAL CONCERNS
The Alliance has also changed to encompass shared political values. As South Korea has evolved from a military dictatorship to a fully democratic society, the United States and the Republic of Korea have become a more natural pairing, sharing a common respect for human rights, rule of law, and freedom of speech. This, I believe, should provide the foundation for our efforts—in tandem with our joint work within the Six Party Talks—to overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula and bring about genuine reform and respect for human rights in the North.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Furthermore, our common political values have opened the way for the United States and Korea to work together, side-by-side, on an unprecedented number of global issues of common concern. Trafficking in Persons is an excellent example. Our countries stand together in opposing trafficking as an flagrant violation of human rights and as a form of modern-day slavery. Last year, the South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking laws aimed at ending the commercial sexual exploitation of women and girls. In our annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department held up your law as model legislation that the rest of the world should regard as a ''best practice.''
The ROK is also a key partner in a number of multilateral efforts to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Partnership of Clean Development and Climate. South Korea is also actively participating in a host of multilateral efforts to develop and deploy transformational technologies able to rise to the challenge of generating adequate and affordable supplies of clean, sustainable energy that will benefit the environment and could reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). These include the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), the International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), Methane-to-Markets partnership, and the International Thermal Experimental Reactor (ITER) project which seeks to develop clean fusion energy.
THE TIES THAT BIND
Our Alliance has also expanded to include ties of education, culture and family. Koreans continue to flock to the United States to study. There are over a million Korean-Americans living in the United States. They have had a huge positive impact on our country and continue to provide a vital and unique link between the two nations.
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
There is little doubt that lifting U.S. requirements for Korean visitors to obtain visas for tourism or business travel will provide a tangible boost to a closer bilateral relationship. It is certainly one of our biggest public outreach challenges in Korea. The Koreans are aware of their status as our seventh-largest trading partner, one of our strongest military allies, and one of our primary sources of tourists and foreign students. Korea is also the third-largest contributor of troops to Iraq, after the U.S. and Great Britain, and has been a participant in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, East Timor and Africa. So Koreans look at all of this and wonder why they aren't included with Japan and the twenty-six other countries whose people can visit the U.S. without a visa under certain circumstances.
There are a number of requirements to be allowed in the Visa Waiver Program, including, for example: plans to issue an electronic passport; a program to ensure effective border security and law enforcement cooperation with the U.S.; and, a visa refusal rate of less than 3%. The Koreans are developing an electronic passport and expect to have it ready for their general public sometime next year. They've made great efforts to work closely with us on law enforcement and border security, and we have very active cooperation with them. Then there's the refusal rate. It looks as though their refusal rate this year will likely be somewhere around 3.5 percent—a half of one percent too high.
So the Koreans feel some frustration on this issue, particularly since their refusal rate has been under 4% for the past four years. Entry into the Visa Waiver Program is something that would hold tangible benefits for many ordinary Koreans. This administration understands that and President Bush assured President Roh at the summit last week that we intend to work together to see if we can get this issue resolved as quickly as possible once Korea meets the statutory requirements to participate in the program. As a part of this, we are exploring the possibility of commencing the administrative review process for Korea's possible inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program, so that we can promptly move forward on this issue, just as President Bush committed us to doing at the summit. We regularly point out to the Koreans, though, that the law has no wriggle room in it and that there's only so much we can do as long as they're above that three percent.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Fifty years ago, the blood that bound our countries was the blood spilled on the battlefield. Now it is the living blood of families that stretch from Seoul to San Francisco that unites us. Korean culture and American culture are increasingly coming together. Our role as government should be to remove as many obstacles as we can and encourage these exciting and dynamic cultural ties.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
At the same time we are coming together, persistent displays of anti-American sentiments sometimes seem to be a regular feature of the political landscape in Korea. I don't believe that across the general population feelings against the United States have actually grown in any significant way. It was, however, something that I took very seriously during my time there as Ambassador-and I still take it very seriously—but I think this is something that is, frankly, somewhat misunderstood here in the U.S. The number of Koreans who are truly anti-American is very small. However, the number of people who care about what America does and how we interact with the Republic of Korea is very large-just about everyone in South Korea, really. And Koreans like to express their opinions. They live in a free society and they have that right and they exercise it. Yes, sometimes they protest against the U.S. or one of our policies but they also protest against real estate taxes, education reforms, fishing regulations, labor laws and a whole range of issues wholly unrelated to the alliance.
Our two countries have a tremendous connection, encompassing the tens of thousands Korean of students who have studied here, the many Koreans who have relatives living here, or the personal relationships forged between members of the two militaries. Many Koreans have a great affection for the U.S. even if they don't always agree with us and I was reminded of that often when I was ambassador there.
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I would say though, that there is something that we could do better in talking to Korea and that is to focus even more on the future. The Korean war and the alliance of the last fifty years are very important and we should not forget them, but older Koreans already understand and appreciate that history. We also need to make our case to the younger generation of Koreans—especially those in their twenties and thirties—and I don't think bringing up the war is the most effective way to reach them. How many of you have ever tried to convince a twenty-year old that something was important by citing something that happened in 1951? I can tell you that it isn't any more likely to work with Korean twenty-year olds than with American twenty-year olds.
