SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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87–796PDF
2003
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS:
A VIEW FROM EUROPE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 17, 2003
Serial No. 108–34
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
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JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
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EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
CHRIS BELL, Texas
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Europe
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
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BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director
PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member
JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member
BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable Hugo Paemen, Senior Advisor, Hogan and Hartson, L.L.P.
Dieter Dettke, Ph.D., Executive Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Justin Vaisse, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Radek Sikorski, Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative and Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Gianni Riotta, Columnist, Corriere Della Sera
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
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The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement
The Honorable Hugo Paemen: Prepared statement
Dieter Dettke: Prepared statement
Justin Vaisse: Prepared statement
Radek Sikorski: Prepared statement
Gianni Riotta: Prepared statement
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE
TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. In Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Mr. BEREUTER. Good afternoon. The Europe Subcommittee will come to order.
The topic of today's hearing, the second in a series on transatlantic relations, is on ''The Future of Transatlantic Relations: A View From Europe.'' We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel with us today.
At our hearing last week we heard that, by any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, ''old or new,'' if you wish, is perhaps the most important foreign relationship we have. No two regions of the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. For the most part, our traditional and closest allies are in Europe.
In Europe, our core national interests are fully engaged. Our economy, our system of trade and our security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues than with any other region in the world.
These facts should lead us to conclude, as many have, that the partnership between the United States and Europe not only remains relevant but is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and strengthened.
Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric we heard on both sides of the Atlantic during the Iraq debate, particularly with respect to and from the leaders and media from a few nations of Europe, did damage the overall relationship between America and Europe and has raised concerns regarding an increase in long-term anti-American attitudes, especially in those nations which opposed United States policy in Iraq. We are already hearing within Europe concerns that the United States is seeking to split the European Union by working to ensure that a future common foreign and security policy does not develop. We also hear references to the desirability of a multipolar world and discussions, particularly by French President Chirac, of a united Europe acting as a counterweight to the United States.
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Therefore, it is important that we examine whether fundamental differences have emerged over our global or at least regional responsibilities and how these responsibilities should translate into future relations between the United States and Europe.
European attitudes and policies have been influenced by its history and culture, which of course is also true of America. However, because of Europe's unique history, its geography and its close proximity of so many strong nationalities, with all of their history of bitter wars and changing alliances, Europeans I think naturally have a predisposition today to support multilateral initiatives and institutions that limit the unfriendly or detrimental actions of individual nations on their neighbors.
I have a very difficult time, I am pleased to say, imagining the armies of these countries crossing borders for aggressive reasons any more.
This gradual and warm embrace of multilateralism in the 20th century has generally served Europe well, resulting in a level of integration and cooperation that Europe's forefathers could not have imagined. It has also helped the smaller, less powerful European states act collectively to reduce the unilateral options or use of power by some of the larger European states. Over the years, Europeans have given up increasing elements of their national sovereignty to the European Union and have certainly accepted a higher level of regulation and standardization than currently would be acceptable to the American public ever, or at least in the foreseeable future. As Philip Stephens wrotes in his Financial Times column of November 23, 2001: Here—meaning in Europe—governments have few hang-ups about pooling sovereignty in the cause of greater security or even a cleaner world. They do it every day in the European Union.
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Americans certainly do understand many of the benefits which membership in multilateral institutions or treaties can provide. However, we Americans are highly protective of our national sovereignty and, as such, have become more suspicious about international efforts that could be seen as setting limitations on our flexibility to use our power to defend the security of our citizens or our allies. As the world's sole remaining superpower, our world view and our global security responsibilities, especially after September 11th, 2001, will be somewhat different than that of many Europeans. We are sometimes regarded as the force of last resort, drawn upon when there is a deficit in international resolve or when all other avenues of conflict resolution fail.
The difference in attitudes on the importance of national sovereignty and multilateralism may be a big reason I think for the increasingly divergent attitudes, perceptions and actions between European nations and the United States. These differences should not be overestimated, underestimated or misunderstood, and they must be addressed or at least appropriately recognized. Some can't be addressed in a manner that eliminates those misunderstandings or—well, I will say different perceptions.
President Bush said recently in Poland that the United States is committed to a strong Atlantic Alliance joined by a union of ideals and convictions.
Today we ask Europe, especially those with whom we have had our greatest differences, if the same holds true for them. Today we ask what kind of a partnership does Europe wish to continue to have with America. Do they want, for example, a north Atlantic partnership, European and American counterparts, or do they really want to build a counterweight to the United States?
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I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
I am pleased to recognize the distinguished Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.
I know we have votes coming up, so I ask your forgiveness for proceeding without you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE
At our hearing last week, we heard that by any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, ''old or new,'' is perhaps the most important foreign relationship we have. No two regions in the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. For the most part our traditional and closest allies are in Europe.
In Europe our core national interests are fully engaged. Our economy, our system of trade and our security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues than with any other region in the world.
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These facts should lead us to conclude, as many have, that the partnership between the U.S. and Europe not only remains relevant but is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and strengthened.
Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric we heard on both sides of the Atlantic during the Iraq debate, particularly with respect to and from the leaders and media from a few nations of Europe, did damage the overall relationship between America and Europe and has raised concerns regarding an increase in long-term anti-American attitudes especially in those nations which opposed U.S. policy in Iraq. We are already hearing, within Europe, concerns that the U.S. is seeking to split the European Union by working to ensure that a future Common Foreign and Security Policy does not develop. We also hear references to the desirability of a multi-polar world and discussions, particularly by French President Chirac, of a united Europe acting as a counter- weight to the U.S.
Therefore, it is important that we examine whether fundamental differences have emerged over our global, or at least regional, responsibilities and how these responsibilities should translate into future relations between the United States and Europe.
European attitudes and policies have been influenced by its history and culture, which, of course, is also true for America. However, because of Europe's unique history, its geography, and the close proximity of so many strong nationalities—with all of their history of bitter wars and changing alliances—Europeans naturally have a predisposition today to support multilateral initiatives and institutions that limit the unfriendly or detrimental actions of individual nations on their neighbors.
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This gradual and warm embrace of multilateralism in the 20th Century has generally served Europe well, resulting in a level of integration and cooperation that Europe's forefathers could not have imagined. It has also helped the smaller, less powerful European states act collectively to reduce the unilateral options or use of power by some of the larger European states. Over the years, Europeans have given up increasing elements of their national sovereignty to the European Union and have certainly accepted a higher level of regulation and standardization than currently would be acceptable to the American public—ever, or at least for the foreseeable future. As Philip Stephens writes in his Financial Times column of November 23, 2001: ''Here [in Europe] governments have few hang-ups about pooling sovereignty in the cause of greater security or even a cleaner world. They do it every day in the European Union.''
Americans certainly do understand many of the benefits which membership in multilateral institutions or treaties can provide. However, Americans are highly protective of our national sovereignty and as such, have become more suspicious about international efforts that could be seen as setting limitations on our flexibility to use our power to defend the security of our citizens or our allies. As the world's sole remaining superpower our world-view and our global security responsibilities, especially after September 11, will be somewhat different than that of many Europeans. We are the force of last resort, drawn upon when there is a deficit in international resolve or when all other avenues of conflict resolution fail.
The difference in attitudes on the importance of national sovereignty and multilateralism may be a big reason for the increasingly divergent attitudes, perceptions and actions between European nations and the United States. These attitudinal differences should not be underestimated or misunderstood and must be addressed or at least appropriately recognized.
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President Bush said recently in Poland that the United States is committed to a strong Atlantic alliance joined by a union of ideals and convictions.
Today we ask Europe, especially those with whom we have our greatest differences, if the same holds true for them. Today, we ask what kind of a partnership does Europe wish to continue to have with America. Do they want, for example, a North Atlantic partnership—European and American counterparts—or do they really want to build a counterweight to the United States.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Chairman, in light of the votes, please let's move to the testimony.
Mr. BEREUTER. All right. We will at least get the very important comments about our witnesses here today—we will complete all of those.
I think we will go in this order. Ambassador Hugo Paemen is Senior Advisor for Hogan and Hartson. He serves as an Advisor to the German Marshall Fund and is Special Advisor to the President of the European Commission. From 1995 to 1999, Ambassador Paemen was the head of the Delegation of the European Commission in the United States. From 1987 to 1995, he worked as Deputy Director General for External Relations for the EC, now EU, and has successfully led the European negotiation team on the WTO-Uruguay Round.
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Dr. Dieter Dettke has been the Executive Director of the Washington office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation since 1985. Prior to coming to Washington, he served as Political Counselor of the SPD Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag. He was a Research Associate at the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin.
Justin Vaisse is a Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and France of the Brookings Institution where he is focusing on United States foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Between 1997 and 2002, he served as an external consultant to the French Foreign Ministry policy planning staff; and from September, 1998, to July, 1999, he was Speech Writer of Defense Minister Alain Richard.
Mr. Radek Sikorski is Executive Director of the New Atlantic Initiative and a Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. He was Poland's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for 3 years, overseeing, among other things, the work of the United States interests section in Baghdad. He signed the agreement to abolish visas between Poland and Israel. He conducted political consultation with, among others, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iran. Sympathy. Congratulations on that. In 1992, as Deputy Minister of Defense in the first democratically elected government after the fall of Communism, he spearheaded Poland's drive to join NATO.
Mr. Gianni Riotta is Columnist for the widely read and influential newspaper Corriere della Sera. Mr. Riotta has worked for Italian public radio Rai and as Special Correspondent for the daily La Stampa based in Rome. He is a graduate of the University of Palermo and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, where he is a Fulbright Fellow.
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All these gentlemen have written numerous articles and books, and we are reminded that Mr. Riotta just has received international acclaim in a number of countries on his recent book.
So, with those introductions, we will go as far as we can before we are interrupted. All of your written statements will be made a part of the record. We are going to ask you to summarize in approximately 6 minutes each.
