SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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43–079 CC
1997
DOES U.N. PEACEKEEPING SERVE U.S. INTERESTS?
PART II: ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 17, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
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WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
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LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
FRANK RECORD, Senior Professional Staff Member
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ALLISON KIERNAN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Hon. Princeton Lyman, Assistant Secretary for International and Organizational Affairs
APPENDIX
Opening statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Statement of Assistant Secretary Ted Warner
DOES U.N. PEACEKEEPING SERVE U.S. INTERESTS? PART II: ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES
THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1997
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:11 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. We regret the delays due to the procedural plight going on on the floor. There may well be another vote in a few minutes, but at least we will get under way.
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I want to welcome our two distinguished Administration witnesses before the Committee this morning on whether U.S. peacekeeping serves our own Nation's interest. The hearing today fulfills a commitment we made last week to give the Administration ample opportunity to discuss this important issue, to also allow our witnesses to respond to the testimony received from our prior witnesses from the General Accounting Office, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute.
My colleagues will recall that the State Department decided shortly before last week's hearing that it would be unable to provide a witness, despite its earlier commitment to our committee staff. With our hearing today, we hope to get this incident behind us and that the Administration in the future will give us its full cooperation on providing witnesses to future hearings on a timely and cooperative basis.
The hearing today, I believe, is particularly important as a source of valuable testimony in the ongoing leadership-led effort to produce a bipartisan agreement on U.N. reform and on a payment of our arrearage to the world body.
I am strongly in support of these efforts, and I believe that it is particularly important that our two key departments with responsibility for peacekeeping operations have an opportunity to explain the current U.S. policy toward U.N. peacekeeping and the extent of our own involvement in these operations.
To a large degree, the reports on U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping would appear to validate the legislative efforts of this committee over the past several years, to oppose large and costly U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia.
In short, the March 27 GAO report on missions requiring force to restore peace clearly indicates that the U.N.'s own organizational limits increase the risk of its operations, especially those calling for the use of force in Somalia in 1992 and Bosnia in 1993.
These limitations on the ability of the United Nations to conduct peacemaking operations have, however, been largely overcome when a coalition of nations with sufficient and credible military forces took the lead in a U.N.-authorized operation.
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The message is clear and simple. The permanent members of the U.N. Security Council should ensure that the United Nations conduct only peacekeeping and not peacemaking operations, and these operations should be done on a cost-efficient basis fully consistent with their mandates.
The second GAO report released on April 8 on the ''Status of Longstanding Operations and U.S. Interests in Supporting Them'' made some equally compelling observations. That report examines the need for the Administration to more closely review the open-ended commitments and the lack of clear exit criteria now prevailing in a number of longstanding U.N. operations.
These two reports together with many works of the GAO on U.N. peacekeeping should assist our upcoming legislative efforts to implement the following:
First, U.N. peacekeeping reforms, including a policy of reimbursements for all items budgeted for all future peacekeeping operations; second, tight caps on our future assessment to the United Nations and specialized agencies; and, third, strict limits on the U.N.'s staffing level and overall budget.
I would like to welcome our distinguished witness from the State Department. Mr. Lyman, who last month was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs. He served formerly as the Acting Secretary, over the past several years overseeing the formation and implementation of U.S. policies with regard to the United Nations. He has served in numerous capacities, including ambassador to both South Africa and Nigeria, and has been the recipient of numerous Presidential and State Department performance awards.
Mr. Lyman, you may begin, and if we are interrupted with a vote, I am going to ask our participants to be patient; we will come back as quickly as we can.
Mr. Lyman.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON LYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Mr. LYMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and, first of all, let me say I apologize, I was not able to join you on April 9. I had an international commitment with a number of other representatives on the issue of U.N. reform that I couldn't change, and I am very grateful that you scheduled today to allow me to appear.
Mr. Chairman, your opening remarks, it really has taken in an awful lot of what I would have wanted to say, and I think that is a good sign. I think there is a great deal of consensus now in the Administration, in the Congress, and, I am happy to say, in the Security Council, on the lessons we have all learned from some of the peacekeeping operations of the early 1990's.
You cited the GAO reports, and I found them extremely interesting and extremely useful, and they go through—the one report you mentioned goes through the history of attempts by the United Nations to organize large peacemaking operations which require the use of force, and they indicate the limitations, and we agreed with that.
We have learned that lesson, and, at the same time, I don't want us to lose sight of the very successful U.N. peacekeeping operations that have been carefully planned within the appropriate mandate and which have served the U.S. interests very well.
I am thinking of Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala. These are areas of importance to the United States where conflicts have now either been resolved or are being resolved, saving enormous amounts of tragedy and of course resources, and the U.S. peacekeeping roles are properly structured there.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, one of the lessons we have learned is that when you need to apply force, either in a peacemaking operation or where there is no agreement among the parties and where force may be needed, it is really more appropriate for the United Nations to authorize a coalition of the willing, and this is what happened in Haiti when we led the way, and once that situation was stabilized, one could turn it over to a more traditional U.N. peacekeeping role. And that has worked very effectively.
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We see it now in Europe, where Italy is leading a coalition of the willing in the situation of Albania, and, again, the United Nations has endorsed that process.
The second major thing we have to keep in mind, I think, and it is very relevant to a situation like Zaire today, Mr. Chairman, is you can't deploy a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the way you have described it if there is no framework within which that peacekeeping operation is taking place, if there is no agreement among the parties and it is the beginning of a political process.
