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2003
U.S. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
JOINT HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 8 AND 14, 2003
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Serial No. 108–35
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
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THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
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BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
CHRIS BELL, Texas
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Europe
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
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ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director
PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member
JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member
BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate
Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation
and Human Rights
ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
NICK SMITH, Michigan
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
CHRIS BELL, Texas
RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director
RENEE AUSTELL, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
DONALD MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member
JOSEPH WINDREM, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
DATES
May 8, 2003
May 14, 2003
WITNESSES
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The Honorable John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State
Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, U.S. Department of Defense
Kenneth E. Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of Energy
Kenneth M. Luongo, Executive Director, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
Laura S.H. Holgate, Vice President for Russia/New Independent States [NIS] Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative
James Clay Moltz, Ph.D., Research Professor and Director, Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Associate and Deputy Director, Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARINGS
The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statements
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The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights: Prepared statements
The Honorable John S. Wolf: Prepared statement
Lisa Bronson: Prepared statement
Kenneth E. Baker: Prepared statement
Kenneth M. Luongo: Prepared statement
Laura S.H. Holgate: Prepared statement
James Clay Moltz: Prepared statement
Jon Brook Wolfsthal: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement, May 8, 2003
The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared statement, May 8, 2003
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Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign: Prepared statement, May 8, 2003
The Honorable Thomas G. Tancredo, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado: Prepared statement, May 14, 2003
The Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan: Prepared statement, May 14, 2003
The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts: Prepared statement, May 14, 2003
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Prepared statement, May 14, 2003
Questions Submitted for the Record to Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, U.S. Department of Defense, by the Members of the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on International Relations, and Ms. Bronson's Responses
Question Submitted for the Record to Kenneth E. Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of Energy, by the Members of the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on International Relations, and Mr. Baker's Response
Questions Submitted for the Record to the Honorable John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, by the Members of the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on International Relations [no responses received by press time]
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U.S. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, and
Subcommittee on International Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Human Rights,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:36 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe] presiding.
Mr. BEREUTER Today, the Europe Subcommittee, along with the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, will hold the first of two hearings on the Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] programs.
I want to thank the Chairman of the ITNHR Subcommittee, Mr. Gallegly, for his cooperation in putting together this joint hearing.
Today, we will receive testimony regarding the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs administered by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. Our primary focus in this hearing is to review those programs in Russia and the nations evolving from the former Soviet Union.
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When the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new Russian government inherited the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] in the world. According to a recent GAO report, the arsenal included some 30,000 nuclear weapons, 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials, 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons, over 2,000 missiles and bombers capable of delivering WMD, some 40 research institutions and 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chairman, and biological weapons scientists devoted to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, the nature and extent of their massive and diverse arsenal of biological weapons has yet to be fully revealed, but, from what I have learned, without exaggeration, it constitutes one of the most terrifying threats to the survival of the planet.
Recognizing this critically important situation, the Congress, in 1992, responded by initiating what has become known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative. The original purpose of the CTR program was to provide assistance for short-term, high-priority elimination of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Over this period, however, the program has expanded to include chemical and biological weapons programs as well.
I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be considered a part of the record, and I would now recognize for his opening statement the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Gallegly, because we are about to have to go vote. Mr. Gallegly.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Bereuter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
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Today the Europe Subcommittee, along with the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, will hold the first of two hearings on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs.
I want to thank the Chairman of the ITNHR Subcommittee for his cooperation in putting together these joint hearings.
Today we will receive testimony regarding the threat reduction and non-proliferation programs administered by the Departments of State, Defense and Energy. Our primary focus in this hearing are those programs in Russia and the nations evolving from the former Soviet Union.
When the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new Russian government inherited the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. According to a recent GAO Report, the arsenal included some 30,000 nuclear weapons, 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials; 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons; over 2,000 missiles and bombers capable of delivering WMD, and some 40 research institutes and 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical and biological weapons scientists devoted to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, the nature and extent of their massive and diverse arsenal of biological weapons has yet to be fully revealed, but from what I have learned, it constitutes one of the most terrifying threats to the survival of the planet.
Recognizing this critically dangerous situation, the Congress, in 1992, responded by initiating what has become known as the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction initiative. The original purpose of the CTR program was to provide assistance for a short-term, high-priority elimination of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Over this period, however, the program has expanded to include chemical and biological weapons programs as well.
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Assessments we have seen suggest that over the past twelve years and with over $7 billion invested in WMD elimination and securitization, the CTR program has achieved a respectable level of success. Various published documents indicate that roughly 6,000 nuclear warheads have been removed as immediate threats. Over 1400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines and strategic bombers have been decommissioned or eliminated. The transport and storage of nuclear weapons has been made more secure. Warhead control and accounting has been improved. Security of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium has been tightened. Some weapons grade uranium has been eliminated.
On the other hand, progress has been extremely slow in attempting to eliminate Russia's large arsenal of chemical weapons and the biological programs to which I have already made reference.. And, many of the large number of unemployed and under-employed weapons scientists have not been transitioned to suitable alternative research or employment. Additionally, we are told that Russia has not always provided its share of the funding for these programs and that it has been less than forthcoming in providing access to nuclear sites and certainly not all biological weapons and research facilities.
Finally, several extraordinarily knowledgeable Members of Congress, past and present, have expressed concerns over the mismanagement of the programs and with the commitment of funds for questionable projects.
Today's hearing is intended to review the exiting programs, to take stock of the accomplishments thus far, to review the problems incurred in implementing the programs, and to determine what the Bush Administration hopes to accomplish through these programs.
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I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the Chairman, my good friend from Nebraska, for working with me today.
The Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Europe are holding its first of two hearings on the issue of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia and other former Soviet states.
In late 1991, as the Cold War was just ending, Congress established a program so that the United States could assist Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan with the safe and secure transportation and disposal of nuclear and other weapons. The program was started after a coup in Moscow and the impending collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the security of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons arsenal.
During the next 10 years, our nation expended more than $2 billion on this program. Initially, the program had focused on securing and destroying Soviet-era nuclear weapons. Today, the threat reduction program has become a part of America's comprehensive, nonproliferation effort and war against terrorism.
It is my hope that today's witnesses will elaborate on this connection between the threat reduction and counterterrorism efforts, especially on the key issue of how best to prevent international terrorist groups from buying or stealing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and materials. I am also looking forward to hearing the witnesses' views on the 10-Plus-10-Over-10 Initiative and how they see this agreement contributing to our country's overall nonproliferation and threat reduction strategy.
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I will have a longer statement at next week's hearing on Cooperative Threat Reduction programs; however, I did want to take this opportunity to thank you, Chairman Bereuter, for agreeing to hold this joint hearing on an issue that is so critical to our relationship with Russia and our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Today, the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Europe are holding their first of two hearings on the issue of threat reduction programs in Russia and other former Soviet states.
In late 1991, as the Cold War was just ending, Congress established a program so that the United States could assist Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan with the safe and secure transportation and disposal of nuclear and other weapons. The program was started after a coup in Moscow and the impending collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the security of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons arsenal.
During the next ten years, our nation has spent over two billion dollars on this program. Initially, the program had focused on securing and destroying Soviet-era nuclear weapons. Today, the threat reduction program has become part of America's comprehensive nonproliferation effort and war against terrorism.
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It is my hope that today's witnesses will elaborate on this connection between threat reduction and counter-terrorism efforts, especially on the key issue of how best to prevent international terrorist groups from buying or stealing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and materials. I am also looking forward to hearing the witnesses' views on the 10+10 Over 10 Initiative and how they see this agreement contributing to our country's overall nonproliferation and threat reduction strategy.
I will have a longer statement at next week's hearing on cooperative threat reduction programs. However, I did want to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Bereuter for agreeing to hold these two joint hearings on an issue that is so critical to our relationship with Russia and our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
We are fortunate that we have before us today two State Department witnesses that are critical in the battle against international terrorism. Ambassador Cofer Black is the Coordinator of the Office of Counterterrorism at the Department of State. His office has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Tony Wayne is the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which formulates and carries out U.S. foreign economic policy. It is also the office within the State Department with expertise on the sources of financing for international terrorist organizations and leads the effort to develop greater international cooperation in attacking terrorist financing sources.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I will now turn to Mr. Sherman, the Ranking Member on this subcommittee, for any remarks he may wish to make.
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Mr. BEREUTER Thank you, Chairman Gallegly. Now, it is my pleasure to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the Ranking Member of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I, too, will submit my statement for the record. The witnesses have waited quite a long while. I would simply just request that the witnesses here today, when we have an opportunity to hear from them, if they could elaborate, to the degree that they can, on how best we can address the challenges and the obstacles that Nunn-Lugar faces, with some degree of specificity in terms of a response to the recent GAO report, which assessed the U.S. efforts, as well as Russian obstacles, to improving security at specific Russian weapon sites.
I strongly believe that our nonproliferation policies and the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs need to be revamped and expanded in order to address the threats posed by the weapons that face America, and I would be very curious to hear the testimony of the witnesses as to their views on expanding the Nunn-Lugar program beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER Thank you, Mr. Wexler. I think we should have time to hear from the distinguished Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, and he is recognized.
Mr. SHERMAN. We have time if he speaks very quickly. Thank you for holding these hearings. Dealing with the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is perhaps the greatest proliferation challenge faced by the United States.
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First, the sheer number of weapons the Soviet Union had, and Russia now has, and the number that the United States has is a concern to people everywhere; second, Russia's system for controlling its nuclear weapons is an appropriate focus of concern, in these hearings; and, third, the potential for Russia's loose nukes and fissionable material to fall into the hands of terrorists and rogue nations is perhaps the greatest immediate concern. It is the most likely source for the misuse of nuclear weapons, even if it wouldn't cause as great a harm, as we could have imagined in the days of the Cold War.
Russia's continued assistance to Iran's so-called ''civil nuclear program'' demonstrates that Russia can and will put aside its own security concerns in order to make much-needed cash from its nuclear prowess. I am particularly concerned about not having a full accounting for Russia's battlefield or substrategic nuclear weapons. There were perhaps 27,000 such weapons at the time of the Soviet Union. How many of them are left, we cannot know until Russia gives us an accounting. We need an agreement to provide that accounting, and so far, the Russians have resisted such an agreement, but we need to continue and make that one of our major bilateral objectives.
I also take exception to what I understand is the Bush Administration's decision to focus almost half of the Pentagon's cooperative threat reduction funding on a particular chemical weapons program. While chemical weapons are, of course, of concern, anything that reduces the total amount we spend dealing with Russia's nuclear weapons is money poorly saved.
So I look forward to this panel, and I thank you for holding these hearings.
