SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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75–563PDF
2001
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 4, 2001
Serial No. 107–44
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
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RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
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JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
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HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
HILLEL WEINBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director & Counsel
DAVID S. ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DEBORAH BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member
PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member
MATTHEW ZWEIG, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Geoffey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center
Charles Duelfer, Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: Prepared statement
The Honorable Eric Cantor, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement
Geoffey Kemp: Prepared statement
Charles Duelfer: Prepared statement
Iraq Watch Roundtables, May 24, 2001, submitted for the hearing record by Mr. Milhollin
Article from Commentary Magazine, entitled ''Shopping with Saddam Hussein,'' dated July-August 2001, submitted for the hearing record by Mr. Milhollin
Reprint of an article from The New York Times, entitled ''What the Inspectors Can't Find and Why They Can't Find It,'' dated December 20, 1998, submitted for the hearing record by Mr. Milhollin
Gary Milhollin: Prepared statement
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APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2001
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:13 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. During the prior Administration, Congress was told that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was in ''a strategic box.'' We were told that U.S. patrols over northern and southern Iraq were preventing Saddam from threatening his neighbors with conventional forces. We were told that the international sanctions were denying Saddam the revenues with which to rebuild large weapons of mass destruction programs. And we were also told that Saddam Hussein was isolated in the international community.
The purpose of today's hearing is to question these assumptions and to discuss what Saddam Hussein has been up to nearly 3 years after the last U.N. Weapons Inspectors left Iraq.
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Iraq has adamantly refused to allow any new inspections, even while making the absurd claim that Iraq is no longer developing any mass destruction weapons.
With Americans justifiably concerned with further terrorist attacks since September 11th, we want to know the extent to which Saddam has rebuilt his biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities.
September 11th has taught us how costly it is to be complacent. It has also taught us to pointedly challenge those who assert that aggressive terrorists or dictators are ''contained'' in ''boxes.'' In point of fact, we can never be certain that dictators or terrorists are in a strategic box as long as they are in power or at large.
Secretary of State Powell's ''targeted sanctions'' are intended to concentrate the efforts of the world community on denying Saddam technology and illicit revenue. Regrettably, however, it seems likely that it will allow Saddam to pick the lock of his cage or—to break down its door altogether.
Accordingly, I very much doubt that the proposed approach will yield the hope for plugging up of leaks in the sanctions regime. Leaks that permitted a Chinese company to install new fiber optic cable to link Iraq's air defense network and make it more effective against U.S. aircraft patrolling the skies over Iraq. Leaks that allowed Iraq, 6 years ago, to import through Jordan Scud missile guidance systems from Russian middlemen.
There is no reason to believe that Saddam would shrink from providing his weapons of mass destruction technology to terrorists, although there is no reason to believe he has done so as of yet. We cannot rule out the possibility that a man who would kill 5,000 Iraqi Kurds in a poison gas attack at Halabja would contemplate the use of such weapons against American targets.
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I am on record, along with the Chairman of the Committee and many of the Members of our Committee, as advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, it is officially declared U.S. policy to change Iraq's regime. There is no other way to fully and finally end the threat Iraq poses to our national security.
This is an important goal, whether or not Saddam is demonstrated to have played a role in the September 11th attack on our Nation.
We do not, of course, want to unnecessarily complicate the struggle we are currently undertaking against Osama bin Laden and terrorists of his ilk.
But our Nation should be able to ''chew gum and walk at the same time.'' At the earliest possible moment—which might be very soon, and certainly will have to come before we can declare total victory over terrorism—we must turn our attention to ending a regime which we should have dismantled years ago. Saddam's regime continues to defy the will of the international community, defies all norms of acceptable international behavior, as well as human rights norms. While we are striking at other terrorists, we should end the regime of a master terrorist like Saddam.
Today we will hear from distinguished experts on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs, Geoffrey Kemp, Charles Deulfer, and Gary Milhollin. I will introduce them in more detail after Mr. Ackerman has an opportunity to make an opening statement if he so desires. Mr. Ackerman.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
During the previous Administration, Congress was told that Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn is ''in a strategic box.''
We were told that U.S. patrols over northern and southern Iraq were preventing Saddam from threatening his neighbors with conventional forces.
We were told that international sanctions were denying Saddam the revenues with which to rebuild large weapons of mass destruction programs.
And we were also told that Saddam Husayn was isolated in the international community.
The purpose of this hearing is to question these assumptions and to discuss what Saddam Husayn has been up to nearly three years after the last U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq.
Iraq has adamantly refused to allow new inspections, even while making the absurd claim that Iraq is no longer developing mass destruction weapons.
With Americans justifiably concerned about further terrorist attacks since September 11, we want to know the extent to which Saddam has rebuilt his biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities.
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September 11 has taught us how costly it is to be complacent and taught us to pointedly challenge those who assert that aggressive terrorists—or dictators—are ''contained'' in ''boxes.''
In point of fact, we can never be sure that dictators or terrorists are in any ''strategic box'' as long as they are in power or at large.
Secretary of State Powell's ''targeted sanctions'' is intended to concentrate the efforts of the world community on denying Saddam technology and illicit revenue. Unfortunately, however, it seems likely that it will allow Saddam to ''pick the lock'' of his cage—or to break down its door altogether.
Thus, I very much doubt that the proposed approach will yield the hoped-for plugging up of leaks in the sanctions regime. Leaks, for example, that permitted a Chinese company to install new fiber optic cable to link Iraq's air defense network and make it more effective against U.S. aircraft patrolling the skies over Iraq. Leaks that allowed Iraq, six years ago, to import through Jordan Scud missile guidance systems from Russian middleman.
There is no reason to believe that Saddam would shrink from providing his weapons of mass destruction technology to terrorists, although there is not reason to believe he has done so as of yet. We cannot rule out the possibility that a man who would kill five thousand Iraqi Kurds in a poison gas attack at Halabja would contemplate the use of such weapons against American targets.
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I am on record, along with the Chairman of the Committee and many of its Members as advocating the overthrow of Saddam Husayn. Indeed, under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, it is officially declared U.S. policy to change Iraq's regime. There is no other way to fully and finally end the threat Iraq poses to our national security.
This is an important goal, whether or not Saddam is demonstrated to have played a role in the September 11 attacks.
We do not, of course, want to unnecessarily complicate the struggle we are currently undertaking against Osama bin Laden and terrorists of his ilk.
But the United States should be able to ''chew gum and walk at the same time.'' At the earliest possible moment—which might be very soon, and certainly will have to come before we can declare total victory over terrorism—we must turn our attention to ending a regime we should have dismantled years ago. Saddam's regime continues to defy the will of the international community, all norms of acceptable international behavior, and well as all human rights norms. While we're striking at other terrorists, we ought to end regime of a master terrorist like Saddam.
Today, we'll here from three distinguished experts on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs, Geoffrey Kemp, Charles Duelfer, and Gary Milhollin. I will introduce them in more detail after Mr. Ackerman makes any opening statement he may wish.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's hearing. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, I think it is important that we as a Nation not lose sight of those states that in the past have wanted to do us harm. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, we have a state that clearly intends to do us harm in the future as well.
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It is also appropriate for the Subcommittee to take up this subject, because at the end of November the United States will again have to make the case in the United Nations Security Council for continuation of sanctions on Iraq. In past discussions of the sanctions issue, we have heard a chorus of calls for the relaxation of sanctions from Russia, China, France, and the Arab world, ostensibly because the sanctions hurt the Iraqi people.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we must be clear and emphatic, that only Saddam Hussein hurts the Iraqi people. If he were to abide by the conditions laid out in the U.N. Security Council resolutions, conditions which he accepted and which the international community demanded, the sanctions would be lifted. But over the last decade, what we have seen is the continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq in direct contravention of those resolutions. But even if the sanctions remain, it is still Saddam Hussein who chooses not to use the money from the Oil for Food program to provide for the Iraqi people. Billions of dollars flow annually through that program, and yet somehow Iraqis continue to suffer as Saddam builds dozens of palaces, none of which appear to be edible. It is time for those outside Iraq who lament the suffering of the people to acknowledge its true source.
Mr. Chairman, we must take back the public debate about sanctions, because for too long Saddam Hussein has portrayed himself and his people as the victims of U.S. aggression. He has identified himself with the Palestinians and suggested that it is U.S. policy to repress both. It is time for this nonsense to stop.
The United States Government should be making an aggressive public case for our policy and we should be making that case around the world. The terrorist attacks of September 11 give us a new context in which to pursue our Iraq policy. The heinous acts of that day should serve as a reminder to our friends on the Security Council that Iraq is still a state sponsor of terrorism and, in this new global coalition to fight terror, Iraq should remain on the terrorist target list rather than their targeted customer list.
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The evidence that Iraq was involved in the September 11th attacks is circumstantial. But if the United States does not continue with an aggressive policy toward Iraq, those Nations which have been opposing sanctions will conclude, if they haven't already, that the status quo in Iraq is acceptable. This is an outcome that we must reject. Instead, we must seize upon this opportunity to press vigorously for continued sanctions. The evidence in support of this policy continues to be clear, as I believe we will hear this afternoon. Saddam Hussein continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction technologies and the means to deliver them. He therefore remains a threat to the region and to U.S. interests.
All of the reasons that the international community went to war in 1991 remain 10 years later. A strong effective sanctions regime must remain an integral part of U.S. policy. The real question in Iraq no longer revolves around whether Saddam Hussein can be contained. The real question is whether the international community, and in particular his immediate neighbors, will recognize that as long as he remains, the region and the world continue to be at significant risk.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from today's distinguished witnesses.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Ackerman.
I call on Mr. Chabot, our Ranking Minority Member. The Majority.
Mr. ACKERMAN. He still is in the Majority.
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Mr. GILMAN. Ranking Majority.
Mr. CHABOT. I will keep my remarks brief so we can get to the panel.
I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing. And just from this Member's point of view, I personally believe that Iraq, and Saddam Hussein in particular, ought to be—I think he has given us more than enough reason to put him up there with Osama bin Laden in this war against terrorism. And if we are serious about ending, destroying and stopping international terrorism, we absolutely have to target Saddam Hussein.