We went back and forth, as you know, in Angola until we got that process going, and now UNAVEM is playing a very strong supportive role in what is, step by step, a political process in Angola. Until we get that kind of a framework in Zaire, we can't anticipate placing U.N. peacekeepers into that situation, so we have learned that lesson as well.
I would add a third one, Mr. Chairman, and that is, I think we have learned the importance of close consultation with Congress. That is where we also fell apart, quite frankly, in that period that you mentioned, with Somalia and Bosnia; we weren't together.
We welcome the opportunity to brief staff on a regular monthly basis, but, more important, to provide advanced consultations with the Congress on any new or expanded peacekeeping operation, and I am very happy with that, and we always welcome suggestions for improving that process. I think it has helped us a long way.
I am saying this, Mr. Chairman, just to add that since we have learned those lessons, the amount of U.S. peacekeeping has declined quite sharply. The number of peacekeepers worldwide for the United Nations has gone down from around 70,000 to 25,000, the budget has been greatly reduced, and we now have an approach in the Security Council to shape very carefully peacekeeping operations in the way you have described.
I just will touch on the points you made also, Mr. Chairman, about reimbursement and assessment. On reimbursements, we feel, and we would like to work with you and the other leadership in the Congress on how we do this from here on in, and that is how the United States gets reimbursed for our participation and support to any U.N. peacekeeping operation led by the United Nations.
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We do make the distinction between those operations that the United States undertakes that may be endorsed by the United Nations, such as endorsing the no-fly zone over Iraq, for which we do not think it is appropriate to ask for U.N. reimbursements, just like the Italians are not asking for reimbursements on their operations in Albania.
On the successful rate, I want to show you, Mr. Chairman, that is a high priority for us to bring the assessment rate in the United Nations, recognizing the level Congress has already legislated at 25 percent. But I have to add, Mr. Chairman, in all candor, that we need your help on the arrears question, for two reasons.
In our peacekeeping arrears, which make up two-thirds of our arrears, much of that money—indeed, all of it—is owed to countries who have contributed trips to peacekeeping, and, whatever our problems and quarrels with the United Nations over reform, we are punishing countries that not only contributed to trips but, in many cases, lost lives, and they are not being reimbursed, and we need to address that.
Quite frankly, we need the leverage to tell other countries we want to pay less and we want them to pay more. They want to go to their Parliament, their legislatures, and say this, and they are telling us they need a firm commitment from the United States on the arrears. So we look forward to working with you on that.
The final point I would make, Mr. Chairman, is that as we have improved the conditions and criteria for U.N. peacekeeping, we come back to the fact that these peacekeeping operations now are serving vital U.S. interests. We all know the tragedy and the treasure expended in Central America wars; we know that in response to the emergency requirements, in conflicts in Africa, the United States provides hundreds of millions of dollars in relief. Settling these conflicts, bringing about a peaceful resolution, is definitely in our interest, and where the U.N. peacekeepers contribute to that, it is in our interest.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am going to delay the testimony of Secretary Warner until the vote is completed. We are now on a vote on the floor. We will come back as quickly as possible. The Committee will stand in recess until the vote is completed.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. Thank you for your patience.
We will now have testimony by Assistant Secretary for Strategy, Ted Warner.
We are pleased that you were able to join us today, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Warner was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and requirements on June 1 of 1993, and in that capacity, he advises the Under Secretary of Defense—excuse me for being out of breath; I ran over here—and the Secretary of Defense on National Security Strategy; the resources, forces, and contingency plans necessary to implement that strategy; and the DOD policy of planning for U.S. participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities.
Dr. Warner also provides policy input to the military requirements process and Defense Acquisition Board; administers the National Security Education Program, which provides scholarships, fellowships, and grants to individuals pursuing higher education in a wide range of international studies. He is also the assistant chairman of the Defense Policy Board, which provides policy advice to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on American policy issues affecting our Nation.
Dr. Warner has taught graduate seminars on Soviet defense and arms control policy at George Washington, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Princeton, and Columbia; graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, and has a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton.
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You may put your full statement in the record or summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD L. WARNER, III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to be here and appear on the part of the Department of Defense before your committee.
I have a longer statement for the record, and I will not go over the entire statement. Let me just make a few remarks on key points related to your concerns.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be made part of the record.
Dr. WARNER. Thank you, sir.
First I might say, it is the view of the Defense Department that peace operations, peacekeeping of one sort or another, carried out by the United Nations and by coalitions of the willing can play a very useful role in international security and in U.S. security policy by providing the means to assist in bringing deadly conflicts to an end and, in some cases, to mitigate the effects of ongoing conflicts.
I have found over the last 4 years, in working on this issue of international peacekeeping, that it is useful to recognize three different types of peacekeeping operations we have engaged in over the last several decades. One of these are so-called interpositional peacekeeping operations, where usually relatively small forces are interposed between former belligerents to sustain a more permanent settlement, and most recently, in the former Yugoslavia, Republic of Macedonia, to seek to prevent the spillover of tensions and conflicts in the broader area. This type of interpositional peacekeeping was, of course, the traditional mode of peacekeeping throughout most of the cold war and remains a very important type today.
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The second type that has grown in frequency and importance over the last several years is peace accord implementation. In this case, peacekeepers come into an area, often in the wake of an internal civil war, to help former belligerents implement the military aspects of a peace accord. We have seen many of the operations, and, as Ambassador Lyman cited, some of these have been the successes of the last several years in Cambodia, Mozambique, and in El Salvador.