Ambassador Paemen, we will hear from you first. You are free to proceed as you like. Thank you, all of you, for coming.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HUGO PAEMEN, SENIOR ADVISOR, HOGAN AND HARTSON, L.L.P.
Mr. PAEMEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, I am very honored to participate in this hearing, and I very much appreciate your initiative to organize this exchange. I will evidently speak in my personal name and not in the name of any organization I am associated with or was associated with in my previous capacity.
Mr. Chairman, as I explained in my written contribution, which is available, I think that we have to make a distinction, when we talk about the possible crisis between the United States and Europe, between the political difficulties—and I would call them geo-political difficulties—and the economic reality, which has shown over the last years an increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy. This appears very clearly from the study that has recently been published by Joe Quinlan of Johns Hopkins University and which I quote in my text.
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Even the idea of a trade war seems to have somewhat disappeared recently, probably thanks to the statesmanship of the people in charge; and there is good cooperation in a certain number of other areas, one being Afghanistan, for instance. But there is no doubt that, on the political side, if there is not yet a crisis, the relations seem to suffer from a serious—what I would call ''lack of trust.'' And what I am saying here is not based on scientific analysis. It is, rather, based on impressions and observations.
There is no doubt that the immediate cause of this situation and the different positions taken on the war with Iraq. On the European side it started with a lot of solidarity and sympathy after September the 11th and an attitude in favor of the action against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. But these were quickly followed by a lack of comprehension when it came to the strategy of the war against terrorism, which was perceived as somewhat vague, directed at an undefined enemy and often changing targets. This was accompanied by a kind of uneasiness about the so-called ''Axis of Evil'' approach and what I would call the whole ''good versus evil syndrome.'' All this resulted in a general feeling—with at least part of the population in Europe—of suspicion about the war against Iraq, because the link with September 11 was not very clear and also the presence of WMD had not clearly been established.
It is my feeling though that the lack of trust which is obviously there, at certain levels and in certain parts of the population on both sides, is more emotionally loaded on the United States side than in Europe. There is, I think, in the United States a kind of sudden and relatively deep resentment felt at the absence of loyalty shown by the traditional allies, whose security the United States has been defending for so many years.
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The lack of trust on the European side, I think, is rather based on a political assessment and less on disappointment, probably because of already existing divergences. One is a disagreement on at least certain aspects of the policy in the Middle East, which the Europeans see as being at the center of the issue.
Then there was also the openly announced new policy by the Administration, which was focusing on the national interest rather than on international commitments.
There are clearly deeper reasons than the war with Iraq, but I will come back to that a bit later.
I have structured my comments on the questions which had been handed over to me by your staff, and one of them concerned the perception of the threat and in how far it differed in the United States and in Europe. There certainly was a difference. Europe saw a much closer link between what happened on September the 11th and the Israeli-Palestinian issue than the United States would admit. Europeans, at least some Europeans—I don't want to generalize—had a tendency to think that if what they considered to be the main cause could be eliminated, a large part of the threat would disappear.
Very important also was the difference of approach by the media in the United States and in Europe. One had the feeling sometimes that in the United States the media were almost pleased with having a war, because it offered them a lot of professional and probably commercial opportunities. I think, from having travelled between Europe and the United States now for quite a while, that the European journalists distanced themselves more from the events and at least tried to give a more balanced view, while being, for instance, quite critical of the so-called embedded arrangements of their American colleagues.
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It can also be said that the general perception of a war is different in the United States and in Europe. In the United States, it is very often perceived and presented in the media as a heroic event, where the United States, with all it represents, can show what it is capable of doing, while for Europe, due to its history, a war evokes own cities being destroyed and innocent civilians being killed.
Perhaps one word on anti-Americanism. I don't think that there is a general anti-Americanism in Europe. There is I think the phenomenon that the United States, being what it is, leaves nobody indifferent. From there on you have a whole range of feelings. You have great admiration. You have sympathy. You have gratitude but also envy, frustration, need for protection but also need for independence.
So, I am convinced that if we have the statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic, we will overcome our present difficulties. But, also think we have to take care of the coexistence of somewhat different views of the future of the world system, and that will be the responsibility of our leaders in the coming months. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Paemen.
I am told that originally we had told the panel they would have 7 minutes, and so we will go to 7 minutes, and I allowed for that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Paemen follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HUGO PAEMEN, SENIOR ADVISOR, HOGAN AND HARTSON, L.L.P.
Facts and perceptions
Among the decisive facts that have influenced the U.S.-European relationship recently are undoubtedly:
the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of the U.S. as sole superpower,
the further development of the European integration with the creation of the Euro, the E.U.'s Enlargement and the start of its Common Foreign and Security Policy,
the U.S.-E.U. partnership in the Balkans,
the disagreements on a solution for the Middle-East crisis, and most eminently
the events of September 11 and their aftermath.