You know, my principal concern—and I have said this to a lot of people—I have spoken to a lot of schools back in my district, and some of the kids are a bit concerned about war and the possibility of a draft and that sort of thing. What I have said, and I firmly believe, is that the loss of life that this Nation suffered just a few weeks ago in New York and here in Washington, DC and in Pennsylvania, as terrible as it was, pales in comparison to the potential loss of life next time if chemical or biological or, God forbid, nuclear weapons are used sometime in the not-too-distant future in this country. And that is why it is absolutely critical that we prevail in this war against terrorism. And I believe Saddam Hussein has to be a principal target of that war. I would urge the Administration to include him in those people that we absolutely have to get rid of.
I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Nothing.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I will just take a few moments to put my views on the record. I was one of the handful of Democrats who supported George Bush a decade ago on the Persian Gulf War. It was not a particularly proud moment for my political party because the majority of my colleagues were on the other side. But the President was correct, and the results, as far as they went, were satisfactory. They obviously didn't go far enough. And when the history books will be written from the vantage point of a hundred years from now, the failure of the first Bush Administration to get rid of Saddam Hussein once and for all will stand as one of the great policy mistakes of the end of the 20th century.
Now, our three distinguished witnesses have submitted superb testimony. I read every line of it and I find it very convincing. Professor Kemp I think in his statement basically summarizes their conclusion:
''Saddam and his regime pose a growing danger to the Middle East and the United States. The regime cannot be rehabilitated. Therefore, the goal of regime replacement should remain a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy options.''
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I could not agree more. I believe that the current war on global terrorism so eloquently expressed by our President at the joint session a couple of week ago, lays out the formula. And it also lays out the sequencing. The number one task will be to get rid of bin Laden and his complex organization present in many countries. But as soon as that task is finished, this Nation and our willing allies will have to move on to get rid of Saddam Hussein and other similar regimes. This regime, as Professor Kemp says, cannot be rehabilitated. It has to be destroyed and it has to be displaced. And the American people will find the willpower to do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate greatly the opportunity to hear this knowledgeable—and although I haven't read it all yet—well written and insightful historic accounting. I am particularly looking forward to this Committee, and hopefully the public, moving back toward where we were prior to September 11th in focusing on our obligation to isolate Iraq, and particularly in our programs that seem to have been long abandoned to reduce and eliminate their ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.
Like many people around the world, I am concerned with the consistent and continued problem of hunger and absence of good medical supplies for the Iraqi people. And I hope that all of us on this Committee can work together and I hope you can give us some insight in how we might do it, to find a way to provide humanitarian relief that actually gets to the people of Iraq, while continuing and improving the containment of Saddam Hussein.
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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have gotten some phenomenally bad public relations as to the effect of our sanctions. There are hungry children and an inadequate amount of medicine Iraq, but we have saved millions of lives by insisting that these sanctions be there. If they were not, then every penny of Iraqi oil revenue would go directly to Saddam Hussein. He would have so many more palaces, would have nuclear weapons, would have tanks by the thousands, and deaths would be in the millions from starvation.
I don't know whether we need humanitarian aid for Iraq because, frankly, that is a country capable of producing oil revenue enough to make it a relatively well-off country. But we have somehow got to explain to the world that these are not sanctions against Iraq, but rather they are a control system to make sure that Iraq's oil revenue is used to buy food, medicine, and the trucks to transport them. And in the absence of that, we would be looking at millions of Iraqi deaths. Never has a country saved so many civilians and gotten not only so little credit for it, but actually been blamed for those who are dying.
As to clearing out Saddam Hussein's regime, I think our policy ought to be first bin Laden then the Taliban. I think we would have some substantial allies to do that. And then we would be in a position to make demands of the Iraqi regime particularly as to U.N. Inspectors. If they reject those demands, as I expect they would, then perhaps with fewer allies we could proceed down the road that the Ranking Member laid out for us.
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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too just want to thank the three distinguished panelists for being here today and sharing with us your outlook on the situation that we have with Iraq. And if I could just ask you, in your remarks or at some point in your presentation, to focus on the issue of Iraq's state sponsorship of terrorism. As you know from the State Department's terrorism report, Iraq continues to provide safe haven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to an Iranian terrorist group. Dozens of terrorist groups are supported by Saddam Hussein, and several maintain offices in Bagdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front, and Abu Nidal. The PLF leader has appeared on the state-controlled television to praise Iraq's leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israel. And furthermore, Saddam Hussein has offered $10,000 rewards to the families of the Palestinian suicide bombers.
So in your remarks, if you could, just share with us some of your knowledge as to the state sponsorship that Saddam Hussein is undertaking toward the terrorist movements.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cantor.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Cantor follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIC CANTOR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
In statements since the terrorist attacks on September 11, President Bush has made it clear that the United States will not differentiate between terrorists and the states that harbor them. He has said to other countries that ''You are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'' With that in mind, it is clear that Iraq has already chosen its side and it is not with us.
According to the State Department, Iraq continued to provide safe haven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to an Iranian terrorist group. Dozens of terrorist groups are supported by Saddam Hussein, and several maintain offices in Baghdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and Abu Nidal. The PLF leader has appeared on state-controlled television to praise Iraq's leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israel. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein has offered $10,000 awards to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
Mr. GILMAN. Today's first witness is Geoffrey Kemp, a well-known expert on the region who served in the first Reagan Administration as Senior Director for Near Eastern Affairs at the National Security Council. Earlier this year, Mr. Kemp co-chaired a prestigious working group on Iraq under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Kemp, your statement will be entered in full in the record and you may summarize if you prefer. Please proceed.
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STATEMENT OF GEOFFEY KEMP, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER
Mr. KEMP. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize for 5 minutes.
Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be made part of record. Would you press the button by your mike?
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am very honored to testify this afternoon on this very, very important subject. Let me get straight to the point. If there is substantial and persuasive evidence that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks on September the 11th, the President has no option but to prepare for a major offensive against Iraq, including the use of military force. Its purpose would be the removal of the regime in Baghdad.
With compelling evidence, one would hope such action would have the direct support of NATO, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. However, if the evidence of an Iraqi connection is indirect, circumstantial, and not credible to our key allies, the United States must pursue a longer-term strategy to undermine the regime.
Whatever the evidence, if we mount an operation to change the regime in Baghdad, we will have few regional allies. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is intense and pervasive. Its causes are complex and are to be found in many more issues than the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the event of clear, substantive and persuasive evidence connecting Saddam to September 11th, the objective, as I said, must be the removal of the regime as well as a coherent policy for a post-Saddam Iraq.
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There is no guarantee that any of Saddam's successors that come from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Saddam, or that they will disband their WMD programs or abandon their wish to rebuild Iraq's military conventional forces.
Under the circumstances of Iraq being responsible in part for September 11th, the military choices the United States faces are formidable. While airpower and missiles can wreak a great deal of damage on Iraq's facilities and demoralize Iraqi security forces, most notably the Republican Guard, there is no assurance such an operation would lead to the end of the regime. In the process we could anticipate a severe backlash throughout the Muslim world, since a sustained bombing campaign would need to be more intense than anything witnessed during the Clinton Administration. This would undoubtedly lead to civilian casualties, probably deliberately orchestrated by Saddam.
While Iraqi forces are much weaker than in 1991, they may still have access to WMD, and certainly they possess short-range surface-to-surface missiles. My colleagues will talk in more detail about this, I believe. The occupation of an Arab country by American forces would reinforce Muslim radicals' basic tenet that we are intent on waging a war against Islam. Nevertheless, we may have no option but to take such a step. Kuwait would likely make facilities available, but this provides a very narrow base from which to launch an invasion. If Saudi Arabia decided to support such an action, the operation becomes much more favorable for the United States.
As for coordinating a guerrilla war using Iraqi opposition forces against Saddam, this too requires bases in regional countries. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria are unlikely to support such operations from their territory. Kuwait might agree, but the terrain in southern Iraq is not well suited to guerrilla operations. Turkey and Iran are much better suited, but Iran will clearly not participate. Turkey might, but will continue to be extremely concerned about the role of the Kurds, given its fear of instability on the border in its own Kurdish problem.
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Now, what should we do if the evidence linking Saddam to September the 11th is flimsy and inconclusive? First, we should not abandon the efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime. The present regime against Iraq is unraveling, and until September the 11th regional support for Saddam Hussein was growing. The revised sanctions policy proposed by the Administration deserves support. Today President Putin may be prepared to go along with the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions regime. China and France have already agreed to.
But for this to work, we will have to provide more aid to Jordan and to convince Turkey and Iran that their interests are served by working with a new U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions.
The question of support for Iraqi opposition forces outside Iraq arouses controversy both within the United States Government and among our allies. Iraqi opposition groups could and should be encouraged to remain active in the political arena and the propaganda war against the regime. Provision of lethal assistance could be considered based on future political progress. A parallel effort must be made in the intelligence arena to seek ways to infiltrate and undermine the Saddam Hussein regime from without and from within. Given the intensity of his security, this is a longshot but one we should pursue.
Irrespective of September the 11th, the U.S. needs to make sure that regional allies understand American red lines and that we understand the limits of their support for future U.S. military action. Three red lines are most likely to continue to receive active Arab and Turkish support:
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First, Iraqi military threats or attacks on allied forces.
Second, Iraqi threats or attacks on neighboring states.
Third, Iraqi acquisition and deployment of weapons of mass destruction or their use, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Red lines less likely to solicit active support include Iraqi aggression against the northern Kurdish enclave, which could be a real problem, and Iraq's military support for Palestinians against Israel. And here to emphasize what several of you said on the panel, the United States must be more assertive and aggressive in its public diplomacy. It should outline its hopes for Iraq and its people once the Saddam Hussein regime is gone.