We are on the brink of the completion of such an operation in eastern Slavonia; there are favorable signs at long last we may be coming to the end of the activity in assisting the peace process in Angola; and we have a similar operation recently gotten under way in Guatemala, all under the United Nations.
Of course, the large-scale operation in Bosnia today, first known as the IFOR, and now the SFOR, is also a large peacekeeping operation.
The final type we have engaged in, particularly here in the last several years of the 1990's, has been humanitarian intervention peacekeeping. This has been really our most difficult challenge and one with which we have had only modest success. In this case, we often insert peacekeepers in order to provide security to assist in the delivery of peace supplies to mitigate suffering in the midst of an ongoing conflict. This is a difficult and often frustrating activity. It was this kind of activity that was undertaken in Somalia, in Bosnia, under the UNPROFOR operation, and with a coalition of the willing with a smaller operation and one that appears to have a much better chance for success, the current operation being led by Italy that is moving into Albania.
We have been asked to comment on the state of current U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations. With the United Nations today, there are 542 American servicemen and women participating in 7 of the 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations that are currently in force. The vast majority of this number, 498 of these troops, are in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where they serve alongside approximately 500 Nordic troops in the preventive deployment to try to avoid the spillover of tensions that exist in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.
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There are also 44 staff officers and individual observers that serve in six other U.N. peacekeeping operations. We have a larger commitment of peacekeepers in a series of operations that are really coalitions of the willing, in all cases operating with the endorsement of the United Nations.
In one case, we have the multinational force of observers in Sinai, where we had been and provide almost 1,000 troops and had been there since August 1981. We had a small group of five observers serving in the small force that is now the observer mission between Ecuador and Peru. And finally, we have a much more substantial number, about 8,500 American troops serving with the stabilization force in Bosnia.
Let me turn to really three topics I would like to address very briefly that relate to the Department of Defense's activities with regard to peacekeeping operations.
One of the responsibilities that the Department of Defense has is to prepare its forces to participate effectively in peacekeeping operations, whether U.N.-sponsored or otherwise, when they arise. We have taken many steps over the last several years to improve the military doctrine and the American armed forces for the conduct of the various types of peace operations, to improve the training that is provided to our troops, and the education on peacekeeping issues that is in the military educational institutions at various levels.
Two things I think are worth remarking on, specifically. As we have prepared to go off to new peace operations, first in Haiti and then in Bosnia, we have improved the predeployment training that is made available to American forces, to military staff, to military line troop personnel, the men and women who are on the ground in such operations.
In preparation for the deployment to Bosnia, the forces from Europe went through the Combined Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, in a special series of tailored exercises to prepare them for the challenges associated with the implementation and sustaining of the Dayton Peace Accords.
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We are using similar training for elements that are located here in the United States that are getting ready to be part of the rotation to go in and take the next tour of duty, if you will, with the stabilization force in Bosnia.
Another thing that is worth remarking upon is our work on lessons learned. All of the services have activities under way to carefully monitor ongoing operations and to try to draw appropriate lessons from them. The Army Center for Lessons Learned has been particularly active in tracking our involvement in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, in Haiti, and now in Bosnia. They have both provided timely support to the forces in the field and to help incorporate the lessons learned in our training and doctrine.
Let me speak for a moment also about the work that we have done with the United Nations to try to enhance the capability of that organization to plan and execute peace operations.
Over the last several years, the United States has assisted the U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in substantially improving its capability to carry out a host of tasks to originally conceive of, recruit, plan, and execute peacekeeping operations. We have detailed several U.S. military officers to DPKO with expertise in intelligence, logistics, operational planning, and other specialties to help, along with many other nations, to professionalize this element of the U.N. Secretariat, so that it can carry out critical activities associated with peacekeeping missions.
Our Defense Information Systems Agency, or DISA, a couple of years ago helped the DPKO do a comprehensive analysis of their communications and command and control needs and helped provide them with a blueprint for an architecture by which they could modernize their capabilities to maintain communication and conduct effective command and control for their forces once deployed.
Finally, we helped establish and staff the situation center that is in U.N. headquarters in New York. That has vastly improved the ability of the United Nations in general, and DPKO in particular, in maintaining contact on a continuous basis, between the headquarters in New York and the peacekeeping forces in the field.
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Finally, let me talk a moment about the efforts we have under way to work with other nations to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities. We have worked with other parts of the agency, with the State Department, with the National Security Council staff, and others in order to develop a program that we call the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capability Initiative. In that effort, we have assessed and located a number of countries on a global basis that, in our view, have the desire and at least the initial capabilities to be effective contributors to international peace operations, be they U.N.-run or a coalition of the willing.
We have begun to work with these nations to make sure that we share with them the appropriate materials for common training standards, and we are also working in order to try to identify the kinds of existing sources of American equipment and identify methods by which they can gain access to this equipment through our Excess Defense Articles and Foreign Military Financing.
The objective of this whole effort is to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of these nations so that when forces are needed in order to more broadly share the burden of carrying out the kinds of peace operations that can be carried out effectively, interpositional peacekeeping and peace implementation operations, that we have a broader set of countries that are able, if you will, to step up to the mark and provide effective contributions to international peacekeeping efforts.
In summary, peace operations, in our view, do provide the United States and the international community with an effective and flexible instrument to help cope with the instabilities that we have been confronting for the last several years in this post-cold war world.
