SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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45–911 CC
1998
CURRENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
NOVEMBER 6, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
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WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
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SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member
ALLISON K. KIERNAN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Mr. Gregory B. Craig, Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Department of State
Mr. Lodi Gyari, President, International Campaign for Tibet
Mr. Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dr. Elliot Sperling, Professor of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Donald Payne, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey
Mr. Gregory B. Craig
Mr. Lodi Gyari
Dr. Elliot Sperling
His Holiness the Dalai Lama (statement before Congress on September 21, 1987)
Dr. Allen Keller, Physicians for Human Rights (Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights on October 29, 1997)
Dharamsala and Beijing—Initiatives and Correspondence 1981–1993
CURRENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1997
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
I want to welcome our witnesses here today who will be testifying on the current status of negotiations between the Tibetan Government in Exile and the Government of the People's Republic of China.
As we review Tibet's current status, let us bear in mind some of the events that have brought us to this significant moment in Tibet's history.
In August 1932, 15 years before China was lost to the Communists, and 17 years before they invaded Tibet, the 13th Dalai Lama wrote what was his final message to his people, and I quote:
''It may happen'', he warned, ''that here in the center of Tibet, religion and government will be attacked both from without and from within. Unless we can guard our own country, it will now happen that the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lamas, the father and the son, and all revered holders of the faith, will disappear and become nameless. Monks and their monasteries will be destroyed. The rule of law will be weakened. The lands and property of government officials will be seized. They themselves will be forced to serve their enemies or wander the country like beggars. All beings will be sunk in great hardship and overpowering fear; the days and nights will drag on slowly in suffering.''
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A year later, the Dalai Lama died and, according to Tibetan tradition, his reincarnation, the present Dalai Lama, was discovered during the winter of 1937. Ten years later, during the summer of 1947, India gained its independence over Great Britain. During that same time a civil war waged in China, the outcome of which would usher into power the forces that would cause the calamity the 13th Dalai Lama predicted.
On October 25, 1947, a little over 50 years ago, in dreaded anticipation of the 13th Dalai Lama's dire predictions, the Tibetan Government made the decision to send a trade mission to India, to England and to the United States in order to form closer ties to the outside world. Nothing, however, could prevent the nightmare that awaited the Tibetan people and that continues to this very day.
Even now the Tibetan Government and its people still look to the outside world for help. His Holiness the Dalai Lama has offered everything, absolutely everything, to Beijing in order to end the destruction and the oppression of the Tibetan Nation. In his proposal outlined in Strasbourg he stated that China could be in control of Tibet's foreign affairs and defense and Tibet could even join with China if only it could have some autonomy.
Although we have no doubt the Dalai Lama only wishes the best for his people, it is disturbing that he has gone to such lengths to get to the negotiating table. We understand, however, that without tangible outside support he cannot expect the Tibetan people to live under such extraordinary repression.
The Chinese leadership, however, has no interest in speaking to His Holiness or his representatives and purposely keeps raising the bar. The latest impossible condition coming out of Beijing is that he must first announce that Tibet was always an integral part of China. It is apparent Beijing is attempting to prevent any talks in the hopes that once the current Dalai Lama dies what will be left of Tibetan culture, religion and nationalism will have been swallowed up by the huge government-sponsored influx of Chinese into Tibet, and at that time the Government of Beijing will instruct their substitute Panchen Lama to select the new Dalai Lama, much like the atheist government selected him.
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Knowing of the Dalai Lama's sincerity and Beijing's misguided intentions, Senator Helms and I introduced legislation mandating the appointment of a special envoy with ambassadorial rank to Tibet. The Special Coordinator to Tibet, who was appointed just last week, is here with us today to testify to the outcome of that legislative initiative.
It is our hope that the Special Coordinator can develop the conditions leading to a solution to the Tibetan problem. His task certainly will not be easy, given the bias in the State Department toward a Chinese perspective on the issue. The American people and the Congress, however, will help to bring balance and support for his initiative. We are, therefore, hopeful about his success.
Someday soon, Ambassador Greg Craig, with your help, we will be celebrating at the base of the Potala when His Holiness returns to Tibet.
I welcome any opening statements. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having the hearing. I want to welcome Mr. Craig here and congratulate him on his appointment as the Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues. We look forward to his testimony and the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. Nice to have you with us.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Our first witness today is Mr. Craig. Mr. Craig is the Director of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. For many years, Mr. Greg Craig was with Senator Ted Kennedy as senior adviser for foreign policy defense and national security affairs, and sat on the boards of a variety of organizations devoted to international policy matters.
It is a pleasure to welcome you here today, Mr. Craig. You may put your full statement in the record, summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate. Please proceed, Mr. Craig.
STATEMENT OF GREG CRAIG, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Mr. CRAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the introduction and listened carefully to your opening remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you as the Secretary of State's newly designated Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues. It is an honor and a privilege for me to have the opportunity to serve the United States in this important matter and I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Congressman Hamilton, and the Members of this Committee and the staff.
Preserving Tibet's unique religious, cultural and linguistic heritage is an important U.S. policy goal and one that I am personally committed to as well. This effort is an integral part of our overall objective of promoting the protection of human rights in China.
In my new position, I will coordinate U.S. Government efforts on Tibetan issues to ensure they are as effective as possible. I appreciate the Chairman's expression of confidence that I will succeed in solving the Tibetan problem and I hope he is accurate. I will devote special attention to promoting substantive dialog between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
Let me take this opportunity very briefly to review the circumstance in Tibet and U.S. policy toward the region, and then speak briefly about my immediate plans.
As you and your colleagues know, Mr. Chairman, disputes over Tibet's relations with Chinese authorities have a long history dating to the late 17th century. Recognizing the importance of that history, I do not propose to summarize it or to discuss it at length today. Suffice it to say that as discussed in the State Department's human rights report, Chinese authorities have committed widespread human rights abuses in Tibet. These acts include instances of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention without public trial.
Beijing places significant controls on freedom of expression, imposing, for example, long sentences on Tibetan nationalists who have peacefully expressed their religious and political views. While authorities permit many traditional religious practices, some activities are forbidden, particularly those perceived by the Chinese as vehicles for political dissent. The government closely supervises monks and monasteries as a means of controlling separatist activities.
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China has taken some steps to address the concerns of ethnic Tibetans, at least within the Tibetan autonomous region. Tibetans receive nominal preferential treatment in marriage policy, university admission and employment, although discrimination nevertheless continues and occurs. Tibetans are represented in the majority of regional government jobs in the National People's Congress. Meaningful political power, however, is maintained in Beijing.
Tibet is China's poorest region. Although the Chinese have devoted substantial resources to Tibet in recent years, its economy has grown considerably more slowly than that of most other parts of China. Moreover, not all Tibetans view Chinese efforts to stimulate the economy as a positive development.
Drawn by economic opportunities in the region, hundreds of thousands of non-Tibetans, many of them Han Chinese, have come in recent years to work on development projects or in related service industries, often in the higher paying jobs. In Lhasa, the so-called floating population of non-Tibetans has been estimated at over 200,000, roughly half the registered permanent population of 400,000. By contrast, until 1951, there were essentially no Han Chinese living in the region at all. These population inflows pose a serious challenge to the preservation of Tibet's special character.
Tensions between Tibet and Beijing could also pose dangers for China. The Dalai Lama has consistently advocated policies of nonviolence, and has attempted to reach a negotiated solution with the Chinese over Tibet's status and cultural and religious conditions. Some of the efforts were described in the Chairman's opening statement. But despite the Dalai Lama's teachings, some young Tibetans today are contemplating the use of violence in their frustration.
The United States disapproves of these tendencies. Examples of the great pain that ethnic strife has wrought elsewhere in the world, however, demonstrates the consequences of failing to respect human rights.
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U.S. policy is clear, and my appointment does not represent a change in our government's position. The United States, along with every other nation, considers Tibet to be a part of China. This policy appears to be consistent with that of the Dalai Lama, who has expressly disclaimed any intention to seek sovereignty or right of nationhood for Tibet, but rather wishes for greater autonomy within China.
Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent State, the United States does not conduct diplomatic relations with the representatives of the Tibetan Government in exile. We do, however, maintain contact with a wide variety of representatives of different political groups inside and outside China. This includes contacts with Tibetans in the United States and individuals in Dharamsala.
Our contacts include meetings with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as an important world spiritual leader and a Nobel Peace prize laureate. It is a signal of our country's respect for him that the President and the Vice President have met with him on several occasions, as has, recently, Secretary Albright.
Within the framework of Chinese sovereignty, we have consistently urged China to respect Tibet's unique religious, linguistic and cultural traditions as Beijing formulates its policies for the region. Although we have broader concerns about the long-term promotion of human rights throughout China, specific issues related to preservation of Tibetan culture can and should be addressed right now. We have raised all of these concerns consistently, most recently during President Jiang Zemin's State visit. I will personally press hard for progress in my new capacity.
How do I intend to address my new responsibility? In the near term, I plan quite simply to learn all that I can. An important part of that process is taking place today and here, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for your leadership on this important issue, and I am glad to have this opportunity early in my tenure as Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues to benefit from the long experience of you and your colleagues and the members of your staff.
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My conversations on these issues will involve many participants and will include the whole range of questions raised by the Tibet problem. I intend to meet with relevant Chinese Government officials and with representatives from the Tibetan community. I also anticipate many conversations with scholars and advocates on all sides of the issue.
I will furthermore seek to travel to the region so that I can assess for myself the circumstances on the ground in Tibet and in the Tibetan exile communities in the area. I hope to gather from these meetings creative ideas in how to encourage dialog between the Dalai Lama and his representatives and the Beijing Government.
I do not want to promise what I cannot deliver. As you know from long experience, Mr. Chairman, substantial obstacles lie in the way of progress and it is always wise to underpromise and overdeliver. But I pledge to you my most serious personal efforts backed by the vigorous support of the Secretary and the institution of the Department of State. She has assured me that I will have at my disposal the resources this job requires.
