SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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49–437 CC
1998
THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON AGREEMENTS AND THE NEW NATO MISSION IN BOSNIA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 12, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
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HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
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HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
JOHN HERZBERG, Professional Staff Member
MARK KIRK, Counsel
KIMBERLY ROBERTS, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for the Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords
The Honorable Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
Ambassador Robert Gelbard
The Honorable Walter Slocombe
The Honorable Joseph J. Dioguardi
Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister of Kosova
O. Terry Heselius, Country Director, Mercy Corps International
Additional material submitted for the record:
Article entitled ''The Agony of Kosova'' by Shirley Cloyes
THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON AGREEMENTS AND THE NEW NATO MISSION IN BOSNIA
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
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The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order.
Today's hearing focuses on Bosnia in light of the recent NATO decision to continue the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia for an indefinite period. As has been reported, the President has agreed that U.S. troops will continue to participate. It's our understanding that approximately 6,900 of our men and women in uniform will be involved. After an initial slow start, progress in the implementation of the civilian requirements of Dayton has been noticeable since the middle of last year, thanks to the commitment and dedication of our troops in carrying out the difficult mission assigned to them.
A most dramatic development has been the recent surrender of several Bosnian Serbs who have been indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Hopefully, we can interpret this as a sign that the atmosphere in the Republic of Srpska is changing for the better. Indeed, a new government in Srpska is controlled by more moderate political forces than those headquartered in Pale under the sway of Radovan Karadzic who has been indicted for war crimes. We'll be watching carefully to see if this new government is going to be cooperative in implementing Dayton.
Our witnesses today are Ambassador Robert Gelbard and Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe. Ambassador Gelbard just returned last evening from another of his frequent trips to the Balkans, and we welcome you back here, Mr. Ambassador, and hopefully you'll be able to discuss with us what's been happening in Kosovo as well, which I understand he was able to visit while on his trip.
Our Committee and many Members of the Congress are greatly concerned about the outbreak in Kosovo and the impact it may have on the region, as well as on our own policy in Bosnia. We're sending a team from our Committee staff to the region in the next few weeks to survey the situation to report to our Committee their findings. And we appreciate the assistance that Ambassador Gelbard's office is providing to make that a productive visit.
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Serbia must not be allowed to repeat in Kosovo the terrible destruction, the violence and ethnic cleansing that was visited on Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia beginning in 1992.
We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and because there's a great deal of ground to cover, I ask that in the opening statements you be brief. Also note that immediately following this hearing, we will have a Committee markup of several important measures, one dealing particularly with Kosovo, and I hope our Members will remain for that meeting.
Before we hear from our witnesses, I'll ask our ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hamilton, if he wishes to make an opening statement, but before you do, I'd like to recognize that in our audience today is Dr. Bukashi, the Prime Minister in exile of Kosovo. We welcome you, Dr. Bukashi, along with the delegation from the Albanian American Civic League. You're all most welcome. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I'll follow your advice and not give an opening statement. We welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Does any other Member seek recognition?
[No response.]
If not, we call on Ambassador Gelbard. Ambassador Gelbard was named by the President as Special Representative for the President, the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and Ambassador Gelbard is responsible for development, coordination and implementation of our U.S. policy and programs related to Dayton. He will be the Administration's negotiator, coordinator and program director for the Dayton Accords throughout this crucial period. And as we know, Ambassador Gelbard is a career foreign service officer assigned as Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement before taking on this new role. Ambassador Gelbard, we welcome you and you may give your full statement as you have printed it or you may summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate.
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. GELBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I returned from the Balkans last night specifically to appear before this Committee, and I thank you for this opportunity to which I have been looking forward a great deal. I would like to submit my entire statement for the record, and I would like to emphasize in my oral statements points on Kosovo and some of the issues on Bosnia.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. GELBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing comes at a particularly opportune time as we have recently made great progress in implementation of the Dayton Accords. In fact, the last part of 1997 and early 1998 will likely be remembered as the turning point in the international community's efforts, led by the United States, to implement the peace agreement.
But before I turn to the specifics in Bosnia, I would like to update you on the situation in Kosovo. Developments over the last few weeks there clearly are a grave concern to the world. We are focusing intensely on immediate diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and stop the violence. This includes bringing every tool we have to bear to ensure that President Milosevic understands the consequences of his actions. He used brutal force against non-combatants and the result is some 80 dead and more missing are in Kosovo. I can assure you that we are not going to stand by and watch 1991 unfold again. At the same time, we have, and will continue to, condemn terrorist actions, no matter what the form, or no matter where in the world. To do anything else would not improve the situation; it would condemn the people of Kosovo to a cycle of violence which could only spiral out of control even further.
During this last trip, I accompanied Secretary Albright to the meeting of Contact Group foreign ministers and visited Belgrade, Pristina and Rome subsequent to the Contact Group meeting. I also accompanied her in her bilateral meetings in Rome, Bonn, Paris and London. In Belgrade and Pristina, I met with Serbian President Milosevic and leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. In Rome I met with the Sant' Edgidio mediator, Monsignor Vincenzo Paglia, who is responsible for trying to implement the education agreement for Kosovo.
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I told President Milosevic that the United States is appalled by his government's actions in Kosovo, and that any progress toward normalizing our bilateral relations for lowering the outer wall of sanctions is impossible as long as he refuses to commit himself to resolving the Kosovo issue through a peaceful dialog and making serious progress on that.
During my meetings in Pristina, I extended the Administration's condolences to the families of those who died as a result of the recent violence, emphasized the international community's outrage over Belgrade's use of brutal and overwhelming force, and called for restraint. A cycle of violence can only bring more suffering. As part of our efforts to energize negotiations between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanian community, we will also intensify our dialog with the Sant' Edgidio Catholic community. Belgrade's outrageous and immoral actions demand a tough united response by the international community.
The Contact Group's March 9th statement made clear that events in Kosovo are not an internal matter, as they have described it, but rather a legitimate subject of international concern. It is Milosevic that has internationalized this issue. We condemned the excessive force used by Serbian police against civilians and peaceful demonstrators and reiterated that Kosovo's problems can only be resolved through dialog. Neither independence nor the status quo can serve as a basis for a solution.
The Contact Group agreed to take a number of steps in response to Belgrade's extraordinary use of force against innocents. These steps will include a comprehensive U.N. arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; (FRY) refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for either internal repression or terrorism; denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive actions by FRY security forces; and a moratorium on government financed credit support for investment or trade. We have already begun to implement these measures ourselves and we are urging others to do so, both inside the Contact Group and outside it.
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At the initiative of the United States, the Contact Group also has urged the prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal to begin gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo that would fall within its jurisdiction to see if any war crimes have been committed, and supported the return of the OSCE long-term missions. In addition, the United States has decided not to go ahead with the limited steps we were prepared to take in response to Belgrade's helpful role in supporting the formation of the Dodik Government in the Republika Srpska.
The Contact Group agreed to meet on March 25th here in Washington again to assess Belgrade's response to the March 9th statement and outlined initiatives. If by then Belgrade has not moved to take the specific steps mentioned in its statement, the Contact Group, I would hope, will move to further measures, including a freeze on funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian Governments.
In Bosnia the news is much better. The events of the last 11 months have demonstrated that U.S. leadership has produced a great deal of progress on even the toughest issues of peace implementation. Moreover, the pace of progress has even accelerated during the last 3 months. Recent political developments, as you said Mr. Chairman, in the Republika Srpska offer real opportunities to make further dramatic steps forward, including on the key issues of allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and bringing indicted war criminals to justice.
Make no mistake about it—bringing a self-sustaining peace to Bosnia is not possible without the leadership of the U.S. Government. Our national interest and the Balkans' unstable history both argue in favor of a consistent policy that will leave the region more stable.
