SPEAKERS       CONTENTS       INSERTS    
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45–354 CC
1998
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 30, 1997

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
JOHN McHUGH, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
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KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
WALTER H. CAPPS, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MIKE ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director
RICHARD KESSLER, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DAN MARTZ, Counsel
HEIDI L. HENNIG, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESS

    The Honorable Stanley Ruth, Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
APPENDIX
Additional materials submitted for the record:
Prepared statement of Hon. Howard Berman, a Representative in Congress from California
Question submitted to the record by Hon. Ed Royce, a Representative in Congress from California
Question submitted to the record by Hon. Walter Capps, a Representative in Congress from California
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD ASIA

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. BEREUTER. [presiding] The Subcommittee will come to order.
    The Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee meets in open session today to receive the testimony from the Administration's newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Affairs. The Honorable Stanley Roth is well known to many members of the International Relations Committee and particularly this Subcommittee. For the better part of a decade, Mr. Roth served with distinction as staff director for the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee. He earned an outstanding reputation here as a capable and eloquent advocate of U.S. interest in Asia. He then moved on to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, the President's National Security Advisor for Asia, and now serves as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia.
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    This is his first return to the Subcommittee in his official capacity as Assistant Secretary. In truth, I had been hoping to receive his testimony in March or April at the latest. However, the slowness of the appointment process meant that the new Assistant Secretary was not named until this summer and was not confirmed by the Senate until immediately prior to the August district work period. This is not meant as a criticism of our new Assistant Secretary, for I know yours were equally frustrated by the delays in your nomination. I think it says something about the whole process as we have discussed, something that needs to be changed for the best interest of the country. This is part of a pattern of delay, that in its totality, is terribly damaging to our foreign policy, as it is to many other aspects of our Government.
    We have had similar and even longer delays in filling key ambassadorial posts to Tokyo, Seoul, and elsewhere. Moreover, these are positions where, unlike the post to Mexico, the Senate seemed willing to act promptly. I would tell the Administration that it's difficult to convince our friends in the region that we take them seriously when the ambassadorial posts are vacant for more than a year. I would say this is a problem, frankly, that plagued the previous Republican Administration, too. It only seems to be getting worse in the process.
    Nonetheless, we are very pleased to have you before us today, Assistant Secretary Roth. Because of the extremely hectic schedule, the Secretary was unable to prepare written remarks. However, Members will find in their information packets Secretary Roth's written testimony from his confirmation hearings and his recent Senate testimony regarding U.S. policy toward China.
    I have asked Secretary Roth to broadly address the nature of U.S. interests in Asia and the extent to which the United States has a strategy for protecting and preserving those interests. U.S. strategy for Asia arises most immediately from the impending summit with Chinese ambassador, Jiang Zemin. His arrival in the Nation's capitol is scarcely 3 weeks away. I have no doubt that my colleagues are interested in learning what the Administration hopes to achieve at this summit. As you know, the International Relations Committee has been considering a package of resolutions regarding various aspects of U.S.-China policy.
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    Perhaps you might be willing to share your views about the issues that these resolutions seek to address. While China is the issue that attracts most of our attention, I would hope that you would not limit your remarks to the PRC. I continue to believe that the situation in North Korea is the most volatile in Asia, perhaps the world. If U.S. military forces become engaged in the next few years, this, I am afraid, is the most likely location. Thus, your view on our strategy toward the Korean peninsula would be welcomed.
    In addition, the United States has just signed a security agreement with the Government of Japan that seems to have escaped public attention; it is an event of extraordinary importance. Our relationship with Vietnam is moving forward, despite some concerns voiced within the Congress, while our relationship with Cambodia is obviously in trouble.
    The Indonesians have told us that they no longer want to buy our F–16s, while the Taiwanese are anxious to buy even more sophisticated U.S. military systems. ASEAN is emerging as a formidable political force in Southeast Asia, and APEC is trying to regain its direction.
    All in all, Mr. Secretary, you have a very active portfolio. Normally the Chair requests that witnesses limit their remarks to no more than 10 minutes to allow for Members' questions. We did not schedule, however, two panels today. I want to give you maximum opportunity to express your views on a variety of interests and share them with the Subcommittee. I am sure Members will have a number of questions when you complete your opening statement.
    I will reserve time for the Ranking Democrat, Mr. Berman, to make any opening remarks when he arrives. But first I would turn to Mr. Capps for any comments he might care to make.
    Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Roth. You are no stranger to Capitol Hill having served on the staff of the former Congressman Steve Solarz for many years, and I know that prior to my coming here, you were chief of staff for the very subcommittee with which you are addressing today, for over 10 years. So you are very familiar with the issues that we're facing here.
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    I look forward to hearing from you and reaping the benefits of your expertise on the subject of Asia, whether you be talking about Korea, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, India or Pakistan, where three-fourths of the world's population lives. I am particularly interested in discussing specific things such as anti-personnel landmines in Korea, human rights in China, the recent outbreak of violence in Cambodia, the devastating fires currently raging in Southeast Asia. I have a special interest in the country of Vietnam. I am also looking forward to your general approach to U.S. interests in Asia.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Capps.
    Secretary Roth, we'll be pleased to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
    Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure for me to be here today. It is an odd feeling to be sitting on this side of the podium rather than on your side. But having done it once before in a personal capacity, I am now happy to do it in my capacity as an Administration official.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Roth, would you forgive me? I didn't notice one of my colleagues here. He is the vice chairman. If you wouldn't mind suspending your testimony, I would like to have a chance for Mr. Royce to be recognized and perhaps Mr. Salmon. We've filled in quite a bit since I noticed.
    Mr. Royce.
    Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Roth. I appreciate that very much. I do want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. Over the last few days, the Full Committee has been in a fairly intense discussion over China policy. There are certainly differences about how we get there, but everyone agrees that it is in the vital U.S. national interest to promote democracy in Asia.
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    We have seen democratic progress in many areas of Asia. I think the Philippines and Taiwan have made great strides. Other countries have not done well. We are all focused on China and rightly so. But I am concerned that we also maintain attention on the other countries of Asia, including Vietnam. The Administration has moved to normalize relations with Vietnam. The Secretary of State has recently visited Hanoi. Some economic reforms have been instituted. Yet there has been little or no progress with democratic reform and the improvement of human rights in Vietnam. It can be argued that things are, in fact, getting worse.
    I am a sponsor of a resolution which brings attention to some of the human rights abuses in Vietnam, and calls on the Administration to take action to try to promote change in Vietnam. I am looking forward to hearing from the Administration on what it is doing to try to improve human rights and promote democracy in Vietnam.
    Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very timely hearing.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
    Mr. Kim.
    Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. As a matter of fact, I do have a couple of questions. If it's OK, I would like to have unanimous consent to ask these questions now.
    Mr. BEREUTER. As long as you don't expect the Secretary to answer at this point.
    Mr. KIM. No. You don't have to answer right now.
    Mr. BEREUTER. You may annunciate them.
    Mr. KIM. Thank you. All right. I understand that this past August, a staff member of this Committee actually went to North Korea and came back with serious concerns about the food aid to North Korea. I don't know if you remember last summer that we approved an agricultural appropriation bill which we amended to prohibit giving food aid directly to the government. We made sure that all the food aid goes into a third party such as an NGO.
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    Now they have expressed three concerns to me. One is that they are afraid that not all food aid gets to needy people, only 30 percent goes to needy people, and the remaining 70 percent they are not sure what happened to it. Could it be diverted to military purposes?