As Ambassador Lyman noted, over the years, we have become increasingly careful about the selectivity with which we engage in peacekeeping operations, and we have led the charge within the United Nations Security Council to ensure that such selectivity is employed in the decisionmaking by the United Nations in undertaking these operations. But if employed judiciously and carefully, we continue to believe that peacekeeping operations can serve an important role in this area.
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Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Warner appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Warner, and Secretary Lyman.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here, and we certainly apologize for the interruptions that have occurred this morning, as sometimes occurs, as you know, in the legislative process.
I want to put peacekeeping in some perspective. What are we assessed now each year, for peacekeeping, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. LYMAN. Congressman, the United States suggests it is just under 31 percent—that is based on the regular assessment—plus a surcharge for permanent members of the Security Council. So our regular assessment in the United Nations is 25.
Mr. HAMILTON. And that comes to what?
Mr. LYMAN. Just under 31 percent.
Mr. HAMILTON. What about in dollar terms?
Mr. LYMAN. Oh, I am sorry. In dollar terms. In this last year, for example, in 1997, we estimate $302 million will be the U.S. assessment, that we will pay. Let me make a distinction there.
Mr. HAMILTON. What country is second in percentage? We are 31 per cent. What country would be second in percentage terms?
Mr. LYMAN. Japan is second.
Mr. HAMILTON. What percentage do they pay?
Mr. LYMAN. I will have to get you that exactly on peacekeeping. I will have to get you that. I know their general assessment rate is a little over 17 percent. I will have to get you exactly what their peacekeeping is.
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[The information referred to is supplied below:]
1997 U.N. RATES OF ASSESSMENT FOR JAPAN WERE AS FOLLOWS:
U.N. regular budget—15.65%
Peacekeeping—15.661%
Mr. HAMILTON. We are in arrears, are we?
Mr. LYMAN. We are in arrears, particularly on peacekeeping. We are in arrears on peacekeeping approximately—actually, around $700 million. Now we have $50 million that we will make as an arrears payment this year that Congress appropriated, but we will still owe a considerable amount in arrears.
Mr. HAMILTON. Has our peacekeeping assessment come down in the past few years? It is less now, is it, than years ago?
Mr. LYMAN. Our assessment was reduced some years ago, generally, but Congress, as you know, put a cap on our peacekeeping assessment that we could pay in the fiscal year 1996 bill.
Mr. HAMILTON. Your cap was?
Mr. LYMAN. The cap was put at 25 percent. So since then, we have only paid the United Nations at a 25-percent rate rather than the just under 31 percent that they assess.
Mr. HAMILTON. So the United Nations states we owe 31 percent, and we are paying 25 percent.
Mr. LYMAN. That is right, and it is one of our major objectives this year, Congressman, to get an agreement with the United Nations that our peacekeeping assessment will be capped at the 25 percent Congress has set.
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Mr. HAMILTON. Are other countries in arrears?
Mr. LYMAN. Yes, other countries are in arrears to the United Nations, including some on peacekeeping, and I can get you a list of those.
Mr. HAMILTON. What I would like to see is a list of our contribution on peacekeeping, say, for the last 10 years, and maybe a separate column on arrearages, and get the figures straight here.
Mr. LYMAN. I would be happy to do that.
[The information referred to had not been submitted at press time.]
Mr. HAMILTON. Now one of the complaints we hear from people on peacekeeping is, the DOD spends too much time, effort, and resources on peacekeeping, and that subtracts from military readiness and isn't really what the DOD is all about, which is the national security of the country.
How do you respond to all of that, Dr. Warner?
Dr. WARNER. We believe that participation of a selective nature, as I noted in my statement, by the United States in peacekeeping operations is, in fact, an appropriate part of our national security strategy. That is certainly noted in national security strategy developed by the President. It is noted in the defense strategy, national military strategy, developed in the Pentagon.
Now in order to carry out peacekeeping operations, we must develop the training and doctrine and capability of our forces, we must manage our involvement in those operations carefully, we must take care that while we are in peace operations, we also sustain our core capabilities to carry out other major military operations, even including, at the high end, major theater war.
Mr. HAMILTON. All of this, is this a major drain on resources and energy?
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Dr. WARNER. It is a major challenge, I would agree, for the United States to sustain the warfighting capacities of its forces while also carrying out another scale of contingency operations, including peacekeeping operations.
In that sense, in the era where we do not get supplemental appropriations of additional monies for the last couple of years, it has meant when we carry out peacekeeping operations and other contingency operations, that the supplementals have been of an offset variety, so we have had to sacrifice other parts of our defense program in order to undertake these operations. That is certainly a fact.
Mr. HAMILTON. We have about how many U.S servicemen and women in peacekeeping?
Dr. WARNER. We have about 550 in U.N. peacekeeping and peacekeeping beyond the United Nations.
Mr. HAMILTON. Most of those are in Macedonia.
Dr. WARNER. About 500 in Macedonia.
Of course, the most substantial number we have, which are non- United Nations, are the 8,500 or so that are in Bosnia with the NATO-led stabilization force. We also have about 1,000 troops in the national force of observers on the Sinai.
Mr. HAMILTON. One of the complaints you get from time to time from servicemen and women is that, ''I don't like peacekeeping, that is not what I went into the military for, I don't want to be a policeman, I want to be prepared for combat, and defense of the country.''
Do you have a morale problem with your Defense Department personnel because of peacekeeping assignments?