We are determined to get this right. By staying engaged in Bosnia, we can ensure that when our troops leave they will not have to return.
We will continue our policy of pressuring the parties to implement fully the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. I will leave the issue of the Follow-on Force to Under Secretary Slocombe who will be addressing this later. The Peace Agreement clearly gave the primary responsibility for civilian implementation to the former warring parties themselves, but our role is to support those Bosnian leaders who are trying to implement the agreement and oppose those who do not. Our policy is not based on personalities. It's based on the principle of strict conditionality and supporting those who support Dayton.
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Civilian implementation would have been difficult even if the Bosnian parties had been led by forward-looking leaders who wanted to build the new Bosnia which Dayton envisaged. However, all three sides had leaders who, to varying degrees, were not ready to put the war and its causes behind them. This was especially true, of course, in the Republika Srpska, which, until recently, was led by the same clique of corrupt xenophobes that were largely responsible for the war and most of the human suffering that accompanied it.
In May of last year, President Clinton approved a new comprehensive American strategy to reinvigorate implementation. That new approach has brought the clear progress that we've seen. Most significantly, the November assembly elections in the Republika Srpska produced a democratically-oriented government under President Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik.
More broadly, pluralist, multi-ethnic government has become a reality in many municipalities and in the Republika Srpska. The return of refugees and displaced persons continues, including for the first time thousands of minority returns. A non-partisan media environment has begun to develop. Eight of the 10 cantons in the Federation have completed the first phase of police restructuring and 7,000 police in the Republika Srpska have been provisionally certified by the International Police Task Force. The power of ethnic nationalists throughout Bosnia, and especially in the Republika Srpska is declining. And many of the symbols that are necessary to show a single state of Bosnia Herzegovina, a national flag, license plates, ambassadors, currency, a customs code, a passport, and a citizenship law, have all become reality.
Our policy owes its success to a number of key factors. We have held Belgrade and Zagreb accountable for delivering on their Dayton obligations. The NATO-led peacekeeping force, first IFOR and now SFOR, has demonstrated their ability and readiness to support civilian implementation efforts when deemed appropriate. SFOR has been able to play an active role in support of the IPTF and local police forces to ensure a secure environment for civilian implementation.
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Other Contact Group members and the Peace Implementation Council have followed our leadership. Political change in the Republika Srpska was key to our success in further reinvigorating Dayton implementation. President Plavsic realized, and had the courage to state publicly, that Pale's obstructionism and corruption were impoverishing the people of the Republika Srpska. Under her leadership, internationally supervised elections for that new Republika Srpska assembly were held which led to the formation of a pro-Dayton pluralist government in the Republika Srpska. That government has now moved in a very positive direction—supporting the surrender of four war criminal indictees, agreement for the Tribunal to open up an office in Banja Luka and a range of other issues.
During his recent visit to Washington, Prime Minister Dodik met with a number of people in Congress, as well as Secretary Albright, the National Security Advisor, Berger. We told him that however refreshing his promises of cooperation on Dayton are, we expect deeds as well as words as you said, Mr. Chairman. We will hold Dodik to his promises and his willingness to follow through will be the standard with which we will judge his government.
It is important to remember that the positive developments in Republika Srpska came about, not by chance, but by design. They are a direct result of the U.S. Government's policy of firm pressure and robust action including, when necessary, by SFOR. Recent progress demonstrates that our approach is sound, and will lead to further progress if we stay the course.
We understand that despite all that has been accomplished in the past few months, much more needs to be done. Peace in Bosnia is still fragile, and the forces of division, intolerance and ethnic hatred, have not been defeated. Political pluralism and independent media must be expanded throughout Bosnia, including in the Muslim-Croat dominated Federation. Ironically, there is today more political pluralism and freedom of expression in the Republika Srpska than in the Federation. The Presiding Arbitrator for the Brcko arbitration will render his decision this Sunday. We expect both parties to implement that decision fully.
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While we have made considerable progress on bringing indicted war criminals to justice over the last 12 months—the number of indictees in the custody of the Tribunal has quadrupled during that time from 7 to 28—much more needs to be done, particularly to ensure delivery of Serb indictees to the Hague. The United States will continue to support the Tribunal strongly.
Over the next 6 months, the efforts of the United States will focus on several tracks:
First, consolidating the political gains we have seen in the past 3 months. The September elections offer the possibility of a break-through in our effort to establish firmly democracy's values and principles in Bosnia. Elections will be held at the national and entity levels in September where we hope to see a significantly greater degree of progress.
Second, securing greater progress in the Federation: With a reform government in Republika Srpska taking positive action, the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats can no longer hide between Serb obstructionism. Much more needs to be done on establishment of a working and cooperative Federation Government, and genuinely democratic institutions at the local and Cantonal levels in the Federation. As President Clinton bluntly told President Izetbegovic and Zubac during his December 22nd visit to Bosnia, the Croats must give up their separatist ambitions and cooperate on the important issues at hand, such as getting an IMF agreement and reintegrating the Bosnian economy. At the same time, the Bosniaks must effectively share power and resist their instincts to dominate the Federation.
Returning Sarajevo to its pre-war status of a truly ethnic city must serve as a model. That was why in February I co-chaired a conference in Sarajevo on the return of refugees and displaced persons. We called for at least 20,000 Croat, Serb and Jewish returnees to Sarajevo by the end of the year, identifying specific actions to achieve this goal and setting deadlines and penalties if the Bosniaks refuse to comply. They said they were prepared to meet these goals, nevertheless so far they have not. The next deadline is this Sunday. And if they do not meet this, we intend to divert economic assistance away from Sarajevo Canton to other parts of the country. We have to show the Bosniaks, as well as the Croats and the Serbs, that all aid is a privilege and not an entitlement.
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On return of refugees and displaced persons, we see this as at the core of returning Bosnia to its true nature of multi-ethnicity and is one of the key Dayton long-term success goals. We must work harder to create the conditions for the voluntary orderly return of refugees. We have already laid the groundwork for substantially stepped-up returns this year working with you at the United Nations. And we adamantly reject linkage by the parties, but understand the need for a regional approach if only because housing is limited. We, for example, are prohibited from funding housing construction because of congressional structures. We are, therefore, working with UNHCR, the OSCE, and the High Representative to develop an integrated strategy this year.
Finally, on pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia—continued strong international pressure will be needed to ensure that both Zagreb and Belgrade play a constructive role in Bosnia. Dayton is not the only issue on the agenda. Regional stability will be assured only when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia embrace real democratic institutions based on the rule of law. Both countries' records on freedom of media and democratization must be substantially improved in order for them to be able to integrate into European institutions.
While much remains to be done to fulfill Dayton's ambitious agenda, we now have the right formula for successful implementation: A vigorous civilian implementation effort, led by a forceful High Representative in coordination with the NATO-led military forces, coupled with robust diplomatic engagement in the region, led by the United States. Developments in Kosovo clearly will have an impact on regional security and on Bosnia. We, of course, will continue to be focused on this at the highest levels. Vigorous U.S. leadership is, and will remain, the key component of international efforts to restore civility to the Balkans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gelbard appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gelbard, and we thank you for your efforts in keeping in touch with our Committee of your latest report on what is happening over there. We are now honored to have with us the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe. Walter Slocombe was appointed by the President to be Under Secretary of Defense back in 1994 and confirmed by the Senate right after that. He has previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and we're pleased to have Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Slocombe, with us. Mr. Slocombe, you may submit your full statement or you may summarize, whichever you deem appropriate.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gilman, Mr. Hamilton, Members of the Committee, it's a privilege to be here before the Committee to talk about Bosnia. I'm accompanied by a Brigadier General, George Casey, who is the Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs in the Joint Staffs Policy and Planning Division, that is J–5, and also served in Bosnia.