It is remarkable that nearly all these events belong to the ''security'' or geo-political side of the relationship. Does this mean that the time of the banana war and the G.M.O. disputes is over? Or rather that the new issues are of such compelling importance that the once predominant trade fights have been dwarfed? Has the combined statesmanship of Bob Zoellick and Pascal Lamy prevailed over the previous inclination towards litigation? Have the security battalions taken over from the trade warriors? Because even more remarkable is the gap that seems to exist between, on the one hand, the developments in the economic sector and, on the other hand, the security areas.
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In a study, published a couple of months ago, on ''The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy'' Joseph P. Quinlan from Johns Hopkins University writes: ''One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the past decade has been the increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between Europe and America than between any other two continents.'' Some of the many facts from the study show not only that both are each other's major trading and investment partner, but that:
both continents are each other's most important market in terms of global earnings;
in 2000 roughly 58% of corporate America's foreign assets were located in Europe and European firms accounted for more than two thirds of total foreign assets in the U.S.;
about 7 million Americans owe their livelihoods to European investors; the corresponding European figure is 6 million.
The general thrust of his findings is that in the past decade ''the transatlantic economy became even more intertwined and interdependent''.
In contrast to this, It goes without explanation that the relations in the security area have developed in a different direction, at least with some countries and with a large part of the European public opinion.
Let's turn to the most recent developments on either side.
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In 2000, the European Union introduced the Euro as common currency. This made the economic integration quasi irreversible. The three Member States of the E.U. that have stayed out will probably join in the near future. There was some skepticism and even some suspicion in the U.S. when the idea of a European currency was launched. This has now disappeared and the Euro is being treated as a normal international currency.
The next natural step in the European integration process is considered to be the establishment of a real Common Foreign and Security Policy. In that context the decision had already been taken to deploy a military force of 50 000–60 000 people capable of performing humanitarian and rescue tasks as well as peacekeeping and certain peacemaking tasks. As their first mission the Union forces have taken over the reins of peacekeeping mission ''Operation Allied Harmony'' from NATO. Matters of collective defense, however, are left to NATO, of which most E.U. countries are members. It has to be said that, although it was an indispensable part of the initial concept of the European integration, the idea of a common foreign and defense policy was only gradually, and even somewhat reluctantly developed.
On the enlargement of the Union, negotiations have been finalized aiming at the accession of 10 new countries to the Union in 2004. That will bring its population close to 500 million. It gives an idea of the Immense challenge this phase of the European integration implies.
In light of these fundamental developments and the challenges involved, the Governments of the Union have organized a Convention, which has been asked to formulate recommendations in order to increase the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the governance of the larger Union.
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Nobody will deny that with all this Europe has taken on a full plate of its own recently and that, inevitably, its collective energy has been mainly devoted to the intricacies of one of the most decisive phases of the integration process.
On its side, the new American administration, which took over in 2000, had openly announced that its foreign policy would be more consistently focused on the national interest. As Condoleezza Rice wrote: ''. . . it will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.'' This led, in the early stages, to the renunciation by the U.S. of some multilateral agreements already in force or in the process of ratification (Kyoto Agreement, A.B.M. Agreement, Court of International Justice . . .). Because of its unique position of strength, it was inevitable that such retreats—as would do more pro-active initiatives—risked appearing as unilateral policies.
On the foreign trade side, the American government was instrumental, with the E.U. and others, in launching the new multilateral negotiations of the World Trade Organization in Doha. Congress gave—it is true, with a slight majority—the administration the authority to negotiate a global agreement. On the bilateral side, and in accordance with some campaign promises, the administration introduced a considerable increase of its farm subsidies and applied safeguard measures to protect the steel industry.
However, the dominating events during the last two years were undoubtedly the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and the subsequent American policy shake-up in the context of the war against terrorism. After the worldwide wave of sympathy and solidarity, reactions to the subsequent U.S. policy became more divisive in the world and more particularly in Europe. Within the U.S., somewhat inevitably, the focus on homeland security and on weapons of mass destruction has strengthened even more the fundamental priority given to the pursuit and defense of the national interest.
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How deep is the gap?
Without going into the circumstances and deeper causes of the Atlantic divorce following the 9/11 events, it is worthwhile trying to understand whether the growing divide has been caused by irreversible forces, inevitable outside developments or whether it is the logical consequence of consciously taken options based on divergent views of a changing world.
There are those who believe that the growing inequality of power, which they equate to military power, inevitably widens the gap between the two partners of the Atlantic Community. This theory says that a stronger U.S. will, quite naturally and inevitably, always want to fully exercise its power in a world where strength is the unique decisive yardstick between nations. Similarly and as inevitably, the weaker Europeans try to hedge their weakness by invoking rules or by concluding international agreements. How do those pundits explain that this anomaly has not appeared more openly before? Because, they say, the Cold War and the protective shield of NATO, essentially provided for by the U.S., made it possible for Europeans to build a kind of paradise based on idealistic but somewhat illusive concepts like international law, multilateral agreements, human rights, etc. These commentators have a tendency to consider the European Union as the apex of fairyland playing funny girls' games and having even invented their own funny currency. Evidently, they consider that, in the new world order, this asymmetrical development can not go on much longer, if only because of the irrepressible need for the superpower to exercise its muscles in order to secure its eminence in a world of macho states.