    The second concern they have is that none of those NGOs or U.N. monitoring staff speak Korean. They have no idea. They are having problems communicating. So they are not sure that their translators convey correct information. They could flat out lie. So that's the second concern they have.
    Finally, the third concern is that the North Koreans give you such a tight schedule. They show you what they want to show you. You are not able to see the whole picture. You can only see a fraction—a very small fraction—of it. As a result, they are deeply concerned that this coming November, the United Nations will make another enormous appeal for more food aid to North Korea and I wonder how the Administration is planning to handle this serious question.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Salmon or Mr. McHugh? Thank you, gentleman.
    Mr. Secretary, I apologize for the interruption. You may now proceed uninterrupted in your opening comments.
    Mr. ROTH. I am looking forward to working closely with this Subcommittee, with you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues. I have already had the opportunity to brief you privately. I hope I'll have an opportunity to meet most, if not all, the members of the Subcommittee privately as well. Certainly I think the spirit of cooperation is reflected in the fact that you agreed today that I would come up without written testimony.
    As I explained last week, I have spent most of the last week up at the U.S. General Assembly in New York meeting with a large variety of Asian leaders, particularly in the last few days spending a lot of time on the Cambodia issue. I'm literally just off the plane from a 2-hour meeting with Hun Sen. So I did not have time to clear the normal testimony.
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    So I thought what I would do is to basically go over some of the key points that I made in my confirmation testimony about the U.S. strategy toward Asia, and add some comments to reflect some of your concerns, an update on Korea and Japan and a few other countries, and then get to the question and answer period. In the future of course, we'll have the regular order. I will submit detailed written testimony.
    I need not go into detail before this Committee about why the Asia Pacific region is essential to the well being of the United States. The region's expanding economic vitality, increasing diplomatic stature, and burgeoning military strength make active American engagement imperative if the United States is to remain a strong and prosperous country well into the 21st century.
    The U.S. policy framework in the Asia Pacific region is derived from President Clinton's vision of a Pacific community, an ideal based on ''shared strength, shared prosperity, and shared values.'' These oft-quoted words have been the touchstone for this Administration's policy in the region, and translate into actions that one, maintain peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. Two, foster economic growth through free trade and investment and the creation of a level playing field for business. Three, encourage the development of democracy and the rule of law and promote human rights.
    We have sought to fulfill these commitments in a variety of ways. In terms of security, we have reaffirmed and solidified our core security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, while maintaining our forward military presence region-wide.
    Through the agreed framework, we have frozen North Korea's nuclear weapons program and set the stage for the ultimate resolution of this menacing threat. We have strengthened our overall security posture by aggressively supporting multi-lateral security dialogs such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, usually known by its acronym ARF, and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue. We have also backed collective proposals on emerging security concerns such as proliferation, terrorism, crime and illegal narcotics, migration, over-population, and environmental degradation.
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    For me personally, the search for POW MIAs continues to be a top bilateral priority both in Southeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. I should also add that the Administration maintains a very robust, if unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We continue to insist on a peaceful resolution of that dispute. I think the Administration's deployment of the two carriers in March 1996 made that point absolutely clear.
    Turning to economics, we have made the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, usually known as APEC, the cornerstone of our economic policy in the region, and have embraced APEC's goal of free trade and investment by the year 2010 for developed countries, and by 2020 for developing countries. APEC's undertakings reinforce our efforts to create a reliable and fair global trading system in the World Trade Organization. We must not only continue to persistently and patiently prod our Asian trading partners to open markets for U.S. goods, services, and investment, but we must also work intensively with them to build markets for all on the basis of a level playing field.
    In this regard, I should add that on my first trip to the region I visited, among other places, Japan and Korea. In Korea, I became a bit notorious for insisting on greater access for American cars. I answered a question at a press conference, pointing out that 4,000 U.S. cars sold out of a market of 1.5 million didn't strike me as particularly good access. In Japan, I pressed very hard on the ports issue, on civil aviation, on extension of the NTT agreement. In other words, trade has to be an important part of our policy with Asia. It can't be left just to economic officials. It has to be integrated into our daily foreign policy. I am committed to doing that.
    Finally, with respect to basic values, the United States remains an untiring advocate of the development of good government, open societies, and the rule of law in Asia. Democracy is the basis for sustainable economic growth and regional stability. It also is the best guarantor of human rights. We cannot and will not overlook the obligations of governments to observe the core values of human dignity set forth in the universal declaration of human rights. Without conceit or excuse the United States must do what it can to help others carry on the task of promoting freedom throughout the Asia Pacific region.
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    To sum up, Secretary Albright succinctly characterized the nature of the U.S. purpose in Asia and the Pacific when she stated last April at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, ''Our role there is vital, from the stabilizing effects of a diplomatic and military presence, the galvanizing impact of our commercial ties, to the transforming influence of our ideals. Our commitment is solid because it is solidly based on American interests.''
    Having set this overall policy context, let me now turn to some of the key bilateral and regional relationships. Let me begin with Japan. At present, the U.S.-Japan alliance, in my judgment, is stronger, deeper, and broader than it has ever been. As a leading democratic nation and an economic superpower, Japan continues to be central to America's global and regional strategic economic and political interests. Although there is no longer an overarching Soviet threat, I view the U.S.-Japan security treaty as the foundation of U.S. engagement in Asia, one that serves to promote stability in the region during the uncertain times of the post-cold war world. Though we have had and will likely continue to have intermittent and serious frictions on the economic front, I believe healthy and cooperative bilateral relations between the United States and Japan is the best way to achieve our aims on urgent trade and investment issues such as market access and deregulation. There is still much to do, but the success of U.S. business in taking advantage of our 23 market agreements with Japan shows that progress can be made if we are firm and determined.
    You noted in your statement, Mr. Chairman, the importance of the guidelines which were just concluded without too much fanfare in this country, but with tremendous fanfare in Asia, particularly Japan. These guidelines updated 1978 guidelines that had been somewhat overtaken by events at the end of the cold war. The key point about the guidelines is that they lay out the roles and missions for the United States and Japan's security relationship in the 21st century and the post-cold war world. They particularly emphasize means by which we can cooperate together in responding to whatever challenges might come up in the region.
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    I want to emphasize that these guidelines are not based on any one contingency involving any one country. There has been a lot of speculation, for example, that these guidelines are either about Korea or about Taiwan. That is simply incorrect. These guidelines are how we would cooperate with each other in any crisis. In fact, we assume that we don't even know where the crisis will necessarily come from. As I indicated to you in your office last week, no one of us would have predicted that we would have had 500,000 troops in the Persian Gulf the year before we had them there, but we had to have the capability to do it. These guidelines are ensuring that in any crisis that comes up in the Pacific, the United States and Japan will be able to cooperate together in meeting that type of crisis.
    Let me turn to China. In a recent speech, National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, captured what I believe is the essence of the strategic challenge at stake in managing U.S.-PRC relations. ''The direction China takes in the years ahead will be one of the most decisive factors that will determine whether the next century is one of conflict or cooperation. The emergence of China as a great power that is stable, open, and non-aggressive, that embraces political pluralism and international rules of conduct, that works with us to build a secure international order, the emergence of that kind of China profoundly is in America's interest.''
