SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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78–682PDF
2002
U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 11, 2002
Serial No. 107–79
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
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NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
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JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina, Chairman
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
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CALEB MCCARRY, Subcommittee Staff Director
PEDRO PABLO PERMUY, Democratic Professional Staff Member
TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member
JESSICA BAUMGARTEN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable Otto J. Reich, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Department of State
The Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, United States Department of Defense
Major General Gary D. Speer, Acting Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command
Michael Shifter, Vice President for Policy, Inter-American Dialogue
Adam Isacson, Senior Associate, Center for International Policy
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Otto J. Reich: Prepared statement
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The Honorable Peter W. Rodman: Prepared statement
Major General Gary D. Speer: Prepared statement
Answer to the question asked by the Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, submitted in writing to the Committee after the hearing by the Honorable Otto J. Reich
Answer to the question asked by the Honorable Jo Ann Davis, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, submitted in writing to the Committee after the hearing by the Honorable Otto J. Reich
Answers to the questions asked by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from American Samoa, submitted in writing to the Committee after the hearing by the Honorable Otto J. Reich
Michael Shifter: Prepared statement
Adam Isacson: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Prepared statement
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Questions for the record submitted to the Honorable Otto J. Reich by Members of the Subcommittee, and responses
Questions for the record submitted to the Honorable Peter W. Rodman by Members of the Subcommittee, and responses
Questions for the record submitted to Major General Gary D. Speer by Members of the Subcommittee, and responses
U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger presiding.
Mr. BALLENGER. Would the witnesses be seated, please? I will make an opening statement, as will the Senior Member on the Democrats side; and also Representative Delahunt would like to say something. I think Congressman Hyde is going to come later—we might have to interrupt you all sometime.
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But being first, let me just say, in Colombia democracy and economic progress are being held hostage by drug trafficking and terrorism. Latin America's oldest democracy is in trouble and we must not fail to help. For years, U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia has solely focused on counternarcotics activities. Drugs, indeed, are the tap root that feeds terrorism in Colombia and elsewhere in the world. The three main terrorist groups now operating in Colombia no longer hold to the political philosophies they once espoused. Instead, they have evolved into sophisticated drug traffickers and terrorists whose only philosophy is money and violence. They are nothing more than criminals, but they should be called what they are: Narcoterrorists.
Up until now, Congress has been reluctant to even address the 38-year-old conflict in Colombia directly. Instead, it has chosen to limit our efforts to counterdrug strategy in an attempt to avoid getting tangled in what seems to be an endless internal struggle. The $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, approved by Congress in the year 2000, limited U.S. assets to counternarcotics operations only. While Congress has strongly supported the peace process in Colombia, it continued to take on a drug war only approach.
The recent failure of the peace talks with the FARC, coupled with sharp increases in terrorist attacks in Colombia, is leading us to seek alternative solutions; and it only makes sense to apply the policies which now guide our worldwide war on terror to the scourge of terrorism in Colombia. If we are fighting terror halfway around the globe, surely we should help our ally, the democratically elected Government of Colombia, defend itself from drug-financed terrorism only 3 hours from Miami by plane.
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I just returned from Colombia and can tell you that the threat posed by the drug-financed terrorism is all too real. Colombia has three organizations named by the Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC; the National Liberation Army, or ELN; and the paramilitaries, or the AUC. All three are extremely violent and are all known to finance their operations through drug trafficking. The FARC and the AUC, particularly, are heavily engaged in the trafficking of narcotics. The ELN is attempting to negotiate peace with the government.
On Monday, March 18th, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the indictment of three FARC leaders on charges of drug trafficking and conspiracy to export cocaine to the United States. This is the first time a member of the FARC has been charged with drug trafficking in the U.S., and it is our first official link between drug trafficking and the terrorist groups.
Let us face it. The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC are terrorists who support their activities with drug money. Although they do not have the reach of Al Qaeda or Hamas, they do have international reach, which includes smuggling drugs out of Colombia into the United States and Europe. They have also been caught importing guns from neighboring nations, including Venezuela. Studies of recent FARC bombings indicate an increased sophistication in bomb making almost certainly linked to the capture of IRA operatives in Colombia last year.
The International Relations Committee has nearly completed a very substantial investigation into the IRA activities in Colombia. The IRA has been in Colombia, providing the FARC narcoterrorists with urban terrorist expertise and training. The presence of the IRA terrorists illustrates clearly the potential for a broader international terrorist threat to the United States financed by illicit drugs in an Andean nation. The terrorist groups operating in Colombia are all capable of large-scale military operations that threaten the stability of Colombia and the region.
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The trafficking of cocaine and heroin is just a symptom of a greater ill in Colombia. The root cause is the terrorist groups themselves. Drugs fund these groups. Colombia has asked us for our assistance but not for the use of our troops. In my considered opinion, the U.S. should respond positively to that request.
Sometime next month, the House will consider the supplemental appropriations bill, which is expected to include funds to train an additional counternarcotics brigade and to provide the Colombian military with infrastructure for training. It is my hope that the final package will provide the Colombians with the necessary tools to fight both terror and drug trafficking at the same time.
I yield time to the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this very important hearing, and I am glad that we will finally hear from the Administration an articulation of its Colombia policy. We have not heard much from them lately and I look forward to their testimony.
President Andres Pastrana has staked his entire presidency and all of his political capital on a peace process that, tragically for the Colombian people, never really took root largely because the key partners in that process, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, never acted honorably. As a matter of fact, as I have seen the situation unfold, they have acted rather savagely. The peace process has broken down, and an already intensely violent conflict has turned yet more violent and lethal, with the guerrillas now attacking urban centers and civilians indiscriminately.
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From the time that drug financing dangerously exacerbated the conflict years ago, the question for the United States has been: Whether and to what extent and in what manner to assist Colombia, a friend in dire need? When the oldest democracy in South America, an important trading partner and oil supplier, and the pillar of the Andean region saw its stability as a state threatened, the United States came to Colombia's aid and appropriately so. Most Americans would probably accept the notion that securing the viability of the Colombian state and stability in the Andean region is a worthy project and an objective for U.S. policy. Most Americans would, hopefully acknowledge, as President Bush has, that the United States, with our constant demand for illegal drugs produced in Colombia, shares responsibility for this problem. So we try to do our fair share to strengthen Colombia's democracy and institutions and assist Colombia with its crisis.
But I believe we must put the Colombian situation in context. This crisis is not limited to the fight against drug trafficking. It never has been. When Colombia's political parties were practically at war during the La Violencia period of the early 1950s, drugs were not even part of the picture and that historic conflict is directly manifested in today's struggle. Nor has this transformed overnight strictly into a fight against terrorism.
We have before us a multifaceted crisis that is uniquely Colombian and that, at the same time, is directly linked with and affects Americans and increasingly European and South American society. Despite the drop in recent years in recreational drug use, roughly five million American drug addicts keep the demand for these drugs constant. Our borders are wide open to visitors and commerce, with close to 500 million people visiting the United States annually. Hundreds of air and seaports process billions of international commercial transactions. It is exceedingly difficult to stop illicit drug shipments among such massive flows so long as the demand persists. And, in terms of supply, the huge success of the Colombian rebels and paramilitaries at financing their murderous ways with drug production and trafficking makes them formidable adversaries for the Colombian government.
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We, therefore, face a very complicated, interwoven set of challenges, and we would be fooling ourselves to believe that this could be resolved either in the short term or simply by focusing on one facet, whether it is terrorism or narcotics, or even both. The United States has stepped up, and the international community, including the European Union, should stand in solidarity with Colombia. But a lasting solution ultimately will not be brought about by the United States or Europe.
At its core, this is a Colombian problem and requires a Colombian solution. Ultimately, the hard decisions must come from leaders in Bogota and throughout Colombia, not Washington or the capitals of Europe. The United States and others may help, but Colombians themselves must take ownership of the crisis, resolve to end it once and for all, and bear the burden necessary to save their country. Colombian elected and appointed officials, business and labor leaders, the security forces, judges, and civil society broadly must join together to address their national crisis. They must do the fighting, collect the taxes to finance their security forces, and make the sacrifices necessary to take their country down the path of peace.
As for the United States, we must periodically take inventory of our goals and objectives and ask: Where is the progress, where is the final goal, and how close is it to being in sight? After a significant commitment of training and equipment, when will the tide turn in favor of the Colombian government? When will the armed forces and police be sized and structured adequately to defeat their adversaries? When do the paramilitaries either go away, as some believe they will when the conflict wanes, or get prosecuted? When do those who are internally displaced find homes? When do eradication and interdiction efforts overwhelm the efforts of the illegal drug producers and traffickers?
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I am interested in hearing about these questions and the answers thereto from both Assistant Secretaries Reich and Rodman. Plan Colombia is a 6-year plan. Will we see significant progress by this time next year? Will it take 2 more years or 5 more years? As guardians of the taxpayers' money, we need the answers to those questions.
Finally, are the Colombian people truly taking ownership of this conflict and showing through their deeds that they are willing to take back their country? I can agree with the main thrust of active U.S. engagement under the Clinton Administration, which has been largely adopted by the Bush Administration. That is certainly a course of action for us to take. We now tackle narcotics and terrorism as intertwined phenomena. Perhaps they are intertwined, but we must be careful not to get ahead of the Colombians in solving this problem or in taking the battle to the illegal groups. We cannot fight the Colombians' battles for them, and that brings me to my last point.