All Americans have reason to be proud of what our troops in Bosnia have done, along with their comrades from some 39 other countries. The war in Bosnia was abhorrent to American values and its ending, with our help, is a true blessing. But our military is not in Bosnia as an act of charity. The civil war in Bosnia threatened our national interests. Twice in this century, the United States has had to send massive forces to fight in wars in Europe that arose in Central Europe and that jeopardized America's most fundamental national security interests. The Bosnian war could easily have spread to neighboring countries and such a broader conflict would have endangered those vital interests. It is to protect those interests that we went to Bosnia and it is to continue to protect them that we need to stay. It is the view of virtually everyone with experience in Bosnia—military, international, civilian and local leaders of all political and ethnic views—that if NATO were to leave as originally scheduled in the middle of this year, the progress which Ambassador Gelbard has described would halt and could unravel.
The reasons for this effort taking longer than expected are many but they are hardly surprising. Bosnia has been at peace only half as long as it was at war. It remains poised on a tightrope moving toward a better future but not at the point yet of a self-sustaining peace. To get there, the people of Bosnia, after June 1998, will still need the helping hand that only the international community, including the United States can provide. And that help must include a strong security element provided by a NATO-led military force in which the United States participates fully.
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That force will continue with our NATO allies and others, including Russia, to provide a national military presence to enable the civilian implementation efforts to proceed in an atmosphere of security and confidence. The progress in Bosnia to date would not have been possible without the secure environment that the NATO forces helped to create. Those forces have not done nation building themselves but by helping assure security in the country, and particularly in key localities where tension is greatest, they have allowed dozens of civilian agencies, local governments and local agencies, and literally hundreds of voluntary international agencies, to do their job and they have permitted Bosnians of all ethnic groups to rebuild their country.
Accordingly, following intensive consultation with the President's national security and military advisors, with our NATO allies, with other troop-contributing countries and with their leaders from both parties in Congress, the President reached the conclusion that in order for the progress that we have seen in Bosnia to continue, a follow-on military force would be necessary after June 1998. It was equally clear that NATO must continue to lead that force. No other institution could do so effectively. And America as the leader of NATO must participate in that force, because the record shows that the United States has to join in such an effort if it is to be successful.
During recent weeks, American military planners, and those of others in the NATO Alliance and other troop-contributing countries have been developing a concept for a force that can both deter a return to armed conflict, and contribute to a secure environment and provide broad support to civilian implementation. The final details of the force size and structure are still being worked out by the military staffs in NATO. But the mission and the basic approach have been agreed. The force will not engage in police work or nation-building, rather it will provide security and back-up for those organizations doing so.
Specifically, the military authorities at NATO have recommended, and NATO at a political level has agreed on, a follow-on force that will combine deterrence plus support for civilian implementation in a manner broadly similar to the approach of SFOR. And indeed we expect a new NATO-led multi-national force will retain the well-established name of ''SFOR'' for ''Stabilization Force.'' The objective of the force is to consolidate the gains achieved to date while sustaining the pace of civil implementation. We will do so without exceeding SFOR's current level of intensity and involvement. And in my statement I list the key military tasks and the key supporting tasks which SFOR will continue to undertake.
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While the force will be similar in size and broadly similar in mission to SFOR, there will be three important differences: First, there will be a reduced size overall and a reduced proportion of U.S. participation. The United States was one-third of the initial implementation force with about 20,000 troops in a total force of just under 60,000. We are now about a quarter of SFOR today with about 8,500 troops and a total force of about 36,000. The follow-on force will be slightly smaller overall and the U.S. contingent will be reduced from a current authorized level of 8,500 to 6,900.
We expect to conduct periodic 6-month reviews with the intent of making further reductions based on progress on the ground.
Second, the future force will have specialized units to focus on certain tasks with regard to public security and to making best use of their specialized training. To that end, specialized units will be created drawing on forces from European and other countries that have special training security functions. In particular, this force will draw on European and non-European para-military security forces broadly referred to as ''gendarmes.'' We will give the follow-on force an enhanced capability to help promote public security in close cooperation with the office of the High Representative, the U.N. International Police Task Force, and most importantly, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These specialized units, no more than SFOR itself, will not take on civil police tasks and will conform to the SFOR rules of engagement. But their specialized training and experience will make them particularly effective in public security tasks, relieving the burden on regular combat troops.
Third, we do not propose to establish an artificial deadline, rather we will use benchmarks to focus efforts, major progress and permit steady reductions in force levels. The way those benchmarks will work is covered in detail in Ambassador Gelbard's statement and in summary form in my own.
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I want to emphasize that some very important things will not change. First of all, the force will be fully able to protect itself. That will be the highest priority and for the other NATO commanders. The force will be somewhat smaller but it will be sufficient, as judged by our military commanders, in numbers, in units, and in equipment to achieve its mission and to protect itself and safety. It will continue to employ NATO's robust rules of engagement. As has been true throughout, force protection is our highest priority.
Second, another thing that will not change is the United States will retain command. U.S. officers will command not only the U.S. units, but will continue to command the overall multinational force, both at the supreme command level, with General Clark as Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, and at the SFOR level with an American officer, currently General Shinseki, who is also Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, as Commander of the SFOR operation. And, of course, there will be an American commander for the Multinational Division, North.
Third, our allies will bear their share of responsibility. Europe and other partners are already doing a great deal. They provide three times as many troops as the United States does, five times as much economic assistance, nine times as many international police, and they have received ten times as many refugees. But this burden on them is wholly appropriate and indeed should increase. While Bosnia is a challenge to American interests and values, the long-term and fundamental challenge is to make Bosnia a genuine part of Europe. And we expect the Europeans will do progressively more.
Finally, the question of cost and impact on our forces overall. The incremental costs of our participation in the Bosnian operation, including ground, sea and air elements, has been running at about $2 billion year. That is large in absolute terms but small relative to the total defense budget, something like 1 percent. These costs will decline as force levels go down and will in any case remain manageable. In particular, the cost of staying in Bosnia will not be allowed to impact on either the readiness of our military for other missions, or on our programs to increase procurement so that we can modernize the equipment our military will need to meet the challenges of the future.
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And in this connection I want to call particular attention to the importance of early action by the Congress on the Administration's emergency supplemental for Fiscal Year 1998 and approval of the budget amendment for Fiscal year 1999. If these measures are taken, the price of staying in Bosnia will not come out of the Services' hide—neither readiness nor procurement.
Some say that a lasting peace in Bosnia is impossible and there is no question that it will be difficult. Those who say that, sometimes say that we should end our efforts now. But we believe that securing the peace in Bosnia is important, even essential, to U.S. interests, and that a fair reading of Bosnia's history, and a fair assessment of the progress that has been made since the Dayton agreement was signed in November, 1996, simply refutes the proposition that the agreement cannot work. If, however, we were to pull out before the job is done, Bosnia would almost certainly fall back into violence, chaos and ultimately a war every bit as bloody as the one that has stopped. That would not only be bad for Bosnia, it would hurt basic American interests and that's the reason we need to stay on at a lower level, with a manageable military mission and to continue to devote substantial non-military resources to the task.
I appreciate the Committee's attention, and I look forward to addressing your questions. I should say I am—as you can hear from my voice—I'm sort of a walking violation of the biological warfare convention, so I hope my voice holds out.
[Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Slocombe, and thank you, Ambassador Gelbard.
Ambassador Gelbard, today's press reports state that Albanian leaders have not responded to Belgrade's offer to begin a dialog. Have you been in touch with Albania leaders in Kosovo with regard to that request?
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Mr. GELBARD. I have discussed at great length the issue of——
Chairman GILMAN. Could you move the 'mic' a little closer to you? Thank you, very much.
