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2001
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 26 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
Serial No. 107–55
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
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RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
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JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
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HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
HILLEL WEINBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director & Counsel
DAVID S. ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DEBORAH BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member
PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member
MATTHEW ZWEIG, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
DATES
July 26, 2001
September 25, 2001
WITNESSES
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The Honorable William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Ambassador Dennis B. Ross, Counselor/Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ambassador Martin Indyk, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution
Ambassador Edward S. Walker, President, Middle East Institute
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: Prepared statements
The Honorable William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State: Prepared statement
The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared statement
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The Honorable Shelley Berkley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada: Prepared statement
The Honorable Dennis B. Ross: Prepared statement
Ambassador Martin Indyk: Prepared statement
Ambassador Edward S. Walker: Prepared statement
Map entitled ''Israeli Proposal for the Palestinian State at Camp David'' submitted by the Honorable Darrel E. Issa
Written response from Ambassador Dennis B. Ross to question posed by the Honorable Darrell E. Issa
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS, PART I
THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2001
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia,
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Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. GILMAN. The Subcommittee will come to order.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This morning we will be hearing testimony from our new Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador William Burns, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians and the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel.
The American stake in the region, and in the peace process, is enormous. Most recently, today's witness was the Ambassador to Jordan, and prior to that, he was the senior advisor to the President on the Middle East. Since taking up his position a few weeks ago, Assistant Secretary Burns has spent most of his time traveling in the region, attempting to reach agreement to try to implement a cease fire. We thank him for his tireless efforts and we welcome him before our Subcommittee this morning.
Regrettably, one of the parties to this conflict, namely, the Palestinians under Chairman Arafat, appear to have reverted to using violence as a way of advancing their positions, this despite the fact that Mr. Arafat sold himself as a statesman when he pledged to the late Prime Minister Rabin in September 1993 never again to use violence as a negotiating tactic.
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The United States was a witness to these agreements and, in reliance on them, has accepted the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as negotiating partners. The questions now before us are: can we or anyone else negotiate with the Palestinian institutions? Are their commitments credible? Are they worth relying upon?
During President Clinton's term, Mr. Arafat was received at the White House more often than any other foreign leader. Yet, at the very end of President Clinton's term, Chairman Arafat could not bring himself to accept what, by all accounts, was an extremely generous offer at the Camp David summit of July of 2000.
Almost immediately thereafter, he allowed Palestinian violence to spin out of control as a means of trying to force Israel to give him a better deal than they would have obtained through negotiations.
It is unclear whether the Palestinian uprising was planned in advance. Many believe it was. Some knowledgeable observers say that the Palestinians are turning their dispute with Israel into an existential and religious conflict between the Jews and Muslims. Endless incitement against Israel emanates from official Palestinian sources.
When speaking to his constituents, Chairman Arafat routinely accuses Israel of using ''uranium-tipped bullets.'' His wife, with then-First Lady Hillary Clinton looking on, falsely accused Israel of using poison gas against the Palestinians. The Arab countries right now are attempting to make an upcoming U.N. Conference on Racism, which will be held in Durban, South Africa, into a forum for denouncing Israel.
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Eighteen Americans have been killed in Palestinian violence since the Oslo Accords. Six of these casualties have occurred since September 2000, when the latest uprising began.
We are also concerned that the territories of some of the neighboring Arab countries are apparently serving as transshipment points for mortars and other arms, financed by, among others, the state of Iran. They are being used to shell Israeli neighborhoods.
What we would like to accomplish at this morning's hearing is to learn just how the Administration now views its relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of Arafat's abrogation of his commitment and how it plans to rebuild the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We anticipate that these questions will also be the subject of further hearings.
I now call on my colleague, our Ranking Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
This morning we will hear testimony from the new Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians and the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel. The American stake in the region, and in the peace process, is enormous.
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Since taking up his position about five weeks ago, Assistant Secretary Burns has spent most of his time traveling in the region, attempting to reach agreement on and implement a ceasefire. We thank him for his tireless efforts and welcome him before the Subcommittee this morning.
Regrettably, one of the parties to this conflict, namely the Palestinians under Chairman Yasir Arafat, appear to have reverted to using violence as a way of advancing his position. This despite the fact that Arafat sold himself as a statesman when he pledged to the late Prime Minister Rabin in September 1993 never again to use violence as a negotiating tactic. The United States was a witness to these agreements and, in reliance on them, has accepted the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as negotiating partners. The questions now are: can we or anyone else negotiate with the Palestinian institutions? Are their commitments worth relying on?
During President Clinton's term, Arafat was received at the White House more often than any other foreign leader. Yet, at the very end of President Clinton's term, Chairman Arafat could not bring himself to accept what, by all accounts, was an extremely generous offer at the Camp David summit of July 2000. Almost immediately thereafter, he allowed Palestinian violence to spin out of control as a means of trying to force Israel to give him a better deal than he could have obtained through negotiations. It is unclear whether the Palestinian uprising was planned in advance but many believe that it was.
Some knowledgeable observers say that the Palestinians are turning their dispute with Israel into an existential and religious conflict between Jews and Muslims. Endless incitement against Israel emanates from official Palestinian sources. When speaking to his constituents, Chairman Arafat routinely accuses Israel of using ''uranium-tipped bullets.'' His wife, with then First Lady Hillary Clinton looking on, falsely accused Israel of using poison gas against the Palestinians. The Arab countries are right now attempting to make an upcoming U.N. Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa into a forum for denouncing Israel.
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Eighteen Americans have been killed or injured in Palestinian violence since the Oslo Accords, and six of these casualties have occurred since September 2000, when this latest uprising began.
We are also concerned that the territories of some of the neighboring Arab countries are apparently serving as transshipment points for mortars and other arms—financed by, among others, Iran—that are being used to shell Israeli neighborhoods.
What we would like to accomplish at this morning's hearing is to learn how the Administration now sees its relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of Arafat's abrogation of his commitment to us, and how it plans to rebuild the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We anticipate that these questions will also be the subject of further hearings.
I now call on my colleague, Mr. Ackerman, the ranking Member of the subcommittee.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you especially for scheduling today's hearing to examine the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians.
I, too, want to welcome Assistant Secretary Burns for the Subcommittee for what I hope will be regular visits, although he may want to reconsider that after today's session.
At the outset of the hearing, I think it is important to note the historic basis for congressional support of U.S. sponsorship of the Middle East peace process has been the explicit renunciation, both in word and deed, by the Palestinians, of all forms of violence to achieve their national aspirations, in return for which we have accepted the Palestinian Authority as a diplomatic partner for peace.
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But events since last September have called into serious question whether we can assume any longer that we even have such a partner. The depth of that skepticism is evident in the action of the House on Tuesday, adopting language which I offered, together with Chairman Gilman and Mr. Lantos, that requires the President to report on Palestinian compliance with their commitments to non-violence and authorizes the President to sanction the Palestinians if he finds that they are violating their commitments.
For our part, we have learned that continued caution on the part of the United States government in condemning and sanctioning the Palestinian Authority for its brazen disregard of its principal obligation amounts to encouraging intransigence, if not the outright resort to violence.
Events over the last several months have led people to talk about a cycle of violence. Let me be clear about this. There is not a cycle of violence. There is a Palestinian violence and there is an Israeli response. If there were no Palestinian attacks, there would be no violence at all. Building apartments is not morally equivalent to blowing up teenagers at a discotheque.
The problem, it seems to me, is that Chairman Arafat learned the wrong lesson from last year's negotiations, that violence yields concessions. This is a lesson we must help him to unlearn. Yet President Bush and Secretary Powell have spoken of achieving a realistic level of violence, implicitly suggesting that our nation could accept some level other than zero.
Maybe it is not possible for Chairman Arafat to control every group of Palestinians, but, at this point, he does not even seem to be trying to control any of them. Fatah and Force 17 are his organizations, yet they participate in attacks on Israelis. For his lack of effort, he gets the G–8, including the U.S., to announce their support for some kind of monitors. This is not the message that we should be sending.
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The United States, as the invited patron of the peace process, has every right to expect Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority not only to call publicly and unequivocally for an immediate cessation of all attacks on Israel, its population, and its armed forces, but to then take all necessary steps to implement that pledge.
Our nation should insist publicly that the security forces under Chairman Arafat's control resume security cooperation with Israel, rearrest security detainees released in October of 2000, and take unmistakable steps to eradicate the local infrastructure of terrorist groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah.
Until the Palestinian Authority demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace with Israel, the United States must demonstrate that there is a heavy price to pay for the Palestinian decision to resort to violence in order to win their aims.
I think you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from Secretary Burns.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts?
Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for your leadership in convening yet another important hearing this morning on United States policy toward the Palestinians.
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Someone once said,
''If you never visit Israel, you could write volumes about what is going on. If you visit a week, you could write a book. If you visit a month, an article. And if you spend a year there, you can't write anything because you do not know what to think.''
This statement speaks to the great complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process, and I do not think there are any easy answers or solutions, but that does not mean that we should throw up our hands in hopeless frustration, nor should the Israelis or Palestinians.
The United States does have an extremely important role to play in bringing the two sides together and encouraging a dialogue that can lead to peace and stability in the region. We have been blessed with peace and prosperity throughout much of our history, and we have much to offer in the peace process, but we must be wise in our efforts and steadfast in our resolve for a lasting peace.
Let me be clear. Israel is our close ally and I believe we must help support her against those who seek to destroy her. But as the United States continues its involvement in the peace process, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with more than just political leaders from Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
We are dealing with families, innocent civilians, and children who want nothing more than to live in peace. I cannot imagine having to live each and every day under the threat of being a victim of an Islamic fundamentalist suicide bomber. Almost every day, we pick up a paper and find another tragic killing of a terrorist in that region.
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It becomes easy for us in the United States to point the finger at all the Palestinians, but is that right?
Like most Israelis, I think the vast majority of Palestinians simply want to live in peace. They want to be free to work and provide food and a good life for their families, too. Unfortunately, they are trapped between a tyrant in Yasir Arafat and hopelessness that leads them to believe that they will never prosper and live in peace.
This trapping has provided an opening to Islamic extremists, many of whom are from outside of Palestine, who are effectively teaching Palestinians, especially children, that violence is the only way to get the attention of the international community.
Palestinian children are learning math by counting figures of tanks and murdered Israelis. They are taught to hate Israelis and to kill them. They are taught that the greatest thing you can do for Allah is to sacrifice yourself in the murder of infidels, which I do not believe is a true teaching of Islam.
As many of you know, recently, two young boys, one of whom was a 14-year-old American citizen named Kobi Mandel, were brutally murdered in a terrorist attack earlier this year. Were they a threat? No. They were Israelis.
The Palestinians are being brainwashed and manipulated for the political gain of a few mad men and the longer this goes on, the harder it will be to turn around. We must teach ourselves to separate Islamic fundamentalists from the vast majority of Palestinian families. However hard it is, we must try to understand the world that most Palestinians see, and this is not easy to do, but the alternative, seeing them all as terrorists and rebels, is wrong and inaccurate and unjust.