The reality is probably somewhat different. But it does not mean that the concept of the rock-solid Atlantic Alliance, as it survived the skirmishes of the Cold War, is not being seriously challenged by the geo-political shifts that have taken place during the last fifteen years. Successive NATO summit meetings have wrestled with the seemingly irreconcilable requirements of the preservation, adaptation and enlargement of the Alliance. It is also far from clear what the role of an ''adapted'' NATO can be in the context of the new national security strategy of the U.S.. Sometimes it looks like preordained as a reservoir for possible ad hoc coalition-building wherever national interests are threatened. As Donald Rumsfeld said: the mission determines the coalition, not the reverse. As the present administration prepares the country for continuous leadership in the world based upon military superiority and balance of power between the major countries, some Europeans also ask themselves what in that scheme the role of the E.U. would be beyond that of a loyal NATO ''dishwasher'', the real menu nor the guests at the meal having been disclosed.
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Some historians tell us that internationalism and introversion have always been two alternating, sometimes competing, features of American foreign policy. Based on what happened to the initial inclination of this administration, some question whether the increasing globalization of the world and the unique position of the US still leave a real option in that respect. Others foresee, not without serious apprehension, that the considerable external commitments, their costs and possible drawbacks, will inevitably generate a domestic reaction in the opposite direction.
On the other hand, it is also far from clear how prepared the Member States of the E.U. are to do what is needed for the establishment of a credible European military force that could really be in charge of the European home security as well as become what was once called the European pillar of the enlarged Alliance. As I said before, the building of a European defense capacity was always considered to come at the end of the economic and political integration process. The internal dynamics of the integration process and the recent developments will increase the pressure on the governments to add this dimension more clearly to the enormous challenge of the enlargement and institutional reform of the Union. As happened with the drive towards a common currency, the call for efficiency, coming from the outside world as well as from inside the Union, will increasingly urge for a more consistent strategic approach to the political and security challenges of the global world.
But their leaders will have to deliver more than plans if they want to convince their own citizens, the U.S. and the rest of the world of their strategic vision and be considered as relevant interlocutors and reliable partners.
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Is there room for compromise?
Answers to these questions would in the first place presuppose that Europe and the U.S. can work out a concept and a ''modus vivendi'' of coexistence between two different views of the future world order. It is indeed unlikely that the European Union will ever, or at least in the foreseeable future, and this notwithstanding its relative economic, political and possible military weight, join the military competition in the world. The whole culture that led to the constitution of the Union, fed by the experiences of internecine wars, has been dominated by the concept of a community of law. It is unrealistic to think that in its external relations the Union would not try to gradually apply the same basic principles. This would imply a fundamental change in the history of international relations (as the E.U. has introduced already as far as its own member states are concerned). The only context in which this is possible is the system of the United Nations, which has excluded the use of force as a legal way to settle international conflicts short of situations of self-defense in compliance with existing rules. It does not exclude competition between nations but would subject all international exchanges to a legal system of multilateral rules. There are the schools of the realists and the neo-realists who, evidently, will look down with skeptical sympathy on these naiAE4ve ''Kantian'' visions.
The position of the U.S. on this issue will be decisive. Its monopoly of military power allows it to satisfy the requirements of a global strategic reach. But solitary action has become difficult in a unifying world and politically risky. Even if this unique position of strength can be maintained in the foreseeable future, it will encourage others to look for recognition based on the same standards and using the same elements of power. With the transfer of technology becoming increasingly fluid, monopolistic positions will be more and more short-lived. One does not need to be a doom-sayer to predict that without a genuine effort to curtail the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction every country in the world that wants to do so will soon dispose of such weapons. But only the United States is in a position today to launch a credible process not to stop the technology, which is already there, not to reserve their use to some privileged and self-designated countries, which will not be accepted by the others, but to gradually come to a system of rules that will be applicable to everybody and monitored and enforced by a credible authority. This authority, according to the Europeans, can only come, in one way or another, from the United Nations, where the U.S. is unmistakably the key player.
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All this does not mean that Europe will give up its military ambitions and its reach for hard power. Nor should other nations do so. What many Europeans would like to see is that this moment of unique economic and military power of the Western world, and of the United States in particular, be used to establish some basic rules of the global game, based on the universal values they represent, and have them accepted and enforced by the world community so that they will survive a possible change in the relative balance of power, which is never to be excluded (if not for our children, perhaps for our grandchildren). They will only have some chance of success, though, if the effort is genuine and if their promoters themselves are ready to respect the rules. It was Dr. Henri Kissinger, in his role of historian, who wrote: ''The test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms, That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times''.