There are grounds for hope. The Dalai Lama has shown great courage in accepting the impracticality of insisting on independence, whatever his views on Tibet's historical status. Chinese spokesmen have responded by stating their willingness to engage in a dialog with the Dalai Lama if he renounces independence and pro-independence activities. The gap is not small, and I recognize that there is disagreement and mistrust between the parties over the preconditions for a dialog. But I also believe the gap is not unbridgable. Both parties have a strong interest in coming together for talks. It is my sincere hope that in my new role I will at least be able to facilitate a serious dialog between the two sides.
As I mentioned earlier, it is not only Tibetans who stand to gain from a better relationship. The rest of China would benefit as well. Stability will be enhanced by satisfying the need of China's minority people to be secure in their cultural and religious traditions.
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One final word on my position as a Coordinator. I view that job as going well beyond coordinating the executive branch's efforts in this area. As a former Senate aide, I recognize the importance of consultation and cooperation and constant communication with the Congress. I am grateful, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this important issue, for the warm welcome that I have received from you and the other Members of the Committee, and also from the reception I have had from the staff.
Thank you for the opportunity to learn from you today and from your colleagues. I look forward to a productive partnership in the months ahead.
[Mr. Craig's prepared statement appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Craig. Should I address you as Special Coordinator or ambassador without portfolio?
Mr. CRAIG. Greg is fine.
Chairman GILMAN. I will address you as ambassador, in our mind. Mr. Craig, we wish you well in your endeavors.
When we met with the President of China in August in China we urged, of course, a better relationship with Tibet. We asked him what his thoughts were. He said, well, if the Dalai Lama will declare that he is not seeking independence, we will be able to talk with him.
We then went to Dharamsala and met with His Holiness and we related that statement to His Holiness, and His Holiness said I have always said that we do not want independence, we want autonomy so that we can have some thinking by our own people as to how to conduct their own affairs. He said, however, I do not accede to what the Chinese want, and that is for me to state that Tibet was always part of China, which historically is not true. So that seems to be the gap between these two leaders.
I would hope that as Coordinator you will coordinate that thinking and try to bring them together so that there can be some solution.
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I hope you will arrange for some early meetings between the parties, and I hope that you will be the facilitator of that.
How do you plan to develop closer ties between Tibet and our own Nation?
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I appreciate the confidence that you have expressed in my efforts here.
I am in the third day or fourth day of my appointment, and I am spending a lot of time dealing with precisely that issue, to develop a strategy to advance the objectives of my mission. I will begin and have begun meetings with interested parties already and will be asking for meetings with officials from the Chinese Government as well as from the Tibetan community.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you plan on traveling to Dharamsala in the near future?
Mr. CRAIG. I will be traveling to India in the very near future, this month is my plan, and whether I go to Dharamsala or not is still up in the air. But I will be happy to keep your representatives informed as to my travel plans. I will be traveling with the Secretary to Delhi.
Chairman GILMAN. I would hope you would find the time while you are in Delhi, as we did, to travel up to Dharamsala and meet with His Holiness and the Government in Exile.
Will you be adding some people to your staff?
Mr. CRAIG. The Secretary has assured me that whatever resources I need, I will get. And because of my concern that this be done correctly and thoroughly, it is my intention to submit a request for the requirements that are needed.
I am not yet certain how many new people will be required. It should not be more than one or two, maybe three at the most. But it is my intention at the moment to do that.
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Chairman GILMAN. Do you intend to travel to Tibet in the near future?
Mr. CRAIG. I have not yet made any formal requests and have not yet developed my plans, but it is quite clear that that certainly is contemplated in the scope of my activities as Coordinator.
Chairman GILMAN. I hope you will do that in the near future. You know, when the President of China was here, he extended an invitation to the Speaker to travel to Tibet, and the Speaker talked to some of us and indicated his desire to go to Tibet sometime in the next year. So I hope your visit will precede our congressional visit to Tibet so that you will have an opportunity to brief us a little more about what your thoughts are.
Senator Helms and myself introduced our legislation to mandate the appointment of a special envoy to Tibet with the rank of ambassador whose sole responsibility would be the issue of Tibet. I am sure you have some other responsibilities, but are you planning on taking on some other issues besides the Tibetan issue?
Mr. CRAIG. No, sir, this is the only additional obligation I have. As the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, I work very closely with the Secretary on a wide variety of long-term policy issues, and that is plenty, to be honest, Mr. Chairman.
It will be an important challenge, which I welcome, to include in those activities the role as Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues.
Chairman GILMAN. Will you be making a request of the Chinese at an early date to discuss the possibilities of some negotiation?
Mr. CRAIG. Absolutely. That is clearly one of my intentions is to approach the Chinese Government.
Chairman GILMAN. Again, I want to wish you well in your endeavors. I hope you will keep an open line of communication with our Committee. We look forward to having an early review with you of your progress in this area.
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Mr. CRAIG. I look forward to that as well, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are the Director of the Policy Planning Staff?
Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. That is a full-time job, is it not?
Mr. CRAIG. It sure is.
Mr. HAMILTON. How much time are you going to be able to give to this job as Special Coordinator?
Mr. CRAIG. Congressman, I will give to this job whatever it requires to do it right. I care a lot about this issue and I plan to devote whatever time is necessary to do it. I have a very strong staff in the policy planning——
Mr. HAMILTON. How many people on your staff will be working exclusively on Tibetan affairs?
Mr. CRAIG. I will be hiring new members.
Mr. HAMILTON. How many people will you be hiring?
Mr. CRAIG. I plan to hire three.
Mr. HAMILTON. Three full-time Tibetan staffers?
Mr. CRAIG. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know you well, but I have known several directors of the policy planning staff and I have always been impressed that it is almost an 18-hour-a-day job. It is a terrific job. It is a very important one at State, and I do not have any doubts about your capabilities.
I know you have the confidence of the Secretary, which is very important here, but I do wonder about how much time and effort you are going to be able to devote to your added responsibility as Special Coordinator to Tibet and how many resources you will have. So that is on my mind. I am not sure you can answer that, but I just want to let you know that it is a question that occurs to me.
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Now, your statement is interesting to me, particularly one word, on page 4, when you are talking about U.S. policy. You say it is clear the United States, along with every other nation, considers Tibet to be a part of China. This policy ''appears'' to be consistent with that of the Dalai Lama.
Why do you use the word ''appears''? Why can you not just say it is consistent?
Mr. CRAIG. As I understand it, it is consistent. This is based on his statements. I have not met with the Dalai Lama.
Mr. HAMILTON. Why do you use the word appears? It is as if you do not understand the Dalai Lama's position for sure.
Mr. CRAIG. Well, I have not yet discussed it with him personally. I look forward to exploring it more with him. I have seen his statements on this concept.
Mr. HAMILTON. Is there a doubt in your mind that our policy is different?
Mr. CRAIG. No, I believe our policy is the same, based on my conversations with his representatives.
Mr. HAMILTON. Does our position with respect to the legal status of Tibet differ from China's position?
Mr. CRAIG. My understanding is that it does not.
Mr. HAMILTON. It is the same. Is it the same as the Dalai Lama's position?
Mr. CRAIG. It is the same, as I understand it.
Mr. HAMILTON. Does our policy today under the Clinton Administration differ on Tibet from the policy of the preceding administrations in any way?
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Mr. CRAIG. That I cannot answer, Congressman. I have not studied——
Mr. HAMILTON. Are you aware of any difference?
Mr. CRAIG. Not aware at this moment of any difference in a change of policy in the Clinton Administration.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK. The point that the Chairman was making I am interested in, too. The preconditions here for dialog between the two leaders. And I am not sure I fully understand it.
What do you think is the difference on the preconditions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government on dialog?
Mr. CRAIG. If I can use the words ''appears to me'', there is a dispute about the historical status of Tibet in that the Chinese, as a precondition for entering into discussions or dialog with the Dalai Lama, want the Dalai Lama to make a statement that Tibet was never independent or free. And the Dalai Lama, at this point, declines to make such a statement.
Mr. HAMILTON. It is more a matter of historical interpretation than it is present status.
Mr. CRAIG. That is, as I understand the situation, yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Did President Clinton and President Jiang talk about Tibet at all, to your knowledge?
Mr. CRAIG. I was not present in the White House for those conversations. I can tell you I was present in the State Department when the Secretary of State met with Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen, and she specifically discussed the issue of Tibet and the appointment of the Special Coordinator and raised her concerns with him at that time.
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Mr. HAMILTON. How would you generally describe China's governing of Tibet; harsh, repressive? What kind of adjectives come to your mind?
Mr. CRAIG. Well, there is clearly restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and freedom of political association and religious freedom. There are clearly efforts to control those activities on the part of religious leaders and cultural leaders inside of Tibet.
Mr. HAMILTON. Is it repressive?
Mr. CRAIG. I would use that word.
Mr. HAMILTON. Do they throw people in jail?
Mr. CRAIG. They have thrown many people in jail, Congressman. I do not know how many.
Mr. HAMILTON. On the economic side, is there some economic growth there that is getting disbursed to the people?
Mr. CRAIG. As I understand it, the Chinese have made efforts to develop and to stimulate the Tibetan economy. To the extent that that is not fully distributed fairly or completely among Tibetan citizens——
Mr. HAMILTON. Is the ordinary Tibetan today better off or worse off than in times past? How would you describe that?
Mr. CRAIG. I am not an expert on that, Congressman. I am just beginning this job. It is a subject that is of some importance to Tibetans, but I am going to be really focusing on the cultural and the religious aspects of their daily lives much more than the economic aspect of it.
Mr. HAMILTON. But you do see the present Chinese policy as being harsh and repressive.
Mr. CRAIG. I certainly see it as being repressive, and harsh, I think, is fair as well.
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Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Thank you. I am very pleased you are in your capacity and I look forward to hearing from you from time to time.
And I do want to say to the chairman of the Committee that this has been a very special interest of his and I commend him for his work on it, and I know he has had a lot to do with the fact that this position has been created.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Thank you for your comments.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Mr. Craig, I hope that your position is significant of something other than just another facade by this Administration created to make the American people believe we are doing something when we are not.
What is your reaction going to be if you find that the Administration's real policy is to facilitate profits by American corporations at the expense of human rights in China?