The Colombian conflict does have an underlying social dimension. Colombian society has failed, to date, to provide an adequate standard of living for a significant number of Colombians. Many social and economic needs remain unfulfilled. Economic opportunity, education, and health care are simply not available to millions of Colombians. That must be as significant a concern as battling the illegal groups, and that must be at the forefront of our policies as well.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as well as our private witnesses and the opportunity to question them as they come forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. And now our true leader, Congressman Hyde, let me turn it to you, please, sir.
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Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Chairman Ballenger. I certainly commend you and the Ranking Democratic Member of this Subcommittee, Mr. Menendez, for holding this very important hearing. We extend a very warm welcome to the Administration witnesses, our friend, Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich and Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman and the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command, Major General Gary Speer. We also welcome the panel of private witnesses.
There is a conflagration slowly emerging in the region where the North and South American continents join. Three hours by plane from Miami, we face a potential breeding ground for international terror equaled perhaps only by Afghanistan. The threat to the American national interest is both imminent and clear. We have become familiar with global terrorism. Even now our country's sons and daughters are in Afghanistan uprooting the infrastructure that supports the Al Qaeda terrorist network. Our President has also dispatched our military to Georgia in the Caucasus and to the Philippines in the Pacific to help these friendly governments combat terrorists and their organizations on their own soil. Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies finance their acts of terror with illegal drugs; and, in so doing, reap a murderous harvest of addiction, death, and misery in the civilized world.
The September 11 attack on the United States demonstrated that we have to look for threats where we least expect them. The dangerous nexus of the drug underworld and terrorism is a grave threat to our national security. There are few places in the world where this threat is more pressing than in Colombia.
I might point out that on the 24th of April, we are going to have a Hearing in the Full Committee exploring the IRA–FARC links further threatening Colombian democracy and their globalization effect on terrorism and national security in this hemisphere.
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In the midst of the spreading chaos in that country, criminal terrorist networks mix freely, unfettered by morality or the rule of law. Cocaine and heroin are the illegal tender of this criminal and terrorist underworld; and narcotics procure the weapons, the explosives, and the expertise that terrorists employ in their campaign of destruction. As I noted, we are going to explore an international dimension of that sad situation. We should not be blinded by false ideological labels. There is no Left and no Right in Colombia, only competing bands of narcoterrorist criminals. Hizballah and other international terrorists have put down deep roots in the Western Hemisphere. They have found fertile soil in a region beset by violence, drug trafficking and corruption.
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Colombians to fight for their country. Colombia's government must extend its effective sovereignty over the entirety of its national territory and protect its citizens from narcoterrorists and other criminals. No group of criminals, including the so-called ''paramilitary groups,'' can be permitted to fill this vacuum, for that would assure victory for criminality and chaos. The toll of drug corruption on Colombian society and institutions has been great.
A new course is possible, but it will take courage. The Colombian National Police have undertaken reforms that have rooted out major elements of drug corruption. All legitimate institutions in Colombian society, especially those institutions that provide for the common defense and administer justice, must deepen their commitment to do the same. There can be no doubt that cutting off our aid to Colombia will only serve to strengthen the grip of narcoterrorists.
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Recently, this Committee passed a bipartisan resolution recognizing the dire situation in Colombia and calling on the President to send legislative proposals to Congress for an American response. I intend to move legislation that includes the President's request for expanded authority to protect American interests in Colombia. The purpose of this legislation will be to free the Administration to employ the resources at its disposal in support of a democratically-elected government that is an ally of the United States.
Prior to the spread of the illegal drug trade, Colombia was a decent country. We have a waning opportunity to help Colombia's beleaguered good citizens recover their country and in so doing protect our own. Again, I commend you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez and the Subcommittee, for this very important hearing. Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recognizing an individual who has been heavily involved with the country of Colombia, let me give time to Congressman Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will waive an opening statement. I do want to associate myself with the observations made by the Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez. I thought his statement encompassed my own perspective and I would only be repetitive.
I think it is important, as he pointed out, to note that violence and armed conflict has plagued Colombian society for decades now. This is not a recent phenomenon. Yes, Colombia has been plagued by the advent of the narcotrafficker. At the same time, I think it is important to focus on the historical context to better understand where we should be looking in terms of developing a plan, a comprehensive plan, a plan for peace in Colombia. Because, even if legislation should pass this Congress, removing the restrictions that the Chairman of the Full Committee alluded to, there will be no peace in Colombia. And until there is peace there will be no stability; and, until we have stability, there will be a continuing flow of illegal narcotics into the neighborhoods of our own society. So I dare say, it is time that we came with a more comprehensive perspective in terms of what we ought to be doing in Colombia. Again, I look forward to the questioning.
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Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Let me, if I may, introduce our opening panel. First, Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, was sworn in on January 11, 2002, and has spent over 30 years in hemispheric affairs. As Ambassador to Venezuela, he has received the highest awards given to an Ambassador from both the United States State Department and the Government of Venezuela. He has served in a number of posts in the State Department, USAID, the military, and in the private sector, and he is one of the best-known experts on Latin America. Welcome, Otto.
Mr. REICH. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. Let me introduce the other two, then we will start. Next, we have Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since July 16, 2001. He is a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy, with the responsibility for East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Latin America. Mr. Rodman has worked in a number of posts in the State Department during the Reagan Administration and has held research positions in the private sector. He has also published a book on the Third World in the Cold War.
And finally, Major General Gary Speer. General Speer assumed the duties as Acting Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. SOUTHCOM on October 1, 2001. He has served as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief since the previous July and Major General Speer worked on the Army staff in the Pentagon as the Security Assistance Officer for Latin America. He is a highly decorated officer, whose awards include: The Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Brazil's Peacekeeper Medal, Guatemala's White Nun Medal, and Paraguay's Marshal Solano Lopez Medal. I could go on.
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Secretary Reich, before I turn to you, let me turn to a young lady who is vitally interested in this topic for a short statement.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for the young lady reference. That wins you a lot of points. I am sorry I will not be able to stay for the Hearing. We have a Subcommittee hearing going on at the same time, but I wanted just to make some brief remarks, especially for my two good friends who are on this panel today: Ambassador Otto Reich, with whom I have had the honor of working on many Western Hemisphere issues for a number of years. It was a very proud appointment of President Bush to nominate you to this post, Ambassador, and I know that we will continue working closely together not only on Plan Colombia but on all of the issues that impact our hemisphere and most especially Cuba, and we look forward to your late-April visit to Miami as we outline U.S.-Cuba policy. And Major General Gary Speer, the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command, is a good, longtime friend. We went to Guantanamo Bay together just a few months ago to see the conditions of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces who are detained there. I came back with glowing reports about how their human rights conditions are wonderful, there are no abuses, that they are able to pray in their Koran in many different languages, the chimes ring five times a day so that they know where to face and how to pray, their dietary needs are being met, and I congratulate all of the men and women in our armed forces who are doing a valiant job of guarding these terrible individuals day in and day out under very difficult conditions. What they have built in Guantanamo in just a few short months is really remarkable. It is an entire city with air-conditioned hospital facilities and the best health care. We are fixing wounds that these prisoners have had for 15, 20 years, so any reports of human rights abuses from these organizations against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces are totally unfounded. And it is thanks to the leadership and the coordination that the Southern Command has been giving these and other operations.
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Certainly, this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, is going to be a very interesting one. We want to know about the terrorist organizations, particularly the FARC, that rank as a real threat to the national security of our country. I am very pleased to hear from Chairman Hyde that on April 24th, we will be having a hearing on the activities of the three Irish nationals that are linked to the provisional Irish Republican Army, who were arrested in Colombia last August. I am wanting to know whether this underscores the danger that Colombia has become a magnet for international terrorists.
And the Administration has testified before this Subcommittee that Hizballah and other Middle Eastern terrorist groups conduct large-scale fundraising efforts for their terrorist organizations in Brazil, in Paraguay, and they are involved in all kinds of illegal activities, including drug trafficking. We hope that, although we are focusing on Colombia, because we have Ambassador Reich with us, he can elaborate on the presence of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations in our hemisphere. I know we have in our audience Colonel Soto, who is in the Washington Times today, focusing on a real criticism of the Chavez-Castro connection: ''Chavez on Way Out, Says Dissenter.'' I do not know if Colonel Pedro Soto is here today, but if he could rise. I am going to be having a side meeting with him today. I look forward to that conversation.
I am also interested in knowing whether the Pastrana Administration has the political will to go after these terrorist groups in Colombia. What have they done to bolster the Administration's view that this really is a true effort? Yesterday, at a House foreign appropriations hearing, it was generally agreed by Committee Members that little concrete progress has been made in Plan Colombia. What changes do we see in the near term to getting some real results, and do we consider the situation in Colombia developing into a regional threat, and what is the panelists' impression on how Colombia's neighbors are responding to this threat?
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And also, we have got to look at our European allies in Plan Colombia. Do we see in the Bush Administration a real role for them in helping us implement Plan Colombia? For years now there has been an ongoing agreement also concerning the role of terrorist organizations in narcotics trafficking. We have had previous U.S. Ambassadors in the past Administrations tell us that there was little evidence that these groups were in the illegal drug business. But we have seen the indictments of the FARC warlords for drug trafficking. How has this position now changed, and what is the role of other governments in the Western Hemisphere, such as the Chavez Administration in Venezuela and Cuba's Castro regime, in promoting and facilitating the drug arms and guerrilla network in Colombia? And finally, using Colombia as a test case, what is the U.S. hemispheric antiterrorism strategy?
So this is certainly an interesting Hearing. I apologize that I will be scooting in and out, but I have had an opportunity to look at the opening statements, and I congratulate you for having excellent private and public panelists.
