SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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41—594 CC
1997
ANGOLA'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 24, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
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ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
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RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM SHEEHY, Staff Director
GREG SIMPKINS, Professional Staff Member
JODY CHRISTIANSON, Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHANNON GAWRONSKI, STAFF ASSOCIATE
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Hon. George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State
Hon. Paul Hare, U.S. Special Representative to Angola, U.S. Department of State
His Excellency Antonio dos Santos Franca, Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Angola
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Mr. Malik M. Chaka, Director of Research and Information, The Center for Democracy in Angola
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Hon. Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey
Hon. George E. Moose
His Excellency Antonio dos Santos Franca
Mr. Malik M. Chaka
Additional material:
Reply from His Excellency Antonio dos Santos Franca on registration requirements in Angola for non-government organizations
ANGOLA'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY
THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order.
In today's hearing, we will look at the current State and future prospects of Angola's newly inaugurated Government of National Unity. Though only 2 weeks old, this government is at a crucial point. Trends established early on will determine whether or not Angola's formerly warring parties will become partners for peace and put years of destruction firmly behind them. Both sides have made a commitment to this process.
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The Government of Angola felt it was winning on the ground when the 1994 Lusaka accord was signed, but the government has accepted a Government of National Unity that includes its former battlefield opponents.
UNITA controlled a significant portion of Angolan territory when the war ended and has dismantled its army, placing all its hopes on the success of the peace process.
This is only the start, though. Significant obstacles lie ahead. Angola has never had local government as we know it. The Portuguese controlled Angola down to the village level, and the MPLA Government was at war from its opening day. Angola's legislature must now fashion a law establishing for the first time effective mayors and city councils in towns where former combatants must learn to live and work together in peace.
Following this, elections for local officials will be vital in seeding democracy in Angola. Local elections must take place at the earliest possible time. National elections have been postponed for several years. It is widely believed that time is needed to prepare the parties and the voters. Preparations for these elections must begin now, though.
Issues such as redistricting, voter registration, and election administration were a problem in 1992 and will remain so for the upcoming elections. These matters must be effectively addressed if we are to avoid a return of the 1992 elections debacle.
The economy matters too. Widespread corruption throughout Angolan society has plagued the country's ability to attract foreign investment and has severely limited economic growth. It was acknowledged to be a problem during the war, and the government will now have to tackle this issue forcefully. Democracy in Angola cannot grow without economic recovery.
The success of the Angolan Government of National Unity will depend on the continued good will of the partners. It will also depend on the vigilance of the guarantors of the accord, including the United States. We must not ignore problems as they arise, as we did in 1992, and we must offer evenhanded solutions and help the parties involved overcome the difficulties they will surely face.
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The recent government closure of the Voice of America affiliate station in Angola and the involvement of the Angolan Government and the involvement of UNITA in the Zaire civil war are issues that must be addressed if the Angolan peace process is to succeed.
Our proceedings today will be conducted in two parts. First, we have a hearing in which Assistant Secretary of State George Moose and Special U.S. Envoy to Angola Paul Hare will discuss U.S. policy toward Angola. Because of his position as a special envoy, Mr. Hare will be responding to subcommittee questions only and will not be presenting a formal statement.
In the briefing immediately following their testimony, Angolan ambassador, Antonio dos Santos Franca and Mr. Malik Chaka of the UNITA Alliance Center for Democracy in Angola will discuss their respective parties' positions on the National Unity Government.
It is important to mention that the distinction between the panels is not significant. This subcommittee is committed to hearing from Africans, both government representatives and Africans representing nongovernmental points of view. This is what members of this committee desire, and it is the Chairman's goal to satisfy these very legitimate requests. That is how this subcommittee will conduct its business.
Before we proceed, I want to recognize the members of the subcommittee who are present. Our ranking Minority member is Mr. Robert Menendez from New Jersey. Mr. Amo Houghton of New York is the panel's vice chairman. We also have with us Mr. Alcee Hastings of Florida and Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey.
Would any of the members of the committee like to make a statement at this time?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, first I want to congratulate the people of Angola, President dos Santos and UNITA Leader Savimbi, for the tremendous effort that they have made to bring to fruition a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation in Angola.
Angola is a country which is rich in its people and its resources. It has oil and diamonds, rich agricultural land, hydroelectrical potential, resources which are sufficient to be the envy of most nations in any part of the world. But two decades of civil war have overshadowed Angola's potential to be an African and world economic and trade power, but with the swearing in of the GURN on April 11, that potential was renewed.
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However, it will take enormous effort on the part of the Angolan people, the United States, and other international donors to address the impediments to that progress, the devastated infrastructure, and the between half a million and a million people whose lives were claimed by the conflict.
In addition to addressing the humanitarian crisis, an ongoing effort, Angola needs assistance to stabilize its economy and to begin to build the institutions which are characteristic of a democratic government.
I believe it is the role of Congress in overseeing U.S. foreign assistance programs to identify how we can best assist Angola. USAID has already launched a 5-year transition assistance program and has committed $190 million in aid. These efforts are essential to the revitalization of Angola.
I believe it is in the interest of the Angolan and the American people to have a peaceful and stable Angola. Most Americans would be surprised to learn that as much as 7 percent of our crude oil comes from Angola and that it has an enormous unexplored reserve.
While most of the news then seems to be good as we head into this process from Angola, I am concerned about the impact of the Zairean conflict on the fragile Angolan process, and I look forward to Secretary Moose's comments on that. I hope to hear also from our briefing on reports of Angolan involvement in that conflict.
The new government faces a challenge unlike that of any armed battle. If there is to be a lasting peace and democracy in Angola, both sides must put aside their differences and agree to work toward the national good. The expected follow-on mission to UNAVEM III will be a crucial demonstration of international support for the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.
I know my colleagues in the Congress, and I believe on the subcommittee, believe that Angola has an historic opportunity to assert itself as an economic power in Africa. For our part, we will do everything we can to ease the humanitarian process, rebuild Angola's infrastructure, help promote investment, and assist their leadership where we may.
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I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Menendez.
Any other opening statements at this time?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. All right. It is a pleasure to introduce the members of our distinguished panel.
Ambassador George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has had a long and distinguished foreign service career, including more than 2 decades of experience with respect to Africa. In his current office, he has been involved in U.S. efforts to end the Angolan civil war and inaugurate the current Government of National Unity.
Mr. Paul Hare is the Administration's special envoy to Angola. He has been intimately involved in the negotiations surrounding the Lusaka accord and the Government of National Unity. An experienced foreign service officer, he is a former Peace Corps director in Morocco and former U.S. ambassador in Zambia.