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As I mentioned before, Israel is a close ally to the United States, but this does not give Israel a blank check. I am deeply concerned about some human rights reports detailing excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians and the demolition of Palestinian homes and excessive rhetoric that leads to hostility. The United States stands as a beacon of justice for all people, including people in the Arab world.
The depth and breadth of this conflict cannot be underestimated. Our government desires to serve as a facilitator to help bring an end to the violence and the conflict, but, in the midst of that, we must stand for the basic rights of all people, both Jewish and Palestinian.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Burns. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pitts.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding these hearings.
Secretary Burns, thanks for being here.
It is a great tragedy in the Middle East, a greater tragedy because we came so close or at least it looked like we were coming close.
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Had Chairman Arafat accepted the Camp David offer, a more generous offer than will ever be put on the table again by Israel, he would probably now be head of a Palestinian state with a progressing economy, technology—technology not only from Israel, but Europe and the United States—and substantial Islamic and western aid. It is not paradise, but it was good and it was that close. But instead of accepting that offer or even making a counteroffer, Chairman Arafat returned and started an Intifadah.
I want to say that violence of any kind as a way to achieve political objectives is unacceptable, but what is worse is that, when we view the violence of war, we usually see adults in uniforms killing other adults in uniform, and that is terrible, but it is far less terrible than what we see in the Middle East. We see terrorism where the object is to kill as many women and children of Israel as possible.
Now, Chairman Arafat, on the one hand, says he regrets these deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, but look what happen to the individuals who perpetrate these attacks. They are praised as martyrs and their families are given pensions. That does not sound like a regretted activity. That sounds, instead, like activity sanctioned, approved, praised, and paid for by the Palestinian Authority.
But perhaps just as bad as terrorists killing children is when the Palestinian extremists send their own children, or at least the leadership urges these children, kids of 11 and 12 years, old to charge into barbed wire, almost hoping, I think actually hoping, for a tragic outcome, so long as that outcome occurs in front of CNN cameras.
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Several decades ago, we had characterized Chairman Arafat's group as a terrorist organization. Today, or more recently at least, we viewed them as partners for peace, and I am not sure that if we do not see a change in the pronouncements, policies, and actions of the Palestinian Authority, that we might not have to return to the former designation. At very least, we would have to evaluate whether we as a Congress should provide any aid at all to any entity that operates under the jurisdiction or control of the Palestinian Authority.
Now, I want to generally associate myself with all the former opening statements. I do have one slight disagreement with my colleague from New York, Mr. Ackerman, who puts forward the theory that perhaps Arafat does not control what is going on. That is one way to look at it. I do not know if this is a real disagreement, but I think another way to look at is that it may be that Mr. Arafat's failure is not his ability to control, but that perhaps he does actually control what is going on and that he has ordered and sanctioned the terrorism that now grips the Middle East.
As I say, I do not think that is a real disagreement with my colleague from New York, and I yield back the balance of the time.
Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
I recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing.
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I am looking forward to hearing your testimony, Mr. Secretary.
I would like to associate myself with my colleague from California's remarks, Brad Sherman.
It is my strong believe that is my strong belief that it is past time for the United States to reevaluate our policy with regard to the Middle East peace process and the Palestinians.
In the past year, Israel has been subject to more violence than any time since the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Palestinian terrorism has been rampant and aimed at Israeli civilians, the worst example being the June 1st disco bombing in Tel Aviv that killed 20 Israeli teenagers.
While the Mitchell Report and the CIA negotiated cease fire provide a potential starting point for return to negotiations, the violence has not subsided enough for either of these proposals to become a reality. The United States must continue to send messages to the Palestinian leadership that more must be done to stop the violence.
Groups closely associated with Yasir Arafat such as Fatah, Arafat's Force 17 security force, and the Tanzim have all been involved in terrorist violence. It is obvious that Arafat and the Palestinians have decided to revert to terrorism. Therefore, it is time for American policy to regard them as terrorists.
It is time to send a very simple message, as others have expressed, that the Palestinians can either align themselves with Hamas, Hizbullah, and Saddam Hussein, or they can follow through on their promises of the last 10 years, refrain from violence, and negotiate in good faith for a lasting peace in the Middle East.
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I am appalled when I hear well-meaning but misinformed people equate the horrendous, barbaric behavior of the Palestinians with the defensive tactics taken by the Israelis in an attempt to protect their citizens and save their tiny democratic nation.
Absent this refrain from violence on the part of the Palestinians, I believe it is time to revisit foreign aid for the Palestinians. America's recognition of, and foreign aid for the Palestinians is predicated on their renunciation of violence. It is crystal clear for the last year the Palestinian leadership has, at best, tacitly approved the violence and, at worst, and what I believe, has encouraged and participated in it. Either way, the American taxpayers should not be forced to fund Palestinian intransigence, violence, and terrorism.
Thank you very much. I yield back my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Berkley.
I would be pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, would like to echo my colleague's statement that there needs to be a consistent and simple message coming from the people of the United States, and that is that the sympathies for those who have grievances, when expressed in a non-violent way, in this country increase daily. However, the sympathies for the Palestinians among all of America have dropped off to near nil because of the escalated violence.
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Violence, in fact, and the killing of non-combatants will not ever, in this country, lead to a change in policy. Just the opposite, as Ms. Berkley has said very accurately. Looking at the Palestinian aid on a near daily basis has to be an issue for this Administration as long as violence goes unchecked in the region.
I am personally appalled that our calls for the Palestinians to curb that violence which they can curb has not been heeded. Chairman Arafat has been given a tremendous responsibility, some funds to accomplish those responsibilities, and although I sympathize that this is a multi-faceted area and that, in fact, the PLO is not in control of every faction, there is no doubt among the people on this dais or among the Administration officials, and I think we will hear more about it today, that something could be done. Dramatic changes could be made to lower that violence and to give the opportunity for those items which were not addressed sufficiently in the last round of peace talks to be addressed.
But I can imagine no scenario in which the United States would reengage or the rest of the world would reengage to the benefit of the Palestinian people until or unless the violence stops. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Issa.
We will now recognize Secretary Burns. You may submit your full statement for the record, summarize, or whatever you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here today. I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the situation in the Middle East and I would like to preface my opening comments on the Israeli-Palestinian issue with two statements.
First, I want to reaffirm our long-standing commitment to achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. Likewise, our commitments to Israel's security and qualitative military edge and to peace and stability in the region remain firm. We are also committed to strong relations with our Arab partners. These commitments form the bedrock of U.S. interests in this vitally important region.
Second, I want to underscore the importance of viewing the Arab-Israeli issue in the context of our broader regional interests. In my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at my confirmation hearing in May, I said that it is very important for us to view the region as a whole and understand the connections between issues. There is no issue that resonates more among the countries of the region than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their views about this issue and about our role strongly influence other regional issues that concern us.
In pursuit of our objectives, we are fully and actively engaged with the Israelis and the Palestinians, with our friends in the region and our partners in the international community in efforts to end violence and restore trust and confidence so that the two parties can ultimately take up again the only mechanism available for achieving peace: direct negotiations.
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Since my swearing in as Assistant Secretary some 5 weeks ago, most of my time has been spent working to help move toward implementation of the recommendations called for by the Mitchell Committee. In that same period of time, Secretary Powell, George Tenet, and I each have visited the region to urge an end to this fruitless violence.
During his visit, the Secretary held extensive talks with Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat, President Mubarak, King Abdullah, and Crown Prince Abdullah to solicit their support for ending the violence and starting implementation of the Mitchell Report recommendations.
During my own visits to the region, including to the countries of the Gulf, immediately after the Secretary's trip, I delivered the same message and sought their support for our approach. In these visits and in subsequent contacts, we have repeatedly and strongly emphasized that violence and the use of force can never be a solution. They are a dead end for both sides.
As the President has made clear repeatedly, the only workable approach is the one outlined by the Mitchell Committee: stop the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations.
To move into the next phase of the Mitchell Report, the ''cooling off period,'' we must see a sustained period of quiet. The Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence. Specifically, this means reining in extremist factions, ordering a stop to attacks on Israelis, making arrests of those responsible for planning or carrying out acts of violence, and calling a halt to incitement.
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The Israelis also have an obligation to help calm the situation on the ground, including stopping incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, ending targeted killings, easing the closure, and ending demolitions and other provocative actions. And, for both sides, it means strengthening their security dialogue and cooperation.
In addition, the inflammatory rhetoric of both sides that only fuels public anger and anxiety must end. The two sides must begin to build a climate of confidence and hope by exercising genuine leadership and urging their populations to refrain from counterproductive behavior.
Our hope is to move into the cooling-off period as soon as possible. While there have been periods of relative calm since the Secretary's visit to the region in mid-June, they have been broken by renewed acts of violence, death, and destruction followed by reprisals and retaliation. There is a real urgency to moving forward.
The human toll of the violence now approaches over 600 dead and thousands more injured and maimed. Too many Israelis and Palestinians feel less secure, less hopeful, and less certain that peace is possible. We understand the difficult situation that Israelis have faced during the past months and admire their resolve.
Palestinians are suffering greatly and are increasingly without work and the means to support their families. The previously marginal quality of Palestinian health care has plummeted further as Palestinians are unable to receive even routine medical attention, have access to medicines, or receive critical care in hospitals.
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The economic cost of the violence is equally high. The Palestinian economy is in shambles as a result of the violence and subsequently imposed Israeli restrictions. There are evident repercussions on Israel's economy as well. The absence of security, work, income, food, and proper health care is feeding this sense of hopelessness and the consequent antagonism of each side toward the other.
In spite of the tragedies we have witnessed and the difficulties before us, we cannot allow ourselves to lose hope. In fact, we do have a basis to continue our work with the parties. Both sides have publicly stated their acceptance of the Mitchell Report recommendations and the need for the violence to end. In the international community and among our friends in the region, there is also widespread support for these recommendations as a road map for the parties to end the violence, rebuild trust and confidence, and return to the negotiating table.
As the Group of Eight Summit in Genoa last week, the assembled heads of state emphasized their shared view that the violence must be brought to a halt. They also gave their unconditional support to the Mitchell Committee recommendations, declaring that ''implementation of the Mitchell Committee Report in its entirety is the only way forward.''
Moreover, everyone—the parties, our friends in the region, our partners around the world and we ourselves—recognizes the very real dangers of an escalated conflict on the ground and throughout the region. Such a conflict is an invitation to extremists to exploit the situation and create further instability in the region. We must continue to do all we can to prevent that from happening.
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At the outset of my remarks, I mentioned the centrality of this issue among our Arab friends in the region in addressing some of our other important regional policy challenges. My discussions with Gulf leaders, for example, focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian-Israeli situation and the urgent need to stop the violence and return to the negotiating table. These leaders are deeply concerned about the potentially broader impact of an escalating conflict on other regional issues of importance to us and to them.