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Mr. BEREUTER Mr. Schiff, we are about out of time, but I recognize you because I understand you would like recognition.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief, and I would request unanimous consent that my full statement, as well as the statement prepared by the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, be admitted in the record.
Mr. BEREUTER Without objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. I recently introduced a bill that would grant the President permanent waiver authority of six original Nunn-Lugar conditions. This has particular relevance to the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility. Current law requires a 3-year waiver of six original Nunn-Lugar conditions. This waiver expires in 2005.
We have also drafted legislation to expand Nunn-Lugar outside of the former Soviet Union, authorizing efforts to dismantle and destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons in nations such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq. The goal of this program is to reduce stockpiles of nuclear and non-nuclear materials in both military and nonmilitary facilities.
Finally, I think we have to place increased focus on the problem of former Russian weapons scientists, and, indeed, as the Administration recently alluded, Iraqi weapons scientists as well, and make sure that we are aggressively finding alternative and more productive sources of employment, and also in the case of the Russian former weapons scientists facilitating their work with U.S. institutions. And I will be happy to yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. BEREUTER Thank you, Mr. Schiff. I want to say to the distinguished panel, I regret the amount of time you have waited, and you have been very patient, but we are going to have to ask you to wait again because we have four votes, and I think, realistically, it is going to be about 2:55 before we can come back.
We have a commitment for the whole House later at 4 o'clock, and so we will complete the hearing at 3:50, and I will not shorten the time that you have for your testimonies; we will simply, as required, submit questions to you because I do not want to shorten your testimony. So, with your indulgence and patience, we will recess the Subcommittees' jointly meeting until 2:55 p.m.
[Whereupon, a recess was taken.]
Mr. BEREUTER The Subcommittees will come to order. Well, of course, I regret that I am unable to predict the House's activities, but we are going to hear from our witnesses and give them a third each of the time remaining.
I would like to introduce, first, John Wolf, assistant secretary of the Bureau of Nonproliferation. He has served as a Foreign Service officer since 1970. Mr. Wolf has served as a principal deputy assistant secretary for international organizational affairs and Ambassador to Malaysia from 1992 to 1995.
Ambassador Wolf, I am prepared to give each of you about 9 minutes, which will be splitting the time available. So please proceed as you wish. Your entire statements in all cases will be made part of the record.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN S. WOLF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be glad to start, and I will summarize my summary statement and leave some more time for Ms. Bronson and Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to appear, and I thank Chairman Gallegly for the invitation to appear. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and skills needed to make them are a partnership we share with you and the Congress.
This has never been more important because trends in the nonproliferation world are not good. Today, more countries and more terrorists than ever have access, or are seeking access, to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. South Asia has crossed the nuclear threshold, and rogue regimes like North Korea, Iran, and Libya seek to replicate that ambition. With globalization, there are more potential sources of sensitive-materials technologies in countries that used to be buyers of weapons, materials, and technology that are now supplying such materials to others.
What is needed is much greater international vision and more determination, much more determination, to combat proliferation. We, in the United States, do a lot, and the statements that you will hear today detail part of that. Others, though, must do more.
I would like to offer some observations, though, based on my participation in Geneva last week at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. There was broad support for the treaty, but interpretations of its meaning differed in worrisome ways. All too many states ignore that there are three pillars to the treaty: Disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The first and third pillars depend on successfully combating proliferation; indeed, that is the treaty's title.
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Too many states focus exclusively on disarmament, and they do so only in the narrowest way, focusing only on warheads, the numbers of warheads. Notably, they take no account of our Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, which, with the cooperation of Russia and the other former Soviet states, have rid the world not only of significant numbers of warheads but also of significant quantities of fissile material and other dangerous materials. We live in a safer world thanks to this effort.
Our CTR programs are designed to assure that the still-significant stocks of weapons, dangerous materials, and weapons expertise left over from the Soviet military programs are being downsized and that protection is being consistently deepened. It is a huge but important task for U.S. national security because we continue to receive reports that terrorist groups and sponsor states are trying to access these stockpiles.
For a decade, State, Energy, and the Department of Defense have all worked together to eliminate the Soviets' dangerous legacy where we can, secure what cannot be eliminated, and ensure that the scientists and engineers who designed and built weapons of mass destruction do not sell their know-how abroad.
In many cases, it is State's responsibility to help facilitate the work for either Defense or Energy. In March, for instance, the State Department's diplomatic support was crucial to making it possible for Secretary Abraham to sign an amendment to the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, and that is going to help Russia to close down its three plutonium-production reactors. That is what I mean when I say the disarmament process and the process of dealing with dangerous materials is going forward, and people need to take account of the two tons of plutonium a year which will not be produced when the reactors are shut down.
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We are working with the G–8, and even this week there was a meeting of G–8 senior officials to pursue creation of the Global Partnership that was announced at Kananaskis last summer. The idea is that others will match the $10 billion over 10 years that we are prepared to pledge. We need their help. It has been too long that Europe and Japan haven't done enough to help these threat-reduction that we have been working on for a decade.
What we want, therefore, is to press our partners to firm up their pledges, commit to specific projects, and, in the case of Russia, to provide the necessary access and tax and liability protections needed for others to begin work.
I am happy to report, we have $6 billion of new pledges in hands, including expressions of interest from states outside the seven, including such states as Norway. The others are prepared to contribute to priority projects like plutonium disposition and the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility. More needs to be done with Russia, particularly pertaining to the liability issues, and the G–7-plus-others still needs to find more money to fund their pledges fully, but we are making progress.
Our programs at State have a lot to do with keeping Soviet WMD expertise at home. We oversee participation in the International Science Centers, and these are platforms for the engagement of former weapons scientists. We propose to channel $52 million in the current year. We are also still working with $30 million that the Congress provided us in 2002 for bio-weapons production facilities to convert them.
These are important programs, and they are targeted at reconfiguring facilities capable of producing large quantities of weaponized agents, such as anthrax and smallpox. We have had results. We have had results in terms of gaining access, although it is too slow, access to places like the Vostok biological plant, the Prokrof bio-preparations facility, the Ross Agro-bioprom, a network of 10 animal-vaccine facilities, and we are working on other places where we haven't yet gotten in: Kyrof 200, where we have a number of projects, to the science centers, which will be the start, we hope, of cooperation. And not only are we getting access, but we are actually getting real results.
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The cooperative research we sponsor often benefits both scientists and U.S. business. One project we sponsored resulted in the development of a high-altitude, laser-imaging device that can detect leaks from gas pipelines; another, new electronics applications for beryllium that allows shift from weapons production to commercial manufacturing.
We are doing a number of things in the bio-medical sphere. Russian scientists have identified two antiviral compounds, including for individuals who may have adverse reactions to existing vaccines. We are doing a lot of other things related to West Nile virus, Newcastle, and Avian flu. I know Congressman Gallegly is interested because Newcastle is one of those things that affects poultry-producing states.
Improved access, I have mentioned. With the additional money, we are going to step up this process because now we need to graduate both institutions and scientists. This can't be a perpetual dole. What we want to do is get these institutions on a self-sustaining basis and get the scientists into commercial work.
Russia and Eurasia aren't the only problems, and we have a variety of threat-reduction programs, including the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which tackles tough, urgent problems, such as the removal of highly enriched uranium from Venshia, near Belgrade, to safe storage in Russia, and in the future, we expect the NDF to focus on unanticipated opportunities to eliminate missile systems, chemical agents, secure orphaned radiological sources. We are going to use it as the project incubator for our Dangerous Materials Initiative, designed to put better controls on dangerous materials, whether they are chemical, biological, or nuclear, all around the world. With DOE, we intend to accelerate our effort to return spent fuel and fresh, highly enriched uranium to safe storage.
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There are other areas that we are working on that I will summarize very briefly. The export control and border security programs; we are now in 35 countries. We have gone well beyond Central Asia, where we stopped. My written statement explains the program thoroughly, and I would just like to make one point. Good export controls are important, but enforcement is the key. Without good enforcement, it doesn't matter how extensive the rules are. Proliferators and their suppliers must know that the international community will enforce accountability.
We are also working with the International Atomic Energy Agency in a variety of ways. Our voluntary contribution is currently helping to strengthen the safeguards program.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you on our agenda. We seek your support for the President's proposal to broaden cooperative threat reduction spending beyond the former Soviet Union by allowing the President to use those resources wherever and however best he can. Each program will be different, and the kind of footprint that we want to have in South Asia will be different from the former Soviet Union and different in other parts of the world.
I hope the Congress will also support the President's request for permanent authority to waive the requirements for CTR certification and for authority to construct the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction plant.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remaining 22 seconds, and thank you very much.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolf follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN S. WOLF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Chairman Bereuter, it is an honor to appear before the House International Relations Committee's Europe Subcommittee. Chairman Gallegly, it is especially appropriate for me to appear before the newly formed Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and skills needed to make them is my mission.
Never has this responsibility been more important. Trends in the nonproliferation world are not good, and the tensions that result are becoming a serious challenge to world peace and stability. During the first 40 years following World War II, we and our allies depended largely on deterrence and tight export controls to limit the spread of dangerous weapons. Today, however, we face a substantially increased risk from countries and international terrorist groups with access to chemical and biological weapons, and at least several states with access to components and technology for making nuclear weapons.
Against this grim backdrop, there is a risk that complacency, inertia, and timidity are preventing the international community from blocking attempted violations, or from reacting decisively to them. Clearly, we cannot simply wring our hands and hope things will get better. We have an active agenda, in partnership with a wide range of other countries and international organizations, and unilaterally.
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In pursuit of this agenda, I have set five goals for the Nonproliferation Bureau. They are to:
Curb the access of proliferators, terrorists, and state sponsors of terrorism to materials, equipment, and technology for WMD and missiles;
Discourage states seeking to acquire, develop, or use WMD and missiles;
Maintain and strengthen the international system of nonproliferation treaties and regimes by raising standards and enforcing increased compliance;
Promote international nuclear cooperation under the highest nonproliferation and safety standards; and
Contain the transfer of advanced conventional arms to states of concern, and to terrorists.
As we pursue these goals, task one is preventing the outflow of weapons of mass destruction, dangerous materials, and weapons expertise from the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). As you are well aware, the Soviets left behind a potential mother lode for terrorists and rogue states. While it is, of course, Russia and the FSU countries that have first responsibility to protect their sensitive capabilities and/or technologies, it's in the US interest to help—and we are leading an international effort to do just that.
This is a government wide effort—and I am honored to appear here with members of that team. Close cooperation among State, Energy, and Defense is essential, and it is an every day fact.