Once again, welcome to Otto and Gary, my good friends, thank you. Not that you are not, Secretary Rodman. You are a wonderful friend. I have just known these guys a lot longer. Thank you. Thank you, Cass. You ought to call me young lady much more often.
Mr. BALLENGER. Okay. Thank you very much. Congressman Paul has a short statement to make.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding these hearings, which I think are very important. Before we appropriate any more money, we ought to know what is going on. I am rather surprised that the money that we voted for last year, the $1.7 billion, already it has probably not even been spent, and we are coming back for some more. I am concerned that we are drifting into nation building and world policeman. And getting involved has no justification. The idea that we can go down there and change our desire for drugs is rather extreme as far as I am concerned.
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But I do not see any national security interest down here. I see a lot of special interests being concerned to go down and protect private property owned by oil companies, as well as selling a lot of military equipment. So to say the least, I am very skeptical of more money going into a Colombian operation. I yield back.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. And finally, the panel. First, we will go with Assistant Secretary Reich. Go right ahead, Otto.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OTTO J. REICH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. REICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be with you here today, you and your colleagues. I want to thank you for accepting my complete testimony and making it a part of the record. I would like to give you an abbreviated statement and then pass the baton to my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Rodman and General Speer.
I know that some of you were in Colombia and Bolivia last week. Although the focus of today's hearing is Colombia, I would be glad to respond to any concerns you may have regarding challenges elsewhere in the region, in the Andean region, especially as it affects our policy toward Colombia.
President Bush's vision for the hemisphere is one of free markets and free people. With the exception of a single country, there is a remarkable hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and open markets. Despite this consensus, democratic institutions face a wide variety of challenges in the hemisphere. In Colombia, the challenges are especially grave, including the outright assault by illegal armed terrorists on Colombia's government, society, and people. What happens in Colombia is of vital importance to all of us in the United States. Terrorism and narcotics trafficking not only exact a terrible human toll in Colombia, but their effects are felt here as well. The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC all have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States. All three threaten a wide range of U.S. security, political and economic interests.
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Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States and is a significant supplier of heroin to the U.S. market. The FARC and the AUC are intimately involved in this trade. Since 1992, the FARC and ELN have kidnapped 51 U.S. citizens and murdered 10. The FARC, ELN and AUC also threaten regional stability. The FARC regularly uses Colombia's border regions for rest and recreation, arms and narcotics trafficking, and resupply operations.
The ongoing attacks on Colombia's democracy have a tremendous cost within Colombia. The AUC has killed two legislators over the past 12 months, while the FARC has kidnapped six, including presidential candidate Ingrid Bentancourt. Three thousand Colombians were killed by terrorist violence in 2001. Nearly as many were kidnapped. Colombian President Andres Pastrana took the initiative in 1999 with the launch of the 5-year, $7.5 billion Plan Colombia. This plan called for substantial social investment, judicial, political and economic reforms, modernization of the Colombian armed forces, and renewed efforts to combat narcotrafficking.
Since July 2000, the U.S. has provided Colombia with $1.7 billion in assistance. We also provided Colombia and our other Andean partners with trade benefits under the Andean Trade Preferences Act, also known as ATPA.
The early results of Plan Colombia have been significant but far from sufficient. Our counternarcotics efforts have made great strides. The Government of Colombia extradited 23 Colombian nationals to the U.S. in 2001. We trained, equipped and deployed the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigade, which destroyed 818 base laboratories and 21 HCL laboratories. A record 84,000 hectares of coca cultivation in Colombia were sprayed last year.
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Our efforts to ameliorate the effect of violence on civilians and help the Government of Colombia deliver public services have had a major impact. Through Colombia's Ministry of the Interior, we have funded a program that has provided protection to 1,676 Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists, and journalists, since May 2001. The U.S., working with NGOs and international agencies, has provided substantial assistance in Colombia to persons displaced by violence since mid-2001. We have opened 18 Casas de Justicia, Houses of Justice, to provide cost-effective legal services and are working to set up a Casa de Justicia in San Vicente de Caguan, the main urban area in the former demilitarized zone.
Implementation of alternative development programs in Southern Colombia has made some progress despite the region's limited economic prospects, weak community cohesion, and especially the lack of security there. As you know, in light of these difficulties, we are adjusting our alternative development programs.
Human rights concerns have been a central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia, and our message is making a difference. In meetings in Colombia with senior civilian and military officials, we have regularly stressed the need for Colombia to improve its human rights performance and sever remaining military-to-paramilitary ties. The counternarcotics brigade that we trained and equipped has compiled an excellent human rights record to date. Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with state security units. Those responsible for such actions must be brought to justice.
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Under section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, the Secretary of State is required to certify as to the Government of Colombia's progress in meeting several human rights-related conditions. The Secretary takes very seriously his responsibilities under the Act, as do I. We are examining carefully each of the conditions, in light of events on the ground in Colombia, as part of preparing a recommendation to the Secretary. We have also been consulting with interested parties, including the Colombian government and armed forces and NGOs, both here and in Colombia.
I cannot presage what the Secretary's decision will be, nor when he will make it. In the meantime, we will continue to adhere to the provisions of the law.
On February 20th, President Pastrana ended the demilitarized zone and the Government of Colombia's peace talks with the FARC. The immediate catalyst for Pastrana's action was the FARC's hijacking of a civilian aircraft and its subsequent kidnapping of the President of the Peace Commission of the Colombian Senate. Since February 20, the Colombian military has reoccupied the main urban areas in the former zone, while the FARC has continued its terrorist violence.
Just as we supported President Pastrana's management of the peace process with the FARC, we believe it is critical that the U.S. help Colombia deal with the surge in violence that followed the end of the demilitarized zone. In the counterterrorism supplemental submitted on March 21, we seek new, explicit, legal authorities that would allow our assistance to Colombia, including assistance previously provided, to be used ''to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security.'' These new authorities recognize that the terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are inextricably intertwined.
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Our request for new authorities does not signify a retreat from our concern about human rights, nor an open-ended U.S. commitment in Colombia. It expressly recognizes that we intend to use the new authorities consistent with the human rights conditions relative to our assistance to Colombia's armed forces and the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel.
We have asked for $439 million in our Fiscal Year '03 budget request to sustain our Plan Colombia programs, as well as $98 million in FMF funds to train and equip Colombian military units protecting the Cano Limon oil pipeline. The $439 million request includes $275 million for the Colombian military and police, and $164 million for democracy and human rights programs, alternative development, assistance to vulnerable groups, and the promotion of the rule of law. These funds will be crucial as the Government of Colombia works to improve security, build effective democratic institutions and foster economic growth.
We have also requested $292 million in FY '03 Andean Counterdrug Initiative funds, along with $44 million in Economic Support Funds to support programs in Colombia's neighboring countries. There will be little benefit to reducing coca cultivation in Colombia, if it were accompanied by a resurgence in cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. Similarly, an effective strategy to reduce coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking in Colombia requires effective steps by Colombia's neighbors to improve controls over their borders and the people and goods that cross back and forth.
We are also seeking $35 million in the FY '02 counterterrorism supplemental to help the Colombian government protect its citizens from kidnapping, infrastructure attacks and other terrorist actions. We have also requested $3 million in the FY '02 supplemental in funding for Ecuador.
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President Pastrana and his Administration have made an exceptional commitment to fighting terrorism and narcotics trafficking and to try to bring peace to his troubled country. The United States has matched that commitment with its own in assistance to the Government and people of Colombia; and in our commitment to reduce the demand and consumption of illegal drugs here at home.
Over the past several months, the Colombian people have demonstrated an exceptional commitment to democracy and an exceptional repudiation of the violence and terrorism of the FARC and other terrorist organizations. Colombia is in the midst of a cycle of national elections to choose a new national congress and the successor to President Pastrana. The first round of elections to choose the new congress was carried out successfully in the face of FARC threats and attacks.
The commitment we have made to Colombia cannot succeed absent a sustained commitment of even greater magnitude by the Government of Colombia. We have met with the leading contenders in the upcoming presidential election to discuss their respective visions for the future of Colombia and their strategies for how to get there. Once the elections are complete and the Colombian people have chosen their next President, we will engage with the President-elect and his or her team to delineate the commitments they are prepared to make.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I greatly appreciate the support that Congress has given in the past to the President's policy toward Colombia. I appreciate as well the House's passage of the Andean Trade Preferences Act and look forward to a positive response from the Senate to the President's call that it pass the ATPA by the 22nd of this month. Protecting our national interests in Colombia will require a sustained commitment on our part. I am here today as part of my commitment to work together with you to build the necessary programs and elicit the necessary counterpart commitment from the Government and people of Colombia and the rest of the Andean region. Thank you very much.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Reich follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OTTO J. REICH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to testify today on our policy toward Colombia. It is an honor to appear before the members of this sub-committee. In addition to Colombia, I also will touch briefly on our policies toward the rest of the Andean region as they affect what we seek to accomplish in Colombia. Some of you, including the distinguished chairman, were in Colombia and Bolivia just last week. I look forward to exchanging views with all of you on the challenges that we face in the region.
President Bush's vision for the hemisphere is one of free markets and free people. With the exception of a single country, there is a remarkable hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and open markets. Despite this consensus, democratic institutions face a wide variety of challenges in the hemisphere. In Colombia, the challenges are especially grave, including the outright assault by illegal armed terrorists on Colombia's government, society, and people.