The globalization of the world has already led to a considerable increase of international agreements and arrangements at the governmental and non-governmental level. This is particularly the case between the U.S. and Europe as a consequence of the increasing integration of the two societies. These networks are not the result of the growing military power of the United States. They have rather expanded in the non-military sector, particularly since the strengthening of the E.U., as appears from the study by Joseph Quinlan I mentioned before. This also shows an interesting relationship between the so-called soft and hard power nations can exert. As there is no doubt that good diplomacy backed by some hard power capacity will be more effective, it is wrong to think that both are mutually supportive in all circumstances. It is easy to recall examples where too much or abuse of hard power has led to a less efficient diplomacy, as there are many examples of deficient diplomacy leading to military conflicts that could have been avoided.
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Between the U.S. and the E.U. a wide framework of consultations has been set up since the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995. The general feeling is that it did not deliver what had been hoped for. It has been working well in the trade sector for quite some time, with ups and downs, notwithstanding the objective differences of interest in certain areas. It has also worked well in other sectors like certain aspects of the war against terrorism. But there is no doubt that the recent experience will lead to some thinking on both sides about how things went as wrong as they did and how this can be avoided in the future, if that is what they want, a goal that I would wholeheartedly endorse.
Mr. BEREUTER. Next we will hear from Dr. Dettke. Pleased to see you here and thank you for your willingness to testify today. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DIETER DETTKE, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION
Mr. DETTKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor for me to testify before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe.
Let me first say how much I appreciate that the Committee is really willing to include European witnesses here in its effort to examine the state and the future of transatlantic relations, and I think it is a great privilege for me to be part of this hearing.
This relationship is crucial, I believe, both for Europe and the United States; and I testify here as a German citizen. I would like to point out first that it is time I think to move on and to put our disagreements over the war on Iraq behind us. Fifty years of great partnership with such a broad political, economic, military, cultural foundation, with extraordinary successes such as the Luftbrueke, the Berlin airlift, the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification, the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, all this cannot be undone by a political disagreement even of the dimension of the war in Iraq.
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I think we must be able to isolate our disagreements and not let them spill over, chipping away at the core of our relationship. It is quite a unique experience in the history of German-American relations that a legitimate but limited disagreement leaves so much bitterness behind, that communication between the top leadership of our two countries died out for such a long time. We need to be able to move on.
I think a good start has already been made. The unanimous vote in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 and the lifting of U.N. sanctions against Iraq is an opening for European-American cooperation in the necessary rebuilding process of Iraq. Despite his opposition to the use of military force in the conflict with Iraq, Chancellor Schroeder immediately after the war committed Germany to providing humanitarian assistance, offering medical help, to providing shelter for refugees. He also expressed his willingness to support the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq under a U.N. umbrella. Resolution 1483, which Germany supported, is now the legal foundation for the international community to contribute to reconstruction and institution-building in Iraq.
Germany has substantial experience in post-conflict reconstruction. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, Serbia is a good example and so is Afghanistan, where both the German government and the German nongovernmental organizations helped in the necessary rehabilitation, including administrative and police training and the strengthening of civil society institutions.
More importantly, in the fight against international terrorism, Germany also plays an important military role and has committed some 9,000 troops as part of several military operations to fight international terrorism. We contribute to ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom, also with forces in Afghanistan, Fox CW reconnaissance tanks in Kuwait and patrol boats around the Horn of Africa; and there is even a small German anti-terror contingent in Georgia.
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Together with KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia and Concordia in Macedonia, Germany's military commitment is not irrelevant. It is, in fact, the second largest deployment of troops abroad after the United States.
During the war against Iraq, Germany kept all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance: United States forces had full logistical support for all their operations in Europe; German troops helped to secure American barracks in Germany; Germany provided Turkey with military support; and Germany's support for Israel continued.
Mr. Chairman, you are particularly interested in the issue of anti-Americanism in Europe. Now, I can assure you, and I agree with Ambassador Paemen, Europe and Germany in particular is not anti-American. Germany is probably one of the most pro-American countries in Europe. Two-thirds of the German population or more would still say that they like Americans.
But this general positive attitude toward America has seen some dramatic changes. I have to admit that. Since 2001, the number of Germans who see the United States as the most important partner has declined from 58 percent of the population in October, 2001, to 49 percent in June, 2003.
In the past, these numbers used to be always much more than 50 percent support for America as an important partner, and more than 80 percent of the Germans always thought that our relations with the United States are good. Today, only 39 percent think our relations with the United States are good. This is clearly a trend related to the war in Iraq, and the reason for such a strain is not anti-Americanism, but Iraq, the war and a rather strong aversion—Ambassador Paemen talked about it—to the concept of war. War is identified with catastrophe.
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Now, I am not saying here that without the war everything would be fine between Europe and the United States. There are a number of issues beyond the war in Iraq that are controversial: The doctrine of preemption, the lack of salience of multilateral institutions for United States foreign policy and the trade and development issues and, of course, let me mention the rejection of the Kyoto protocol, just to name a few issues.
However, my central argument here really is that these issues are manageable even after the deep transatlantic rift over Iraq. Actually, the longtime prospects for the transatlantic relationship are quite good. There is hope that we will be able to address some of the key issues, transnational issues together. Terrorism, WMD, trade development, climate change, energy, all these issues I think could be most effectively in my view addressed jointly between the United States and Europe.