Mr. GELBARD. I have discussed at great length, and in great detail, during my recent visits to Kosovo, the need for urgency of unconditioned dialog between the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and democratic Kosovar Albanian leaders. This dialog, as I have described it, has to be unconditioned, it has to start in private, because there is clearly dramatic, and understandable lack of trust on the part of the Kosovar Albanian leaders for Milosevic, and needs to be based on the idea of achieving some form of enhanced status for Kosovo leading toward a significantly greater degree of self-administration in Kosovo.
I raised this subject repeatedly in my conversation with President Milosevic that lasted 4 hours on Monday night, a very difficult conversation as you can imagine, Mr. Chairman, and I obviously was very, very unhappy to see that the proposal that his government has come up with fails on every count. First, he is proposing that this be done with some Serbian political leaders. Second, they're trying to do this in public, and I feel very strongly this allows too much opportunity for traps to be set, to de-legitimatize the Kosovar Albanian leaders. It fails in every way possible. This is why we intend to continue to take strong measures if within the course of the next 10 days since the Contact Group statement, serious progress on all the items we stressed in that declaration are not met.
Chairman GILMAN. What are the strong measures that we're talking about?
Mr. GELBARD. First, we agreed to seek a United National Security Council arms embargo. Second, agreement to withhold any kind of equipment that could be used for internal repression. Third, denial of visas to any Serb or FRY officials who are responsible for any of this repression. Fourth, withholding all financing for trade and investment that would go to Serbia. I wanted to distinguish here between Serbia and Montenegro, where as you know, Mr. Chairman, a new democratically oriented government has been elected.
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In addition, the Contact Group requested that the prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal undertake immediate gathering of information and evidence to determine whether war crimes have been committed as defined under the Hague's terms of reference. I have requests from Milosevic that he urgently get the International Red Cross to assemble a team of international forensic experts to examine the bodies of those that have been killed to determine whether these people were indeed, as is alleged around the world credibly, murdered. And if so, second step, that prompt action be taken in compliance with the rule of law. And a whole series of other steps.
We have also supported the idea that Felipe Gonzalez, the former long-time Prime Minister of Spain, be designated by the OSCE to renew his mandate and broaden it to cover the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with particular emphasis on Kosovo, and to begin that mission urgently. I have been meeting and speaking with Gonzalez since January about this and I will be meeting with him again on Saturday. And the Contact Group agreed on a broad action plan of measures that we think would be appropriate to do such things as develop a consortium approach between governments and NGO's to develop a civil society program in Kosovo.
I would note, too, finally, that the United States has been at the forefront of this kind of issue. Through USAID we have been providing $6 million a year for humanitarian purposes for the last several years and have disbursed a total of $32 million for these kinds of programs through organizations such as the Mother Theresa group and Mercy Corp.
Secretary Albright has signed a waiver to permit USAID assistance in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—would go entirely to support democracy building programs, $3 million of which would be used for Kosovo as part of this consortium approach. So we have a lengthy and, we believe, very strong action plan to try to do this. And I told Milosevic in no uncertain terms that we were prepared to do much, much more if they do not act with great urgency to turn this situation around right now.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you and Secretary Slocombe, are our European allies contributing troops for the specialized units that you referred to?
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Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. And to what extent?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The exact numbers haven't been worked out. The idea is, I think, a force of a couple of battalions drawn as I said largely from, what are generically called ''gendarmes.'' A number of European countries and indeed some non-European countries, particularly in Latin America, have such forces and have indicated that they would be willing to contribute them to this special unit.
Chairman GILMAN. And Secretary Slocombe, has there been any change in our military operations or designations as a result of the latest Kosovo incident?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not at this time. Obviously, we watch the situation very carefully but there haven't been any in the sense I think you mean, there haven't been any changes in operations in this position.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes. Ambassador Gelbard, do you agree that the burden of responsibility for the recent violence in Kosovo rests entirely on the regime of Mr. Milosevic?
Mr. GELBARD. I think the burden of responsibility is with Milosevic and his government. The overwhelming amount of violence has been caused by the government. There is not the slightest question of that.
Chairman GILMAN. You know, Margaret Thatcher once said that, ''One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'' And you were quoted as referring to the Kosovo Liberation Army or the UCK as ''terrorists.'' I hope you agree, however, that whatever you call them, the UCK is a symptom of the policies that have been pursued by the Serbian authorities as more of a defensive measure than offensive measure.
Mr. GELBARD. Well, I agree that it's a symptom of the climate which has been created in Kosovo as a result of the repression generated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There is no question about that. Unfortunately, and tragically, terrorist acts have occurred and they provided the excuse for Milosevic here, but, as I said, there is no question at all that the overwhelming brutal, repressive, despicable violence, the criminal actions, I believe, committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia here are responsible for the tragedy we have at hand right now.
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Chairman GILMAN. And Ambassador Gelbard, when you said other options may be available, indicating possibly military options, were you referring to the possibility of our being involved militarily?
Mr. GELBARD. What I said, Mr. Chairman, is that the Administration does not rule out any options. That's indeed what President Clinton said yesterday, and obviously we're watching the situation with extreme care. We obviously want to try to find every possible measure, both diplomatic, economic sanctions, everything that can be used, but no options are ruled in or out.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, my time is expired. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is the KLA a terrorist organization?
Mr. GELBARD. They have not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization but——
Mr. HAMILTON. Did you identify them as such?
Mr. GELBARD. I said that they have committed terrorist acts. They have killed unarmed non-combatants, they have killed individuals such as a letter carrier.
Mr. HAMILTON. The United States does not support their aims of independence, is that correct?
Mr. GELBARD. We do not support independence for Kosovo.
Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask you about——
Mr. GELBARD. We believe, if I may just say, Congressman, that the U.S. Government feels that the future of Kosovo is within the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That has to be decided based on negotiations between sides and we obviously can't predict what the outcome would be.
Mr. HAMILTON. On the steps that were agreed upon on March 9th, we're going to push for a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing a comprehensive arms embargo. The EU already has an arms embargo, doesn't it, against——
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Mr. GELBARD. Yes, it does.
Mr. HAMILTON. And the real impact of this would be on Russia, is that right?
Mr. GELBARD. That's absolutely correct, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Are the Russians going to agree not to sell, not to trade, not to transfer?
Mr. GELBARD. The Russian Government agreed to support that part of the Contact Group statement. We were particularly concerned about this in light of their having signed an arms supply agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and we are deeply concerned about the destabilizing effect this has, both on the region and, of course, in Kosovo.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now you were unable, as your statement says, to reach an agreement with regard to freezing of the assets but you also indicated, at least I thought you did, that you thought they would move to include a freeze on funds abroad at the next meeting, is that your impression?
Mr. GELBARD. We were quite satisfied with the agreement that we came up with on Monday, but we held in abeyance, as was announced at the time of the meeting, other measures, including freezing assets. The United States will support that kind of measure, that measure and others, if significant progress has not been reached in the ensuing period.
Mr. HAMILTON. Would the other countries support it?
Mr. GELBARD. I hope so—that will be determined by events. Next week, Foreign Ministers Vadrine and Kinkel of France and Germany will be visiting Belgrade, as will Foreign Minister of Russia. I certainly hope they will come away with some positive results because obviously our preference would be to see serious progress in the region.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now in this 10-day waiting period that we have here, Milosevic hasn't done anything that gives you any encouragement at this point, is that right?
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Mr. GELBARD. As of this morning, and to the degree I am aware, I am totally dissatisfied with the lack of progress.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now President Bush issued in December 1992 the so-called ''Christmas warning,'' to take unspecified military action in response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And is that still American policy? I think President Clinton reaffirmed it in January 1993.
Mr. GELBARD. Well, as the President said yesterday, we believe that no option should be ruled in or out for now. What we prefer to do, as I said in response to the Chairman's question a moment ago, is use every possible economic sanction or other kind of tool we have diplomatically, but we're not ruling anything out.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, so far as I know, the ''Christmas warning'' is still on the books, and that was a warning to take unspecified military measures in response to ethnic cleansing. Are you saying it is or is not American policy?