Colombia's 40 million inhabitants and its democracy are under assault by three terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The three groups have a combined force of over 25,000 combatants, and engage regularly in massacres, kidnappings, and attacks on infrastructure and public utilities. The FARC and AUC are involved in all facets of narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing, and transportation. The income they derive—estimated at over $300 million a year—has been key to their expansion over the last ten years.
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U.S. INTERESTS IN COLOMBIA
What happens in Colombia is of vital importance to all of us in the United States. Terrorism and narcotics trafficking not only exact a terrible human toll in Colombia, but their effects are felt here as well. The FARC, ELN and AUC all have been designated ''Foreign Terrorist Organizations'' under U.S. law; all three threaten a wide range of U.S. security, political, and economic interests.
Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States and is a significant supplier of heroin to the U.S. market. The FARC and the AUC are intimately involved in this trade, and in creating the lawless conditions under which this trade thrives. Both the FARC and the ELN have kidnapped and killed U.S. citizens, and regularly attack U.S. investments in Colombia. Since 1992, the FARC and ELN have kidnapped 51 U.S. citizens and murdered ten.
The FARC, ELN and AUC also threaten regional stability. The FARC regularly uses border regions in Panama, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela for rest and recreation, arms and narcotics trafficking, and resupply operations. For some time, conflicts between the FARC and AUC in northwest Colombia have led to the limited movement of displaced Colombians into Panama's Darien region. Venezuela and Ecuador have experienced similar problems with displaced persons at various times.
The ongoing attacks on Colombia's democracy—one of the hemisphere's oldest—also have had a tremendous cost within Colombia itself. The AUC has killed two Colombian legislators over the past twelve months, while the FARC has kidnapped six, including Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. The three terrorist groups assassinated 12 mayors during the last year alone. 3,000 Colombians were killed by terrorist violence in 2001; nearly as many were kidnapped.
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THE U.S. RESPONSE TO COLOMBIA
Colombian President Andres Pastrana took the initiative in 1999 with the launch of the five-year, $7.5 billion Plan Colombia. This plan recognized that Colombia's narcotics, political, terrorist and economic problems are interrelated, creating a vicious downward cycle. To break these links, it called for substantial social investment; judicial, political and economic reforms; modernization of the Colombian Armed Forces, and renewed efforts to combat narcotrafficking. The United States shared Plan Colombia's vision of a peaceful, thriving, democratic Colombia free from the scourges of narcotics and terrorism; our support has been a key component of the plan.
Since July 2000, the U.S has provided Colombia with $1.7 billion to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democratic institutions and human rights, foster socio-economic development, and mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombian civilians. We also during most of this time have provided Colombia and our other Andean partners with trade benefits under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) to encourage economic development outside of the narcotics trade. Our assistance to Colombia using Plan Colombia funds is limited to support of counternarcotics activities.
The early results of Plan Colombia have been significant, but far from sufficient.
Our counternarcotics efforts under Plan Colombia have made great strides. The Government of Colombia extradited 23 Colombian nationals to the U.S. in 2001, an unprecedented level of cooperation. We trained, equipped and deployed the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigade, which destroyed 818 base laboratories and 21 HCL laboratories, and provided security for our aerial eradication operations in Southern Colombia. A record 84,000 hectares of coca cultivation in Colombia were sprayed last year, up from 58,000 in 2000.
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Our efforts to ameliorate the effect of violence on civilians have had a major impact. Through Colombia's Ministry of Interior, we have funded a program that has provided protection to 1,676 Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists, and journalists, since May 2001. Separately, the U.S. Government-funded Early Warning System helps to alert Colombian authorities to threats of potential massacres or other human rights abuses, enabling them to act to avert such incidents. To date, the EWS has issued 106 alerts. Lastly, the U.S.—working with non-governmental organizations and international agencies—has provided substantial assistance in Colombia to persons displaced by violence since mid-2001.
Our programs to help the Government of Colombia reform its administration of justice and strengthen local government have also advanced. We have opened 18 Casas de Justicia to provide cost-effective legal services to Colombians who have not previously enjoyed real access to the country's judicial system. We are working to set up a Casa de Justicia in San Vicente de Caguan, the main urban area in the former demilitarized zone. Similarly, our program to help municipalities improve their financial management, fight corruption, and boost community participation has completed six Social Investment Fund projects in Southern Colombia.
We have worked to increase the capabilities of the criminal justice system. Our work has included developing specialized units or task forces to pursue the investigation and prosecution of human rights, money laundering/asset forfeiture, narcotics, and corruption cases. In addition, we have provided training, particularly in oral trials, to prosecutors and police across the country. We have assisted in the development of maritime enforcement, port security and prison security; undertaken projects to develop and equip witness and judicial personnel security corps, and continued a vigorous program of bilateral criminal investigations against the highest-level traffickers and money launderers.
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Implementation of alternative development programs in Southern Colombia has also progressed despite the region's limited economic prospects, weak community cohesion, and, especially, the lack of security there. The limited institutional capacity of the Colombian Government agency charged with implementing the programs has also been a problem. As you know, in light of these difficulties we are adjusting our alternative development programs in Southern Colombia to focus on job-creating projects to improve the infrastructure there. Other alternative development projects will be shifted to near-by areas of Colombia that offer better economic prospects and security.
Human rights concerns have been a central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia. In meetings in Colombia with senior civilian and military officials, U.S. officials, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lorne Craner, and I have regularly stressed the need for Colombia to improve its human rights performance and sever remaining military-paramilitary ties. Most recently, Curt Struble, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America, and Scott Carpenter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, traveled to Bogota late last month to underscore the importance we attach to human rights. This was but the latest in a series of such efforts both here and in Colombia.
Our human rights message is making a difference. The counternarcotics brigade that we trained and equipped has compiled an excellent human rights record to date. President Pastrana and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have repeatedly denounced collusion between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitary terrorists. The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitaries and killed 92 in combat last year. Six military personnel, including two colonels and a lieutenant colonel, were charged with collaborating with paramilitaries or with having committed gross human rights violations in 2001. A senior Colombian naval official's career was recently ended because of allegations that he collaborated with paramilitaries.
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LOOKING AHEAD
Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with state security units. Those responsible for such actions must be brought to justice. The establishment of the rule of law and personal security for all Colombians will not be created through human rights abuses or impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes.
Under Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, the Secretary of State is required to certify as to the Government of Colombia's progress in meeting the following human rights-related conditions:
that the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is suspending from the Armed Forces those members, of whatever rank, who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups;
the Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities, including providing requested information such as the identity of the persons suspended and the nature and cause of the suspension, access to witnesses and relevant military documents and other information, in prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts those members of the Colombian Armed Forces, of whatever rank, who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups;
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the Colombian Armed Forces are taking effective measures to sever links (including by denying access to military intelligence, vehicles, and other equipment or supplies, and ceasing other forms of active or tacit cooperation), at the command, battalion, and brigade levels, with paramilitary groups, and to execute outstanding orders for capture for members of such groups.
The Secretary takes very seriously his responsibilities under the Act, as do I. We have been queried as to why the certification has not yet been made. The simple answer is that we are examining carefully each of the conditions in light of events on the ground in Colombia, as part of preparing our recommendation to the Secretary. We also have been consulting with, and gathering information from, all interested parties including the Colombian Government and Armed Forces, and non-governmental organizations both here and in Colombia.
I of course cannot presage what the Secretary's decision will be, nor when he will make it. In the meantime, we will continue to adhere to the provisions of the law.
THE NEED FOR NEW AUTHORITIES
On February 20, President Pastrana ended the demilitarized zone and the Government of Colombia's peace talks with the FARC. The immediate catalyst for Pastrana's action was the FARC's hijacking of a civilian aircraft and its subsequent kidnapping of the President of the Peace Commission in the Colombian Senate. These were merely the latest in a series of outrages by the FARC since Pastrana had renewed the zone on January 20. The FARC had also stepped up attacks on military and police targets, bombed key economic infrastructure, and refused to participate in good faith in peace talks.
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Since February 20, the Colombian military has reoccupied the main urban areas in the former zone, while the FARC has continued its terrorist violence. President Pastrana has announced a hike in Colombia's defense budget to cover the cost of heightened military operations, and has announced plans to add 10,000 professional soldiers to the army. He also requested help from the U.S., including approval to use military assets provided for counternarcotics purposes to help cope with the increased terrorist threat.
Just as we supported President Pastrana's management of the peace process with the FARC, we believe it is critical that the U.S. help Colombia deal with the surge in violence that has followed the end of the demilitarized zone. We answered Pastrana's immediate request for help by providing increased intelligence support on terrorist actions, expediting the delivery of helicopter spare parts already paid for by the Government of Colombia, and assisting the Colombians with eradication activities in the former zone.
We are also acting to address the Colombian people's broader needs as they defend their democracy from terrorist violence. In the counterterrorism supplemental submitted on March 21, we are seeking new, explicit, legal authorities that would allow our assistance to Colombia, including assistance previously provided, to be used ''to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security.'' These new authorities recognize that the terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are inextricably intertwined. If enacted, they will give us greater flexibility to help the Government of Colombia attack this hydra-headed threat.
I would stress that our request for new authorities does not signify a retreat from our concern about human rights nor an open-ended U.S. commitment in Colombia. Our proposal expressly recognizes that we intend to use the new authorities consistent with the human rights conditions relevant to our assistance to Colombia's armed forces and the 400 person cap on U.S. military personnel providing training in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia.