    Whether China chooses this positive route remains to be seen. The purpose of U.S. policy is to seek to facilitate this outcome; the integration of China into regional and global institutions even as we continue to press hard for sustained progress on policy issues where we have serious concerns, including but by no means limited to human rights, non-proliferation, and trade.
    I believe that one of the key challenges that I face in my job is to try to help rebuild the weak domestic support for a productive U.S.-China relationship. The 1997 MFN debate laid bare a fraying bipartisan consensus. But it also revealed some shared views and opportunities as reflected in the 85-vote margin. A lasting and prudent China policy demands that the Administration and Congress jointly work to take advantage of these openings to hammer out a common approach.
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    In terms of the legislation that you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, let me express my concern about the cumulative impact of the five pieces of legislation that were acted on earlier today. First, I must note with some regret that I agree with the comments you made several days ago at the beginning of the markup about the process itself. I deeply regret that I was unable or any representative of the Administration was unable to testify about this legislation. In fact, the Senate gave me an opportunity to testify on comparable legislation over there. It was an extremely useful hearing. It went on for several hours. More than 10 Senators attended. I think we did have a useful dialog. I regret that the legislation went forward in this manner.
    Second, on the substance, I must say again that the cumulative impact of these provisions will be overall unhelpful in terms of the preparation for this summit. I think it's not just a question of the specific actions. It is a question of the overall tone. It is a question of a number of findings and the way they were stated. It creates the impression that the United States is seeking a confrontational approach with China, that we're not working in the context of the upcoming summit to try to achieve progress through dialog and cooperation whenever possible. In other words, it's counter to the message. I think it's likely to harm our ability to get the kind of progress that we want on human rights, on non-proliferation and on trade.
    I think that we are making progress as we head toward the summit. We are not there. I'm not telling you that by the summit we will have resolved all our human rights problems, all our non-proliferation problems, leveled the trading field or eliminated the trade deficit, certainly not. But we have been making progress in a steady direction in contrast to a few years ago. I regret that the impact of this legislation could go in the opposite direction.
    Let me now turn to Korea. The bedrock of our policy on the Korean Peninsula is our decades-old alliance with the Republic of Korea, an economic powerhouse and a vibrant democracy. U.S. strategic objectives in this part of Asia have been remarkably consistent and successful since the Korean War. We seek to build a durable and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula by facilitating communication and progress among the Korean people themselves toward national reunification. In close coordination with the ROK, U.S. efforts to realize these goals are based on strong military deterrence and diplomatic engagement. A solid U.S.-ROK security relationship has maintained the peace for nearly 50 years. Military deterrence remains crucial to keeping that peace intact. Engagement, especially DPRK participation in the four-party peace talks proposed by President's Clinton and Kim a year ago April, offers the North its best chance to move away from fruitless confrontation to a more constructive posture.
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    Needless to say, since I wrote these words for my confirmation hearing, the situation has changed somewhat in the sense that our two rounds of preparatory talks did not succeed in reaching an agreement before the beginning of the actual peace talks themselves. I'll try to characterize the process as stalled rather than ended. I believe that we have made a very fair offer together with our ROK ally to the north. I believe that the North remains interested in coming to the peace table and I am confident that they will come back in due course.
    We have said many times in many venues that the Administration is in this business for the long haul. Those of you who followed the nuclear framework closely know that it took several years to secure the adoption of that agreement. There were many low points during that process as well. So yes, we are at a low point now without a new round of negotiations scheduled. But I still believe that the fundamental interests of all parties are served by these talks, and I remain hopeful that we will get them resurrected.
    Moving to ASEAN, let me begin with the observation that while events in Northeast Asia, meaning Japan, China, and the Korean Peninsula, have in the recent past occupied the United States more than those in Southeast Asia, this situation is rapidly changing. Southeast Asian countries require a considerable amount and are receiving a considerable amount of high-level attention. Cambodia and Burma most notably have figured prominently in headlines of late. You of course, Mr. Chairman, mentioned Indonesia in your opening statement as well.
    Even more fundamental than the specific country problems or issues however, is the rise of ASEAN as a major force for stability in the region. As illustrated by its leadership with respect to APEC, WTO, ARF, and the NPT, ASEAN is credibly establishing itself as a bloc that is advancing the global and regional economic and political interests of the United States. Whereas it was only a loose grouping of small developing countries 30 years ago, ASEAN today collectively is one of the world's fastest growing economic subregions. It is our second largest overseas trading partner, fourth overall, and is expected to surpass Japan shortly after the year 2000. ASEAN also plays a role, increasingly so, a geopolitical role, as a regional balancer, as vividly demonstrated in its response to China's 1995 activities on Mischief Reef. Most of its members support our forward military presence in the Asia Pacific region.
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    Let me conclude with just a few remarks about Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands. Although Mr. Faleomavega is not here today, I know he would not forgive me if I did not say a few words about Down Under. U.S. relations with Australia, a valued alliance partner, and New Zealand are excellent. We collaborate across a broad spectrum of bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues. Both countries firmly endorse a vigorous U.S. presence in the region and actively work with us in APEC, in CATO, and the ARF. Australia and New Zealand have also been our partners on free trade, on international peacekeeping, on environmental protection, and on non-proliferation issues. Of course we share values on democracy and human rights. These are very close relationships that are probably the easiest accounts on my beat as Assistant Secretary.
    With respect to the Pacific Islands, although they are small in size and population, they are important friends that should not and will not be taken for granted. The ties forged during World War II must never be forgotten. The island States have eight votes in the United Nations and support many of our global and regional positions, including initiatives to influence global climate change. However, a new generation is emerging and fresh relations are evolving. The United States must do what it can to tend and foster both.
    I regret that due to the timing this year of the South Pacific Forum, which was concurrent with the beginning of the General Assembly, I was unable to attend. One of the accomplishments I believe of the congressional delegation that Mr. Solarz led to the South Pacific in 1989 was the adoption of a recommendation by subsequent Administrations that the Assistant Secretary should attend the South Pacific Forum. This is an opportunity to meet most of the leaders face to face. My predecessor, Winston Lord, was scrupulous in following through on this. I had intended to do the same. But in light of the bilateral meeting between the Secretary and Jiang Zemin, the two-plus-two meeting with Japan on the security guidelines, a host of meetings on Cambodia, an important meeting with the Foreign Minister of Korea, I simply could not skip New York in order to attend the forum. One of my deputies had to attend in my place. But I shall endeavor to do better next year. They will see me tonight at Pacific Night at the New Zealand Embassy, which is an annual event in Washington.
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    So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, the Asia Pacific is replete with challenges in the post-cold war period. But with challenges come opportunities. I am excited about our ability to make a positive impact on the region's future. If confirmed, I will do all I can to ensure that the United States concentrates its efforts to creating a Pacific community, one that will be more open, secure, and prosperous for all of us in the Asia Pacific region. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for an excellent overview of the region and your comments on it. They are very much appreciated. I am afraid that the late vote schedule tonight will keep me from going to Pacific Night at the New Zealand Embassy. Please convey my regrets, if in fact that is the case. This Member shares, and I know many Members do, an interest in the Pacific Island areas and in continuing our strong and positive relationship with Australia and New Zealand.
    I would like to begin with some comments and questions on Japan—primarily questions. There's been considerable discussion about whether or not the geographic context of the new security arrangement that we have with Japan covers Taiwan. What can you say about that subject?