Our most effective short-run strategy toward Iraq should be to keep Baghdad guessing as to what we are going to do. There is circumstantial evidence that since September the 11th, governments cozying up to Saddam and the dozens of companies seeking lucrative business deals have had second thoughts, not wanting to be seen acting against American interests or caught in the cross-fire of military confrontation. If countries such as Turkey reassess their present favorable relations with Iraq, others might follow.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. will have to walk a fine line between developing a more robust diplomacy while seeking regional support in preparing for a military response at some time in the future. Thank you.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Kemp.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Kemp follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEOFFEY KEMP, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER
The immediate priority for U.S. foreign policy must be the removal of Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network from Afghanistan and the installation of a new regime in that country. To this end the Bush administration has assembled a powerful but fractious coalition. It includes Russia, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, our European allies and some of our Arab friends. This is not going to be an easy operation and it may take months to succeed. We may find ourselves drawn deeper into the quagmire of south Asian politics. The stability of Pakistan, including its nuclear facilities, must be of concern. A humanitarian crisis could be upon us. Under these circumstances any effort to widen the confrontation to take on Iraq or other Middle East countries that harbor terrorists would put in jeopardy this particular coalition. Thus the administration's argument for a sequential approach to dealing with states that support terrorism makes strategic sense.
If we are successful in eliminating the Bin Laden network from Afghanistan and if a government comes to power in Kabul that can bring some stability and humanity to the region it would signal that we are serious about confronting those states that support terrorism. At that point our ability to muster support to end the remaining terrorist threats in the Middle East may be enhanced, though not assured.
In the meantime, Saddam and his regime pose a growing danger to the Middle East and the United States. The regime cannot be rehabilitated. Therefore, the goal of regime replacement should remain a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy options. The danger posed by Iraq increases the longer Saddam Hussein has access to ample hard currency, which enables him to continue to fund his security services and his WMD programs. The U.S. cannot negotiate with the Saddam Hussein regime. Its demise would be greeted with pleasure by the vast majority of Iraqis, most of our Arab friends, and of course, Israel.
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In the aftermath of September 11th, the most pertinent questions concerning Iraq are what actions should we plan for and over what period of time? If there is substantial and persuasive evidence that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks the President has no option but to prepare for a major offensive against Iraq, including the use of military force. Its purpose would be the removal of the regime in Baghdad. With compelling evidence one would hope such action would have the direct support of NATO, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
However if the evidence of an Iraqi connection is indirect, circumstantial and not credible to our key allies, the United States must pursue a longer term strategy to undermine the Iraqi regime. This should include: more aggressive intelligence operations and assistance to opposition groups both in Iraq and outside; tightening of U.N. sanctions; continued patrols of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq; and a coordinated international campaign to demonstrate to the world that the United States cares about the plight of the Iraqi people and that it is Saddam Hussein alone who is responsible for their misery and suffering.
Whatever the evidence of Iraq's complicity the reality is that if we mount an operation to change the regime in Baghdad, we will have few regional allies. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is intense and pervasive. Its causes are complex and are to be found in many more issues than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its true that the Intifada of the past year has magnified the problem, but even if there was an Israeli-Palestinian agreement hatred towards America would still be present. Much of the anti-Americanism in the Arab world reflects the anger and rage of discontented populations against their own regimes. As my colleague, Fouad Ajami has written, ''It has been America's fate to be caught in the crossfire of a war over Islam itself. A war between privilege and wrath, between the secular powers in the saddle and a nativist-pious opposition from below.''
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Some have argued that anti-Americanism is one thing, but that if the United States shows new resolve and is prepared to do whatever it takes to end the regime in Baghdad key Arab governments will support us, albeit reluctantly, since their interests ultimately lie with the West. However this proposition would need to be carefully tested before taking precipitous action. Certainly the hostility shown to the United States by citizens of one of our closest Arab friends, Egypt, is a very sober portend of what could lie ahead.
What options do we have in event of clear, substantive and persuasive evidence connecting Saddam Hussein to the events of September 11th? Few governments, including Arab governments, approve of the Saddam Hussein regime. However they express concern that a new American military offensive that did not guarantee the final and definitive removal of Saddam Hussein and his cohorts and the emergence of a stable, unified, Iraq would create more problems than it would solve. Thus if force is to be considered, the objective must be the removal of the regime, as well as a coherent policy for a post-Saddam Iraq. Removing Saddam alone might have some short term benefits, but there are downsides. First, if only Saddam and his immediate entourage are ousted, the Baathist regime will remain in power and Saddam's likely successor (unless it is his sons) would likely be greeted with such relief by the international community that Iraq could soon get out from under the punitive sanctions that have limited Saddam's strategic ambitions. There is no guarantee that any of Saddam's successors that come from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Saddam or that they will disband their WMD programs or abandon their wish to rebuild Iraq's military conventional forces. Iraq has suffered great humiliation in the past 10 years; the desire for redemption and revenge is not restricted to Saddam Hussein alone.
The military choices facing the U.S. in event of a decision to use major force are formidable. A strategic air offensive without the use of ground forces has well known limitations. A ground offensive analogous to Desert Storm would take months to put in place, assuming we had access rights in the region. A more indirect strategy of subversion and guerilla warfare has no guarantee of success.
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While airpower and missiles can wreak a great deal of damage on Iraqi facilities and demoralize Iraqi security forces, most notably the Republican Guards, there is no assurance such an operation would lead to the end of the regime. In the process we could anticipate a severe backlash throughout the Muslim world since a sustained bombing campaign would need to be more intense than anything witnessed during the Clinton administration. This would undoubtedly lead to civilian casualties, probably deliberately orchestrated by Saddam. Images of Iraqi suffering would be duly reported by the worlds' media, particularly CNN and the Arab station Al-Jazeera. Under these circumstances the danger of polarizing the region against the United States would grow unless we were lucky and in the early days of an air campaign Saddam was either overthrown or killed.
If the Iraqi regime survived such an attack but was severely hurt another consequence could be chaos. An imploding Iraqi state could have a destabilizing impact on the neighborhood, particularly on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Iran. Of course events might turn out for the good, but the belief that a pro-Western Iraqi regime will emerge from the ashes of a strategic bombing campaign may be wishful thinking.
The only sure way to replace the Baathist regime is to invade and occupy Iraq. This is such a daunting challenge that it would require a far greater consensus amongst regional and international partners of the United States that is present today. While Iraqi forces are much weaker than in 1991, they may still have access to WMD and certainly possess short range surface to surface missiles. The occupation of an Arab country by American forces would reinforce Muslim radicals basic tenet that we are intent on waging a war against Islam.
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Nevertheless under certain circumstances we may have no option but to take such a step. The political and logistical complications are formidable. Without major bases in Saudi Arabia it is difficult to invade from the south. Kuwait would likely make facilities available but this provides a very narrow base from which to accommodate a major American ground force and launch an invasion. If Saudi Arabia decided to support such an action and accept a large American military build up on its soil, the operation becomes much more favorable for the United States. However in 1990 Saudi Arabia itself was directly threatened by Saddam's forces; today it is not. In fact the regime might become more vulnerable from within if it accommodated a huge American military presence.
As for coordinating a guerilla war using Iraqi opposition forces against Saddam this, too, requires bases in regional countries from which to support such action. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria have repeatedly made it clear they would not support such operations from their territory. Kuwait might reluctantly agree but the terrain in southern Iraq is open and not well suited to guerilla operations. Turkey and Iran are better suited but Iran will clearly not participate. Turkey might, but will continue to be extremely concerned about the role of the Kurds, given its fear of instability on the border and its own Kurdish problem.
What should we do if the evidence linking Saddam Hussein to September 11th is flimsy and inconclusive? First, we should not abandon the efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime. The present sanctions regime against Iraq is unraveling and up until September 11th regional support for Saddam Hussein was growing. The revised sanctions policy proposed by the administration deserves support. It is focused on four key issues.
First, the preservation of the UN ''escrow'' account and other measures directed against the regime's financial assets to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining additional revenues from increased commerce between Iraq and the outside world.
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Second, giving Iraqis more freedom to purchase civilian goods thereby shifting responsibility to the regime for continued civilian suffering.
Third, the continuation of an embargo on all conventional weapons transfers to Iraq.
Fourth, a refinement of the list of prescribed dual use technologies that can assist Saddam Hussein's efforts to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction.
These are realistic goals for which there is considerable international support. It can be argued that under the new circumstances with greater Russian cooperation on a number of issues, President Putin may be prepared to go along with the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions regime on Saddam Hussein. China and France have offered support for a new sanctions regime. If it were to be implemented it could set the stage for reducing Saddam's access to foreign currency.
In parallel we will have to provide more aid to Jordan and to convince Turkey and Iran that their interests are served by working with a new UN Security council resolution. It will be difficult to ensure that goods and services which would now be free to move to Iraq do indeed reach the Iraqi people and are not pilfered by Saddam and his cohorts. Yet under these circumstances it would be less easy to criticize the sanctions as being against the Iraqi people. Saddam would now be demonstrably accountable for the suffering, not the UN.
Concerning enhanced support for Iraqi opposition forces outside Iraq, this issue arouses great controversy, both within the United States government and among our allies. Many military analysts have little expectation that any of the Iraqi opposition forces could at anytime soon provide the basis for a military challenge to Saddam Hussein. However the Iraqi opposition groups could and should be encouraged to remain active in the political arena and the propaganda war against the regime. Incremental support for the opposition can be pursued with additional support contingent upon progress in political de-legitimization efforts and opposition successes in the field. Pressure to broaden the appeal of the opposition among the various Iraqi clans, both Sunni and Shiite, should be made though we do need to find more specific groups we can effectively work with. Provision of lethal assistance could be considered based on future political progress. Under present circumstances, it would take a major political investment by the U.S. to make support for opposition groups more credible in the region.
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A parallel effort must be made in the intelligence arena to seek ways to infiltrate and undermine the Saddam Hussein regime from without and from within. Deception and dirty tricks should be refined and implemented. No one doubts the difficulties of these types of operations, but clearly the most likely danger to Saddam himself is an uprising within his own Sunni organizations. Given the intensity of his security, this is a long shot, but one that should not be pursued.