They pointed out the rise in public dissatisfaction in their countries with the situation, with the direction it seems to be taking, and with America's role. I say this only to underscore how important it is that we consult with and listen to our friends in the region, all of whom renounce violence as a solution to Palestinian-Israeli differences and embrace a negotiated solution.
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the chance to meet with you today. I have enjoyed the opportunity to work closely with you and other Members of this Committee in my previous post as Ambassador to Jordan and I look forward very much to continuing that cooperation in my new position.
We have our work cut out for us in the Middle East. The challenges are enormous and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes close cooperation between the Administration and the Congress all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a turbulent and uncertain period.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the situation in the Middle East. I'd like to preface my opening comments on the Israeli-Palestinian issue with two statements. First, I want to reaffirm our long-standing commitment to achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. Likewise, our commitments to Israel's security and qualitative military edge and to peace and stability in the region remain firm. We are also committed to strong relations with our Arab partners. These commitments form the bedrock of U.S. interests in this vitally important region.
Second, I want to underscore the importance of viewing the Arab-Israeli issue in the context of our broader regional interests. In my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at my confirmation hearing in May, I said that it is very important for us to view the region as a whole and understand the connections between issues. There is no issue that resonates more among the countries of the region than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their views about this issue and about our role strongly influence other regional issues that concern us.
In pursuit of our objectives, we are fully engaged with the Israelis and Palestinians, our friends in the region, and our partners in the international community in efforts to end violence and restore trust and confidence so that the two parties can ultimately take up again the only mechanism available for achieving peace: direct negotiations.
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Since my swearing in as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs some five weeks ago, most of my time has been spent working to help move toward implementation of the recommendations called for by the Mitchell Committee. In that same period of time, Secretary Powell, DCI George Tenet and I each have visited the region to urge an end to this fruitless violence.
During his visit, the Secretary held extensive talks with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat, Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordanian King Abdullah, and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to solicit their support for ending the violence and starting implementation of the Mitchell Report recommendations. During my visit to the region, including to the countries of the Gulf, immediately after the Secretary's trip, I delivered the same message and sought their support for our approach. In these visits and in subsequent contacts, we have repeatedly emphasized that violence and the use of force can never be a solution. They are a dead end for both sides. As the President has made clear repeatedly, the only workable approach is the one outlined by the Mitchell Committee: stop the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations.
To move into the next phase of the Mitchell Report, the ''cooling off period,'' we must see a sustained period of quiet. The Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence; specifically, this means reining in extremist factions, ordering a stop to attacks on Israelis, making arrests of those responsible for planning or carrying out acts of violence, and calling a halt to incitement. The Israelis also have an obligation to calm the situation on the ground, including stopping incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, ending targeted killings, easing the closure, and ending demolitions and other provocative actions. And, for both sides, it means strengthening their security dialogue and cooperation.
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In addition, the inflammatory rhetoric of both sides that only fuels public anger and anxiety must end. The two sides must begin to build a climate of confidence and hope by exercising genuine leadership and urging their respective populations to refrain from counterproductive behavior.
Our hope is to move into the cooling-off period as soon as possible. While there have been periods of relative calm since the Secretary's visit to the region in mid-June, they have been broken by renewed acts of violence, death, and destruction followed by reprisals and retaliation. There is an urgency to moving forward.
The human toll of the violence now approaches over 600 dead, and thousands more injured and maimed. Too many Israelis and Palestinians feel less secure, less hopeful, and less certain that peace is possible. We understand the difficult situation that Israelis have faced during the past months and admire their resolve. Palestinians are suffering greatly and are increasingly without work and the means to support their families. The previously marginal quality of Palestinian health care has plummeted further as Palestinians are unable to receive even routine medical attention, have access to medicines, or receive critical care in hospitals. The economic cost of the violence is equally high. The Palestinian economy is in shambles as a result of the violence and subsequently imposed Israeli restrictions. There are evident repercussions on Israel's economy as well. But the absence of security, work, income, food, and proper health care is feeding this sense of hopelessness and the consequent antagonism of each side toward the other.
In spite of the tragedies we have witnessed and the difficulties before us, we cannot allow ourselves to lose hope. In fact, we do have a basis to continue our work with the parties. Both sides have publicly stated their acceptance of the Mitchell Report recommendations and the need for the violence to end. In the international community and among our friends in the region, there is also widespread support for these recommendations as a road map for the parties to end the violence, rebuild trust and confidence, and return to the negotiating table.
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At the Group of Eight Summit in Genoa, Italy last week, the assembled Heads of State emphasized their shared view that the violence must be brought to a halt. They also gave their unconditional support to the Mitchell Committee recommendations, declaring, ''. . . implementation of the Mitchell Committee report in its entirety is the only way forward.''
Moreover, everyone—the parties, our friends in the region, our partners around the world and we ourselves—recognizes the very real dangers of an escalated conflict on the ground and throughout the region. Such a conflict is an invitation to extremists to exploit the situation and create further instability in the region. We must continue to do all we can to prevent that from happening.
At the outset of my remarks, I mentioned the centrality of this issue among our Arab friends in the region in addressing some of our other important regional policy challenges. My discussions with Gulf leaders, for example, focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian-Israeli situation and the urgent need to stop the violence and return to the negotiating table. These leaders are deeply concerned about the potentially broader impact of an escalating conflict on other regional issues of importance to us and to them. They pointed out the rise in public dissatisfaction in their countries with the situation, with the direction it seems to be taking, and with America's role. I say this only to underscore how important it is that we consult with and listen to our friends in the region, all of whom renounce violence as a solution to Palestinian-Israeli differences and embrace a negotiated solution.
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the chance to meet with you today. I have enjoyed the opportunity to work closely with you and other members of this committee in my previous post as Ambassador to Jordan, and I look forward very much to continuing that cooperation in my new position. We have our work cut out for us in the Middle East. The challenges are enormous, and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes close cooperation between the Administration and the Congress all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a turbulent and uncertain period.
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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Burns. We thank you for your testimony and your willingness to be with us. We look forward to closely working with you in the days ahead.
Are we even close to a cooling-off period right now? The violence seems to be getting worse, not better.
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, we are working very, very hard to try and urge the parties to move toward a cooling-off period.
Now, it is very important, as many of the Members of the Committee indicated before, for the Palestinian leadership to do more to rein in violence. There has been some progress, some improvement in some areas, for example, the resumption of security cooperation, which brings the security services on both sides into direct contact with one another, which was not happening for most of the Intifadah.
Some areas of the West Bank and Gaza have been relatively quiet, but it is a mixed picture, as I said, and it is absolutely clear that more needs to be done, and the focus of our efforts has been to press the importance of, particularly on the Palestinian side, doing more to rein in violence so that we can get into the next phase of implementation of Mitchell and sustain that through a period of rebuilding a level of trust and getting back to the negotiating table.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you mentioned the Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence. Now, there has been a lot of discussion about that concept of Mr. Arafat exerting 100 percent effort or achieving 100 percent results. Even if we were to hold him to that effort standard, it seems to me that those efforts have been sorely lacking.
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Do you agree that he could do much, much more to stop the violence as he did when he cracked down on the extremists in the past when it suited his purposes?
Of course, that would probably cost him a great deal of his support among his own people. He has failed to exercise political leadership to prepare his people for peace, and it is true that he failed to stop incitement. In fact, he himself participated in some of that incitement, and of course occasional Israeli overreaction and isolated incidents of Israeli vigilantes, sometimes with truly tragic results, have not helped the situation.
But Mr. Arafat apparently is not willing to take any risks for peace. Is he making a reasonable effort, say a 50 percent effort or 70 percent, any effort? How will we know when he achieves 100 percent effort?
Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said, I think it is clear without assigning percentages that more needs to be done.
As I said, we have seen some progress in some areas, particularly in some geographic areas of the West Bank and Gaza, which reflect increased efforts on the part of Palestinian security services under the control of Mr. Arafat. But, as I said, more needs to be done in a number of areas and we will continue to press for that.
Mr. GILMAN. Do we see him truly trying to reduce the violence?
Mr. BURNS. In some areas, sir, I think we do, and we can see that through the efforts that go on in the trilateral security committee, but it is also absolutely clear that more needs to be done.
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As you also mentioned, sir, it is a complicated picture. Incitement is a real problem and has been a problem for some years now. One of the things that the Mitchell Committee report, I think, makes clearest is the importance of beginning to take a more serious stance on that issue of incitement and that, I think, as we get into the implementation of the Mitchell Report, is something that is going to deserve a lot of our attention as well.
There have been, also, unfortunate statements as you indicated, sir, from senior members of the Israeli government, which have also fueled an atmosphere and been provocative to Palestinians and not helped calm the situation at all.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, as some of our colleagues have suggested, do you think we should withdraw any of the benefits we have given the Palestinians in reliance on their assurances, which have turned out to be without merit, that they are giving up on terrorism?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I think it is important to understand first that we do not provide direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority.
The assistance moneys which we and the Congress have worked together on are provided through non-governmental organizations and contractors. For example, one of the areas in which we focused a good bit of our resources has been in water issues, which are of extraordinary importance, not just to Palestinians, but to Israelis as well, given the water constraints that both peoples face.
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And I think, sir, I am sorry, just to finish, that given the dire situation economically and socially for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, I think the attention and the resources that we are able to devote through NGOs on water projects of the sort that I mentioned can be extremely helpful.
Mr. GILMAN. Well, we are not giving direct benefits to them. We do give the PLO diplomatic recognition, offices and we recognize them in an official capacity. Now, there is some talk about maybe we should review those benefits.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, just in another incident where an American citizen was killed apparently by a Palestinian terrorists, and yet the Administration has ever posted any reward for the capture of anyone involved in the killing of Americans in Israel or the territories on its Web site. I had written to the Secretary of State about this more than a month ago and the issue has been raised repeatedly in the press and by some of my colleagues.
In fact, a department official was quoted in the newspaper as saying that, ''The decision is being made at the political level. People have gone to Capitol Hill before in this issue, so it is under consideration,'' but that statement was made a year ago, and now the purpose of offering rewards and advertising them is to elicit information.
Can you tell us, is anything being done with regard to any rewards being offered?
Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir, I can. Let me just offer two comments. First, rewards are available for information leading to the arrest of anyone implicated in the murder of an American any place in the world, whether it is on the webpage or not. That is the first point.
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The second point, sir, is that the Administration shares the concern of many Members of Congress and many Americans about the importance of finding a way to address this on the Web site and we are going to do that. We are looking now at exactly how we do that on the Web site, but we will move ahead and find a way of advertising on the Web site.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, one last question. I am running out of time.
Why has the Administration now come out in support of peace monitors when they initially were opposed to them? How can such monitoring be consistent with Israel's sensitivities and long-standing concerns about foreign monitoring?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, let me just say that our paramount focus right now is on implementation of the Mitchell report and getting to the point where we can get into the cooling-off period. That is the focus of our efforts, is the implementation of Mitchell.