Mr. CRAIG. Well, I do not anticipate that is what I am going to be discovering. I hope that is not the case. So far, in my conversations with the Secretary of State, I have been impressed with her enthusiasm.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am pleased at your loyalty to your President and your boss, Mr. Craig. But the fact is your boss lied to the American people when he talked about human rights in his first election. He has reversed himself on his human rights stand on China that he made during his first election against President Bush, who I might add he criticized for being soft on human rights in China, and then became ''Mr. Softy of All Times'' as he became President.
Let me get this straight. You believe the dispute over Tibet is based on an interpretation of the historic status of Tibet?
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Mr. CRAIG. No, the question about the preconditions for discussions appears at this point to be a dispute between the Chinese and the Dalai Lama on that question; that the Chinese have said, as a precondition for us to talk with you, you have to make a public statement on this history.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am happy to hear that we are talking about these statements or these preconditions by the world's most vicious dictatorship, the world's No. 1 violator of human rights, and giving them the dignity of the analysis that you have just given us today.
I would suggest to you, Mr. Craig, if you are going in to your new job with the idea that we have a problem of mistrust between this Communist dictatorship in Beijing and the people of Tibet, that you are going to be no more effective in representing the values and principles of the United States than President Clinton is in his relationship with this bloody dictatorship.
This is not a problem of mistrust. This is a problem where we have a dictatorship engaged in the worst kind of oppression and cultural genocide against a people, and our government will not even call it cultural genocide and oppression. I wish you luck in your job.
Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. But if you cannot be stronger than your boss, and your boss shepherded around people, a man responsible for more oppression than any other regime in the world just a few weeks ago as if we were talking to, as if we were bringing around the head of a democratic government.
Is this a moral equivalency this Administration has: If you are a bloody dictator or an Adolf Hitler, you are morally equivalent to any other Head of State who happens to be elected by the people and respects human rights?
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Mr. CRAIG. With respect, Congressman, I think we have a different view as to how to achieve the objectives that we share, which is greater freedom and political and religious and cultural freedom inside Tibet.
I think the President's statement about human rights in his public appearance with the President of China speaks for itself.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. It certainly does. His words stand by themselves because there are no actions behind those words. And when a President of the United States throws up so much word confetti about believing in human rights and moves forward with commercial policies that permit the type of profit taking at the expense of slave labor in China, the President of the United States is not representing the values of the people of the United States.
I do wish you luck, because you are caught in the middle. You worked here on the Hill, and you know that there are differences between the Hill and the President, and we can respect that in our system, but I do not respect this President. I do not respect the way he has been handling relations—we have a billion people in China, and we have been sending them the message that we are on the side of their oppressor. We have been sending them the message there is a moral equivalency between dictatorship and tyranny. We have been sending the message that we are going to buy the arguments about Tibet and all the other dictatorial and oppressive policies that they have by permitting them to just excuse it away as some misunderstanding.
These are not misunderstandings. These are the actions of a bloodthirsty and brutal regime that is not democratic and has made no move toward democracy. And, yes, there are people making billions of dollars off it, but that is something I do not think we can be proud of any more than we can be proud of people who dealt with Adolph Hitler.
Mr. CRAIG. With respect, Congressman, if I can respond, and I hope you will respect my difference with you on this, I have sat with the Secretary of State at six different bilateral meetings with the Foreign Minister and Vice Premier of China in the course of the 5 months I have been in the job as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
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At every single one of those meetings, with great energy and eloquence, Secretary of State Albright has raised the issue of human rights, individual cases, and the subject of Tibet. This is not something that is being ignored or downplayed by this Administration in its policy toward China.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. What do you think the reaction is when those despots sitting across the other side of the table, when they realize that the Americans are raising this issue, but they are not willing to make any policy differences that will bring down the $40 billion in trade deficit that we have with them?
These dictators on the other side of the table think we are just playing a game. I do not blame them for thinking we are playing a game, because this Administration is playing a game. You can throw up all the word confetti you want about believing in something, but unless you do something about it, it does not mean anything. In fact, it fosters a disregard for all of our talk about freedom and human liberty that our founding fathers based their whole lives on. They sacrificed their lives for these principles, and we have an Administration that will not sacrifice a billion dollars in trade.
No, Tibet is perhaps the best example. We have cultural genocide going on there. We have an oppressed people and we are talking about it as if there is a communications gap. This is not a communications gap. This is unacceptable behavior on the part of a vicious dictatorship. If we do not label it that, we can never expect them to budge and they will not budge.
Mr. CRAIG. I am concerned that it is an additional condition, precondition, that has arisen, from where I do not know and for what reason I do not know, in our efforts to get the Chinese to begin discussions and dialog with the Dalai Lama, which is something I think you would support.
That is why that topic has come into the hearings today. The Chinese have introduced this additional precondition that there must be some agreement about the historical facts before we can even begin discussing.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have we asked the Chinese to release the 6-year-old boy that is one of the religious leaders in Tibet?
Mr. CRAIG. Yes, we have.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what force have we put behind that request? What have we told them we will do unless that young religious leader is released?
Mr. CRAIG. This issue, Congressman, was raised by our——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is the answer nothing? The answer is nothing. So what if you make a demand and you have nothing to back it up? They know that that demand is nothing more than, again, word confetti. Posturing for the American people. We posture for the American people, and the dictatorship in China is strengthened in their resolve to ignore every type of request we make.
Now, you come back to us and tell us what demand we are making about the 6-year-old religious leader who they have taken away and what your response is going to be if they do not meet that demand, and then we will take your job seriously. Otherwise, it is just a lot of—I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, for losing my temper, but otherwise this is just a bunch of—what kind of game are we playing here? It is a meaningless game.
I have 3 minutes to vote. My people expect me to go vote.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will stand in recess momentarily. Mr. Smith will be back shortly and will be conducting the hearing until we get back from the vote. The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. SMITH. [Presiding] The Committee will resume its hearing.
Let me, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have read it and appreciate it. It was nice meeting you the other day, and I wish you much success. We are hopeful and have high expectations that you will do everything humanly possible to make this job work. So we—on both sides of the aisle—are very pleased to see you in this position.
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Let me ask you about the Panchen Lama and what you think might be done to rescue him—assuming he is alive, and that is a hope we all have—from whatever incarceration or whatever kind of situation he might find himself in now after his kidnapping.
Mr. CRAIG. Well, it is a matter of great concern to us. It is a matter of great concern to the Government of the United States. And let me tell you that I am thinking very seriously about how to go about that.
There are two answers that I have to tell you. One is that I would love to share with you my thoughts and consult with you about ways in which you think this could be most effectively done, A, to guarantee his safety and security and, B, to obtain his freedom.
The second point is it is premature at this point for me to tell you what those thoughts are because I have not finalized them or formulated them. And, to be honest, it would be irresponsible for me to tell you that I have got an idea about how to do that completely right now. I have some ideas. There are a lot of people who have been working on this project outside and inside the government that I want to talk to about it.
But I recognize that this is a concern of yours and of the Committee's, and I will spend a good deal of time thinking about it and working on it.
Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, and I look forward to the consultations and the dialog that will ensue.
On October 28th, we had a hearing in my Subcommittee on International Operations on ''Human Rights and the People's Republic of China''. We heard expert testimony from Dr. Alan Keller from the Physicians for Human Rights, and his subject was ''Torture in Tibet''. He gave a very disturbing report on what is going on based on his personal observations and those of his fact-finding team. He pointed out that this is the second study on torture in Tibet, the first was in 1989, and that torture of Tibetan political prisoners is routine, to use his word. The finding was substantiated by their new study.
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In his findings, he reports that it is common among, as I said, people who are incarcerated, but he said it affects everybody; even those arrested for regular crimes, petty crimes, are subjected to torture. Ninety-four percent of the individuals in the survey who reported being detained because of their political activities also reported being tortured. And he goes through some of the heinous things they do to people when they are being tortured.
What do you think you might be able to do, and what could be done to try to mitigate these abuses? Is there any hope, you think, of getting the ICRC into some of these prisons? What can we do to impress upon the Chinese authorities that this is absolutely uncivilized and unacceptable behavior?
Mr. CRAIG. I am familiar with Dr. Keller's studies and they are very disquieting and troubling, and I share your concern about it. It is not in any way reassuring to know that political prisoners are treated just as badly as other prisoners. The existence of torture in any circumstance is totally unacceptable by every human rights standard and international legal standard that could be possibly identified here today.
I do know that the policy of the Government of the United States is to support the ICRC's activities and access to the prisons in China and in Tibet. That will clearly be a topic that will be discussed in the course of my work.
Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that.
Without objection, even though it is part of our Subcommittee's official record, I would like to make the testimony of Dr. Alan Keller part of this record, so I will be giving this to you a little bit later.
[Dr. Keller's statement appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. I think it is very important that this get widespread coverage and be read by as many people as possible because it is so incredibly disturbing.
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Your statement indicates that you will not be officially developing ties with the Government in Exile, but will you be meeting with their representatives?
Mr. CRAIG. Yes, sir. I have met.
Mr. SMITH. Have you met with the special envoy to His Holiness the Dalai Lama?
Mr. CRAIG. In Washington, DC, yes, I have, sir.
Mr. SMITH. Why do you believe Beijing asks for impossible conditions before they begin negotiations? Why is the bar so high, in your view?
Mr. CRAIG. I will not speculate at this point, because to speculate would diminish my chances of success. And to be quite honest with you, Congressman, the Government of the United States has not been on top of or between or a participant in the communications between the Dalai Lama and the Government of China, so we are not in a position, really, I think, to opine on that question.
This is something that I myself am going to spend a good deal of time finding out about. So when we continue our conversations, I will give you my view of what the state of play is and what the intentions are of the Chinese. I am hopeful that they want to resolve this. And as I said in my testimony, from the appearances on the substance, it seems likely that at least in content the negotiating positions are not that far apart and can be bridged.
But I am speaking without personal experience here, and I would like to wait before giving you my opinion until I have had a little of my own personal experience.
Mr. SMITH. OK. When the speaker and all of us met with President Jiang Zemin last week, the invitation was issued, matter of fact it was done before the meeting that we had——
Mr. CRAIG. I heard.