Saddam Hussein is likely to behave egregiously at some point in the future. The U.S. therefore needs to make sure that regional allies understand American red lines and that we understand the limits of their support for future U.S. military action. Red lines remain an important element of our policy. Three red lines are most likely to continue to receive active Arab and Turkish support, as distinct from acquiescence.
First, Iraqi military threats or attacks on allied forces.
Second, Iraqi threats or attacks on neighboring states.
Third, Iraqi acquisition and deployment of weapons of mass destruction or their use, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Red lines less likely to solicit active support include Iraqi aggression against the Northern Kurdish enclave and Iraq's military support for Palestinians against Israel. There remains considerable room for ambiguity on these issues. For instance, most regional powers accept the US and UK right to defend aircraft patrolling in the NFZ by attacking Iraq's anti-air capability. However, they are unlikely to support major retaliatory action against other Iraqi military and civilian targets.
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The United States must be more assertive and aggressive in its public diplomacy. It should outline its hopes for Iraq and its people and state that they will be well treated and respected once the Saddam Hussein regime has gone. The U.S. has been losing the propaganda war and it should be a priority to retain the high ground on the matter of who is most responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people. The U.S. should lead international efforts to indict leading regime figures, including limiting their foreign travel and freezing their external bank accounts. Those who wish to profit from supporting present regime should be placed in position of having to defend it in light of its track record.
Our most effective short run strategy towards Iraq should be to keep Baghdad guessing as to what we are going to do. There is circumstantial evidence that since September 11th governments cozying up to Saddam and the dozens of companies seeking lucrative business deals have had second thoughts, not wanting to be seen acting against American interests or caught in the crossfire of military confrontation. If countries such as Turkey reassess their present favorable relations with Iraq, others might follow if they believe the U.S. is serious about eventual regime change. This could reverse the favorable momentum Saddam has been exploiting for the past year and could make it more difficult for Baghdad to reassert its presence in the region. For this reason the U.S. will have to walk a fine line between developing a more robust diplomacy while seeking regional support in preparing for a military response at some time in the future.
Mr. GILMAN. Next we will hear from Charles Duelfer, who is one of the few experts who can attest from personal experience just how difficult it is to obtain information from Iraq on its weapons programs. He visited Iraq many times during his tenure as Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, the special U.N. commission charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons programs. He is now a visiting scholar in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Duelfer, please proceed.
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STATEMENT OF CHARLES DUELFER, VISITING SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. DUELFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to have my written testimony submitted for the record.
Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, we will be pleased to make it part of the record. You may summarize.
Mr. DUELFER. I will summarize briefly and informally, and hopefully in questions we can get to some of these points in more detail.
Much of what I have to say would underline, I think, the comments made by Members of your Committee. My comments are, as you mentioned, drawn upon my experience of having spent a lot of time in Iraq with all sorts of Iraqis, both very senior officials, Saddam's highest officials in charge of his weapons of mass destruction program, his experts, and average Iraqis in the street.
Let me make first some comments on the weapons of mass destruction threat, and then secondly I will talk about some of the specific problems of the Iraqi regime. UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, and the IAEA accomplished a lot during the many years we spent chasing down these programs in Iraq. We accomplished a lot over the obstructions put in our way of the regime. We accounted for a lot of the weapons of mass destruction, but there were some key remaining issues and some key uncertainties which were left.
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Ultimately, Iraq successfully divided the Security Council and we found that the Security Council, all of its members, would not agree to pursue sufficient force to cause Iraq to comply fully. But anyway, in this process we learned a few key things. One is the enormous value Iraq attaches to weapons of mass destruction. I remember spending many long nights with top commanders, trying to get them to explain how they planned on using them, why they were designing them, why they kept them. And it really boiled down to two points which they made:
One, in the war that they conducted with Iran, they believed that the use of chemical weapons saved them. Iran was using these human wave attacks, you may recall, and Iraq responded by using 100,000 chemical munitions. And they believe that they survived and prevailed in that war because of their possession of weapons of mass destruction.
Secondly, and in the second Gulf War, they argue that the possession of weapons of mass destruction deterred the Coalition and the United States from going to Baghdad. From their perspective that is how they see it. It raises a question: Who is deterring whom in the region these days? But in any case, that is the view; they attach high importance to these weapons. It explains why they devoted so many resources, billions and billions of dollars, buildings, people, throughout decades. Some of these weapons have military rationales. This is what we tried to explore from them. Some of them did not.
Iraq would never explain what the rationale was for some of their biological weapons. UNSCOM was never able to get a full and concrete description of the purposes for some of these. We all have our opinions, but it is not a pretty picture. It is for population modification. Killing their own population was one of the logical explanations. Iraq never said that—UNSCOM never stated that as a fact, but it is one of the logical reasons why they would have made some of these agents.
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Remaining in Iraq is the intellectual capital to produce all of these. Remaining in Iraq is production equipment. Remaining in Iraq is at least a strategic reserve of these forces. And from what we are able to gather—there are many Iraqis who have left Iraq—these programs are still underway. Their full extent and their full capacity can only be surmised. But no serious analyst believes that Iraq is not pursuing these programs and does not retain some capability. One can only assume they continue to harbor ambitions of having a full array of these weapons, including nuclear.
A couple of comments about the regime and its behavior. America seems to think that the Gulf War ended in 1991. Baghdad doesn't. They are still at war. And in fact, they make an argument that they have been successful and are probably winning the war. They believe that there has been an economic as well as a hot military war going on throughout the period. So there is definitely a difference in view between Washington and Baghdad on what is going on.
Their fight to erode sanctions has been largely successful. Even if new sanctions are put in place in Iraq, Baghdad will see that as a success; because the type of sanctions and the type of enforcement are certainly less stringent than had existed originally.
Curiously, in a lot of my experience with senior officials and professionals in Iraq, it was astonishing that, in fact, they would like nothing better than to be reconnected with the West, with the rest of the world and, curiously, the United States. The average Iraqi, the professionals, the technocrats, the bureaucrats, are all under the thumb of an onerous government.
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But the people are the ones who are suffering, and that is where the real tragedy of this whole circumstance is. Because if you look at what Iraq could be in the region, the potential for economic growth, for a growing society, for the proper utilization of oil revenues, with a different regime, with one that would behave by international norms, one that Washington could have relations with, it could change everything in the Middle East. Palestinians could be going to Iraq for schooling, for jobs. Thus, to me, if you compare what Iraq could be with what Iraq is and what it is growing as a threat, there is a big difference. And the potential gain to me is worth the risk, because it really could change everything in the Middle East.
A couple of other brief comments. One good thing about Saddam Hussein is that it doesn't appear that he is suicidal, and therefore deterrence seems to work. This has been the one success, I suppose, in the last decade, and that is that we have been able to deter Iraq again from invading its neighbors, from using overtly some of the weapons which we know it possesses.
However, the question is, if Baghdad were able to conduct an attack that we would not be able to link specifically to Baghdad, would it? And the potential that we saw in its biological weapons program and some of the research activities which we saw them conducting, seemed to indicate what they were looking at ways where they could conduct an activity or a strike that would not be able to be connected with Iraq.
I just ask you to envision if you went up to Saddam Hussein and said, ''Hey, boss, I have got a way of responding to the economic hardships that have been imposed by on us by the United States; we can cause them some damage and they will never be able to connect that to you,'' what would he do?
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So we have got a problem if all we do is rely on deterrence. And I say this, simply to say that treating this problem incrementally, continuing to kick the problem down the road, may be a recipe for long-term disaster.
I subscribe to those of you that say this is a problem that has got to be dealt with. Managing it, deferring it, is not going to work. So far, the regime has not done us the favor of collapsing on its own. I think it is going to need some help. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES DUELFER, VISITING SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee and discuss Iraq. I will focus first on the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and secondly on the broader Iraq problem.
The Baghdad regime has had the intention of acquiring weapons of mass destruction since the 1970's when most of their programs began. As is well known, the Baghdad regime successfully developed long range missiles with chemical and biological warheads in the 1980's. They came very close to achieving a nuclear weapons capability just before the war in 1991.
Iraq used over 100,000 chemical munitions during its war with Iran. It used a variety of chemical munitions against its own population as well. Best known was the attack against the Kurdish city of Halabja. Immediate casualty figures numbered in the thousands, with long term effects that have not been calculated. There are no confirmed reports of biological weapons use, but the evolving study of health conditions in Kurdistan point to a growing possibility that biological agents caused some of the extraordinary incidences of cancers, birth defects and major diseases now prevalent. Interestingly, Baghdad has blamed similar health problems on the presence of depleted uranium shells used by coalition forces in the south of Iraq in 1991.
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UNSCOM and the IAEA were able to account for much of the Iraqi WMD programs. Despite a systematic policy by Iraq to conceal the full extent of their programs, much was learned—albeit with some key gaps.
A few salient points are worth recalling from UNSCOM's work. First, the level of effort and resources committed to these programs was enormous. Billions of dollars, thousands of people, and hundreds of buildings were dedicated to developing and producing these weapons.
Second, the origins of the programs and their purposes are not fully understood, but they were not simply military in nature. In particular, the biological weapons (BW) program appears to have had its origins in the security services. No military concept was ever presented for their research or production. In fact, Iraq claimed that their Ministry of Defense had nothing to do with the BW development program.
Third, when UNSCOM and IAEA left in December 1998, there certainly remained in Iraq the intellectual know-how to continue all these programs. UNSCOM had significant concerns about remaining production capability and indeed, weapons themselves. During the period of time UNSCOM still worked in New York, but was not in Iraq, it continued to collect evidence or ongoing Iraqi work in all areas of WMD. I doubt anyone believes Iraq has stopped its WMD efforts. Even while UNSCOM was operating with our most creative and intrusive inspection techniques, we remained deeply concerned that programs continued clandestinely—albeit at a reduced level.
Fourth, Iraq is actively and apparently successfully developing both liquid and solid fuelled ballistic missiles. The United Nations resolution banning Iraqi WMD programs does permit missiles of range under150 kilometers. While UNSCOM was in Iraq, we monitored these programs quite carefully. In particular, a program called the Al Samoud was being energetically pursued. It has been tested frequently. It may or may not exceed the permitted range, but what is clear is that Iraq is developing an indigenous missile capability that did not exist before the war. This sizeable commitment of resources by a regime which pleads that the United States is starving its population via sanctions, puts in bold relief their true intentions and priorities.