Dr. WARNER. Undoubtedly we have some individuals who would share that point of view. I think, in general, our troops have found the assignment to recent peacekeeping operations to be a challenge and one that most of them accept as part and parcel of America's security activities and a mission that, if they are appropriately trained, and the right command and control arrangements are made and so forth, it is one that they, in fact, serve in willingly and with considerable distinction.
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Mr. HAMILTON. You are now doing a review, are you not, of your Defense Department capabilities needed in the next decade or so? Do you anticipate that peacekeeping will be a major part of that?
Dr. WARNER. We have developed the strategy portion of what is called the Quadrennial Defense Review which will be brought to the Congress here in the middle of May. We have expressly noted one of the main objectives that the American military forces fulfill is to help respond to a wide range of contingencies, and among those contingencies are various types of peace operations. So we recognize peace operations as a key component within the respond aspect of our defense strategy.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, do we support a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force? And if we do not, why do we not?
Mr. LYMAN. No, we do not. We do not believe the United Nations ought to have a peacekeeping standby force under its authority. We believe it is appropriate and we believe member countries are more comfortable when they know that they will vote on each peacekeeping operation and see a plan from the Secretary General how we put it together.
Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think that will come some day?
Mr. LYMAN. I don't anticipate it in the near future; I do not.
Could I add just one comment, if I may, Congressman, to your previous question. I had the privilege of visiting our troops up along the border between Macedonia and Serbia who served in the UNPREDEP U.S. peacekeeping operation. They serve way up on the border, and they go up there in groups of 9 or 10 at a time. And I was struck with the pride and the sense of accomplishment that they had in knowing that they were contributing to preventing the spread of the war in the former Yugoslavia into Macedonia.
Mr. HAMILTON. Is the Albania instance a pattern or model for the future here?
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Mr. LYMAN. It is a very important model.
Mr. HAMILTON. We are not participating.
Mr. LYMAN. We are not, and it is a very important example of why we need to go to the coalition of the willing. When you need force, they may have to use force, and it is going into a situation in which there is not a political framework, it is——
Mr. HAMILTON. Is that under U.N. auspices?
Mr. LYMAN. It is under U.N. organization but ordered and paid for outside of the United Nations
Mr. HAMILTON. By the Italians.
Mr. LYMAN. By the countries who are participating.
Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Warner, have we had any role in that at all?
Dr. WARNER. No, we have not. We made known to our partners, if we want any particular support that is helpful, we are prepared to support them but we have no intention of participating in this coalition of the willing.
Mr. HAMILTON. We support this Albanian effort?
Mr. LYMAN. Yes, we voted for the resolution.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
What are the criteria of determining whether the United States should vote in support of the U.N. peacekeeping operation? And what steps are you taking to ensure there will be congressional support for funding when you decide on that operation? Would you tell us some of the steps you have taken for consultation and the criteria?
Mr. LYMAN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. We look at several things.
First of all, we look at whether there is a proper framework for the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping operation. That is, is there a political framework? Is there an agreement among the parties so that the force is not going into a war situation, for which we have agreed, as we said earlier, the United Nations is not appropriate? Is the force structure appropriate to the mission? Is there an exit strategy or a set of criteria by which this would phase out and end? And then, how is it going to be paid for and what's the cost?
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Now we always consult with Congress in advance of any vote on a new or expanded peacekeeping operation. If it isn't in our budget, we come to you and say we would like to reprogram within our peacekeeping to support this. So we come to you with a way of how we think it can be financed with the funds that Congress has made available to us.
We also, of course, discuss the mission with you, and the mandate, et cetera, and want to be sure that the Congress is comfortable as well.
Chairman GILMAN. Whom do you consult with in the Congress?
Mr. LYMAN. Well, when we do monthly briefings on the status of peacekeeping, but when there is a newer expanded one, we contact the chairmen of the relevant committees and you send up a written communication, or if there is a request for a meeting, we have a meeting.
I remember last year, there was a request to then Ambassador Albright to come up and talk about the change in the operation in Haiti. I think you chaired the meeting that brought a number of people together with her.
Chairman GILMAN. I would urge when you have that future peacekeeping mission, make sure you get to the Members as well as the staff. I think it would be quite helpful.
What is the Administration's policy toward peacekeeping as contained in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which has been formulated to balance the competing interests in maintaining regional stability with closing long-standing missions which can no longer fulfill their mandates?
Mr. LYMAN. It is a very important question, and it is raised in the GAO report which you cited in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
We have a number of longstanding peacekeeping operations that were developed many years ago, and before we developed the guidelines that you mentioned. Some of them are in the Middle East, then we have the Cyprus operation, and we have the one between India and Pakistan. And the difficulty there is that there is no existing strategy in place for those missions.
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On the other hand, the conditions in each of those cases are such that withdrawing those missions could raise the possibility of conflict. So what we have been doing is two things. We have been pressing hard for more movement on the political framework, and at the same time we have been producing those missions, they have come down as much as 20 percent.
The Middle East is very sensitive, so it is hard to maneuver outside the general peace process in that regard.
In the India and Pakistan case, it occurs now there is talk going on between the two governments. Cyprus: We launched an initiative last year that got bogged down, and there was a lot of tension between them, and we continue to try to work toward a solution in that area.
Chairman GILMAN. Have all of the U.N. peacekeeping missions met the criteria of PDD 25?
Mr. LYMAN. Since we did the new criteria, yes.
Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Warner, under what circumstances in DOD—what makes these missions eligible to be reimbursed?
Dr. WARNER. We get reimbursement on two bases in DOD for participation in U.N. peacekeeping. One is if we contribute forces under the U.N.-mandated and assessed—that is, a blue helmeted operation—then the United States is reimbursed at the standard rate, the $909 or so per person per troop, that it participates in the operation.
The other form of reimbursement we get is when we provide goods or services of one sort through a letter of assistance process to the United Nations. That is a complex process, where the United Nations has asked for assistance of varying types from various airlifts and sealifts to various types of equipment and the like.
A few years ago, the amount of money under these letters of assistance was very high. We had figures like between 50 and 90 million dollars' worth of assistance that was provided. That has tailed off considerably for two reasons: First, that the size and scope of U.N. peacekeeping has shrunk dramatically over the last 3 years, the pace of their own operations is different; and, second, with our assistance, among others, we have helped create in the United Nations a consciousness that they can acquire goods and services and support at cheaper levels from different means. So they haven't come to us as often. We did about 11 million dollars' worth of assistance to the United Nations in fiscal year 1996, and we have only done less than a million dollars here halfway into fiscal year 1997.
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Chairman GILMAN. And we have been reimbursed for those missions?
Dr. WARNER. We were reimbursed on a regular basis until the United Nations ran into difficulties due to the lack of payment of assessment, due to, among others, ourselves. We have been paid back on all of our troop contributions, with the single exception, we were still owed money from September of last year up until the present for our roughly 500 troops that are on the operation in Macedonia.
Chairman GILMAN. How much is still owed?
Dr. WARNER. I can get you that figure, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Just roughly.
Dr. WARNER. Let me look for it for just a minute.
Chairman GILMAN. While someone helps you look for that, let me ask you, in which cases has DOD sought reimbursement for the United Nations? And when does the President waive the requirement for U.N. reimbursement?
Dr. WARNER. We looked to try to see when the last time was we waived the requirement for reimbursement, and the last one we found was in the summer of 1995 when we had to transport ballots to Haiti in association with their elections, but we have not been in the waiving business much at all in that regard.
Chairman GILMAN. Did we seek reimbursement for the cost of extracting the Pakistani forces from Somalia?
Dr. WARNER. We did not because that was in another category of activity, if you will, and in support of the operation that we undertook voluntarily. It was not, in fact, within the mandate of the U.N.-Somalia operation.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you have any idea what that voluntary effort cost?
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Dr. WARNER. I can check into that.
Chairman GILMAN. If you would.
Dr. WARNER. I would be happy to submit it for the record.
[The information referred to had not been supplied at press time.]
Chairman GILMAN. Or any other we took, so we have an idea of how much we are volunteering.
Dr. WARNER. We have been providing to you, to the Congress, for the last couple of years, per your direction, a quarterly report on the operations in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions which are not mandated and assessed. We have that information.
Chairman GILMAN. Did the Administration seek reimbursements from the United Nations for the cost of lifting a battalion and furnishing soldiers to the former U.N. operation in Namibia?
Dr. WARNER. I would have to check into that.
Chairman GILMAN. If you could provide that information as well.
[The information referred to had not been supplied at press time.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Luther.
Mr. LUTHER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I certainly want to thank both of you for your presentations.
The only question I have, and it would be to either or both: As I understand—and this is true of the panel—the first part of this discussion of a couple days ago too is, I hear, concern being expressed about the appropriateness of U.N. involvement in certain operations; in other words, a general agreement that there are many operations where it is appropriate but concerns about some operations.
My question is, in this new era, post-cold-war era we are in, as we look to the future, are there changes that could be made in the U.N.'s approach that would make the United Nations suitable in more circumstances? Because obviously, as I look ahead, thinking of the credibility that U.N. involvement brings to some of these operations, I ask that question. And if so, what kinds of changes might they be?
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Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Congressman.
There are a number of ways in which they are and can continue to improve their ability so they are more effective. As Ted said a minute ago, the Pentagon has been extremely helpful to the United Nations in organizing its planning and deployment capabilities in times of peacekeeping and developing a better communication system and operations room. That means they can deploy quicker, more efficiently, and at less cost, and that helps a great deal when you are dealing with sometimes a crisis kind of situation.
Second, we have found that on this civil police side, which also comes under peacekeeping, there needs to be a lot of improvement in the quality of people that are recruited and in clarifying the mandate and control of those individuals. Unlike military, where you recruit units under—from a country; in the police case, they recruit individuals because that is what police do, and you don't get the organization out there in the field that you need. We are going to be working with the United Nations to improve that.
Finally, of course, as we have been saying, much greater clarification in the mandate before they go, very clear on what it is that we are prepared to do, what it is they are supposed to do, and do they have the agreement of the sides that they are going to be permitted to do that.
For example, in Angola, we delayed the deployment of the UNAVEM, full employment, because the two sides had not lived up to the conditions that the United Nations set down for their full deployment, and until they reached those steps, the full deployment was not made, and that is the kind of improvement we are trying to make.
Dr. WARNER. Just a brief word, if I can relate it back to what I said earlier. The intercessional peacekeeping, which is usually of the kind which uses relatively lightly armed forces and not a highly conflictual situation, is one the United Nations can still most certainly carry out.
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I think peace implementation has become the very important type. Particularly as we respond to the problem of failed States in various parts of the world, that is the one that has seen growth. It has been done effectively. We have learned lessons on how to do it.