Mr. GELBARD. I think at this time, Congressman, I prefer to leave it by saying that we want to use every appropriate instrument at hand, but we're not ruling anything out.
Mr. HAMILTON. All right. On the larger question of Bosnia, let me just say that I think the Administration and NATO has wisely refused this time to put an end date on the deployment of the SFOR continuation force, and I really commend you for that. On the other hand, I think all of us understand that the patience of the Congress and the patience of the American people is not without limit, and they would want, I believe, at least a notional idea of how long the American commitment is in Bosnia. Can you say anything to us about it in terms of time, and I'm not asking you for a date here, but are we going to be there 1 year or 10 years or is this a Cyprus situation, are we going to be there 30 years? What can you say to us?
Mr. GELBARD. I think the President has said that ''indefinite'' doesn't mean ''infinite.'' There is no way——
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Mr. HAMILTON. That really ties it down——
[Laughter.]
Mr. GELBARD. There is no way you can say we aren't going to put a deadline on and then put on a deadline and give it a time. Our approach will be what practice it has been up to now. That is to, as the situation develops, at regular intervals look at the progress that's been made, and we fully expect to be able to make substantial reductions as we go forward. But I can't tell you it's going to be a year or 10 years, although I suppose that brackets the possibilities. I can't give you a time without in effect putting on a deadline and that's precisely what——
Mr. HAMILTON. But you do over a period of time in the next few years expect a kind of declining line so far as the number of American forces on the ground?
Mr. GELBARD. The number of forces and the number of total forces. I think if I could just add to that, Congressman, we have a series of key indicators and benchmarks and criteria to have an idea ourselves that we'd be happy to share with you, how we know the job is getting done. It's essentially a road-map with a sense of the benchmarks and desired end states in about 10 key objectives. If we continue the progress that has been made over the last months, we would feel very good about the future. And I continue to feel quite optimistic about how this is proceeding.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very much interested in the benchmarks that Secretary Slocombe has in his prepared remarks and in Ambassador Gelbard's comments just now. If we're to avoid a substantial number of votes to cut off funds for our forces and activities in Bosnia, those benchmarks further worked on with the Congress are going to be a crucial defense for you. Congressman Buyer and I have been delegated by the Speaker to work on such things. So I hope that you give us a chance to see your full range of benchmarks and then perhaps to work with you a little bit to refine it, if necessary. I don't know the state of them at this moment, so that we can go to our colleagues, and with confidence, say we have some to measure the progress, particularly on the civilian side. I offer that as a hope and request.
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Mr. GELBARD. Can I just say, Congressman, as you may be aware, I'm meeting with you and Congressman Boyer, I believe, next week and——
Mr. BEREUTER. That's great.
Mr. GELBARD. And my intention would be to discuss exactly that.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Congressman Lantos and I went to the President very early, and met with him and his key civilian military leaders and the Vice President about sending forces to Macedonia. And we have, of course, that battalion there. I would hope that you're giving consideration to extending their presence there. I speak for myself only, but I think many other people believe that if you need more forces there, with different rules of engagement, that is something that I will support, and hope that you'll make that quite clear very soon.
Mr. GELBARD. If I could just add to that—one of the conclusions of the Contact Group statement in London indeed does address that point, sir, and says that we will in particular want to address—we recommended that consideration be given to adapting the current UNPERDAT mandate and would support the maintenance of an international military presence on the ground in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia when the current mandate of UNPERDAT expires.
Mr. BEREUTER. I would just say this because I know our vote is about up. I think it should be clear to the American people that, if we permit the conflagration to spread to Macedonia, it potentially places Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, on opposite sides. That would be a very damaging blow to our national interests. So I would say to the people to this audience and across the country, that the American people should do nothing to incite violence in Macedonia. I would hope that the Administration will specifically consider a request to the American people not to incite violence abroad, and specifically in Macedonia. We have a very important national interest there, and people who have these kinds of motives should understand that we will protect the American national interests in Macedonia. It's irresponsible for any incitement of violence in that country. I hope you'll consider actually making a statement on that. It would be good for the American people to understand that inciting violence in any place in the world is not in our national interest. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. GELBARD. Can I just add——
Chairman GILMAN. Well, if you would hold, we're going to put the Committee in recess. There are two votes on the floor. We'll return as quickly as possible, no more than about 15 minutes.
The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. I believe that Mr. Bereuter was questioning at the time we recessed. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. I just have a couple of questions that perhaps can be answered quickly. Have the European Governments and EU speeded up the disbursement of funds for economic assistance since last year? Also, are we satisfied that the EU is keeping its pledge to lead the economic reconstruction for Bosnia? I would ask either of you gentlemen to respond to that if you could please?
Mr. GELBARD. We've been very pleased by the emphasis that the European Commission has put on finding mechanisms to accelerate disbursement of assistance. They were very quick, for example, to provide cash assistance to the Dodik Government and my sense is that they're making a lot of progress in this area. There's been a very active dialog between Brian Atwood, the head of USAID, and the Commission and we think there's good progress being made.
Mr. BEREUTER. With respect to the financial assistance from the European Governments individually, for training and equipment for the Bosnian police, both in the Federation and Srpska, how much have the Europeans provided, how much has the United States provided?
Mr. GELBARD. The United States has been providing approximately 90 percent of the funds for equipping and training the police. The European Commission just provided $10 million ECU, which is, I think, probably about $12 or $13 million for training. This was largely, as I understand it, at the instigation of the German Government which has been very helpful in all this. They provide, in fact, about 28 percent of all those funds. But clearly much more needs to be done and we are putting serious emphasis on getting European Governments to do a great deal more. Secretary Cohen, Secretary Albright, General Shelton, and the President have put enormous emphasis on urging the European Governments to do a great deal more. This, in our view, is a fundamental in order to have refugee returns accelerate. Because we need a serious public security presence that's indigenous to protect refugees who return.
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Mr. BEREUTER. I'm concerned that, of course, our military forces and those of other countries that are involved are going to be pushed into police roles with the absence of adequate police forces that are well-trained and well-equipped. Did we have an original understanding about how much the Europeans, for example, would pay versus what the Americans would pay, and it's now being violated or not being kept at least, or was there no initial agreement? Finally, why are we satisfied and why are we paying such a large percentage?
Mr. GELBARD. There was no original agreement on the percentage that European Governments, or any other governments, would provide. But we are not satisfied by any means. The demand for funds for training and equipping the police is increasing exponentially, and I'm not exaggerating when I use that term, because of the extraordinary change which is taking place in the Republika Srpska, as well as in the progress taking place in the Federation. The Deputy Police Commissioner responsible for this, for training and restructuring, is American, former Deputy Commissioner of the Los Angeles Police Department, Mark Croker. And he is finding that there is a dramatic need for more funds. The point I have been making is if European Governments, particularly those that have refugees, wish to see significant refugee returns there has to be much greater progress in this area. We intend to press to see that this takes place.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You can tell them we're impatient. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Now let me get this straight. There are 36,000 troops, not our troops, but all together down there?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Roughly.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And of those 36,000, 8,500 troops are American troops?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, sir.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, and we will be reducing that to 6,500 this year, is that correct?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. 6,900.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. 6,900. OK.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Again, the exact numbers will be determined after the NATO force generation process is complete but those are the orders of magnitude?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, so we'll have around 7,000 troops and they will have around 36,000, or there will be reduction of that 36,000 as well.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, the 36,000 includes the Americans.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, the 36,000 includes the Americans?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, I see. So how much money are we spending per year on this operation?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. For Fiscal Year 1998 it will be just over $2 billion.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. $2 billion.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, we'll spend it, assuming that we get the supplemental.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we've already spent how much money on this so far?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The total, including Fiscal Year 1998, is on the order of $6 billion. We can get you, obviously, the exact number.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, $6 billion, all right, OK. Is there any other country spending this much money, or are we out there in front again on this?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I don't know that we know in detail what other countries are spending, we know what forces they have in the country. And I should make the point that for the United States, and presumably for all the other countries, these numbers are the incremental costs. Obviously, the troops would draw a salary whether they're in Bosnia or not and that cost is not included in the total.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. The cost of the salary of the troops is not included in the $6 billion or the $2 billion figure that you just gave me.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The cost of the base pay is not included but in almost all cases there are additional allowances that are paid.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Combat, combat pay?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I don't think, I'm not an expert on military pay. I know that there are additional allowances which are paid, and those additional allowances count toward the incremental costs.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. In addition, there are a fair number of reservists and, of course, the full pay and subsistence for reservists is included
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, and we don't have any idea if there's another country that's spending as much money as we are in the——
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, it's unlikely any country is spending as much money as we are because no other country has as many soldiers. But the British, for example, have about 5,000 of very high-quality troops. What the British pay depends, among other things, very much on how they account for operations like this.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. So we do not have firm figures as to the dollar or pound or lira or ruble costs of the other countries.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we've spent $6 billion—what would be the next best country, would your estimate be——
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The next largest country, the next largest troop contribution is the British. So presumably they are the second biggest expenditure.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have no idea about expenditures broken down into other countries?