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Mr. SMITH [continuing]. When he was just meeting with the two Democrat and two Republican leaders in the House. He invited the Speaker to lead a delegation to Tibet. And the Speaker, in what I thought was an extraordinarily brilliant statement, combining all the human rights issues, as he was closing that breakfast, said to the President and his delegation, when I step off the plane I would very much like to meet with you and the Dalai Lama in Tibet.
What do you think the prospects are for something that democratic? I will never forget when Ronald Reagan said ''Tear down the wall''. People laughed all over this Capitol because it seemed impossible that the Berlin Wall would ever, ever be deconstructed. Certainly, the trip would have considerable merit, especially if many of us on both sides of the aisle who are always involved in human rights issues go and try to get into the prisons. There could be some real value. But what do you think of the trip and what do you think of the Speaker's statement?
Mr. CRAIG. I am not laughing at the Speaker's comments. I take it very seriously, and I will work very hard with him to make it happen. I think that would be a terrific objective and I think it is useful for him to travel there.
Mr. SMITH. Let me ask, in meeting with the Government in Exile, is it likely those meetings will take place at the State Department or is that something that is done less formally at restaurants and things like that?
Mr. CRAIG. I should tell you in my first meeting I went to their offices and met their staff and had a good long discussion with them about the issue, beginning what I believe is going to be a long relationship.
My own view is that there should not be a whole lot of political meaning put into who I talk to and where I meet with them. That would be a mistake and it puts too much weight or freight on my activities. But I want to assure you, Congressman, that I will meet with whoever I can, if it, in my view, is to advance the success of this mission, wherever it is necessary to meet with them to advance the success of the mission.
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I care about the success, and I join the Speaker in expressing the desire that the Dalai Lama and the President of China will one day be able to have a conversation and work things out. The best location for that would be in Tibet itself.
Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, but Chairman Gilman is supposed to be on his way back, and we are checking to make sure before we release you.
For the time being, the Committee stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. I am sorry for the disruption. We have had a series of votes on. I think we will have about an hour now uninterrupted.
I know that in my absence they were asking you a number of other questions, and we will allow you to be winding up your testimony in just a moment.
Do you have any plan for inviting His Holiness the Dalai Lama to come here to confer with any of our officials?
Mr. CRAIG. Not at the moment. But all options are open, and that would be something that would certainly be something I would consider.
And in your absence, may I say, Mr. Chairman, I have had a very useful seminar here with Mr. Luttwak on how to negotiate with the Chinese.
Chairman GILMAN. Good. We are going to be hearing from Mr. Luttwak very shortly. I am glad you found this to be beneficial.
We are joined now by Congresswoman Pat Danner, and I am going to ask if she has any questions before we wind up. This is Mr. Craig, who is the new Special Coordinator for Taiwan.
Mr. CRAIG. Tibet.
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Chairman GILMAN. Tibet, I am sorry. That was a Freudian slip.
Ms. DANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do not have any, and in order to clear up my conversation with you earlier, when I said I was in a meeting across the hall and that I had some questions to ask, our Chairman did not make the second vote so we have recessed for 15 minutes. So I am over here for 15 minutes before I have to go back across the hall.
Chairman GILMAN. If you have any opening comments you may want to make about Tibet, you are welcome to do so before we move to the next panel.
Ms. DANNER. I am perfectly willing to go to the next panel, but thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Again, Ambassador Craig, if you would tell us when you are planning to go to Tibet or to Dharamsala, we would welcome your meeting with us after you return to give us the latest of your thinking. We have tried to do that with a number of our officials, as you know, when they come back from their overseas visit to get the benefit of their thinking. So we look forward to that.
Again, we wish you success in all of your new endeavors. We look forward to joining with you in Tibet as we welcome the Dalai Lama back to his headquarters. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. We will now move on to our second panel, panel No. 2, and I thank the panelists for coming.
Panel No. 2 is Lodi Gyari, President of the International Campaign for Tibet; Mr. Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Elliot Sperling, Professor of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington.
If our panelists would kindly take their chairs we will proceed. Our first witness on this second panel is Mr. Lodi Gyari. Mr. Gyari escaped from Tibet in 1959 and has since served in several high-ranking positions within the Tibetan Government in Exile. He currently serves as a Cabinet adviser and special envoy for His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the United Nations in Washington, as well as President of the International Campaign for Tibet.
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We look to Mr. Gyari as sort of an unofficial Secretary of State for Tibet and we welcome all of his meetings with us and keeping us apprised of what is happening, and I want to thank Mr. Gyari for arranging our recent trip to Dharamsala, where we had an opportunity once again to confer with His Holiness.
Mr. Gyari, you may put in your full statement or summarize, whichever you deem appropriate.
Lodi Gyari.
STATEMENT OF LODI GYARI, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET
Mr. GYARI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again it is a great honor for me to testify before your Committee. I will submit my text for the record and I will make brief remarks.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, we will receive your full report for the record.
Mr. GYARI. Thank you, sir. I feel that this hearing that you have called is timely and most appropriate for a number of reasons, but particularly because of the recent State visit by President Jiang Zemin to the United States, and the fact that the Secretary of State has appointed a Special Coordinator for Tibet.
I want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and other Members of your Committee, as well as your counterparts in the Senate, for making this possible. I also want to, at the same time, express our gratitude to the Administration for working with you because, in the past, I feel not only with regard to Tibet, but on a number of China-related issues, the Administration has failed to work closely with Congress and thereby has sent the wrong message to Beijing, which I think has done no service to the interest of your great Nation.
So I think this appointment of the Special Coordinator, though it is not exactly as you and your other colleagues in the Senate desired, I think it definitely is a clear indication on the part of the new Secretary of State of her interest in working with Congress, and I think this is a very good beginning.
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I was also very happy to listen to the remarks by the Coordinator for Tibet. Obviously, there were some issues that he raised where I had reservations, but again I feel that I will have an opportunity to discuss those reservations with him separately and also with you, Mr. Chairman, maybe separately. Because I do believe that the task that has been given to him is not an easy task.
But I was very pleased to hear of his personal commitment and I was also very happy about his statement which clearly indicates that he will have the full backing of the Secretary of State and that of the Department of State, which I think is very important.
However, I think it is very important, and I had this opportunity to convey to the Special Coordinator when I met with him separately, that while I do appreciate his need to be careful so as not to jeopardize his opportunities to work with the Chinese, at the same time I think it is very important that he be very strong, very candid and very clear from the very beginning. Again, we certainly do not want to send the wrong messages.
In that regard, I want to make two observations. One is the observation that this Special Coordinator made with regard to the position of the U.S. Government on the legal status of Tibet. Again, I do not wish to take much of your time on that matter, because there are obviously different views. However, as I have said many times in the past, I strongly disagree with the observation that has been made this morning.
The position of the U.S. Government with regard to the legal status of Tibet is not as stated this morning. But then again, I do not hold Mr. Craig alone responsible because I have heard this from his other colleagues in the past at the various committees that we testified before together.
The U.S. position on Tibet has been, I think, sometimes ambiguous, but certainly not as stated this morning. The fact is that it is clearly on the record that several times the U.S. Government, even through its ambassadors in the early 1950's, have made strong efforts in urging His Holiness the Dalai Lama to refute the 17-Point Agreement that we were forced to sign by the Chinese Government, and had very strongly urged His Holiness the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. All this clearly indicates, unless they were using us as a pawn in the cold war, clearly indicates, I think, the U.S. Government at times had a different position.
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However, again, as I said, Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to take up your time, nor do I wish to start my relation with the new Coordinator by talking about the history of Tibet. I think what is important for all of us is to look forward. And, in fact, one of the reasons why there has not been any progress in regard to negotiations with the Chinese is that the Chinese Government is always looking back. They are not looking forward. On the other hand, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has always been looking forward.
Because what is important for us is the future. We do not want to live in the past. Looking at the past, we bring more problems. For example, ask any Tibetan. If we were forced to look back to what had happened in the recent past, it would be even harder for us to negotiate with the Chinese. There is not a single Tibetan who has not been tortured, or suffered at least. Myself, I have stated many times in the past, I have lost several members of my own family, including two of my brothers, as a result of the Chinese occupation.
So even when I went to Beijing in the early 1980's, I have always said to my friends, let us not talk about the past. The past only brings bitterness. So I think it is very important we look to the future.
With regard to the future, I have full agreement with the statement that has been expressed this morning by the Special Coordinator. It is very clear, and I want to really assure you once again, that His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, is clearly committed, as he had personally told you, Mr. Chairman, when you visited Dharamsala, that he is fully committed, in spite of not receiving any positive response from the Chinese Government to his middle-way approach, where His Holiness is willing to meet with the Chinese leaders any time, anywhere—any time, anywhere—to start negotiations without the issue of independence being on the agenda.
However, as I have stated in my written statement, this does not mean that His Holiness is willing to forego or to state that Tibet has always been part of China. He had told you, I know many times, that particularly as a Buddhist monk he cannot tell a lie, and you cannot alter history. The fact is Tibet has not been a part of China. It had been a separate nation.
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And there was another point I wanted to briefly remark on. Again, I hope to be able to discuss this with the Special Coordinator. I do hope that with his appointment there will be also symbolic change in the way the State Department deals with the leaders of the Tibetan Government in Exile. The very fact that you have a Special Coordinator specifically designated as Coordinator for Tibetan issues, I think it would be quite ridiculous to continue to carry on the same style of the meetings. I think that would only minimize them.
At the same time, we have also made it very clear many times that we will not in any way misrepresent the appointment of the Special Coordinator as an indication of the U.S. Government's acceding to nationhood of the Exiled Government. That has not been our intention, and I know I have had an opportunity to discuss with you many times in the past several years when you were working on the legislation to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet, that that was not for the purpose of seeking recognition of the Exiled Government, but specifically to help with the negotiations with the Chinese Government.
Another important point which I had an opportunity to mention to the new Coordinator, is that whatever solution is worked out must include all of Tibet. All the Tibetan people. It should not be confined to what is the so-called Tibetan autonomous region, which in terms of population, in size, is less than half of what Tibet is.