The humanitarian intervention peacekeeping, which tends to assert you in the middle of turbulent, conflictual areas, is probably the one the United Nations has shown the least capability and probably the least willingness to try to do. Here it appears, as we both said earlier, coalitions of the willing, of those who can employ a set of rules, and robust rules, of engagements and the like and can agree on that, that is probably the better response, and even that needs to be undertaken very carefully, because it is just a very difficult task to get yourself in the middle of an ongoing conflict and try to assist in the provisions of the humanitarian assistance.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Luther.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Dr. Warner, I would hope that our soldiers and the military personnel, as they are recruited, are given an image of what their job is supposed to be that is consistent with the realities of the next century. It will not be tank battles against Nazis in France and along the Rhine, but, rather, missions like Haiti, like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as probably more often it is battles like Desert Storm.
Have you worked with those who kind of set the tone for recruitment and—those who set the military culture, so as to adjust the thinking of those who are called upon to serve in our military, to what their job is more likely to be, consistent with the strategic objectives of the United States?
Dr. WARNER. I think the answer is, in part, we have done that. I think it is a good idea. Let me look into it to see what more we can do.
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Certainly we have worked with the schooling systems, and that has even overflowed to the commissioning academies. I can't say we have reached out, even on just the officers' side to ROTC. And I don't know how we have done it vis-a-vis our volunteers in the enlisted ranks.
In the service itself, we have certainly made clear, once they are in the service, there is a wider concept of the seven missions that are the national security missions they are called upon to fulfill, and in that defense strategy for the Quadrennial Defense Review, I think it is an important step forward. We emphasize this wide range of activities, not simply the high end of fighting large-scale war, which we may yet be called upon to do, in the hills of Korea or again in the desert, as we did in the Persian Gulf region. But we most certainly want people to understand that this is the legitimate exercise of American military activity.
Mr. SHERMAN. I hope the next time the screen on my television set says, ''be all you can be,'' that some part of that commercial shows our troops engaged in peacekeeping or peace-creating, as well as those engaged in training in what appears to be a war against a USSR that has evaporated.
Ambassador Lyman, like my colleagues on this committee, I have seen a thesis emerge in the next 3 months and that is that our State Department is incredibly timid about focusing on the financial and economic interests of Americans as workers and as taxpayers. I note, for example, that China is given a veto in the United Nations, and yet we are called upon—the United Nations would have us pay 40 to 50 times as much as they do for peacekeeping, and we, because we are unwilling to pay that full assessment, at least as of yet, we are only paying 30 times what the Peoples Republic of China is paying.
How active are we, if necessary, taking off a shoe and pounding it on the table at the United Nations to say the continuing rip-off of the American taxpayer has got to come to an end, and that there has to be some matching of responsibilities, rights on the one hand, with powers and contribution on the other? And I am not suggesting the removal of any shoe.
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Mr. LYMAN. And I hope we are not considered timid on this front because it is a major concern of ours in a variety of ways because many activities of the United Nations touch upon very vital economic interests of the United States, including major trade standards that are set. But to go, specifically, to your point, we agree. We think that a country that is a permanent member of the Security Council, and which has veto power, should not get the discounts that China gets as a low per capita country.
We have just put on the table in the United Nations a proposed revised financing system, which would, I think, raise by five times the amount that the Chinese now pay. They are not pleased with this proposal, but it is a major part of our proposal on the table to change the financing in the U.N. system.
Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador Lyman, my definition of timidity, in my mind, I would argue that our in-kind contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping efforts and the general effort to keep peace and security around the world are roughly a quarter of a trillion dollars a year; that, in fact, that is the overwhelming mission of our military forces. And the real cost of evacuating Pakistani soldiers from Somalia is not the cost of the Marines involved in that operation on a particular day, it is the cost of maintaining the U.S. military forces day after day. And if we don't make that argument in the United Nations, I don't expect the Chinese will make it for us. And I would hope that when we tell the American taxpayers, that, yes, their dollars are involved in peace, that we will explain why, on a per capita basis, we have to spend 20 times as much as those who are, from, say, Japan, who I assume have just as much at stake in peace and security in the world as we do.
Mr. LYMAN. Congressman, if I may comment on that. We do make that point more than a few times, about the major contribution the United States makes quite outside our assistance to the United Nations, to the peace and security of the international community and it is a very important point.
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At the same time, it is important that we preserve our influence within these organizations, where a lot of decisions are taken, and that is why we do have to carry our share of the assessment, but I don't think we pay 20 times as much as Japan, because——
Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, I am talking about total military expenditures, and if it is only ten times and I am off, I will make the same point.
Mr. LYMAN. I respect your point there and we do make that point.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Back in 1995, the debate was ongoing with the Administration and the House and the Senate as to whether we should support the President in sending troops into Bosnia, and there were many of us here in the House, myself included, who felt we should not, that there was a role for us to play, and I don't want to go through all the arguments again here, but we felt that it wasn't appropriate for us to have ground troops over there.
The President, however, assured us that the troops would be out in a year's time, and there were many, like myself, who made the argument that one of two things would happen, and this was one of the reasons we opposed sending the troops there to begin with. Either, No. 1, the troops would be there much longer than a year, the President insisted they would be out in a year. They would be there longer than a year, or in the alternative, if they were out in a year, the people there would go right back to the fighting and bloodshed and the things we were trying to prevent to begin with. I think we felt that inappropriate.