We have to focus on the future of the relationship and how its changing and is going to meet the future needs of our two countries. Korea has become a very technologically sophisticated society and Koreans, very rightly, have a lot of confidence about their future. Our message to them should be that we share this confidence. Ambassador Vershbow and our embassy in Seoul are working hard to get that message out; the good news is that we have already made significant progress on telling this very compelling story.
I would add that Congress has an important role to play in communicating with the Korean public. When members travel to Korea or meet visiting Korean legislators or officials here in the U.S. it sends a strong signal that the relationship is important to us, so I would like to acknowledge the role you have also played. Notably, your recent visit, Mr. Chairman, to Korea generated a lot of attention there. Visits such as those have an enormous impact on Korean perceptions of U.S. priorities and policies.
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In this respect, a key goal of our public outreach efforts is to encourage continued direct contact between Korean citizens and U.S. officials and to help advance our foreign policy interests in Korea and strengthen our alliance. One new way we hope to do this is by establishing a diplomatic presence in Korea's second largest city, Busan. By inaugurating what is called an ''American Presence Post'' (APP) there, we hope to reach out to an under-targeted segment of the Korean population that has experienced a significant and generational shift away from the traditionally positive feelings towards the U.S. Furthermore, an additional diplomatic post in Korea would demonstrate an expanding commitment to a critical ally in a region where the rise of China and instability of North Korea create a possibly unfavorable geopolitical outlook. Finally, the establishment of an APP in Korea's largest port and main transport center for U.S. imports will benefit our growing business and commercial and contribute to the success of our Free Trade Agreement negotiations.
In response to our Secretary's call for new ways to make diplomatic inroads into under-represented regions, we have already begun preliminary logistical investigations for the opening of an APP in Busan, Korea that is required before we can formally submit the proposal to Congress for approval. I look forward to your future support in what I fully expect to be a rewarding foreign policy project.
CONCLUSION
Our relationship with the Republic of Korea is one with a long and honorable past; but more importantly, an even more promising future. It is blossoming into a maturing global partnership, and we are at a point in time where we can start to translate those exciting ideas into actions that will benefit both countries and our close relationship. I look forward to doing what I can to work with you to seize this historic opportunity.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lawless.
STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD P. LAWLESS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS—ASIA PACIFIC, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. LAWLESS. Yes. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and the distinguished Members of this Committee, I paid very close attention to the eloquent opening statements, and I would just like to begin by stating that to those of us who work every day in the Executive Branch of the Government, DoD, State Department, wherever, it means a lot to us, as we work very hard every day to make this alliance work and make it stronger, that we have the attention and the attention to detail and the interest that is exhibited by this Committee. So again, we deeply appreciate that.
Thank you for providing this opportunity to talk about our alliance relationship with the Republic of Korea. This opportunity to discuss this topic with you today comes at a key juncture in the half-century partnership that we have had. It is indeed a partnership, an alliance which has stood the test of time.
For several years now, as you are aware, the United States and the Republic of Korea have been engaged in a process to evolve the alliance to meet the demands of the future security environment. Beginning in 2002 with a process that we called the ''Future of the Alliance Talks,'' the Department of Defense, State Department, and our other partners in the United States Government, along with the respective ministries of the Republic of Korea, have conducted an ongoing dialogue on the realignment of United States Forces in Korea, the transfer of conventional defense missions from the United States to the Republic of Korea, and the enhancement of our combined defense and deterrence capabilities on the peninsula. These agreements reached with the Republic of Korea have now entered the implementation phase. The ROK has committed sufficient resources to acquiring land for the relocation of Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
When this relocation and facility consolidation is complete, our forces will be much better positioned to support the Republic of Korea defense and the United States national interests, and our servicemembers and families will enjoy a significantly increased quality-of-life improvement.
This process of discussion is also allowing us, very importantly, to return vacated facilities and land to the Republic of Korea Government. When negotiated—when we negotiated the Yongsan relocation plan and the 2nd Infantry Division redeployment, we dramatically accelerated this camp return—land return process. When completed in 2009, we will have returned 59 facilities to the Republic of Korea control. Much of this is very high-value property. To date, we have returned 19 facilities. We are on schedule, and we are meeting our obligations.
In this same process the Republic of Korea agreed to take on new missions, missions that were traditionally the responsibility of United States forces. Again, the Republic of Korea is meeting its obligations in this mission transfer process; we are on schedule, and will continue the mission transfer exercise.
When the future of the alliance dialogue began with the need to address certain legacy issues, it focused primarily on those issues. But we were also able to turn very quickly to the future of the alliance, and we are now at a point where we can seize certain opportunities to set a new vision for this important partnership.
