SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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47–503 CC
1998
ALGERIA'S TURMOIL
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FEBRUARY 5, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
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LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
Subcommittee on Africa
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EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
TOM CAMPBELL, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM SHEEHY, Staff Director
GREG SIMPKINS, Professional Staff Member
JODI CHRISTIANSEN, Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHANNON GAWRONSKI, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Mr. Robert E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
His Excellency Ramtane Lamamra, Ambassador, Embassy of Algeria
Ms. Mary Jane Deeb, Editor, The Middle East Journal
Mr. Eric Goldstein, Director of Research for the Middle East and North Africa, Human Rights Watch
APPENDIX
Mr. Robert E. Neumann
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Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra
Ms. Mary Jane Deeb
Mr. Eric Goldstein
Human Rights Watch 1978 World Report—Algeria excerpt
ALGERIA'S TURMOIL
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1998
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 1:50 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. ROYCE. [presiding] This hearing on the Africa Subcommittee will now come to order.
Since the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on December 30, there have been over 1,300 innocent Algerians, including women and children, who have been brutally murdered. Since 1992, there have been tens of thousands of Algerians who have lost their lives because of ruthless killers in Algeria. I know this hit home with many Americans who watched a recent ''60 Minutes'' segment showing graphic footage of Algeria's suffering.
The primary perpetrator of these atrocities is the radical Armed Islamic Group, or GIA. These radical Islamic insurgents, many who were trained, actually, in Afghanistan during the war there, call themselves ''Holy Warriors,'' and during holy periods like Ramadan, they believe that their actions are doubly blessed by God, and so these terrorists intensify their efforts.
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Now there are lists of crimes that the emirs of the GIA have spelled out. Those crimes include the pursuit of formal education by female children; women who do not wear a veil are committing a crime. The punishment for these crimes is having one's throat slit. Some of the emirs have come to the conclusion that anyone who does not support the GIA, should have their throat slit for opposing the intentions of the GIA. So the violence now really extends to any Algerian who fails to join with the GIA.
Combating this violent fanaticism has taxed the Algerian Government. And meanwhile, the Algerian Government has been sharply criticized by some for its inability to prevent these terrorist attacks. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that the government turns a blind eye to the attacks, with several theories to explain this.
The attacks come in the dead of night; some gendarmes have been ambushed when responding to the attacks. Some question whether the Algerian conscripted troops will venture out of their barracks at night in order to protect village populations.
Because of these suspicions and the shear scale of the killings, pressure has been building on the Algerian Government to allow international observers to investigate the massacres. In mid-January, the European Union was permitted to send a delegation of junior ministers to Algeria, but the dialog was limited. Moreover, the Algerian Government has rejected offers of international relief aid for victims of violence. The Subcommittee looks forward to Algerian Ambassador Lamamra's discussion of these concerns.
Much of this crisis in Algeria can be traced to the annulled 1992 elections. An attempt at political reform by then-President Bendjedid included the legalization of opposition political parties. One of the parties, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), wanted a State governed according to Islamic law. They were on the brink of a parliamentary victory in January 1992, when the military forced the President's resignation and annulled the election.
The banned FIS has since been eclipsed by the GIA, a terrorist group that neither the FIS nor the government can control. Despite this setback, Algeria now has held elections in 1995 and 1997, and is making strides toward building democracy, even with the random violence that is bleeding the country.
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Today's hearing is intended to examine the current crisis in Algeria. By calling together U.S. and Algerian Government officials, a journalist and a human rights expert, we hope to gain a better view of the policy options available to the United States.
I would like to introduce several Members of the Subcommittee who are present, at this time, who will make opening statements. And the first is our Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Bob Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I applaud you for holding this hearing which I think has been due now for some time. It's rather pressing.
The situation in Algeria is like no other; the violence in Algeria surpasses violence elsewhere, in length, scope and brutality. Unarmed men, women and children have had their throats slashed, been thrown out of buildings, and burned alive. Since 1992, as many as 80,000 people have died and thousands of others have been injured.
Last month we witnessed a dramatic escalation in violence coinciding with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The death toll for January alone, as the Chairman pointed out, is estimated at 1,300 individuals. Sadly, this is the second Algerian civil war in 40 years, the first for Algeria's independence from France, and now for the political future of the State.
Violence has become an integral part of life in Algeria; it consumes the country and it has temporarily derailed the future of what should be a vibrant nation, politically and economically.
There is no question that the armed Islamic fundamentalist groups, like the GIA and the FIS, are directly responsible for these horrific attacks. Yet, the notably weak response from the Algerian Government, the absence of civilian protection, its refusal to allow relief assistance to reach the victims of violence, or the U.N. Special Rapporteur to conduct missions in the country, lends credibility to the argument that the more extreme elements within the government are exacerbating the violence for their own political purposes. I look forward to hearing the Ambassador's remarks on this matter.
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Reports proliferate of fundamentalist attacks on villages which have lasted for hours, but which have occurred within minutes of Algerian Government military posts without eliciting a response.
The United States and the international community have attempted to reach out to Algeria, to offer assistance and guidance, but to date they have been largely rebuked.
Algeria's efforts to handle this crisis internally have been at best ineffective, and at worst virtually nonexistent. Progress will require Algeria opening up to the world. This means allowing the United Nations and other bodies to look at what is happening inside Algeria, and undertaking reforms in the areas of freedom of the press and human rights, and possibly pursing the perpetrators through the International War Crimes Tribunal.
Since the fundamentalist are accountable to no one, the onus for action by necessity falls upon the Algerian Government. While the government may not be responsible for the violence which plagues Algeria, it is responsible for undertaking steps to lead the country toward reconciliation and ultimately peace. Only the government can start the process which will make 1998 the last year of bloodshed and the first year in many of stability, peace and economic prosperity to Algeria.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the witnesses. I want to welcome our Ambassador and look forward to his testimony as well as the rest of the witnesses who come forth.
Mr. ROYCE. And, may I ask Mr. Payne if he wants to make a statement at this time?
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me also commend you for calling this hearing at this very crucial time in the history of Algeria. I think it's at a very critical time. And I certainly applaud you for calling this hearing, and for the interest that the Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez, has shown in this very tragic situation. Let me say that nothing is more disappointing than to see Algeria engulfed again three decades after independence from France, in a savage war promoted by some of the same causes.
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The escalation of massacres, counter-violence retaliation, that occurred since August 29, 1997, by the Jihad, reached similar levels of brutality in 1957 by the National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the National Liberation Front.
After colonialism ended in 1962, the French did little to prepare Algeria for independence. It's common knowledge that the first armed Islamic groups were organized by veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and trained in Pakistan. Today the Jihad still receives weapons and money from outside sources which include Palestinian Islamists. In addition, I remain ambivalent about France's intentions in this whole matter.
While 1997 marked the first legislative and local elections since 1992, it also turned into the bloodiest war in a longstanding political strife for power. The desire to maintain Islamic dominance and to radically change the food and clothing habits of the people, was thwarted by most of the Algerian citizens in 1992. This explanation can be summed up by saying that democracy cannot benefit if those that desire it want to end it once they are in power.
As we seek to formulate U.S. policy, we must remember that Algeria has helped with Iran hostages in the crisis in 1982, continues to assist in the resettlement of refugees, and is presently helping with the Iraqi problem that we have today. In conclusion, we must not confuse the nonviolent Islamics with Islamic fundamentalists. I believe that in many of our western countries and indeed, here in the United States, we have a lack of understanding of the difference between radical, fanatical fundamentalists and what the basic religion teaches. And I think it's necessary that we understand that there is not necessarily contradictory goals of Islam as a religion and what we think is right for people in our democracies. I think we have to be careful with that.
And, so, as the bell rings, we also need to look at the causes that create radicals, and I think that this political war, to win at any cost, has alienated the very people for whose benefit the struggle was designed to help.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We've also been joined by Mr. Davis of Florida. And at this time, our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ronald E. Neumann, who served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1994 to 1997. Over a 25-year career, Ambassador Neumann has held many foreign service posts in the Middle East, and Ambassador, we welcome you here and look forward to your testimony. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF RONALD E. NEUMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Mr. NEUMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I'm honored to be invited to meet with you this afternoon to discuss the country where I was proud to represent the United States as ambassador for 3 years.
The news these days from Algeria is appalling. The world rightly reacts in shock and horror to the brutal massacres occurring on a daily basis. The United States vigorously condemns the atrocities being committed against innocent men, women, and children in Algeria. We extend our deepest sympathies to the victims of these crimes.
Our Ambassador to Algiers, Cameron Hume, recently visited the site of one of the massacres to express solidarity with the Algerian people and to reiterate our condemnation of terrorism. We call on all Algerians to denounce and stop the violence now.
We also call upon the Government of Algeria to do more to fulfill its duty to protect its citizens within the rule of law, and respect for human rights. We continue to believe that the Islamic extremist organization, the GIA, is responsible for the great majority of the atrocities. You will recall that in October 1997, we included this vicious group in our designation of foreign terrorist organizations. The government has a right to protect itself, and a duty to protect its citizens against this bloodthirsty group consistent with the rule of law. However, some security forces personnel may also be involved to some extent in some of the killings. This situation is complex, and as long as there continue to be differing accounts of what is going on, and many questions about why civilians are not better protected, the need for greater openness remains.
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Along with many in the international community, we have repeatedly asked the Algerian Government for more transparency, to let respected organizations conduct objective, factual studies into the massacres and other human rights concerns in Algeria.
Towards these ends, we have suggested to the government that facilitating visits by international non-governmental organizations would not violate Algerian sovereignty since such groups have visited before. We welcomed the Algerian Government's intention to invite the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Executions and another on Torture to visit. We have urged these organizations to go to Algeria, to perform such fact-finding missions.
The real issue here, however, is increased transparency. I underline this because it cannot be obtained without the willing cooperation of the Algerian Government and even then, objective reporting will be a difficult task. Therefore, it is important for us to keep the focus on transparency—that is, the quality of information, not the particular means by which that transparency is obtained.
Transparency is also important for the government's credibility with the international community. We, along with others in the international community, continue to impress this point on Algiers in our respective dialogs. We think it is the advice of a friend. However, the Algerian Government has yet to respond positively or definitively. Recently, they also rejected offers, made by the European Union, of humanitarian assistance for the victims.