As the G–8 statement suggested, the idea of third-party monitoring, some form of third-party monitoring, if it is accepted by both parties, could be useful in helping them to implement the Mitchell Committee recommendations.
We have done some very preliminary thinking, but we would obviously have to engage both parties on what they think about that idea and then consider how, if they saw merit in the idea, to help them facilitate implementation of Mitchell, we could contribute to that.
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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Before calling on Mr. Ackerman, I am going to ask our Vice Chairman of our Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot, if he could take over. I am being called to the Floor for a quick appearance and I will try to be back as quickly as possible.
Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, we have been providing assistance to the Palestinians on the basis of their acceptance of the very fundamental idea that their conflict with Israel can only be resolved by peaceful means. Clearly, they have departed from that position.
Are we providing any aid in any form to the Palestinians that is not humanitarian aid, either through NGOs or other sources?
Mr. BURNS. To the best of my knowledge, sir, we do not provide any direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The assistance we provide goes through NGOs, as well as contractors focused on projects of the sort that I mentioned, water projects, for example. There is also some technical training of Palestinians to help run those sorts of projects as well.
Mr. ACKERMAN. And there is no other aid provided through NGOs and no aid provided outside of NGOs?
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Mr. BURNS. To the best of my knowledge, sir, our assistance flows through those two kind of channels.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. The travel advisory that has been issued vis-a-vis Israel—what effect has that had on the ability of the AID staff to monitor the assistance programs administered through the NGOs and how do we know what the NGOs are doing if the AID people can not monitor that because of the travel restrictions?
Mr. BURNS. Sir, the AID people, I think, have been able to keep a very careful eye on how the money is used, the progress of particular projects——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Without being on site?
Mr. BURNS. Well, they have managed to travel. We opened a water project recently in the course of the last week, which——
Mr. ACKERMAN. AID can travel despite the travel ban?
Mr. BURNS. AID is able to travel to some areas. Other areas are very difficult from time to time, and we have not been able to run projects in some areas because of security conditions.
Mr. ACKERMAN. The U.S. patronage of the peace process has been predicated on the idea that the conflict between the parties was a political one and that they have to come together to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. Increasingly, the Palestinians, with support from other predominantly Arab countries, are trying to redefine in legal terms their conflict as international aggression and they are seeking the security council to mandate intervention and they have classified Israeli actions in completely different than political terms but in legal terms, using such phrases as ''war crimes,'' ''atrocities,'' ''holocausts,'' ''crimes against humanity,'' and they therefore conclude that their attack against Israel is legitimate resistance.
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Does the United States view this conflict as a political issue, as we have always in the past, or a legal one, as the Palestinian Authority and others would now seek to recast it?
Mr. BURNS. I think the issue is one that can only be resolved through a political process and that is through direct negotiations between the two parties. That has been the whole premise of our approach and that remains the foundation.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would like to return to a question that Chairman Gilman raised, which is of some concern to quite a number of us, and that is the lack of posting on the Web site, whereas the Web site lists rewards for Americans who were killed by terrorists almost anywhere else in the world, and you stated that the rewards are nonetheless available even if they are not posted on the Web site.
I have been in places in the world where U.S. citizens have been killed or terrorized. In some places, it is on the Web site, in almost all places, it is on the Web site, but in other places, that is augmented by flyers and people going around and putting things on poles and letting people know. Is such a program in existence in Israel?
Mr. BURNS. As I said, sir, we are going to find a way to put it on the Web site. There are different forms that are used in different—regarding different countries around the world.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, but none of them are used in Israel, it that seems like that is a glaring omission, which is problematic, which if you add on to that the fact that I assume is a fact, I have been told, that the U.S. Embassy in Israel has refused to send representatives to the funerals of Americans who have been killed by terrorists. Could you explain that?
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Mr. BURNS. I am not sure that is true, sir, but I will check on it. I can not imagine that that is the case.
Mr. CHABOT. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Secretary, on April 28th in a rare session with foreign journalists, Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat was questioned about his intention to arrest Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists believed by Israel to be involved in acts of deadly violence against Israelis over the past months.
Chairman Arafat replied publicly in English, and I quote,
''I am not looking for Hamas or for Islamic Jihad or any other parties because we respect all these parties and there is a union between all of us.''
Given that the U.S.-Palestinian relationship is predicated on the PLO's renunciation of terrorism and violence, that Arafat had officially disavowed the use of terrorism and violence on numerous occasions to the United States Government and had committed to work against terrorism and incitement in innumerable forums throughout the peace process, including in recent meetings with yourself and Mr. Tenet, many find troubling his declared union and respect for Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
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Numerous statements have confirmed the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and these terrorists. For example, Marwan Barghouti, head of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO and the West Bank and a champion of Palestinian violence against Israel, stated in the New Yorker that Fatah is working with the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, formerly regarded as a rejectionist group, vis-a-vis Arafat.
In fact, Barghouti said, ''We are all fighting together now,'' before lamenting the capture of a boat load of weapons from Lebanon to the Palestinian Authority-controlled territory by the IDF.
Given these declarations by Arafat and Barghouti, do you believe that Chairman Arafat is making a 100 percent effort to fight terrorism and incitement to violence amongst the Palestinian people and what percent effort would you say he is now making?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, as I said before, I can not assign a percentage except to say that it is absolutely clear that more needs to be done. More needs to be done to rein in violence, more needs to be done to curb incitement, which as I said before, has had a poisonous effect, not just over the last 10 months, but for years before that as well. So it is——
Mr. CHABOT. Would you be willing to say that a lot more effort is required on his part?
Mr. BURNS. I think it is true that a good deal more effort is required.
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Mr. CHABOT. I would agree with that.
How can we ensure that there will be greater Palestinian compliance to their agreements? And do you agree that the basis of our relations with the Palestinians was their renunciation of violence and terrorism?
Mr. BURNS. I think it was one of the most important foundations, and it remains one of the most important foundations of the relationship, I think, coupled with a commitment to getting back to a political process and resolving the conflict through political means.
Violence, as I said before, is a dead end. It has to be made clear to people that it is a dead end, but it also has to be made clear that there is a political process that will work. There is a way to address the economic problems that people have. There is a way of reviving a sense of trust and confidence which does not exist now, and that does require efforts on the part of both sides.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My next question, State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said in April that it was, ''Outrageous and deplorable,'' that Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeni said that, ''Jews exaggerated the extent of the Holocaust to gain international sympathy.''
Yet Reeker said nothing about the fact that the official Palestinian Authority newspaper published an article in its April 13, 2001 edition calling the Holocaust a fable and saying that,
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''The figure of 6 million Jews cremated in the Nazi Auschwitz camps is a lie for propaganda as the most spacious vaults in the camp could not have even held 1 percent of that number. When Zionism cannot find an enemy to separate and repel the Jews, it invents such an enemy and so was the case with the Holocaust.''
The State Department has also said nothing about the fact that the Egyptian government newspaper published an article in its April 18, 2001 edition which declared,
''Thanks to Hitler, blessed memory, who, on behalf of the Palestinians revenged an advance against the most vile criminals on the face of the earth, although we do have a complaint against him, for his revenge on them was not enough.''
Is it not strange that the State Department so forcefully condemns Holocaust denial statements by Iranian officials yet remains silent in the face of identical Holocaust denial statements by the Egyptian government and Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority officials?
Do you agree the Arafat and Egypt should be immune from criticism?
Mr. BURNS. The kind of comments that you just read, sir, are ugly and reprehensible and there is no excuse for them, whomever they come from.
Mr. CHABOT. And do you agree that we should be equally critical, whoever makes those kinds of comments?
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Mr. BURNS. The statements that you read, whomever made them, are ugly and reprehensible and there is no excuse for them.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CHABOT. I would be happy to yield. I will grant myself an additional minute and yield to the gentleman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chairman, and I thank the Chairman for bringing this up, although to some it might seem to be an extraneous comment, but within the seeds of the thought that the Chairman just read expressed by somebody else is the entire genesis of the argument of the Palestinians.
Israel, having been created by the United Nations and the international community because the Jewish people had no place to go when they were being annihilated by Hitler in all countries throughout the world where he could reach, they formed in addition to the country called Jordan, a country predominantly Palestinian, they formed a Jewish state, which was Israel.
If the Holocaust is denied, as is this current game plan which is part of a new overall strategy to discuss this in legal rather than political differences, denying the Holocaust and selling that notion internationally undermines the whole intention and contention for the existence of the state of Israel, and that is really what those statements are all about. It is not just another Hitler-denying, Holocaust-denying program. This is to delegitimize the very establishment of the state.
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And I thank the Chairman for bringing that up.
Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for making those very important points and I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. It is, I think, clear that there are differences of opinion between us and others on the one hand and the Palestinian Authority on the other and that it is not an easy thing for Arafat to control some of the entities that operate in his territory.
On the other hand, I would like to put a chart into the record that shows that since June 13th when the Tenet plan was adopted, there have been between five and roughly 30 acts of violence by the Palestinian side every day.
Do you agree that Arafat could do a better job of controlling the violence, and if ultimately Arafat cannot control armed groups operating on territory he ''controls,'' does it make any sense to go through with the Mitchell plan in which Israel negotiates concessions with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government then must deliver those concessions and then the Palestinian Authority, having no power, does not have to do anything because they allegedly can not do anything?
So can Arafat do more and does it make sense for us to push forward with negotiations if he does not have the ability to deliver?
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Mr. BURNS. I think, sir, to answer your questions, that he can do more. I think the advantage of the Mitchell report is that it provides a bridge back to a negotiating process. It does not prescribe how the negotiating process is going to work, but it is a pathway to rebuild a sense of trust between people and to find a way to sustain a cessation of violence in the interest of both peoples, and that requires steps on the part of both Palestinians and Israelis.
But the first and primary step is to rein in violence, and that is what we are working so hard to do now. But as Senator Mitchell and his colleagues pointed out very clearly, in order to sustain that cessation of violence, in order to sustain that serious effort, you have got to be able to move in to the rest of the Mitchell process so that both sides can see a sense of hope and can see that there is a political process that holds out a way of addressing their concerns and frustrations in a way that violence never will.
So I think that is the logic, sir, behind trying to move into Mitchell, but we have to see a serious effort to rein in violence.
Mr. SHERMAN. Shifting to Egypt, one of the decisions this country has to make is how much aid to provide Egypt and whether to mark that as military or economic aid. Now, money is fungible so, frankly, how we mark it is of only slight significance.
Since the Oslo Accords, Egypt has done a great deal to arm itself. It has spent in the neighborhood of $5 billion a year on defense at a time when it itself is a very poor country and it has very little in the way of military threats from its neighbors.
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Is this level of military spending something that we should encourage or subsidize and what is the state of talks between Egypt and North Korea regarding the acquisition of the No Dong class missile with an 800-mile range and does it make sense for us to be providing money to Egypt if they spend this fungible money on something like an 800-mile range missile?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, on the second question that you asked, we have been in touch directly with some Members of the Committee and in a different forum, I would be glad to come up and discuss that with you as well on the recent conversations that we have had.