Korea, indeed, has changed, particularly in the last decade. And there are new pressures, as you have mentioned today, on the U.S.-ROK security relationship and on our military alliance. The younger generation of Koreans seeks a different relationship with the United States, a relationship that would be perceived to be more equal. Alliance issues have become more of a political concern than in previous years. This is not to say that this generation is in any way anti-American or calling for an end to the alliance, but this is a generation that is not bound by the memories of the Korean War, and it is therefore not bound and not knowledgeable of much of the American sacrifices. For this reason, perhaps, it is more assertive of its desires and its concerns than perhaps previous generations of Koreans have been.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
With the continued development of a free, democratic, and prosperous nation, our Korean partners have, quite understandably, set new goals for themselves. We are responsive to that requirement.
In recent years, President Roh Moo Hyun and his government have increasingly expressed the desire to take the lead role in the conventional defense of Korea and, in particular, to exercise operational control, OPCON, over Korea's own forces in a contingency situation.
The Republic of Korea forces have developed, we should note, into a world-class military power, and South Korea's economic capability and national infrastructure empower that country to bring capabilities to bear in a military conflict.
Naturally, Republic of Korea predominance in its conventional defense is a reasonable next phase in the maturation of the U.S.-ROK relationship. The United States fully supports this fundamental change. Indeed, the two sides have been discussing this change for many years.
This is an important point I would like to emphasize. The discussion of a change in our alliance military structure and in particular in the command relationship, is not new. We have seen this as a natural next step in the evolution of the alliance for some time, as have our Korean counterparts. It is unfortunate that some in the Republic of Korea have chosen to define the issue as one of sovereignty versus alliance, with an emphasis on division. Change of this nature is difficult, and there are other voices in South Korea expressing concerns that this transition may signal a United States abandonment. Let me assure you, the way that we are going about this, nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact remains, however, that this is a natural evolution and one whose time has come both militarily and politically.
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We have committed to achieving the goal of an ROK-led defense structure in this alliance. Doing so requires a reshaping of the U.S.-ROK military partnership in a manner that strengthens the critical U.S.-ROK relationship while facilitating the Koreans' predominant role in their own conventional defense. This will require that we transition our relationship from a system of shared operational control under a combined headquarters to a system of independent parallel national commands, where the United States plays a supporting role to the ROK lead. In basic terms, this means the disestablishment of a Combined Forces Command.
Let me be clear on one point. While the United States forces will support the ROK commander, U.S. forces will remain under the command and operational control of an American commander; no other option has been discussed. We are confident that the adjusted overall United States security posture in the Asia-Pacific region, coupled with improvements in ROK capabilities as well as significant and continuing U.S. capabilities on the peninsula, will permit this transition to occur at low risk, with no degradation of deterrence, and with minimal adjustments in the overall U.S.-ROK relationship.
The U.S.-ROK alliance and the United States military presence in Korea remain a critical element of the security architecture of Northeast Asia. The maintenance of that relationship and the United States presence in Korea are of strategic importance to the United States. We plan to remain in Korea with a major national security presence as long as we are welcomed there by the people of Korea.
As we transition to a new security structure, the United States will continue to provide U.S. unique capabilities. These are life of alliance capabilities, such as sustained abilities to execute air campaigns, strategic intelligence, and other such capabilities. These are central to the U.S. support of the ROK defense and will remain in place post the transition.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Additionally, the United States is committed to continue to provide specific U.S. capabilities currently embedded with the CFC. These will be provided to the new ROK joint operational commander for an extended period beyond the transition. We refer to these capabilities as ''bridging capability''; in other words, we will not leave the Republic of Korea absent critical capabilities that that alliance now exists.
These continuing U.S. capabilities are tangible and demonstrate the long-term United States commitment to the Republic of Korea security. The key point here is that we are focused on maintaining a proper capability on the peninsula. Our assessment is that the Republic of Korea forces are capable of defending the Republic of Korea, but that United States support in key areas such as air power are critical enablers to that defense. Our focus must remain on capabilities and not numbers. The U.S. presence will continue to adjust itself as we move forward.
Much attention in recent days, and particularly during the recent visit with President Roh and other exchanges, have been on the issue of when. The President has stated that he will not discuss specific dates for the transition and will leave this to be worked out between the two governments at an appropriate level. General Bell, the commander of ROK Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, and the U.S. Forces-Korea assesses that we can accomplish this transition within the next 3 years at low risk.
While 2009 may appear ambitious, it is achievable we believe. As we make these changes to strengthen the alliance, we must have strengthened burden-sharing support, as has been noted here today, from our ROK partner, and we must have a continued provision of appropriate training facilities. These two elements are critical to ensure our ability to bring all that we can bring to the warfight. These two issues are very much before us today. In order to avoid a degradation of our capabilities and consequent impairment of the alliance, we need near-term resolution of these two issues.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
One observation taken from all this is that this is an alliance with many moving components that requires constant attention and fine-tuning. I assure you today that we are giving this bonded and blood alliance our full attention.