And in that regard, again, I would like to be given permission, Mr. Chairman, to mention also that there is wonderful research being done by two independent people who have spent months in the various parts of Tibet, particularly in the eastern parts of Tibet, Mr. Steven Marshall, who is, in fact here, and Dr. Susette Cooke. This information, if it was printed out would be 2,000 pages. But very soon we will be able to provide it to you because they have printed this on a compact disc (CD). I think their work is very important because it explains what exactly Tibet is.
Because quite often I think people seem to misunderstand. I remember very well, for example, President Carter, when he met with His Holiness some years back, thought His Holiness was making a territorial claim on China that he was claiming the China provinces of Qinghai, large parts of Gansu and Sichuan. That is not true. Tibet is exactly what China considers as Tibet. All the areas, in fact about 90 percent of the areas we consider are Tibet are also defined by China themselves as either Tibet an autonomous region or areas or prefectures or counties.
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So it is something that the Chinese themselves in their constitution and in their administrative and political setup have also clearly defined and set up as being part of Tibet. So this is a very important point which I have mentioned to the State Department, and which I would also like to fully state here, as His Holiness also has stated in the past many times, to share his thoughts on this matter.
And finally, I was disappointed, of course, with the visit of President Jiang Zemin. I thought he would take the historic opportunity offered to him not only with regard to Tibet, but a number of other issues, such as human rights, to make a departure from the status quo. That was a disappointment.
But I think he went back a far wiser person. This time I think he came out of the closet, where he was given a totally distorted view of American ideals, I think, by the corporate leaders and by some very high paid lobbyists who go there and tell Chinese leaders what they want to hear. This time I think he came here and was able to see America is still a Nation that truly cares for the principles that the Nation was founded on. So I do hope President Jiang went back a far wiser person and with added credibility. This, of course, is obviously to be seen in the next several weeks.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I think I will close my remarks. But once again, I want to emphasize His Holiness the Dalai Lama is clearly and is firmly committed to finding a negotiated settlement. He is not insisting on the issues of independence to be on the agenda. This is a very brave position His Holiness took. It is not a very popular position.
There are a large number of Tibetans, as well as Tibetan friends, who feels His Holiness has made too much of a concession, but it is precisely for those reasons many of us respect him. I think a leader is someone who is willing to be take unpopular positions with farsightedness.
I also want to state clearly that sometimes people tend to think that His Holiness has formulated, as a last resort, a proposal because he felt so hopeless. That is not true. In fact, I think this is a proposal, if you look carefully, of a farsighted leader. And he proposes that because he genuinely believes that it is in the best interest of his people as well as that of the Chinese people and the whole region.
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I want to make it very, very clear, because quite often China has acted suspect, and I do not blame them, I think it is the system which has bred them that makes them very untrustful, but I want to assure you that there is no hidden agenda. His Holiness is very committed and there is absolutely no hidden agenda.
And finally, again, with the very eminent person with us, Mr. Luttwak, whose expertise is obviously on the issue of strategy, I wanted to, with his permission, remind him of a matter which he spoke of sometime last year about central Asia, with which I agree, and I have had the opportunity to share with you previously, and that is that the United States should not look at Tibet as purely an issue of human rights, but also an issue of strategic importance.
With the demise of the former Soviet Union, with the recognition of so many newly independent sovereign States, central Asia, as an entity, has once again emerged. So, therefore, unless we solve the Tibet issue, there is a tremendous possibility of instability in that region, which I do not think is in the best interest for anyone, particularly not in the Chinese interest.
So I think they will take the opportunity to reach out to His Holiness and not to look at His Holiness as a problem, which I think sometimes Chinese leaders do, but look to him as a solution. And it seems that a few Chinese leaders are beginning to look at that, and I am encouraged.
On the whole, Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic. There is a saying in Tibet that we are betrayed by our optimism, and the Chinese are betrayed by being too suspicious. But I think it is our optimism that has kept this issue alive. After more than 3 decades, the issue is very much alive, and largely, of course, it is also due to the tremendous support we have received from people such as yourself and your colleagues. Once again I want to express our gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, and the U.S. Congress for keeping this issue alive. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gyari appears in the appendix.]
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gyari, for your statement. I know you have an important appointment, so I will ask that we deviate from waiting for the whole panel to testify by addressing questions to Mr. Gyari at this time.
Mr. Gyari, are there any negotiations under way at the present time between Tibet and the People's Republic of China?
Mr. GYARI. No, Mr. Chairman. There have been, as I mentioned in my statement, some low-level approaches by the Chinese in recent months, but they follow a pattern; every time there is the Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva or every time His Holiness makes an important visit, such as his visit to Taiwan. So there have been some low-level contacts, but those are done more as PR so that the Chinese leaders can tell you and others, oh, we are in touch with the Tibetans. We met with them.
There have been no serious efforts on their part in negotiations with us.
Chairman GILMAN. Have you made a request of the People's Republic for any meeting of the road?
Mr. GYARI. Mr. Chairman, I think almost on a daily basis, through every channel that is available to us. We take this very seriously, as you know yourself when you went to Dharamsala, His Holiness did ask you. Through Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, any businessperson, any person who has any relation with the Chinese or with government or otherwise, we have been making a tremendous effort, and we will continue to make those efforts.
Chairman GILMAN. Will you, once again, spell out what His Holiness is saying to the Chinese with regard to independence and autonomy, just so we underscore it?
Mr. GYARI. His Holiness has categorically and expressly told the Chinese over and over again, and as recently as a month and a half back, he also had an opportunity to write to President Jiang Zemin through a mutual friend, that he is committed to finding a solution without the issue of independence being on the agenda; that he is willing to, if the Chinese are willing to give the Tibetan people the possibility of self-rule, that he will not insist on Tibet being a separate nation; that Tibet is willing to continue to be part of one nation.
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This is all semantics we can work out. Not necessarily part of China, because the whole idea is to be a part of one nation. The Chinese always say that China is a nation consisting of different nationalities. Hopefully, not a nation that is ruled as right now by the Chinese.
Chairman GILMAN. Tibet today is considered, in Tibetan viewpoint, as a colonial possession of China.
Mr. GYARI. Absolutely, sir. I think in Tibet, anyone who looks up in the dictionary to define what is colonization, you have the living example in Tibet today. In fact, the policies of the Chinese Government in Tibet today are also very much that of the colonial revolution period. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Has Tibet ever suggested an independent arbitrator or third party to negotiate?
Mr. GYARI. No, sir. Our policy has so far been that ultimately it should be a relationship between the Chinese and the Tibetans themselves. However, since 1985, when we failed to convince China or make them seriously negotiate with us, as you know, we have been approaching the world leaders, such as the Congress of the United States, the U.S. Government, many other Western nations, to help officiate such a meeting.
In fact, His Holiness always says there is one accusation that the Chinese make of His Holiness that he is willing to confess that he has done; it is the internationalization of the issue of Tibet. But he says he did not do it out of a desire to humiliate the Chinese. He was compelled to do this because of China's lack of any positive response.
Chairman GILMAN. Just one other question. How many Tibetans are now living in India as refugees?
Mr. GYARI. Mr. Chairman, I think all together outside of Tibet, I think we are roughly about 150,000. The vast majority of them in India, a fairly large number, unofficially maybe as much as about 20,000 in Nepal.
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As you know, because of the recent political crackdown in Tibet, the number of refugees from Tibet has increased manyfold. Nepal is the transit country, and then some in Bhutan, a few thousand in Europe. And because of the generosity of Congress, one-time legislation many of you supported, we have also in this country, I think, nearly about 4,000 Tibetans scattered throughout the 50 States of the United States.
Chairman GILMAN. And what is the population of Tibet today?
Mr. GYARI. We believe there are roughly about 6 million Tibetans. The Chinese disagree with that figure. They feel it is slightly more than $4 million.
The Chinese have classified some of the people who are ethnically pure Tibetan as different nationalities, because I think they want to divide and rule. That could be one reason I think our numbers differ.
Again, to go back to what I said earlier, our problem is not about how many Tibetans. If they count all the Tibetans who consider themselves as Tibetans, whether it is 6 million or 5 million, that is not our problem. But any solution we find for the Government of Tibet must benefit all the Tibetans; anyone who considers themselves as a Tibetan.
Chairman GILMAN. How many Tibetans are political prisoners in the People's Republic of China?
Mr. GYARI. Again, sir, it is very difficult, as you know, in a government such as China, to find exact figures. But we do know there are several thousand political prisoners in the so-called Tibetan autonomous region alone. And there are, we know, a good number of people in the other parts of Tibet. So it is very difficult but, obviously, a very sad thing that we certainly rank as No. 1 with regard to the number of prisoners in all of China.
Chairman GILMAN. I will now yield to some of our colleagues.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. In the interest of time, I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman.
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How many Chinese have moved into Tibet at this point in time? What are your estimates there?
Mr. GYARI. Again, Congressman, it is very difficult to be precisely correct, but we know that there are more than 7 million Chinese in the whole of Tibet. So, therefore, speaking of the whole of Tibet, we have suddenly become a minority.
Fortunately, there are still large areas, especially in remote areas, that are still predominantly inhabited by Tibetans. But most of the big cities are now, such as Lhasa, our capital, which is the center of our culture, and Shigatse has become a big Chinese town like any other. You will see if you go to Lhasa, except the Potala Palace, it is like any other Chinese city in the heartland of China.
Mr. CHABOT. How much intermarriage, for example, is going on between the two cultures?
Mr. GYARI. Not so much, in my view. Not so much. There was in the 1960's an official policy of almost encouraging it. In fact, children of mixed marriages are called united nationality, something like that, so, therefore, one is given some kind of honor to encourage that. But that did not work, and so there is some, but not so much.
Mr. CHABOT. Have they enforced the one-child policy that has been under such deserved attack, I believe, from many folks? Are they enforcing that in Tibet as well?
Mr. GYARI. Well, one of China's laws for so-called minorities is that it is supposed to be exempted. They are supposed to be allowed to have more than one child. But from testimony of many refugees who come from many parts of Tibet, they have been very harsh in implementing these, even though their rule says that Tibetans, like any other so-called minorities, are allowed to have more than one child. I think they are supposed to be able to have two children.