Ambassador Moose.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. MOOSE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is indeed a pleasure to be here this morning to discuss with the members of the subcommittee our continuing efforts to consolidate peace and reconciliation in Angola.
Let me say that we have appreciated throughout the strong interest of this subcommittee. We believe firmly that the bipartisan support for this negotiating process has been one of the reasons that we have been able to make the contribution that we have made to the peace effort in Angola.
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I am delighted also to be here with my colleague Paul Hare, who has been intimately involved in that process.
Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement for the record which I would ask be included in the record of the hearing.
If I might start off with a few brief observations. First, successive U.S. administrations have reaffirmed our commitment and the importance to us of the search for peace in Angola. Certainly we have had an abiding humanitarian interest in bringing to an end one of the world's most brutal and long-lasting civil conflicts. The United States over the years has contributed more than $500 million to assist the people most affected by that conflict.
As members have already mentioned, we have a very strong economic interest as well in Angola, reflected in U.S. corporate investment of almost $4 billion, primarily in the oil sector. Angola accounts for 7 percent of all of the U.S. oil imports.
Beyond that, we have, I think, a very strong interest in bringing peace to Angola because of the contribution it can make to the consolidation of peace and democracy and prosperity throughout southern Africa, a region of 140 million people with enormous potential, enormous opportunity, both for Africa and for the United States.
I think the United States can rightfully take some satisfaction in the progress that has been achieved over the last 4 years in the effort to bring peace to Angola. I recall that following the violent breakdown of the peace process back in the fall of 1992, there were very few observers that held out much hope for a restoration of the peace process or for its successful conclusion.
Despite those odds, the United States took the lead in seeking to reestablish a basis for negotiations. It was because of our efforts in the spring of 1993 that eventually the formal negotiations got under way in Lusaka, Zambia, in the fall of 1993. Ambassador Hare was our representative to those talks.
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I think it is also important to recall just how much has been accomplished in the last 4 years. Under the stewardship of the U.N. Special Representative, Ambassador Alioune Blondin Beye, the Lusaka talks did produce a new framework for peace in Angola. Both sides generally respected and observed the November 1994 ceasefire.
In accordance with the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, more than 60,000 UNITA troops have surrendered their arms and agreed to be either demobilized or integrated into the new armed forces of Angola.
A critically important milestone was reached earlier this month with the seating of 67 UNITA parliamentarians in the National Assembly, with the agreement on UNITA's role as an opposition party with a formal status as such, and with the installation on October 11 of the new Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.
Not least during these past 2 1/2 years, the people of Angola have enjoyed a far greater sense of security, peace, and promise than at any time during the last 30 years of Angola's difficulties. The process of implementation has obviously been at times a very difficult and challenging one. There have been many delays.
There are a great many individuals, I think, who deserve some credit for that. I would certainly single out Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, whose stewardship of the discussions in Lusaka and whose management of the implementation process in Angola has been key to the successes we have noted to date.
I would also register our appreciation for the professional role that has been played by all of the members of the U.N. contingent under Mr. Blondin Beye's direction. I think the UNAVEM III operation, which is one of the largest U.N. peace operations ever organized, does clearly demonstrate what can be done when there is a well-defined, well-organized, well-recognized U.N. mission to help bring about peace and reconcile differences among opposing parties.
I would also want to acknowledge the role that was played by our troika partners, Russia and Portugal, and indeed by Angola's neighbors. I think their support throughout this process has been critical to its success.
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As you yourself mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is a significant milestone, there is no question of that, but it does not signal the end of the peace process. I think we all recognize that durable peace and reconciliation will require a great deal of further effort and goodwill, and to that end the Administration will continue to work to help the Unity Government succeed, and we will particularly focus on seeing that UNITA has the opportunity to play a meaningful role within the new political dispensation.
That said, there are many tasks that remain to be completed. The selection of UNITA troops has been all but completed, but many of those troops who have been selected have yet to be incorporated fully into the new army. The same can be said on the police side; the selection of UNITA personnel into the national police remains open and must be addressed quickly. Nearly 100,000 other UNITA and government troops also need to be demobilized or returned to their home areas and given a chance to engage in productive work.
Both the government and UNITA have yet to fulfill some of their critically important obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. For example, the government has yet to fully deal with some of the armed police elements and has yet to carry out its obligations to disarm the civilian population.
For its part, despite having declared itself disarmed last December, UNITA has retained what it describes as a personal security force for Dr. Savimbi and has not fully disclosed to UNAVEM the size of that force.
These factors are indeed very worrisome, and we have made clear to both parties our insistence, and indeed that of the entire national community, that these issues be addressed and resolved quickly.
Finally, I would note that the gains of the peace process could be threatened by the poor state of Angola's economy, by the weakness of its economic institutions and policies. We expect the Angolan Government to act promptly to adopt needed changes in economic policy to ensure that the people of Angola can realize the full benefits of peace.
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We are also deeply concerned about reports of Angolan involvement in Zaire, which we fear could seriously complicate efforts to achieve peace in both Angola and Zaire. We will continue to urge restraint by all parties as well as full cooperation from all concerned with the efforts of the United Nations and the OAU, and particularly the efforts of Mr. Sahnoun, the OAU's special representative.
Perhaps the most delicate of the remediation tasks that remains to be completed is the normalization of the Unity Government's authority throughout Angola. The country has for too long been divided physically as well as emotionally, and it is important that the new government portray the process of normalization not as an imposition of Luanda's authority but, indeed, as an extension of normal governmental activities throughout the territory.
Mr. Chairman, finally, I would note that the process of orderly, phased withdrawal of UNAVEM has already begun, but discussions are under way in New York within the United Nations on the nature of a U.N. follow-on presence after the current mandate for UNAVEM III expires on June 30.
We believe that a modest monitoring presence will be important in ensuring the completion of the remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol, and it is important to give both sides confidence that the international community remains engaged. We will continue to consult with Congress as we work with the Security Council to determine the structure of that follow-on operation, and we will notify Congress at least 15 days in advance of any Security Council action to establish such an operation.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would simply say that all of us who have been involved in this process recognize that a great deal of hard work remains to be done to consolidate and secure the important gains that have been made. But we can see, I think, our goal much more clearly now, and that goal is, indeed, the emergence of an Angola which promises greater security and prosperity and democracy to its own people and, indeed, to Angola's neighbors. And I think that objective, which has been in many respects accomplished, should encourage us to stay this course.
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Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are greatly appreciative of your plans to make a trip to the southern Africa region and particularly of your intended stop in Angola. We look forward to working with you and facilitating that trip in any way we can.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moose appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Moose.
As a matter of fact, we will be there May 27. We will be making our trip as a subcommittee.