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In Russia and Eurasia, we must eliminate weapons and dangerous materials where we can, secure what cannot be eliminated, and ensure that the scientists and engineers who designed and built these things do not sell their know-how abroad. With regard to nuclear issues, this means we must:
Improve security at Russian storage facilities;
Consolidate stored fissile materials;
Stop new production; and
Purchase, down-blend, or effectively dispose of former nuclear weapons materials to reduce supply.
Energy and Defense have effective programs to do these things, and State's job is to provide them the diplomatic support they need to get on with the job. In March, for example, State's diplomatic support was crucial to making it possible for Secretary Abraham to sign an amendment to the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, as well as an implementing agreement, committing Russia to a program that will eliminate production of plutonium in that country by 2011. State is also providing the lead in multilateral negotiations on an agreement to finance Russia's plutonium disposition program, which will utilize nuclear reactors under strict controls to burn excess weapons plutonium corresponding to well over 4,000 nuclear weapons.
In addition, State is working to increase the international community's contribution to the threat reduction effort in the former Soviet Union. Until recently, the threat reduction efforts were largely a U.S. show. At last year's G–8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, however, the other seven G–8 partners agreed to the creation of a Global Partnership in which they would match the $10 billion we plan to spend on threat reduction efforts in Russia and Eurasia over the next 10 years.
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Since then, this Department has been energetically pressing the seven to firm up their pledges, commit to specific projects, and, in the case of Russia, to provide the necessary access and tax and liability protections needed for the others to begin work. As we meet today, I am happy to report that we have approximately $6 billion in firm pledges, expressions of interest in contributing from states outside the Seven such as Norway, and strong interest from our partners in contributing to such U.S. priorities as plutonium disposition and the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility. Knotty discussions are still ongoing with Russia to resolve longstanding differences on liability issues, but we are making progress. We will continue to pursue the issue vigorously when the U.S. assumes the G–8 presidency next year.
State also has its own nonproliferation programs. We oversee the U.S. Government's participation in the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center and the Kiev-based Science and Technology Center of Ukraine. These centers provide flexible platforms for the engagement of former weapons scientists and for tasks that other U.S. agencies cannot accomplish through other means. State will use the centers to channel $52 million in the current fiscal year to redirect former Soviet WMD/missile scientists to peaceful, commercial purposes through cooperative research. This funding includes $20 million in FY 2003 specifically targeted at redirecting former biological and chemical weapons scientists. The Energy Department will use the centers to oversee expenditure of $12 million on Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) projects that are also designed to guide former weapons scientists to commercial employment. In addition, the Defense Department uses the Moscow center for projects to secure dangerous pathogens at Russian biological institutes. The State Department also provides funding to the U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, a non-profit organization established by Congress with a broad charter to engage former weapons scientists of the FSU.
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State is also responsible for implementing the Bio-Industry Initiative, established with $30 million provided by Congress in Defense Emergency Response Funds in June 2002 for conversion of former bio-weapon production facilities. This is the only U.S. program targeted at reconfiguring former Soviet biological production facilities, which are capable of producing large quantities of weaponized agents such as anthrax and smallpox. This initiative also supports our efforts to combat bio-terrorism by supporting accelerated drug and vaccine development for highly infectious diseases.
Our engagement effort produces results. It has forged strong links between the U.S. and FSU scientific communities. Former weapons scientists regularly tell us that our support provides them a genuine incentive to spurn offers from rogue states which we know continue to be made. But it also has made an impact in the marketplace. One project we sponsored resulted in the development of a high altitude laser-imaging device that can detect leaks from gas pipelines and is now under commercial development here in the U.S. Another has identified new electronics applications for beryllium that allow a shift from weapons to commercial manufacturing for one facility in Kazakhstan. Overall, the centers have produced 270 patentable ideas.
Some of our biggest achievements have been in the bio-medical sphere, where we have made real progress in public health and agricultural issues of concern both in the U.S. and abroad. In research jointly sponsored by State and the U.S. Public Health Service, Russian scientists have identified two anti-viral compounds that hold the promise of proving effective against smallpox, including for individuals who may have adverse reactions to existing vaccines. If this effort bears fruit, we could have an important new tool in the event our nation is ever exposed to attack with the smallpox virus. Another project involved U.S. collaboration with the Kazakh scientists formerly employed at the biological weapons facility at Stepnogorsk. The team developed new agents for which they are seeking patents to treat heart arrhythmia. Similarly, Russian researchers in the program are hard at work developing kits for rapid diagnosis of West Nile, Newcastle, and Avian flu—diseases that pose serious economic threats to U.S. poultry producers.
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Improved access is another important benefit of our programs. The economic advantages of participating in our programs are so great—particularly with regard to the Bio-Industry Initiative—that with time and persistence, we have steadily reduced the number of institutes that are closed to us. In recent months members of my staff were the first Americans to receive a thorough tour of the Berdsk biologics facility and the Vostok joint stock company facilities at Omutninsk. They also were the first Americans to be received in any fashion at the Institute of Toxicology in St. Petersburg.
Sometimes engaging former weapons scientists leads to a direct improvement in our ability and techniques to halt proliferation. For instance, our establishment and support of the International Geodynamics Research Center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, not only engages scientists, but has created a location capable of verifying and detecting nuclear and seismic activities in nearby India, Pakistan, and China.
Looking to the future, with the additional funds we are requesting this year, we plan to step up efforts to engage Russian chemical weapons scientists in accordance with the conclusions of the policy review this Administration conducted shortly after coming into office. This year, we introduced representatives from the U.S. chemical industry to Russian scientists from a former CW research facility that, until last year, was closed to foreigners, and collaborative research projects are under development. We have also initiated projects with newly contacted former CW institutes in Ukraine. We will use our additional funds to develop new projects and relationships with other high-priority chemical institutes in Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia.
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We also plan to use the funds to step up efforts to guide former weapon scientists and the institutes at which they work to commercial self-sustainability. After a decade of engagement in cooperative research, it is high time that we begin implementing the steps that will eventually allow us to phase out these programs. Done right, this should produce more of those mutually beneficial situations I mentioned earlier. Commercialization efforts can, however, be more expensive in the short run than simple engagement programs. Former Soviet scientists and institutes often need advice on business development and ways to market their intellectual property.
Specifically in the coming year, we will reorganize the Moscow and Kiev centers to make them more effective at marketing the scientific research produced under their auspices. We will use Bio-Industry Initiative funds to assist former bio-weapon production facilities to obtain western business advice and to foster the formation of a consortium of key Russian industry, academic, and ministerial representatives. This consortium, led by the Moscow Medical Academy, will be used to support the development of a pipeline from research to commercialization for Russian biological researchers in the pharmaceutical industry. In the process, we will support American firms seeking to invest in projects at these institutes. The Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company has, for example, expressed interest in producing an anti-tuberculosis drug at one. If over time we can link former Soviet scientists into the international business community and allow their excellent scientific skills to be used to heal rather than to harm, we should be able to wind up these programs in a few years. Already, we have made considerable progress and I hope that within the next two years we can begin graduating institutes from our assistance programs.
This is not altruism, and it's certainly not corporate charity. Refocusing scientists and facilities reduces risk that proliferators elsewhere will successfully tap into this expertise. Our access and contacts give us substantial encouragement that leakage is not occurring. We are not complacent however, and we use regular reviews, internal controls and external audits to further reduce the risks.
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While I have focused so far on Russia and Eurasia, these are not the only countries of concern, and our nonproliferation programs are not the only tools we have at our disposal. A glance at the headlines shows proliferation threats all over the globe. Iraq is on the way to solution, but others remain. Recent visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Iran have made it all too clear, for example, that Iran has made a sizable, heretofore clandestine, effort to acquire capabilities that make sense only as part of an effort to produce fissile material for weapons. North Korea has an openly avowed nuclear weapons program, and there are others who are in contravention of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Outside of these regimes there are additional concerns. The situation in South Asia deserves special mention. It is different from the dangers posed by the rogue states. India and Pakistan are two very different countries, with which we are pursuing boldly different relationships. Each though has lethal arsenals, and the continuing friction between the two suggests the urgent need for dialogue and confidence building measures to lessen the risks.
Dealing with each of these challenges requires a different response. In most cases, we will not be able to fall back on the model of our proliferation threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. The scale of the potential threat is much smaller, and we are unlikely to encounter elsewhere the willingness we found there to build down or scrap weapons establishments. In some instances our focus will be on securing sensitive technologies. This is particularly true in South Asia, where we have active nonproliferation dialogues with Pakistan and India. There we may need to be able to seize opportunities quickly.
This also the reason for developing a Dangerous Materials Initiative (DMI). We want to help countries establish better accounting and control mechanisms to secure radioactive materials, pathogens, and sensitive precursors, from the laboratory to movement into internal and international commerce. DMI will aim for synergies among U.S. Government agencies and programs and also with international partners and international organizations.
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At this point, we are not seeking separate funding for the DMI but expect that the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) will be a major resource, along with other U.S. assistance programs. This is in part why the President has requested $35 million in FY 2004 for NDF, more than double the FY 2003 appropriation.
NDF has tackled tough, urgent, and often unanticipated problems on a worldwide basis. In the recent past, it has negotiated and executed the removal of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Serbia, the destruction of missiles in Bulgaria and the return from Cyprus of nuclear reactor parts en route to the Middle East. The NDF has also led a successful international effort to develop a state-of-the-art automated tracking system, referred to as Tracker, designed to help governments strengthen their control over sensitive exports or transshipments. Tracker has been a key tool for engaging nearly two dozen countries—either as design partners, current users, or in discussions of future implementation. Now deployed throughout Central Europe to track sensitive exports, this system is of increasing interest to countries in Western Europe and Asia as a means to track terrorists and to monitor the movement of dangerous materials. The State Department is closely coordinating this export control assistance tool with other U.S. equipment assistance provided to European and Eurasian states.
In the future, we expect the NDF to focus on urgent, unanticipated opportunities to eliminate missile systems; destroy, secure and remove biological pathogens; eliminate chemical agents and weapons; rescue orphaned radiological sources; inventory and track dangerous materials; assist countries in developing laws and regulations to control the movement, storage, and security of dangerous materials; and encourage countries in the Middle East and South Asia to use the Tracker system and to assist with its development.
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Another of our major programs to prevent transfers of sensitive goods to end-users of proliferation concern is centered in State's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. The EXBS program assists governments in strengthening their export controls by improving their legal and regulatory framework, licensing processes, border control and investigative capabilities. We also work closely with the Department of Defense to coordinate our efforts.
We currently have active programs in over 30 countries, with 20 EXBS program advisors serving overseas engaging foreign officials on ways to strengthen controls, and directing training activities and the delivery of much-needed detection and enforcement equipment. In a number of countries officials trained by the EXBS program or using EXBS program-provided equipment have seized sensitive goods or weapons components bound for terrorists, state sponsors of terror, or other proliferant entities. U.S. export control assistance is largely responsible for over a dozen European and Eurasian countries adopting comprehensive export control laws that meet recognized international standards.