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Mr. CHABOT. And finally, in positions of authority, judges, police officers, teachers, things of that nature, are those mostly Chinese occupying those positions or are they also Tibetans, or what is the status there?
Mr. GYARI. Well, there are some Tibetans, but all of the positions of importance, all the positions that really wield any power, are had by the Chinese. Particularly in the last couple of years, under the new Party Secretary in Tibet, there has been a new policy where, even right down to smaller than counties, right down to prefectures, every one must be clearly a Chinese. Positions that are of importance are in the hands of Chinese. There are some Tibetans, yes, occupying some positions.
Mr. CHABOT. In the interest of time, I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Can you describe the refugees in India and what the Indian Government has done to accommodate them?
Mr. GYARI. The Indian Government has been generous and we are very grateful. India, as you know, is not necessarily a rich country, but they have been a wonderful host and we have been there for a very long time. They continue to be very generous and very kind, and we have been able, as a matter of fact, to reestablish most of our institutions in India. The true Tibetan culture resides not in Tibet, unfortunately, but in India. So we are very grateful.
Obviously, we are not satisfied with the political stand of the Indian Government, but, on the other hand, since other powerful nations, such as the United States, fail to take up a strong political stand against China, I think one should be more accommodating. But we certainly do hope that India will be more strong with regard to its political position on Tibet.
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But they have been wonderful hosts. They have given us every opportunity to set up our own schools, which is very important, so that we have a generation of young Tibetans who are able to gain an opportunity to go back and make a contribution in rebuilding their nation.
Mr. SHERMAN. In the interest of time, I will yield back.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gyari, thank you so much for your testimony. I have a question that might help us on a vote to happen today. The vote is on a bill which we have concerning China. It deals with leaders of religious associations in China, such as the Chinese Buddhist Association.
The bill specifies that such leaders may not come to the United States with a Federal Government subsidy. The original draft of the bill prohibited them entirely. It was amended to say that they may not come at the U.S. taxpayers' expense.
My concern stems from your comment about Jiang Zemin's visit, and I read your testimony again. You believe that he was wisened.
Mr. GYARI. Wisened, yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL [continuing]. In the depth of devotion held by the American people, that he learned something from coming to the United States.
If you wish, and if you do not, that is perfectly all right, but if you wish, I would like your advice on whether it is wise, helpful, for the United States to have a policy against the U.S. Information Agency, USAID, or any other agency of our government supporting a visit to the United States by religious leaders in China, such as the head of the Chinese Buddhist Association.
And my point of view would be it might be helpful if they had the same wisening experience that Jiang Zemin had. But that may not be your point of view, I do not mean to suggest, and I am happy to hear your response.
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Mr. GYARI. Congressman Campbell, I am familiar with the bill to which you refer.
I have discussed it with some of my colleagues. On the one hand, I absolutely agree with those who are in favor of imposing this restriction. Most of the official religious organizations, like the Chinese Buddhist Association, are all handpicked by the Chinese Government; all report directly to the Department of United Front, a party organization that controls all activities outside of the party. And if they were able to come to the United States, unfortunately, they would only be permitted to say what they have been told to say. So, therefore, I, at one stage, feel it would be improper, particularly to spend American taxpayers' money to facilitate such a visit.
Also, you must understand that I would not say everyone, but a large number of those people who occupy such a position are not truly religious leaders. They are, in fact, people who have done more disservice to their respective church or to their respective religious organizations by collaborating with the Communists. And if you look back, many of them will have a history of having denounced their colleagues, having been a puppet in the hands of the Communists. So, therefore, I feel that it is at least improper that hard-working American taxpayer money should go into providing such trips, which too many of them, to be very frank, many of them would misuse. I do not think they would have an opportunity to learn. If I can say so, they would have a great time to visit this wonderful Nation of yours, which I think many people in the world want to visit.
However, at the same time, I do agree that direction is very important, vitally important. So, therefore, unlike many other human rights organizations, the International Campaign for Tibet, the organization that I head, as well as in my personal capacity, we have very strongly endorsed the President Jiang Zemin State visit, not only this time, as a matter of fact last year, when he wanted to come, when President Clinton was reluctant to receive him, for political reasons.
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Even at that stage I told people at the White House that we would not oppose it because we do believe that the only way that, for example, with regard to Tibet, the U.S. Government can help is that if you have a relationship with the Chinese Government. If you do not have a relationship, obviously, there is no way you can influence them.
So I am afraid I have not been able to give you a very clear answer, but I am giving you a very candid answer. So I am torn between whether to be in favor or against, as many people are, I am sure. But if I had to take a position, I would probably at this time say, Congressman Campbell, that I would not be in favor of providing taxpayers' money to provide such trips. There would be some advantage, but I think we are giving opportunity to people who really do not deserve that.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Gyari, we thank you for your time, your being with us, your patience, and for your leadership. And we wish you safe trips.
Mr. GYARI. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. I am sorry to leave, but I have an appointment in New York that I have to make. So I want to catch my shuttle flight.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Gyari, you have the disks available that you mentioned?
Mr. GYARI. Yes. So whenever your staff can get them, it is the product of two independent researchers, but we will have extra copies in the next few days.
Chairman GILMAN. If you will get copies and give them to my staff member, Paul Berkowitz, he will try to distribute it to our Committee.
Mr. GYARI. I will certainly do that, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. And now we turn to the rest of our panel No. 2. Our final witnesses include Mr. Luttwak and Dr. Elliot Sperling.
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Mr. Luttwak has served as a consultant to the National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department, as well as several allied governments. He has taught at Johns Hopkins University and has been an invited lecturer worldwide.
We look forward to your testimony, Mr. Luttwak. You may put in your whole statement or summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD LUTTWAK, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. LUTTWAK. Thank you very much. I, of course, am honored to appear before this Committee and, obviously, for citizens like myself, it is the spectacle of our elected representatives occupying themselves in matters in which there is no lobbying involved, in which there are no material motives that uphold respect for Congress.
First of all, I think we all agree that the end station of the Tibet problem is the same as the end station of the China problem, in the sense that when China will become a tranquil and prosperous country, it will also be a country in which relations with the Tibetans will have been put on a basis of amity and mutual respect.
There is no possibility of China reaching a position of tranquility and prosperity unless the Tibetan issue has been resolved in a manner that allows the Tibetans to have feelings of friendship for the Chinese Government. Worldwide, we have many examples of regions which interact with separate nationalities; wherever there is tension and conflict, there is no progress, no real advancement.
In the United States we are now conducting a debate between those who favor engagement with China at any cost, and those who favor the affirmation of U.S. values, sometimes by challenging the Chinese Government, even using pressure against it. This is exactly the same debate we had in regard to the Soviet Union; it is the usual debate of American foreign policy. What is unusual this time is the very large role of lobbying and manipulation by interests which are purely commercial.
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In the parallel, debate we had about the Soviet Union, the two sides were not divided by material interests. Some business lobbies for China operate in the clear light of day (on our local radio stations, we hear advertising for the Bank of China); others prefer to act behind the scenes.
The worldwide trend in which the Tibetan issue arises is the affirmation of independence by ethnic, cultural and regional groups. The worldwide trend is that people no longer want to belong to the most powerful and largest possible political entity. Instead they want to belong to political entities that will respond to their own needs including cultural needs.
The Tibetan issue, therefore, is one of very many in the world in which local patriotism is increasing as a force, while big-State nationalism is declining. Nationalism, in the sense of an attachment to political entities which may be empires, is declining; patriotism, which is an attachment to a real human community, is increasing.
It is unfortunate that the Chinese authorities in recent years have specifically encouraged a rather nasty form of nationalism. Nationalism is not love of people, love of country, but rather hostility toward others. This is unfortunate for them because nationalism is a horse that will not ride in present circumstances, as we saw with Soviet nationalism.
The Chinese Government is of course free to make political errors. It has been estimated that at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, around the year 1800, the GNP per capita in China was the same, more or less, as in Western Europe. Between 1800 and 1980 a very long period of almost 200 years, political errors by the successive rulers of China brought about a series of catastrophes that condemned many generations of Chinese to acute sufferings, and economic stagnation.
China cannot deviate from the world trend without consequences. In a world in which Scotland has just peacefully received its parliamentary autonomy; in which northern Somalia separates in violence; in which Czechoslovakia separates into two nations; in which in many other places local, ethnic and cultural identities are being affirmed, peacefully where possible, violently where not, China cannot deviate from this world trend, without paying a stiff price.
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The appointment of a Tibet Coordinator by the U.S. Government should not, therefore, be interpreted as a way of making trouble for China or create difficulties for it, but rather as an effort to avoid collisions, and facilitate a process whose end point would be a tranquil and prosperous China, with amicable relations with the Tibetan people.
At the present moment, for example, the relations between the central Government of Spain and Catalonia are perfectly amicable. Catalonia has received as much autonomy as it wished and relations between the two are now defined by the fact that the Catalonians themselves want to retain many links with Madrid. Because linkages with Madrid reflect Catalonian interests and priorities, there is a situation of tranquility and cooperation which is obviously crucial for the continued prosperity of Spain.
This is the model that stands before the Chinese; and then there are many examples of unsuccessful efforts to impose control by force, which always have terrible consequences.
The Chinese have a well-established operational method for dealing with other nations; it is not some mysterious oriental method, but rather a Soviet method. Today's Chinese Government is ''westernized'' but in a Soviet way.
If you negotiate with the Chinese, presenting a number of demands, specifying that some are not, in fact, sine quae non conditions, from the Chinese point of view, that means that you are being insincere. It means that there is somebody you are trying to satisfy verbally, by presenting demands that are not meant in earnest.
I come to negotiate and I ask for four things; three of them I say are make-or-break conditions but I make it clear that the fourth is not such a condition, a nice-to-have, but not make-or-break. From the Chinese point of view, that is proof of insincerity; it means that I do not really want that one thing. I am only asking for it because I am trying to please some constituency that is watching the negotiators.