In closing, my only regret is to say that time has not permitted me in this statement to explain in detail all that we have accomplished in the past 4 years in advancing this relationship. It is strong, and it is getting better every day. Thank you very much.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lawless.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lawless follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD P. LAWLESS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS—ASIA PACIFIC, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for providing this opportunity to talk about our Alliance relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK). The opportunity to discuss this important topic with this Committee comes at a key juncture in our half-century old partnership, a partnership that remains important to both countries' national interests.
EVOLVING THE ALLIANCE
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
For several years now the United States and Republic of Korea have been engaged in a process to evolve the Alliance to meet the demands of the future security environment. Beginning in 2002with the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Talks, the Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense, along with our partners from the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, have conducted an ongoing dialogue that has led to agreements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea, the transfer of conventional defense missions from U.S. to ROK forces, and the enhancement of our combined defense and deterrence capabilities.
These agreements have now entered the implementation phase. The ROK has committed significant resources to acquiring land for the relocation of Yongsan Garrison and the Second Infantry Division (2ID). This has not been easy politically, and the efforts of the Ministry of National Defense and the ROK government deserve recognition. While we are approximately one year behind our original, but admittedly ambitious, schedule, we continue to work with the ROK and expect to complete the realignment of U.S. forces by 2009. When this relocation and facility consolidation is complete, our forces will be in a much better position to support the ROK defense and U.S. national interests and our service members and their families will enjoy a greatly increased quality of life. This process is also allowing us to return vacated facilities and land to the Republic of Korea government. When we negotiated the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the 2ID redployment in 2003–2004, we dramatically accelerated this camp return process. When completed in 2009, we will have returned 59 facilities to the Republic of Korea control, much of this high value property. To date we have returned 19 facilities.
At the same time, the ROK agreed to take on new mission areas, missions that have traditionally been carried out by U.S. forces. The transfer of these missions has unencumbered the 2ID forces, greatly increasing their flexibility and facilitating their relocation from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and bases north of Seoul to a consolidated base south of Seoul. The ROK is meeting its commitments under this agreement, and the transfers are on schedule.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
During the FOTA talks, both nations committed to increasing our combined capabilities. With the help of Congress, U.S. forces in Korea and in the region have greatly increased their capabilities since 2003. The $11 billion investment by the Department of Defense in the past three years provides U.S. forces in Korea and the region increased agility and lethality. During this same period, the Republic of Korea developed its Defense Reform Plan, a complementary program, and invested over $10 billion in capabilities modernization. These investments have resulted in the highest level of combined deterrence and defense posture in the history of the Alliance.
While the dialogue began with the need to address ''legacy'' issues, it has focused primarily on the future and has brought the Alliance to a point where we can seize opportunities to set a new vision for the U.S.–ROK partnership.
A CHANGING ROK
Korea itself has been changing significantly, bringing new pressures to bear on the U.S.—ROK relationship and on the military Alliance. A younger generation of Koreans seeks a different relationship with the United States, a relationship that is perceived to be more equal. Alliance issues have become more of a political concern than in previous years. This is not to say that this generation is anti-American or calling for an end to the alliance, but it is not bound by memories of the war and of American sacrifices and is therefore much more assertive of its desires and its concerns than perhaps previous generations have been.
With continued development as a free, democratic and prosperous nation, our Korean partners have, quite understandably, set new goals for themselves. In recent years, the Roh Moo-hyun government has increasingly expressed its desire to take the lead role in its conventional defense, and in particular, to exercise operational control (OPCON) of its own forces in a contingency. ROK forces have developed into a world class military power and South Korea's economic capability and national infrastructure empower the country to bring civilian production capacities to bear in a military conflict, something its neighbor to the North cannot do effectively. Naturally, ROK predominance in its conventional defense is the reasonable next phase in the maturation of the U.S.–ROK relationship and the United States fully supports this change. Indeed, the two sides have been discussing such a step for nearly two decades.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
This is an important point that I would like to emphasize. The discussion of a change in our Alliance military structure and command relationships—OPCON—is not new. We have seen this as the natural next step in the evolution of the Alliance for some time. It is unfortunate that some in the ROK government have chosen to define the issue as one of sovereignty versus Alliance, with an emphasis on division. Change of this nature is difficult and there are other voices in South Korea expressing concerns that this transition might signal US abandonment. The fact remains, however, that this is a natural evolution, one whose time has come both militarily and politically. Transitioning the Alliance to a new military and command structure now will establish a relationship that better serves both nations' interests and is sustainable for the long-term.
A CHANGING STRUCTURE
We have committed to achieving the goal of a ROK-led defense structure. Doing so requires a reshaping of the U.S.–ROK military partnership in a manner that will strengthen the critical U.S.–ROK relationship while facilitating the Koreans' predominant role in their own conventional defense.
This will require that we transition our relationship from a system of shared operational control under a combined headquarters to a system of independent, parallel national commands where the U.S. plays a supporting role to the ROK lead. In basic terms, this means the disestablishment of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). While CFC's replacement has not yet been fully decided, the evolved system will be one of a continued combined defense and mutual support that is fully capable of defending the Republic of Korea.