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THE NEED FOR NEW ASSISTANCE
We have asked for $439 million in Andean Counterdrug Initiative funds in our FY–03 budget request to sustain our Plan Colombia programs, as well as $98 million in FMF funds to train and equip Colombian military units protecting the Cano Limon oil pipeline. The $439 million request includes $275 million for the Colombian military and police, and $164 million for democracy and human rights programs, alternative development, assistance to vulnerable groups, and promotion of the rule of law. These funds will be crucial as the Government of Colombia works to improve security, build effective democratic institutions and foster economic growth.
We have also requested $292 million in FY–03 Andean Counterdrug Initiative funds, along with $44 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), to support programs in Colombia's neighboring countries. At the same time that we assist the Government of Colombia to confront its narcoterrorist threat, it is important that we not neglect the serious challenges faced by Colombia's neighbors. There would be little benefit to reducing coca cultivation in Colombia if it were accompanied by a resurgence in coca cultivation in countries such as Peru and Bolivia. Similarly, an effective strategy to reduce coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking in Colombia requires not only action in Colombia, but also effective steps by Colombia's neighbors likewise to improve controls over their borders, and the people and goods that cross back and forth.
We are also seeking $35 million in the FY–02 counterterrorism supplemental to help the Colombian Government protect its citizens from kidnapping, infrastructure attacks and other terrorist actions. Our $35 million request includes:
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— $25 million in NADR funding for anti-kidnapping training and equipment for special units of the Colombian police and military;
— $6 million in FMF funding for training for Colombian military units protecting the key Cano Limon oil pipeline; and
— $4 million in INCLE funding for the construction of reinforced police stations to enable the police to reestablish a presence in conflicted areas.
We have also requested $3 million in the FY–02 counterterrorism supplemental in FMF funding for Ecuador, principally for the purchase of spare parts and equipment to improve the air mobility of Ecuador's military. This is a particularly critical need to address if we are to assist the Government of Ecuador in strengthening its controls over provinces bordering Colombia.
COLOMBIA AT THE CROSSROADS
President Pastrana and his administration have made an exceptional commitment to fighting terrorism and narcotics trafficking, and to try to bring peace to his troubled country. The United States has welcomed that commitment, and has matched it with its own in assistance to the government and people of Colombia, and in our commitment to reduce the demand and consumption of illegal drugs here at home.
Over the past several months, the Colombian people have demonstrated an exceptional commitment to democracy, and an exceptional repudiation of the violence and terrorism of the FARC and other terrorist organizations. Colombia is in the midst of a cycle of national elections to choose a new national Congress and the successor to President Pastrana. The first round of elections, to choose the new Congress, was carried out successfully in the face of FARC threats and attacks in the wake of President Pastrana's decision to end the demilitarized zone. The people of Colombia deserve to be congratulated for their commitment to democracy. We are pleased that the Organization of American States, at the request of Colombia, stepped forward with a small observer mission for the Congressional elections and has committed to sending a robust observer delegation for the presidential balloting.
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The commitment we have made to Colombia—to sustain our counternarcotics programs, step up our counterterrorism assistance, strengthen programs to protect human rights, and help to foment alternative development, among other areas—cannot succeed absent a sustained commitment of even greater magnitude by the Government of Colombia. In our Bogota embassy and in Washington, we have met with the leading contenders in the upcoming presidential election to discuss their respective visions for the future of Colombia and their strategies for how to get there. Once the elections are complete and the Colombian people have chosen their next president, we will engage with the president-elect and his or her team to delineate the commitments they are prepared to make.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, members of the sub-committee, I greatly appreciate the support that Congress has given in the past to the President's policy toward Colombia, including the recent passage of FY–02 funding for programs in the Andean region. I appreciate as well the House's passage of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and look forward to a positive response from the Senate to the President's call that it pass the ATPA by the 22nd of this month. Protecting our national interests in Colombia will require a sustained commitment on our part. I am here today as part of my commitment to work together with you to build the necessary programs and elicit the necessary counterpart commitment from the government and people of Colombia and the rest of the Andean region. Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Secretary Reich, and now Secretary Rodman, if you will.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. RODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank the Chairman and the Committee for your courtesy to us and to congratulate you for convening this Hearing on such an important and timely subject. I am pleased also to join my colleagues from Southern Command and the Department of State because we represent elements of the Executive Branch, who have, after long deliberation, come together on two propositions. One is that our national commitment to help Colombia in present conditions is at least as important as it was before, even given all of our other preoccupations in the world right now.
The second proposition is that the time has come to offer some modifications of our previous approach. Our thinking in the Executive Branch has evolved over the last year, and I sense that thinking in the Congress has evolved, and I think what we are proposing is in the spirit of H.R. 358, which Chairman Hyde referred to. The reason we believe some adjustments need to be made in our previous approach is that a lot has happened in the last year. Obviously, September 11th has heightened everyone's awareness of the evil of terrorism. In Colombia itself, in addition, in the last year or so there is a greater awareness of the link that exists between narcotics and terrorism. That is why we are all thinking about enlarging the scope of our policy to some degree beyond just the counternarcotics struggle, which has dominated our policy up to now.
The other event is the dramatic event that has been referred to, President Pastrana's decision at the beginning of the year that the peace process had come to a dead end and the courageous decision, in our view, to close down the despeje. We supported President Pastrana when he pursued the peace diplomacy, and we believe he deserves support now as he deals with the consequences of the very fateful decision he has made.
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The last factor I would point to is that we believe there has been a noticeable improvement in the effectiveness of the Colombian military over the last year, and we believe this is in part the product of the training we have been giving them in the last couple of years. We believe that the improvement in their military effectiveness, the improvement in their professionalism—we will discuss also the improvement in their human rights performance—but all of these reflect, to some degree, the help we have been giving them. And this encourages us to believe, therefore, that an additional increment of support at this time will, indeed, make a significant difference in Colombia.
And the effectiveness of the Colombian military will allow a future Colombian President either to continue the military campaign if that is his choice or if he chooses to pursue a political solution, he will be able to pursue a political solution from a position of strength. In either case, as I said, we think that an additional increment of support and the adjustments of policy that we are discussing here will make a big difference.
The bottom line is that we have, as Chairman Hyde mentioned and the Chairman mentioned, a friendly, democratic government that is under assault from extremists of all stripes. This is a democratic government that is struggling to ensure basic security, and basic security is a precondition for every other goal, every other kind of economic or social progress that we hope for. Basic security is the precondition. And it is a government that is struggling to assert effective sovereignty over its national territory, and this is the prerogative of any legitimate government.
You have my prepared statement, but this is the point I wanted to emphasize to the Committee. All of us are here to engage with this Committee and to try to construct a national consensus of both Congress and the Executive Branch, because it is clear that without this kind of consensus between the two branches it will be much harder for this country to have an effective policy in Colombia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee. I want to associate myself with the testimony of my distinguished colleague, Assistant Secretary of State Reich. I am honored to provide the Defense Department's perspective on threats to Colombian democracy and the Bush Administration's proposed initiatives to assist the Government of Colombia in addressing those threats.
POLICY THAT ADAPTS TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
The Administration has wrestled with developing a more effective policy and strategy to address terrorism as well as narcotics trafficking—the twin challenges posed by Colombia's illegal armed groups.
Both the U.S. and Colombian governments recognize that the threat has evolved and now requires new thinking and new programs. President Pastrana's decision to terminate the FARC safehaven and this Administration's request for new authority, as described by Ambassador Reich, reflect our shared assessment that terrorism and narcotics trafficking are inextricably linked in Colombia today.
For the past decade, U.S. aid has focused almost exclusively on counternarcotics. Although counterdrug programs remain an important part of the security equation in Colombia, our assistance has not yet had a decisive impact on the political and security challenges that continue to threaten both Colombian democracy and U.S. interests. Therefore, President Bush has asked Congress for:
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— expanded authority for Colombia to use U.S.-provided support in its unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities; and
— new funding in Fiscal Year 2003 that would provide assistance to train and equip units to protect critical economic infrastructure.
These authorities will provide the Government of Colombia with the flexibility and resources needed to combat violent and formidable narcoterrorist threats to Colombia's national security. Over the past several years, these groups have increased their involvement in illicit drug operations. These drug revenues contribute to their war chests and have enabled them to increase their terrorist activities, placing further pressure on Colombia's democracy. This critical assistance will allow the Colombian security forces to confront more vigorously the increasing narcoterrorist attacks by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) and deal more effectively with the narcoterrorist paramilitary groups, like the United Self Defense Group of Colombia (AUC).
These three groups—the AUC, ELN, and FARC—already are designated under U.S. law as terrorist organizations. Although not considered terrorists with global reach, they threaten regional stability and U.S. interests through transnational arms and drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Together, these groups are responsible for more than 90 percent of the terrorist incidents in this hemisphere. The changes in authorities described by Ambassador Reich will help Colombia fight these groups more effectively, not only in traditional coca-growing regions such as Putumayo and Caqueta, but throughout Colombia.
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Beyond the toll in Colombian lives and treasure, these organizations have kidnapped and murdered U.S. citizens with impunity and damaged major U.S. commercial interests, such as oil pipelines. Accordingly, the Administration's strategy is to provide the Colombian government with the wherewithal and incentive to confront these groups throughout the national territory, whether or not individual units or combatants are engaged directly in drug-related activities. This is because, as we have learned, Colombia's major terrorist organizations both enable the drug trade and are financed in significant part by the revenues drugs provide. Attempting to segregate drugs and terrorism into distinct and severable threats is both politically unrealistic and militarily futile. Colombia urgently needs to establish the rule of law in its many regions that are presently ruled by lawless violence. A crucial component in this objective is a stronger, more effective security presence.