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It follows that for the Chinese to make a concession on that specific point, the one I am not sincerely asking for, is to give me something I do not really want. And since I do not really want it, I will not reciprocate for it. So the Chinese never agree to such non sine quae non conditions.
When the United States takes positions with regard to Tibet, it is better not to mention them at all rather than to affirm positions which are not seriously meant, which are not made decisive conditions for, the outcome of negotiations.
A final point. Mr. Lodi Gyari referred to something I said about central Asia. The matter can be stated elaborately or it can be reduced to a very simple point. Tibet was of immediate and central military importance to China during the period when there was a military confrontation between China and India. Military conflict between China and India over Tibet is a nonsense in strategic and operational terms; it has been duly renounced by both sides.
The only reason why there was a conflict at all was because it was during a peculiar moment in international politics. India was a sort of proxy for the Soviet Union. It was not one of the great military conflicts of history, and the ease with which the Chinese and Indian Governments, despite a lot of sensitivities, were able to do away with the problem is very telling.
In the context of a China and an India that plainly do not wish to engage in any kind of conflict, I think that it is very advantageous for both and for everybody else to have a Tibet which is demilitarized, a Tibet which does not contain Chinese military forces. Those military forces are costly to China. It is extremely expensive to keep troops in Tibet and they yield nothing, because Tibet is not a strategic platform to deal with any security problems that China might have.
What the occupation of Tibet does do is to give an unwanted and counterproductive military dimension to the Chinese presence in central Asia, which harms Chinese dealings with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and so on. I fear that what we have here is actually a bureaucratic perversion: for the Chinese Army, Tibet is a big deal. That is where the soldiers are still important, whereas in the rest of China they are increasingly marginalized.
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I do see the possibility of a constructive and helpful U.S. engagement on Tibet. I think that a Tibet Coordinator can actually help the Chinese, help them manage their own internal dealings with the Army, parts of which are attached to the Tibet garrison which has totally lost its strategic importance.
Returning to my central point, I believe that the Chinese will consider any U.S. demands over Tibet as insincere, unless negotiating outcomes are conditional. It is therefore better not to ask for anything unless one is prepared to make it a sine quae non condition.
When the U.S. Government asked the Chinese Government to reduce the production of fake CDs, the U.S. Government was serious and immediately mentioned the sanctions that would be applied if those CD factories were not shut down. The result was positive.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Luttwak, if I might interrupt.
Mr. LUTTWAK. I am finished.
Chairman GILMAN. They are going to call us to the floor shortly, and I want to give Dr. Sperling an opportunity.
Thank you very much for your testimony. It is very comprehensive and you have given us some good thoughts about our negotiations. I just hope that some of our colleagues in the State Department will take a closer look at your testimony.
Mr. LUTTWAK. I am finished. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Our final witness this morning is Dr. Elliot Sperling.
Dr. Sperling is currently an associate professor of Tibetan studies at Indiana University at Bloomington, Indiana. He has written and published numerous papers on the subject of Tibet, and we look forward to your testimony, Dr. Sperling. You may summarize your testimony or you may put in the full statement, whichever you may deem appropriate.
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Mr. SPERLING. I think I will get in most of the full statement, speaking very quickly and very briefly.
STATEMENT OF ELLIOT SPERLING, PROFESSOR OF CENTRAL EURASIAN STUDIES, INDIANA UNIVERSITY AT BLOOMINGTON
Chairman GILMAN. All right, Dr. Sperling, please proceed.
Mr. SPERLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here both as a professor of Tibetan studies and also a member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad.
The historic perceptions that underlie modern Chinese policy can be set out very clearly. It is the position of the People's Republic of China that Tibet became an integral part of China in the 13th Century; that this sovereignty over Tibet was claimed by all subsequent dynastic rulers; and that inasmuch as China has consistently been a multinational State, the fact that two of the three dynasties involved in this rule were established by Mongols and Manchus has no bearing on the question of Chinese sovereignty.
With the collapse in 1911 of the last imperial dynasty, the Ming dynasty of Manchu rulers, Chinese claims were taken up by the Republic of China and in 1949 by the PRC, which was able to fully implement them. In May, 1951, following military clashes that left Tibet with no real defense, the central Government of China concluded an ''Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet'' with the Government of the Dalai Lama.
The basis for the view of Tibetan history which I have just described is not strong. While this is not the place for a discussion of the historical arguments that can be used to challenge it, I will simply note that this emotional and nationalistic perception of Tibet as a centuries-old ''integral part of China'' is used to introduce all official Chinese polemics and arguments about Tibet and its history, ancient and modern. It is the rationale behind this view more than claims of material progress and social liberation, which China does voice, that underpin China's assertions about its place in Tibet.
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Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China this emotional element has been significantly nourished by the ideological imperatives inherent in the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. The view derived from their ideas holds Tibet's integration into China to be part of the inevitable workings of history, as nations and peoples inexorably move together. This is, of course, an idea that is now rarely, if ever, overtly invoked or even seriously considered. It is sustained by inertia as much as anything else and as such has served to solidify a dogmatic attitude toward Tibet.
None of this meant to deny that Tibet also has a marked strategic significance for the PRC. It occupies a sensitive border area and thus, out of concern for stability, including stability in other areas of the PRC that are potentially restive, the Chinese Government has clearly felt a need to integrate it as closely as possible with the rest of the country. To that end Chinese migration into the area is significant in the development of an economy, albeit a Chinese-dominated one, that binds Tibet ever closer to China. Be that as it may, in stating its case, China has never based its claim to sovereignty over Tibet on military or security concerns. It has been based on the historical argument.
The ideological considerations that I have described have exerted an influence on the situation that is sometimes poorly perceived. On several occasions the Tibetan Government in Exile has put forward propositions for a special status or condition for Tibetan areas within the PRC on the basis of the distinctive nationality of Tibetans. These have been rejected for reasons that can only be understood from an ideological perspective. For China the great cultural and national differences between Chinese and Tibetans cannot be a basis for special treatment within the PRC, since these distinctions are in theory defined as superficial, unlike the profound differences that China's ideological theorists recognize between the social and economic systems in the PRC proper and Hong Kong or between the systems in the PRC and on Taiwan, for that matter.
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Not surprisingly, the PRC rejects such propositions, including proposals to lump all Tibetans in the PRC into one large, Tibetan autonomous unit, since they are grounded in national concerns rather than in concern about differences in social and economic development. Within PRC thinking, the major contradictions between the social and economic systems in Tibet and in the PRC in general have long since been resolved, thus obviating the need for special arrangements along the lines of what is accorded Hong Kong. In essence then, the Tibetan question is settled as far as the PRC is concerned; it is simply a question of moving on. China would like to bring in amenable exile elements, but does not consider this essential and will do so only on its own terms. The perception that the PRC has been minimally forthcoming in offering creative solutions to the impasse that has developed between it and the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile is largely rooted in this stance.
Against this background, certain attitudes on the part of the Chinese Government have become clear over the last 2 or 3 years. In the spring of 1995, a conflict arose over the selection of the Panchen Lama, generally regarded as the second most important incarnate hierarchy within the Dalai Lama's sect after the Dalai Lama himself. As is by now well known, the Dalai Lama selected one child as the legitimate incarnation of the previous Panchen Lama who had died in 1989. The Chinese Government reacted vociferously and angrily, eliminating that child from consideration as Panchen Lama and severely punishing those in Tibet believed to have been in communication with the Dalai Lama on the matter.
These and subsequent Chinese actions point to a sense, on the part of the Chinese Government, that whatever the inconveniences that occur, the government is fully capable of forging ahead in Tibetan matters without the cooperation of the Dalai Lama. If the Dalai Lama wishes to cooperate and assume the ceremonial place that China is willing to grant him, well and good, otherwise it is of little consequence to China's policies that he is not on board.
This, as I note, seems to be the Chinese attitude. I would even say it has gone further. Chinese policy now seems to evince an assumption that the Dalai Lama can be written out of the picture with minimal inconvenience. The matter of the Panchen Lama appears to point to this. Traditionally, the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas have played important roles in recognizing each other. This is something that has traditionally been of great importance for the continuity of leadership in Tibet.
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In one fell swoop now the Chinese Government has negated the Dalai Lama's role in the selection of the current Panchen Lama—although it should also be noted that many, if not most, in Tibet clearly view the Dalai Lama's choice as the legitimate incarnation—and set the stage for the selection of the next Dalai Lama on terms it views as favorable. That is a selection carried out under the aegis of a Panchen Lama sanctioned by and aligned with the Chinese Government.
Given the impasse that has long existed in getting negotiations started between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile, there is good reason to suppose that China's policy has now come down to one of avoiding negotiations while waiting for the present Dalai Lama to pass from the scene.
If this is indeed the case, as seems most likely to me, it would put the conditions that China has placed in the way of talks with the Dalai Lama and his Exile Government in a different light. It is well known that the Dalai Lama has long since given up the position that Tibet should be independent and has asked for what he terms ''genuine autonomy''.
In the 1980's, he and members of his government stated on several occasions that if China was not forthcoming in dealing with him on the basis of this major concession he would have no choice but to reconsider and possibly withdraw it. Well, China remained unforthcoming but the Dalai Lama did not withdraw his concession. China has, in fact, pressed for a variety of statements or actions from the Dalai Lama and he has tried to project a willingness to accommodate these demands.
In large part, they relate to statements to the effect that Tibet is and has been for centuries an ''integral part'' of China. While he has refused to characterize Tibet as such during past history, he has reinforced his opposition to Tibetan independence, going so far as to term it a potential ''disaster''.
Still there has been no reciprocal move on the Chinese side. As such, the most likely scenario for the future would seem to be at this point a calculated lack of movement on the Chinese side, accompanied perhaps by continuing demands about what the Dalai Lama should say or do, with an underlying assumption it is better to wait until the Dalai Lama passes from the scene, after which China will be able to reshape the political situation in Tibet accordingly.
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China seems unconcerned about any pressing need to come to an accommodation with the Dalai Lama on any terms but its own and has been taking steps that it hopes will undercut his visibility and influence in Tibet. The effectiveness of such measures is, of course, doubtful, but they form part of a concerted strategy.