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me be clear on one point here—while United States forces will support the ROK commander, U.S. forces will remain under the command and operational control of an American commander. No other option has been discussed.
We are confident that the adjusted overall U.S. security posture in the Asia Pacific region, coupled with the improvements in ROK capabilities as well as significant and continuing U.S. capabilities on the peninsula, will permit this transition to occur at low risk with no degradation of deterrence and with minimal adjustments in the overall U.S.–ROK bilateral relationship.
AN ENDURING U.S. PRESENCE
The U.S.–ROK Alliance, and the U.S. military presence in Korea, remains a critical element of the security architecture of Northeast Asia. The maintenance of that relationship and the U.S. presence are of strategic importance to the United States. We plan to remain in Korea as long as we are welcomed by the Korean people.
As we transition to a new structure, the United States will continue to provide U.S.-unique capabilities. These ''life-of-the-Alliance capabilities'' (e.g., sustained air campaign execution and intelligence) are central to the U.S. support for the ROK's defense. Current DoD planning calls for maintaining the existing ground combat brigade, Army combat support elements, and air combat power.
Additionally, the U.S. has committed to continue providing specific U.S. capabilities embedded in the current CFC structure to the ROK joint operational commander for an extended period beyond the transition. A prime example of these ''bridging capabilities'' is continuing the current U.S.-provided CFC command and control system support as part of the new military construct. These continuing U.S. capabilities clearly demonstrate the U.S. long-term commitment to ROK security.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
A key point here is that we are focused on maintaining the proper capabilities on the peninsula. Our assessment is that the ROK forces are capable of defending the Republic of Korea, but that U.S. support in key areas, such as airpower, is a critical enabler to that defense. The United States is committed to maintaining the proper capabilities for supporting the ROK defense, and for conveying clearly to the North the strength and credibility of the alliance's deterrent.
The focus must remain on capabilities, however, not numbers. The U.S. presence will continue to adjust itself, and overall troop numbers may decline slightly once the new command relationships are established and U.S. requirements to support ROK defense are clarified. Such adjustments will likely be small and will be made with a view to maintaining the proper deterrent and defense capabilities on the peninsula to complement the very capable ROK force. The makeup of this presence will evolve over several years as we transition to new command relationships and new plans to support the ROK's defense.
A QUESTION OF WHEN
Much attention has been focused on the question of when this transition should occur. The President has stated that he will not discuss specific dates for the transition and will leave this to be worked out between the two governments at the appropriate level. General Bell, the Commander of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command, and United States Forces Korea assesses that we can accomplish this transition within the next three years with low risk, as long as we execute an appropriate training and exercise plan, while establishing necessary coordination centers and providing access to important command and control and intelligence capabilities. We are in the process of working with our partner to develop such a training regimen and the necessary coordination structures.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Raised expectations among the ROK public and in the region must be addressed. We will soon agree on what the replacement for the current military structure will be. With the decision to disestablish CFC, both partners will naturally begin investing in the new structure. For CFC—our legacy warfighting mechanism—this will mean dwindling resources, in terms of money and personnel. Lengthening the transition or implementation period beyond three years only increases risk and degrades deterrence. Conversely, demonstrating our Allied ability to transition the command relationship arrangement on an expedited schedule will send a signal of strength regarding the Alliance.
While 2009 may appear ambitious, it is readily achievable. The Commander of CFC, working with the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will establish an Implementation Working Group that will report directly to the two of them and manage the implementation process. This group, for example, would implement a theater exercise cycle to allow a validation of ROK capabilities before 2009. The key elements that make a 2009 transition possible are the enduring U.S. support presence and our provision of ''bridging'' capabilities.
As we make these changes to strengthen the Alliance, we must have strengthened burdensharing support from our ROK partner and the continued provision of appropriate training facilities. These two elements are critical to ensure readiness for the warfight. These two issues are now very much in front of us. In order to avoid degradation of our capabilities and consequent impairment of the Alliance, we need near term resolution of these two issues. One observation to be taken from this is that this is an Alliance with many moving components requiring constant attention and fine tuning. I assure you that we are giving this bonded-in-blood Alliance our full attention
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
CONCLUSION
The U.S. and ROK have stood side by side on ''Freedom's Frontier'' for more than 50 years. We have shed blood together in freedom's cause, both on and off the peninsula. This relationship, forged on the battlefield and sustained through the years by the efforts of Korean and American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, can and should continue. But it must change to meet the current realities of a prosperous, democratic and independent Republic of Korea. Both sides are committed to instituting this next phase of our Alliance history in a way that ensures our future generations will still enjoy the unique friendship that is the U.S.–ROK Alliance.
We know that the support of our Congress and of the American people is essential to achieving that objective. I welcome your questions.
Chairman HYDE. And we will now entertain questions of the panel by the Members. If they would limit themselves to 5 minutes, it would be appreciated. And Mr. Lantos will be first.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for very substantive and informative testimony.