Mr. SHERMAN. Has the United States publicly opposed the acquisition of this missile by Egypt?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, we have been quite concerned about the whole problem of missile proliferation in the region, but I would be glad to come up and brief you in detail in a classified forum on that issue, and, as I said, we have been in touch with other Members of the Committee as well.
Sir, on the broader question about our security assistance for Egypt, I think it is very important to understand that this is an investment, as you well know, in our own security interests in the region. Egypt has been an important coalition partner for us. Ten years ago at Desert Storm, Egypt contributed, after the U.S. and Britain, the largest number of troops to the coalition at that time.
We have a very active exercise relationship with the Egyptians. The biggest military exercise we participate any place in the word is Bright Star, which the Egyptians host. The Egyptians play a critical role in protecting air and sea lanes through the Suez Canal, which are very important to us. Our security assistance relationship——
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Mr. SHERMAN. Those air and sea lanes—are France and Britain planning to reconquer the Suez Canal or is there some other military force? I realize there is terrorism everywhere, but I am talking about $5 billion a year being spent on military, tanks, and planes. I think the Russian navy is no longer a threat to the Suez Canal, so these air and sea lanes that Egypt is defending, who are they defending them from?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think the Egyptians have their own security concerns as do we about whether it is the Iranians or other countries in the region, but I think it is also important to note that we have built a fair amount of interoperability between our military, the Egyptians', and other militaries in the region, which really does serve our own security interests. So I think that our security assistance to Egypt over the years has been a very good investment, for us as well as for the Egyptians.
Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony.
The Palestinians are now using mortars and other forms of heavier weaponry against Israel. From where do the Palestinians obtain these heavier weapons and what can the Administration do, if anything, to prevent the flow of weapons to the Palestinian?
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Is there any evidence that U.S. foreign assistance is freeing up Palestinian money for the purchase of weaponry?
Mr. BURNS. On the last question, sir, I know of no evidence to suggest that. We are obviously very much concerned about the smuggling of weaponry into the territories.
There is also a problem with regard to home-grown mortars and factories, some of which the Palestinian Authority has actually raided and closed down, but more of which are operating, and so it is a very serious problem that has to be addressed. I agree with you.
Mr. PITTS. And from where are these coming?
Mr. BURNS. Well, the home-grown ones, as I said with mortars, can be produced in local factories. The technology is not very complicated.
Mr. PITTS. Those that are not home-grown?
Mr. BURNS. There has been some concern about Iranian funding and support for weaponry that has gotten into Gaza, for example, which is, given the fragility of the situation there, a real concern.
Mr. PITTS. And what has the U.S. done or what can we do to prevent that flow of illegal weapons?
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Mr. BURNS. Well, I think we need to continue to work with the parties, with our friends in the region who can control their own borders, whether it is the Egyptians or others. We exchange a lot of information with other parties to help them, at least, have a clear picture of the problem and we will continue to do that.
Mr. PITTS. Okay. Well, many Israelis from all political stripes now no longer consider Arafat a partner for peace. What is the Administration's view of Arafat at this time?
Does the Administration agree with the comments of the former Ambassador Martin Indyk that recent events demonstrate that Arafat has not forgone violence as a tool of political negotiations?
Mr. BURNS. I think we engage Arafat and the rest of the Palestinian leadership as the leaders of the Palestinians and the people with whom we have to work and whom we have to push in the direction of doing more to rein in violence and get us back to a political process, which is the only way to restore a sense of hope for Palestinians. And, so I think the direct engagement that we have with Arafat and with others in the Palestinian leadership is important so that we, as bluntly and candidly as we can, can impress upon them the importance of reining in violence and moving toward a political process. That is the only way in which Palestinians are going to be able to achieve a settlement.
Mr. PITTS. What has the United States done to pressure Arafat to rearrest Hamas and other Palestinian terrorists?
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Mr. BURNS. That has been among the subjects we have raised directly with him a number of times; that is the importance of resuming counter-terrorism cooperation and the importance of moving decisively to prevent acts of terror and to act against those who are planning it. And that is a feature of almost every conversation we have had recently.
Mr. PITTS. And why has Arafat not rearrested those terrorists?
Mr. BURNS. Well, there have been some actions taken. There had been some arrests made, but as I said before when I was talking about the broader category, there is much more that needs to be done.
Mr. PITTS. Now, there are differences of opinion on the benefits of U.S. aid to Palestinians. What has U.S. assistance done to the Palestinian economy and how has our aid improved U.S. influence with the Palestinians?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, again, if you just take the example of water projects, whether it is waste water treatment facilities or a similar project, water constraints are among the biggest problems that Palestinians face in terms of economic development. It is an enormous problem for Israel as well as for Jordan and other countries in the region. So I think the efforts that we make to make better use of existing water resources for Palestinians are a direct benefit to Palestinian people and to their potential for economic development. And it also frees up resources for Israel and other countries in the region as well. So, that is just one example of the way in which our assistance moneys, I think, do make a difference for Palestinians.
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Mr. PITTS. Is there any demonstration that it has increased our influence with the Palestinians?
Mr. BURNS. I think it contributes to improving the standard of living of Palestinians, to helping to avoid an even more dire situation for many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I think it is also appreciated by Palestinians who have the benefit, ordinary Palestinians who would not otherwise have the same access to water. So I think, in that sense, it is appreciated. I could not measure the influence more broadly in terms of policy or the behavior of——
Mr. PITTS. Well, just how much control does Arafat exercise? In the Administration's view, could he end the violence if he were completely committed to doing so?
Mr. BURNS. I am not sure that he could end the violence completely. I think he has a significant degree of control and I think it is important for him to exercise all of the control that he has.
Mr. PITTS. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Pitts.
Ms. Berkley, the gentlelady from Nevada.
Ms. BERKLEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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I would like to hearken back to your testimony where you talked about the quality of health care plummeting for the Palestinians and the living conditions being inhumane and unemployment rampant and the feeling of hopelessness that is growing, but I would like to submit to you that these conditions are, in my opinion, a direct result of Yasir Arafat walking away from the Camp David negotiations.
None of this had to be, and as Mr. Sherman stated in his testimony, we could be enjoying peace and prosperity in that region now, had the parties reached an accord, and it was not the Israelis that kept that from happening.
I have not been in Congress very long, but I have been very involved in Middle East issues for many, many years as a citizen activist. For many years, we would listen to Yasir Arafat's speeches translated in English that were very conciliatory and appeared to American audiences that he was, in fact, a true partner in peace.
We would also be privy to his speeches in Arabic, and to people in the Arab world and the Palestinians, it had a decidedly different flavor in the rhetoric that was not at all conciliatory and was quite explosive.
Now, we were told by the State Department year after year after year that this is what he had to say in the Arab world in order to maintain his position and that he was truly a moderate and what he was saying in English or to American audiences was how he really felt.
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Now, I did not believe that then and I think his behavior, as of the past year, emphasizes my position that he has no intentions of sitting down as a true partner for peace and negotiating a true piece for all the people in the region.
Having said that, and I know that other people have asked this question, but let me ask it in a different way. Do you believe that Yasir Arafat has any control over the terrorist violence in the region?
Mr. BURNS. Yes, ma'am. I do believe he has a significant degree of control, not total control.
Ms. BERKLEY. Then what do we do as the American government to ensure that he exercises that control? Because we have not done a very good job convincing him that there is a price to pay for not doing what he has promised to do?
Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, we have pressed him at the highest levels of our government and we continue to urge him to recognize that reining in violence is the paramount concern right now and it is a pathway to get back to the kind of process that offers real hope for Palestinians, both in terms of economic problems, as well as a potential for a political process.
Ms. BERKLEY. Well, how long do we continue to urge him before there is a price to pay for his not doing what he continues to promise to do?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, in many ways, Palestinians are paying a price. As you said, conditions are awful. I think it is very clear to Palestinians as well as to Israelis because, as one of your colleagues said earlier, I do believe that the vast majority of both Israelis and Palestinians want a peaceful solution and that the kind of extremist rhetoric that you see still represents a minority of both populations. But that is why it is so important for us to continue to press as hard as we can, because the pathway that the Palestinians are on now is a dead end and the virtue of Mitchell, as I mentioned before, is that it does offer a way to get back to a political process.
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It does hold out things that, if the Palestinians are able to fulfill their obligations with regard to violence, offer a pathway to lift the closure, to end the kind of restrictive practices which make it so hard for Palestinians to live in the West Bank and Gaza right now. It offers a way of addressing concerns of incitement and the kind of rhetoric on both sides that really do make it more difficult to get out of the deep hole that the two parties are in right now and get back to a political process.
There is no magic formula beyond us, I think, continuing to push as hard as we can to take advantage of that opportunity because, otherwise, it is a pretty dismal future.
Ms. BERKLEY. The current conditions are completely unacceptable for both peoples, but I will submit to you that Arafat is not paying a price. His people are, but what Arafat has managed to do is blame the Israelis for their plight and they are becoming increasingly angrier at the Israelis as opposed to their own leadership for the position that they find themselves in now.
Let me just switch. It was widely reported recently that former President George Bush assured the Saudis that his son's heart was in the right place. Can you explain that statement?
Mr. BURNS. All I know about that is the press report that I saw.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.
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The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary.
A little while ago, you talked briefly about the G–8 statement calling for the monitors, and last week, I believe the United States supported that. My question to you is what countries do you see participating in this force to comprise the monitors and what international authority would have jurisdiction over it and do you believe it would be modeled after the lines of the multinational force and servers in Sinai, Egypt?
Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, as I stressed before, our focus right now is on implementation of the Mitchell report and especially on reining in violence so that we can get into the next phase of implementation of Mitchell.
What the G–8 statement suggested is that some form of third party monitoring, accepted by both parties because you could not go anywhere if it were not accepted by both parties, might be helpful in the process of facilitating implementation of Mitchell.
So, it is important for us not to get ahead of ourselves, I think. We have done some preliminary thinking on this. We obviously would have to engage both parties directly about what they have in mind and if they thought there was some value in this kind of a modest mechanism. What we are not thinking of now is a military force or a large number of observers, but a more modest mechanism which would help the two parties to implement their commitments under the Mitchell committee report.
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So again, I think we have to take this step by step and keep our focus on getting the parties to do what is required to get into the next phase of Mitchell.
Ms. DAVIS. So we are not looking at the United States sending a peacekeeping military force over there at this point?
Mr. BURNS. No, ma'am.
Ms. DAVIS. I think we all understand and recognize the role that Egypt has played as a leader in the Arab world and I believe it was last September when Egypt removed the Ambassador from Israel. Will you be taking a position to encourage or put any kind of pressure on Egypt to put him back in Israel?
Mr. BURNS. We have encouraged the Egyptian government to return their Ambassador to Israel, but I think it is important to bear in mind that the Egyptians, including President Mubarak himself, have played a very active role, especially in the last 4 or 5 weeks that I have been working on this issue, in direct contacts with both parties, with Prime Minister Sharon, with whom he has spoken on the phone, as well as with Chairman Arafat.