As tragic as the situation is, it is important to recognize, and I'm sad to tell you, that the violence in Algeria will not end tomorrow. There are no quick fixes. More needs to be done to protect civilians, but the violence in Algeria is the result of complicated political, economic, and security factors. Each will need to be addressed to bring the country to peace. While the elements are complex, the broad lines of what needs to be done are not.
A long-term solution must combine political and economic reform. Consequently, our policy in Algeria is properly a long-term one that encourages the growth of democratic institutions and the liberalization of the economy. The form of such changes is properly an Algerian concern because only Algerians will be able to solve Algeria's crisis. At the same time, we strongly believe that political reform must be credible to Algerians themselves. They, not we, must believe that the reforms open the way for people to affect how they are governed. Only if this happens will there be a broadening of participation and support for the State so that extremists and terrorists will be isolated and eventually eliminated.
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We continue to believe that all Algerians who renounce terrorism and violence should be able to participate. By the same logic, we believe that the economic system must move away from State ownership and control and toward privatization and market reform which encourage the full participation of Algerians in the economic life of their country.
When he was elected in 1995, President Zeroual pledged to support a policy of economic and political reform, freedom of the press, and development of the rule of law. The United States strongly supports this policy as enunciated by Zeroual. I want to restate today our support for a political vision even as I make clear that the results on all of the above fronts raise questions for us. We hope to see a more definitive commitment in action to the goals President Zeroual has articulated.
In the last 4 years, the Algerians have elected a President, a Parliament, and local governments. These elections replaced a ruling military council and an appointed legislature with the institutional structure of a mixed Presidential parliamentary system. It is not yet a democracy, but neither is it the one-party State of the past. A balanced appraisal is complex, but I want to make a few central points. The November 1995 multi-candidate Presidential elections were considered by observers and the opposing candidates to have produced the real election of a legitimate President, Liamine Zeroual.
The national legislative elections held in June 1997 were also broadly representative, and Algeria invited international observers. There were allegations of fraud. Yet, this historic election, by no means completely free and fair, produced the first multi-party Parliament in Algerian history, including a wide spectrum of opposition voices. The following city and provincial council elections in October 1997 had no international observers. There were wide-spread allegations of fraud and vote-rigging. The results of these elections sent opposition Members into the streets in protest. Some of these protests may be overstated. Whatever the precise facts, the indirectly elected Upper House is clearly not as representative of the overall body politic in Algeria as the Lower House. Despite these difficulties in putting these new institutions into place, there have been indications that the newly elected Lower House is taking its legislative and oversight duties appropriately seriously.
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For example, the legislature established parliamentary commissions to investigate questions of parliamentary immunity and fraud in the local and municipal elections, as well as a commission to focus on the internal security situation. Recently, the Parliament went on a kind of strike in order to get the government to respond to questions about the security situation. They were successful in getting the Prime Minister to address their questions.
Although Algeria's political reform thus far has had mixed results, this newly elected multi-party Parliament could prove to be a significant vehicle for change in the long run. It has the potential to eventually function as a vital forum, both for expressing conflicting view points and for working out sensible compromises. More needs to be done by the Algerians to strengthen these new institutions, and it is here that we are focusing our political efforts and looking for ways to help.
As an immediate step, we're sponsoring a group of six newly elected Algerian parliamentarians representing all of the major political parties for a visit to the United States to learn about democratic institutions. They arrive in Washington later this week. As part of their program, we anticipate their visit will include meetings with Congress.
And if I might divert from my text just for a minute, these men risked their lives, to some extent, to run for public office, and I ask you to risk a little of your time to meet with them while they're here in Washington.
We hope that this will be the first of many such exchange visits and would like to see, if possible, a delegation of Members visit Algeria to demonstrate further our commitment to its nascent democracy. We anticipate using funding from the Middle East Regional Democracy fund to finance activities and training supporting the development of democratic governance.
Economic reform is equally essential for the long-term well-being of the Algerian people; however, the balance sheet on the economy is also mixed. Four years ago, the Algerian economy was a shambles, facing huge international debt and falling oil prices. The government embarked on an IMF-supported program. We strongly supported this step, and we also supported the generous rescheduling of public debt, including U.S. debt, and a strong World Bank program.
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Despite uneven performance in the domestic economy, the government has balanced its international accounts and the IMF program will be complete next month. To change a statist system into a market economy is a huge task. The government legislated reform to encourage foreign investment, but State-owned industry and banking sectors continue to impede this reform. The housing shortage worsens yearly, and unemployment has reached 30 percent and it's growing, and it's higher among youth.
We have supported the continuation of U.S. investment in hydrocarbons essential for Algeria. Other investment may be possible. We strongly support the decision of a U.S. bank to open in Algiers. Business is possible in some areas and with due caution. But economic change in Algeria is a race against time that the government will lose unless it picks up the pace of liberalization. This reform is essential to treat the massive unemployment and social desperation which feeds extremism.
The Algerians want to do more business with American firms, and despite security concerns, U.S. firms have concluded major deals in the petroleum sector. In time, we are hopeful that the economy will grow in other sectors as well, such as housing and construction. We are considering technical training to help the Algerians with their current housing crisis.
We continue to press the government to move toward a market system which will provide adequate housing, food, and employment for all Algerians, thereby weakening the appeal of extremism. We also continue to encourage the Algerians to expand their private sector and dismantle the State controls which stifle it. It is the private sector that in the long run will produce sustainable growth. Labor organizations, professional associations, women's groups, human rights groups, a free press and humanitarian organizations already active in Algeria are also agents for constrictive change and for the rule of law. These things exist. They are a tribute to the Algerian people and hold the hope of the future and they are all fragile.
We are working to promote these burgeoning organizations and the growth of civil society in Algeria. We continue to encourage improvements in civil society, including strengthening the rule of law and furthering freedom of the press.
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Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, excuse me. I'm going to have to interrupt. My colleagues have just enough time to get a recorded vote on a quorum call. We will return after that, all right?
Mr. NEUMANN. Well, we'll get to my rousing conclusion in the last 30 seconds.
[Laughter.]
Mr. ROYCE. Well, yes, we wish we could've gotten to it. Steve Chabot has joined us from Ohio, Alcee Hastings from Florida, and we'll be back right after this vote. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Hastings, we're going to reconvene here, but I did want to ask you if you had an opening statement you'd like to make at this time or do you want to wait until questioning?
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, that's very kind of you, I know that you're in the midst of hearing from the witness. As the Chair knows, I join as all of our colleagues have, in thanking the witnesses, particularly Deputy Assistant Secretary Mr. Neumann, who I heard a portion of his testimony as I came in, Mr. Chairman, and the Ambassador from Algeria, as well as Ms. Deeb and Mr. Goldstein from the Human Rights Watch. This is a most important time for us to have this hearing and I appreciate the Chair.
I did file legislation, Mr. Chairman, that I'm seeking not only co-sponsorship of, but understanding with reference to. And with that in mind, I'd invite the Chair, Members, and others who have an interest in trying to perfect some kind of peace in Algeria, and some kind of stability in that region of the world, to at least give vent to the legislation that I dropped the day before yesterday, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Hastings. I just want you to know that the Subcommittee welcomes your resolution as a sign of American interest in Algeria, and we look forward to this legislation and discussing this matter further in this Subcommittee. We trust that the facts that are presented today will be taken into account in the statement that Congress makes regarding Algeria, and with that note, I'd like to return to Ambassador Neumann. We're going to ask you for that rousing end to your testimony.
Mr. NEUMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador.
Mr. NEUMANN. Just to conclude, and I promise to conclude quickly. I was speaking about the fact that there is a fledgling civil society in Algeria which includes labor unions, journalists, teachers, and that we think it is and ought to be part of our policy to help that, and to help that group emerge and I had wanted to tell you—that's where I broke off, that Algerian journalists of widely different political views tell me our support is a major source of encouragement to them. We will continue. The Parliament will be debating a new information law this year which we will follow closely as it may greatly affect the freedom of the press. We will continue also to bring leading Algerian writers, judges, human rights workers and others to visit here, and I hope you and your staffs will meet with them.
Mr. Chairman, in closing today, I want to be clear. The challenge is for the Algerian Government and people to obtain their own goals. Algeria is a country of great promise in the throes of a long crisis. Any action we take is meant to be supportive and in the direction of greater political openness, respect for human rights, marginalization of extremism, elimination of terror and political violence, of market reform and of hope for the citizens of Algeria.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Neumann appears in the appendix.]
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. We have some questions for you at this time, if we could. One of the questions that I have, that I wanted to ask of you was whether the Islamic leaders in Algeria had made any headway in convincing radicals there that violence is contrary to Islam? What do we know about the ideology and what do we know about the religious motives of this group, the GIA, the terrorist organization that has been killing so many civilians in Algeria?
Mr. NEUMANN. We know some things. I dread giving you a long professorial answer here. It is a group that is fragmented, it is a group that has been based, in many cases, on very small cells, and it is a group which is difficult to know a lot about. However, they did put out a rather lengthy publication—tract, it wasn't really a publication, last year, which we translated and had a look at. And there was a kind of ideology, but it was a very extreme view in which all who disagreed with them were considered heretics, and you will remember that even in the religions past of Christianity, there have been periods when the punishment for heresy was death. They too take that view. They view anyone who is not with them, as being opposed to them, as having committed heresy. It is a very extreme view. What we have a lot of trouble identifying is the extent to which followers in this group are motivated primarily by ideological view or simply by loot or by, kind of simple-minded views—that's very hard.
We know that some people who are in groups which have been affiliated with the GIA, or close to them, have in fact become repulsed by the massacre of civilians, and there are at least a couple of groups on the fringes of the GIA which have joined the cease-fire called for by the AIS. There is an intellectual movement back and forth, across these groups. They're not hermetically sealed.
In fact, at one point, there were a number of people who deserted from the AIS in an earlier phase, moved to them, then fell out from them, the GIA, then were later assassinated. Recanting is not one of the things they're big on.
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It does seem to us that the more you bring in a legitimate political system in which Algerians have faith, the more you will get people to respond to that. I do not think that you are going to get the very fringe of the GIA ever to calm down, and there's a question as to whether you would ever want such people. But, they need to be cut off from the base, they need to be cut off from support, they need to be cut off from recruitment, and all of that is part of the building of a credible political process to attract people to something else.
Mr. ROYCE. Is this group strengthening? Is it weakening? How cohesive is this terrorist organization? Does it actually pose a threat to the Algerian Government? We see the communiques where they take credit for these terrorist attacks, but do they actually pose a threat to the government itself?