Even before September 11, 2001, the EXBS program and its advisors were active in key Central Asian countries, a factor that doubtlessly paid unanticipated dividends when these countries were thrust into the front line of the war against terrorism. Following September 11, increased EXBS program resources were focused on this strategic region to help these countries, and key countries in the Caucasus as well, shore up vulnerable borders and improve capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict the transit of illicit goods and weapons.
In Europe, we are increasing export control assistance to the Baltics and Southeastern Europe, and Mediterranean transshipment points like Malta and Cyprus. All states, especially those with large ports, must do their part to forestall the transit and transshipment of dangerous materials and technology. Furthermore, EXBS and NDF are working closely with our Allies and international partners to ensure that our assistance is non-duplicative and coordinated with international nonproliferation political and assistance efforts, and to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer receives the maximum value for his or her assistance dollar.
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Given the global nature of the proliferation threat, the EXBS program has expanded its focus to include countries along key transit routes and countries with substantial volume of transshipment trade in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In potential South Asia supplier countries, we continue to encourage the development, full implementation and enforcement of export controls that meet international standards.
The State Department also works cooperatively with other, related programs to harmonize efforts abroad. For example, we have a close working relationship with both the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), which funds and manages the Second-Line-of-Defense (SLD) program that provides advanced radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, and with Customs/DHS, which has the lead on the Container Security Initiative (CSI) designed to secure the supply line of cargo shipments destined for U.S. ports. The State Department's Export Control and Related Border Control Assistance (EXBS) program has worked with NNSA's SLD program to integrate it into overall USG export control assistance efforts and to jointly ensure that previously provided radiation detection equipment is repaired and maintained. My bureau, which manages the EXBS program, also is leading an interagency effort to complete a strategic plan for provision of overseas radiation detection equipment. The Nonproliferation Bureau also chairs a NSC-mandated Sub-Policy Coordination Committee to coordinate all USG nonproliferation export control assistance. State is also working closely with U.S. Customs/DHS officials to ensure that U.S. Government approaches countries with ports scheduled to join the Container Security Initiative are aligned with our broader nonproliferation policy and with the export control outreach and assistance efforts we are carrying out in some of these countries.
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Our third goal, making the export control regimes stronger, is also one aimed at reducing supply. As we noted in our response to last year's examination of the regimes by the General Accounting Office, the Administration is in the process of reviewing the nonproliferation regimes. Since September 11, anti-terrorism has been adopted as a formal goal of the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Nuclear Suppliers Group. We have won Australia Group agreement to adopt catch-all and intangible technology control provisions, setting the standard for the other regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement amended its dual-use export control list to begin adding items specifically of concern for terrorists, and this year is reviewing its controls on man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) like SA–7s and SA–18s with a view to further strengthening them.
In the year ahead we intend to push adoption of catch-all controls and denial consultation in areas where they haven't yet been implemented; continue to review control lists to make sure they are keeping up with technology and the threat, and; as always, look for ways to strengthen implementation and enforcement. We are also working in the Nuclear Safety Group and Missile Technology Control Regime on other ways to tighten further these agreements.
While strong regimes are necessary, they are not enough. We also need to take concrete action to enforce commitments more strictly and make proliferation more costly—politically, and financially. This is one of my problems with the Europeans who seem to want to spend more time debating what I'd call ''architecture''—treaties, arrangements, etc.—and not enough time discussing implementation. What we're not doing enough of is taking concrete action to make other countries live up to their commitments more strictly.
Tightening regimes and improved enforcement are part of the answer. Many governments tell us about their export controls and laws. But what counts is their willingness to enforce the law, to make clear there is a price for violation of the law. Proliferators need to know they face isolation and consequences if their efforts continue. Ending the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will send a powerful signal to other proliferators that the world will not stand by idly.
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To help deal with determined proliferators not prepared to conform to international standards, we look among other things to the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iraq's weapons programs is being dealt with, but the nuclear weapon ambitions of Iran, North Korea, and others are potential hot spots we must deal with now. When I spoke last week to the Preparatory Conference for the NPT 2005 Review Conference, I acknowledged that the NPT is built on three pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear power. While many speakers seemed fixated on the need to accelerate disarmament, I maintained that the problem in 2003 is that the treaty is out of balance. The failure of the more than 180 members of the NPT who abide by their obligations to insist that the small minority stop cheating puts both disarmament and peaceful nuclear trade at risk. We must strengthen enforcement tools, like the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we must ensure that the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA expanded inspections capabilities, is universally adopted. To enable the IAEA to use its strengthened capabilities effectively, we must ensure that the IAEA safeguards budget is fully funded. Even more importantly, the international community, not just the US and a few allies, must make clear to proliferators that the price of proliferation will be increased international political and economic isolation. Frankly, the ambivalent attitude of many governments in Europe and Asia is worrisome. We will not, however, be discouraged. We will press our friends, allies, and the world community as a whole to take decisive action to deal with a threat to us all.
Beyond multiple safeguards activities, the IAEA has an important role in preventing nuclear terrorism. After September 11, 2001, the IAEA moved quickly to develop a comprehensive Nuclear Security Program to help states protect against acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. In March 2003, the Department of Energy, working with the IAEA and Russia, hosted an international conference to develop recommendations to help states, among other activities, identify and control their high-risk radioactive sources, and establish effective national infrastructures for the secure management of vulnerable radioactive sources. Part of our voluntary contribution to the IAEA will support this important effort.
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In those instances when traditional approaches fail, the properly planned and executed use of targeted sanctions can make an important difference, and send a strong message—both to states considering whether to acquire WMD capabilities, and to those that are willing to spread them. Sanctions are a key component of our counterproliferation efforts—which constitute one of the three pillars of the President's National Strategy to Combat WMD. That said, U.S. legislation currently offers a number of overlapping requirements that lack the transparency and clarity needed to enable foreign entities to understand them. We hope to be able to work with you to consolidate and rationalize these important legal authorities and to do it in a way that ensures the Administration has the tools and the flexibility to advance our nonproliferation objectives.
Let me turn now very briefly to the fourth goal that my bureau is actively pursuing—strong support for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with continued adherence to stringent nonproliferation and safety standards. We maintain and carefully implement an extensive array of bilateral agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with other nations, the ''good guys,'' nations that are firmly committed to a shared view of nonproliferation norms and values. In all, we have about 25 such agreements, including one with the European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom—which currently encompasses 15 member states and by this time next year will likely have ten more. Besides facilitating ordinary, day-to-day peaceful nuclear commerce, agreements for cooperation serve an important nonproliferation purpose, affording the United States bilateral controls over significant fuel cycle activities such as reprocessing and enrichment that go well beyond anything in multilateral nonproliferation instruments.
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As we pursue our nonproliferation objectives, it is also very important for our broad political and economic relations with friends and allies that the United States continue to demonstrate that we are a predictable and reliable partner in civil nuclear affairs. Facilitating peaceful nuclear commerce under appropriate conditions and controls can directly support our broader nonproliferation agenda in very concrete ways. A case in point is the marketing worldwide of low enriched uranium reactor fuel derived from down-blended Russian weapons material under the U.S.-Russia HEU–LEU Agreement.
I have already spoken of IAEA safeguards in regard to the Additional Protocol, citing it as a valuable new nonproliferation tool. But I want to say a word here also about the enduring value of the traditional IAEA safeguards system. Traditional IAEA safeguards are essential to the ability of nations to engage in day-to-day commerce for peaceful nuclear purposes with a sufficiently high level of confidence that nuclear materials are not being diverted to non-peaceful purposes. Traditional IAEA safeguards are a key—indeed for the U.S. a legally mandated—feature of the agreements for cooperation I referred to a moment ago. The United States has historically made a tremendous contribution in support of traditional IAEA safeguards, and we will continue to do so.
One final point on this general theme: Ensuring safety and security, in transportation as well as at reactors and other nuclear sites, is obviously a key concern. The Nonproliferation Bureau at State is heavily engaged in matters relating to the safe transportation and use of radioactive materials, and we will continue to devote significant resources to these efforts as well.
We know the important role that Congress has played over the years in providing the intellectual, legal, and financial foundations for programs. Looking forward, we urge the Congress to support the President's proposal to broaden the current Cooperative Threat Reduction spending authorities to permit use of up to $50 million of CTR funds beyond the Former Soviet Union, allowing the President to use those resources in the best way he can.
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And, of course, I strongly urge Congress to support the President's request that the authority to waive the requirements for CTR and Title V of the Freedom Support Act certifications be made permanent. We also strongly support permanent waiver authority to cover construction of the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction plant in Russia. Finally, I urge that Congress revert to the annual CTR certification requirement to an annual year basis (from its current fiscal year basis) to prevent needless bureaucratic delays.
Conclusion—Nonproliferation is a Team Effort:
We are all partners in the worldwide effort to make the world safer. There are many areas where the interlocking nature of the challenges confronts us all.
Nonproliferation challenges are multiple and multiplying. We need to focus on the meat of the issue, and not lose the forest for the trees.
Enhancing nonproliferation dialogue with our worldwide partners is essential to success. But dialogue is no substitute for concrete action, and where dialogue fails we will have to use other means—whether multilateral, bilateral or unilateral. That is at the heart of President Bush's National Security Strategy.
There are lots of opportunities to make progress; it's up to us to transform opportunity into reality.
Thank you.
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Mr. BEREUTER Ambassador Wolf, thank you very much. I don't think there is any subject on which the Europe Subcommittee and, I would say, the other Subcommittee can spend its time more productively and importantly than on the subject we are discussing today. We will look for your advice as to how the Subcommittees can be better informed.
Next, we will hear from Secretary Lisa Bronson, who is the deputy under secretary of defense for technology security policy and counterproliferation and director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. She has also served as a director for negotiations and implementation at the Department of Defense, where she oversaw the development and implementation of DoD policies concerning nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile-proliferation and arms-control issues.
Secretary Bronson, we are pleased to hear from you. You may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. BRONSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
Congress established CTR in 1991 to assist the former Soviet states in dismantling, destroying, consolidating, and securing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Congress continues to provide strong, bipartisan support, as well as rigorous oversight. We appreciate both types of involvement.
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Since its inception, the CTR program has assisted with the deactivation or elimination of a total of 6,032 nuclear warheads, 846 ballistic missile launchers, 109 strategic bombers, 26 strategic ballistic missile submarines, 554 air-to-surface missiles, and 888 ballistic missiles. These are important achievements.