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Mr. SLOCOMBE. We do not have in detail. I mean, they're anecdotal numbers, and all of the countries are conscious of the fact that this is an expensive operation.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you had a meeting with Mr. Milosevic for 4 hours, is that correct?
Mr. GELBARD. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, by the way, before I go into detail about your meeting with Mr. Milosevic, we've been through briefings about how our military is suffering from lack of readiness because there's not the money to buy spare parts and this operation has seriously impacted on our military. And you should not fool yourself into thinking that the $6 billion that's being spent here comes from ''Fairyland''; it comes out of people's hides and it's coming out of the hide of the military. The Tooth Fairy doesn't come in and leave it under our pillow. You had dinner with Mr. Milosevic?
Mr. GELBARD. Can I just say before I get into that, Congressman, in terms of other areas of costs——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Mr. GELBARD. We provide only 15 percent of the economic assistance. The Europeans provide over 50 percent.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how much is that?
Mr. GELBARD. The total economic assistance—they provide about, I would guess, about $1 billion a year.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.
Mr. GELBARD. We provide about $200 million.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see, is that——
Mr. GELBARD. In terms of the——
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that included in that about $7 billion figure?
Mr. GELBARD. No. In terms of the international police monitors——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Mr. GELBARD. we provide only about 10 percent and the Europeans provide the predominant amount so there's a balancing here in terms of overall types of support, and I think it's fair to say too, that in terms of the very large number of refugees, for example, there are some 300,000 refugees in Germany alone, they are paying an extraordinarily high amount of costs, basically in welfare costs, to support these individuals because the circumstances have not been created yet for the full return of refugees.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have one more minute, I'm sorry.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, you had dinner with Mr. Milosevic, or you had——
Mr. GELBARD. No, I had a meeting with Mr. Milosevic.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And is Mr. Milosevic still on the list to be tried as a war criminal?
Mr. GELBARD. He has not been indicted by the Hague Tribunal.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, he has not.
Mr. GELBARD. No, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, for some reason I thought that he was. I guess that was all of his buddies that were indicted.
Mr. GELBARD. I would not be meeting with him if he were indicted.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, yes. And you mentioned an arms embargo if they start killing the people in Kosovo the way they started killing their neighbors in Bosnia, that we're going to put an arms embargo on?
Mr. GELBARD. We already do not supply arms, nor does the European Union.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I was wondering about that——
Mr. GELBARD. That's correct.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Why an arms embargo was being used at all?
Mr. GELBARD. No, but the purpose of this idea is through the U.N. Security Council, to impose an arms embargo so that those countries which do, or could supply arms in the future, would be prohibited from doing so.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I'll wait for——
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to be back where I belong. Let me first of all, I want to talk about the events in Kosovo. And let me, of course, say that the events of the past several weeks have shocked all of us. The Chairman and I have a resolution, cosponsored by a number of our colleagues, which criticizes the Serbs as rightfully we should.
Ambassador Gelbard, I want to just ask a couple of questions. A few weeks ago, we loosened up on some of the sanctions on Belgrade. I am afraid we sent the wrong signal. I want to commend you for reversing that position and tightening up the sanctions again. But I am very much concerned about the signals that we may be sending. We used words such as ''terrorist group'' in terms of the KLA, and Milosevic has been repeating that as a ruse for the crackdown. I just think that the outer wall of sanctions ought not to be mixed with anything else but rights in Kosovo. We ought to lay the blame squarely—I know that we've done that, and you've done that, and Madeleine Albright has done that with the Contact Group. We ought to make no mistake about it, this happening, in my opinion, because Milosevic wants it to happen. He wants to prevent Albanian elections from ever being held in Kosovo. And I'm just wondering, would we not consider some further sanctions?
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For instance, I propose a no-fly zone in Kosovo because we know that Serbian helicopters were aiding and abetting the massacre of Albanians, not only men but women and children. Should we not also consider re-imposing some of the inner wall of sanctions?
Belgrade made an offer of holding talks with the Albanians on further status, which was woefully inadequate and disgraceful. Are we going to put teeth behind our words? Because, at the start of the Bosnia conflict, as you well know better than anybody else, it was the inaction of the world that emboldened Serb nationalism, emboldened Milosevic, and allowed him to think that he can keep doing this. It was only when the United States and the Administration got involved and grabbed the bull by the horns, that we were able to change policy. I'm afraid that if we don't have a swift and firm response, not only in words, but in actions, early on in this Kosovo incident Milosevic will get the wrong signal again. I'm wondering if you can comment?
Mr. GELBARD. Congressman, as always I agree with you completely, or almost completely. Secretary Albright at the Contact Group meeting said, ''We do not want to repeat the events of 1991. We have to learn from history, we cannot allow this to happen again. So we need to act swiftly and with strength.'' We feel that it was, therefore, really important to get a strong Contact Group set of actions, which I'll be going over with you in great detail later; and we feel that the measures that were put in place are strong. Now, the United States would have preferred others. But we're satisfied with the ones that have been put into place.
What I was saying earlier, I think in your absence, Congressman, was that we're prepared to examine with great seriousness and put into place with great seriousness other measures, and we're not ruling anything in or out.
The one clarification I would like to make is that the four small measures which I had announced a number of weeks ago did not affect the outer wall of sanctions at all. They were completely separate from it. The outer wall is basically composed of measures which forbid the entry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from joining the United Nations and any U.N. organization, the IMF, the World Bank, and so on. We do not have full diplomatic relations with the FRY, and the way things are going I think it's going to be a long time before anything like that ever happens. What we did propose were some very small measures, with some symbolic importance granted, which unfortunately had to be withdrawn because of the beastly actions, the despicable actions that the FRY took.
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Now I should say that when I talked to President Milosevic—I guess it's now a little over 2 weeks ago—I said to him that he was basically at a fork in the road. And he had two choices: either he could proceed along the path to which we had potentially begun to put him by the announcement of these new measures. And that path, through good behavior, positive measures involving Kosovo, involving internal democratization, handing over indicted war criminals inside the country, resolution of state succession issues, and continued cooperation on Bosnia Dayton implementation, would mean that they could reintegrate with the outside world.
But the other path, I said, was that if they undertook violence in Kosovo and undertook repression in Kosovo further than that which they had already had, and did not reverse the situation urgently, it would mean dire circumstances for their future. So he was under no illusion and could not have been under any illusion about the seriousness with which the U.S. Government was approaching these issues.