Mr. NEUMANN. They do not pose a threat to the government. In fact, I would say that the threat to the government is considerably reduced from when I went to Algeria in 1994. They pose a great terrorist threat. They are still capable of killing a lot of innocent people. They are not capable of taking power.
I don't want to exaggerate the precision of our knowledge. The question that I have tried to look at, which is kind of a subset of yours on the question of people being killed or recruited, is the recruitment base continuing to keep the movement alive?
We had an experience with that when we counted body counts in an earlier period in our political history, and didn't focus on new people joining the action. I think, therefore, the critical question is, are they able to replenish their ranks. So far, I see no hard evidence that they are not able to maintain a measure of recruitment. I cannot say precisely how much, but it is still there, and that is why, again, there needs to be an alternative political process and economic strengthening.
Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask one last question of you. The Algerian Government has objected to outside inquiries into the massacres. You suggest in your testimony that you think these concerns are overstated. Would such investigations pose a threat to Algerian sovereignty and government stability, in your view? I'd like to hear your view.
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Mr. NEUMANN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is vital that Algeria permit more transparency. It has got to let people have a look at what is going on. There is a serious issue of its own credibility. This lack of transparency, I think, is producing a barrier between Algeria and people who would like to help that government.
At the same time, I think there are a lot of ways to get to transparency. You can get there by a Special Rapporteur, but that seems to be unacceptable to them. You get there through other rapporteurs that they said they would accept. You could get there through NGO's coming in, if they're allowed to function. Journalists, obviously, are a major portion of this.
I put the emphasis on transparency because I think it's important not to get locked up on one particular means which itself can be denuded of value if it is not carefully handled, and to keep the focus on whether or not you're getting transparency, and I think that's important.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. I'm going to ask our Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez of New Jersey, now.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary. I referred to you before as Ambassador; you were in Algeria for 3 years, and it is in that context I call you Ambassador—in your opening, you even said, the country I was proud to represent the United States in, for 3 years.
Let me ask you, this transparency that you both cited in your prepared remarks and now in response to the Chairman, why is it that you sense that the Algerians aren't understanding that it is in their interest as well to provide the opportunity for transparency that we so clearly see is in their interest?
Mr. NEUMANN. Let me give you a piece of the reason, although I think a whole reasoning gets into not only political factors, but psychological ones and to history. But, I will say, Algeria is a very proud country. They fought very hard for their independence. They lost around about a million people in an 8-year revolutionary war. They were the leaders of the development of the whole idea of the Third World, the group of 77. There is a sense of a loss of dignity, I think. I hope that they will find a way to climb around or over this. There may be other reasons for it.
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Mr. MENENDEZ. It is pride, then, historically, pride is the issue?
Mr. NEUMANN. Pride. It is a very, very proud people and a very proud nation, and that is a big part of it, and——
Mr. MENENDEZ. Cannot one be proud to show what they are doing to combat terrorism on the front lines, and show the world that, in fact, they are proud of what they are doing?
Mr. NEUMANN. I certainly share the view that one ought to be able to be proud in that fashion.
Mr. MENENDEZ. If we continue to see the Algerian Government, for whatever reasons, not permit the transparency that you have suggested is necessary in your testimony, then is it the U.S. intention to sponsor a resolution in the March meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to establish a Special Rapporteur as it relates to the situation in Algeria?
Mr. NEUMANN. We have not made a decision on that issue at this point. Our view at this time is that it is unlikely that such a resolution would achieve its purpose, achieve greater transparency. We are, at this point, focusing on trying to persuade the Algerian Government that there are ways of meeting the needs of transparency which would help it and which are consistent with its sovereignty, and which are not insulting. And we would be happy to work with them to achieve that.
Mr. MENENDEZ. How are we trying to engage the Algerians as to an understanding that allowing international observers would in fact be in their interests in satisfying the international community's concerns? This is not just a U.S. concern, and I note the Europeans were recently there.
Mr. NEUMANN. This is an issue that has been discussed by quite a number of us. I have discussed it here with my honorable colleague, the Ambassador of Algeria who you will be hearing from later. My boss, Assistant Secretary Indyk has discussed it. Our Ambassador in Algeria, Cameron Hume, who took my place, has discussed it at a variety of levels, including the most senior. It has also been discussed, obviously, by the European Union Troika that was just in Algeria. So it's not an issue which is only discussed by the United States, in isolation.
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Mr. MENENDEZ. I read the Ambassador's statement, which he'll be presenting shortly, and there are two questions that are in my mind, that I want to ask you, and I'll have an opportunity, hopefully, to ask him. One is, he states that the worst is behind for Algeria. That's not my sense based upon your statement and the fact that you said that the killing is not going to stop anytime soon. And, second, he speaks, and these are his words, ''some have spoken or written in support of dialog, reconciliation, inclusion, accommodation. Noble and attractive notions, indeed, as a solution, while skillfully avoiding to shed any light on the rationale behind the words. Is it to offer the terrorists a deal to trade in their knives, axes and bombs, for seats in the Parliament and portfolios in the government?'' What's our response to that?
Mr. NEUMANN. If I may take those in order. Algeria is a place that defies sound bites, but on the issue of ''the worst is past'', if you mean by the worst, the period when it appeared the government might be overthrown, that all possibility of a modern State would be thrown out the window in the face of some other vision, that moment is, I think, past. In the period of the last 3 years, the security of the State is larger. Its economic condition is better. If you look way out, a period of years, you also see a State which still has massive unemployment, a non-performing economy in terms of jobs and housing creation, a great deal of political cynicism and resentment—in other words, almost a classic list of long-term trouble. So, the issue in my mind is not whether right now, today, it's better or worse, but whether the period which has been gained by a great deal of blood and a great deal of work by Algerians, is going to be utilized to improve those longer-term conditions that still pose a considerable risk to the future.
Your second question dealt with what is this business of dialog. Well, first of all, dialog is a word which has been used by the Algerian Government, it's been used by President Zeroual. Our position has been a fairly careful one. We have said that those who reject violence ought to be included in political participation. There is a need to broaden the base of those who participate. Assistant Secretary Pelletreau at one point, I remember, said that, in answer to a question on who is included, said, everybody, Nationalists, Islamics, Berbers. That's still our view a couple of years later. We have certainly not suggested that the people running around murdering women and children ought to be immediately rewarded with position in government; that is not our view. But there is a lot of margin between bringing murderers into the government and a policy of very limited inclusion in power that is broadening.
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I don't want to be too critical here, but there is a need to create in Algeria a sense of credible participation. I go back again and again to the need to think about this in terms of Algerians; do they see the system as credible, and because they see it as credible, will they give it their enthusiastic support. And that is a development which has a long way to go still. And I think this is a critical part of it.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. We'll go to Mr. Payne of New Jersey, and then to Mr. Chabot.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, I appreciate your first-hand information. Let me just ask a couple of quick questions. In December of last year, Congressman Campbell and I visited southern Sudan, and I wonder, in your opinion, whether you believe that the Ahmed al-Bashir Government and the Government of Iran may be supporting the Jihad.
Mr. NEUMANN. Over the years, there has been some dabbling of Iran in this area, but I think it's important to point out that this is essentially a homegrown problem in Algeria. It is maintained essentially through homegrown people and weapons captured or manufactured in Algeria. There is some foreign support and it is extremely important to stop the foreign support, but it's also important to see it in context. It did not create the problem. If you ended it all tomorrow, I doubt you would see much difference.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I know it's difficult for you to have any kind of control over those rogue States that I just mentioned—rogue States in my opinion, the Sudan and Iran—but we do have allies and friends and there's been some, as you know, tension between Morocco and our friend in Algeria over the western Saharan dispute, and others. And it's been rumored that one of the Jihad leaders was found and located in Morocco in a hotel and it's common knowledge that its border is like a sieve, according to the Defense Minister of Algeria, are there any rumors that perhaps in Morocco, there may be transshipment to some of the extremist groups?
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Mr. NEUMANN. I know of no evidence that there is any intention by the Government of Morocco to nourish or facilitate or in any way aid instability in Algeria. In fact, I think that the Moroccans also find this a very worrisome situation. That said, the border is very long, it is mountainous, and it is very difficult to control. And I think when you look at Algeria, it's a very large country, this is not exclusively a Moroccan issue. You have the Libyan border, you have a very long desert border there. We know something about the difficulties about trying to control long borders through difficult country, and that is a problem.
Mr. PAYNE. Just finally, I had an opportunity to chair a human rights caucus meeting, and one of the panelists, Mrs. Judith Cumin from the UN-HCR, brought out the fact the asylum-seekers from Algeria attempting to become political refugees in the EU countries find a very restrictive approach to their requests. And I wonder if there's any discussion with those concerned about the situation there, with the EU countries in seeking their support, at least temporarily, for some of the political asylum-seekers, regardless to who's creating the problem. Have there been any discussions on that situation?
Mr. NEUMANN. I'm not aware of any discussions with an EU focus, particularly on political asylum. We've got our own procedures and laws, as you noted, to deal with that, as do they. One of the problems in the case of Algeria, much more so for the Europeans where there are much, much larger numbers, is to distinguish between political asylum-seekers and those essentially seeking economic asylum. The country has its dangerous places, it has other places which are not greatly more dangerous than a lot of other parts of the world, which may not be a great commentary, but is a comparison. But it also has huge economic problems and difficulty in finding jobs. Unemployment among 15- to 30-year-olds approaches 60 percent, by some counts. So, as we have looked at this from time to time, we also try to steer our way between reasonable refuge for those who are, in fact, political opponents or in a proper case for political asylum, and opening wide the door to a flood of people who may be very decent folk, but primarily the problem is they don't have jobs.
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Mr. PAYNE. I'll conclude, my time has expired—but there is a fine line. It seems though, in normal circumstances, that whole economic thing would probably certainly prevail. I would think that if I lived in Algeria right now, I'm not sure I'd be as concerned about having a job as just trying to stay alive. It's the same question we had as related to refugees from Haiti when they were coming in boats, and it was considered, well, it's economic, but those that stayed in Haiti in many instances, were brutally killed or summarily executed or imprisoned and tortured, and so, I think that when critical times come, we might need to take another look at how we define things under normal circumstances. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. CHABOT. I, first of all, want to thank the Chairman for holding these very important hearings and thank the Secretary for his testimony here this afternoon.