    Mr. ROTH. I think Prime Minister Hashimoto did the best job of putting this to rest on his recent trip to China, where he made it very clear that the guidelines do not correlate to a specific geographical contingency and do not have a specific geographical definition. So it is not based on any one place.
    Mr. BEREUTER. The reaction from Beijing was quick and not too positive. What do we say to the Chinese about this new security relationship of ours with Japan? They seem to give the impression that they feel that it's aimed against the People's Republic of China.
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    Mr. ROTH. We have at many different levels, from the Secretary down, gone over the history of our efforts with the Japanese on the guidelines and on the so-called Nye initiatives for a few years back, to explain what the origins were. In fact, it had to do, as I indicated earlier, with trying to come up with new roles and missions for the U.S.-Japan security relationship in the 21st century. I think it was the fact that the security communique came out in April, right after the deployment of the two carriers in the Taiwan Strait that made it look like these guidelines were linked to China, when, in fact, they have had very little to do with that and had to do really with the future of U.S.-Japan relations.
    We have explained that in some depth. We have indicated what some of these new roles and missions are, such as peacekeeping, search and rescue. We have made an offer which to date the Chinese have not accepted to participate them in a tri-lateral venue, Japan-U.S.-China, which we think would be an excellent way of ameliorating some of their concerns that they are being left out of the dialog on what is happening in Northeast Asia.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Roth, I know you have been fairly explicit in your response to the Senate inquiries about what the nature of the Clinton Administration's agenda will be with respect to the upcoming summit. So I am not going to pursue that. I think you are on the record, as far as I am concerned; I understand what their intentions are. I have no disagreement with those intentions as I understand them.
    I would like to end with one question that relates to Cambodia. You just met with Hun Sen. We, at this point, do not call what happened there a coup because it has certain implications and actions that follow from that kind of determination. I understand that we were expected to oppose credentialing Hun Sen. I assume that happened, that the Administration opposed that. What is the basis for our action then for opposing credentialing Hun Sen? I ask that question agreeing with the outcome of what you have done, but I am wanting to understand the basis for that determination.
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    Mr. ROTH. Let me say first that the basis for the determination, which happened before I got on the job, was not what it would require us to do. I mean, the Administration does not have the luxury of not invoking laws simply because it doesn't like the consequences. That is not a legal argument and the Congress would be more than able to hold us accountable for that.
    The reason was actually a legal argument to suggest that the use of force by one part of a government against another part of a government was not a military coup as interpreted to be what the Congress has in mind when this statute was initiated. Meaning the thought was that it had to do with the military coming from outside the government to throw out a democratically elected government, which was not this situation, the use by one part of the government against another. It was on that grounds that the Administration made its determination.
    But the more important point, just from a policy perspective, we have behaved as if the coup legislation had been triggered. As you know, we suspended all of our assistance except humanitarian aid distributed through non-governmental organizations. We have gone out of our way in every possible means to show Hun Sen that we are not prepared to do business as usual in light of what took place. That was precisely the rationale for supporting the empty seat at the United Nations. We felt that there had been a use of force which had driven out the duly elected first Prime Minister, and that given that we could not allow the second Prime Minister to waltz into town, get his credentials and appear before the General Assembly while Prince Ranariddh was reduced to giving a press conference in an obscure hotel room somewhere across town. So we thought it was important to level the playing field by keeping the seat open.
    Mr. BEREUTER. By whatever method, I appreciate the outcome of what you have accomplished in that respect. In accordance with Subcommittee precedent, I would recognize the Ranking Democratic Member for a statement or submission of it at this point—whatever he cares to do.
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    Mr. BERMAN. I am going to ask that my statement be put in the record.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Berman appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BERMAN. First of all, I have to apologize. On Friday I was not in town and missed the start of the markup on all the bills affecting China. This morning when we continued that markup, I had a Judiciary Subcommittee dealing with an issue of critical importance to my district. Just now I left the Senate having to introduce a constituent who is up for a confirmation hearing. So I missed Mr. Roth's testimony. He is a good friend. We know him well from this Committee for many years in his work here, and then over at the National Security Council, and now as Assistant Secretary in the State Department. So I want to quickly peruse his testimony and perhaps ask some questions after my colleague from California, Mr. Capps is concluded.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Capps.
    Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Roth, I appreciated you comments very much. You know, your ability to provide an overview and also to be specific about the various countries, including Australia and New Zealand is very very helpful to the Committee. I am speaking on my own behalf. I learned a great deal.
    I want to ask you what for me is the No. 1 question. You began by saying that the President has aspirations for what he wants to call a Pacific community. I am new at what I'm doing now. I worked in the University of California for a long time and taught courses in comparative culture. I know how difficult it is when cultures come together and how difficult it is to create the kind of understanding that will enable people to work together to live together. These are all things that are required in the achievement of a Pacific community. You think particularly of the relationship between us and Asia and how that was translated into differences between the Orient and the Occident. It wasn't very many years ago that F.S.C. Northrup wrote the book ''The Meeting of East and West''. That was within the last 50 years. It was a breakthrough book that not many people understood. We still have a difficult time coming to terms with a way of life that is not our own, as I think was illustrated by the action that the Committee took this morning on some bills that I wanted to vote against and that I find really reprehensible.
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    It seems that when we don't understand another people, a people different from ourselves, the first impulse is to be fearful. It's to be anxious. Yet we can't create a Pacific community out of anxiety. We can't do it, as you pointed out, out of confrontation. How do people whose backgrounds, whose cultures, whose geographies are different, how do they create shared understanding of each other, and what role do you see the Congress, the State Department, the President playing in that regard? I know it's a large question, but I know you've been thinking about it, because it goes with the territory.
    Mr. ROTH. Well I think you have to answer it on several levels. First, you have to make clear what you mean by Pacific community. We do not mean by that that we're ready at this stage for a NATO type alliance where you have a group of countries that commit to each other's defense, that they all share exactly the same common interests and are pledged to defend each other against common threats. That is not what we have in mind.
    What we do have in mind is a region that is increasingly being integrated, certainly by commerce. There is a staggering amount of trade going on. As you know, we are approaching the point of having twice the trade across the Pacific that we do across the Atlantic. The contact among the countries in the region is intense as well. There are over 200 ASEAN meetings alone a year, just for the nine members of ASEAN. So what we felt in the Administration was that in a sense, the political process had not caught up with the economic process. That you had a region that in commercial terms was already looking at itself as a region. You are increasingly seeing the West Coast of the United States become Pacific-oriented. The same is true of Honolulu. The same is true of much of the Pacific Rim. Yet on political levels, no institutions. So we set out to create some, working with the countries in the region.
    The President took an initiative, I think a very important one, in establishing the leaders meeting, where you get 18 leaders from Asia Pacific countries together on an annual basis to talk about anything that's on their minds. That is a staggering accomplishment. There was no comparable venue to do that before. It's not that they agree on everything at this stage, but at least they can talk about it and they know that they are going to see each other every year and will have an opportunity to continue the dialog. Many of these countries, their leaders, are from countries that have been enemies, have been at conflict with each other in the past. It's quite a remarkable accomplishment.
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    The same thing is true with the ASEAN Regional Forum. Here I should emphasize that this was an ASEAN lead, not a U.S. lead, but one we were happy to support. It's the first venue that we have at a governmental level where ministers get together to talk about common perceptions of security threats. I attended the first meeting in Bangkok in 1994. I looked around the table. There were the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Russians, as well as the United States and its five traditional allies in the region, and many other players. Such a gathering would not have been possible in the cold war period. Here we were trying to talk about the peaceful resolution of disputes and confidence-building measures.