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A final observation about UNSCOM's investigation of Iraq's BW program is relevant under today's circumstances. The BW program was the least understood program and the one Iraq obfuscated the most. There are multiple reasons for this. One is that the purpose behind the development of certain biological agents and weapons was probably not military. For example, Iraq produced large amounts of an agent called Aflatoxin. Exposure to this causes cancer over a period of years. Such exposure might prevent a lieutenant from becoming a colonel, but it is difficult to envision a military purpose—especially bearing in mind that Iraq had extensive experience with the tactical military use of chemical weapons against Iran in the eighties. Their successful use of chemical weapons was one factor that reinforced their commitment to WMD.
We also know Iraqi scientists conducted some experiments in mixing Aflatoxin with a non-lethal agent—CS, or tear gas—commonly used as a riot control tool. The question is what purpose is served by camouflaging the dispersal of an agent that causes cancer?
Another aspect of Iraq's BW research is also troubling. Experiments were conducted with substances that cause agricultural damage such as wheat cover smut. This indicates they were investigating potential economic weapons. Moreover, such agents could easily be deployed in ways that would make their origin virtually impossible to trace. If a potential enemy can harm you without you knowing who did it, it makes deterrence very difficult. Recent events underscore the importance of being able to identify the culprit in a terror attack. Conversely, opponents may increasingly seek to conceal their complicity through various methods.
If I may expand my remarks beyond Iraq's WMD capabilities, I would like to make a few observations drawing upon several years of experience in dealing with Iraq and senior Iraqi government officials.
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The regime in Iraq sees itself at war with the United States. It is a military and economic war that is ongoing. The regime is intent on winning and is willing to pay a heavy price to reemerge as the dominant country in the region. Baghdad, with help from friends on the Security Council, has been successfully eroding the consensus that has contained it during the past decade. They have astutely distributed economic favors in ways that win them support. Baghdad has convinced many that the regime is inevitable and therefore must be accepted. Moreover, those who befriend Baghdad will profit. A blind eye is turned to past aggression and atrocities. The regime, at tremendous cost to its own population, seeks to outlast the United States.
At the same time, the Iraqi professionals, technocrats, and even government officials, while they serve their country, would like nothing better than to be reconnected with the rest of the world—including the United States.
The magnitude of the tragedy of Iraq can best be appreciated when you consider two alternative futures for Iraq over the next few years. Presently, Iraq, under the current regime, is on a path of growing threat to the region and the world. It has not lost its ambition to dominate the region through military intimidation. It has growing WMD capabilities, and a significant conventional military. It also will have the increasing leverage of growing oil production—potentially growing to 4–5 million barrels per day in the next few years. Its practice of domestic oppression is certainly not decreasing. Iraq's best and brightest escape if at all possible. Further, there can be no doubt that the regime will continue its battle with the United States. The regime has supported and harbored terrorists in the past and will continue in the future. The regime can be expected to use whatever means possible to attack the United States if it can, and can get away with it.
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An alternative future is an Iraq governed by a regime which follows international norms and with which the United States could have normal relations. Such a regime could not only free Iraq from its current quagmire, but could change much in the Middle East. A growing Iraqi economy with the reconstitution of normal international commerce, educational systems and societal revival could go a long way toward addressing some of the endemic problems in the region. It certainly would release energies and talents of the Iraqi people who currently either escape or suffocate under the current regime.
The difference between these two futures is huge, and growing. The threat Iraq poses will continue to grow if the present regime continues to renew itself. The policy of containment has succeeded in deferring the Iraqi problem not solving it. The potential that Baghdad could act overtly or covertly against the United States remains high. Moreover, there has been a tremendous cost to the Iraqi people. They have had to suffer under Baghdad's repression for another decade while Iraq was contained.
Obviously, the world will watch closely to see how the United States addresses the Iraq problem. Many regional states have become convinced that they must seek their own accommodation with the regime as it poses both a growing threat and reward in terms of oil exports. No firm policy has emerged from Washington in recent years that would lead to other conclusions. Regional states will also watch how the present campaign against terror plays out. If it does not include an Iraq component, the conclusion will be drawn that either the United States accepts, if not desires, the present circumstances in Iraq—or is powerless to change them.
There is an opportunity now to refocus how the world is dealing with Iraq. The threat posed by this regime needs to be highlighted. Certainly the world is right to worry about the suffering of the Iraqi people. But, the actions over the past few years have had the effect of conveying legitimacy on this regime—a regime that has invaded two neighbors and used chemical weapons on its own population. Trusting that this regime, which has used chemical weapons against its own population, won't use them elsewhere is foolish. So far, the American military presence has deterred such attacks. But over the long term, only a when there is new leadership in Baghdad will there be real improvement to regional security and the Iraqi people.
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Mr. GILMAN. We'll next hear from Gary Milhollin, who is the Director of the Wisconsin Project in Nuclear Arms Control, perhaps the most authoritative center for the study of proliferation issues in our Nation. Mr. Milhollin has produced volumes of work on Iraq's efforts to obtain weapons-related technology.
Mr. Milhollin you may put your full statement in the record and summarize however you may desire.
STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have three items that I would like to add to the record.
Mr. GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. They are findings from a roundtable that we conducted recently, an article from Commentary Magazine, and a table in the New York Times.
Mr. GILMAN. Would you identify the conference and the article dates? Could you identify those dates?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Just a moment. The roundtable has just been put on our Web site in the last few days.
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Mr. GILMAN. Where was that conducted and the date?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. The date of the roundtable was May 24th, 2001. It was conducted here in Washington. And the article in Commentary Magazine was published in the July-August edition 2001. And the table in the New York Times dates from 1998. We prepared the table just after the inspectors left.
Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, they will be received in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
IRAQ WATCH ROUNDABLES
Panelists:
W. Seth Carus
Pierce S. Corden
David Kay
Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack
John Larrabee
Moderators:
Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz
Editors of IraqWatch.org
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What policies would be most effective now in dealing with Iraq?
What practical steps would improve the present situation?
These were the subjects of a roundtable discussion that the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control hosted in Washington, D.C. on May 24, 2001. The roundtable's five panelists were chosen on the basis of their experience in Iraq and the Middle East. They were W. Seth Carus, one of the world's leading authorities on Iraq and on the spread of weapons of mass destruction, Pierce S. Corden, who served as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, David Kay, who led nuclear inspection teams in Iraq, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, who led biological weapon inspection teams in Iraq and who is presently chief of the biological weapon section at the U.N.'s Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and John Larrabee, who led missile inspections in Iraq and is a specialist on ballistic missile technology.
The panel found, in sum, that there is little incentive for Iraq to disarm or cooperate with U.N. inspectors; that smuggling has created a multilayered infrastructure that has corrupted Iraq's neighbors from top to bottom; that ''smart sanctions'' may not be an improved policy; and that given the forces and policies now operating in the Gulf, the mass destruction weapon threat from Iraq will continue.
These findings are a composite of the panelists' personal views; no particular finding should be attributed to any single panelist, nor should the findings be thought to represent the views of any organization with which a panelist is affiliated. The full text of the panel's findings follow.
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Finding 1—Iraq is still committed to developing weapons of mass destruction. In biological weaponry, Iraq is now self-sufficient; it has what is necessary to build a biological arsenal. Iraq also appears to possess stocks of chemical agent and is known to have had virtually every element of a workable nuclear weapon except the fissile material needed to fuel it. Iraq's authorized program for developing short-range ballistic missiles could enable the building of longer-range missiles, and Iraq is also showing an interest in cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Since the cease fire agreement that terminated the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq has waged an unceasing political struggle with the United States, the object of which has been to undo the strategic results that the Gulf War produced. Iraq's goals are to undermine the position of the United States in the Middle East, to reestablish Iraq as the leading Arab state, and eventually to dominate the region.
Iraq's programs to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, together with long-range missiles, are seen as essential to the achievement of these goals. The drive to possess these arms will not abate as long as the current regime remains in power. In fact, the regime has paid a huge price to protect these programs. Equally important, it has paid this price in order not to be seen as surrendering to the United States.
The panelists agree that Iraq's biological capability now presents the greatest threat. Iraq has the infrastructure, the knowledge base, and the ability to produce what it needs indigenously. This includes growth media for microorganisms, equipment to produce microorganisms in vials, and biological warfare agents. Iraq already possesses the necessary biological strains, some of which are endemic, so there is no need to rely on imports. In addition, biological weapons are relatively cheap to make so there is no financial constraint. Iraq has never demonstrated that its biological weapon program has been terminated or destroyed.
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Some panelists are particularly concerned about the covert use of an agent not known to have been in Iraq's arsenal. Such an agent could be produced with a minimum of effort, and a properly released or timed introduction could bring an opponent to its knees. The agent need not be lethal. In fact, the introduction of an economic-focused agent (such as foot and mouth disease) could be highly effective and difficult to trace.
Nuclear weapons also remain a danger in Iraq. Baghdad presently possesses a workable nuclear weapon design and had virtually every necessary component to build it except the fissile material needed for fuel. In addition, Iraq has sought to keep its nuclear weapon teams intact. With sanctions against Iraq declining, foreign travel to Iraq increasing, and interactions becoming more common with Russians trying to recover billions of dollars in pre-Gulf War debts, the odds are increasing that Iraq may get what it needs. If Iraq manages to import the necessary fissile material, one panelist believes that Iraq could fashion a bomb in a matter of months. This panelist also believes that Iraq still has a pilot centrifuge cascade of some size that the U.N. inspectors missed. The panelist warns that the operation of such a cascade would be hard to detect, and could be used in an effort to process low-enriched uranium up to weapon grade.