I have to say that the incidents that we heard about in Algeria are examples of some of the most barbaric, absolutely outrageous behavior I've ever heard of. The numbers probably aren't as high as they were in Rwanda, for example, but there are women and children. It's just absolutely outrageous and I think whatever we can do to help Algeria to deal with this situation and to stop the killing, we should do.
Mr. Secretary, in some of the reports that I've seen and read, there seems to be a fairly long time between when one of these incidents starts before security forces actually arrive on the scene. Why is that? What, if anything, can be done to better protect the civilians that are at risk?
Mr. NEUMANN. This is not a question with one answer because you have a sort of continuum, if I can call it that, of incidents. You have some incidents which have occurred in the suburbs of Algiers or very close to posts, where there are questions which we too have posed, why no response. There are a number of answers which the Algerian Government gives. I think Ambassador Lamamra will give you some of those answers as well, and they have a degree of validity, but the question remains.
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At the other end of the continuum, you have attacks on villages that are extremely remote. Remember that Algeria is a country about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. I mean, this is a big hunk of country, and even if you leave off the southern desert, you got a lot of mountains, a lot of rough terrain where it is frankly, not possible to expect a rather small army to be everywhere.
The most recent Algerian response has been to begin to increase arming of local populations, so-called patriot's groups. Our view has been that we're not going to take a position as to whether or not this is a preferred military course, but we do take the view that the government bears a responsibility for any forces it raises and arms, to ensure that they function consistent with the rule of law. They must not become a further part of the problem of repression, and we are pressing that view on them.
But there are questions which I cannot answer for you fully, and this goes back to the issue that Chairman Royce was asking about earlier and that I have in my statement, the need for transparency. I can tell you what they tell us about the problems of getting draftees to run the risk of blowing up on mines in the middle of the night, we can talk about the possibility that people aren't too keen to go help villagers that were supporting people in insurgency against them. A lot of reasons may play a role. But the fact is, we need more transparency. The international community, I think, deserves more transparency. And hopefully the Algerians will cooperate with that.
Mr. CHABOT. Let me follow up. In your testimony, you had stated and I quote, ''some security forces personnel may also be involved to some extent, in the killings.'' Could you elaborate on that, and why you would say something like that in your statement?
Mr. NEUMANN. There have been periodic reports of individual killings by people in some of the security forces. Primarily in the last year or so, this has been an issue of the so-called patriot groups, which are organized around local leaders. It was a problem. There was a larger problem of that nature several years ago in the elements of the security forces and it seems to have lessened.
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I want to be clear. I do not believe that they are responsible for the vast majority of massacres. I do not believe that there is a government policy of sending out death squads. I do believe that you are dealing with people whose passions are inflamed, you often have people within these groups who have often lost their own family members, sometimes large numbers of family members. You are in a society where vengeance and collective guilt are also accepted principles and you are running deep in blood. It's not that surprising that you get people taking vengeance on their own, and we've seen that in a lot of places, and that is also alluded to in our human rights report.
I want to add, to the credit of the Algerian Government, that there have been at least some of these cases where we know that people have been disciplined, there are a couple such cases alluded to in the human rights report, and that is information furnished by the Algerian Government. We hope they will continue to do more in this line because I think it's a basic principle that justice needs to be seen to be credible.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, we'll go to Mr. Davis of Florida, and then Mr. Hastings.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Neumann, earlier in response to Mr. Menendez's question, you mentioned that it would probably not be constructive to approach the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to seek a resolution. If Algeria is not sufficiently responsive to our requests for the transparency you have described, what recourse is available for us to further pursue that point?
Mr. NEUMANN. I would, as you can understand, like to not go too far down the road of hypotheticals. That resolution is something at which we could look at. There are, I think, a limited number of things though, to be quite honest. We do want transparency, we do not want to be put in the place where the Algerian Government rather than those who we think are doing the majority of the killing, becomes the only object of our ire. I think that is not a policy course that makes a lot of sense. So we are looking for ways to help the Algerian Government, as a friend, understand that we could do more, and others could do more, if they could move forward, find ways to open up on this issue.
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Mr. DAVIS. Appreciating the tone of what you just said, would you further agree that cooperation from the Algerian Government is the essential key to the transparency issue?
Mr. NEUMANN. It is absolutely essential. There cannot be transparency without it. There is no way you can force this, not only do we, the international community, not have any power to force someone in, but someone who goes in cannot operate without security. For all the things we've been talking about, it's real hard to get the casual visitor to go out strolling in the hills looking for information. So there's going to have to be willing Algerian cooperation if any such visit is to have any productive value at all.
Mr. DAVIS. What sort of timeframe do you have in mind in respect to some concrete action on the part of Algeria, including any timeframes in terms of making a specific proposal to them with respect to timing?
Mr. NEUMANN. Yesterday would've been great. I mean, this is an issue which needs attention. It's an issue which is not going away, and it's going to go on for awhile. So, we hope they will move quickly.
Mr. DAVIS. Well, are we in a position to make any requests or demand on them with respect to a specific timeframe and some accountability attached to that?
Mr. NEUMANN. We are certainly in the position to make the request. I don't think we are in the position to make a demand in the sense of some harsh counteraction if that demand is not met. And I don't think it would be a very effective policy with this very proud government, and given what is in fact the reality of just how much power we have, I think we can and we will continue to say to them, as a friend, that a lack of transparency is a clear blockage between them and people who would be inclined to do more in their situation, and we need to help them to understand that.
Mr. DAVIS. I read earlier that the IMF has provided some support to the country. Are there other forms of aid which the United States directly or indirectly supports for the country of Algeria?
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Mr. NEUMANN. There is no bilateral aid, there are no military lethal sales, there is no military aid program. Remember that Algeria is a country that because of its own political course in the 1960's and 1970's, chose a position which was independent but which we saw as quite divergent from our interests, and our diplomatic relations throughout most of the cold war were in fact not very good. Algeria did provide major assistance in resolving the Iran hostage crisis, and they were the mediators at that point. But we did not have, at the beginning of this crisis, a deep structure of relations with lots of ties, and aid, and these things, so the elements that we have to work with are rather few.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Neumann.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing, and Mr. Secretary, I appreciate all your comments. As a segue to what my colleague, Mr. Davis, just asked, in light of what you just said, that the turn of the cold war or after the cold war, and during, if you will, our diplomatic relations and diplomatic efforts were not very good. How about today? How active, diplomatically is the United States in mediating and continuing disputes in this region of the world?
Mr. NEUMANN. The question is overall, not just Algeria? I just want to make sure I'm answering your question.
Mr. HASTINGS. Let's restrict it, first to Algeria.
Mr. NEUMANN. We have not sought to mediate. I think that is not a role that you can take on without being asked to take it on. You've got to have parties accept, and clearly the government has not, and there is a certain resistance even from some others. What we have sought to do, what I sought to do in the 3 years that I was there, was to try to convince people that our policy was not one of taking sides, but of holding out a vision of solution which encompassed the kind of reforms I've been talking about here today which we think is essential to getting out of this crisis. To make it clear that what we backed was a vision, and is a vision of a solution, not one party or another in a dispute. That's sometimes difficult because there is a natural human tendency to try to line you up, for or against. We've resisted that. We have provided a rather steady dose of public comment, private comment, supporting things like a free press. And there is very vigorous press. It's not quite as broad as it was 3 years ago, but it's still pretty impressive. When there has been something we could do, we have tried to step in and do it. One example was the legislative elections. Algeria took the initiative, for which I commend them, to ask for international observers. We took the decisions to send Americans around Algeria, you have one of those observers, Professor Mary Jane Deeb who's testifying later, that was not an easy decision. We did make it, we did take the lead in encouraging Europeans and other powers to send observers of their own. So, I would say that where we had a place to work, where we had an opportunity, we have been active, but I also have to tell you that those opportunities are not numerous.
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Mr. HASTINGS. I'll tell you a statement I heard in Uzbekistan, and I was being spoken to by someone who was attending a meeting with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and what he says when I put the question to him about Algeria is, and he was not necessarily being facetious, at least in his own way of thinking, what he said to me was, the United States treats Algeria as if it's a European problem. And he says, quite frankly, Europe treats it as if it's a French problem, and the French can't make up their mind. I recognize, among other things, that Spain and certainly Morocco and Tunisia and Mali and the surrounding areas, have to at some point be impacted in a meaningful way with what's going on. But I guess I need to know from you whether or not the Mediterranean sea lanes, or the security that's involved at that top portion of Algeria, allows that there is any interruption of, for example, the international oil and gas market, and how that would impact the national interests of the United States.
It's easy for you to say we can't mediate without anybody, but if you were to answer the question that I just put to you that, boy, you know, this thing is civil war—all of these fights—whatever it's about—it's going to get out of hand, and one day it's going to affect Gibralter and the sea lane, and I damn well bet you we will find a way to get involved in reconciling some of the differences. That's where I have a problem.
Mr. NEUMANN. It's a fair enough question. Let me see if I can answer it. First of all, I don't think we have treated it just as Europe's problem. We recognize and we've been saying, at least since 1993, maybe earlier, but I remember the testimony from that point, that what happens in Algeria can have a major impact not only on the North African side of the Mediterranean, but on the other side. We have treated our interest there as being, above and beyond everything else, a regional interest in stability; more important than our own economic interests, more important than any particular strategic advantage in Algeria. So I think that we have come to that recognition.
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I certainly have personally and have argued strongly for it, but this is a damned messy situation. And to make the leap, to say that if we only recognized it, we'd find the silver bullet. Algerians are tough folk. Eight years of civil war, a million dead, the French fielded a 500,000-man army. It's not a place you plunge into casually or divert easily.
And it is important to remember that this is not just an issue of two-party. That's one reason I don't like the term ''mediate'' much, because it conjures up a sort of two-party formulation in which you're going to get in the middle and find some middle ground. This is not the case of Algeria. You have these really crazy fanatics running around and killing people. You have an old regime that is resented. You have a new political party, you have a half-dozen other political parties that range from two legal Islamic parties—well, they're not called Islamic anymore, but they clearly are—whose own members get assassinated by the crazies, one of whom is in the government, one of whom is in the opposition. You have vehemently anti-Islamic parties which are in the opposition and which are bitterly critical of the government. Finding common ground in all these folk is not an easy thing, no matter what the level of our interest.