A new element has been added to the situation with the appointment of a Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues in the State Department. This appointment is a particularly pointed indication that Tibet should now receive a higher profile as a foreign policy concern of the Administration. This is significant, although it remains to be seen whether this Special Coordinator will be able to directly facilitate meaningful discussions between the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile and the PRC. In fact, if that alone is the immediate or short-term goal of this appointment, it is more likely than not there will be a good deal of disappointment. However, if the Special Coordinator is determined to act on a number of fronts to raise the profile of the Tibetan issue within U.S. foreign policy deliberations and in multilateral fora, there is room for significant work.
It is important for the Special Coordinator to bear in mind that a large part of the Tibetan issue as a foreign policy concern stems from the visible violation of human rights in Tibet in a number of contexts. This is not to deny that there has been a relative liberalization in many areas of Tibetan policy since the early 1980's. However, human rights violations in Tibet remain significant and affect international perceptions surrounding most other aspects of the issue.
Moreover, these violations are more often than not linked in one way or another to agitation for Tibetan independence, which remains the stated goal of most dissident activity. In this context, with increased focus on the Dalai Lama's renunciation of Tibetan independence, it would be lamentable if human rights considerations vis-a-vis Tibet came to be fragmented along the lines of concern for freedom for the expression of sentiments with which the Administration might agree while downplaying the violations of the right to free expression for sentiments with which the Administration is less sympathetic. The protection of fundamental human rights, including the right to express unpopular sentiments, is a necessary element in creating an atmosphere within which any dialog on the Tibetan issue can proceed.
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In setting the tone for U.S. concerns on Tibetan issues, the Special Coordinator should make it a priority to get an accounting of political prisoners in Tibet and to arrange for visits with them by acceptable third parties. He should significantly seek to meet with the young child recognized by the Dalai Lama as the incarnation of the Panchen Lama and who is now held under detention. A focus on this last case would also underscore U.S. concerns about religious freedom in Tibet.
It is a well-known fact that religion in Tibet often overlaps and intertwines with questions of national and cultural identity. This should not, however, cause us to lose sight of the fact that ultimately there are many instances in which freedom of religion is clearly at issue. The most clear-cut current instances include the continued detention of the child whom many Tibetans consider the legitimate Panchen Lama, as well as the ongoing campaign against displays of religious loyalty to the Dalai Lama and the political reeducation campaign in monasteries. The violations of fundamental human rights inherent in these campaigns make them appropriate concerns for the international community and for the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues.
In the same vein, it is important that efforts toward multilateral action be part of the Special Coordinator's mandate. In this respect, I must point out that the one place in which measured and appropriate action on Chinese policies in Tibet are surely called for is in the yearly meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Coordinator should act as early as possible in preparing for the meeting so as to have a suitable draft resolution that includes Tibetan issues at hand to circulate among other participants.
Well before the meeting, he should work to coordinate support for the resolution so as to avoid the sad fate of the 1997 resolution presented in Geneva, which China easily defeated. If we are unable to make our concerns count in Geneva, and after all we are talking here about human rights concerns, then we must really begin questioning important aspects of the process by which we press our advocacy of human rights.
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The appointment of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues should be a turning point for the projection of our concerns about rights violations in Tibet. In this way, it should also set the appropriate tone via which an atmosphere can develop that will be conducive to dialog. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Sperling, and I appreciate your rushing through your testimony.
Mr. SPERLING. I am a Hoosier by adoption, but I was born in New York, so I have perfected the fine art of speaking quickly.
Chairman GILMAN. I will address some questions and then will turn to any of our Members who may still be here.
Mr. Luttwak, you gave some special advice to the Special Coordinator on how the Coordinator should negotiate with the Chinese on the Tibetan issues.
Mr. LUTTWAK. Well, it is not particularly sophisticated, or original advice. There is a standard operational code which is followed by the Chinese in their negotiations.
Chairman GILMAN. You mentioned some of that before.
Mr. LUTTWAK. Yes. And Dr. Sperling has invoked, in fact, some of these aspects of that. The important point is that raising issues that one is not serious about is counterproductive.
Chairman GILMAN. So do you think we are doing that with regard to Tibet?
Mr. LUTTWAK. Yes, I think that in regard to human rights in general and Tibet in particular, there has been a tendency for members of the executive branch, from the President down, to raise issues with the Chinese with no firm determination to obtain results.
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On other issues, on trade dispute issues, our U.S. Trade Representative goes to the Chinese and says that we are not happy with this or that, invoking the sanctions that will be applied if U.S. demands are not met.
The Chinese respond in a very practical way. They either accept the sanction as a cost or they avoid it by doing what is required of them.
If there are no sanctions, no penalties involved for ignoring U.S. demands, from the Chinese point of view this means that the negotiator is not sincere (better not to raise Tibet issues if no penalties follow if U.S. requests are ignored). You do not mean it. You are only coming and raising the issue because you are trying to impress somebody back in the States that you promised to raise the issue to.
You are saying to the Chinese you do not mean it. You are not serious and, therefore, if they do do something for you, you will not, in fact, pay them back because you did not really want it. You only pretended to want it. And so they are not going to reciprocate.
This is a central and a very straightforward point which everybody has in government. Falsifying, then, in negotiations with the Chinese, the Chinese are now manufacturing, falsifying under their own nameplate, when the false American company failed to withdraw from China the way Peugeot withdrew from China, the Chinese conclusion was that they did not care and that they did not really mean it. And the result is, of course, there is no future for falsifying in China.
So I think it is a straightforward procedure. The negative side to it is do not raise things with them.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Luttwak.
Dr. Sperling, you just returned from Tibet. What do Tibetans think about us holding this proposal that China can control Tibet's foreign affairs in defense and Tibet could be part of China if it had some autonomy? Are they accepting that proposition?
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Mr. SPERLING. I should say I have been to Tibet a number of times. Most recently when I was in Tibet, I did not go to undertake, shall we say, a fact-finding mission. And what I can tell you about this, I can only tell you anecdotally.
I can also tell you, since you have a list of some of the things which I have written, that I did do a study of the polemics being produced in Lhasa by Tibetan dissidents, and the fact of the matter is that while there is great reverence for the Dalai Lama, I cannot say that I am aware of any great degree of acceptance of his proposal that Tibet remain a part of the People's Republic of China.
What people are asking for, what dissidents are asking for in Tibet is independence. Their leaflets talk about independence. When people talk in private, they talk about independence. They do not talk about special autonomy. The issue in Tibet for Tibetans is not one of getting better Chinese policies, it is basically a nationalist issue.
I think we have to be aware of that. We might not like it. My colleague is saying I should say ''patriotic''. Whatever term we use, I would not want what they are saying to be misrepresented, since basically they are talking about a Tibet that is not a part of China. That is the rhetoric that they use.
Chairman GILMAN. If Beijing were to accept the Dalai Lama's proposal that Tibet would join with China and China could handle Tibet's foreign affairs and defense, what do you think the response would be among the Tibetan people?
Mr. SPERLING. That is an interesting question, because that would not be the first time that something like that has been done. You know, the 17-point agreement that was signed in 1951 between the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile and the People's Republic of China essentially allowed for a wide degree of autonomy, as it were, within the area that the Chinese term the Tibet autonomous region.
It was not an autonomous region at that time, and the government ultimately failed, and it failed largely on the basis of Tibetan sentiment. The Dalai Lama ultimately was swept along. For a very, very long period he tried to get that agreement to work.
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I think one is overly optimistic about the Dalai Lama's ability to sway sentiment in that sense. I think we have this Western perception that if the Dalai Lama says something, people automatically will go along with it. They have great reverence for him, and that has not diminished in Tibet. However, when they talk about their aspirations or their national aspirations, they simply ignore the statements that he has made, which would keep Tibet as a part of China.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Luttwak, what are your thoughts about that proposition?
Mr. LUTTWAK. Well, the history of China since the 18th century has been the history of political errors by Chinese rulers. The Han people were living at the same level as Europeans, but were brought down into poverty and weakness by their rulers. It would be perfectly characteristic for the authorities in Beijing to behave toward the Dalai Lama as if the Dalai Lama were their great enemy when, in fact, he is their potentially valuable ally.
The Dalai Lama takes a position that is far more moderate, as we have just heard from Professor Sperling, than the standard position of national leaders battling alien domination. Everybody wants independence nowadays in Tibet, too, naturally this sentiment reigns. Yet the Dalai Lama is willing to settle for autonomy for the sake of peace.
It is characteristic of the kind of error that Chinese political leaders have tended to make, even before communism, to mistake their friends for their enemies. They think that the Dalai Lama is their enemy, when, in fact, he is their friend.
Professor Sperling suggested that the Dalai Lama may have difficulty in gaining acceptance for his position, perhaps so. In the end the Chinese would be faced by less moderate people willing to use force.
Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Sperling, do you want to comment?
Mr. SPERLING. If I can comment in continuation of the question you asked about the Dalai Lama's proposals and all that. There are a number of aspects I see from China's perspective, which are often not clear when one treats them in isolation.
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For instance, the Dalai Lama says what he would like for Tibet is genuine autonomy. Now, imagine that China were to say, OK, yes, we will grant you genuine autonomy. That means that what they have been granting so far is fake autonomy. That has grave implications for the people in Xinjiang who say, well, they have genuine autonomy, why do we not have genuine autonomy.
There are a lot of aspects to this which the Chinese would find destabilizing. I am not defending this view, because I am certainly the last person to say that people should not determine their own political systems. But when the Dalai Lama does say that, he is really calling for—this is the implication, not his words—he is calling for a fundamental change in the nature of the State. There are aspects of that, naturally, which the Chinese would find unpalatable.
As I said in my testimony, I think there is a little game going on here, and I think in many ways China has decided to wait for the Dalai Lama to pass from the scene.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, I want to thank both of our panelists for their time, their patience and for their views. If you have any more comments you would like to submit to our Committee, we would certainly welcome them. It is certainly an issue we are going to be giving a lot of attention to in the days ahead.
With that said, I declare the Committee adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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