Iraq's chemical weapon capability also remain a danger, despite the fact that U.N. inspectors managed to destroy large amounts of it. Iraq appears to retain small stocks of chemical weapon agents, including the highly destructive nerve agent VX. It may be some time, however, before Iraq can produce strategically significant quantities of chemical munitions. To be effective, a chemical agent must be delivered over a considerable area in high concentrations. One panelist pointed out that in addition to the risk that Iraq may restart its known chemical weapon programs, Iraq could pursue some of the new avenues the Soviets opened up. These avenues included novel chemical agents, such as the Novichok family, which are designed to avoid the routine monitoring provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, while being easy and cheap to produce in civilian plants. A step in this direction by Iraq might be difficult to detect.
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Iraq is presently barred by U.N. resolutions from possessing or developing ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers. Most panelists agreed that Iraq will not be able to perfect missiles beyond that range without flight tests, which would probably be discovered. They note that the technologies Iraq has chosen for its 150 kilometer missiles, however, are clearly intended to support follow-on systems with longer ranges. Thus, Iraq's 150 kilometer Al Samoud missile, which is now under development, is little more than a reduced-range SCUD missile, which has a range of 300 kilometers. Iraq has already shown the ability to modify SCUDs to fly more than double their original range and Iraq may still retain a few SCUD-type missiles at secret locations. Some panelists were of the view that the 150 kilometer limit is not self-defining. Without overtly violating the 150-kilometer restriction, Iraq could flight test some of the systems and technologies necessary for a longer-range missile. Iraq could use techniques such as increasing the warhead weight beyond that designed for the eventual operational missile. The heavier payload would limit the range in flight tests, but would still allow the testing or validating of longer-range operational systems.
Some of the panelists believe that Iraq is more likely to deliver chemical or biological agents with a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) or cruise missile. These agents are more difficult to deliver successfully with ballistic missiles. A UAV or cruise missile provides better control. It is known that Iraq had a program for using a MiG-21 as a UAV for delivering biological agents and that Iraq actually carried out delivery tests with simulated agents. Iraq also modified a fuel tank to disperse biological agent from a Mirage F1 used as a UAV.
Iraq's conventional military forces are limited, but significant. Iraqi ground forces are weaker than they were in 1991. Some panelists believe that Iraq nevertheless retains the power to overrun Kuwait unless the United States should have enough warning time to increase U.S. forces in the region. Iraq's air defense system is also weak, but improving. U.S. military commanders have expressed the view that it is only a matter of time before Iraq manages to shoot down a U.S. aircraft operating in one of the no-fly zones.
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The panel believes that the pace of Iraq's present activities may depend on whether Iraq plans to re-admit U.N. inspectors under some future compromise. If Iraq re-admits inspectors, it would be required to account for the use of the sensitive equipment that the inspectors were formerly monitoring. This requirement could limit what Iraq is doing with the equipment now. If, however, Iraq has decided that it will never again admit inspectors, then Iraq could already be using the sensitive equipment without restraint, which would increase significantly its ability to develop weapons of mass destruction. From Iraq's recent announcements, it appears that the latter course is the most likely.
Finding 2—Iraq has little or no incentive to disarm or to cooperate with U.N. inspectors. Several panelists noted that the United States no longer appears to consider the disarming of Iraq to be an achievable foreign policy goal, or to believe that the resumption of U.N. inspections is a high priority.
Most panelists agree that Iraq has little or no incentive to re-admit U.N. inspectors. Iraq has achieved much of what it sought to gain—including an easing and possibly a near lifting of sanctions—with no cooperation on its part. By promising and actually providing financial advantages to key countries, Iraq has assembled a number of supporters in both the United Nations and the Gulf region. There is no reason for Iraq to see its present intransigence as bringing anything but gain. The greatest remaining restraint on Iraq is U.N. control of Iraq's oil income. Iraq is working hard, however, to increase the amount of oil that is smuggled across its borders without U.N. control.
Some panelists noted that the Bush administration appears to have decided that inspections are not a high priority. The administration has no desire to return to the situation in which the Clinton administration found itself, where U.N. inspectors asked for access to an Iraqi facility, were wrongfully refused, and then turned to the United States for enforcement help. That process gave Saddam Hussein the power to create an international incident at will, and ultimately demonstrated the impotence of the international community—and the United States—when it came to the use of force. They noted that Vice President Cheney has expressed the view that Saddam Hussein can be counted on to frustrate any inspection likely to produce results, and therefore that inspections should not be a high priority.
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Nevertheless, some panelists pointed out that it is in Iraq's interest to work out a better relationship with the U.N. Security Council. As long as Iraq is in noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, Iraq's diplomatic standing will be impaired. Even more important, Iraq will continue to be barred from military and civilian dual-use imports. These factors, however, have not been enough to produce Iraqi cooperation so far, and are not likely to produce it in the future.
Finding 3—If Iraq were to re-admit U.N. inspectors, a new baseline for inspections could still be created, notwithstanding the gap in inspection coverage during the past two and one half years. Iraq, however, would have to provide accurate declarations of its weapon activity and immediate, unrestricted access to all persons, documents and sites. In addition, the U.N. Security Council would have to refrain from exerting pressure on the inspectors to wrap things up quickly.
If Iraq re-admits U.N. inspectors (by accepting, for example, U.N. Resolution 1284) Iraq would be required to declare every change made to its monitored facilities since December 1998, when inspections ended. It would also be required to declare what it did with every piece of monitored equipment and all monitored materials. New sites would also have to be declared, as would imports of dual-use equipment. UNMOVIC would analyze these initial declarations, together with other information, and use them as a starting point for a new inspection baseline.
In the opinion of some panelists, a missile or nuclear baseline would probably require only a few months, whereas baselines in the chemical and biological areas would take considerably longer. The gaps in knowledge of these latter areas could be resolved only over a period of time. The time needed would depend on the accuracy of Iraq's declarations and on the degree of access provided to the inspectors. Immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to physical locations, personnel and documents would be essential to both disarmament and monitoring.
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Some panelists fear that if inspectors were re-admitted, there would be tremendous political pressure from the U.N. Security Council to do baselining quickly and to get the inspections over with. Because the inspectors' only authority is derived from the Security Council, the Council's ability and willingness to insist on effective inspections is vital to success.
It is also a fact that even the most intrusive inspection system—such as the one that UNSCOM operated in Iraq—will still produce a residue of uncertainty. It is simply not possible to monitor every square inch in the territory of a state—and some weapons activities do not require much space. It is a political task to decide how serious the residue is. International inspections can be an important confidence building measure, but no illusions should be harbored.
Finding 4—Oil-for-food monitors are no replacement for arms inspectors.
It has been suggested that the monitors responsible for the oil-for-food program in Iraq could verify that sensitive items purchased by Iraq are not misused. However, these monitors have neither the ability nor the mission to carry out such a task.
First, they lack the expertise. They have no training in the use of sensitive equipment or in the ways by which such equipment might be diverted to a weapon program. The typical oil-for-food inspector would not be able to distinguish a milling machine from a vacuum furnace, and would have no hope of distinguishing a corrosion-resistant pump from an ordinary one. Even trained UNSCOM inspectors have had difficulty combating Iraq's practice of switching identification plates on machines, and of carrying out secret weapon work at supposedly civilian sites.
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Second, oil-for-food monitors do not have the mission or the authority to prevent diversions. Their mission is limited to verifying that contracts are fulfilled and that an item goes to the site that purchased it. What happens to an item after that is not their concern. The task of weapon inspectors is quite different; weapon inspectors must track sensitive items wherever they go and however they are used. Only continuous monitoring can prevent weapon development at a civilian site. Thus, the presence of oil-for-food monitors cannot justify the export of sensitive items under ''smart sanctions.''
Finding 5—The smuggling of oil out of Iraq and of goods into Iraq has created a multilayered infrastructure that has corrupted Iraq's neighbors from top to bottom. The prospects of stopping this smuggling are not good.
The international trade embargo did reduce Iraq's access to resources when it was first imposed. Since then, however, Iraq's methods for smuggling oil have grown more sophisticated and the financing harder to trace or block. Within Iraq, Saddam Hussein has used smuggling revenues to enrich his family and friends and to bind groups to his regime. He has also used these revenues to build support in neighboring countries. In addition, important elements of the Kurdish economy have become entrapped and dependent upon oil smuggling.
The smuggling of goods into Iraq has also grown, and become more sophisticated. It now consists of a multilayered infrastructure that reaches back through the highest levels in Jordan, Syria, Turkey and even Iran. Overall, Saddam's oil revenue has now reached the levels he enjoyed before the Gulf war. This increased stream of petrodollars has created a political momentum in Iraq's favor that will be difficult to stop.
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To reverse the momentum, the front line states would have to be given great incentives. However, there are obstacles in the way. The first is the nature of the governments with which one would have to deal. There is real doubt whether some of the front line states possess the internal coherence to counteract the secret flow of money to elites—a weakness that Iraq is now exploiting. There is also the fact that the West would have to deal with people in the Middle East that it doesn't normally turn money over to. And finally, there is the brute question of the amounts required. It is by no means evident that the United States and its allies would be willing to pay enough to offset the secret profits from billions in illicit oil sales.
Among the incentives that might be possibly offered—other than money—are intelligence sharing, increased sales of weapons or dual-use goods, or even threats of sanctions for non-cooperation. These incentives, of course, present many problems of their own. Iraq would no doubt retaliate against the first state that decided to cooperate with the West, and would immediately shift its business elsewhere. Thus, all states would have to cooperate. One benefit of cooperation would undoubtedly be increased inspections at the borders of the front-line states. These inspections might catch some goods coming in, but, in the panel's opinion, they would be no effective substitute for U.N. inspectors on the ground inside Iraq itself. Borders leak, and the more money that is at stake, the more they leak. A dedicated country with the desire and resources of Iraq will either divert revenue or obtain it outside the streams presently controlled. It will also seek new illicit revenue streams as old ones are closed off.
Finding 6—The ''smart sanctions'' proposed by the administration may not be an improved policy, and could increase the danger posed by Iraq.