At this time, I would like to ask you a few questions. You mentioned in your testimony the continued lack of fiscal transparency and accountability. Why don't we call that corruption?
The fact is that we have had major scandals involving the disappearance of vast sums of money from the central bank and from the parastatals of Endiama and Sonangol, and those remain unresolved. As I have seen it, the figure is in the hundreds of millions.
I just would ask, what is the U.S. position on these matters of the disappearance of these funds?
Mr. MOOSE. I think we have been very much involved with discussions with the government about the urgent need to reform the economic institutions and policies and practices of that government, not least considering the investment that has been made in peace in Angola.
This is a country of enormous resources that needs to redirect those resources toward investments in the welfare and the well-being of their people; I think all of us understand that until and unless these economic issues are addressed, and until and unless the people of Angola feel they, in fact, are benefiting from this effort at peace, then the ultimate goal of this exercise--namely, permanent stability, peace, and reconciliation--remains in jeopardy.
When I was there just about a year ago, Mr. Chairman, I spent most of my time discussing with President dos Santos and with members of his economic team the importance that we attach to their taking necessary economic reform measures.
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On my return to Washington, I met with Mr. Candessus at the IMF and reported to him the agreement by the government to receive a mission by the IMF to help them begin to plan that necessary restructuring of institutions and policy reform. There is a great deal of work that remains to be done on that score, but I think at least the government has acknowledged that this is an area which requires urgent attention.
Mr. ROYCE. I would also ask, according to reports from Voice of America, the Angolan Government has ordered the banning of broadcast by Radio 2000, the VOA affiliate in Angola. What is the U.S. Government doing about this infringement on freedom of speech?
Mr. MOOSE. This is a matter of great concern to us, Mr. Chairman. Our Embassy already raised this issue directly with the Minister of Social Communications, and we are discussing with the government how we can assure these broadcasts inside Angola could continue.
These are broadcasts which are provided in two ways. One is by VOA's normal shortwave broadcasts. But VOA had also worked out a cooperative arrangement with the local Angolan radio station to retransmit those broadcasts.
In any event, we have begun that discussion with the government to try to understand why it feels some sensitivity about the nature of these broadcasts.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.
I will ask one last question, and that would be to Mr. Hare.
In 1992, there was a rather horrific massacre in Luanda of UNITA supporters that helped kick off the resumption of the war. How is the security situation any different today? How legitimate are the security concerns of Mr. Savimbi? Could I have your opinion on that?
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL HARE, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ANGOLA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. HARE. Well, I would first point out that there are now about 70 UNITA deputies in Luanda, 11 ministers and vice ministers, and other UNITA generals who have been integrated into the National Army. So I believe this is a question of a process, a question of time, where people gain greater trust and confidence with each other.
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Certainly Dr. Savimbi has expressed his concerns about security when he comes to Luanda, but I don't believe, quite frankly, that this is a major impediment. It is something that will be overcome. I don't think it is very useful to go back into history and try to see what happened at that time.
I am actually writing a book about Angola, and I will do it in my book, but I don't think at this particular moment, when we are trying to promote national reconciliation between the Angolans, that that is a very helpful intervention.
Mr. ROYCE. Of course, that is the question raised by Mr. Savimbi. I mean, this is his point, not mine.
Mr. HARE. I understand that. I have had many discussions with Dr. Savimbi over a period of time, and I am not saying that the concerns about security are not legitimate on his part. I am simply saying that the process of creating a more secure environment is something that is evolving, and I am convinced it can be taken care of. That is basically my point.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I am going to allow the ranking member, Mr. Menendez, to take over at this point.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me ask you, it seems to me that although symbolic in some respects, but very forceful in others, is when we have President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi meet in a symbol of national reconciliation. Do we have any sense of when that would take place or what conditions are going to be needed for that to take place?
Mr. MOOSE. Congressman Menendez, certainly we share the view that a meeting between President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi in Angola will be an important contribution. It will be more than symbolic, I believe, to the building of that confidence and the reinforcement of the peace process and the process of reconciliation.
The two leaders have committed themselves to having such a meeting, but we do not yet know when and under what circumstances they will actually hold that meeting. We would hope that it would be sooner rather than later. Indeed, we had hoped that circumstances would be such that Dr. Savimbi would have felt comfortable and secure in coming to Luanda for the installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.
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A dos Santos-Savimbi meeting is a very important objective and one we will continue to encourage. But I don't think we should ignore the other aspects of the reconciliation process that are going forward. I do think the events of April 11 are significant; that, as Ambassador Hare mentioned, we do now have all of the UNITA parliamentarians who have taken their seat in the government; that the four ministers that UNITA was promised under the Lusaka Protocol are there and beginning to at least work their way into their duties; and that nine generals have taken up their positions in the joint staff of the military. Are all of these important building blocks in this ongoing process of building confidence between the sides?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me ask you, I don't mean to diminish April 11 by any stretch of the imagination, but it seems to me that at a certain point in time--as you say, hopefully sooner than later--that not having this meeting creates uncertainty in some quarters.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, by the time we get there to Angola, we would have the opportunity to meet both President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi, and hopefully in Luanda. It would be a great accomplishment.
Moving from that, let me ask you: In the process of integration, I have listened to the testimony of what has happened. There is integration and then there is integration. Are we monitoring the effects of the integration?
It is early, but I assume that one of the concerns is, do people get marginalized even though they are integrated? And even though they may be integrated, to what degree do we see a sense of commitment that those who have obtained their positions won't be marginalized and, in essence, have no ability to pursue their true involvement with the government?
Mr. MOOSE. Indeed, this has been a major concern, and perhaps Ambassador Hare can comment on this as well.
Throughout the process, beginning with the process of military integration, UNITA has expressed a concern that they would have their people included but they would not be allowed to make a meaningful contribution to the decisionmaking, to policies, et cetera.
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We, in our numerous and constant conversations with government have stressed that this reintegration process will not work, will not be meaningful, unless the government understands the need to make UNITA's participation meaningful.
We think that the government over the last several weeks has indeed made a number of important gestures which suggest to me that they understand that message.
There was considerable discussion prior to the installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation--which, as you know, was delayed on at least three different occasions, precisely around this question--how to ensure that, both as a member of the parliamentary opposition, UNITA would be allowed to make a meaningful contribution through the debates in Parliament, to decisions, policymaking, et cetera, and, equally, that as part of the government, UNITA members of the government would be allowed the opportunity to influence significantly those areas of policy under their control.
I think, again, this is a process of building step by step, by actions on both sides, to demonstrate that there is a serious commitment. I think that but for the willingness of government to acknowledge and take into account some of the concerns that UNITA expressed over the last several weeks, we would not have reached the April 11 inauguration. This reflects a serious effort, in my view, on the part of the government to take into account the concerns that UNITA had raised.