So I think the Egyptians, as they have for many years in the past, have been very actively engaged in trying to urge an end to violence to take advantage of the Mitchell report and get back to the negotiating table.
Ms. DAVIS. Did the Egyptians not actually discourage Arafat from making the deal with Israel? When we had Mubarak and spoke to him, I thought he gave us the indication that he was not willing to get involved, that they had to work it out amongst themselves, and I guess I am hearing differently from you right now.
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Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, I think there are two things that apply. First, it is obvious the parties themselves, Palestinians and Israelis, are going to have to negotiate directly, work out their differences, and work out an acceptable resolution. Second, parties like Egypt can play a very helpful and constructive role with both sides in trying to encourage them to look at the sort of steps which are going to be necessary to reach those kind of solutions; and I think the Egyptians, historically and particularly in the last 4 or 5 weeks, have played that role.
Ms. DAVIS. So you believe Mr. Mubarak is playing a role in trying to encourage Mr. Arafat to publicly denounce the violence and to put pressure on the Palestinians to stop the violence?
Mr. BURNS. I think the Egyptians and President Mubarak specifically have continued to play a helpful role in encouraging both sides to take advantage of the Mitchell report, to rein in violence, to rebuild confidence, and take the other kind of measures that Mitchell and his colleagues laid out.
Ms. DAVIS. So then I can assume Mr. Mubarak has changed his position from what he had when he met with the International Relations Committee when he was here.
Mr. BURNS. No, ma'am. I do not think there is any question that either the Egyptians or anyone else can substitute for the parties. Palestinians and Israelis will have to make these decisions themselves. All I mean to say is the Egyptians have played a helpful role in helping to encourage the parties to move in that direction, just as we have tried to play and just as the Jordanians have continued to play. They can not speak for the parties, but they can offer their encouragement.
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Ms. DAVIS. But would you not agree that Mr. Mubarak probably has some influence over Mr. Arafat?
Mr. BURNS. I think Egypt plays a very influential role in the region. I think their relationship is an important one for Palestinians and Egyptians, and, as I said, especially in the last 4 or 5 weeks, I think Egypt has tried to use that influence to move things in the right direction. And I think the direct contacts between Egypt and Israel are extremely important as well, and we urge the Egyptians to keep them up.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Secretary, good morning and thank you for taking this on, not the hearing, the job.
Tell me why I am wrong. Abba Eban is frequently quoted for saying that the PLO never fails to miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. I look at the events since a year ago, since Camp David, and I think he was wrong, that they do not view a peace with Israel and coexistence with Israel as an opportunity.
For some years before Oslo, I met with and listened to many Palestinian leaders speak, seemingly persuasively, about their recognition that Israel is a permanent part of the Middle East landscape, that the Palestinians wanted to live in peace with them. They had interests in Palestinian self-determination and independent states and withdrawal back to the 1967 borders and Jerusalem is a capital of that new state, but that underlying it was a willingness to live at peace and coexistence with Israel.
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I watched the events from Camp David on what I believe the calculated effort by the leadership to encourage the start of the Intifadah long before Prime Minister Sharon, then Parliamentarian Sharon, went to the Temple Mount to resurrect the Intifadah in a very different form than had existed before, and I say they really do not want it, this has been a con, they conned me, they conned a lot of people, that the leadership of the PLO, now the Palestinian Authority, has never abandoned its original desire to push Israel off the map. That, to me, is the most likely explanation of the events that have transpired in the past 12 months.
Given the American position about wanting to get back to the final status talks through the steps promoted in the Mitchell report and all that stuff, square the American policy with my view and tell me why I am wrong, because it would be silly to accept what I accepted and be pursuing that as the policy.
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I still think it is true that the vast majority of Palestinians want a peaceful solution to this issue and want to work out a permanent status settlement which would allow Israelis and Palestinians to live together in peace. I still believe that, on both sides, there is the potential for doing that.
Mr. BERMAN. How can you explain what has happened, then?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think it is also true that, if you look back over the course of the last year—and I was not a direct participant in the negotiations at Camp David, a number of the direct participants are offering their own views now about what happened and why, and it is probably not a smart idea or a useful idea for me, not having been there, to offer a lot of specific judgments on what happened and who was responsible.
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I think it is a very complicated diplomatic picture. I think it is probably best not to make sweeping judgments or point the finger exclusively at one party or the other. I think the truth is that a lot of opportunities were missed, mistakes were made, and I think hopefully people will learn from them.
We are in a state now which is so difficult that we are going to have to try and move inch by inch away from violence and back toward a political process, but keep in view the potential which was very clear from Camp David on through the last half of 2000, because the truth is, as people look back on it, there was serious engagement between Palestinians and Israelis.
Whatever mistakes were made or opportunities were missed, people did break a number of the taboos on issues which had not really been addressed directly by the parties before, and I hope that the day will come in the not too distant future, although it is going to be a painful process to get anywhere near there from where we are today, when the people can reengage on those issues.
And I have not, I guess to answer your question, lost all hope that it is possible for the two leaderships to engage on those issues. It is not going to happen tomorrow and it is going to be a very difficult road to get there, but I think there still is the potential for doing it, however many opportunities were missed in the last year and however tragic the consequences have been for ordinary Israelis and ordinary Palestinians.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
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Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I would like to ask you a question. Given the incredible provocations that I see by the Palestinians, over 6000 live fire incidents directed against Israel since last September that include almost daily killings of civilians, shooting mortars into Israeli towns and terrorist attacks in major Israeli cities, I believe the government of Israel has shown remarkable restraint, far greater restraint than any other country, including our own, would show in the face of such relentless lawless violent attacks.
In fact, I think the Prime Minister is under tremendous pressure every day to do far more to respond to those attacks. He has resisted the pressure because he understands the cost of escalating the conflict, as you have pointed out in your remarks, but also because I think he has faith in the United States to help and pressure Mr. Arafat to put an end to the killings and the violence.
I believe that we in the United States have not done a great job in doing that, given the recent incidents and the ongoing incidents in Israel. In fact, I think that Chairman Arafat is gaining ground, having now secured the U.S. support for the long standing Palestinian goal of international observers.
I take this, and I believe this to be an untenable situation, and I think either we in the United States do all we can to help Israel or we are going to create the situation where Israel will have to act on its own, and if the United States cannot or will not do that, I, for one, am one that will support what Israel feels it needs to do. And my question to you is do you expect the Administration to do the same?
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Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, our relationship with Israel has been and always will be a very close one. I think we have urged restraint on both sides, not as a favor to the other, but in the self interests of both parties and as a way of trying to end violence and get back to a political process as a way to try and calm the situation. That is a very difficult thing to do, but I think it has been admirable the extent to which restraint has been shown and we will continue to urge that.
I think, with regard, sir, to your comment on third-party monitoring, I think we have to keep in perspective that our focus right now is on implementation of Mitchell. The idea of third-party monitoring is something which would have to be accepted by both sides, and that is the premise of the whole idea. And what we are talking about is a fairly modest mechanism that both sides might see as a way to facilitate implementation of Mitchell, which is a report that both accepted.
So it is a fairly modest idea, and we are just at the very beginning stages of thinking it through.
Mr. CANTOR. I would just like to add, also, I recently submitted a bill to Congress relating to the systematic attempt by Chairman Arafat and his Waqf, the religious council which operates the daily management of the temple mount, their attempt to excavate and what is resulting in the erasing of Judeo-Christian heritage on the temple mount and I do not know if you have seen the bill, but my bill calls for the cessation of all U.S. aid directly, indirectly to Palestinian Authority and its instrumentality.
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So do you have any comments or can you speak to that bill? Would you support such measures?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, on the issue that you raised, it is obviously a very serious concern and our consulate general in Jerusalem is looking into the issue. Based on the conversations that they have had so far with experts, we do not see any current excavations which would damage the religious heritage of the temple mount. But it is obviously a serious issue and we are going to follow it very closely.
Mr. CANTOR. If there is anybody that I could talk to or you could have call me, I just returned from 2 weeks ago and have up-to-date photographs and certainly saw for myself what is coming out.
Mr. BURNS. We would be glad to follow up with you, sir.
Mr. CANTOR. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. GILMAN. The Committee now will stand in recess. We have two votes on the Floor and we will be back as quickly as possible and will continue.
Mr. Secretary, thank you.
[Recess.]
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Mr. ISSA. [Presiding.] Mr. Secretary, earlier there was a question as to President Mubarak's role. I guess I will preface this by saying that I was also in that meeting and the questions and answers were related to President Mubarak's role in the Middle East peace negotiations and what he did or did not say to Chairman Arafat as to whether to take the deal. Without revisiting that, I would like you to give me your observations of our two closest allies to us and neutrals, or even friends, of Israel in the region, Jordan, Egypt, and what measures you believe they are taking and what role they are playing in this period of unsettled behavior.
Mr. BURNS. Well, thank you very much, Congressman.
I think both Egypt and Jordan, as I said before, have continued to play very constructive and helpful roles in support of the same objectives that we have, and that is to rein in violence and implement the rest of the Mitchell report as a way of getting back to negotiations.
Both have kept up their lines of communications with Israelis and with Palestinians, which is a very important thing to do and, in some ways, a politically difficult thing for both leaderships to do, given the deep frustrations and anger in larger parts of the Jordanian and Egyptian population. So it takes a certain amount of leadership to be able to continue to play that role, but I think it is a recognition of what they both have at stake.
Jordan in particular, where I served the last 3 years, has as much at stake in a resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as anybody other than the two parties themselves, and I think their efforts have reflected that and we continue to stay in very close touch.
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Mr. ISSA. Additionally, there was a mention, and I think it is very noteworthy, of a seizure of weapons coming from Lebanon. Can you comment to the extent that you are aware of the various sources of weapons and the original parties, to the best you know, where these weapons may be coming from?
Mr. BURNS. Well, there is one instance which I can recall without getting into all the details where it is a faction which has been a rival, and in many respects, an enemy of the Palestinian Authority for some time which tried to smuggle weaponry into Gaza. It is the kind of act that not only fuels violence by giving people the means to carry out acts of violence, but it also makes it more difficult for the Palestinian Authority and its security services to do the things that they need to do.
Mr. ISSA. Perhaps a slightly astray question, but one that I think impacts the region, the activities of Hizbullah, primarily still operating in the south of Lebanon, impact the region. Can you comment on the impact and how it influences the perception of where Israel is being attacked from, and of course if you have any suggestions of constructive ways we can deal with this?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think Hizbullah provocations and attacks across the blue line between Lebanon and Israel have been a real source of concern. The situation in that area is very fragile, especially coming against the backdrop of the continuing tensions between Palestinians and Israelis, and on my own travels through the region, including stops not just in Israel but in Lebanon and Syria about 2 weeks ago, I stressed the obvious to all the parties that this is a time when maximum restraint is extremely important because you can easily see one provocative act, by Hizbullah, for example, leading to an escalation which is very difficult for any of the parties to control and it is the last thing that anybody in the region needs right now.