Today, the political/military situation in Colombia has reached a stalemate. Taken together, the FARC, ELN and AUC effectively control over 40% of Colombian territory. This stalemate works to the advantage of those groups, whose acts of terror and narcotics trafficking continue unabated even though the overall military contest remains inconclusive. Hence, this situation compounds all of Colombia's problems:
It delegitimates the democratic state.
It undercuts any real possibility of negotiation with the guerrillas on better-than-surrender terms.
It places a ceiling on what can be accomplished with the counternarcotics effort.
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It creates a security vacuum that is filled in part by the rightist paramilitaries. It is a vicious circle.
The Colombian State's weakness in many parts of the country leads many citizens to believe that the paramilitary groups are more effective in promoting security. In turn, these groups receive greater support and legitimacy, making the state's ability to fill the vacuum even more difficult.
The activities of the paramilitaries, of course, also undercut political support for Colombia in the United States.
The United States cannot solve all of Colombia's problems with increased levels of aid, and given Colombia's human and capital resources, we need not do so. Currently, the government devotes approximately 3.5% of GDP to combating the narcoterrorists. Colombia must shoulder more of the burden by funding its security structure—meaning both military and police—at levels that are more appropriate for a wartime footing.
We are encouraged by President Pastrana's recent decision to increase the force structure by 10,000 soldiers and provide an additional $110 million for military operations related to elimination of the FARC safehaven. But current funding for security forces is simply inadequate to meet the current threat, and Colombian forces are simply too small and poorly equipped to provide basic security to large areas of the country. At the end of the conflict in El Salvador, the military had 50 helicopters while Colombia, fifty times larger, has only roughly four times as many. The Colombian military has roughly an 8:1 soldier advantage over the narcoterrorist, an inadequate ratio if the military is to seize the initiative in the conflict.
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The Colombian military's situation is partly due to the evolving nature of the threat, partly due to a lag in the Colombian public's learning curve, and partly due to lingering hope that numerous peace proposals would be successful.
As Ambassador Reich pointed out, after three years of FARC duplicity at the negotiating table, on 20 February 2002 President Pastrana eliminated the FARC safehaven. Frustrated at the FARC's lack of good faith, the Colombian public appears to be gaining a more realistic understanding of the security challenges their country faces. But Colombia's difficulty in providing for its own security is due in no small part to its inability to protect significant revenue-producing infrastructure such as oil pipelines, which leads us back to the imperative for expanded authorities that Ambassador Grossman has described.
EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND BASIC SECURITY
If U.S. aims in Colombia are cast solely in terms of reducing the production and export of drugs to the United States, important aspects of the violence there and the inability of the government to respond effectively will be ignored. As a practical matter, we cannot view Colombia as a country in which we either adhere to a counterdrug program or slide unwittingly into a Vietnam-style counterinsurgency. More realistically, we must pursue policies and fashion programs that permit Colombia to meet the challenge of the narcoterrorists so that U.S. forces are not called upon to do so. There is a strong moral and strategic impetus behind this support for one of the United States' oldest and most reliable hemispheric allies.
Virtually all experts concur that the problems of narcotrafficking and guerrilla violence are intertwined. Both the United States and the Government of Colombia hold that reducing drug exports can serve important political and security objectives by reducing drug-related income available to illegal armed groups. Nevertheless, though drug-related income is an important factor in sustaining insurgents and paramilitaries, it is doubtful that even effective counternarcotic operations in specific areas within Colombia can, on their own, be decisive in disabling illegal armed groups or forcing them to negotiate seriously for peace.
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Continuing to link U.S. aid to Colombia to a narrow counternarcotics focus means that, by law, we must refrain from providing Colombia certain kinds of military assistance and intelligence support that could immediately strengthen the government's position throughout the country. Hundreds of attacks by the ELN and FARC have been directed at electrical, natural gas and oil infrastructure. The narcoterrorists' sabotage of oil pipelines alone has cost the Government of Colombia lost revenue on the order of $500 million per year. The pipeline was bombed 170 times in 2001, spilling 2.9 million barrels of oil—eleven times the amount of the Exxon Valdez.
The Administration has proposed to Congress $6 million in FY02 supplemental funding and $98 million in FY03 Foreign Military Finance funding to train and equip vetted Colombian units to protect that country's most threatened piece of critical economic infrastructure—the first 170 kilometers of the Cano-Limon oil pipeline. This segment is the most often attacked. U.S. assistance and training will support two Colombian Army brigades, National Police and Marines operating in the area. These units through ground and air mobility will be in a better position to prevent and disrupt attacks on the pipeline and defend key facilities and vulnerable points such as pumping stations. These units will also send a message that the Colombian State is committed to defending its economic infrastructure—resources that provide sorely needed employment and revenue—from terrorist attacks.
Basic security throughout Colombia's national territory is the essential but missing ingredient. The Pastrana administration's Plan Colombia was an admirable start toward resolving Colombia's interrelated problems, of which the security component is only one part. But there can be no rule of law, economic development and new job creation, strengthening of human rights or any other noble goals, where there is no basic security.
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Therefore, our policy in Colombia should augment traditional counterdrug programs with programs to help Colombia enhance basic security. A friendly democratic government in our hemisphere is struggling to preserve its sovereign authority under assault from extremists of both left and right. U.S. policy towards Colombia requires a bipartisan consensus at home for a long-term strategy aimed at strengthening Colombia's ability to enforce effective sovereignty and preserve democracy. The new and more explicit legal authorities that the Administration is proposing are intended to serve these goals.
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
The Administration is concerned, as are many Members of Congress, about human rights in Colombia. President Pastrana has instituted important reforms. The practices and procedures that the U.S. government has put in place, often at the behest of concerned Members of Congress, and the example set by the small number of our U.S. troops training Colombian forces, have also had an impact. Professionalism is, after all, what we teach. Human rights violations attributed to the armed forces dropped by 95% during the period of 1993–1998, to fewer than three percent of the total reported abuses.
Armed forces cooperation with the civilian court system in prosecuting human rights violations committed by military personnel has improved. Over 600 officers and noncommissioned officers have been relieved of duty under a 2000 Presidential decree that provides military commanders a legal means for removing personnel suspected of human rights violations and collusion with the paramilitaries. Officers have been dismissed for collaboration with or tolerance of paramilitary activities, while others face prosecution. The armed forces have demonstrated aggressiveness recently in seeking out and attacking paramilitary groups.
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Indeed, as already stated, the problem of the paramilitaries is itself partly a function of the vacuum left by the weakness of the national government and the Colombian military. By bolstering the democratic government and its effective assertion of national sovereignty, we weaken the paramilitaries.
COLOMBIANS MUST MAKE THE MAIN EFFORT
Although a policy cast in terms of basic security should enhance overall prospects for peace and for more effective counternarcotics, neither goal is assured without a firm and enduring commitment by the Colombian government and Colombian people to devote a greater share of their own national resources to the effort. The key principle should remain that the Colombian people bear the ultimate responsibility for their own security and must demonstrate their national will through a commitment of resources.
The Colombian military, by its own admission, is not optimally structured or organized to execute sustained operations. The Colombian military has greatly improved in many respects over the last several years—especially in the areas of tactical and operational effectiveness, increased professionalism, human rights training and awareness, and has realized a modest but sustained increase in force structure. But the military continues to suffer from limited resources, inadequate training practices, significant shortfalls in intelligence and air mobility, and lack of joint planning and operations. They need to better coordinate operations among the services and with the Colombian National Police. Adequate funding and restructuring of the military are essential if Colombia is to have continuing operational success against its national threats.
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The adoption of Plan Colombia demonstrates that Colombia is moving forward aggressively, exercising its political will to address, and ultimately solve, domestic problems that have persisted for decades. The U.S. has an enormous stake in the success of this plan.
Victory in Colombia can only come—and U.S. interests in Colombia can best be served—once the Government of Colombia asserts effective sovereignty over its national territory. It is time for the United States to reinforce its commitment to Colombian democracy.
CONCLUSION
President Pastrana has asked for both international and U.S. support to address an internal problem that has international dimensions—fueled in part by our country's and the international demand for cocaine. It is time to move forward, in partnership between the Administration and Congress.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I again thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. General Speer.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GARY D. SPEER, ACTING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
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Mr. SPEER. Mr. Chairman, Representative Menendez, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to represent the United States Southern Command to discuss this important issue today, especially concerning Colombia. Mr. Chairman, thank you for leading the delegation to the AOR last week, especially to visit Colombia, to get a fresh look and a current assessment. Thanks to all the Members of the Committee for your support of the United States Southern Command and especially for your support of the men and women in uniform deployed around the world today.
Certainly this Committee knows that Latin America and the Caribbean is a region that is of increasing importance and significance to the United States because of demographics, trade, resources such as oil, and geographic proximity. It is also an area that has had tremendous progress in the last quarter of a century, and much of the credit for that progress in the transformation to a hemispheric community of democratic nations goes to the men and women of the U.S. military who served in the region, day in, day out, working with their host nation counterparts, joint exercises and training, and the opportunities for foreign officers and noncommissioned officers to attend professional military education in the United States. And in each of these cases U.S. service members served as a role model for the proper conduct of a military in a democratic society, with a respect for the rule of law, human rights, and subordination to civil authority.
But as we look at the region today, many of these democracies are very fragile by cause of the challenges of instability and corruption due to drugs and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and other transnational threats, and certainly today, the concern with terrorism. In Southern Command, we have been focused on terrorism in Latin America for a long time, well before 11 September. As Chairman Hyde highlighted, we have been focused on the tri-border region of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, where there are terrorist supporters with links to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Gama'at in terms of financial support to these organizations. And certainly as we look at the region, no country is more challenged than Colombia as it faces the FARC, the ELN, and the illegal paramilitaries of the AUC, who exact terror on the population of Colombia, financing their activities through drugs, kidnapping, and extortion.