Perhaps, Paul, you would wish to add to that?
Mr. HARE. I would simply add that I think this is another test case where we, the Americans, as well as the international community, can be very productively engaged. I know our Embassy staff and our ambassador there certainly have extensive contacts with government as well as with representatives of UNITA, including the newly appointed members of UNITA into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation.
While in the final analysis this is something that has to be sorted out between the Angolans themselves, I believe there is also a very important role that we, the Americans, and other representatives of the international community can play as well as in the weeks and months ahead.
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This is just to say that I think we have come this far, as George pointed out, in large part because of the sustained commitment of the international community. That sustained commitment is going to have to continue in the weeks and months ahead.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.
Mr. Houghton?
Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a very quick question. We are now on the consolidating process. You have been 30 years at this. You feel very good about what has gone on, and the credit really goes to many people, and not the least of which are you two gentlemen.
What is the main concern you have in getting this whole process off the tracks? Is it the relationship between the two leaders? Is it the splitting of the international grouping? What is it? What concerns you most about the continuation of this consolidation?
Mr. MOOSE. Congressman Houghton, you know very well the history of this civil conflict, which has had many twists and turns, promises that were unfulfilled, destroyed, in effect, by actions on the other side.
I think the greatest obstacle, frankly, is the understandable lingering mistrust which has characterized the relationship between UNITA and MPLA. That trust was deepened considerably by the events of 1992. Both sides, rightly or wrongly, felt betrayed by the events that took place in 1992. Getting back to a point where even getting both sides to a table where they would talk to each other required tremendous effort.
That distrust is still there. It is deep. It is not simply at the leadership level. It is all the way down to the cadres and the members of the armies on both sides. And that is why the process has been one of gradual, specific steps taken on one side and the other in the hopes of being able to rebuild some sense of mutual confidence in the commitment of the other.
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Again, when one looks at what has been accomplished over the past 2 1/2 years, it is extraordinary. In fact, if you look at the issues of disarmament, demobilization, integration of institutions, in the military particularly, but now in the government as well, there are signals to us that, in fact, these things are not things that could have happened but for a sustained commitment on the part of the leadership, notwithstanding their doubts, reservations, and hesitations.
But as Paul has also indicated, the role of the international community, the United Nations and UNAVEM on the one hand, but also the other partners in the troika, the regional leaders, has been important in helping sustain the process and rebuild that confidence.
I think also this is a society that has not really known democracy for as long as any Angolan can remember. It went from a period of colonialism to a period of civil conflict under a governmental structure that was far from democratic. So engendering now in this society a sense that people deserve respect and opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, this is going to be a major cultural change, and it is not something that is going to happen overnight.
One of the things that we are already beginning to focus on is what we can contribute to helping build the institutions of Parliament, of judiciary, of the press, et cetera, that are going to be critically important to that transition, and also what we can do to give the people of Angola a sense of ownership about this process, what we can do to support nongovernmental organizations in helping to build society.
That is why I always take a great deal of satisfaction in what has happened, and not least the fact that Angola has been at peace for the most part for the last 2 1/2 years. I think all of us recognize that this is going to be a process that takes not only months but years to complete.
Mr. HARE. Could I just say in addition to that, I agree with what George said, but in tangible, specific terms, I will breathe a lot easier as we see what is called the extension of State administration over the coming weeks and months. This is a cooperative program for the extension of State administration throughout the country that has been agreed to within the Joint Commission, the body that is responsible for supervising the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. But this is going to be a difficult and potentially explosive process because of the divisions, geographic and otherwise, that continue to exist in Angola.
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But as that process goes forward--and I am convinced it can, and this is where a continuing U.N. presence, by the way, is going to be vitally important to ensure that it succeeds--geographic and other divisions break down, and lines of communication begin to really open up within the country. Communication has significantly opened up so far, but needs to further open up. This in turn is going to provide a very important stimulus to local economists as goods and people can move more freely throughout the country.
So I think looking at a very specific thing that needs to be done, I would put this at the top of my agenda.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Donald Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous consent to have an opening statement put in the record.
Mr. ROYCE. Without objection.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank you for calling this very important hearing and the excellent--as usual, testimony of our ambassador, Mr. Moose.
I do, though, have a few concerns. I think, first of all, if Angola had been recognized earlier by the United States--I could never understand the delay in recognizing Angola--I think that this peace process might have gone along a little more quickly.
I also believe that it is unfortunate that the elections were held without disarmament, because when Savimbi and UNITA lost the election, they decided to go back to the bush with the weapons. Of course, that period of time also, in my opinion, created this lapse of time that we see.
Of course, we realize how important the cold war period was between the United States and the Soviet Union, and as a result we have these problems that we are still trying to uncover. Some of us, particularly those who have made it a longtime effort, of the suppression in South Africa, to bring down the apartheid government in South Africa, were not condoning the involvement of Cuba in Angola, primarily because South Africa and Mobutu were suppressing the legitimate needs and concerns of blacks in South Africa, and this whole picture was all kind of involved.
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So there is, in fact, a difference of opinion regarding the whole situation there. I just wanted to put that on the record.
The question regarding your statement about the concern about the Government of Angola in your statement on Zaire and their potential involvement, especially with the Katanganese Zaireans, seemed to put more onus on the Government of Angola, and perhaps it may be wrong, they may have wrongdoings by virtue of the fact that there seems to be support in Angola by the dos Santos Government of the alliance.
Of course, very little is said about UNITA, which has been supplied weapons and money for decades by Mobutu. If it was not for Mobutu in Zaire, UNITA would have had to agree years ago. But because of the illegal selling of diamonds and moving that cash through the Mobutu Government there for buying weapons, I see very little mention of UNITA being a destabilizing factor. As a matter of fact, at one point it was felt that UNITA forces would actually go into Zaire.
So it seems that in the area where you deal with Zaire, there appears to be an imbalance. I think we need to tell all sides that they should work toward a solution. But it appears, according to your report here, that most of the onus is on the Government of dos Santos, and UNITA forces actually are in Zaire.
So I just have a question.
The other problem I do have, too, as the Chairman mentioned about the disappearance of dollars in Angola plus the fact there is a breakdown and evidently some corruption going on in Angola, which is bad; of course it is Angola's money. The United States gave billions of dollars to Mobutu, and I have not heard the same concern about our taxpayers' dollars that went to Mobutu that went into his personal account--he took Zairean money, but he also took U.S. Government money, and there are some people in my community that feel that Mr. Mobutu's resources should be attached or there should be some step to try to freeze his assets and perhaps some of those dollars could go back at least into the Government of Zaire so that the people there might be able to improve their quality of life.