Ambassador Hill, there are a number of interrelated issues with respect to North Korea I would like to ask you to comment on, so I will just quickly list them and you take your time to respond to these.
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
First, on sanctions, what is the status of Administration deliberations with respect to sanctions? What sanctions may be considered by the Administration? And will you commit to consulting with Congress prior to the imposition of any sanctions?
With respect to the Six-Party Talks that you have been in charge of on behalf of the United States—and I want to commend you for your very fine work—but will you give us a candid appraisal of where these talks are at the moment?
There are periodic reports, Mr. Ambassador, that North Korea may be planning to test a nuclear device. I would like to get your appraisal of how Japan, China, and South Korea would react to such an unfortunate eventuality.
And finally, as you know, our Department of Treasury took action against a bank in Macao, the former Portugese colony, because that bank was laundering counterfeit United States currency from North Korea as well as other North Korean funds obtained through illegal means.
How much money did North Korea lose as a result of our action? And can you tell us what banks in other countries, how they have reacted to this? What has been the impact on North Korea of this action by our Treasury Department?
Mr. HILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Lantos. I will do my best to answer as much of those as I can.
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
First of all, with respect to sanctions, as you know, the United States has looked into the question of North Korean abuse of financial—the international finance system, and this bears on the issue of this bank in Macao, this Banco Delta Asia. And with respect to Banco Delta Asia, the United States did take the action, pursuant to section 311 of the PATRIOT Act, to warn United States banks of the possibility that we would designate Banco Delta Asia as a money-laundering concern and it would therefore require those banks to not do business with Banco Delta Asia. So that action was taken about a year ago, so that is one action we have taken.
We have also—and this is not a sanction, but rather it is in respect to our obligations against—to work against proliferation—we have designated several North Korean companies—we have also designated other companies through an executive order, other companies in other countries as companies who we have identified as engaging in proliferation and materials or finances for weapons of mass destruction, and we have taken actions against those companies. So that is another action that we have actually taken.
That latter action, that is, action against known proliferators, is something that is called for in the UN Security Council Resolution 1695; that is, all countries are required to exercise vigilance, consistent with our laws and the international laws, to prevent the financing and transfer of technology of weapons of mass destruction.
Since we have already taken some of those actions, it was other countries that have, to some extent, have been catching up with us. And indeed, with respect to implementation of 1695, the Australians and the Japanese announced certain measures on September 19th—that is just a week ago—to follow up on essentially—to bring them up to where we are in terms of designating proliferators.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
With respect to additional sanctions, we are of course looking at the issue, and we are looking at the issue particularly in light of the fact that the North Koreans had a missile moratorium. Some sanctions were relaxed in the context of their imposing the self-moratorium, and then they violated the moratorium. So we have to look in terms of what additional measures we might take.
I can assure you, though, that any additional measures will be done in consultation with our partners. And indeed, we have looked at some of these and we have inquired about what other partners are doing, but we have not really—we have not begun any real formal consultative effort with other partners at this point. And we will be consulting with with the Congress on that.
So with regard to sanctions, I want to draw a clear distinction between sanctions and efforts—defensive measures, that is, efforts to protect us against money laundering and other activities.
With regard to the status of the Six-Party Talks, alas, I do not have much new to report on this. We have just passed the 1 year anniversary—a rather sad anniversary, because 1 year ago we reached an agreement in the six parties. It was an agreement on a set of measures which, if implemented, I think would really transform Northeast Asia. It would involve a denuclearized North Korea, it would involve, really, the opening up of North Korea to the world.
And so to date, the North Koreans have not agreed to come to further sessions of the Six-Party Talks, further sessions that are necessary in order to implement this agreement. This is a set of principles, and the principles need to be implemented, and to date the North Koreans have not come. They said they have not come because of the action I described a few minutes ago against Banco Delta Asia; but I would remind people that, although this time it is with respect to the action against Banco Delta Asia, previously it was with respect to comments made by our President, comments made by our Secretary of State, in which the North Koreans said that their feelings were hurt, said that this was somehow a sign of a hostile policy, and therefore they would not come to the Six-Party Talks. In short, Mr. Congressman, if it is not one excuse, it is another.
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me come back to the issue of testing a nuclear device, and first mention—or go to your last question, which was how much money is involved in BDA. We estimate there are some 50 North Korean accounts that have been frozen not by us, but by the Macao Monetary Authority in respect of our action to tell or to warn us banks that we may be telling them not to deal with Banco Delta Asia. They stopped doing business with them; that caused obviously some cash problems for that bank. The bank went into receivership for a while, and the Macao authorities froze North Korean accounts. How much—about 50 accounts. How much money? Something on the order of $24 million.
We estimate that if you implemented the agreement that was reached in the Six-Party Talks in September, there are some provisions there that would give to North Korea some electricity, which we estimate would be about $24 million per week.
So you really have to ask yourself the question, why would they stay away from the talks for 1 year, when, by implementing that agreement, they could make that same amount of money per week?