I also warned him that we were concerned about the information that we had developed about a police buildup that we saw. We informed our allies about this, we urged that all governments approach him. Some governments thought we were over-reacting. Well, I think circumstances show that we knew what we were doing. It took a week, but we were right. And I warned him that we knew this was happening, and I warned him that he better stand down immediately. So the result is going to be that if this situation is not changed, over the course of coming days, the United States, and we certainly hope our allies will join us, wants to approach this with much severer measures and rapidly.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I just want to add, I know my time is up, that I feel it is so important to reiterate the ''Christmas warning'' that President Bush made and President Clinton, upon taking office, reiterated. I just feel that it is so important. All the words have been good, the rhetoric has been good. We know in the past that trying to get a little bit of a backbone with some of our European allies hasn't always been so easy. I just worry about Milosevic testing this down the line to say, OK, we've had our rhetoric but we really have to back it up with strong action. If it means the U.N. forces in Macedonia across the border have to be renewed and beefed up and enhanced, than I think we ought to do that. But I think every step possible, and not ruling out the possibility of, as you say, ''nothing ruled in or ruled out,'' of military action if he doesn't stop this because if we don't intervene now, we're going to see a much greater tragedy down the road. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Engel. I think that the response you solicited from Ambassador Gelbard is important for the record, and reassuring from my point of view.
Mr. GELBARD. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd just like to make a quick comment to Ambassador Gelbard and Under Secretary Slocombe before going to my questions, and that is just to let you know that I have the highest regard for you both personally, and for the difficulty of the job that you have, and your effectiveness in carrying out. And though we disagree on which agency of our government, under the Constitution, should have authority to commit troops overseas, it does not in the slightest lessen my admiration for each of you and what you've accomplished.
Under Secretary Slocombe, you gave some numbers at the start regarding IFOR to SFOR to the new proposal?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. By the way does it have an acronym?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. We intend, at least my understanding is, that NATO intends to maintain the same name.
Mr. CAMPBELL. SFOR?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Partly because it turns out to cost a million dollars to repaint all the trucks and reorder stationary.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Now that makes more sense than virtually anything else I've heard in this Committee for the past couple of weeks. But I didn't get the numbers correct. It seemed to me that you were saying that the numbers are coming down from 20,000 to 8,500 to 6,900 and that the overall forces were coming down from 60,000 to 36,000 to what? I didn't have the denominator, if you will, so that I know——
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Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand, and the reason for that is that the denominator has not yet been established. At the moment in the NATO military authorities, in Brussels and in dealing with their national counterparts, are working out the very detailed list of which company, and where is it going to come from, who is going to provide that? And until that process is over, we will not know what the total is. But it will be somewhat below the current level, but not very much below.
Mr. CAMPBELL. The question I was getting out is since our SFOR commitment was about 25 percent, do you expect that percentage to drop?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, the degree to which it drops will depend on how the denominations—we know, we know what the numerator of the fraction will be, it will be about 6,900 for the United States. It will drop somewhat, how much it drops depends on the size of the overall force. But I suspect it will drop, it will drop somewhat.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, to put a fine point on it, which I must then, you cannot assure me that the percentage contribution of the U.S. troops will drop?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think I can assure you it will drop. I can't assure you of how much it will drop.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That's what I was getting at. So if it's about 25 percent now, you think it will be——
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The mathematics are at 6,900 which is about 7,000. Unless the force is below 28,000, it will drop. And I would be very surprised if the total force was below 28,000. So it will drop somewhat but it's a matter of mathematics until you know what the number is.
Mr. CAMPBELL. It was just conspicuous by its absence when you went through the numbers and that's why I was pursuing it.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. And the reason for that, sir, is because you can't do the mathematics until you have two numbers.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. I understand, thank you. Second, you said that Europeans will do progressively more and I take it that is not only in commitment of troops but also in material and in actual money outlay, is that your judgment also?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Proportionately, it is certainly true.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Third——
Mr. SLOCOMBE. As I say, because it's very difficult to do cross-country comparisons of expenditures. The reason we know how much European countries contribute to economic programs is in effect they write a check, we know how big the check is. What we don't know in detail is how much it costs to maintain a British soldier in Bosnia, relative to maintaining that soldier in Britain, or Germany or Northern Ireland.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Understood, thanks.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I'm not sure the British know either, but that's another question.
Mr. CAMPBELL. The emergency supplemental is being proposed, and I'm trying to quote you close to exactly so, ''that money won't come out of the services' hide''——
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think that was in your opening statement. So where does the money come from?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The money comes out of the surplus that is——
Mr. CAMPBELL. Oh no, please. There's no surplus.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. It comes out of additional government revenues, or if they're not government revenues, we have, by long tradition in this country, dealt with unexpected expenditures by supplementals. My understanding is that the leadership has agreed that under the particular circumstances that exist here, it is appropriate to deal with the additional Fiscal Year 1998 costs for both Bosnia and southwest Asia as non-offset supplementals. It is important to do that for precisely the reason you identify.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. That there's no surplus?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. That it does not—otherwise it will have a substantial impact on the defense program. We have found it extremely difficult to make adjustments in what is in effect at the last minute, in either the training and readiness program, the general operations of the force or in the procurement program. And in order to avoid that disruption, the funds the Administration has proposed, and we believe with the support of the leadership in Congress—and we hope to get the support of the Congress as a whole—that just as for, for there's some money in it for repairing the damage done by a typhoon in Guam, that that will be on a non-offset basis. And, it seems to me, as a matter of mathematics, that you're right, it doesn't come from the Tooth Fairy.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I'm sorry.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you, Secretary Slocombe.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I understand that in Pristina, there is a USIA office, and I understand that there's been pressure perhaps for the office to come out of the predominately ethnic Albanian area. And I wonder if this is anything that any of you've heard about, if it has not been brought to you at your level?
Mr. GELBARD. I was just at the office on Tuesday. We rely very greatly on that office. The current American official there, Richard Huckabee, is doing an excellent job. Our local staff are superb, and we, if anything, are expanding that office. My intention is to add an aide officer there from USAID to manage the approximately $3 million in funds which we have proposed this fiscal year for democracy building programs, and we consider this to be an extremely important presence in Pristina and in Kosovo generally.
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Mr. PAYNE. That's good then—I'm glad that what I had been hearing is untrue because I certainly think it would be a mistake if we altered the office because of the local pressure. I understand that the 700-man U.N. peacekeeping force's time in Macedonia is expiring, is there any possibility that they would stay in the region or perhaps go to Kosovo?
Mr. GELBARD. As I mentioned earlier, Congressman, one of the points that came out of the Contact Group declaration was a recommendation that consideration be given to adapting the current UNPERDAT mandate to seeing in fact whether it's appropriate to increase the size of the current force, and that we would support the maintenance of an international military presence where the mandate expires. We think it's a very important presence. We feel they have accomplished a great deal, and we think it ought to be kept.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me conclude by saying the whole area, as you know, with the Greeks and the situation still in Cyprus and the new military cooperation that we see, I guess, between the United States, Turkey and Israel, I think that a number of things are starting to warm up in the region; and I would just hope that we would continue to keep the Dayton Accord going. I support U.S. troops staying in Bosnia as long as they should until the job is done. I think one big mistake is this date-certain business. There is absolutely no reason, and it is to me the most folly thing to do, to talk about a date-certain that you simply will come out because the job is done. The job is done when the job is done. And I guess politically the Administration has to give date-certains or they would run into even more opposition from the Congress, but I think it's absolutely not management by objectives and certainly support the President's position, and the allocations that are necessary to do the job I think should be made available. And so, although I know you get a lot of the other side of the question, there are many of us who feel that the job is being done right, and we should stay the course. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Smith.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to first of all ask that the full statement of mine be made a part of the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I want to thank our two very distinguished witnesses for their excellent testimony. I have a couple of questions. Later on we mark up Mr. Engel's resolution. I have a few amendments that I'd like to offer.