What we have identified is that they, the Government of Algeria, has taken some positive steps. It has created a Parliament which, whatever criticisms one can make, has brought into the Lower House a real political force in Algeria. Maybe not exactly in proportion to the perfect numbers, but they're there and they're active. What we have tried to focus on is finding things that exist and seeing what we can do to build them. That is not going to give you a quick fix, and I was explicit about that, but it is important because it's the only way out.
And I'm reminded of a story which may have many roots, but one of them is the colonial North African past, where a Governor told his gardener he wanted to plant a certain kind of particularly beautiful tree, and his gardener told him, Excellency, this tree takes 100 years to grow. And the answer was, well, we must lose no time, plant it today. I hope it's not going to take 100 years, but this is going to be a long-term process, and we have got to put our shoulder to that wheel and keep working it without building what I think is an inappropriate belief that we're going to get a quick result. That is just to set ourselves to be knocked 6 months from now because we screwed it up.
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Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Neumann. We really want to thank you for your testimony here today.
We are now going to proceed with the testimony of Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, the Ambassador of Algeria to the United States, and so we will ask Ambassador Lamamra to come forward. He has a very long and distinguished career as a professional diplomat of Algeria, including the permanent representative of Algeria to the United Nations in New York from 1993 to 1996. He has also held many positions within the Algerian Government, including director of press and information, and advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
So, Ambassador, welcome, and we will proceed with your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY RAMTANE LAMAMRA, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF ALGERIA
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and honorable Members of the Subcommittee, I wish to thank you for inviting me to testify before you and will be delighted to answer all of your questions. I have submitted for your attention a rather exhaustive deposition and I would appreciate if it were annexed to the transcript of this hearing.
Mr. ROYCE. We will do so; we read that last night, and we will include it in the record.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. I would therefore summarize its main points, and maybe the best way for me to do that would be for me to provide short answers to six most-frequently asked questions on Algeria, including some which have been posed to my distinguished predecessor at this table.
Question one: Isn't the suspension of the electoral process in the month of January 1992 the direct cause of the current violence which, therefore, becomes somewhat understandable?
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The current situation in Algeria is the product of a multitude of factors, the first of which being the failures and frustrations generated by the single-party system. And it is during the 1979–1989 decade, which many Algerian intellectuals call the ''lost decade,'' that Algeria first experienced the emergence of the fundamentalist terrorist phenomenon. Transition to pluralist democracy and market economy was at the early stages, rash, ill-prepared and it took place amid great tensions. It was that context which became the prime mover which led many voters to express their rejection of the old regime by casting a sanction vote in the 1991 election. The annulment of the runoff of that election for valid constitutional, political and psychological reasons was generally welcomed by the Algerian people. In any case, nothing justifies terrorism in Algeria and anywhere else. Terrorism is always a crime and never a justifiable political act.
Question two: Isn't Algeria sinking in the crisis since 1992?
No. The Algerian Government designed and has been implementing a threefold strategy to end the crisis by dealing with the underlying causes of terrorism. At the political level, today, for the first time in the history of the Algerian nation, all institutions of the republic, from the top to the bottom of the State's pyramid, are multi-party representative institutions. Algerian civilian society is active and the private press is rich, diversified, and outspoken. The economic level, the essential microeconomic accounts have been restored. The economy is now regrowing again as privatization is underway. At the security level, in real attempts to bring down the government and establish a theocratic State, terrorist groups and their sponsors sought to isolate the State from the society, and the country from the rest of the world. However, this strategy has largely failed since terrorism has not succeeded in holding hostage the positive political and economic evolution of the country throughout the last 6 years, and since the true nature of terrorism was exposed, and since more and more segments of the Algerian people reject terrorism.
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Question three: If terrorism is declining, how do you explain then the recent massacres of civilians?
Massacres of civilians are massive retaliations conducted by terrorist groups against civilian populations, including some who rejected the terrorist groups after having provided some logistical support to them under constraint rather than out of conviction or adherence to the terrorist venture. Between 1992 and 1995, terrorist activity was almost exclusively aimed at so-called hard targets, civil servants, military personnel, journalists, intellectuals, modernity-oriented women and, of course, foreign visitors and foreign citizens, in general. The years 1996 and 1997 were the years of full-scale indiscriminate violence using car bombs, throat slitting, and other atrocities against defenseless civilians. This indiscriminate violence stems from a sense of desperation rather than strength.
Question four: Why can't the government protect the civilian populations that are being massacred?
The Algerian Government's comprehensive response to terrorism includes a redemption law which secured, so far, the surrender of 2,000 armed terrorists. Over the past few months, some other terrorist groups, AIS, FIDA, and others, have decided, in the same spirit, to put an end to their terrorist activity. Only those groups coming under the GIA umbrella are now pursuing their adventure. The Algerian Government has been devoting 100 percent of its capacities to terrorism prevention and suppression, but as you know, no government in the world has succeeded to obtain a 100 percent result against terrorism. Added to what all the conventional forces of the government do, you have to be reminded of the fact that the size of Algeria is about four times the size of the State of Texas, that the country's borders and vital installations to be protected are considerable, and that the personnel and equipment used to that end are very insufficient.
Furthermore, conscripts, draftees, make up 80 percent of the Algerian army. And for obvious reasons, they are there for only 18 months. They cannot be efficiently committed to the antiterrorist effort and on the other hand, early warning systems are not available throughout the country so that the professionally trained antiterrorist units could respond quickly.
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In view of such circumstances, the government agreed to the requests made by large segments of the population to set themselves up into the patriotic self-defense groups that are legally organized, armed, and placed under the control of civilian and military authorities. Contrary to villages, where self-defense groups function, these villages are rarely attacked by terrorists. It is, rather, localities which have not felt threatened, and therefore, they saw no need for self-defense groups, that are often targeted by terrorists.
Question five: What about accounts that have reported massacres perpetrated near military barracks?
Here I say, a propaganda campaign—attempts to turn the exception into the rule. In the few cases where such situations occurred, the military barracks in question are army logistical and technical facilities with no combatant force or antiterrorist unit. Furthermore, it is known that security forces usually undertake assigned missions that require advance preparation and planning. I was told by various foreign experts that a nighttime immediate response improvised without sufficient intelligence, appropriate mobility, and night-vision equipment, is generally considered as hopeless and suicidal.
Who is behind the killings? Most of you know that it is the GIA. This group holds the view, as Ambassador Neumann was saying, that any Algerians who are not with them are against them, and will bring death upon themselves. The GIA claimed responsibility for killings and it has announced death tolls in European capitals. Of course, there are cases of misconduct and brutality by law enforcement officers, but these cases are always, as matter of policy, they are always punished, both on disciplinary and criminal charges. Clearly large-scale massacres perpetrated by the GIA and the limited number of occurrences of misconduct are not morally equivalent.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the CBS ''60 Minutes'' program, in which Mr. Abdel Hamid Brahimi, an Algerian citizen, accused the Algerian army of being behind the massacres. I think that I have to say something about the credibility of such a witness, which is questioned by most Algerians as this individual was a politburo member of the ruling party in the 1980's where he was representing the pro-fundamentalist leaning. As Minister of Planning, then Prime Minister between 1979 and 1988, which is the lost decade, this individual is considered by most Algerians as the father of all disasters that have overtaken the country since then.
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Last question, I'm sure it will come: If the Algerian Government is so convinced of the soundness of its positions, why is it opposed to an international investigation?
Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that first of all, Algeria is not at all a secretive country, and Algeria has nothing to hide. Algeria is a signatory to all the multilateral treaties on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Algeria is a signatory to 23 conventions aimed at protecting and promoting human rights and Algeria voluntarily accepts the optional protocols attached to those treaties which establish monitoring mechanisms. All of these international obligations are based on the national sovereignty of States and respect for the prerogatives of national institutions, including Parliament, but the premise of the international investigation or fact-finding concept is that one deals here with a murky situation, with a situation, as one of the NGO's puts it, of a complete breakdown of law and order, a situation in which, therefore, some are tempted to grant a presumption of innocence to terrorist groups while holding the government to a demeaning standard of defense built in an assumption of guilt.
Understandably, the Algerian Government, which is respectful of its own Constitution and laws, as well of international law, cannot cooperate in an undertaking whose sole visible and immediate effect would be the exoneration of the terrorist groups from their crimes and delegitimization of the multi-party elected institutions of the Republic.
From a more practical viewpoint, it is clear that a politically motivated ad hoc international fact-finding or investigation mission would clearly accomplish much less than what, let's say, what the western embassies—the U.S. Embassy, for instance—do in their discreet and perseverant daily work with access to a variety of sources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lamamra appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. You know, you've addressed a number of questions which were posed by Members in questions to the former U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and again, we appreciate your willingness to discuss these issues. But let me add a couple, and one is on the status of the FIS, which you mentioned. Are FIS members who renounce violence, are they now able to participate in the political process in Algeria? How does that work? We're not talking about the terrorist GIA, but we're talking about the FIS.
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Ambassador LAMAMRA. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all it's extremely difficult to clarify the picture on the Islamist movement in general, but Ambassador Neumann did mention that two formally religious parties do freely act within the Parliament. One of them is a full member of the Cabinet. Twenty-eight percent of the membership in the Lower House in Algeria today represent the moderate, non-violent Islamism.
FIS people, we believe, are sponsors of terrorism. FIS people have been found guilty of incitement to crime. Some of them have been duly sentenced to terms in jail. Some of them have been released, but their civil rights have been suspended as part of the judiciary rule or penalty or sentence for a few years. So, as individuals, whoever is not affected by such a decision of justice, I assume they are already voters; they have been able to choose their representatives. And that is not an issue, but as a political group or movement, that is behind us. The judiciary has ruled about the very existence of such a party, and we believe that most Algerians today look forward rather than backward.
Mr. ROYCE. Let me follow up with one more question. You know, your government has categorically rejected a call by the United States and by the European Union for an independent inquiry into the current killings in Algeria. More specifically, you refer to those killings and you refer to the investigations as an old trick, and you've warned that such investigations exonerating the terrorists would basically delegitimize the government—was the point you made.
But I'm wondering, in what other instances have other governments been weakened by such international investigations? I guess we have a hard time perceiving how other governments have been weakened by fact-finding investigations, and I'd just like you to comment on that, if you would.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you kindly mentioned, I have been the permanent representative of my country to the United Nations, and to the best of my knowledge there has never been any politically motivated investigation in any country unless there is a clear, legal mandate from an appropriate and competent U.N. body—that may be the Security Council, the General Assembly, the U.N. Commission for Human Rights. What we are talking about here, we are talking about transparency. This is an effort which is requested on the part of the Algerian Government to do, and we believe that transparency cannot and should not be limited to one means of achieving transparency.