Finally, you asked about a nuclear device. Obviously this is something that we are concerned about. We have been in close contact with our partners. We have tried to work—we are working with our partners on what our responses are. At this point I cannot say with certainty how each party would respond, except to say that all parties have made it very clear that that would be a very, very serious matter indeed, a very serious matter for China, Japan, South Korea and, by the way, for the Russian Federation.
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So we have all reacted very clearly, and really in unison, to this. The question is how we would put together actions, together with these partners, which would first deter, and if we were not successful to deter this action by North Korea, ways that would further isolate North Korea.
I must say, if you look at the Korean Peninsula, it is a very small piece of land in the world. There are some 70 million people living in the Korean Peninsula. Just from an environmental point of view, it is, frankly speaking, rather shocking that anyone would think of exploding a nuclear weapon on the soil of the Korean Peninsula.
We hope, obviously, that this would not happen; that this would have terrible effects, possible terrible effects environmentally, possible terrible effects in the region generally in making sure that we have tranquility in the region. So this would be a very serious matter.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think everyone in Congress is thoroughly supportive of the Six-Party process. But the Six-Party process is just a technique, it is not a goal unto itself. So one of the great questions is should it be supplemented by bilateral discussions, and why not?
I realize the Administration has a firm perspective on this, and I don't want to get exactly into that. We have discussed this before. But I would suggest that the North Koreans are clearly looking into issues, they are delaying, and they are looking at issues in American politics. Everyone does. It is my very strong view that they make an enormous mistake to delay further not only the cost in terms of keeping North Koreans impoverished for an extended period of time, but also the advantages in dealing with a pretty stiff, pretty tough administration, because dealing with a tough Administration means that agreements made will not be challenged, and that has real advantages for them as well as for us. So my advice to the North Koreans is to move rapidly and forthrightly.
Page 60 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
But we also have a problem with the South. Many of our problems with the South are truly difficult in terms of attitudes for new generations. As you know, we are moving our force structure from one place to another, and in a timing sense is going to be involved in a political election.
Do you see any difficulties emerging from this in terms of passions of South Koreans to set a more dispassionate time frame than being tied, exactly, to a political process? Mr. Lawless.
Mr. LAWLESS. I think we are very mindful of that concern. In fact, many of us lived through a very bad period back in 2002, which was a period of heightened tension. A lot of damage, perceived damage, was done to the alliance. This was a Presidential campaign ongoing in the Republic of Korea.
One of the things we have done in a negotiating process over the last 4 years is trying to get ahead of those issues and resolve the legacy issues and remove a lot of the irritants that were then in place.
So my feeling is moving into a volatile election period, a democracy, in the Republic of Korea in the next 2 years, that we have made significant progress. I believe that President Roh has acknowledged or made mention to our President and to other Members that the agreements that we have reached over the last 3 years have—at least four, possibly five, significant agreements in the restructuring of the alliance, probably would not have been predictable or thought possible by most of the folks coming into his Administration.
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I think we have made terrific progress in detuning a lot of those legacy issues, including the issues of just the way the alliance is physically arranged in the Republic of Korea.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Hill, since 2001, North Korea restarted its nuclear installations in Yongbyon, which we shut down during the Clinton Administration. North Korea claims to have reprocessed over 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, providing additional material for nuclear weapons, and they have also moved forward with their long-range missile program.
The question that a lot of people are asking with regard to other places in the world are applicable here, too, and the key question is are we any safer now with respect to the North Korean threat than we were 5 years ago?
Mr. HILL. Mr. Congressman, there is no question that the North Korean threat remains today. North Korea has posed a threat for some years. Its ballistic missile programs——
Mr. ACKERMAN. With all due respect, is it more of a threat now than it was previously, 5 years ago?
Page 62 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HILL. I think what I can say is we have taken some additional measures, working with other countries, to contain the North Korean threat. We have a proliferation security initiative where we worked very closely with other countries. We are sharing data as never before. We are working on the North Korean financing of these programs, working to identify North Korean companies that have been involved in procuring the technology as never before.
We have really been able to make some progress in that area. So I think those are all positives. But I acknowledge your point, which is that we have a situation where North Korea is continuing to operate a plutonium—a reactor and producing weapons-grade plutonium. We have to deal with that.
Mr. ACKERMAN. So it has gotten worse?
Mr. HILL. Overall we have done some things to ameliorate the problem by working more closely with allies, but also the North Koreans.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Are we working more closely with South Korea?
Mr. HILL. On balance—I am not prepared to say on balance that the growth in the amount of plutonium is greater than the growth of cooperation that we have had in other countries in proliferation security initiatives, in shutting down—getting access to money accounts and shutting down some known North Korean trading companies which are proliferators. So overall I think it is a mixed picture, but all that I can tell you is we are continuing to work on this every day.
Page 63 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. ACKERMAN. We appreciate your hard work, but it seems we are not even marching in place, we are kind of slipping backwards as far as where we were vis-a-vis our security issues.