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Mr. ISSA. And this may not be something you can put a number on, but I think it is fair to say that Hizbullah will not voluntarily stop their activity. They will not answer to the requests of Jordan, certainly not Israel, certainly not Egypt, and not the PLO. In order to reduce their activities, would you describe what you think would be the level of effort and, if you can, in general terms of the level of troops they are funding or the type of effort that you think would allow for that to occur?
Mr. BURNS. I am sorry, sir. That would allow for?
Mr. ISSA. For the reduction in Hizbullah. I am going to make the bold assumption that it will not be a small task to recapture, if you will, the hearts and minds of the towns that harbor them and, in fact, to put the type of monitoring in that would allow a reduced level of freedom for those who would choose to, in the day or the night, run out and shell positions and the like as have been going on.
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I think one of the most important things that we have tried to contribute to and that the Lebanese government has been concerned about is meeting the economic and social needs of ordinary Lebanese in South Lebanon.
I think it is a very useful expenditure of our own resources to try and address some of those needs because it provides a kind of counter-balance to the very active social programs that Hizbullah, for example, sponsors there, and it is important to show people that the Lebanese government is addressing their needs and providing them the means for economic development, and so I think, in that sense, whatever we can contribute, and as you know we do contribute, in that effort is very valuable.
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Mr. ISSA. And as a follow-up to that, we do contribute. We have humanitarian aid. We have NGOs that are operating with some 15 million plus dollars over the last several years, but I think it has been said here in the Full Committee that there is probably 100 million plus dollars coming in to support the Hizbullah's activities, primarily hospitals, schools, oil for widows in the winter, and so on. Do you think that, in fact, what we are putting in begins to displace the influence of those dollars?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, sir, it can offer a counter-balance. It offers an alternative for people to show that the Lebanese government, with that kind of support, can meet those needs, and I think that is a very important political reality that has to be addressed in the south of Lebanon and it provides a way in which the Lebanese government can really establish a degree of control and influence which it does not have now.
We also have continued to urge the Lebanese government to deploy its armed forces down to the border, but I think addressing economic and social needs is an important complement to that.
Mr. ISSA. I very much appreciate that. There are many places in which dollars and military aid come into various factions within Palestine and the West Bank. Could you comment on, assuming, for example, we plugged one hole, what the others would shift to and ultimately where the hardest one is for us to plug and any suggestions you have on limiting the arms, which is part of the problem in the region?
Mr. BURNS. It is, sir. It is a major concern and I think it is actually a concern for the Palestinian Authority in many respects, too, because of the funding that comes in to groups like Hamas, which can rival their influence as well. Some of it comes from private groups in terms of financial support, but we are also quite concerned, as I had tried to stress before, about the problem of arms smuggling as well, and we will keep a careful eye on that.
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Mr. ISSA. Mr. Secretary, I will make an assumption that is well above my pay grade. Let us assume for a moment that this Committee and the Congress as a whole gave you a blank check to work on these issues. You talked about South Lebanon and let us start with that.
Where would you put new additional dollars that you believe would be useful to help curb the violence throughout the region?
Mr. BURNS. I am not used to, in the State Department, getting blank checks from anyone.
Mr. ISSA. And, Mr. Secretary, you are not likely to get it, but it's always good to know where you would put it if you got it.
Mr. BURNS. That is a good way to start my tenure. Yes. Well, sir, I think just in general terms, I think there is enormous value in investing in some of the economies in the region, and I will just speak to my own experience in Jordan the last 3 years.
When you can couple our resources with a commitment on the part of the leadership, essentially, people are willing to help themselves and make ambitious and difficult economic changes to enable economies in the region to compete in a global economy, then that is a place where our resources, I think, can be very valuable because it creates a sense of hope for people. It provides a much more solid foundation for people to consider the kinds of political compromises which are going to be very important.
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So without specifying particular countries, I think that is the kind of thing where, if we are careful in allocating resources in places where leaderships have committed themselves to doing everything they can to help themselves, I have seen in Jordan, and I am certain you can see in other parts of the region, the value of doing that.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Issa, for taking over while we were on the Floor. Our next intervener is Mr. Schiff, the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to follow up, to some degree, on some of the comments made by Mr. Berman. I think, watching the events over the last year and Mr. Arafat's walk away from the table on the incredibly far-reaching offers that were made by Mr. Barak, would lead one either to the conclusion that I think Mr. Berman reaches that he was unwilling or, the alternative conclusion, he was unable to accept terms that, I think for most in Israel, were far beyond anyone anticipated the government going.
I wanted to get your sense of is this a problem that Mr. Arafat, among other things, has not prepared the Palestinian people, the sacrifices that would need to be made in order to find either a long-term or a short-term solution. And if that is the case, if both the Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab nations will never be prepared, under current leadership will never be prepared to go as far as necessary to meet the farthest point the Israeli people are willing to go, what can this Administration or this Congress do to change the climate in the Middle East to make the parties understand that mutual sacrifice is a necessary part of even a short-term solution?
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If I first could get your sense of was that part of the problem and what remains to be done about it?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, as I said before, I think that a lot of opportunities were missed over the course of the last year. A lot of mistakes were made. I am not a big believer in finger-pointing myself or trying to precisely apportion blame. It is a very complicated diplomatic picture, but the truth is a lot of people lost out on opportunities.
I have not, myself, given up hope that we can not, some day, get back to the point where those kind of possibilities exist again, but I am also realistic. The two parties are in a very difficult situation right now and we are where we are, and what I think the United States has to do is to work as hard as we can.
It is not our exclusive responsibility. There are others in the international community in the region who have to play an important and constructive role, too, but I think we have to exercise leadership in our own interest in the region and in the interest of our relationship with Israel as well as the Palestinians.
To begin, two things: first, to push in a practical direction, which can only come if violence is reined in and we can get to the sort of modest stages of implementing the Mitchell Commission report, which is a bridge to get back to a negotiating process.
Regarding that negotiating process, we are not going to be able to turn the clock back and move immediately back to the place that people were a year ago, but I think it also is important for the United States to continue to remind the parties, and here I think it is the vast majority of the Israelis and Palestinians as much as the leaderships, that there is a political pathway, that there is political hope out there, that there is a way in which, through a political process, you can reach a resolution of their differences that addresses the concerns and the aspirations of both peoples and allows them to live side by side.
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I think it is important for us, as distant as that day may seem right now and as difficult as the situation is, for us to be able to remind people that that is the only real possibility which exists right now.
Mr. SCHIFF. I do not disagree with that at all. The concern I have, though, is that even if you could turn back the clock a year, which plainly you cannot, that would not be good enough, because when the clock had been turned back before all the violence began or began anew, there still was not a climate suitable to reach a settlement.
I am not interested in trying to simply finger-point either, but the broader problem I am trying to get at is whether it is out of a failure of leadership or otherwise, it seems to me that the Palestinian constituency was not prepared to go as far as it would take.
How do we impress upon either the leadership in the Arab world or the Palestinian people what the brass tacks are of any kind of a short-term or long-term resolution?
Mr. BURNS. I think it is a very good question, Congressman, and it is a fair criticism, also, of what happened and what did not happen, because one of the real tests of leadership, whether it is Palestinian leadership or Israeli leadership, is preparing people for difficult choices and for people on both sides to understand that practical compromises are going to be essential if you are ever going to get that kind of a settlement.
I think one of the things, as I mentioned before, sir, that was most valuable in the Mitchell Commission report is that one of its recommendations does focus on the question of incitement, for example, which gets right to your point about preparing people for a future of coexistence.
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Mr. SCHIFF. Probably the most graphic example is the failure in Palestinian textbooks to include mention of Israel. If even at the level of that preparation there is not a foundation, then what hope can there be for the children reading those textbooks a decade or two decades from now to have them willing to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve a meaningful peace?
Mr. BURNS. I think, sir, it is a test of leadership for Palestinians and it is also, in many way, a test of leadership for Israelis. The problem you mentioned about textbooks is a very real one and it has to be addressed and I think as we, hopefully, get to the point of implementing the Mitchell Commission report, that is something, that in whatever role we can play, we need to focus on.
It is important, also, for Israeli leadership to be equally direct about the kinds of things which have a very negative effect on the environment and make it more difficult to calm the situation, whether it is issues as I raised before, housing demolition, settlement activity, those kinds of things as well. So I think for both leaderships, it is very important to prepare people for the situation which hopefully we will return to one day.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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First, Mr. Secretary, I would like to applaud Secretary Powell's good judgment in elevating you to head our Middle East team. Your record stands for itself and it is one of extraordinary integrity and thoughtfulness and you are a very decent man in a process that sometimes may not seem to be so decent.
Your expression of hope with respect to the idea that, still, the extreme elements or the extreme points of view are a minority and there still is a majority of both Palestinians and Israelis who generally desire peace—in my heart, I hope that is correct, but if I could read or share with you something you may already know, part of a note that was sent to the family of the suicide bomber in Tel Aviv, where the writer expressed that the suicide bomber in Tel Aviv was a hero, that his deed was heroic, and that, ''to turn one's body into a bomb is the best example of willingness to make a sacrifice.'' That letter was from Yasir Arafat to the family of the Tel Aviv Suicide Bomber.
In that context, to follow Mr. Schiff's question with respect to incitement, this is not a novel discussion anymore, Palestinian textbooks, Palestinian television shows, Sesame Street type shows that applaud and encourage children to blow people up. This is not new and I am as guilty as anyone throughout the process of supporting the peace process. I overlooked it. I made excuses for it.
I said, ''Well, that's only one show, but look at the other 20 shows that are not like that,'' but it seems to me those like yourself who are in charge of this program at this point have as great an obligation not just be hopeful, but also be realistic and be cognizant of past performance.
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So in that regard, I am wondering what consequences can the United States lay out for the Palestinian Authority in terms of incitement rather than a discussion?
And you say both sides need to be direct, and I appreciate that, and it is a two-way street, but in terms of incitement, what standards can we set up and what consequences can we lay out so that, in fact, we know what will occur when the Palestinians, if they do, continue in this way?
Mr. BURNS. Well, I think one of the things I could offer, sir, is that, if and when we get to the stage of implementing the full body of the Mitchell report, and again, incitement is one of the clear recommendations, one of the clear issues that has to be tackled according to those recommendations, it is going to be very important, I think, for us and for others in the international community to hold people accountable for their obligations.
Both sides have said they accept Mitchell word for word, and, with regard to the question of incitement, that implies a clear sense of obligations for the Palestinian leadership, and I think we are going to have to be willing to speak out about those issues in a way that, maybe in the past, we have not always done.
Mr. WEXLER. Could you refresh my memory? In one of the past agreements, was there not a group or commission that was set up specifically for this purpose?
Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir.
Mr. WEXLER. It was after the Wye Agreement and it is a group that has met from time to time but had fallen essentially into disuse and, especially over the last 10 months, as the atmosphere in the region collapsed, has not met in a long time as far as I know, but it is the kind of issue that has to be addressed very seriously. I agree with you.