Now my last comment is about the future of our strategic relationship. As has been mentioned already, particularly in the context of the summit of the Four on April 29 in Brussels—the idea that Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg would be willing to give up the strategic partnership with the United States has really no basis. It is explicitly rejected. The communiqué clearly states that the transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe, and it also says the partnership is a precondition for security and world peace.
Chancellor Schroeder sees these initiatives that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg started not as an effort of decoupling but rather as an effort of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar. I think it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the Four is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union; and it is the old two-pillar concept that drives the ambitions, if you wish, of the Four and nothing else.
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The contributions of the EU, in particular through its enlargement, to stability in Europe is enormous. It is important, and I want to say it is a contribution to our common security, not only European security. NATO and Europe are now committed to strategic adjustments in response to new threats and to meet the new security requirements. And so does Germany. Just recently, the German Defense Ministry released new guidelines. They see German security as a global issue, not only as a German national issue. It is an international defense concept. We have learned our lesson.
Mr. Chairman, I will come to a conclusion. One of the key questions of this Committee is whether Europeans can be pro-Europe and pro-Atlantic at the same time; and my answer, Mr. Chairman, is, yes, we should be able to cooperate on a common agenda. We recognize U.S. leadership. The issue is not that we have too much America in the alliance. The issue is that we have too little Europe. That is what we are trying to change, and so you should follow the advice of many Europeans and Americans: Let Europe be Europe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Dettke.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dettke follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DIETER DETTKE, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS—A VIEW FROM GERMANY
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INTRODUCTION
For Germany, a country in the center of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance has always been and will continue to be a crucial security lifeline. Precisely because of US-leadership after World War II, the Atlantic Alliance provided protection without submission and today: NATO is still alive, whereas the Soviet empire collapsed and the Warsaw Pact is gone. Freedom and common values—democracy and human rights in particular—just as much as a common threat have kept the Alliance together in the past despite political differences and economic conflicts. As a result, Germany is united and Europe is whole and free today. This remarkable, historically unique achievement of the West is also a solid foundation for a European-American partnership in the future despite the deep rift over the war in Iraq. As far as Germany is concerned the transatlantic relationship is not heading for separation. To be sure we will have to address a number of differences beyond the Iraq issue but they are manageable. The long-term prospects for the transatlantic relationship are actually quite good. There are a number of global and transnational issues that can best be addressed in a joint European and American effort: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, trade, development, climate change and energy just to name a few. In view of the new threats and different security requirements after September 11, NATO will have to make adjustments too, but there is no reason to believe that the alliance will not be able to succeed in taking on a common agenda in the future.
A good start to overcome the transatlantic rift has already been made. The unanimous vote in the UNSC for Res. 1483 and the lifting of UN-sanctions against Iraq is an opening for European-American cooperation in the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq. Fortunately, the war was short and not too costly as far as loss of human life is concerned. This will help in the difficult task of building the foundations of a liberal democracy in Iraq. Immediately after the war began, on March 20, 2003, despite his opposition to the use of military force in the conflict with Iraq Chancellor SchroAE4der committed Germany
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to providing humanitarian assistance,
to offering medical help and
to providing shelter for refugees.
He also expressed his willingness to support the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq under a UN-umbrella. Resolution 1483 which Germany supported is now the legal foundation for the international community to contribute to reconstruction and institution building in Iraq.
Robert Kagan's advice that it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world is probably a good hypothesis to start with in order to find out how deep the transatlantic rift is in reality. For it follows from his realist's school argument that artificial disagreements should also be ruled out. It is true that we had difficulties before the war in Iraq and these differences also reflect larger issues such as a changing pattern of attitudes and values. The Iraq conflict revealed that we do have a conflict of world order concepts. Europe has indeed reached a post-national stage in its history and is quite willing to pool its potential and to live with rules that chip away at individual national sovereignty. But Europe is not an empire and still far away from common power, let alone power projection.
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Robert Kagan is right to point out the differences between European and American thinking with regard to world order concepts, in particular the European preference for policies of persuasion rather than coercion.(see footnote 1) However, the concept of power and weakness can also be misleading because it suggests a permanence of divergence that is not necessarily warranted. A closer, more detailed look at the structure of European and American power reveals that Europe is not all about weakness and America is not all about strength. Even though the United States is by far the strongest military power ever, with a global reach far beyond any empire in history, and is dominant not only politically but also culturally, the US is no less vulnerable in economic terms than Europe or any other economic power. Whereas military power can be controlled nationally, economic power is beyond full national control. Economic power relies on markets and therefore is much more amorphous and less tangible than military might. Europe is in the same league as the United States on the level of economic power and to some degree even capable of matching US power. Finally, under the conditions of globalization, quite a number of issues are transnational in nature (the environment, drugs, crime, trafficking in persons) and inevitably need international cooperation for successful solutions. Although the US can go it alone militarily, it is much more difficult to achieve American economic objectives unilaterally.