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The administration has proposed a new set of ''smart sanctions'' for Iraq, but the panel as a whole is not convinced that they are a step forward. Allowing Iraq to import a broader range of civilian goods, which is what the new sanctions would do, is not likely to help the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has deliberately chosen to maintain the suffering of the Iraqi population by refusing to buy civilian goods with existing oil-for-food revenue. He has used the suffering, in turn, to build pressure for ending the U.N. sanctions and its control over his oil revenue. In fact, none of the major players on Iraq's side in the present debate—Russia, China or France—appear to be motivated by concern about the Iraqi population and neither does Saddam Hussein. Ordinary Iraqis are ill-starred pawns in the struggle for control of Iraq's bank accounts.
The U.S. proposal would retain U.N. control over Iraq's oil income and would forbid the purchase of arms and sensitive dual-use items; however, it would abolish controls on just about everything else. It would not require Iraq to re-admit U.N. inspectors or to take any steps toward disarmament.
Without inspectors, there is no internal restraint on Iraqi efforts to rebuild the infrastructure necessary for rearmament, including efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. In particular, there would be no on-the-ground control to prevent diversion of Iraq's increased civilian imports to military ends. One panelist pointed out that when the United States and its allies compromised in December 1999, and agreed to U.N. Resolution 1284, they were trying to allay the humanitarian argument against sanctions by allowing Iraq to sell unlimited amounts of oil. The U.N. received, however, nothing in return. Now, with smart sanctions, the process would be repeated. Controls on Iraq would be weakened once again without any Iraqi movement toward disarmament or inspections. There is no reason to believe that Iraq will cooperate with the new sanctions any more than with the previous ones. Thus, the new sanctions may be a slippery slope, with further reductions of sanctions to follow. The illusion of controls would be preserved while sanctions continue to erode.
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Finding 7—The prospects are dim for a satisfactory outcome in Iraq. Options are few, and there are no good ones. The United States has never had a long-term strategy for dealing with Iraq; this would be a good time to devise one.
Most panelists agree that Iraq has won the public relations battle over sanctions. The general public no longer realizes that if Saddam Hussein truly decided to disarm, he could clear Iraq's name in a matter of months, end the embargo, and remove any restraint on the flow of goods to the Iraqi population. He has been rejecting this opportunity, however, since 1991. Saddam Hussein obviously believes that preserving his mass destruction weapon programs is more important than the billions of dollars in oil income that his country has foregone and will continue to forego.
In the face of Iraq's intransigence, the West has tried to compel its compliance, both by economic means through sanctions, and by political and military means through a multilateral coalition. Neither of these efforts is succeeding. The principal remaining option—full-scale military intervention—carries a price no one is willing to pay. Thus, an uneasy status quo remains.
Yet the status quo is unacceptable. The Gulf states and others are already currying favor with Iraq because they perceive that it will not be compelled to give up its weapon potential. They also perceive that Iraq has a growing chance of evading U.N. control of its bank accounts. Thus, there is an increasing willingness to violate sanctions. The result is that sanctions are eroding even while Iraq is working to enhance its mass destruction weapon capabilities.
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This outcome will undoubtedly spur weapons proliferation in the region. If Iraq is successful in pursuing secret weapon programs, others will see that they can do the same. Iran, in particular, will be under pressure to match Iraq in mass destruction weaponry, and Saudi Arabia will be watching. The United States and its allies have been able to threaten countries with an array of sanctions for proliferation, but if sanctions prove unsuccessful in Iraq, they will necessarily lose credibility. The price of not making things better in Iraq may be to make things worse in the region.
The alternatives seem to be to keep sanctions as strong as possible or to replace them with something better. However, giving up on sanctions would hand a tremendous victory to Iraq; there would be no way to ''spin'' it otherwise. Thus, while there may be a temptation to declare victory on sanctions and retire from the field—by arguing that sanctions have at least slowed down Saddam for a decade—it is not possible to abandon sanctions unless something more effective can be substituted.
The opposition to sanctions is fundamentally driven by money. The reason why Russia, France and China oppose sanctions is that they want access to Iraq—to ''get the money out,'' in the words of one panelist. France, in particular, has always seen Iraq as a major source of income. What is needed is an arrangement in which these countries can get dollars out of Iraq while preserving international security. That arrangement cannot mean a resumption of Iraqi mass destruction weapon programs.
One of the reasons the United States may not have been more successful in the Gulf is that U.S. diplomats have pointed their energy further west—to the Israeli peace process. Because the United States sees the peace process as its most important interest in the region, it has been willing to overlook things, for example, taking place in Jordan. To make progress in the Gulf, the United States needs to spread its efforts across both parts of the Middle East more equally.
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U.S. Iraq policy continues to be largely tactical, without an evident long-term strategy for dealing with the threat that Saddam Hussein presents. ''Smart sanctions'' are primarily a tactic—designed to counter the criticism that too many sales are now being held up by U.S. and U.K. objections. Even if these new sanctions are adopted, however, Iraq would be no nearer to disarmament than it was before.
The longer-term strategic question seems to be whether some common ground can be found among the former members of the Gulf Coalition and the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Most panelists believe that little such ground exists. Nevertheless, it might be feasible to fashion a consensus around the principle that Iraqi military moves against its neighbors will not be tolerated; that Iraq's military capabilities must be strictly limited; and that information should be shared on what Iraq is up to. The United States may be compelled to seek such a consensus eventually. The panel concludes that ''solving'' the problem of Iraq does not now seem feasible. The removal of Saddam Hussein does not have the support of U.S. allies, nor is such a step within the power and resources that the United States is willing to commit. Nor is Iraq likely to disarm or re-admit arms inspectors with real authority. This situation, coupled with the rise in Iraq's oil income, will produce a steady increase in Iraqi arms, with weapons of mass destruction likely to be part of the mix. This is a hard conclusion to accept, but given present policies toward the Gulf, the risk that Saddam Hussein will plunge the world into another crisis remains.
SHOPPING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN
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By GARY MILHOLLIN &(see footnote 1)
Commentary Magazine
July-August 2001, pp. 23–7
Whether or not the world is ready, Saddam Hussein is back. With oil income now reaching the levels he enjoyed before the Gulf war, Iraq's president is beginning to buy his way out of the ''box'' in which former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright famously declared we had confined him.
What Saddam chooses to spend his money on is of cardinal importance. During the decade before the 1991 Gulf war, when he could buy what he wanted, his weapons scientists imported factories to make poison gas, strains of microbes for germ-warfare agents, missiles that during the Gulf war would kill U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, and equipment that, had the war not intervened, would long since have produced an atomic bomb.
But the Gulf war did intervene, and as a consequence, after its troops were routed in Operation Desert Storm, Iraq pledged to disarm. To verify that it had done so, a UN inspection regime was put into place, coupled with a ban on international trade with Baghdad that had been imposed in 1990. The inspectors were in for a big surprise. They uncovered a complex of secret sites in which virtually every kind of weaponry of mass destruction was being fabricated. Iraq had purchased giant magnets and centrifuges for enriching uranium, had imported German components to enhance the range of Scud missiles purchased from the Soviet Union, had bought plants for producing chemical and biological agents, and had actually loaded those agents into warheads. (The record of these purchases can be found in our online publication, IraqWatch.org.)
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It was these discoveries, and the resulting friction with Saddam's regime, that led in 1998 to the UN inspectors being forced out. The sanctions on international trade, however, remained in place, though increasingly they had come to resemble what President Bush last January characterized as so much ''Swiss cheese.'' Now a joint British-American proposal has been put forward that would replace the current broad-based sanctions with prohibitions only on the sale of arms and some civilian ''dual-use'' items. The new arrangement would also continue the current ''oil-for-food'' system, under which Iraq can sell as much oil as it wants but is supposed to deposit the revenue in a UN-supervised escrow account and use it only to buy civilian goods that the UN has specifically approved.
The new proposal—whether adopted by the UN or not—has little hope of stopping the Iraqis from sneaking in what they need to rebuild their weapons sites and sneaking out the oil to pay for it. For the truth is that even when the UN inspection regime was in place, the Iraqis had already figured out how to do just that.
Here is how the system works. Suppose an Iraqi site needs a new computer-controlled machine tool, one especially capable of making the high-precision parts needed for long-range missiles or nuclear weapons. Since such a purchase would be vetoed at the United Nations, the order goes instead to a middleman in Jordan. The middleman contacts the manufacturer, who cannot export to Iraq without the approval of the UN but is perfectly free to export to Jordan, unhampered by any embargo. The machine goes to the free-trade port of Aqaba, where the middleman—listed falsely as the final user—loads it on a truck and illegally sends it to Iraq.
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The international community's export-control system operates on the assumption that, in such cases, at least some steps will be taken to stop goods at the border, or, failing that, to punish malefactors later. But neither is happening. The only trucks that stop at the border between Jordan and Iraq are the ones carrying goods bought under oil-for-food contracts that have been authorized by the UN. These come to rest inside Iraq itself so that UN monitors can check the paperwork, thus enabling the seller to get his money. Other trucks, carrying contraband cargo, simply cross the border unchecked.
And how does the contraband cargo get paid for? According to the latest estimates, Jordan imports, at discount prices, about $300 million worth of Iraqi oil per year outside the UN oil-for-food program. (Jordan argues that it has no other source of affordable oil, so the UN and the United States have chosen to ignore this continuing breach in the embargo.) To get reimbursed for his hot cargo, the smuggler or his agent presents an invoice to the commercial attache at Iraq's embassy in Jordan, who pays him out of the proceeds of the sale of Iraq's oil shipments. In effect, cut-rate oil is being bartered for whatever Iraq wants to buy.
There is, of course, a reason why Jordan does not police its borders or track what goes through its free-trade zones. If machine tools stopped coming out of Jordan, discounted oil would stop coming in. Jordanian middlemen, officials, and others who live off the discount would be hit hard. Besides, in addition to the $300 million in unregulated oil, Iraq directs oil-for-food contracts through Jordan. The money gives Baghdad enormous leverage.
A similar situation is developing in Syria. Last November, oil began to flow through a newly repaired Iraq/Syria pipeline, all of it outside UN control, at a value estimated at $1 billion a year. Although Secretary of State Colin Powell recently announced a Syrian pledge to bring this revenue under UN jurisdiction, Syria has taken no discernible action. As billions of dollars in unregulated cash pile up in Damascus, smuggling can be expected to explode. And Lebanon, which this past April was offered a deal similar to Jordan's, appears to be next.