The Administration is also acutely aware of the difficulties encountered by the program. The past 17 months have been challenging for CTR. In February 2002, Russia told us that a facility built with approximately $106 million in CTR assistance would have no use. The missile fuel it was intended to neutralize had been diverted to the Russian commercial space program. The waste in U.S. tax dollars represented by the so-called ''heptyl'' situation was inexcusable.
In response, we impressed on the Russian government at all levels the gravity of the situation that their negligence had created. In addition, we looked inward at how the program had been managed, and we found ways to better protect CTR investments. We instituted a program of semi-annual executive reviews with Russia to revalidate plans, assumptions, and schedules on a regular basis.
We asked the DoD inspector general to review the heptyl situation and how CTR is organized more broadly. The first phase of the inspector general's report was completed in September 2002, and we have worked closely with the inspector general. The IG even participated in our January 2003 executive review meeting with Russian officials in Russia.
We analyzed all CTR projects for our reliance on good-faith, Russia promises or assumptions. We are converting those undertakings into formal, legal agreements. In a related step, we have pressed the Russian Ministry of Defense to guarantee access to loosely guarded nuclear weapons storage sites where CTR would like to assist with the security and inventory control systems. The access agreements for these sites were recently approved as a prerequisite for CTR assistance.
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Another illustration of the difficulty of dealing with another country's infrastructure relates to local politics. In January of this year, DoD officials were informed that local leaders in Russia's Udmurt Republic had reversed their prior position and would bar construction of a solid-rocket motor destruction facility. This facility was intended to support the ambitious decommissioning schedule for Russia's mobile, SS–24 and SS–25 missiles. CTR had invested some $14 million at this site near the city of Votkinsk. We had also invested approximately $85 million in designs and testing for the rocket motor disposal facility that was also to have been built at Votkinsk.
The Votkinsk situation is similar to the heptyl experience in one respect: A significant, U.S. nonproliferation investment was jeopardized. However, Votkinsk is markedly different from the heptyl situation. Our information is that the Russian central government took significant steps to secure the necessary land and environmental permits from local officials. The Russian executive agent for this project alerted us as soon as possible of rumblings from local opposition as it appeared in September 2002. Although we were surprised that Moscow was unable to overcome local opposition, we knew that efforts were being made to address the problem.
In addition, the Russian government has taken the initiative to work around this impediment, including the commitment of Russian funds to partially resolve it.
Finally, over 400 SS–24 and SS–25 ICBMs are still scheduled to begin decommissioning later this year. Thus, as opposed to the heptyl situation, there remains a significant proliferable commodity here that the U.S. has an interest in destroying.
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The heptyl situation was, indeed, a wake-up call for us. It underscored that while we would like to trust our CTR partners, we must remember that every assumption, every expectation, and every schedule for a project must be verified repeatedly.
That said, the U.S. has a strong interest in Russia becoming a full partner in the global war on terrorism and combating WMD proliferation. We want Russia to comply fully with its arms control and nonproliferation obligations. We want Russia to safely and securely store its nuclear weapons, fissile material, and dangerous pathogens.
This is a vision for Russia, parts of which CTR may help to realize. As we continue to pursue this vision, we are mindful that we must do so through responsible stewardship of U.S. investments.
Mr. Chairman, we are in a period of transition for the CTR program. The budget requests for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 include greater emphasis on the threats we confront in the global war on terrorism. As you know, we have requested additional funds to build the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye in Russia.
This new focus does not come at the expense of the classic threats addressed by CTR: Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Rather, we are trying to leverage the CTR experience in the former Soviet Union to address today's threats, including borders that cannot be policed against WMD trafficking, loosely guarded biological materials, BW expertise, the former Soviet BW infrastructure, and the large stockpiles of chemical weapons, especially the proliferable, nerve-agent weapons that Russia is ready to eliminate.
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The reforms we are implementing during this transition are intended to reduce the risk to U.S. investment and ensure that we are investing to address the most pressing threats to U.S. national security. The CTR program is an increasingly important element of our strategy to combat WMD and terrorism. We urge your continued support of this vital, nonproliferation effort. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bronson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
WHY THE CTR PROGRAM EXISTS
The CTR program is a result of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which directed DoD to assist the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in dismantling, destroying, consolidating and securing Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. Since then, Congress has continued to support DoD in implementation of this program. CTR activities seek to increase national security by addressing WMD threats at their source.
In the Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress authorized DoD to provide assistance through CTR programs to achieve the following broad objectives:
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Facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear, chemical and other weapons and their delivery vehicles;
Facilitate the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weapons;
Prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components and weapons related technology and expertise; and
Expand military-to-military and defense contacts.
The FY 1997 NDAA remains the primary authority for conducting CTR assistance activities. The CTR program was subsequently modified to prohibit CTR assistance to:
Peacekeeping exercises or related activities with Russia;
Provision of housing;
Provision of assistance to promote environmental restoration;
Provision of assistance to promote job retraining;
Promotion of defense conversion; and
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Elimination of conventional weapons or delivery vehicles primarily intended to deliver such weapons.
WHO IS INVOLVED IN THE CTR PROGRAM
DoD implements the CTR Program through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, pursuant to policy guidance provided by the Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. DoD coordinates implementation of CTR activities closely with the National Security Council staff and the U.S. Government agencies that provide nonproliferation assistance to FSU states.
DoD is authorized to provide CTR assistance only to FSU states, subject to annual certification of eligibility. The current states eligible for CTR assistance include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. DoD has requested the authority to use up to $50 million in CTR funds annually for non-proliferation activities outside of the FSU. We believe this will provide the flexibility to respond to evolving national security threats that will not duplicate other authorities.
Initial CTR assistance focused on the states that inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union's nuclear and chemical weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Over time, DoD extended the CTR program to address the dangerous remnants of the Soviet arsenal in other FSU states such as Uzbekistan, Moldova and Georgia. In addition, DoD recognized the opportunity to address the threat of biological weapons proliferation with the CTR program.
WHAT THE CTR PROGRAM INCLUDES
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In the beginning, DoD's CTR Program enabled FSU states to accomplish what they would not have been able to do otherwise. CTR assisted cash-strapped Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing nuclear weapons from their soil and eliminating strategic infrastructure. CTR also facilitated Russia's efforts to draw down the massive strategic nuclear weapons arsenal remaining at the end of the Cold War. This assisted Russia in addressing its arms control commitments faster than Russia would have done on its own. The CTR program helped reduce the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal by consolidating thousands of nuclear weapons in secure storage in Russia and eliminating strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, fixed silos and strategic submarines.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER THE PAST 12 YEARS
Since its inception in 1991, the CTR Program has facilitated the following reductions in strategic arms in FSU states:
6032 Nuclear Warheads
109 Strategic Bombers
554 Air Launched Cruise Missiles and Air to Surface Missiles
506 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
382 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
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438 ICBM Launchers
408 SLBM Launchers
26 Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines
The CTR Program also has helped enhance the security of nuclear and chemical weapons storage facilities in Russia; demilitarized chemical weapons production and research facilities in Russia and Uzbekistan; removed and secured tons of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and Georgia; enhanced the security of dangerous pathogen collections in Russia and Kazakhstan; demilitarized the world's largest anthrax production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan; inhibited access to 181 nuclear test tunnels at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan; and destroyed residual pathogens at the former Soviet BW test site on Vozrozhdeniye Island, Uzbekistan.
WHERE THE PROGRAM IS GOING
The CTR Program continues to fund several classic WMD elimination projects. These include assisting Russia with elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, fixed and mobile missile launchers, strategic submarines, and chemical weapon nerve agents. The program also assists Ukraine to eliminate strategic bombers and air to surface missiles.
In the beginning, a central concern of the CTR Program was the potential threat to U.S. security posed by residual WMD weapons and forces in Russia. The danger that Russia might employ these forces against the U.S., our allies, or global interests has declined dramatically. Today, the more significant threat to U.S. security stems from the possibility that WMD-related materials in the FSU might fall into the hands of terrrorists or rogue states. The porous borders of the FSU states offer the potential for illicit transit of WMD and related materials to terrorist organizations and their sponsors. The September 2002 National Security Strategy and the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction highlighted the critical role that nonproliferation assistance programs must play in addressing these threats. Accordingly, DoD has adapted the CTR Program to address this evolving threat. We have refocused CTR to redouble our efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, technologies and expertise in support of the Global War on Terrorism.
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We are working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to implement comprehensive security upgrades at numerous nuclear weapons storage sites. Thus far, CTR-provided ''Quick Fix'' fencing and sensors have been installed at more than 30 sites by MOD as an interim measure. In the next year, we plan to initiate comprehensive security upgrade projects at nine nuclear weapons storage sites, recently identified by MOD. We also are assisting the MOD to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons while in transit from operational bases to dismantlement or consolidated storage facilities.
We are expanding CTR efforts to prevent biological weapons (BW) proliferation by:
Consolidating and enhancing the security of dangerous pathogen collections at biological institutes to help prevent their theft, diversion, or accidental release;
Eliminating infrastructure, equipment, and facilities previously used to perform BW related research, testing and production;
Engaging former BW scientists in cooperative projects while providing transparency at FSU bio facilities, promoting higher standards of ethical conduct, and pre-empting a potential ''brain drain'' of scientists to rogue states and terrorist groups;
Initiating a new Bioattack Early Warning and Preparedness project in Central Asia to detect and diagnose disease outbreaks, to attribute them to natural or terrorist causes, to access real-time medical intelligence, to consolidate pathogen collections in central labs, to modernize diagnostic capabilities and minimize need for pathogen retention at vulnerable field stations, and to develop a network of scientists trained and equipped to prevent, deter, and contain a bioattack.
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The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative is designed to address the vulnerability of the FSU's porous borders. This initiative will enhance the capability of FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. The initiative will provide equipment, training, infrastructure and logistics support to help recipient countries develop the comprehensive capabilities required to develop an indigenous, self sustaining capability to prevent the trafficking of WMD materials across their borders. This initiative is being implemented in close coordination with other U.S. Government agencies to ensure it complements and reinforces other related US assistance projects.
Finally, we are looking beyond the Soviet WMD legacy. As mentioned above, the Administration has proposed legislation that would give the President authority to use up to $50 million annually in CTR funds outside the FSU to resolve critical emerging proliferation threats, or to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals. This proposal recognizes that the world has changed since CTR began and that the program should change with it to best serve U.S. global efforts to combat WMD and terrorism. We would use this authority where DoD has a sizable presence, and in close coordination with other departments to maximize the expertise U.S. agencies can bring to bear against a proliferation threat.