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And something which has not been mentioned here, and I think it is my duty to mention it, transparency cannot be guaranteed only if foreigners are involved, because we are seeing here that the Algerian institutions, the Algerian media, the Algerian political scene, are developed and strong enough to take care of several of these issues while the government would continue to honor all its international legal commitments.
I can mention that the Lower House has devoted a 6-hour debate to the security situation, and that has not been exhausted. The Prime Minister did answer all the questions, and tomorrow, on Friday, the Lower House will be resuming its consideration of the security situation with live coverage by the Algerian TV. So we do practice transparency.
Mr. ROYCE. Well, I appreciate again your willingness to testify here with us today, Ambassador Lamamra, and I'm going to turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez of New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador, thank you for both the written testimony you submitted, which I've read in full, as well as for all of the questions that you say are most frequently asked. I hate to be repetitive in one or two of the questions, but I'm going to pursue them.
Let me first say that I condemn terrorism under any form that it is conducted, and I believe most of the Members here would do the same. I find it hard to believe that your country's concern is that those who would be invited in would do so with the thought that they would be exonerating terrorism, or that the assumption of guilt, as you suggest, might be ascribed to the State automatically. I mean, that is clearly not the case.
The question that still plagues me after having listened to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and now having listened to you, Ambassador, is what is the difficulty in permitting others to view what you are doing, how you are doing it, and what you are facing? What is so difficult with that? We hear a call for transparency, and you suggest that transparency by foreigners is not acceptable. In America, we have this saying that it's the equivalent of the fox guarding the chicken coop.
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The reason that we suggest transparency is that we subject ourselves completely to international review. We submit ourselves totally open to a wide range of criticisms, and they are often by foreigners. What is wrong with providing the means for the transparency that would probably ultimately inure to your government's benefit? You suggested that there are other means, other than those that are suggested. Tell the Committee, what are the other means that Algeria is willing to provide in meeting transparency?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. OK. Congressman, there can be two sets of answers to your very important question. As far as other means of transparency, beyond transparency, international legal commitment, I did mention that Algeria is a signatory to 23 international conventions relating to the protection and promotion of human rights, and, as such, Algeria does report to the monitoring mechanisms on its achievements, as well as shortcomings, in promoting and protecting the human rights. And the mechanisms are composed of elected experts from various countries under the U.N. umbrella, so those are foreigners, and we gladly cooperate and openly cooperate with them.
Transparency, again, is also the 561 foreign journalists who were admitted in Algeria in the year 1997 alone, one of them having produced the famous ''60 Minutes'' program that we mentioned earlier. In the month of January alone, 90 foreign journalists, including American journalists, have been admitted, have been able to visit the sites of the massacres, meet officials and people in the civil society. We do practice transparency, and we intend to do more of it—and with due respect to the national security, the laws of the Republic, and our international commitment.
Now the second component to my answer would be that, for an Algerian, whether he is sitting here reading papers or following some of the questions, one can wonder if the accent here is not put on ways and means to obtain something from the Algerian Government, rather than ways and means to defeat terrorism and the GIA in Algeria.
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I would have liked to hear a question on what Algeria could expect from the Europeans, for instance, to weaken the terrorist, dormant networks that operate in European capitals.
Mr. MENENDEZ. What do the Algerians want to see? Ambassador LAMAMRA. We want all governments——
Mr. MENENDEZ. There's a question; let me hear your answer.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Thank you for that. We want all governments—members of the United Nations—to honor their international legal obligations relating to the use of their territories as a springboard for criminal activities directed against other nations. There is a basic obligation in international law, which is prosecute or extradite, and they do none of the two.
Mr. MENENDEZ. And doesn't that sometimes require transparency, to find out who is permitting a springboard to be used and who is not?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Congressman, several European countries did prosecute before their own courts Algerian terrorist operatives who were caught committing crimes in European countries—I can mention France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium—so when the threat or the criminal act committed by Algerian terrorists was targeting people in the territories of those nations, prosecution did take place. But those who commit crimes in Algeria are sometimes granted political asylum in Europe. This is the issue.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I don't want to belabor it, Ambassador—my colleagues, I'm sure, have questions, so I'll cease on this last one—but let me just say that for those of us who would want to be supportive of the government in their efforts against terrorism, you deny us the opportunity to be fully supportive because we don't have the sense of the transparency that is necessary to say that in this context the government is fully performing in a manner in which we can be fully supportive.
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And in that context, let me just call to your attention the Human Rights Watch 1998 World Report, which is part of my concern, when I read the information on Algeria. It says, ''The security forces often reportedly did not try to halt the massacres or apprehend the killers, even when the slaughter took hours to complete and occurred less than a mile from their barracks and installations. According to survivors interviewed by Amnesty International, armed forces units with armored vehicles stationed just outside Bentalha, did not intervene even though it was clear they were aware of the situation and even stopped some villagers trying to flee from doing so. The army also did not allow neighboring local militia to enter Bentalha in response to the attack. After massacring over 200 persons over the course of several hours, the attackers fled without being stopped.''
Now, clearly, we assume for argument's sake that the attackers are the terrorists. We would have wanted to not only stop them, but to have prevented them. If this allegation is true, and others that I could read, which I won't read in the interest of time, this is where the difficulty comes—in the ability to have a sense as to what is fully happening. And this is what causes difficulty, I think, for Algeria here in the Congress.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Congressman, from that perspective we certainly can discuss it further, but let me just make one point here. You refer to Amnesty International; I'm sorry to say here that Amnesty International is not at all conducting itself as an impartial organization aiming at promoting human rights in Algeria. They are disseminating those kinds of allegations which are fanciful, extravagant. And for many Algerians, Amnesty looks more like the second outlawed political party in Algeria; that is, a second FIS rather than a neutral international organization or non-government organization that would interact with the government and make every possible effort to have the government feel that they are an integral part of the solution, rather than an integral part of the problem.
This is our view of the situation, and we believe that it's not enough for organizations like that one, which have the possibility to disseminate information in the reports to make those facts not supported by true facts.
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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. We're going to go to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the Ambassador for his testimony. We had the opportunity to meet in my office the other day and go over some of these things in detail, and I appreciate the opportunity to do that.
Just following up on what Mr. Menendez was saying, I have many of the same concerns that Mr. Menendez does, and I'm struggling with those because I'm predisposed not to believe these stories, that there is a connection between the government and these attacks. To me, you know, I'm inclined to believe that terrorist groups are responsible for the vast majority of these, if not all of these incidents, and that it's almost incomprehensible that the government would be involved in activities where women and children are being killed. I just don't believe that.
However, when the government resists letting legitimate organizations or groups come in to do an impartial study of the activities that are going on, to assist the international community or the United States to help your country in fighting these terrorist activities, it makes one wonder. So I would just strongly encourage you to take back to your government the feelings that we have that you should cooperate so that these terrible activities can be thoroughly investigated, because we want to help; we want to stop the killings.
As I said early on, I think these are absolutely some of the most barbaric things I've ever heard or could ever imagine, and we want to stop these innocent people from dying and we want to assist your country. So, please cooperate and, you know, let's put an end to these things.
Would you want to respond to that before I ask any more questions?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Well, Congressman, as I was trying to say, we do believe in transparency and we do strive to really expand transparency in our country. We are going to work within established frameworks, and we're willing to have whoever is willing to come and discuss with the members of our Parliament, with the Algerian Government, who thrive in the civil society, to clarify the ideas or the impressions that one may have now.
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But what the Algerian Government cannot accept as a matter of principle, for the obvious reasons that I have mentioned, is a politically motivated investigation which we think is a disservice to the cause of fighting terrorism, since it is well known that that has been a claim by some of the sponsors of terrorism for some time.
Mr. CHABOT. Let me ask this. Are there specific instances in which the government has successfully confronted or captured terrorists while they were attacking villages?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. There are many, many terrorists who have been arrested in various security operations. They have been put to trial. That is largely covered by the Algerian media, and I think, here again, it's lack of information rather than anything else that brings many people to think that the Algerian Government has not been implementing due process of law, even against terrorists. Whenever terrorists could be caught, that is the preference of the Algerian Government.
Mr. CHABOT. OK, let me ask you this. It is my understanding that early on there were specific attacks on government officials, police officers, others—terrorist-type acts—and then it shifted over into what we've seen recently, where there are attacks on civilians—women and children. And let's talk about the latter now, these attacks on villages. Have any of those terrorists been captured?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. I'm quite sure that some of them have been killed, either by the self-defense groups, the armed civilians who are in some of the villages, or by the security forces or army units which intervene. But you have to know——
Mr. CHABOT. But just following up, are you aware of any of these people that were terrorists that were attacking villages—are you aware of any of those people who have been captured, taken into custody?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Yes. Yes. There have been a few of them captured, and they spoke on the Algerian T.V. I mean, the security forces presented them to the press, and Algerian citizens could see them on T.V., yes.
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Mr. CHABOT. And these people, I would assume, had no connection with the government whatsoever?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Absolutely not.
Mr. CHABOT. And are you able to obtain information from them that would help you in determining where they're coming from, where they reside between these attacks?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Yes, sir. There is obviously information which is sometimes given to the security forces themselves, and that helped them, certainly, to develop their security arrangements. But in some cases that kind of information is also presented to the public through the Algerian media, and even more so, some survivors in the villages, survivors of the massacres, have many times given the names, identified some of the killers, because they have been either passing though that village in the past or even getting shelter or just because they are relatives of some of them.
Mr. CHABOT. Well, just let me conclude by briefly stating that I know that I speak for most, if not all Members of Congress, that we very much want to assist in stopping these very barbaric acts, and we certainly hope that we'll have the full cooperation of the Algerian Government in doing that.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Thank you.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. And let me just add if I could, Mr. Chabot, the GIA, on a rather routine basis, does take credit for these terrorist attacks, and a number of people who are GIA terrorists have been apprehended after attacks and been held.
But let me go to Mr. Payne, if I could, of New Jersey.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I understand that in October there was a cease-fire between the FIS and the government, but as we've heard, the Armed Islamic Group—the GIA—is continuing its activities. Has the FIS considered attempting to assist the government in its attempt to stamp out the GIA groups? And, second, do you feel that there are several or a number of bandits, terrorist groups, under the leadership of different persons, or whether it's simply one GIA group that can be pointed at?