    So it's an incremental process, but it's one that is taking place anyway through the commercial side. I think we need to catch up on the political, diplomatic side.
    Mr. CAPPS. Mr. Chairman, can I have a followup? Thank you very much.
    Specifically on the matter of religious persecution, we have had very vigorous debate about that. There is no way in the world that anybody can condone religious persecution and religious persecution, I understand, is on the rise around the world. There's also somewhat conflicting evidence that some Christian groups in China are thriving. It depends on what data one reads, what data one gathers. From your vantage point, can you give us the scoop on that? I mean has religious persecution from your point of view risen to dangerous levels, requiring the kind of action that is now contemplated by the Congress or is there other data there that we should be looking at?
    Mr. ROTH. Thank you for asking the question. It gives me an opportunity to say what I should have said in my opening remarks, that the Administration certainly shares the concerns expressed by members on the Committee, as well as many other Members about religious persecution in China. The opposition we have is not to the goal of trying to promote religious freedom. It's rather to the specific measures being suggested.
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    One of the reasons why we oppose it is because we feel that the restriction of visas to some of the people that we need to talk to precisely to get the kind of change that we want is counter-productive. We don't believe that giving somebody a visa is an endorsement of their policies. Frequently you have very confrontational and difficult meetings with people to whom you grant visas. But the purpose of the dialog is better served by having them come here. We also want them to get exposed to our system and to see how we do things and to see that religious freedom does not have to be a threat to stability.
    Now turning to your question itself on the situation in China, I think we have to recognize that there are two contradictory trends going on at the same time. On the one hand, you have what I think you could call the explosive growth of organized religion, of Christianity at least, in China. Right? You are seeing a dramatic increase in the evangelical churches as well as in Catholicism. You are seeing this both with respect to the so-called house churches, the ones not recognized by the government, and in the recognized churches. So that is the good news, that there has been and continues to be a major expansion of religious worshiping, particularly the spread of Christianity, in China.
    The bad news is equally clear. That there has been an effort to severely restrict religious freedom. There were registration requirements imposed, I believe, in 1994, which limit what churches are officially recognized by the government. There have been many reported instances which are talked about in the State Department's annual human rights report of very serious human rights abuses ranging from arrests, beatings, harassment, and so forth against evangelical leaders, against the house churches. So you do see efforts by China to try to restrict the practice of religion, despite the fact that their Constitution permits religious freedom. So it's a troubling situation. You have both trends at the same time.
    Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
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    Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I didn't make myself clear during my opening statement. I have two questions. One is again going back to North Korea humanitarian aid. I thought I asked the questions, but I didn't hear you addressing these issues.
    We are in a dilemma because on one side I am hearing these horror stories about malnutrition of the kids. Yet the other side keeps saying that that starvation is very limited. According to the Committee staff report, it says that only 30 percent of the aid is accountable. Seventy percent we have no idea where it goes to. Perhaps we are strengthening their military buildup. That is a dilemma we have. The Administration never made that clear.
    My second concern is that you keep saying that our relationship is strong with South Korea, but I listened to the gathering the other day from the defectors from North Korea. They said that North Korea made a decision long ago that they are going to attack South Korea at any chance they can get. So long as we have our military out there, they will be hesitant to do it. But as soon as we withdraw our military from South Korea, the next day they are going to take military action against South Korea.
    I don't remember your Administration ever made a clear message to North Korea saying, ''Don't even think about taking military option.''
    Mr. ROTH. You merely have to read President Clinton's speech in Korea in 1993 to see the clear statement that you are talking about. I think the Administration made it——
    Mr. KIM. 1993 is a long time ago. Can you make another statement, I mean in 1997?
    Mr. ROTH. We have made numerous statements to the North Koreans, both publicly and privately. They know what the consequences would be.
    The more important point on the military side is, I know of no one in the Administration who is even contemplating the withdrawal of U.S. forces until there is a peaceful resolution on the peninsula. I mean this is not under active consideration for precisely the reason that you talked about. We don't want to undermine deterrence. While we welcome a peaceful solution, we are going to maintain our strength until such time as we have one.
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    On the food situation, first I don't know anybody now, including in South Korea, who doesn't concede that there's a very serious humanitarian crisis. I just returned from Korea about 2 weeks ago. Their assessment has changed remarkably from a year ago. A year ago they were arguing that maybe this isn't so serious, maybe the North Koreans are exaggerating, maybe it's only a couple of provinces. Now they recognize that this is a massive shortfall and that there's a significant risk of famine. One can argue precisely how many hundreds of thousands of tons a shortfall is, but there is no doubt that this is a serious crisis.
    In terms of the monitoring, I have seen nothing to suggest that the statistic you have given is accurate. That basically the food going through the World Food Program we are reasonably satisfied with the monitoring of it. I don't know where this 30–70 percent statistic comes from, but I have seen no information to corroborate it. Obviously we are not in the business of giving food to the North Korean military. If we thought that 70 percent of our food was being diverted, we would not continue to give it. We only give food through channels where it is monitored. We do not just turn over food at the port to the North Korean Government. The World Food Program is undertaking this.
    Finally, with respect to your comments about we don't know what is going on throughout the country, I would suggest that that is absolutely right. We continually ask the North Koreans for greater transparency so we can get a greater assessment of needs. We had an agreement a few weeks back that they would permit an AID team to go for the first time and travel through the country to try to assess the food shortfalls. I hope that they will follow through on that and allow that team to go because then we could get you some hard information about the situation throughout the country.
    Mr. KIM. Just for your information, I just received a little note that says that the 30 percent, you say you don't know where it comes from. It actually comes from the U.N. World Food Program director herself. She said that. Obviously this is very reliable information.
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    Mr. ROTH. I would have to see the context. We talk to them all the time. I never heard that kind of statistic.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Kim, have you concluded your questioning?
    Mr. KIM. Thank you.
    Mr. BEREUTER. We have a procedural vote on. Sometimes it's followed by a second one. If it is not, Mr. Royce will come back and assume the chair to expedite the hearing. The Committee will be in recess for approximately 10 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. ROYCE. [presiding] We will reconvene at this time. Secretary Roth, thank you very much for appearing before the Committee today. I had several questions that I was going to ask you.
    Mr. ROTH. Please.
    Mr. ROYCE. The first has to do with the new leadership in Vietnam, the triumvirate that have just been put into the position as Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai, and the new President, Tran Duc Luong. I think that we are in agreement that they are working toward economic reforms, but there is a concern that they are not supportive of any type of reforms of human rights. Do we have any idea if these men have a commitment to human rights? If not, would we then see the situation getting worse? How do we read these political developments?
    I want to mention that I am a cosponsor, along with my colleague Congressman Rohrabacher, of House Resolution 231, which calls for the United States to work with the Vietnamese Government to protect under law all Vietnamese, regardless of religious belief or political philosophy. What is the United States doing to reach this objective? Of course I want to take this opportunity to urge the Administration to be focused on these goals. But could I have your response?
    Mr. ROTH. Let me begin by saying that we certainly share your concerns about the human rights situation in Vietnam. We have no hesitancy in expressing our concerns as you see in the annual human rights report, which I think you would agree is very straight forward.
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    Mr. ROYCE. Yes.