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPEDIMENTS
The past 17 months have been challenging for the CTR Program. In early 2002, we learned from Russian officials that a facility begun in 1994 and built with approximately $106 million in CTR assistance would have no use. The missile propellant (heptyl) that it was intended to neutralize had been diverted to the Russian commercial space program. The waste in U.S. tax dollars represented by the ''heptyl'' facility situation was inexcusable.
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This heptyl situation was a wake-up call. We impressed on the Russian government at all levels the gravity of the situation that their negligence had created. In addition, we looked inward at how CTR has been managed, and found ways to better protect CTR investments.
We asked the DoD Inspector General to review the Program. The first phase of the IG's report was completed in September 2002. DoD has worked closely with the IG, which has joined the CTR executive review teams in meetings with Russian officials.
We instituted a program of semi-annual ''executive reviews'' with Russian agencies responsible for CTR projects. These reviews, of which three have already have been conducted, revalidate project plans and permit more direct, senior level input on CTR to the Russian bureaucracy.
We analyzed all pending CTR projects for risks that were similar to the heptyl facility situation—reliance on good faith Russian promises or assumptions—and are currently working to convert such undertakings to formal, legal agreements. Three of these agreements already have been signed.
In the wake of the heptyl situation, we reaffirmed some key management practices that have protected US investments in the past: CTR does not provide direct cash grants to recipient governments; most CTR prime contractors are US companies, and when any Russian contractors are used today, they are hired on a firm, fixed-price basis.
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We have also reaffirmed the need for transparency and access to confirm requirements for, and use of, CTR assistance. For example, we pressed the Russian MoD for agreements guaranteeing access to loosely guarded nuclear weapons storage sites and transshipment areas where CTR would like to assist with security and inventory control systems. The necessary site access arrangements were concluded in February 2003, as a prerequisite for CTR assistance.
In addition, negotiations continue on an agreement guaranteeing DoD access to the fissile material storage facility being built with CTR assistance. This agreement will provide for access during loading of the facility and permanently thereafter to ensure that only weapons-grade material is being stored.
Another illustration of the difficulty of dealing with another country's infrastructure relates to local politics. DoD officials were informed that local leaders in Russia's Udmurt Republic had reversed their prior position and would bar construction of a solid-rocket motor destruction facility. This facility was intended to support the ambitious decommissioning schedule for Russia's mobile SS–24 and SS–25 missiles. CTR had invested some $14 million in the Udmurt site, near the city of Votkinsk. CTR had also invested approximately $85 million in designs and testing for the rocket motor disposal facility to have been built at Votkinsk.
The Votkinsk situation is similar to the heptyl situation in one respect. A significant US non-proliferation investment was jeopardized.
However, the Votkinsk situation is different in many other ways. Our information is that the Russian central government made significant attempts to secure the necessary land and environmental permits from local officials. In addition, the Russian executive agent has come up with its own alternatives to the Votkinsk facility, as well as some of its own funding. Moreover, Russian officials were fully transparent with us regarding the local political problems as soon as they began brewing last year. Finally, over 400 SS–24 and SS–25s are still scheduled to begin decommissioning later this year. As opposed to the heptyl incident, there remains a proliferable commodity here that the U.S. has an interest in destroying.
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A final decision on whether or how CTR might provide additional assistance to facilitate these goals has not been made. Yet, we are again confronted with a potentially significant loss of a CTR investment.
The past year has been extremely frustrating. It serves as a reminder that we need to do better internally; I think we have moved quickly to put better management controls in place. But, the past year also highlights how hard it is to pursue this type of program in a country like Russia, even if we do everything correctly.
In addition to the oversight changes described above, we are in the process of scrutinizing all ongoing and planned CTR projects to determine if they still serve U.S. nonproliferation and security interests; if the original rationale for their implementation remains valid; and if there might not be better, more effective ways to achieve the original goals the respective projects. We anticipate this review of CTR projects will result in more efficient and effective implementation, and revalidate the necessary link between a CTR project and current threats to US security.
One of the key lessons learned is that CTR recipients are not always all alike. The Administration's recent implementation of the program recognized that in the case of Russia, we cannot conduct business as usual. For example, for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, Russia was not certified as eligible for CTR assistance, while all other states for which funding was requested were certified.
Russia was not certified in both Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 because the Administration had continuing concerns over Russia's commitment to comply with biological and chemical weapons arms control agreements. This was a departure from years past. As a result, all new assistance for Russia was suspended until August of 2002 when, in order to continue CTR efforts to reduce and prevent the proliferation of WMD, the President exercised the first waiver granted by Congress. In Fiscal Year 2003, he executed a second waiver. In Fiscal Year 2003, he also exercised his authority to waive certification requirements on the CTR project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia. The Administration urges the Congress to make both waiver authorities permanent. We will, of course, examine closely each year recipients' records in meeting certification requirements before recommending any exercise of a certification waiver to the President. The same will be true regarding the conditions on the Shchuch'ye project.
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FY 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
Russia. The United States would like to see Russia become a full partner in the Global War on Terrorism and combating WMD proliferation; comply fully with its arms control and nonproliferation obligations; and safely and securely store its nuclear weapons, fissile material and dangerous pathogens. This is a vision for Russia, parts of which CTR may help realize. The reality tells us that we must be very cautious, and find new ways to protect US investment in CTR projects.
Russia: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE). The FY 2004 budget request includes $57.6 million for SOAE, a $12.5 million decrease from FY 2003, reflecting a carryover of unobligated funds from previous years. The carryover results principally from the 2002 delay in certifying Russia for CTR assistance. SOAE assists Russia in eliminating strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. SOAE assistance is framed as an incentive for Russia to draw down its former Soviet nuclear forces. One of the larger project areas under SOAE relates to Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination, where $25.9 million is requested for FY 2004. The termination of the Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility has resulted in a reassessment and potential restructuring of this project. $18.7 million is requested for SLBM Launcher Elimination and SSBN Dismantlement. This is a $7.3 million increase from FY 2003, resulting from our plan to dismantle two SSBNs in FY 2004 as opposed to one in FY 2003.
CTR's Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program assists Russia with safe and secure storage for nuclear warheads. We requested $48.0 million in the FY 2004 budget for this program. The bulk of the funds, $47.9 million, are directed toward the Site Security Enhancements project, which provides urgently needed security enhancements to Ministry of Defense (MOD) nuclear weapons storage sites and temporary transshipment points for movement of deactivated warheads. As noted above, we concluded agreements with the MoD last month that will guarantee CTR personnel the access necessary to oversee security upgrades at these sites.
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We have requested $23.2 million for the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, which provides safe and secure transport of nuclear warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement or enhanced security storage sites. This is a $3.6 million increase over the FY 2003 budget. The increase will support Russia's improved efforts to draw down its nuclear stockpile pursuant to the Moscow Treaty. The FY 2004 budget request for the Weapons Transportation Safety Enhancements project area is $5.7 million greater than for FY 2003. This will enhance safe and secure transport, to include purchase of ten replacement warhead transportation cars. Russia agreed to destroy two unusable warhead transport cars at its own expense in exchange for each new car CTR provides.
To assist Russia in providing a secure, centralized storage facility for fissile material removed from nuclear weapons, CTR is building a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak. This project is over 90 percent complete and requires no additional funding. DoD is negotiating a transparency agreement to ensure that only weapons-grade material is stored at the FMSF.
Russia: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). Overall funding requested for the BWPP program remains roughly at the FY 2003 level, $54.2 million. FY 2003 increases in BWPP funding reflected the Administration's interest in combating biological weapons proliferation as part of the war on terrorism. DoD anticipates obligating approximately $31 million in FY 2004 for BWPP activities in Russia.
These activities will include additional cooperative research projects with Russian scientists and institutes that are designed to prevent proliferation of BW expertise, enhance transparency, improve standards of conduct and leverage the extensive expertise of the former Soviet bioweapons complex. Additional efforts are planned to dismantle and eliminate BW infrastructure in Russia as well as projects to enhance security against theft or accidental release of dangerous pathogens.
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Russia: Chemical Weapons Destruction. The budget request for the Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program in Russia is $200.3 million, an increase of $67.4 million. This reflects the President's direction to accelerate progress at the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facililty (CWDF) project in Shchuch'ye ($190.3 million). The Shchuch'ye project is a CW destruction facility for nerve agent-filled, man-portable, tube and rocket artillery and missile warheads. This facility will be able to destroy 1700 metric tons of nerve agent per year. $126.6 million of FY 2003 funds and $35.0 million in FY 2002 funds have been obligated for Shchuch'ye as a result of Russia's recent agreement to destroy all nerve agent weapons at Shchuch'ye. The President sought and Congress granted authority to waive certification requirements related to the Shchuch'ye project. The President exercised this authority on January 10, 2003 because of proliferation concerns about the types of munitions to be eliminated there. However, the Administration continues to press Russia for a full and complete accounting of its chemical weapons stockpile, in addition to completing a practical plan for eliminating nerve agents.
CTR continues to assist Russia with dismantling and demilitarizing the former CW production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. CTR is also enhancing security for highly proliferable chemical weapons stored at Planovy/Shchuch'ye and Kizner. DoD already has provided interim security enhancements, and is in the process of installing comprehensive security upgrades that will be completed this year.
Non-Russian FSU States. As with Russia, the vision for CTR assistance in the other FSU states is tempered by a mixed record of responsiveness. There are a number of areas in which certain FSU states have demonstrated a significant commitment to cooperation and transparency. For example, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are free of nuclear weapons with the help of CTR assistance.
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Non-Russia FSU States: Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms and WMD Infrastructure. Ukraine. We have requested $3.9 million for CTR's Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program area in Ukraine. DoD has successfully removed all SS–24 missiles from their silos, and eliminated all launchers and launch centers. The SS–24s have been disassembled and the proliferable components destroyed. There is no longer a proliferation threat from these systems. CTR also will use prior year funds to continue elimination of Tu–142 Bear and Tu–22M Backfire bombers and KH–22 nuclear capable air-to-surface missiles in Ukraine.
For DoD's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area in Ukraine, no new funds are requested for FY 2004. DoD will use FY 2003 funds to eliminate additional nuclear weapons storage sites.
Kazakhstan. CTR's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area assists Kazakhstan in providing safe and secure storage of fissile material and in destroying former nuclear weapons and liquid propellant storage sites. We are requesting no additional funding in FY 2004 and will rely instead on FY 2003 funds.
Non-Russian FSU States: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). DoD has concluded Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreements with Uzbekistan and Georgia and negotiated an agreement with Ukraine. We are also providing BWPP assistance to Kazakhstan under the WMD Infrastructure Elimination agreement. DoD already conducts BWPP projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and is planning to begin activities in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003.