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Ambassador LAMAMRA. Yes, thank you, Congressman. I think some of the terrorist groups, which have been announcing since the month of October, last year, their decision to put an end to their terrorist activity, have been motivated by the dead end in which they found themselves. That has not been the result of a negotiation between anyone on the government side and/or any politician claiming to speak for the FIS.
So, this cessation of activity on the part of several groups, the so-called Armed Islamic, also Armed Salvation Islamic Army, and FIDA and others, was a decision made by their local leaders based on the circumstances in which they found themselves. It has a somewhat positive impact on the security situation, but it does not have any political significance, as it is not the result of a political discussion or negotiation.
The normal way the GIA calls themselves, or the right translation for the way this group labels themselves, is a plural. It's Armed Islamic Groups; they use the plural to describe themselves and, indeed, this is an umbrella organization for multiplicity of smaller groups which, yes, sometimes help each other when there is a need for some logistical support or when they engage in fairly large terrorist operations, but most of the time there is in-fighting, and we cannot for a second believe that this is a well-structured organization responding to a central command.
Mr. PAYNE. What is the legal status, currently, of the FIS? And if there are members who renounce violence, are they able to participate in the political process in Algeria today?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. We believe, and the Constitution requires, that political activity should stem from a rejection of violence rather than a renouncement of violence. We believe that no side, no individual, should come, after a few years of efforts to impose his own view through violence, through terrorism, and say, ''Now that I have attempted to get in the other way, I will renounce violence and try to get a political treatment and a political position.'' Law has to be implemented. I did mention the law on repentance, the judiciary rules on individual cases. Those individuals who have not been deprived by a court of law of their civil rights for a certain period are absolutely free citizens enjoying the rights and duties of other Algerian citizens.
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Mr. PAYNE. Well, I, of course, certainly deplore violence, but the question of renouncing rather than rejecting is certainly not an uncommon phenomenon. As a matter of fact, in Israel, the group that became the legitimate government was originally a terrorist group when the State of Israel was being formed or in the process of it, but they became the legitimate government.
And in Palestine the PLO was definitely a terrorist group. They renounced terrorism, and they have become the legitimate government of Palestine. I just question the fact that an organization cannot change, because if we don't allow legitimate change to occur then we're keeping it in arm's distance. If it's truly a legitimate renouncement of terrorism, it would appear to me that, as the PLO has been recognized as a legitimate political party denouncing violence, that the FIS could possibly reform itself into a political part.
But having said that—and you know, I don't want to try to impose on a country what they should do—but I just use as an example former terrorists groups that have changed in their ways. Even the Minutemen in the United States were terrorists, kind of, against the British, and they became a legitimate government once we got the Colonial people out.
Let me just conclude with the notion that the United Nations could possibly do a better investigation. Now, as you know, the United Nations can be political also, just as you can be political, and there are people in the United Nations who have strong voices. And I don't necessarily think that the panacea of a U.N. investigation—a good example is the problem that the U.N. team in the Congo had to do an investigation, because they came in with a pre-conceived notion, and they were just there to verify what allegedly occurred and therefore stifled the whole investigation. As a matter of fact, the U.N. team was headed by Zimbabweans who used to be on the payroll of Mr. Mobutu, who was the deposed dictator, so it becomes complicated even with the United Nations, and that's not always the panacea. But even so, I would ask you to respond to that.
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My final question is, the United States, the Members of Congress, those of us here, just have a real genuine concern about the situation in Algeria, and we don't really have any previous involvement. As a matter of fact, it's almost non-engagement, which perhaps doesn't help the problems of unemployment and development and all of that. But would your government be willing to at least entertain, if the U.S. Government had a very objective person—someone like Senator Mitchell, who has been to northern Ireland, or someone who has a reputation of fairness—we have not the baggage that the Europeans have as it relates to Algeria. Would there be a consideration of a U.S. attempt to deal with the situation?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Well, first of all, let me just try to clarify my thinking. When I was talking about the United Nations, I was certainly not encouraging the U.N. investigation. I was saying that the politically motivated call for an investigation now is not backed by any mandate from a competent international organization and is not stemming from any international legal commitment or obligation of the Algerian Government. That was the point I wanted to make.
The second point, Congressman, is that Algeria has been through a liberation movement, and we are proud to have been through that part of history, and international law does have a special status for liberation movements. And FIS has never been a liberation movement and cannot be a liberation movement. It's only Amnesty International that calls FIS or the GIA Armed Opposition Groups, as if any constitution on earth would allow an opposition to be armed. That is completely without any grounds in contemporary international law.
Now with respect to the idea of mediation, I think Ambassador Neumann did speak to that, and one has to, even if we leave aside the principle involved here as far as the Algerian Government is concerned—this is a domestic issue. The solution to our problems will be brought about by Algerians themselves within their elected institutions. Even if we were to leave aside that significant aspect of the debate here, can anybody believe that the GIA would be talking to any mediator and would be ready to listen to any voice of reason? Absolutely not.
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These are fanatical people. These are people who would be quite happy to take hostage whoever could fall into their hands, as they have done last year with seven monks, who were living peacefully in some of the Algerian mountains. They kidnapped the monks for a few months. They wanted to blackmail a foreign government—not even the Algerian Government—for the release of the monks, and eventually, when that foreign government rejected the blackmail, they just murdered the seven monks. So this is the picture.
Mr. ROYCE. We'll go to Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, if I understand you correctly, you're saying that you do not oppose the concept of some form of investigation from outsiders for the sake of developing transparency. Is that the view you're sharing with us today?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Congressman, what I was saying was that Algeria is deeply committed to transparency. It develops transparency within its own institutions within the civil society, and if discharging our international legal obligations, and if the 23 international treaties in the human rights field are also considered to be transparency, in that case, yes.
Mr. DAVIS. Do any of those 23 agreements you've signed contemplate your willingness to agree to some form of investigation by outsiders, assuming the terms and conditions are set up in a reasonable fashion?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. I don't know whether they call it ''investigation.'' Usually it is reporting; it is reporting, so the Algerian Government would be submitting a comprehensive report on the various spheres of human rights that is assessed, discussed by elected experts, and usually they make recommendations to the government to address certain issues. But if it is the wish of those people to visit Algeria, that would certainly be backed by an international legal commitment, which is not yet the case.
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Mr. DAVIS. The choice of the word investigation seems to have created some friction here; that's my impression. But getting past the semantics, you seem to be saying you support the notion of transparency. You have valiantly identified some concerns associated with some type of process that might be politically motivated or otherwise unbalanced. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be constructive for you to perhaps suggest some terms and conditions associated with some process for the sake of transparency, regardless of whether it be referred to as an investigation or not.
Wouldn't that be a reasonable response for your country to take in response to what you've been hearing from so many of us who have expressed our desire to try to work with you and support your efforts to eliminate terrorism?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. We strongly believe—and when I say we, it's the Algerian people—and I can speak, I think, for an overwhelming majority of the Algerian people, and you can get it also, probably next week, through the voices of six elected Algerian parliamentarians, including people from the opposition. We can say safely that this is not the issue of the day in Algeria. This is a concern outside Algeria, and I acknowledge that it may be a concern.
The Algerian people and political parties, I believe, are fairly satisfied with the level of transparency that exists, and they are all putting their energies together to expand the scope of transparency, both the government and the political parties, civil society and others.
Now we are not trying to work out a magic formula that would have the effect of selling to the Algerian Government a violation of its principled position just because we would have developed a different way of calling it. This is not the way this thing can be tackled. We are saying that the Algerian Government would be presenting reports based on the agreements that it is a signatory to. And the idea of an investigation is completely outside the scope of the Algerian international legal obligations.
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Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Ambassador, are you also expecting the United States to provide some outside support to assist you in your efforts to eradicate this terrorism?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. In our efforts—I'm sorry—to?
Mr. DAVIS. Are you affirmatively seeking support from our country right now to assist you in some fashion in dealing with the terrorism problem? Or are you basically saying, ''We've got control of this inside the borders of our nation and we really don't need your help, but we appreciate your concern.''?
Ambassador LAMAMRA. You know, by nature, and by training, I don't practice megaphone diplomacy. I rather prefer quiet diplomacy, and a few things that I have in my mind or heart—I'd rather discuss them diplomatically.
But the main issue here, I think, is that many Western governments are somehow reluctant to look at the Algeria situation the right way. That is to say in terms of the parameters that the truth is, that is democracy versus terrorism. Because if some of these governments were to look at it the right way, that would entail for them some moral, political, and legal obligations. So we acknowledge in our bilateral dialog with many partners, with many governments, that they have the right to look at the situation the way it seems to them to be appropriate.
At the same time, the bottom line is the international obligations of all States, and all States should be committed to prevent and combat terrorism.
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Davis. We have one more panel. I want to again thank Ambassador Lamamra for his appearance here today, and we will now go to our third and final panel. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador LAMAMRA. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROYCE. We will have Mary Jane Deeb, editor of The Middle East Journal, and Eric Goldstein, director of research for the Middle East and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. Ms. Deeb is also a professor of International Relations at the American University in Washington, DC. She has authored and co-authored many books on Middle Eastern issues, as well as over 50 articles. Ms. Deeb has recently been to Algeria as a U.N. observer of the legislative elections there.
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Mr. Goldstein has been Human Rights Watch director of research for the Middle East and North Africa since 1989. He has monitored developments in Algeria during that time and has co-authored several reports on that country.
Ms. Deeb, will you begin? And we will go until 4:30, at which time we will have to conclude the hearing. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARY JANE DEEB, EDITOR, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Ms. DEEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have summarized briefly the report.
Mr. ROYCE. Yes, please. If you could summarize it in 3 minutes, that would be very much appreciated.
Ms. DEEB. Absolutely; absolutely. I don't want to go over some of the issues that were already discussed because you have them in my report. I would like to talk briefly about some of the recommendations that I've suggested.
I think that one of the things that the United States and the international community could do is back German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's proposal to send representatives to Algiers to discuss with the government the issues which are at hand. I think that that exchange was very important because it has opened the way for further dialog between Europe and Algeria. And this dialog between Europe, the United States, and Algeria I believe should continue because, first of all, through a continuous dialog, it is possible to convey the concerns of the international community without being intrusive, as the Ambassador has pointed out. And by continuing the dialog it is possible to get a better understanding of the issues at stake, because one has a tendency to speculate sometimes.