    Mr. ROTH. We raise them in meetings face to face all the time. We specifically have a human rights dialog with Vietnam, which meets regularly. We raise lots of specific cases. In my few weeks on the job, I have already raised several specific cases with the Vietnamese, like the request of Members of Congress, and will be happy to continue to do so.
    To date, one can not say that the economic reforms have been matched on the political side of the ledger, or with respect to democracy and human rights. I would hesitate to put any words in the mouths of the new leadership. I would rather let them speak for themselves and give a chance to see their policies. I certainly couldn't tell you they have a commitment to do the things you have talked about. But I can't pretend to know exactly what is on their mind. We will, of course, encourage them to move down that path.
    In the meantime, it is worth noting that we have scrupulously implemented all the requirements of U.S. law. If you look at the fact that we normalized relations diplomatically almost 2 years ago, we have still to date not implemented or activated most of the various economic programs that we have. We are still working on issues because of the requirements of Jackson-Vanik, because of the requirements about labor rights with OPIC. We are still negotiating a trade agreement, you know, it's been over 2 years. So we have certainly not rushed the Administration to just provide benefits to Vietnam and ignore human rights considerations, as some would charge. It is very much at the forefront of our thinking.
    Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that. I have raised the issue of several individuals who were held in Vietnam. The Ambassador is working on their behalf. I will bring up two names that I haven't raised with you in the past or with the Administration. I wouldn't expect at this point that you would have an answer on these two individuals, but I would appreciate your consideration for pressing the Government in Vietnam. The first would be working toward the release of a political prisoner now detained there who was arrested in 1990 for producing an anti-government newsletter and sentenced to 15 years in jail. That's Dr. Nguyen Dan Que. A founding member of the National Movement of Progress, Professor Dun Viet Hoat, is the second individual who was involved in underground newspapers. They are serving 15 and 20 years, respectively, hard labor. So if I could ask you specifically to raise their plight with the government.
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    I know that during Secretary Albright's visit to Vietnam, human rights, especially religious persecution, was a topic of much discussion. Have we seen any change since then?
    Mr. ROTH. I am not aware of any fundamental change in the situation since that visit. I will get you a more detailed response for the record in terms of whether there's been release of any specific individuals or other developments of that nature. But I am not aware of any fundamental change.
    Mr. ROYCE. I know that a colleague of mine who wanted to be here and is now advancing an amendment on the floor, had a question about the Administration's thinking on MFN for Vietnam. So if I could raise that question now. What is your thinking on MFN?
    Mr. ROTH. As you know, there are a number of procedural requirements that have to happen before you can go forward with MFN, one of which is a determination on Jackson-Vanik. We would need to have the trade agreement in place. We are working on both these issues. So no decision has been made at this point to proceed with MFN. It is, however, something that we would like to move to, as you know, probably know we moved to MFN with Cambodia relatively recently. It's something that we consider normal trading status. So if we can meet the procedural hurdles, we would like to move in that direction.
    Mr. ROYCE. OK. Well I thank you, Secretary Roth. My time is up. So when my colleagues return, we'll reconvene. We'll recess until that time. Thank you very much.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. ROYCE. Secretary Roth, I am going to wait for my colleague from California, but in the meantime, perhaps we could reconvene.
    You pointed out that the Administration pushed for MFN for Cambodia and put that in place. You anticipate pushing for MFN for Vietnam. I would ask if the results in Cambodia wouldn't lead you to question the thought of putting MFN in place before you have the democratic structure in place, before you have a judicial system in place that can basically cope with—are you getting the cart in before the horse? I mean in Cambodia, 6 months after we put MFN into effect, we then find that the government was not prepared, democratic governance came to an end. There wasn't the structure in place. How would you respond to that concern?
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    Mr. ROTH. I would like to emphasize the fact that Most Favored Nation status is really not, as you have undoubtedly heard many times, what it sounds like, most favored nation status. It's in fact what we give to the vast majority of countries of the world, all but literally a handful, and that there are dozens, several dozen countries which are not democratic that are beneficiaries of MFN. The reason we do that is not because it's to support their policies on the political side of the ledger, but rather because of our commitment toward moving toward an open international trading regime which we believe is a benefit both for us and for the people in these other countries. So therefore, we haven't attempted to attach conditions of many different types of MFN.
    As you know, there are frequently people who want to attach conditions, whether it be for non-proliferation concerns, geo-political concerns, human rights concerns, all things which have nothing to do with the basic purpose of MFN itself.
    Mr. ROYCE. But my question goes to using it for leverage. Let's take Cambodia. Had we perhaps traded MFN and leveraged that for a more secure and independent judiciary system for a governmental system which was more secure in promoting democracy and creating stability there, had we been a little more focused on leverage in this in terms of assuring transition to true democratic governance, might that not have been in the best interest not only of international trade, but certainly of human rights in Cambodia? Isn't it possible now that with respect to Vietnam, we are giving up one by one all the points of leverage that could be used to get some minimal guarantee of human rights in Vietnam? I think that is the concern of many Members on both sides of the aisle when we talk about Vietnam and MFN.
    Mr. ROTH. I would like to answer that question on two levels. One, I believe that in the short-term or tactical sense, it is not clear to me that MFN is quite as much leverage as you suggest, particularly if other countries of the world are not going to follow the same policy and they are going to be trading and in many cases providing assistance or export subsidies as well. What you are essentially doing simply is putting United States at a disadvantage in its trading relationship rather than using leverage vis-a-vis another country. So that is a problem.
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    On a different plane, I would also like to suggest that economic development over a period of time has been a powerful engine for development of pluralism, the growth of middle classes, and ultimately the growth of democracies in Asia. When I started working for this Committee in 1979, we didn't have democracy in the Philippines. We didn't have it in Korea. We didn't have it in Taiwan. I think that most people would acknowledge that it was the economic benefits, the growth of the middle class, the exposure to the outside world, particularly in the Korea and Taiwan cases, that had so much to do with the achievement of our ultimate goal, which was democracy, which in turn led to immediate and dramatic improvements in human rights.
    So I think there is something to be said for trade as an engine of growth, and growth as an engine for pluralism, and pluralism as a means to democracy and human rights. So it's another reason for trying to go forward with our economic relationships with a wide variety of countries whose policies we disapprove of in the short term.
    Mr. ROYCE. I see that point, but I can also recall instances with foreign governments where in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and for trade incentives and so forth, we have been able to encourage them to move toward democratic elections. Nicaragua comes to mind as a case where actually it was leveraged. All right, here are the benefits of open trade with the United States, drop the sanctions and so forth. And what was the result in that case? The result was that they did agree to move toward elections. You had an opportunity for open elections in which people could vote. So I just raise that as an example, that my concern again is just that one by one as you give up every bit of leverage with these governments, you lose the ability to sort of entice those governments to move toward some recognition of human rights, which is the other side of the equation. It's not just through economic freedom that people eventually get liberty. The other half of the equation is that usually it comes incrementally with changes that bring about some recognition of basic human rights.
    The United States has a certain responsibility here because part of our theme in the United States—I mean this is a country of ideas based upon liberty, freedom as a fundamental value. So there probably isn't an expectation around the world that other countries with a different Constitution and a different commitment to liberty don't necessarily try to champion the rights of mankind. But I think with the case of the United States, we do have that responsibility. So I do want to thank you again for your testimony here today. I want to reiterate, if I could, that it's essential for the Administration to push for human rights and push for democracy in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia. Again, I will return the gavel to the chairman of this Committee, Congressman Bereuter.