Mr. HILL. I believe our security is best enhanced when we work with other nations, and I think——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Why are we pushing the South Koreans away? It seems, as the most casual of observers, we are mucking up this relationship. I agree with Secretary Lawless that we have had 50 great years, if you look at the long picture, but the last 5 years have been less than happy. It seems people who are married 50 years and decide to get divorced, it is not because of the first 50 years, it is because of the last 5.
We are kind of in a precarious spot here in our relationship with somebody who is supposed to be our friend and ally. I assume South Koreans are one of the good people you are implying we are working closely with, and it doesn't seem that we are working too closely with them.
Mr. HILL. Why don't you answer, then I will come back.
Mr. LAWLESS. With all due respect, I believe that the situation that we came into in 2002 in particular was one where the alliance was under considerable strain, and I believe in many ways it was because of, again, some unresolved legacy issues.
Page 64 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. ACKERMAN. When you say legacy issues, you mean it was President Clinton's fault?
Mr. LAWLESS. No, absolutely not.
Mr. ACKERMAN. What are legacy issues?
Mr. LAWLESS. Legacy issue means we were simply arranged a certain way or postured in a certain way on the peninsula that really didn't take due notice and didn't adapt ourselves to a very dynamic economy and a changing society.
For example, we reached an agreement with the Republic of Korea in, I believe, 1990, and again, I believe, in 1992, to remove Yongsan from the center of Seoul, a very tangible irritant in the center of their country and in the center of their capital. We had not executed on that agreement over that intervening 12-, 13-, 14-year period. So one of the things we set ourselves to do was resolve that issue, get out of Seoul, and return Yongsan to the control of the Republic of Korea, where it belongs.
There are other issues related to how our 2nd Infantry Division was organized and positioned north of the Han River. In many cases what we had were situations where just a growth of—economically had encroached upon those camps and created situations where we couldn't even move our forces around. So we had no choice but to relocate. That should have probably occurred prior to the time that we did it, but now we have got a plan to do it, and we have agreement to do so.
Page 65 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So when I talk about legacy issues, these are the issues I am talking about resolving. If we don't resolve the legacy issues, we will not be positive in creating an enduring alliance.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. First of all, I would like to note that when we are asked whether or not we are safer in the last 5 years than we were, let us note that the safety factor of the last 5 years was determined by the policy of the previous 5 years to that. I mean, it takes a while for the dynamics of any government's policy to take effect.
Usually what we suffer in the United States or the democratic countries is that the policy that was actually in place 10 years ago is what we have to try to deal with today. Let me note that that is not any different on the Korean Peninsula, nor is it any difference than it is in the war against radical Islam, which we are now having to deal with based on what was handed to us by the policy set in place 10 years ago.
I would like to ask you a little bit, when we talk about that safety, and what we have done, didn't we, in our attempts to stabilize the Korean Peninsula, actually save the North Korean regime from falling apart?
Mr. HILL. Sir, are you referring to our efforts?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We actually moved forward, I remember, 10 years ago, sitting in this hall, with a program that actually transferred funds and food to North Korea at a time when there was hunger and instability, and their agreements were made about nuclear weapons, et cetera, which don't seem to have panned out—did we not save them from, perhaps, their own disintegration?
Page 66 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I can't speak to issues that took place 10 years ago, but I will say that with respect to food and humanitarian assistance, we provide that regardless of political conditions when people and children are starving.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, that is ridiculous.
Mr. HILL. We do our best to address suffering of civilians.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So they are spending all of their money, Saddam Hussein is spending all of their money on weapons to murder us, so we feed their children so they don't have to divert their resources toward that end; is that right?
Mr. HILL. Well, as I understand it, in North Korea at the time there were conditions of famine, and we responded to that.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me ask you, was that famine caused by the policies of the North Korean Government, or was it caused by some change in the weather that made it different between North and South Korea where they had an abundance of food?
Obviously it was created by the policies of the North Korean Government, which was a Stalinist dictatorship, and so by feeding the people of North Korea, we permitted that dictatorship to do what? Have they invested in the last 5 years? Have they invested more of their money in nuclear weapons, for example?
Page 67 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So what you are describing is a subsidy by the United States of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and other building up of their weapons capacity in the name of helping starving children. Well, I will have to tell you, this Congressman thinks that that is totally illogical, and it may make sense when we are dealing with democratic countries. It does not make sense when we are dealing with the type of dictatorship that we are faced with in North Korea.
Let me ask you, in terms of that North Korean nuclear weapons capability, which has been expanding and expanding as we have fed their children, did not much of this weapons technology that has permitted them to expand their program, didn't that derive from Pakistan?
Mr. LAWLESS. Sir, if I may, I think one of the things we have to keep in mind is that the North Koreans have been beavering away on their nuclear program for something like 40 years.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.
Mr. LAWLESS. So the investment in thousands of people and hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars has been going on for some time.
I believe, to my knowledge, the Pakistan issue is related to one subset, the enriched uranium program, which, frankly—as a complement to their plutonium program, which was moving along very well on its own, th