Shortly after the election last year of 1996, the President then announced that, yes, it is going to take longer than a year, and in another year and a half, and now it is questionable whether that timeframe is even going to be met. I guess it is one of the things that makes the American people cynical, and this really didn't get a whole lot of media press and focus, this extension, because people agreed. Some people didn't want to pull the troops out because we didn't want to see the bloodshed, but it is one reason people don't trust the government, because their elected leaders oftentimes just aren't straight with them. And the President made that assurance they would be out in a year, and they are not. And I would just like to know if either of you gentlemen can comment on that. And I know you are in a bit of a difficult situation with respect to that, but I would be interested to hear what you might say.
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Dr. WARNER. It is certainly, at this point, NATO's plan and NATO's decision to plan to terminate their NATO-led peacekeeping activity in Bosnia in June 1998. Secretary Cohen spoke about that when he appeared before this committee a little less than a month ago. We believe that in that timeframe, that we will have given the chance for peace to take hold in Bosnia, a very substantial chance. We will work with our NATO allies to honor our commitment within that force.
We have plans, as well, to draw down that force, we hope, in the latter part of this year, so it will be a phased transition with the exit planned in the summer of 1998. Having said that, I certainly can't argue with the historical record of the last several months, but we are determined to pursue that course.
Mr. CHABOT. OK. I thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Just one or two questions. We won't keep you much longer. I know you have been very patient. To Dr. Warner, are the U.S. forces in Macedonia serving under the operational control of the front commander?
Dr. WARNER. Yes, they are. They are serving under the command of, at this point, a Swedish general. As you know, we have a policy in which we will never designate the official command. We will not delegate the command of American forces other than to the U.S. President, but we do under certain circumstances, we are prepared for a temporary period, under specific conditions, to, in fact, allow the operational control to be exercised by others.
We are convinced that the professionalism and capability of this Swedish general and of some of his Nordic predecessors has all been adequate in light of the conditions within that particular area to make this an appropriate delegation of operational control for this mission.
Chairman GILMAN. When do you make that determination of allowing a foreign commander?
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Dr. WARNER. It is made on a case-by-case basis and very carefully within the highest levels of the government with the consultation and advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and most certainly the Theater Command.
Chairman GILMAN. Doesn't the present statute prohibit that?
Dr. WARNER. No, and it is most certainly our view that the President can never surrender command of American forces, but that temporary operational control can and has been delegated to foreign commanders in various circumstances. Throughout the NATO arrangement, we have an arrangement where forces are under temporary operational control of foreign commanders within NATO.
Chairman GILMAN. How many instances do we have of foreign commanders being in charge?
Dr. WARNER. In the peacekeeping area, the only example where American units are under that arrangement at this time is the arrangement in the operation in Macedonia.
Chairman GILMAN. I see. To both gentlemen, what is the current status of the African Crisis and Response Force?
Mr. LYMAN. I'm sorry.
Chairman GILMAN. The African Crisis and Response Force.
Mr. LYMAN. We are beginning this summer to begin some training of units in Africa that are prepared to improve their capability to participate in future peacekeeping operations. We are also consulting extensively with both African countries and with our European allies on how to move this initiative forward.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, will France and Britain take part?
Mr. LYMAN. France, Britain, the Netherlands, a number of countries have indicated their desire to support this idea. The way we put it together is still being worked out, but there is agreement that increasing Africa's capability to play a role in peacekeeping is desirable and actually the British and the French and the others are doing this bilaterally now, and so the question is how do we coordinate it better.
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Chairman GILMAN. Will the U.N. Secretary General have any authority over that force?
Mr. LYMAN. Only if it is decided that the United Nations, as we normally do through the Security Council, is to deploy a particular peacekeeping operation, and then draws on those units. Then they would come under the U.N. peacekeeping. But while they are in training, and before they are deployed, they remain in their countries under their own command.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you have anything to add?
Dr. WARNER. Yes, we have been active in helping support the military side of this. It fits into the broader policy I spoke of earlier, enhancing the peacekeeping initiative. It is an explicit and regional application of that general principal.
Along with the political arrangement for broader support, we have been working with some of the nations of Africa. We have sent assessment teams down from the European Command, from Ethiopia, Uganda and Senegal, countries that indicated their willingness to provide a battalion that would develop, its capabilities enhanced, if you will, under this initiative.
There are other visits planned with Mali and Ghana and Tunisia and we are in consultation with others. Once we have identified those nations, we will work with others to try to assist them in approving their training and potentially their equipment. Then they really remain the national forces that are potentially available for regional or more global response.
Chairman GILMAN. How much of a financial commitment are we making today?
Dr. WARNER. Let me give you the exact cost associated with it. It has to do with some drawdown authorities, and I will get you those specific numbers.
Chairman GILMAN. If you would provide that for the record.
Dr. WARNER. I will be happy to.
[The information referred to had not been supplied at press time.]
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Chairman GILMAN. And Mr. Lyman, what are you doing to put a floor of at least 3 percent for all permanent members of the Security Council, including China?
Mr. LYMAN. As I said earlier, we have a proposal that is now before the United Nations on revising the financial basis, and it would include raising China's contribution to over 3 percent. They are the only permanent member below that figure at this point.
Chairman GILMAN. Again, I want to thank Secretary Lyman and Dr. Warner for your being here today, for being patient with all the interruptions, and we may have some questions we might submit in writing to you, in which case, we ask you to return them to the Committee.
The Committee will stand adjourned.
Mr. LYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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