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    Mr. BEREUTER. [presiding] Thank you very much, Mr. Royce.
    Mr. Secretary, I would like to resume with a few questions for you and a comment, first of all. Along with Mr. Ewing and important cosponsorship of a number of other Members of Congress, we introduced a revised form of legislation to attempt to move China along into full membership in the World Trade Organization, to help them make the kinds of changes and commitments necessary to bring them in so that they will be subject to international discipline as opposed to just a bilateral kind of relationship and U.S. pushing.
    We have had favorable comments from people at the working level now in the U.S. Trade Representative's office about this legislation. It is H.R. 1712. It's called the ''China Market Access and Export Opportunities Act''. We have an indication that Chairman Crane, the chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, will hold hearings on that legislation next month. I would urge you to visit with other people in the Administration interested in this relationship, to take at least a careful look, hopefully a favorable look, at this legislation now. If you hear comments about it, make sure they are not talking about the legislation introduced last year, or early this year, because we went through some changes in it last May.
    Mr. ROTH. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. Second, Mr. Secretary, I want to bring your attention, as well, to the attention of my fellow Members of the Committee and the media, that a friend of ours, Mr. John Kamm, who, you know, has just reported to us a modest suggestion in getting information on several individuals convicted of offenses in China. This is a resumption of a favorable kind of dialog and discussion that had been going on until terminated.
    As you know, and I will say for benefit of others here, Mr. Kamm is an American businessman who recently received the best global practices award from President Clinton for his work in promoting human rights throughout the world. Mr. Kamm had previously established a relationship with the PRC's Ministry of Justice to obtain information about certain prisoners in China. Despite the fact that this prisoner information exchange was one of the areas identified for significant progress in the President's early executive order linking human rights issues to MFN, this cooperation ended in the spring of 1995. It seems like it has just resumed.
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    Since the spring of 1995, several Members of Congress, including this Member and Representatives Salmon and Royce of this Subcommittee and others, sent letters to the PRC asking them to resume this important dialog with Mr. Kamm. He has just received a letter from the Ministry of Justice providing important information on a small number of additional individuals convicted of offenses in State security, subversion, theft of State secrets and espionage. So I think this information again starts the flow of information that's important to all of us.
    In conclusion, let me say that I think that this effort by Mr. Kamm and the help of Members of Congress, dramatizes the best way to constructively work toward progress on human rights within the PRC—or at least it's one progressive, effective way to proceed. I think it stands in stark contrast to any kind of hyperbolic approach that we have been engaging on Capital Hill, to some extent, recently.
    I would like to move to a question on Burma. If you have any comments about Mr. Kamm, please feel free to interrupt, but let me give you the question on Burma as well. I am wondering what you think the opportunities are for ASEAN countries to bring any effective pressure on Burma to change their pattern or repressive practices that exist in that country.
    Mr. ROTH. Let me start with a few comments about Mr. Kamm. He is a good friend of mine. I have worked with him for many years in the Congress and in the White House and now with the State Department. We have actively encouraged his efforts and spoken to the Chinese Government on his behalf, in a low key fashion. I think day in and day out he does terrific work in trying to get hard information about difficult cases. I was delighted that he received the award that you mentioned. He certainly deserved it. He called from Hong Kong just after he received the information from the Justice Ministry that you described. I hope that this is an indication that he will now have greater success and go back to his pre-1995 status with the Chinese Government when he made significant progress in trying to determine the fate on specific cases.
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    With respect to Burma, I am slightly more upbeat that ASEAN will exercise its influence now than I was perhaps 6 months ago. I believe that the developments in Cambodia have been a very sobering event for ASEAN, that they have seen the implications of instability for a member or potential member in its midst. They have no desire to have two such members or two such potential sources of instability in its midst.
    My impression from meeting with a number of the Foreign Ministers and leaders recently is that they are more seized now than they were before of the need to get a dialog going, a genuine dialog going between the opposition, the NLD and the SLORC. So hopefully they are making these points clear to their interlocutors in Burma when they go there or when they travel to their countries.
    I don't want to overstate this. I am not telling you that the ASEAN countries are ready to move to sanctions the way we have done or any steps like that, but I think they are more cognizant of the need for stability and the notion that dialog and a political process is the means to obtaining that stability.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I have other questions on Indonesia, but I would like to turn to Mr. Berman now for comments and questions he might have.
    Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The summit is coming up. I would like to hear a little bit of your thoughts about it. I gather that there are preliminary discussions with eight different baskets. I'm not sure what all eight of those are. But I do know, just in terms of the congressional interest, we're talking about issues involving Hong Kong, issues involving Taiwan, issues involving Tibet, human rights issues, specific dissidents, religious persecution, different kinds of trade issues, People's Liberation Army and the companies that they control. What I get concerned about, and not to mention the issue which I consider is first and foremost, is how to get China to stop proliferating weapons of mass technology.
    What I am nervous about is in the context of trying to move ahead on all these different issues, we will miss an opportunity to make major gains on some of the critical ones. I don't know if you feel comfortable in this setting trying to prioritize, but I would be interested in your reaction. I just pass on the notion that dealing with the Chinese relationship with Iran, dealing with Chinese activities in the nuclear and missile area and the chemical area, these are critically important. I mean the consequences of this conduct we will be facing in years to come in many many different ways is very hard for us now to even anticipate. I guess maybe this is just a call for a prioritization of the issues as we try to deal with the Chinese right now in the summit. I would like to get your thoughts on where you think this is going, what you might think will come out of this.
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    Mr. ROTH. Needless to say, Congressman Berman, the Administration shares many of the concerns that you have just described. In fact, we have been pushing very hard to try to get progress in all of the areas you just described. But I would like to make a couple of other points. First, we think that in terms of our ability to get progress on the kinds of issues that you are talking about, we have a better shot if we do it in the context of direct dialog with the senior Chinese leadership.
    Mr. BERMAN. I agree.
    Mr. ROTH. You know, essentially that the Chinese have gotten used to dealing with Presidents, beginning with President Nixon. It has been an aberration since Tiananmen. We think we are more likely to get results in the context of the two summits, theirs here at the end of October and President Clinton's there sometime next year. So that is part of the overall strategy. It is not a reward. It is, in fact, a means of trying to get an accomplishment. So let me add that perspective.
    Second, we are trying to broaden the framework of the relationship. What I mean by that is not that we're walking away from the problems that you are talking about, not at all. But rather that in addition to each of the specific problem areas, non-proliferation, human rights, market access, we are trying to identify areas where we believe we have common interests. There are quite a few of them. Whether it is on the country-specific side, regional concerns like North Korea and Cambodia, where we have been working quite well, we are trying to develop a commonality of interests in an area where we have not worked well recently, which is the Persian Gulf, where we believe that with China becoming an oil importer of significant magnitude, we can have a basis for common interests.
    We are trying to develop some commonality of interests in South Asia, where we have had very explicit differences in the past, but now China is becoming much more aware of the dangers on the non-proliferation front. So we are seeking to really broaden the relationship as the two great powers of the next century to see if we can increase the areas of cooperation, even as we manage the differences.
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    At the same time, we are pushing very hard for progress on the issues you talked about, whether it be the cruise missiles in the Persian Gulf, whether it be the non-proliferation activities in other specific countries that we have discussed before, or certainly in the field of human rights and Tibet that you mentioned in your statement.
    Mr. BERMAN. What is public about the cruise missiles to Iran?