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There is also a concern that the Forces of Zaire, the FOZ, the Interahamwe from Rwanda who were the perpetrators and the organizers of the genocide, are perhaps making their way up to Angola, and if they, in fact, are welcomed by the UNITA forces, this once again is going to be a very destabilizing factor. Not only the FOZ force from Zaire, but also the EXFOR, some of the ex-forces of Rwanda, still are making their way up into UNITA.
So I wonder if you might comment on that situation?
Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Congressman Payne.
Obviously, there is an awful lot of history here which we could not encapsulate in a very relatively brief statement with the committee. Our concerns about the cooperation between Zaire and UNITA, have been registered on many occasions, not least in the Security Council when we voted for a number of resolutions which imposed specific sanctions on UNITA in terms of the illegal importation of arms under the protocol.
Notwithstanding the actions in the Council, including our condemnations and those of others, that illicit traffic continues, we know that. And indeed it continued up until very, very recently, notwithstanding the Government of Zaire has repeated commitments to the Government of Angola that the traffic would be suspended and ceased.
So there is a lot of history here which, if you will, in an academic sense helps us understand why there has been such concern and involvement, on the part of both UNITA and the Government in Zaire. Zaire has been sort of a hinterland which has been an extension of the conflict in Angola for many, many years.
While all of that might help explain the government's concern, and indeed UNITA's concern, about what is going on in Zaire, I think the point we are seeking to make here is that we believe that both sides need to be extremely cautious and circumspect about continuing that involvement in Zaire under the current circumstances.
As we mentioned in the hearing on Zaire a little while ago, the concern we have is that these actions can inadvertently, unexpectedly, provoke other actions which contribute to the instability that we see already in Zaire.
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Now, there is a positive side to that coin, I think, and that is in the course of our repeated conversations with both UNITA and the government, these parties recognize that they are going to be the ones who bear the brunt, the consequence, of further instability or crisis in Zaire. They understand that they, more than anyone, need a solution and outcome in Zaire that establishes some greater sense of stability and security than currently exists.
And our recent conversations with, and the recent actions by, both the government and UNITA show a willingness to use their respective influence in ways that we think will contribute to the efforts to get a negotiation under way and an outcome.
I will simply mention that Secretary Albright had a conversation only yesterday with Dr. Savimbi on this score: His response to her urging that he play a constructive role in seeking a solution in Zaire was positive. Ambassador Hare and others who were in Luanda for the inauguration of the Government of National Unity had similar conversations with both UNITA and the government. Ambassador Sahnoun was in Luanda yesterday meeting with President dos Santos and others.
Again, I don't want to say we have all the answers or all the knowledge, but our sense is that there is a growing recognition that all of those concerned about stability in Zaire need to be using their influence in ways that will promote an orderly negotiated transition leading to elections, because that is the best way to ensure that the instability in Zaire comes to an end and the threat of regional instability is ended.
Regarding the issues of the Angolan Government's management of the economy, yes, in a sense we are talking about Angolan national resources. On the other hand, if one considers the substandard investment of the international community in the peace process now going back over the last 6 years and in humanitarian assistance to the people affected by the war, the international community can rightly ask and expect of the Government of Angola a greater effort to ensure that indeed their national resources are being deployed in ways that are supportive of the peace process and which address the socioeconomic needs of their own people.
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Let me say, in our discussions with them, they do not reject that proposition. So we are at a stage where we are really talking about the practicalities, what is needed in order to establish some more transparent and effective management of those resources to ensure that they are being invested more productively in the future of Angola.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Moose. Thank you, Mr. Hare.
Several weeks ago in this committee, we held a hearing on the situation in Zaire, and at that hearing I called for Mobutu to stand down, for the House to go on record, and indeed Mr. Payne joined me in that and Mr. Menendez as well, and it was partly as a result of the corruption in Zaire that we called for that step to be taken.
Shortly thereafter, we passed a resolution through the House of Representatives. And I just wanted to point out that with respect to the United States focusing on corruption in this case, I think, as I said in my opening remarks, that the government will now have to tackle the issue of corruption forcefully, and I think that a U.S. focus on that will assist. And I think democracy in Angola cannot grow without economic recovery.
So to the extent that we have a success here for the Angolan Government of National Unity, this is going to help heal the country. So I think it is incumbent upon us to turn the bright light on that situation.
Again, I just want to thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony here today. And again, Mr. Hare, thank you so much.
Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. It is a pleasure to introduce the members of our distinguished panel. Before I do that, I would like to make a point. We would appreciate it if the witnesses would summarize their testimony and hold their presentations to no more than 5 minutes. I have read your statements. We will have them in the record. But this will allow more time for members' questions. And we, as I say, invite witnesses to submit the full text of their testimony at all of these hearings and include them in the record.
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In this portion of the proceeding, we will hear directly from representatives of the Government of Angola, their UNITA partners in government.
His Excellency Antonio dos Santos Franca has had a long-standing role in Angolan politics, especially the peace process. He holds the rank of general of the Army of the Angolan Armed Forces and is also special advisor to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and has been a member of the MPLA Political Bureau for the past 20 years.
Mr. Jardo Muakalia, chairman of the Center for Democracy in Angola, was unable to be with us today. Representing the Center is Mr. Malik Chaka, its director of research and information.
Mr. Chaka has been involved in African affairs for more than 25 years. He first visited Angola as a journalist in 1973 and has traveled widely in the country in the 1970's and 1980's and in the past few years has represented the Center, formerly known as the Free Angola Information Service, at international and domestic meetings since 1991.
Ambassador Franca.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I want both Ambassador Franca and Mr. Chaka to know, I have a meeting with the Secretary of Commerce, so I am going to try to stay as long as I can to listen.
I have already read your testimony. I don't want you to think if I walk out, it is any lack of respect or interest in what you have to say. I will ask Mr. Payne to take over when I leave on our side.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY ANTONIO DOS SANTOS FRANCA, AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
Ambassador FRANCA. Mr. Chairman, I am going to speak in Portuguese. I have my interpreter.
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Mr. ROYCE. That will be fine.
Ambassador FRANCA (through an interpreter). Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Africa, distinguished guests, thank you for inviting me here today to speak to you about the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation in Angola and about the challenges it will face in the coming months.
I have a longer prepared statement which I would like to have submitted for the record in its entirety.
Before I commence, I would first like to applaud the Chairman for the impressive schedule of hearings this committee has held and plans on holding. Your keen interest in Africa and especially in my country, Angola, is greatly appreciated.