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As mentioned, this is an area of critical importance, and Colombia is of critical importance. From a security perspective, I view Colombia as the linchpin in the Andean Ridge and for that reason even more importance. Certainly, President Pastrana's decision on 20 February to terminate the despeje, or the FARC safe haven, significantly changes the landscape in that country. The Colombia military very deliberately initiated operations to reclaim the population centers within the former despeje. Their operations were deliberate, well executed, with the intent of avoiding civilian casualties, and they did this very well. But the fact of life is the Colombian security forces lack the resources to reestablish a safe and secure environment throughout the country of Colombia.
Colombia is not just about a counterdrug operation. Colombia is about a fight for democracy because the fact is without a safe and secure environment all of the other aspects of Plan Colombia cannot take hold.
As we look to the region at large throughout Latin America, many of the security forces and militaries lack the resources and capabilities to protect their own borders against these transnational threats. In fact, for the last decade our foreign military financing alone has been insufficient to provide for the sustainment of the aircraft and other equipment that the United States has previous provided, much less to address any genuine needs for modernization or respond to any growing or evolving challenges from new threats. This is an area where we look to you, the Committee, for your continued support for our Southern Command as we go forward to try to address these challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean so that we do not sacrifice the gains of the past 25 years.
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In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions and thank you again for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Speer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GARY D. SPEER, ACTING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Mr. Chairman, Representative Menendez, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you to discuss United States Southern Command's role in assisting Colombia. The men and women of United States Southern Command deeply appreciate the hard work by the Members of this Committee and we thank you, and your colleagues in Congress, for your commitment and steadfast support.
I have served as the Acting Commander in Chief of United States Southern Command since October 1, 2001 when General Pace assumed the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the past ten months, I have traveled to Colombia eight times. I have met key leaders in Colombia and here in the United States, both military and civilian. I appreciate their challenges and am convinced that the Colombian military is led by experienced and principled officers.
I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an overview of the problems facing Colombia and its neighbors, and what we have done to date to address these threats and enhance security and stability, which are the underpinnings of economic growth and legitimate governance.
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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
During the past twenty-five years, nations of our hemisphere have made substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. All countries, except for Cuba, have democratically elected governments. Without a clear or imminent external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially appear to be at peace with their neighbors.
Underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and organized crime, all of which threaten the security and stability of the region. Some of our hemispheric neighbors are suffering from the effects of political instability, faltering economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these governments and consequently threaten U.S. hemispheric interests. Governments are feeling the strain of weak economies, rampant corruption, ineffective judicial systems, and growing discontent of the people as democratic and economic reforms fall short of expectations.
Transnational threats in the region are increasingly linked as they share common infrastructure, transit patterns, corrupting means, and illicit mechanisms. These threats transcend borders and seriously affect the security interests of the United States.
TERRORISM
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Southern Command recognized a viable terrorist threat in Latin America long before September 11. If not further exposed and removed, that threat potentially poses a serious threat to both our national security and that of our neighbors. We in Southern Command have monitored terrorist activities for years with such incidents as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish-Argentine Cultural Center in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 attributed to Hizballah.
Recently, international terrorist groups have turned to some Latin American countries as safe havens from which they sustain worldwide operations. As an example, the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay serves as a base of support for Islamic Radical Groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Al Gama'at al-Islamiyya. These organizations generate revenue through illicit activities that include drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged travel documents, and even software and music piracy.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and the United Self Defense Group of Colombia (AUC) are all on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The FARC has been implicated in kidnappings and attacks against United States citizens and interests, including the murder of three U.S. citizens in 1998. According to the Department of State's most recent ''Patterns of Global Terrorism'' report, 86 percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the world in 2000 occurred in Latin America, predominately in Colombia.
The recent bombing outside the U.S Embassy in Peru preceding President Bush's visit is indicative that other domestic terrorist groups pose threats to the United States elsewhere in the hemisphere. These include, but are not limited to, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru and the Jama'at al Muslimeen (JAM) in Trinidad and Tobago.
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DRUG TRAFFICKING
Illegal drugs inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States and our hemispheric neighbors, and appropriately, have often been characterized as a weapon of mass destruction. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spend more than $64 billion on illegal drugs while drug abuse killed more than 19,000 Americans and accounted for $160 billion in expenses and lost revenue. Most of the world's cocaine and a significant portion of the heroin entering the United States is produced in the Andean Region.
Drug trafficking persists as a corrosive threat to the democracy, stability, and prosperity of nations within the region, especially in the Andean Ridge, adversely affecting societies and economies as scarce resources are diverted to rehabilitation, interdiction, and crime prevention efforts. Drug trafficking generates violence, fosters crime, and corrupts public institutions. Increasingly, terrorist organizations support themselves through drug trafficking. This trend is particularly troubling in Colombia where we find clear connections between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and terrorist activities.
It is not only the drug producing countries that suffer. No country in this hemisphere through which drugs transit escapes the violence and corrupting influences of drug trafficking. Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit countries, transit nations are now becoming drug consumers as well.
ARMS TRAFFICKING
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Although Latin America and the Caribbean spend less than any other region on legal arms purchases, illegal arms sales pose a significant threat to the stability of the region. Of particular concern is the rising trend in which Drug Trafficking Organizations exchange drugs for arms, which are then provided to terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia. Illegal arms originate from throughout the world and transit through the porous borders of Colombia's neighbors. Arms traffickers use a variety of land, maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug and human trafficking networks.
ILLEGAL MIGRATION
Latin America and the Caribbean are major avenues for worldwide illegal migration. Although not a problem directly tied to Colombia, illegal migration and human smuggling operations are linked to drugs and arms trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and the possibility for the movement of members of terrorist organizations.
According to the Census Bureau's latest figures, more than eight million illegal immigrants reside in the United States; nearly two million of them are from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates more than 300,000 illegal immigrants annually originate in, or transit through, Central American countries destined for the United States. Also, many Chinese illegal immigrants destined for the U.S. transit through Suriname, Ecuador and other countries in the hemisphere. Human trafficking is highly profitable, providing revenue of more than $1 billion annually to smuggling organizations within the region. Moreover, human trafficking provides the potential means of entry into the U.S. for criminals and terrorists.
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COLOMBIA
No other region is suffering the destabilizing effects of transnational threats more than the Andean Ridge countries. In Colombia, the FARC, ELN, and AUC have created an environment of instability in which the Government of Colombia does not control portions of the country. In the areas where military and police are not present and do not have control, there is lack of a safe and secure environment, which undermines the ability to govern and permits terrorism and crime to flourish.
The violence in Colombia remains a significant threat to the region as the combination and links among guerrillas, terrorists, drug-traffickers, and illegal self-defense forces have severely stressed the government's ability to exercise sovereignty and maintain security. The FARC and other illegal groups cross into neighboring countries at will. In addition, neighboring countries remain transshipment points for arms and drugs entering and exiting Colombia.
Colombia is critically important to the United States. With over 40 million people, it is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere, and it is an important trading partner, notably for oil. More importantly, it is the linchpin of the Andean Region; as such, it is critical for the United States that Colombia re-establish a safe and secure environment within its borders and survive as an effective democracy. Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador are certainly at risk to some degree based on what happens in Colombia.
The current political and security situation in Colombia is at a critical juncture. Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia's eleventh hour extension of the despeje, the FARC's ''safe haven,'' on January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a countrywide terror campaign with more than 120 attacks against the nation's infrastructure and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President Pastrana to eliminate the despeje on February 20, and initiate operations to occupy the area. From a military perspective, it was the right move. The FARC used the despeje as a sanctuary to support their drug trafficking operations, launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and train their forces. Simply put, the FARC is a terrorist organization that conducts violent terrorist attacks to undermine the security and stability of Colombia, financed by its involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation, production and transportation, as well as by kidnapping and extortion.
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The Colombian military immediately initiated operations to reoccupy the despeje, focusing on occupying population centers with deliberate operations to prevent civilian casualties. This strategy averted significant displacement of the population. In response, the FARC avoided confronting the military and has broken down into small elements, retreated into the jungle and rural areas, and concentrated its actions on terrorist attacks against the country's infrastructure.
While the March 10 Congressional elections were executed relatively problem-free, the weeks leading to the upcoming Presidential elections on May 26 will be particularly critical as the Colombian Military dedicates significant resources to ensure the security of the electoral process.
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND'S SUPPORT TO PLAN COLOMBIA
We continue to execute the Department of Defense's counterdrug support to Plan Colombia, Colombia's national security plan. Colombia is just beginning the second year of this six-year plan. The initial phase of operations focused in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments of Southern Colombia where approximately half of Colombia's coca cultivation takes place. In implementing U.S. Support to Plan Colombia initiated by the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental, Southern Command has been responsible for training and equipping a Counter Narcotics Brigade, riverine units, fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, training pilots and crews, infrastructure upgrades, and providing counterdrug intelligence support. We are seeing positive results from our support.
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COUNTER NARCOTICS BRIGADE
The Counter Narcotics Brigade (CN Brigade) headquarters and its three battalions are now fully trained and equipped. United States trainers performed staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. The brigade headquarters and the second battalion of the brigade completed training and began operations in December 2000; we completed training of the third battalion last May. We continue to provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade.