    Mr. ROTH. What is public?
    Mr. BERMAN. What is in the public sphere now on that issue?
    Mr. ROTH. Well, the Administration has stated publicly that there have been sales of 801 and 802 cruise missiles to Iran. We have said that we view those sales as unhelpful, that we believe they do pose an additional degree of threat to the U.S. Navy operating in the Gulf, and that we have warned the Chinese that this could have very serious consequences if any of those missiles are ever used against the United States.
    Mr. BERMAN. What is the status of the sales?
    Mr. ROTH. In unclassified session I can't give too much detail, but there have been deliveries of them.
    Mr. BERMAN. There have been?
    Mr. ROTH. A reasonable number of missiles. In other words, it's not one of these future sales. They are already there.
    Mr. BERMAN. I think you misunderstood a little bit of my point. My point is there are all these issues and all of them are important, many of them are compelling. I certainly think pursuing areas of common interest is very useful. But I guess what I would like to know, and maybe I don't even require an answer at this point, I would like to have a sense that the Administration is prioritizing within these very many issues to determine both what is achievable in the near-term and what is most important from a national interest point of view that we will make our focus those issues or else the Chinese won't quite understand what they are supposed to do in the context of all these that would really make us feel like progress had been made at this summit.
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    Mr. ROTH. That's a fair point. Obviously, I don't want to get into our negotiating strategy with the Chinese in open session, but I would be happy to brief you more about our priorities.
    Mr. BERMAN. Very good.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. Capps.
    Mr. CAPPS. Mr. Roth, I want to ask a question about landmines, specifically in Korea. In May 1996, President Clinton ordered the Pentagon to start a search for weapons and tactics that could substitute for anti-personnel landmines. An interim report in January 1997 said that contrary to the views of 14 retired generals, including former commanders in Korea, these anti-personnel landmines continue to be necessary to U.S. military missions. This report was what originally prompted the President to announce that he would not sign the Canadian ban in December. What the report actually said is that no single technology exists that can fill all the functions of landmines. That is, finding, delaying, channeling enemy forces. It also identified for the first time the types of technologies and weapons which, used in combination, could do the job both militarily in Korea and diplomatically in Ottawa.
    I believe, as do many others, that U.S. landmines in Korea which would be barred by the Canadian ban can be replaced without impairing the defense of South Korea. What is missing are not tactical tools, but a firm instruction from the President to test them in realistic exercises and then integrate them into U.S.-South Korea plans.
    The question then is how do you think the U.S. Administration will proceed with this issue?
    Mr. ROTH. I am afraid that your question somewhat exceeds my expertise on the specific question of alternatives to landmines. I would be happy to get you a better answer from the Pentagon for the record.
    Needless to say, as a civilian, I tend to take it quite seriously when our senior military leadership tells us they have a specific military requirement in one of the most heavily armed regions of the world, where we have 37,000 American military personnel directly at risk. So this is not something that we could consider very lightly. But I will try to get you a much more specific answer for the record.
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    Mr. CAPPS. A follow-up on human rights and MFN in China. I am asking big questions today, but I voted for MFN status for China. I am also a very very firm believer in human rights. I have talked with various people who have come out of the re-education camps in China. I understand the pathos of that situation. But I think the question would be what are your thoughts on how Members of Congress who support MFN status for China can work together to ensure that human rights improve in that country?
    Mr. ROTH. I think there's a range of things that Members of Congress who support MFN, but still care about human rights can do. One thing is to keep speaking out frankly with your concerns about Chinese human rights with Chinese leaders, certainly with the embassy here. Second, I would urge you to travel to China and to express your concerns directly to the Chinese leadership. I think there's sometimes a tendency to think that representations on human rights are not what they seem, meaning not an expression of genuine concern, but rather somehow anti-China. That of course isn't the case for people who know our Congress, but I think it is important for Members like yourself to get to China directly and to express those viewpoints.
    Third, there are legislative vehicles. For example, the Administration, the President has already expressed its support for an increase in radio broadcasting, which is one of the steps that was voted on earlier today. Based on the precedent of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in a different venue, the Administration has certainly been supportive of Radio Free Asia. I think that strikes a blow for democracy and human rights. So I think there are different ways in which one can continue to support a free trading environment through MFN and still make clear that you have legitimate concerns on human rights.
    Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Capps.
    Finally, on the subject of Indonesia. I understand that the Portuguese and Indonesians are about to re-engage or have just reengaged on negotiations related to the status of East Timor. I am very encouraged to see them re-engaged. I hope that we'll do everything we can to energetically urge them to continue those negotiations to find a solution. And you can tell me what our prospects are for reducing the unhelpful kind of external and internal activities that could lead to violence there as we look for some way that the people of East Timor can have greater autonomy.
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    Can you enunciate for me the U.S. policy—which is not just the Clinton Administration policy but also endorsed by it—regarding the U.S. position concerning East Timor?
    Mr. ROTH. Let me begin by saying that I share your strong support for the U.N. process that you just described. I met last week with Ambassador Marker at the United Nations, specifically to get an update on the talks themselves, as well as meeting with the Indonesians. I intend to meet with the Portuguese here. I think this is the most promising initiative we have seen in years. Even though I am not sanguine that this is going to lead to an immediate agreement, one hopes that it can lead at least in the short-term to some reduction of tensions and confidence-building measures, ultimately to be followed by an agreement. So I think it is an important process.
    In terms of how we can reduce the violence, I think the first point is the very existence of a viable negotiating process helps. I think when people lose all hope and they believe that the world has forgotten them and there are no negotiations going underway, then they really have no incentive not to resort to violence or to other extraordinary means. So I think in and of itself, these talks are a confidence-building measure.
    Beyond that, we would like to see both parties take steps. We would like to see them renounce violence. We would also like to see the Indonesian Government reduce its troop presence on the island. We believe both of those can be helpful steps. But at this point, we're not in the business of making counter proposals. We want to let the negotiations proceed on one track and not have competing initiatives.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, is my understanding correct that we recognize the fact that Indonesia controls East Timor?
    Mr. ROTH. Accept that.
    Mr. BEREUTER. We seek an opportunity for the people of East Timor to express their views regarding their future. Are those two elements correct in our current policy?
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    Mr. ROTH. Yes. That has been the heart of every Administration's policy since the actual events in the 1970's. President Clinton enunciated that very clearly when he visited Jakarta in 1994, when he expressed in a press conference his personal hope that it be possible to find a way to give the people of East Timor a greater say in their daily lives.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I just express my hope that Bishop Bellow, along with his new counterpart bishop (I understand there are now two dioceses in East Timor), will be able to keep a lid on the violence there and counteract external forces which are attempting to create some violence, perhaps, so that we might have an opportunity for negotiations to continue and for some progress to be made toward self-determination and perhaps then leading to a greater autonomy in some degree within East Timor.
    Mr. ROTH. The Administration shares those hopes.
    Mr. BEREUTER. And let's do everything we possibly can to encourage the Portuguese and the Indonesians to resolve this issue.
    Mr. ROTH. I agree fully. We will try to do that.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, I thank you very much for giving us your time today, for your candid remarks, for your testimony. I understand the kind of very busy schedule that you have had in the last week, so we're particularly grateful for the time that you have spent with us here today.
    Mr. ROTH. It's a pleasure. I look forward to returning.
    Mr. BEREUTER. We look forward to it. The Subcommittee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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