Mr. Chairman, on April 11, the peace process achieved a major victory as we welcomed into government representatives from all political parties represented in the National Assembly, including 4 UNITA ministers, 7 UNITA vice ministers, numerous UNITA provincial leaders and Governors, and 70 UNITA parliamentarians.
The installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, however, is only the beginning. We now face the daunting task of governing and rebuilding a nation. In order to do that, all members of the government must build trust and work together for the good of the country.
The Government of National Reconciliation and Unity was envisaged as a true partnership in nation building and democratic governance. UNITA ministers will oversee issues that are vital to Angola's economic and social development. The Ministries of Trade and Commerce, Geology and Mines, Health, and Tourism will be led by UNITA officials. With 70 representatives in the National Assembly, UNITA will be an active and important participant in the debate on national policy and how the country is governed.
The new GURN will face many difficult challenges as it begins to govern. We must extend State administration throughout the national territory, complete the incorporation of UNITA forces into the National Army, and intensify our efforts to rid the country of land mines so that people and goods can circulate freely. Only by accomplishing these tasks can the GURN restore basic social services and rebuild our nation and economy.
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The GURN has made as its top priority economic recovery and sustainable development. The GURN must accelerate the procession of transition from a centralized economy to a broader, decentralized one governed by the principles of the free market system.
In order to achieve this goal, the new government will continue the process of following macroeconomic policies that will stabilize the economy. And as we stabilize the economy, we will continue discussions with the IMF on the structural adjustment plan and look to reschedule our international debt.
The new government must extend its Administration throughout the territory and establish an atmosphere of peace and security so that goods and people can move freely throughout the country.
We must clear our roads and countryside of deadly land mines so that our displaced refugees and demobilized soldiers can return to their homes and farms and resume productive livelihoods.
The government must also undertake major reconstruction efforts to rebuild roads, bridges, telecommunication systems, water and sewage systems, schools, and health centers. The new government must at the same time address the serious social needs of our people. We must finish the incorporation of former UNITA combatants into a unified National Army and police. We must complete the demobilization and reintegration of some 100,000 former soldiers into civil society.
Obviously, the government cannot do all these things at once, nor can we do them alone. Foreign development assistance will play an important role in revitalizing the economy.
The new government knows, however, that Angola's long-term future does not reside in foreign aid but rather in promoting trade and investment. My goal as ambassador is to improve relations between our two countries, not only politically but also economically.
In recent years, the Angolan-U.S. trade relationship has grown exponentially. Since 1989, U.S. exports to Angola have more than doubled, and imports from Angola have more than tripled since 1986. But I believe this is only the tip of the iceberg. Angola is a country rich in natural resources. We have largely untapped resources of diamonds. We have 8 million hectares of fertile farmlands. We have timber resources, a coastline teaming with three major ports, and a river system that can generate more hydroelectricity than we can use.
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I believe that our proven record of working cooperatively with U.S. companies for over 50 years amply demonstrates that the United States and Angola can do business together to the benefit of both countries.
Mr. Chairman, the process of consolidating peace and promoting national reconciliation in Angola has admittedly been a long and, at times, difficult one. We are grateful for the persistent help and support we have received from the United Nations and the troika of the observer States, Portugal, Russia, and especially the United States of America. Without the unprecedented involvement and support of the international community, Angola would not be celebrating now the formation of this new government and the dawning of a new era of peace and reconciliation.
On behalf of my government and the people of Angola, I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Franca appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Chaka.
STATEMENT OF MALIK M. CHAKA, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND INFORMATION, THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY IN ANGOLA
Mr. CHAKA. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Africa Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Antonio dos Santos Franca, thank you for holding this hearing and providing a valuable forum in which to discuss the issues facing Angola in the immediate and medium-term future.
On April 11, 1997, a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was established in Angola. It is made up of 28 ministers and 55 vice ministers and incorporates representatives from UNITA as well as other political parties. This is an important benchmark for Angola and clear evidence of the progress achieved in implementing the Lusaka Protocol.
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This development followed the UNITA deputies taking their seats in the National Assembly and the formalization of the special status of Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, as the leader of Angola's largest opposition party. With these benchmarks of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol completed, Angola has effectively put decades of war behind it.
Both the government and UNITA must now make fundamental changes in their thinking and behavior in this new environment of national reconciliation. UNITA will now play a more constructive and creative role as the only significant opposition political party. The MPLA Government must learn to accept political pluralism and accept UNITA as a partner in government.
The challenge now for both Angolan parties is to establish what type of society Angola will become and what opportunities will be made available for the average Angolan.
Though the most recent developments have been positive, major tasks remain in order to conclude the Lusaka Protocol. These include extending State administration, concluding the formation of a National Army and National Police Force, and demobilizing soldiers.
Large areas of the country have been outside of the government's administration for years, and in many cases decades. Consolidating government services in these areas and building political trust will be a complex process.
Moreover, UNITA retains an extensive network of social and administrative services that it has historically administered in these areas. UNITA does not believe that these resources should be dismantled or the persons providing the services discriminated against but, on the contrary, should be incorporated into the central administration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation so as to not disrupt the provision of services. This will also serve as a concrete example of inclusion, national reconciliation.
The extension of State administration must be done in a sensitive manner, with the politicians from GURN advancing the process. If this task is left to the military, it could undermine national reconciliation and generate social conflict. Efforts must be made to enlist the support of civil society, traditional authorities, the clergy, local civic leaders, as well as UNITA structures.
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The extension of the State administration into the Lundas, the diamond-producing region of the country, must be considered within the framework of the ongoing discussions between the MPLA and UNITA on the diamonds issue. The MPLA Government has agreed that UNITA should be able to maintain some of its diamond resources to sustain its political party efforts.
I was quite happy to see a statement from Jose Diaz, the chairman of Endiama, of the State diamond parastatal on the 21st of this month. He spoke on Angolan television. He said the discussions between the two sides were going very well and he expected them to be concluded in the short term.
About 19,000 UNITA personnel have been identified to integrate the National Army; 8,000 have thus far been integrated. In addition, some 4,000 UNITA personnel have been identified for incorporation into the National Police Force. This process is way behind schedule. The delays are largely attributable to the criteria that the government has set for participation, which includes overly high education requirements given the Angolan context.
The bulk of UNITA soldiers remain in camps awaiting transport and other support to reenter civilian society. Despite commitments from the international community, the required support to assist these men in reentering civilian society has not been forthcoming. This assistance should include training and assistance to facilitate their integration into civilian life.