The CN Brigade is the best-trained and equipped unit in the Colombian Army. It has impressive results during drug interdiction operations by destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf in Southern Colombia. Since operations began in December 2000, over 890 drug labs have been destroyed and 119 people detained for judicial processing. The CN Brigade has also provided the ground security for the spraying of 59,000 hectares of coca in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions. Colombia's spraying effort in Putumayo last year would not have been possible without the CN Brigade's aggressive ground support to spray aircraft.
In addition, indications are that the Colombian military's concerted interdiction efforts combined with aerial spraying are having an effect on the narcotraffickers. Cocaine labs are being established away from the Putumayo and Caqueta cultivation areas; in fact, large scale, industrial size labs were discovered in the former despeje. With the training and capabilities of the CN Brigade, no longer does the FARC own the military initiative in Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, but avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian military. This increased security in the coca growing areas affords a better environment for interdiction efforts by the CN Brigade and the Colombian National Police.
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HELICOPTERS
Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to the first CN Brigade using 33 UH–1Ns with a combination of Colombian and Department of State contracted pilots. The UH1N aircraft are based in Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward deployed to Larandia for operations. Last year, the UH–1Ns flew over 10,000 flight hours in direct support of Joint Task Force South CN operations, moving over 26,700 soldiers and 261 tons of cargo. The current operational focus remains providing air mobility support for Joint Task Force South counterdrug missions in Colombia.
Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capability to the Colombian Army. All fourteen UH–60L Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian military were delivered by December 2001. The first 6 of the 25 Plan Colombia Huey II aircraft arrived in March 2002. Under the current delivery schedule, we expect the remaining 19 Huey II helicopters to be delivered by the end of September 2002.
Department of Defense training programs specifically designed to fulfill the requirement for trained Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs, and maintenance personnel for the Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters are currently underway and progressing well in Colombia and in the United States. In addition to training pilots, crew chiefs and maintenance personnel will also be trained.
This has been a real success story: Colombian Air Force Instructor Pilots under the quality control of an U.S. Army Technical Assistance Field Team are training Colombian Army pilots in the Blackhawk transition and the Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) courses. The night vision training, advanced or readiness level progression training, and the Huey II transition are being executed through a DOD contract in Colombia. Crew chiefs are being trained in Spanish, both in the United States and Colombia. The various special aviation and avionics maintenance training is conducted in Army schools in the United States. The Plan Colombia Blackhawk pilot and crew training will be complete in July. The first IERW course is in progress and Huey II transition will commence this month with a projected completion of Colombian Army pilots and crews for the 25 Huey IIs by mid 2004. The long pole in the aviation training is the CONUS specialized maintenance training, which will last through 2003 due to the extensive technical courses and the limited throughput possible. As such, contractor logistics support will be required throughout this entire period.
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RIVERINE CAPABILITY
For much of Colombia, the rivers are the highways. Consequently, the rivers are the only means of transportation and commercial communication. As a result, an integral part of our support to Colombia has been the training and equipping of the Colombian Riverine forces. The goal of the Riverine Forces is to permit the Colombian government to exercise sovereignty throughout the vast regions where other governmental entities are otherwise absent. Colombia's plan is to establish controls at critical river junctures along its borders and throughout the heartland of the country. The plan includes establishment of 58 riverine combat elements, with support structures, at these critical river nodes. The operational objective of the Riverine Forces is to establish control over the riverine transportation network and interdict illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the production of cocaine.
To date five riverine battalions, composed of thirty riverine combat elements, have been deployed and are operating throughout Colombia. These riverine combat elements have successfully supported the operations of the first CN brigade in destroying riverside labs and by providing convoy security for building material used to construct the Tres Esquinas airbase. Furthermore, these riverine units have established the first continuous presence of the Colombian government in areas previously abandoned to control of narco-terrorists organizations. Continued support to complete the fielding of the remaining riverine combat elements and establishment of a self-sustaining training capability are high priorities in our strategy for the future.
ENGINEER PROJECTS
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Extensive projects are underway in Larandia to support the CN Brigade and associated helicopters. They include helicopter pads, a fueling system, maintenance hangar and storage warehouse, operations building, control tower, and an ammo storage facility with arm/disarm pads. The first helicopter projects will be completed later this year, with the overall construction complete in 2003. Other projects at Larandia include additional barracks for both counter narcotics and aviation brigade personnel, a counter narcotics brigade headquarters facility, and a supply warehouse. These support projects will be complete later this year also. At Tres Esquinas (a forward operating site in Southern Colombia), construction was recently completed on the riverine facilities, an A–37 ramp, and taxiway. The remaining projects at Tres Esquinas (runway extension and Schweizer hanger) are in progress with completions also scheduled for later this year. The riverine base at El Encanto (forward base in Southern Colombia) and the riverine maintenance facility at Nueva Antioquia are complete. However, the airfield runway improvements at Marandua remain unfunded; this airfield will be critical to supporting operations in Eastern Colombia. The military base and improvement projects, which we have funded and overseen, have effectively enabled the Colombian military to expand its influence over the coca growing areas of Putumayo and Caqueta.
Additionally, we continue to improve our infrastructure at the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador. Last year, operations at the FOL ceased for six months while we made runway improvements. The current construction for living quarters and maintenance facilities will be completed in June 2002. The infrastructure upgrades for the FOL at Curacao are in progress, but Aruba remains unfunded. The FOLS are critical to our source zone counterdrug operations and provides coverage in the transit zone Pacific where we have seen the greatest increase in drug smuggling activity.
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PROFESSIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and respect for human rights and the rule of law by the Colombian military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug operations. The increase in professionalism starts with the continued professional military education, the confidence gained by technical proficiency, and resources available for operations.
Our legal assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human rights reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps. The initial JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently approved funding for construction of a permanent JAG facility, and we expect completion in July 2003.
In the area of human rights, United States Southern Command has supported Colombian efforts to extend human rights training throughout its ranks. Additionally, we sponsor opportunities for the continued exchange of information on human rights issues, such as: a recent Human Rights Seminar with 60 Colombian media and international representatives, bimonthly human rights roundtables involving representatives from various sectors of Colombian society, incorporating human rights in every training initiative, and advanced education programs. This summer, twenty students from the Armed Forces, National Police, Ministry of Defense, and Commanding General's office will receive specialty degrees in International Humanitarian Law.
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I am convinced the military leadership in Colombia is firmly committed to human rights and is taking action on any reports of wrongdoing. They have suspended officers and noncommissioned officers for acts of wrongdoing and have stepped up their operations against illegal defense forces.
In fact, in a short period of time, the Colombian military has emerged as one of the most respected and trusted organizations in Colombian society. Fewer than three percent of complaints of human rights abuses last year were attributed to the Colombian Security Forces, down from a high of 60 percent just a few years ago. There have been zero allegations of human rights abuses against the U.S. trained counter narcotics drug brigade.
This is a success story that often gets overlooked. Colombia should publicize what the military is doing and take credit for the accomplishments they have attained. This progress reflects a strong and principled leadership and the genuine desire of the Colombian military to honor and promote democratic principles in their country.
FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2002 ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE
The Department of State's Andean Counterdrug Initiative is designed to sustain and expand programs funded by the FY 2000 emergency supplemental. It addresses potential production, processing, and distribution spillover due to successful Plan Colombia execution. Since the beginning of 2001, we have been working with the Department of State to help develop, prioritize, and validate requirements for partner nation militaries. In each case, although still counterdrug focused, we are seeking to sustain the military contacts focused on professionalization of the armed forces and the specific challenges and security needs within available resources.
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Approximately $100 million of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative will be allocated to support the Colombian military. This funding will be used to sustain the capabilities initiated under the FY 2000 supplemental appropriation, particularly in the areas of training and aviation support for the first CN Brigade, riverine programs, and the Colombia military legal reform program.
SECOND COUNTER NARCOTICS BRIGADE
Based on the success of the first CN Brigade, the U.S. government is supporting Colombia's request to train and equip a second CN Brigade in FY 2003 for employment elsewhere within the country. The existing CN Brigade has been successful in forcing the drug traffickers to move their operations outside of the Putumayo and Caqueta departments. A second CD Brigade will enable the Colombians to attack the other main coca growing areas to the east of the Andean Ridge or elsewhere in the country.
Using the first CN Brigade as a baseline, we will profit from our experience in training and equipping the second CN Brigade. The second CN Brigade will be made up of approximately 1,700 troops. If approved, using U.S. Special Operations Forces, we could train one battalion per quarter, commencing with the second CN Brigade Staff. This training will continue to emphasize professionalism and human rights requirements. The equipment will include weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment. Additionally, the Department of State's FY 2003 request includes funding to continue sustainment training of the existing CN Brigade.
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY
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In addition to counterdrug assistance, the Administration has proposed to Congress $98 million, for FY 2003, to help Colombia to enhance the training and equipping of units to protect the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, one of the most vulnerable elements of their economic infrastructure. The FARC and ELN are active in carrying out attacks against Colombia's energy infrastructure. Attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline cost the Government of Colombia more than $40 million per month in revenues when the pipeline is not operational. During the past year, the pipeline was offline for more than 266 days. In addition, the amount of oil spilled during these attacks is eleven times greater than the Exxon Valdez spill, creating significant environmental damage.
The Administration has included $6 million in the FY 2002 Supplemental to begin the training. The first unit to be trained for this program will be the recently human rights vetted, Arauca-based Colombian Army 18th Brigade. Subsequent units to be trained for infrastructure security include the 5th Mobile Brigade, designated Colombian National Police units, and Colombian Marines. The Colombian units will also be equipped with weapons and am