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In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, CTR's BW Infrastructure Dismantlement and Restructuring program assists with destruction of WMD-related infrastructure. In Kazakhstan, CTR is helping eliminate the anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk. The project has now entered into phase IV, which includes dismantlement of the facility. In Uzbekistan, CTR has implemented phase I of the destruction of the Soviet BW testing facility on Vozrozhdeniya Island. We believe this phase fully destroyed viable anthrax spores left in approximately 100 tons of anthrax weapons agent the Soviet military buried near the laboratory complex on the island in the late 1980's. DoD is working with Uzbekistan to determine whether additional work at Vozrozhdeniya is required.
CTR's Collaborative Biological Research (CBR) projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan help prevent the proliferation of BW expertise, enhance transparency, improve standards of conduct of former BW scientists and leverage their extensive expertise. There is currently one project in Kazakhstan and two in Uzbekistan. CTR plans to expand CBR projects to Ukraine and Georgia.
In Kazakhstan, two CTR Biosafety and Biosecurity projects are (1) characterizing and protecting strain collections of dangerous pathogens at the Scientific Research Agricultural Institute in Otar, and (2) designing and constructing an earthquake-proof building to secure dangerous pathogens at the Kazakh Institute for Research on Plague Control in Almaty.
The FY 2004 request calls for $23 million for CTR's Bioattack Early Warning and Preparedness project. This new program area received 42% of the overall FY 2004 budget request for the BWPP program. Under this project, CTR will expand research cooperation with Ministry of Health institutes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Ukraine to build infectious disease surveillance networks that will allow these countries and the US to better detect, characterize and monitor disease outbreaks and to consolidate pathogen collections in secure, DoD-accessible, institutes.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD–PPI). $39.4 million is requested in FY 2004 to support this initiative, which is designed to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities to prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. DoD is collaborating with other US agencies to develop an overarching US government strategic plan for export control and border security assistance to FSU states that will encompass assistance provided through this initiative. This initiative will build on the foundation created by the CTR Defense and Military Contacts program.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks, subsequent discoveries of terrorist plans to obtain WMD, and the need for a rapid expansion of border security efforts in Central Asia underscored the role that DoD could play through CTR in support of the war on terrorism. This initiative is designed to develop self-sustaining capabilities, not merely to provide equipment and services. This vision will require close coordination with other US agencies to ensure that recipient countries are developing the law enforcement and regulatory capabilities necessary for a comprehensive approach to WMD border security.
In implementing the WMD–PPI, DoD has developed projects designed to produce comprehensive operational capabilities based on the interagency approved US strategic plan and country/regional requirements. These projects will provide not only equipment and related training, but also self-sustaining operations and maintenance capabilities.
DoD is developing the following projects through the WMD Proliferation Prevention initiative:
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Providing a Caspian Sea maritime control capability in cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials.
Supporting Ukraine's plans to develop mobile response teams to address WMD trafficking incidents between ports of entry on the land border with Russia.
Completing deployment of fissile material portal monitors at key border crossings in Uzbekistan to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
Developing a Regional Training Center to provide realistic training on border control operations and procedures to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the CTR Program has assisted with deactivation or elimination of a total of 6032 nuclear warheads and 846 ballistic missile launchers, 109 strategic bombers, 26 strategic ballistic missile submarines, 554 air-to-surface missiles and 888 ballistic missiles. These are important achievements. The Administration also is acutely aware of the difficulties encountered by the program. The reality is that this program, which we undertake for our own national security purposes, comes with costs that we must bear if we continue to take advantage of this approach to threat reduction. This Administration believes that it is worth the cost. As we urge your continued support we pledge our efforts to ensure that additional non-proliferation achievements within, as well as outside, the FSU are won through responsible stewardship of US resources.
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Mr. BEREUTER Secretary Bronson, thank you very much.
Next, we will hear from Kenneth E. Baker, who is the principal assistant deputy administrator for defense and nuclear nonproliferation at the Department of Energy. Administrator Baker held previously the positions of principal deputy assistance secretary and principal deputy director of the department's nonproliferation office. His previous experience included a substantial amount of time spent in the Strategic Air Command, which was of some interest to me.
Administrator Baker, we are pleased to hear your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH E. BAKER, PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for your time and the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the National Nuclear Security Administration's [NNSA] nonproliferation program. It is especially nice to brief you, Mr. Chairman. We can talk about something besides corn, wheat, and Cornhuskers. I went to graduate school in Lincoln, so it is a big day when Nebraska plays football, and I am sure you feel the same way.
Why do our programs exist? Our programs exist to reduce the risk to the United States' national security caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We do this by protecting under-secured nuclear material in the former Soviet Union by providing technical and policy support to international nonproliferation efforts, through programs to prevent the adverse migration of Russian nuclear scientists and engineers to rogue states and terrorist organizations, and through other measures to reduce proliferation risks.
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The need to pursue such programs became clear with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, which left hundreds of metric tons of nuclear materials in Russia undersecured and was given additional impetus on September 11, 2001. September 11th made it clear that enemies would stop at nothing to harm this country and the United States could not allow terrorists and rogue states to get their hands on nuclear and radiological materials. Imagine what September 11th would have been like if the criminals that committed these crimes had nuclear devices aboard those airplanes at the World Trade Center. Most of lower Manhattan would have been gone.
The Bush Administration's December 2002, National Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction cited strengthening nonproliferation as a top priority.
Who and what are the nonproliferation programs involved in NNSA? NNSA programs draw upon the technical expertise from our national laboratories, the oversight and implementation function provided by Washington, and, of course, the NNSA men and women in the field who carry out these programs daily. These people are the real heroes of DOE. They often work 16 hours a day, sometimes in extremely adverse conditions in remote areas of Russia, often with no heat in their rooms, no hot water, to implement U.S. nonproliferation initiatives.
Our initiatives are not assistance programs. They are cooperative threat reduction efforts carried out in close coordination with the National Security Council, the Department of State, Department of Defense, and our international partners. They have fixed timetables and are conditioned on partners and their contractors meeting specific requirements before receiving payment. They also deliver technologies and expertise that address specific threats to the security of this country.
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What have we done in the last 12 years? DOE's program is just under 12 years' old. We started out with $15 million. Today, our budget in nonproliferation is $1.3 billion. DOE's nonproliferation program came into their own, like I said, in 1993, the year the United States signed with Russia an agreement to purchase 500 metric tons of excess, Russian, highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons to use the material in U.S. power reactors. The Department of Energy is critical to the implementation of this program. To date, 179 metric tons have been downblended.
There have been many successes in the past. In 1994, we carried out a project called Project Sapphire, which secured 600 kgs of highly enriched uranium in Kazakhstan. Iran was trying to get this material. The United States went into Kazakhstan in the middle of the night, with DoD, packaged the material and shipped it to Oak Ridge, Tennessee for safe keeping.
We launched a new generation of nuclear detection sensors, operating from GPS satellites, in 2001. We deployed a prototype biological agent detection, in 2002, at the Winter Olympics. We deployed chemical detection systems in the DC Metro.
In March of this year, Secretary Abraham and Russian Minister Rumyantsev signed an amendment to the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement that will lead to the shutdown of Russia's last three plutonium reactors. These reactors will be shut down and replacement fossil energy plants will be constructed to meet the energy needs of the local community.
We will soon begin construction on key facilities that will permit the elimination of 34 metric tons of surplus, weapons-grade plutonium in the United States and pave the way for a parallel program in Russia to dispose of similar quantities of surplus Russian plutonium.
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We are accelerating and expanding our work in Russia to secure nuclear materials. Since 1993, we have improved the security of approximately 222 metric tons of nuclear materials, either through rapid upgrades or comprehensive security upgrades at numerous sites. In 2004, we expect to complete upgrade security on another 24 metric tons of Russian nuclear material. We also expect to conclude this work ahead of previous schedules.
In addition to the work with Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, we are working with the Russian navy and the Strategic Rocket Forces to secure nuclear warheads. In fiscal year 2004, we expect to upgrade security on 1,200 Russia navy nuclear warheads at Russian storage facilities. We are reducing the number of locations in Russia that material is stored. By the end of 2003, we will have removed all weapons-usable material from 23 buildings, reducing the number down to 139. We will continue these programs.
The NNSA has worked with Kazakhstan to can 3,000 nuclear fuel assemblies containing several tons of weapons-grade plutonium stored at the BN–350 reactor, 450 miles from Iran, right on the Caspian Sea.
Secretary Abraham presided over a major international conference on the security of radiological sources, the materials that could be used for so-called ''dirty bombs.'' Over 750 international participants from 120 countries attended this meeting in March. At the conference, Secretary Abraham announced a major initiative to improve the security of materials worldwide. The conference produced detailed recommendations on how to improve the security of radiological devices, and the NNSA will be responsible for implementing these recommendations.
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We will continue our programs to funnel ex-Soviet weapons expertise to commercial projects. This program now enjoys tremendous support in the United States. Over $75 million of venture capital has been directly applied to this program, because technology is transferred to U.S. companies, and they profit from the investments and put Russians to work on other things besides building bombs.
We have just launched a major, new program to keep nuclear materials from America's borders through a comprehensive initiative that will improve radiation-detection capabilities at major international seaports. The U.S. and Russia will soon sign an agreement to facilitate the return to Russia of Russian-origin HEU at research reactors and facilities in 14 countries, which Secretary Wolf just mentioned.
These are worthy accomplishments, but there is more to be done. What are the impediments? And I will make this short because we are running out of time. We have impediments. We need to ensure effective access to sensitive Russian facilities, work out liability questions consistent with other obligations, and, in many cases, overcome simple Russian distrust of our motives and intentions.
Much of what we are doing has never been tried before. In some areas, we are gaining access into locations where no American has ever been. Challenges and setbacks will come and will be anticipated.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, because my time is running out, to leave the rest of my testimony for the record. It goes on to explain the accomplishments. We do have people on the ground. We do have the money to do the programs and we are working very hard.
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One last thing: The support we have received from Congress has been gratifying. As this hearing demonstrates, Congress understands that our national security is at stake. Terrorists will stop at nothing to get their hands on WMD material. We must do everything in our power to prevent this from happening.
I look forward to working with Congress. Thank you for this hearing, and we will continue to work as hard as we can.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH E. BAKER, PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committees, for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nonproliferation programs, and how these programs are helping to make the United States more secure.
WHY THESE PROGRAMS EXIST
Our programs exist to reduce the risks to United States national security caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We do this by protecting previously under-secured nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, by providing technical and policy support to international nonproliferation efforts, through programs to prevent the adverse migration of Russia's nuclear scientists and engineers to rogue states or terrorist organizations, and through other measures that reduce proliferation risks.