It should be understood that this task is made more difficult because the Angolan economy, outside of the oil and diamond sectors, is moribund. There are 100,000 former soldiers, 60,000 government and 40,000 UNITA, and their families who need assistance. This must be addressed frontally and with the necessary resources. These 100,000 men could prove to be social dynamite in an economy not doing well.
One of the main tasks facing the GURN is the collection of arms now in the hands of civilians that were distributed by the ruling party on a partisan basis and resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians on the basis of their political affiliation or ethnic origin.
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General Higino Carneiro, the recently appointed vice minister of territorial administration, said during negotiations in Ivory Coast that there were 700,000 illegal arms in Luanda alone.
Although this is a provision of the Lusaka Protocol, the efforts of the pre-GURN government were anemic. Failure to carry out these tasks effectively undermines national reconciliation. Creative approaches like food and money for guns must be instituted to take military weapons out of civilian hands.
The Lusaka Protocol is not our final destination but merely a stage in our journey toward creating a democratic and economically vibrant state. There are several key issues that must be addressed in the Parliament and in the GURN immediately if the Lusaka Protocol is to serve as a foundation for a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future.
In order for the Lusaka Protocol to have meaning beyond a transitional period, it must set the foundations for the institutionalization of democracy in Angola as defined by freedom of association, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, a free and independent press, safeguards for the protection of human rights, a bill of rights, and equal access to economic opportunities.
Steps must be taken to establish a timeframe and pace to reintroduce the electoral process in Angola. It is our opinion this should start at the local level, where it is a win-win social situation, rather than to start at the national level, because we are still in the process of establishing trust and we trust each other a lot more today than we did when the Lusaka Protocol was signed.
Democracy must also be accompanied by individual freedoms. While the aforementioned steps, including development of a bill of rights and establishment of a free and independent press, will go a long way toward achieving this goal, more will be required to provide Angolans with a true sense of physical and emotional security.
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To be free, Angolans must be convinced there will be no return to war, that retribution will not be sought for past grievances, and there be no discrimination because of party affiliation or ethnic origin.
To be free, Angolans must be able to provide their families with basic necessities. They must be able to secure gainful employment, and they must be able to move freely without fear of armed gangsters or threat of land mines.
Civil society becomes very important in the democratization of the country. Democracy in Angola cannot be reduced to elections or a Government of National Unity. Democracy will require a vibrant civil society, with churches, the professional associations, traditional rulers, all playing a part.
The primary responsibility of the GURN must be to create an environment where national reconciliation is both encouraged and practiced and by employing the resources of the State as well as those contributed by the international community to respond to the basic needs of the population. Success will depend on an economic strategy that seeks to develop the non-petroleum sectors and to identify productive investment programs on a region-by-region basis. It will also depend on GURN's ability to decentralize the resources of the state.
UNITA will work within the GURN and the National Assembly to make certain that a clear, unequivocal, and rational investment code is promulgated and widely published. Foreign investors ask for nothing more than a uniform set of rules on such matters as cost of entry into a market, taxation, reparation of profits, et cetera.
The humanitarian situation will continue to remain at a crisis level in parts of the country. There are two elements to this crisis. The first is the shortage of basic necessities, especially food, water, and medical care. The second is the abundance of land mines, which makes foraging for food or planting crops a life-threatening exercise. The GURN must make it a priority to respond to these pressing needs.
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UNITA will face many challenges during the transition period. UNITA today is a political party second only to the MPLA. As the major opposition party, we must serve as a watchdog for the interests of the other minority parties and the Angolan people. This new co-responsibility with the ruling party for governing the party is taken seriously by UNITA, and it will do its best to earn the respect and trust of its partners and of the Angolan people.
For several months, UNITA negotiators worked with the MPLA Government to establish a common platform of government for the GURN that would set broad goals for the country. UNITA argued that such a program would serve all participants in the government. A program was subsequently adopted. UNITA members who have now assumed their positions in the GURN are committed to implementing the program and will contribute to the best of their abilities within the hierarchy of the government.
The Lusaka Protocol would not have been negotiated nor would it have been successfully implemented if it were not for the support of the international community, particularly the United States. It is our hope that the United States will continue to play an active role in Angola as we move to strengthen our democratic institutions and develop an open economy.
Support from the international community will be important in several areas. First, a small United Nations force will be needed in Angola to assure compliance with the remaining aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. Angola will also need the assistance of nongovernmental organizations to aid in the development of democratic institutions and ensure respect for human rights.
Finally, Angola will need the participation of the international financial community to help develop and implement a rational economic plan that emphasizes the private sector, decentralization of the economy, and equitable distribution of resources and transparency in government.
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Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chaka appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. I am going to begin by asking a question that Mr. Houghton from New York, the vice chairman, asked me to ask. He has to chair another committee at this time. His question, Mr. Ambassador, was, in order for an NGO to provide assistance in Angola, there is a Government of Angola requirement that each NGO be registered in the country. This process can be lengthy and expensive.
Are you aware of any problems or outstanding registration issues related to any USAID-funded NGO working in Angola? And he goes on to say--to leave me a note, he requests that you advise the committee in writing, if you would, at a later date the status of each U.S. NGO's registration. And if the registration has not been approved, could you please provide information as to the issues involved? That is his request.
Ambassador FRANCA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are many international nongovernmental institutions working in Angola today, and especially in the last year. I would not be able to tell you now what is the situation of the registration of all the requests that we have received, but I would most gladly provide this information to you in writing at a later date.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate that.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. I was going to ask a question of Mr. Chaka.
Dr. Savimbi did not attend the swearing in of the new government or other functions in Luanda and has cited past assassination attempts against him and other UNITA leaders as his reason.
Is it reasonable at this point to believe that the government would plot to kill Dr. Savimbi when so much is at stake for both sides? When will Dr. Savimbi take up residence in Luanda?
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Mr. CHAKA. It is my understanding that security concerns were just part of the problem. Security concerns continue to be of importance to UNITA. There are some people who believe that if you cut off the head, the body will die.
Dr. Savimbi will be moving to Luanda. We have been working with the government, and I understand that a house has been found in Cacuaco that meets Dr. Savimbi's needs, and the government has agreed on this.
I think you will see Dr. Savimbi in Luanda in the not too distant future, and I believe it will follow the meeting being set up between him and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Angola.
Mr. ROYCE. I think that is a very important step. As you know, our delegation is going to be in Luanda. We would certainly appreciate an opportunity to meet with Dr. Savimbi at that time as well. We will be meeting with the government and would appreciate that. If he is in Luanda, that makes it possible.
Let me ask a question of the Ambassador.
Voice of America has reported that your government is stopping all broadcasts of Radio 2000, the VOA affiliate in Angola. Why is your government opposed to free access of information through VOA?