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Since Saddam could sell his oil at a much higher price by operating through the UN, he is obviously expecting something in return from the slush funds he has been creating around his borders. What is he getting, and from whom?
Before being forced out in 1998, the UN inspectors compiled a series of confidential reports detailing what they knew about Iraq's foreign suppliers. We have been able to see these reports, which have never been published. What they recount is an ongoing effort to build weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the 90's, in violation of the UN embargo and in the teeth of the inspection regime, the Iraqis were continuing to ''import goods . . . from at least . . . twenty different countries.'' On Iraq's shopping list were ''turnkey facilities, full-sized production lines, industrial know-how, high-tech spare parts, and raw materials.'' The success of this import program depended on ''a disturbing proclivity on the part of several countries and companies to supply Iraq with missile technology and assistance, despite the sanctions maintained by the United Nations.''
The core of Iraq's present supply network dates from the early 1990's. As the result of a decision to concentrate its shopping expeditions in Eastern Europe, Iraqi delegations fanned out to Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia, waving petrodollars in front of these countries' once proud but now starving missile and military plants. They returned with suitcases full of illicit contracts for virtually every kind of equipment a missile-maker might need.
The experience in Belarus was typical. In July 1995, a high-level Iraqi delegation arrived in Minsk. It came from the Badr State Establishment, which had achieved renown before and during the Gulf war. Badr's machine tools had turned out components for the high-speed centrifuges that Iraq was counting on to process uranium for its first atomic bomb. Badr also made parts for the Al Hussein missile, one of which killed U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf war and several of which landed in Tel Aviv. Today, the plant still retains a line of powerful machine tools.
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The main attraction in Minsk was a company called Belstroyimpex. There the Iraqis looked at high-end machine tools, a production line for making diamond-cutting tools, and another production line for powder metallurgy. Iraqi records show that a contract for these machines, or for an even longer list of equipment, was then being carried out. The final shopping list included the diamond-cutting tools, which can be used to make precision parts for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and a highly sensitive plasma spray machine that can be used to protect nuclear-weapon components from corrosion. The list also included design work for integrated circuits destined for a military electronics plant that, before the Gulf war, had produced military radars, missile components, and equipment for making nuclear-weapon fuel. The deal was obviously not submitted to the United Nations as required; if it had been, it would never have been approved.
Like so much other contraband entering Iraq, the machines traveled first to the free-trade zone in Aqaba. There they lay until word was given to transfer them to the buyer. An outfit in Amman called the Firas Trading Company served as broker. The confidence Iraq placed in its Jordanian arrangement was a marvel to the UN inspectors. As one of them (a non-native speaker of English) put it colorfully, ''Iraq does not consider goods laying in a Jordanian free zone being threatened to loose control.''
Indeed not. During visits to the Badr site in 1996 and 1997, UN inspectors discovered both the powder-metallurgy line and the plasma spray machine (the latter manufactured by the Belarus firm Visoky Vacuum). Obviously the contracts had been fulfilled.(see footnote 2) As far as anyone can tell, moreover, the Belarus connection is still active: when inspectors visited the Saddam State Establishment—known also as the Saddam Artillery Plant—in 1998, they observed the Iraqis installing fourteen new machines for manufacturing 75-millimeter lenses. The crates were marked ''Republic of Belarus, Vitebsk Machine Building Plant'' and ''Free Trade Zone, Zarka, Jordan.'' In light of the fact that the plant was making optical sights for artillery, one inspector remarked: ''You can bet the lenses were not for eyeglasses.''
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In Ukraine, the Iraqi focus was more specific: missile components. In September 1993, a Ukrainian trader with a Ph.D. in electronics named Yuri Orshansky arrived in Baghdad. He was accompanied by Dr. Yuri Ayzenberg from a Ukrainian firm, Khartron, well known for its ability to design missile-guidance systems. Within two months, an Iraqi delegation would travel to Ukraine to follow up.
The Iraqi delegation was led by Brigadier General Naim Bakr Ali, head of Iraq's Scud missile-guidance program. With him were two officials from Iraq's Missile Research and Development Center, and rounding out the team were Brigadier General Safa from Ibn Al-Haytham, Iraq's largest missile-manufacturing site, and Major Raad from Al-Karama State Establishment, another such site. Their mission was clear: to negotiate agreements for as much help as they could get. As General Naim would himself tell the UN inspectors, his instructions were simple: ''If you find something good, sign; if you do not find something good, then don't sign.''
He signed. In Ukraine, Orshansky, Ayzenberg, and Naim executed a ''protocol''—amounting to an outline of future cooperation—that promised Iraq the keys to a trove of missile technology. Ukraine would sell guidance components for surface-to-surface missiles, help Iraq develop batteries of the latest anti-aircraft missiles, provide equipment for missile research, and even establish a college to train missile experts. To get things started, Iraq asked for price quotes on a test stand for rocket motors, a series of gyroscopes and accelerometers for missile-guidance systems, and high-precision machine tools for making missile parts.
Under questioning, General Naim later claimed that the deal was supposed to take effect only after the embargo was lifted, and hence did not violate UN resolutions. As the inspectors pointed out to him, however, the agreement expressly stipulated that it would come into effect ''from the moment it [was] adopted by the governments of Ukraine and Iraq''—that is to say, almost immediately. (Both Naim's superior and the Ukrainian cabinet approved the deal in 1994.) General Naim also claimed that Iraq intended to work only on missiles that could fly under 150 kilometers, permitted under certain UN resolutions. But an appendix to the agreement described a system for ''separating the warhead from the bus''; only long-range missiles, which Iraq is not permitted to possess, have warheads that are separated during flight from the rocket engine (or bus) that carries them aloft. In short, Saddam Hussein was aiming to project his power as far as possible.
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In November 1994, General Naim led another Iraqi delegation to Ukraine. Aided by many of the same experts, he signed a second protocol as ambitious as the first. Khartron was now to provide four different types of missile guidance, two of them for separable warheads. According to the protocol, Iraq had already given Khartron the data needed to build the first type, and a schedule was included for receiving the data for the other three. Khartron also helped the Iraqis work on missile-guidance problems during the visit itself.
Iraq has always sought independence in missile production, and so the second protocol, like the first, took into account the ability to manufacture. To help the Iraqis do the necessary research toward that end, Ukraine agreed to supply laboratories, a wind tunnel, computer software, technical assistance, and training. For developing guidance systems themselves, Iraq would get raw materials, a production line for key parts, testing equipment, and a ''clean room'' to allow assembly of delicate parts in an atmosphere free of dust or dirt. Iraq would also get a production line to build rocket engines, plus equipment to test the engines and their sub-assemblies.
All in all, Yuri Orshansky would travel to Iraq at least six times between 1993 and 1995, and Iraq would send at least four delegations to Ukraine. But under questioning by the UN inspectors, General Naim claimed that Iraq had never actually received a single import. ''No deals were ever finalized, no money was ever transferred, and not one penny was made'' by the company he had set up to handle the missile deals. The inspectors, who concluded that Naim ''was rarely honest,'' did not believe his story. Nevertheless, they were unable to find any of the equipment listed in the protocols. None of it turned up at the missile sites they were monitoring, nor could they develop any evidence showing that it might be elsewhere. In interviews with us, the inspectors have offered two possible explanations for this outcome. Either Iraq bought the equipment and hid it for future use, presumably when the inspection regime would be lifted, or Iraq may have been only shopping—comparing prices in Ukraine to those in Russia and Romania, where it was looking at the same kind of equipment. The latter possibility seems unlikely after so many trips, so much consultation, and so many contracts for specific items. More likely by far is that Iraq received some of the Ukrainian equipment it tried so hard to buy, and that the equipment is in use today.
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As it turned out, moreover, Orshansky was offering more than just missiles. At an Iraqi site called Al Kawthar, the inspectors found a 300-page file detailing an illegal February 1995 deal for Russian aircraft. The agreement, with Orshansky's firm Montelect, included Mi-17 helicopters and Su-25 fighter planes—military hardware that the embargo unquestionably banned—as well as engines and guidance systems for remotely-controlled drones. The drones were every bit as disquieting an item as the tanks and planes; they could be used to deliver poison gas or germ-warfare agents.
This Iraqi file did not reveal whether the helicopters and fighters were to be sent directly from Russian factories or were to be assembled in Iraq. A firm called the Russian Aviation Trading House was supposed to do the buying in Russia, and a Lebanese company, Amsar Trading, was to handle the shipping of arms into Iraq and of oil out. Livinvest, a Russian company, would obtain the needed ''approvals'' from the Russian government.
Whether this deal went through is likewise uncertain. The Iraqis claimed it did not, and that they never paid Orshansky anything. Whether or not that is true, he clearly remains in favor in Baghdad, and Ukrainian companies are still willing to trade. Only this past April, according to a news report from Kiev, more than 100 Ukrainian companies, including makers of space and aviation gear, displayed their wares at a Baghdad trade exhibition. The report quoted none other than ''the honorary Iraqi consul in Kharkov,'' Mr. Yuri Orshansky.
While Iraqi delegations were signing contracts in Ukraine, they were also signing them in Romania, in some cases for similar equipment. The main place of interest in Romania was Aerofina, a military firm that Iraqis had visited even before the Gulf war. In February 1994, a group of missile experts returned to Aerofina to ask for help with liquid-fueled missiles. This trip led to still further visits; in January 1995, experts from the Ibn Al Haytham and Al Karama missile sites signed a contract with Aerofina for 250 sets of missile-engine parts that Iraq could not produce itself.
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This was, of course, egregiously contrary to the UN embargo. Aerofina nevertheless agreed to provide the special valves, sealing rings, needles, and O-rings that Iraq needed. Some of these parts arrived in Iraq around September 1995, intended for a regulator, the part of a missile engine that maintains thrust.
As in Ukraine, the Iraqis were also looking for missile-guidance components. For $1.16 million, Aerofina agreed in July 1995 to supply