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For many years, the United States has pursued activities to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials. But such activities were given additional impetus by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, which removed the Cold War infrastructure that secured Russia's vast complex of nuclear weapons and materials and leaving such materials undersecured and vulnerable to misuse.
September 11 further made clear that, against enemies that would stop at nothing to harm this country, we could not allow terrorists and rogue states to get their hands on nuclear and radiological materials. Imagine what September 11 would have been like, if the criminals that committed these crimes had nuclear devices on those airplanes that hit the World Trade Center. Most of lower Manhattan would have been gone.
Reflecting these trends, the Bush Administration's December, 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) listed ''strengthened nonproliferation'' as a central tenet of its approach.
WHO AND WHAT NNSA NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS INVOLVE
NNSA programs involve steps to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while improving nuclear safety. These efforts draw upon the technical expertise from our national laboratories, the oversight and implementation function provided by Washington, and of course, the NNSA men and women in the field who carry out the programs. These people are the real heroes—they often work sixteen-hour days, sometimes in extremely adverse conditions in remote locations of the world and away from their families for long stretches, often with no heat in their rooms and no hot water for showers, to implement U.S. nonproliferation initiatives.
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We work closely with our international partners to implement our programs, but our initiatives are not assistance programs—they are cooperative threat reduction efforts carried out in close coordination with the NSC, the State and Defense Departments, and our international partners. They have fixed timetables; are conditional on partners and their contractors meeting certain requirements before receiving payment; and deliver technologies and expertise that address specific threats to the security of the United States.
Our nonproliferation activities fall into a broad spectrum of activities. Each is important, and each has had successes.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER THE PAST 12 YEARS
The Department of Energy's nonproliferation program started in 1993. That year, the United States signed with Russia an agreement to purchase 500 metric tons of excess Russian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, to use that material in U.S. power reactors. The Department of Energy is critical to the implementation of this agreement. To date, 179 metric tons have been downblended—potentially enough for thousands of nuclear weapons.
In 1994, we implemented Project Sapphire, a joint DOE–DOD project that secured 600 kg of weapons grade HEU from Kazakhstan. This material was sought by Iran, who was trying to purchase it. The United States literally went into Kazakhstan in the middle of the night, packaged the material, and shipped it away to the United States for safe keeping.
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We developed and launched a new generation of nuclear detonation sensors operating on GPS satellites in January 2001. We also deployed a prototype biological agent detection system at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and a prototype chemical detection system in the D.C. Metro.
To focus on more recent accomplishments:
In March, the Secretary and his counterpart, Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, signed an amendment to the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor agreement that will lead to the shutdown of Russia's last three reactors that are still producing weapons-grade plutonium, and replace them with fossil fuel plants.
We will soon begin construction of key facilities that will permit the elimination of 34 metric tons of surplus, weapons grade plutonium in the United States—and pave the way for a parallel program in Russia to dispose of similar quantities of surplus Russian plutonium.
We're accelerating and expanding our work with Russia to secure nuclear materials there. Since 1993, we have improved the security of approximately 222 metric tons of nuclear material under either rapid or comprehensive upgrades. In FY 2004, we expect to upgrade security on 24 additional metric tons of Russia's nuclear material. We expect to conclude this work ahead of previous schedules.
In addition to our long-standing work with Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, we are working with Russia's Navy and its Strategic Rocket Forces to secure nuclear warheads. In FY 2004, we expect to upgrade security on 1200 Russian navy nuclear warheads at Russian storage facilities.
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We are reducing the number of locations in Russia where this material is stored and thereby reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage. By the end of FY 2003, we will have removed all weapons-usable material from 23 buildings—reducing the total number of buildings with such material in the civilian and defense sectors from 162 to 139. Over time, that number will further decrease.
NNSA worked with Kazakhstan to can 3000 nuclear fuel assemblies containing several tons of weapons grade plutonium stored at the BN–350 reactor in that country, and assisted Kazakhstan in the permanent shutdown of that reactor. This reactor was located on the Caspian Sea, just 450 miles from Iran.
Secretary Abraham presided over a major international conference on the security of radiological sources—the materials that would be used in a so-called ''dirty bomb.'' The conference was attended by 750 participants from over 120 countries—far exceeding expectations. At that Conference, Secretary Abraham announced a major initiative to support efforts to improve the security of these materials worldwide. The Conference produced detailed recommendations on how to improve the security of these devices, and NNSA will be responsible for implementing these recommendations with the leadership of the Secretary.
We're continuing our programs to funnel ex-Soviet weapons expertise to commercial projects—an effort that has resulted in a great number of industrial and medical breakthroughs. This program enjoys tremendous technical and financial support from United States industries—over $75 million of venture capital has been directly applied to this program, because technology is transferred to U.S. companies, and they profit from the investments.
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We've just launched a major new program to keep nuclear materials away from America's borders, through a comprehensive initiative that will improve radiation detection capabilities at major international seaports.
The U.S. and Russia should soon sign an agreement to facilitate the return to Russia of Russian-origin HEU at research reactors and facilities in 14 countries outside Russia, including many in regions of proliferation concern.
Russia and the United States are working on programs to reduce the stockpiles of Russian HEU, beyond levels stipulated in the U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement.
These are just some of our accomplishments, but I am not satisfied. There is more to be done, and we will continue to push ahead with all of our ability.
CURRENT IMPEDIMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED
I do not want to imply that the road is easy, the path is clear, and progress assured. As I mentioned, we do need to resolve with Russia a number of bureaucratic obstacles to success. We need to ensure effective access to sensitive Russian facilities. We need to work out liability questions consistent with all of our obligations. In some cases, we need to overcome simple Russian distrust of our motives and intentions.
The question, however, is not whether we will have setbacks, but how well we will respond when they occur. Much of what we are doing in Russia has never been tried before, much less achieved, and in some cases, we are gaining access into locations where no American has ever been before. Challenges and setbacks will come and must be anticipated. However, considering the potential security consequences of failure we must—and will—continue to act.
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Among the lessons we have learned is that for these programs to succeed, the support of Congress is indispensable. We work closely with our oversight and authorization committees and we are fortunate to have such support.
Another lesson is that committed leadership is essential to success. We have top level support not only from NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks, but from Secretary Abraham as well.
The Secretary has met with his counterpart in Russia, Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, some half a dozen times now. He has worked hard to accelerate and expand our programs in Russia and to clear away bureaucratic obstacles. These are the ''nitty gritty'' issues that determine success or failure, and they must be dealt with along the way.
Just last month, I met with senior Russian officials from both the Ministry of Atomic Energy as well as the Ministry of Defense to reiterate our commitment to removing obstacles and accelerating programs. Secretary Abraham has requested that I work with one of my counterparts, MinAtom's Deputy Minister Kotelnikov, to bi-annually review our bilateral cooperation and to provide the Secretary written progress reports. You can be confident that DOE will do everything it can to ensure the success of these programs—failure is just not an option.
WHERE WE ARE GOING FROM HERE
What does it mean to chart a meaningful course for the future? I suggest the following:
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We need to continue to clear away bureaucratic obstacles in Russia, so we can meet anticipated dates for completion of programs and transition to self-sufficient Russian operations, further reduce stockpiles of nuclear materials, and continue the transition of Russia's nuclear complex to one emphasizing peaceful, civilian applications.
We need to continue to expand our programs internationally, because the risks we address in Russia must also be tackled elsewhere.
We need to continue to work with our international partners such as the G–8 Global Partnership, which I will elaborate upon momentarily, while continuing to work with international organizations such as the IAEA and voluntary regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
We need to continue our research and development efforts, which provide state of the art nuclear detection capabilities that keep us steps ahead of potential adversaries.
Finally, we need to continue to support our regional security initiatives, which give us insight into the motivations of potential proliferators and rogue actors and thereby allow us to contribute to USG efforts to plan effectively.
Meeting these and other such benchmarks will contribute to the Administration's efforts to implement the President's national security strategy, and thereby help to make the world a safer place.
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G–8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
International cooperation is essential to the success of our efforts. In June of 2002, G–8 nations agreed to support a ''Global Partnership'' to fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction, committing up to $20 billion over 10 years to fund threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, beginning in Russia. About half of the amount pledged will come from existing or planned U.S. threat reduction programs. Among the areas of particular interest to DOE that may receive new funding from other G–8 countries are plutonium disposition and the program to shut down Russia's plutonium-producing reactors.
Equally important as the new funding is the endorsement by the G–8 leaders, including President Putin, of guidelines that should govern cooperative programs under the Global Partnership. These guidelines explicitly call for transparency, access, liability protections, tax exemption of assistance, and other measures that we regard as necessary elements for success. Since last summer, we have had several rounds of senior-level discussion among G–8 officials about the implementation of these guidelines.
The strong support expressed by the other G–8 countries for these guidelines should increase our chances for securing Russia's agreement to implementation measures that are fair, effective, and consistent with previous U.S. agreements.
FY 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
This Administration has been aggressive in its pursuit of effective non-proliferation. We have enlarged the scope of our programs, built partnerships and worked to break down bureaucratic and legal barriers that impede our work. We have looked for ways to move beyond the traditional list of concerned countries to help us address emerging threats, such as radiological dispersal devices.
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These efforts require resources to be effective. NNSA's fiscal year '04 budget submission contains the largest request for non-proliferation programs in U.S. history—$1.3 billion, a 15% increase over our '03 appropriation. This request will permit us to begin construction of facilities necessary for U.S. and Russian plutonium disposition, pursue our efforts to accelerate the pace of nuclear materials reduction, accelerate our programs to better secure nuclear materials, and take any number of steps, consistent with the priorities I have discussed with you today.
The support we have received from Congress has been gratifying—and as this hearing demonstrates, Congress understands our national security, and American lives, are at stake. Terrorists will do anything to get their hands on WMD material. We must do everything in our power to prevent this from happening.
I look forward to working with Congress as we move forward with the work planned under our '04 budget.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. BEREUTER Administrator Baker, thank you very much, and thanks to all of our witnesses. We will be proceeding with another hearing on this subject shortly. We will be hearing from Senator Lugar and also Senator Nunn in short order.
As I recessed the Subcommittees before, I indicated to the witnesses that I would complete this at 3:50. Well, we missed it, and in order to do that, we are going to have a concentrated effort on both sides of the aisle to collect the most important questions from Members in attendance or who have been in attendance and submit them to you. We would have liked to have had a direct engagement, but that is just not possible today because of our schedule.
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Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks are on the Floor at this moment, just arriving, so we have to conclude the hearing at this point, and I thank the Members for their interest, and you can be assured we are going to return to this subject. So, with that said, the Subcommittees stand adjourned, and thank you very much, the witnesses, for their patience.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.]
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