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Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, again, I want to thank you, as my colleague Mr. Wexler did, for the good work that you have done through the years and the good work that you continue to do.
My colleagues have all raised different points and I concur with virtually every point that has been raised. What disturbs me is that sometimes in some quarters from our government, I hear talks of even-handedness. Indeed, even in your remarks, and perhaps you are trying to be the diplomat, you said that, in the negotiations, people broke taboos. It really was not people that broke taboos. Prime Minister Barak broke taboos by talking about Jerusalem and doing all kinds of things.
And what disturbs me about it is that I think we send the wrong message, quite frankly, when we talk about even-handedness. Yes, we want an end to violence. Yes, violence needs to stop, but I think, quite frankly, there is a difference between one side which is deliberately inciting violence and causing children to get involved and another side where a lot of it is self-defence, a lot of it are different acts.
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It is not orchestrated by the entity that is supposed to govern these people, and I just wish that we would not talk about both sides ought to end the violence. Yes, violence ought to end wherever it rears its ugly head, but in doing that, we equate one side with another, and frankly, I think it is really not in balance at all, and I would like you to comment on that because, even in your remarks, you tend to do that, and I just think we do a tremendous disservice to the whole process when we do that, because it gives the people that are encouraging kids to blow themselves up some hope.
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, at first, I understand the seriousness of your point and of your concern and I do not think it is a question of equivalence. I think, in my mind, it is a more practical question. There is absolutely no doubt, as I have said before, that the Palestinian leadership needs to do more to rein in violence and that is something that we will continue to impress upon them at every level as clearly as we can.
Incitement, as was mentioned before, is also a problem that needs to be tackled head-on without any equivocation or dissembling, but at the same time, again, as a practical question, it is important to recognize the need to avoid other kind of steps which are provocative, whether it is housing demolitions, which is one example of that, and that is not a question, again, as I said, sir, of equivalency. It is a practical question of taking certain steps and avoiding certain steps that make it more difficult to calm the situation.
Mr. ENGEL. I do not want to read the whole thing, but a German television network just last month reported on its program a special titled, ''The Father of the Terrorist,'' and focusing on the life of the Tel Aviv disco suicide bomber, his family and friends.
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One of the things I want to just quote is it says,
''The album, a tell-tale collection of condolence letters, this one here from the Hamas, but much more surprising for us, there is also a letter from Arafat. 'It was a heroic deed,' he lets his Embassy in Jordan write to the family. 'To turn ones body into a bomb is the best example of willingness to make a sacrifice,' ''
signed Yasir Arafat.
I have a resolution that Mr. Cantor is sponsoring with me which is talking about the participation of children in organized Palestinian violence and we are asking our colleagues to really condemn that children are being urged on by their role models and people in positions of authority to take part in the violence.
They violate the basic principles embodied in the U.N. convention on the rights of the child, which says that persons under 15 should not take a direct part in hostilities, and I think it is important to condemn the Palestinian Authority for its abuse of the rights of the children as laid out in the U.N. convention, and I just wish that our government would be a little bit more forthcoming in laying the blame where the blame is.
Because I, too, had tremendous hopes for the peace process. I concur with what Mr. Berman said before when he said tell me how I am wrong.
I think this was a con job. I am sorry to have to say that, but I have come to the terrible conclusion that—you know, every time in the negotiations when it seemed that the parties were just about to make an agreement, the Palestinian side would throw in one more obstacle and the final obstacle was the right of return, which, in essence, takes away the whole Jewishness of the state of Israel, which is certainly something that no Prime Minister can accept, and I just think that we ought to be just a little louder and a little more forthcoming.
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And the final thing I want to say is the Embassy. We ought to just move our Embassy to Jerusalem, because now what we are doing is rewarding the Palestinians for their intransigence by saying, well, we're going to wait again, and I think that President Clinton was wrong in not moving the Embassy and I think President Bush is wrong for not doing it not.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I showed Eliot an article here that he was reading earlier this morning. I got a chance to catch up, I guess, now, and that is the front page of today's New York Times which I am sure you have read this morning and it talks about the overall failure in the talks in the Mid-East and who is to blame, and that, according to this article, everyone has some share of the blame here, and this kind of piggybacks with what Eliot was talking about, is that there have been peace negotiations that have taken place in certain parts of the world that have hit rough spots and have broken down.
Look at Northern Ireland, for instance, where there has been some what of a breakdown on the negotiations at this point, but there has not been the level of violence, even in a percentage or a scale way in Northern Island as there has been in the Middle East, in other parts of the world as well when we have come to—especially when the United States is involved in the middle of those peace negotiations.
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It seems to lay the blame everywhere, but simply the fact that violence occurred, that violence took place—and who was responsible for that violence? Was it the Israelis or was it the Palestinians? And I think that is sometimes where I do not think this is a very fair treatment in terms of who is to blame.
You know, you talk about the negotiations, but the bottom line is negotiations take place, they succeed, and they fail. They do not necessarily have to resort back to violence, and I think that is something that the article, in my opinion, is clearly missing.
I just want to go back. I do not know if anyone has touched on this, but the State Department's most recent PLO Commitments Compliance Act report issued at the end of March at this year is, at certain points, quite explicit in its description of the culpability of certain PLO elements in the ever-deteriorating situation in the Middle East.
Now, specifically, the report discusses the Tanzim, and more vaguely, Arafat's Palestinian police force, and I am just going to quote from one portion of that. It said,
''Palestinian civilians throwing stones or Molotov cocktails were often joined by Palestinian police or Tanzim using firearms, shooting at Israeli troops or civilians, usually settlers, became common.''
My question to you is are the Tanzim involved against Israeli targets, and if so, would you please characterize their actions, specifically either involving shootings, bombings, operational training for terrorists or all of the above?
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Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, there is no question, as we made clear in that report, that there are individuals that belong to those organizations, Force 17 and Tanzim in particular, who have been involved in acts of violence against Israelis, and it is a question that not only is a serious concern but it is also something that we are very seriously reviewing.
One of the key factors that we look into, which is provided for in the criteria for designating such organizations, is the extent to which those individuals were directed in those actions by their leaderships and we are taking a very careful look at the information we have about that.
Mr. CROWLEY. So it is possible they will be designated a terrorist organization?
Mr. BURNS. We are very seriously reviewing that issue against the backdrop of the criteria that I mentioned.
Mr. CROWLEY. Well, I guess the question is whether or not Arafat or other leaders within the Palestinian Authority gave the Tanzim authority to shoot or to commit those acts.
Mr. BURNS. The issue, I think, as I understand it, sir, is exactly that. There is no question but that individuals have been involved, as you have said and we have said in that report. The issue is the extent to which they were directed by their leaderships, and that is something we are evaluating.
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Mr. CROWLEY. And I know that there has been some question as to whether or not Arafat himself or high-level officials sanctioned those acts, but if I just bring to your attention, given the recent statements by Chairman Arafat and with respect for his union with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, I think one could make the reasonable determination that he did sanction those attacks, and I hope that those statements subsequent to those attacks since then will be taken into consideration.
Mr. BURNS. We will take a very careful look at all that information, sir.
Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Crowley.
I have just one or two more questions that I would like to ask. They were so close to a deal when Barak was still there. Why did not Mr. Arafat take advantage of that? Any thoughts about that, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. BURNS. Sir, as I said before, I am not sure it makes a lot of sense for me—I was not a direct participant in that period—to offer a judgment.
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Mr. GILMAN. Yes. I recognize that, but in looking back?
Mr. BURNS. It is a very complicated diplomatic picture. Having experienced these things in earlier incarnations in my own career, generally, I shy away from making sweeping judgments about those kind of issues because it is very complicated, and, as I said before, you can easily see how a number of parties made mistakes and missed opportunities.
I think Palestinians obviously had a huge opportunity before them and it is important to learn lessons from that as, hopefully, we move back in the direction of a political process.
Mr. GILMAN. All right. Now, in the foreign aid appropriations bill for fiscal year 2002, there are provisions for the Ackerman-Gilman bill on PLO compliance. That is H.R. 1795. What is the Administration's position on conditioning assistance on PLO compliance in the foreign aid bill?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I guess I would say several things. First, the Administration, as I have stressed, is quite concerned, as you are, about the issue of Palestinian compliance with their commitments.
Second, as I have described, including the efforts of President Bush, Secretary Powell, and many others in the Administration, we have continued to push very hard at every level of the Palestinian leadership to try and press for compliance with those commitments, particularly with regard to the question of violence.
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But the third thing I would say in response to the particular legislation is that, in our judgment, it is going to make it more difficult for us to continue that kind of high-level press if some of the elements in the legislation are introduced and the possibility of sanctions is raised. That is going to make it more difficult for us to continue the kind of engagement that I think is going to be essential to bring about the compliance that we both seek.
Mr. GILMAN. Hopefully, it will give you more leverage in your negotiations.
Mr. Ackerman for the last question.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take another shot at the question you asked from a different direction, if I might.
Rather than analyzing why Arafat might have rejected the Israeli proposal, how about a reading? On a scale of one to ten, how surprised were you and/or others in the department that Arafat rejected an offer of that magnitude?
Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I do not think it was a simple question of who offered what and who rejected what. You had a complicated diplomatic picture that spread on from Camp David through the end of the year and the beginning of the year 2001 and there was still serious engagement going on directly between the two parties, without us being there, almost up until the eve of the Israeli election and a fair amount of ground covered between the two parties.
So I guess what surprised and, more than surprised, disappointed me, and I am sure many of my colleagues in the Administration as well as in the Congress, was that, given the grounds that the two parties had covered and given what seemed to be possible, that we not only were not able to reach a point of real political progress, but that we descended so rapidly into the extremely difficult and violent situation we are in now.
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Mr. ACKERMAN. You are really good. I will let you go on that, but I want to ask you—you said in response to Mr. Gilman that a number of parties made mistakes and had missed opportunities. Could you just tell us the biggest mistake you think the Israelis made and the biggest mistake the Palestinians made, without doing that little dance that you're good at?
Mr. BURNS. I am sorry. I will not try and do the dance, but, honestly, I do not think it is going to be very helpful for me—I was not a direct participant—to offer a judgment. I think what is a disappointment, as I said, is that we were not able to achieve more political progress than we did.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I thank you for your participation. This hearing, I believe, is extremely unusual in that it appeared to me that at least almost every participant in the hearing on both sides of the aisle had the same point of view, not that we are marching in lock step because that does not happen here, very rarely, but certainly I think the questions were indicative that most people on the Committee, at least this Subcommittee, view the facts relatively the same way and we appreciate you being here with us.
Mr. BURNS. Sure.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
Just one last thought, we were informed that, during the Camp David negotiations, Arafat was told by the Egyptians that he should not compromise on Jerusalem. Is there any basis for that?
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Mr. BURNS. I do not know, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. All right. Thank you very much for being here. Thank you for taking the time. We look forward to having more meetings with you.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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