Ambassador FRANCA. I am very well informed about this situation. This occurred in a province of Huila in the south of the country. My understanding is that the Governor of the province had prohibited their transmissions and had requested for the transmissions to be done indirectly and not directly.
As you may understand, after so many years of conflict, control of some institutions is not yet very well established, but the government has been made aware of this fact and is trying to resolve it to all the sides' satisfaction. But I can affirm to you that there is no intention on the part of the government to close any media or to restrain the free exercise of the press.
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
One last question. In light of Angola's lack of experience with local government, how difficult a task will it be to create local governments? When might this process be completed, and when do you foresee local elections taking place?
Ambassador FRANCA. The Protocol of Lusaka has established that a new round of elections will be held 2 to 4 years from now. Taking into account the conflict, the war that erupted in 1992, there was no opportunity for these local elections to be held by that time. But now that we have the Parliament working, we do expect that very soon we will be able to hold these elections at local levels even before holding the national elections.
Many tasks remain to be resolved nevertheless, and one important one is extending the authority of the State throughout the national territory. It is also absolutely necessary to have free circulation of goods and people throughout the territory. These are very sensitive tasks, and we have to implement them in a very careful and cautious way. But as soon as we resolve these two main pending matters, we do expect to be able to hold these elections.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.
I am going to ask Mr. Donald Payne at this time for questions.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you for the fine testimony from the both of you.
Mr. Ambassador, I have to commend you for the outstanding work that you have been doing here in the United States. Your colleagues often say that you are a hard working ambassador, and that is good.
Ambassador FRANCA. Thank you.
Mr. PAYNE. I have a question regarding the problem of land mines and the children, the amputees. Back when I was a member of the municipal council in the city of Newark back in 1983 or 1984, we brought youngsters to our city, to our hospital, the University of Medicine and Dentistry, in Newark, New Jersey, to have them fitted with the prostheses and to try to help with their rehabilitation.
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What plans does the government have in the whole question, as you mentioned, of the land mines that are proliferating? We know there are more amputees in Angola as a result of the land mines than any other country in the world.
What has the government planned? Has it made any requests to the world bodies and perhaps the United Nations to remove the mines, but, second, a program to deal with the rehabilitation of the children primarily?
Ambassador FRANCA. We have followed.
Thank you very much for all of the support you have provided our people, and especially our children.
Removal of the mines is a major priority for the Government of Angola. After so many years of war, Angola does have too many mines. For all those years, we had about 10 different armies acting in the country, and each one of these fighting forces installed mines throughout the territory, and in most cases there are no maps or charts to guide us to where exactly they are located.
As a result, this work of demining has been very expensive. Companies that do this work, they charge almost $1 million by square kilometer, and we do have many millions of kilometers that have been mined.
We have received a great amount of assistance from the international community, and most especially from the Government of the United States, that has given great priority to this matter.
But besides the problems of removing the mines, we do also have to take care of the people who have been maimed by these mines. According to the data we have, about 80 percent of the people who have been maimed by these mines are young people who will have a long life ahead of them, and, as a result, this is a major problem. We have asked for international assistance, and we have seen a great deal of effort by the international community to help us. We are aware that we will have to focus a lot of resources to the recovery of these people, to the rehabilitation of these people.
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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
It is something that I think we, Mr. Chairman, need to keep in mind as we proceed into the future. I visited Angola last in 1993, I believe it was, and I know you will certainly find it a very fascinating country on your upcoming visit.
I just have one last question to Mr. Chaka. I was unaware, and it is kind of surprising, that there seems to be an accord with all parties, according to your testimony, that a portion of the diamonds would be used to fund the political party if there is a new Government of GURA, Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.
How can a resource of the Nation be allocated to a political party, and what is the rationale? Evidently it is a key part of the agreement that is trying to be sought. But what is the rationale for that? This is a new one for me. I have been around awhile, but this is a pretty interesting twist.
Mr. CHAKA. The rationale is that if UNITA is to be an effective political force inside of the country, a national political force, it is going to need a certain amount of funds in order to operate. The government has agreed to this and has given UNITA the green light to negotiate with foreign companies.
So UNITA will be working in the diamond sector with independent companies which already are registered and set up for that purpose, as they will also be working in other sectors of the economy. They are going to spin off companies to work in other sectors of the economy. These funds will be used to support the political party and will also be used for things like agriculture extension services, health centers, and schools that are not government schools.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.
I will ask one last question, if I could, to the Ambassador.
The operation of the paramilitary forces known as Ninjas and the presence of executive outcomes personnel as security forces have been contentious issues. What will happen to the Ninjas now, and do you believe that outside security forces are still necessary?
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Ambassador FRANCA. Mr. Chairman, fortunately, we now have a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation and now people can go to the country and see what the situation really is.
I can state that there are no members of the Executive Outcomes in Angola. They were in the past there, but we were submitted to great pressure and we were forced to rescind the contract we had with this company which was engaged in training of our armed forces. The country is now open, and anybody can go there and see and inspect, and they will not find Executive Outcomes there. We are very at ease about this, because we think that there is no problem in this area any more.
Now, as far as the Ninjas are concerned, this is just a name that was given by some to our special forces. These special police forces were trained by Spain, and there are many members of UNITA now that are part of this special police. These are anti-riot forces. Any country has them, and they are necessary for the control of disturbances.
Now that we do have a new Government of National Unity, now that we have members of UNITA as part of the special forces and with an environment of open and free discussion in the country, I don't think that this will be a barrier to further understanding.
If you would allow me for a small detail, we do think that many of the questions that have been existing for a long time will be resolved in a speedy way now because people are together, they can now talk, and they can see what is happening, what the facts are. That is the reason. Although we think reconciliation will not be easy, we are very optimistic it will work, because we can see and talk.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Payne, yes.
Mr. PAYNE. What has been the reception to the new UNITA people that you say have entered the government? Have there been any problems? Have they been accepted? Is there any tension? How has that worked?
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Mr. CHAKA. I think that things have gone smoothly thus far. The ministers who came from the ranks of UNITA have already met with their staffs. UNITA now makes up 4 of the 12 people on the permanent commission which runs the National Assembly between the plenary sessions. There are seven representatives from the ruling party, there are four from UNITA, and one from a party called PRS. UNITA also has the vice president of the National Assembly.
So I would say so far so good, and I would also say that I concur with His Excellency, the Ambassador, that people are optimistic, and if there is a necessary political will, Angola will have a bright future.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We also have a program called IMET. You don't have to use the South Africans. The U.S. trains troops. There is a university in Georgia, the University of the Americas or something like that.
Mr. ROYCE. This subcommittee thanks all our witnesses who testified today at this hearing, and this subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]