Chairman GILMAN. Let me remind our Members, right after the testimony is completed, we'll be marking up H. Con. Res. 235, calling for an end to the violent repression in Kosovo.
Mr. SMITH. The first has to deal with trying to energize all parties, especially the Serbian authorities, to allow OSCE mission to be redeployed. I know, Ambassador Gelbard, you very strongly support that.
Mr. GELBARD. Yes.
Mr. SMITH. The hope would be that maybe upwards of a hundred people would be part of that mission. Last week the Helsinki Commission, of which I am co-chair with Al D'Amato, sent a letter to Madeleine Albright asking that this be pushed very, very heavily. Believing that that presence may act to deter some repression and hopefully will act as an eyes and ears for the international community. And perhaps you might want to respond what you think the prospects are of that?
Second, you, I think, answered this in part—I have an amendment that would ask that the staff of the USIA be augmented. The belief being that, I believe we have one person there, perhaps a few more might make it even more effective, and I would appreciate your comments on that.
And third, an amendment that states that the U.N. Security Council should consider the question of restoration of human and political rights of the people of Kosovo, and actions to halt Belgrade's violent repression of the region's population, and I would hope that you could support that, but also your thoughts on whether or not it is time that the Security Council embrace this foursquare.
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Mr. GELBARD. Thank you, Congressman. I, of course, have examined the letter that you sent with great care and, of course, we're completely in agreement. We support totally the idea of the immediate and unconditional return of the missions of long duration from the OSCE to Kosovo, Sanjak, and Vojvodina. And in fact that appears in the Contact Group ministerial statement.
We also have proposed, it was announced at the Contact Group meeting and now has come out of OSCE to have an augmented and urgent mandate for Felipe Gonzalez to go back, and I'll be meeting with him on Saturday. You also mentioned the swift enhancement of UNPERDEP, and I've responded to that we're supportive.
You finally suggested the support for the Hague Tribunal's investigation, that was actually an American Government initiative, so we're obviously extremely supportive of that; and I certainly emphasized that point with great seriousness to President Milosevic, and I think he got it.
The issue of USIA presence is something that, as I was just saying to Congressman Payne, we feel is very important. I've actually asked our embassy for a list for what USIA needs, whether it's in Pristina or in Belgrade or anywhere else, as well as the embassy as a whole; and that means personnel, equipment. For example, they had come to me 2 weeks ago and said they wanted access to Worldnet. In Pristina, that's been done. We intend to respond rapidly to all of their needs.
And on the issue of the Security Council, we, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Albania have now gone to the Security Council, asked for a meeting of the Council this week—we wanted it after the Contact Group ministerial—to report on the Contact Group meeting, to have the British report on Foreign Secretary Cook's visit—and Foreign Secretary Cook and the British Government have been extremely helpful—with the discussion of the issues, analysis of the issues, and, of course, we're looking toward a U.N. Security Council embargo on arms. We continue to press this very hard.
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and look forward to the markup to follow, and I don't have any questions at this time.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. If there are no further questions. Mr. Hamilton, any further questions? If not, we'll now proceed——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Hamilton, hold on——
Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to make a request—I asked Ambassador Gelbard about that Christmas message. I've never seen the text of that, could that be made part of the record please?
Mr. GELBARD. [Mr. Gelbard shakes head indicating ''no.'']
Mr. HAMILTON. Cannot be?
Mr. GELBARD. I would prefer that if there's going to be any further discussion of an issue that sensitive that that be held in——
Chairman GILMAN. Executive Session.
Mr. GELBARD. In Executive Session or——
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we're not going to have an Executive Session, I just want to see the text of it. If it's a classified document then I appreciate that.
Mr. GELBARD. It is.
Mr. HAMILTON. May I see the text of it?
Mr. GELBARD. It is classified.
Mr. HAMILTON. May I see the text?
Mr. GELBARD. Yes.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK, that'll be fine. Thank you.
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Chairman GILMAN. So there's no misunderstanding, Mr. Hamilton would like to see the text.
[Laughter.]
Mr. GELBARD. I said, ''Yes,'' Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much longer, and I know you don't want to set a date-certain, but is there a ''guesstimate,'' how much longer the American people will be expected to finance a military operation in Bosnia?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Hamilton and I had an exchange on this issue. For reasons that have been explained repeatedly, we do not think it is useful to have a fixed date.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Correct, I understand that.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. If you say you're not going to have a fixed date, then you don't have a fixed date, or we don't have a basis at this point for saying when all the troops will be out.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me ask it in a different way then. Do you believe Congress was honestly informed with the estimates that we had about how long this operation was going to be when we first approved it?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the Congress was honestly informed as to what the Administration in good faith expected would be the pace at which progress would be made. That estimate turned out to be too optimistic.
[Laughter.]
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that's one of those understatements that will just remain on the record there.
Mr. GELBARD. Could I add a point, Congressman, if I may?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is also true that when the Administration at the same time we were making those estimates, we explained what we thought would happen. We were told that we were hopelessly wrong about that, there would be massive casualties, there would be no progress, we were right about those.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, that's correct. For those of us who sat for years pleading with this Administration to let those people who were the victims defend themselves and to eliminate this foolhardy arms embargo which really put us in a situation where the victims of aggression couldn't defend themselves, thus they could only rely on outside help, i.e., troops in the United States to come in and save the day, this, this whole thing has been very frustrating. And I do not believe, although I certainly am not saying this about yourselves, but I do not believe the Congress has been dealt with honestly as well. I mean I think people knew this was going to take longer than a year, and they just made that the official position anyway.
And one last note, and, look, the cold war is over. We're facing a lot of new crises in the world. One of the crises deals with the fact that there are people out there who want to govern their own lives, they want to control their own destiny. And, Mr. Chairman, this is a broad philosophical question that maybe sometime we should have a hearing on just what our basic philosophy is in terms of self-determination. We've got 2 million Albanians in Kosovo who want to control their own destiny and would probably prefer—and I'll just put it this way, and I know this isn't part of the policy of right now what we're talking about, but should self-determination, the ability of people to vote as to what government that they will be under, should this be part of American foreign policy? Where does this all fit in? And I'm sorry for asking a philosophical question at the end but I think it's something that we need to be thinking about.
Mr. GELBARD. I was going to make a comment earlier, if I may though, about the point you were raising about the duration of our presence in Bosnia. And I think it relates to a range of these issues. We have a very different set of circumstances, Congressman, as you said, in the post-cold war environment. The new democratic, new, for the most part, market-oriented economies of Central and Eastern Europe are still fragile. Their democratic institutions are still fragile. We see in a number of areas in the Balkans, but elsewhere too, in places such as Slovakia and Romania and elsewhere, that there are ethnic divisions that are developing. We know that they're watching in lots of parts of Europe to see whether, not just the United States, but whether the allies are determined to carry out our mission in a serious way, and lock in the success that has developed over the course of the last year. One of the problems we often have is that we want to see quick fixes. If we don't get the quick fixes, we pull out.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. But success has to be determined on more than just stability——
Mr. GELBARD. That's absolutely correct.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I have a quote here from a senior member of the Administration who has recently left the Administration, Mr. Joseph Nye, who says that: ''self-determination is neither a clear legal principle, nor an over-riding moral claim.'' And my suggestion today is that No. 1, the United States of America should be on the side of democracy and freedom and self-determination. In the long run, that's where we will find stability in this world, by siding with those people who are being oppressed, by people who have maybe more guns, but until we actually assert that principle and until we start looking at that as a long-term situation, letting people vote to determine who their government is going to be, and supporting that principle, I think we're going to have these types of flare-ups all over the world and it's going to be an ongoing commitment of the United States. I just don't see that as being a very positive future for the people of America.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. We're trying to get our measures through now. We'll now consider, and I want to thank our panelists for being here and for your very full statements that you've given to the Committee. We thank you for your time.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 a.m., the Committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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