I think that the United States should work with its European allies to encourage Algeria to apply the rule of law to all Algerian citizens, whatever their ideological preferences, and to encourage them to undertake investigations into every massacre that has taken place and attempt to bring to justice in fair and public trials the perpetrators of those crimes. The United States and the European Union should also express their concern about press censorship and the rights of local and international human rights organizations to report freely on the situation in Algeria.
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It is important, however, that the international community and the United States also recognize how much has already been achieved in Algeria. Despite significant shortcomings, multi-party Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections have taken place in the past 2 years. The parliamentary debates are being televised throughout Algeria so citizens can see what the issues are and who's debating.
Despite the censorship, the Algerian press is one of the freest in the Arab world, and despite the barbaric massacres in the northwest, most of the country is calm, and most people are going about their daily lives without fear. Movies are being produced, sport events are taking place, major concerts are being held in open air arenas.
I think it is also necessary to look beyond the massacres and see Algeria as a country with enormous economic potential for U.S. businesses that goes beyond oil and gas. I think it is one of the most beautiful countries on the Mediterranean and could draw hundreds of thousands of tourists. It is in need of housing, and so U.S. construction companies could certainly find an enormous market there, as could a number of companies—pharmaceutical and other consumer goods companies. Investing in Algeria is a win-win situation. Businesses make money and jobs are created for Algerians. Economic and financial stability can in turn lead to political stability and to the decline of violence.
And, finally, there is a need to expand educational opportunities for Algerians. This can be done by increasing the number of Algerian students in the United States, or, more efficiently, by undertaking educational programs via the Internet, via satellite. Language, business, and computer programs may be the ones that are needed most. Such programs could be set up between universities in the United States and in Algeria. Education is perhaps the single most important way to improve the lives of people and help them help themselves.
So, I've gone through the core of what I've written. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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[The prepared statement of Ms. Deeb appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. All right. Mr. Goldstein, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ERIC GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, I'll depart from my prepared remarks in the interest of brevity and also to reflect the very probing questions and comments made by Members of the Committee.
The international community of course has been shocked by the horrific massacres since 1996. These massacres, however, form a part of a larger human rights picture that is quite disturbing. Some 70,000 people have been killed since the outbreak of strife in 1992, according to estimates cited by the State Department. This represents about 1,000 persons dying every month, most of them innocent civilians.
The situation remains dire today. Although the situation is quite complex and some questions hang over what is going on in Algeria, there are conclusions that can be drawn. There are also modest ways that the United States can contribute to promoting respect for human rights.
First, both the armed groups and the government are responsible for gross and systematic human rights abuses. We have read about the killings carried out by the armed groups that call themselves Islamic. I won't go into the details; they've been covered a bit here already. Of course, we and others condemn them unequivocally.
But on the other side, the government's record on human rights can in no way be characterized as one that is generally acceptable, marred only by isolated excesses in the fight against terrorism. The security forces have been responsible for practicing systematic torture, summarily executing individuals, and disappearing hundreds, if not thousands, of men and women whose fate remains unknown until this day.
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Sometimes the victims are suspected militants, but just as often, or perhaps more often, they are ordinary, non-violent citizens who are detained, interrogated, or punished merely because they are suspected of having some piece of evidence or knowledge about their brother or a neighbor that the authorities are after. Such abuses are not only systematic; they do not lead to punishment of the perpetrators.
We believe there is impunity in Algeria, despite what the Ambassador said earlier. This is certainly an area where there could be greater transparency. If security force members are being prosecuted, we'd like to see the evidence. It could only help the authorities in their claims that there is accountability in Algeria. Any policy designed to help the government in its fight against terrorism or in other realms, we believe, must take full cognizance of the tremendous improvements that need to be made in human rights practices.
Second, there is really a lack of information about Algeria. It is not an open country overall, particularly in what concerns the ongoing violence. There is a measure of freedom in the local press, but it is not thoroughly free to cover the conflict. There is heavy censorship, and there are various forms of pressure exerted on the press.
You will very rarely, for example, find it reported in the Algerian press that Algeria's security forces are committing abuses. Foreign journalists and NGO's are sometimes let in; sometimes they're not let in. Human Rights Watch was let in in 1997, and we published a report on our findings. Amnesty International was not. We currently have a request pending for a return mission.
Now, despite the mention of Amnesty International as the basis for accusations coming from survivors of massacres—that the government did nothing to intervene, as was mentioned earlier—it is also the Algerian press that has reported on the inaction of the security forces in certain massacres. It's not just an outside organization doing this reporting. We believe these reports to be credible.
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We don't know why there is this inaction. This is part of what needs to be investigated. To investigate does not simply mean, ''See if the security forces are involved in the massacres.'' It's also better to understand why the security forces have been so ineffective in stopping these massacres which have been going on now for over a year.
So, while we also, of course, favor and support efforts by Algerians, members of civil society, human rights organizations in Algeria to try to understand what is going on in these massacres we note that, so far, no such investigation has taken place, so we, of course, favor international involvement as well as Algerian involvement in trying to understand this picture. I think that any effective strategy on Algeria must begin with insistence on greater transparency on the part of the Algerian authorities, and this involves support for access by U.N human rights mechanisms, journalists, and NGO's.
The question of Algerians rejecting this kind of investigation as an assault on their pride—I think it is true, as the Ambassador said, that some Algerians feel this way, but anecdotal evidence—there is no public opinion survey that I am aware of—indicates that an increasing number of Algerians who have lived through this violence for 6 years and have seen one massacre after another, are open to the idea of international involvement and sympathy, and, yes, an investigation into their plight. They are proud Algerians, they are proud of their history, but many of them also do not regard such an investigation as an intrusion on their sovereignty.
At the United Nations, it is the case that the Algerians have accepted in principle a special rapporteur to visit the country—the rapporteur on executions. But for months now the rapporteur has been ready, expressed a willingness to go; the Algerians have not given him a date as to when he may go. So, this raises some questions about the Algerians' willingness to cooperate with the U.N. mechanisms.
In addition, there is the question of the disappearances. The Algerians have reported to the U.N. Working Group on Disappearances about specific cases that have been raised with them, but it sometimes happens that cases they report on have not even been reported on to the families who have been looking for their missing relatives for a long time. And then the U.N. Working Group Committee is informed by the authorities that such-and-such missing person was killed in a clash. So there are very serious questions about the degree to which the Algerians, as they claim, scrupulously comply with all the U.N. mechanisms and cooperate with them.
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Let me just conclude here. The United States does not license export of equipment that can be used in an offensive capacity by the Algerian security forces, as I think Ambassador Neumann mentioned. We believe that this policy is appropriate until there is a measurable improvement in human rights practices on the part of the authorities.
I would also mention that at the United Nations, the Algerian Government voted in favor of assigning a special rapporteur on human rights to Iran and the Sudan—votes that were successful. So, we think that given the horrible situation in Algeria, it is high time for such a rapporteur to be assigned to Algeria, and we urge the U.S. Government to begin preparing for a favorable vote on such a rapporteur.
Of course, having an investigation will not end the problems in Algeria, but I think that it will contribute to a better understanding of a murky situation and help to provide solutions. And the massacres are not the only murky situation in Algeria.
There is, of course, the assassination of President Boudiaf 5 years ago, and if you ask any Algerian, he or she will be likely to tell you that the investigation conducted by the government—the conviction of one low-level soldier—did not get to the bottom of this affair. So these massacres and the questions that surround them are not isolated incidents in the confusion that often surrounds what is happening in Algeria.
And I'd like to close by just thanking you very much for this hearing, which, I think, has been useful in calling attention to what is going on in Algeria.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, and let me thank you for your patience here. Your full statement, of course, will be in the record.
I'd like to return to Ms. Deeb and ask her—you know, you indicated the importance of education in Algeria for young people, and yet there's a certain irony here in our readings of the background. One of the things that one of the GIA emirs took opposition to was young women receiving an education, and so he handed out a dictate, and now you have school buses stopped and the children have their throats slit when they go to grade school.
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There is another dictate about learning French, and so terrorists go in, and if the children in the home are learning the French language, they have their throats slit. There is so much about the GIA that we know in terms of these statements that they make, often taking responsibility for specific terrorist attacks, but beyond that, what do we know? What have you learned in your studies in Algeria about this organization, their emirs and their spokesmen, etc?
Ms. DEEB. OK. I think that one of the factors behind extremism is ignorance, and, in fact, many of these groups are ignorant about Islam, and they issue statements which are absolutely contrary to Islam. And that is the case, for instance, in Afghanistan. You find the same ignorance.
In fact, the Koran says that you should seek knowledge, even in China—that's a statement. So, the reason for the emphasis on education that I placed here is that I feel that there is a need to prepare the young in Algeria for the 21st century, and that the United States is perhaps the best country that can offer a way of helping them. And that can be done quite cheaply through the modern means of communication—through satellites, through Internet.
Universities and schools lack books, they lack computers. They lack means of moving and training the young, and if we're going to address the problems of Algeria, one of the best ways is to address it through education; this we can do. Eventually it will undermine the basis of ignorance among Islamists.
Mr. ROYCE. Presumably the media has had opportunity to talk to some of the extreme Islamic fundamentalist leaders in the GIA. What do they tell the media about their goals? What do they tell the media about their organization? This is what I was wondering.
Ms. DEEB. I think the ones who talk to the media were really the more middle-of-the-road groups, the members, for instance, of the FIS groups.
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Mr. ROYCE. Yes.
Ms. DEEB. These are the ones who are educated, trained. Some of the leaders were even in the United States, in Germany, in Great Britain. They talk about an Islamic republic. They talk about Islamic law being enforced in Algeria; however, the ones who are killing do not speak to the media, and, in fact, find the media most distasteful and are ignorant of foreign languages and whatever.
There has been very little communication from those groups, except in publications that they have issued. That was mentioned earlier—tracks that they have published, where, for instance, they have justified killing adults by saying that this is punishment, and if they are innocent, then they will be saved. If they are guilty, then they will go to hell. The killing of children is justified in terms of saving the children from those heretic parents they've had.
So, they justify killing in terms which are completely un-Islamic and which shows their own ignorance, but they do not speak to the media as far as I know. I could be mistaken.
Mr. ROYCE. Well, I want to thank you both for your appearance here today, your testimony. We're now at the time that we have to conclude the hearing, but your full testimony is part of the record. Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon.
Ms. DEEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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