A closer look at the growing European-American values gap also reveals that it is important not to dramatize the differences. These differences do exist. One only needs to examine differing opinions on social issues, religion, patriotism, family values and sexual orientation. How much social safety should the government provide? How to protect the environment? How to take care of the poor? Should homosexuality be accepted? How much religious tolerance are we willing to accept? What about minorities? The answers to these questions in the US and Europe can differ quite strongly, but in most cases it is more a matter of degree, not principle. This is even true for the death penalty, which is often cited as one of the most fundamental value differences. To be sure, a large majority of Europeans is against the death penalty, but the number of people in Europe and the US favoring or rejecting the death penalty is not totally different. Many Americans have very similar concerns about the death penalty. Our legal systems differ, but there is no clash of civilizations within the Atlantic Alliance as some have claimed.(see footnote 2) In a pluralistic society value clashes are more or less a built in phenomenon. They are normal.
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Add to this the broad areas of value commonality including:
democracy,
freedom,
tolerance,
pluralism,
human rights and
equality of men and women
and it is obvious that our differences emanate from a common foundation, and they should be manageable even if at times our interests and values collide. One example of colliding values is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The American opposition to the International Criminal Court is hard for Europeans to understand. They believe that in this case the radical protection of national sovereignty is excessive. Europeans see the ICC as an institution, which will help create and maintain civility in an era of globalization.
II
From a German perspective opposition to the war in Iraq is a legitimate but limited disagreement with the United States. It is a policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship. The differences began to surface in the spring and summer of 2002 when the German media—often reflecting the domestic debate in the United States at the time—took up the issue of a potential war in Iraq. This occurred during an election year in both countries: German national elections and US mid-term elections. Election pressures are not the best communication devices.
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It is important to remember that UNSC Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 led to an alliance consensus to disarm Iraq on the basis of a multilateral process administered in the UN Security Council. However one interprets the quality of this consensus, the Alliance was able to find common ground at this critical juncture. Why it fell apart in the early months of 2003 is the crucial question, which Europeans and Americans will certainly answer differently.
The German case is unique. There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use military force, the strongest one being our own history of warfare, militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for WWII and the Holocaust. Fifty-five million people died as a result. For a German of my generation to think of war is to think of catastrophe. This is another important difference to consider in the difficult debate in Germany and the US about the use of force. During the last decade Germany has come a long way from its civilian power paradigm to a more active policy of engagement commensurate with Germany's economic and political weight in Europe. Chancellor SchroAE4der and Foreign Minister Fischer, both men with quite pacifist pasts, prepared Germany for the use of force in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. German public opinion, like almost everywhere in Europe, was reluctant to use military force. Chancellor SchroAE4der had to go through a vote of confidence in the German Bundestag. The country finally supported his policy course because in both cases fundamental values were at stake: humanitarian values in Kosovo and existential values in Afghanistan in the fight against international terrorism.
Only force could help avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo where Serb armed forces used violence against the predominantly Muslim civilian population of Albanian origin. To stand by and let this happen, as had happened before in Srebrenica and other places in the former Yugoslavia, was neither a politically acceptable nor morally justifiable option. Kosovo was the first time since WWII that German combat forces participated in a major military operation and the Bundeswehr is still present in Kosovo in fulfillment of a peacekeeping mission.
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Only military force was able to bring the perpetrators of September 11 to justice who were responsible for an apparently civilian, but in essence really a war-like catastrophe. Traditional police forces and the instruments of law enforcement were utterly insufficient in a country ruled by the Taliban, an extremist and fundamentalist Muslim regime dominated by the same terror organization that planned and executed the September 11 attacks. For this reason Germany decided to participate in this existential conflict, again with substantial military forces. As part of several military operations, Germany has committed about 9,000 troops to the fight against international terrorism:
ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, to protect the provisional government of Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai. Germany provides some 2,500 troops and took over the command of ISAF together with the Netherlands at the beginning of February 2003. Just a few days ago, 4 German service men were killed in Kabul as the result of the terrorist activities of al-Quaeda.
Enduring Freedom, a military contribution in the fight against international terrorism, with German forces deployed in Afghanistan, with Fox CW reconnaissance tanks in Kuwait and patrol boats around the Horn of Africa. Altogether some 2,000 troops including Special Forces are participating in Enduring Freedom.
Germany also maintains a small anti-terror contingent in Georgia.
Together with KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia and Concordia in Macedonia, Germany's military commitment is not irrelevant. In fact it is the second largest deployment of troops abroad after the US. In addition to this, Germany has a substantial capacity for post conflict civilian reconstruction. This capacity played quite an important role in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Serbia, where both the German government and German non-governmental organizations helped in the necessary reconstruction effort, including the strengthening of civil society institutions.
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During the Iraq war Germany kept all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance:
The US forces had full logistical support for all their operations in Iraq.
German troops helped to secure American barracks in Germany.
Germany provided Turkey with military support and aid.
German support for Israel was never a question. There was public criticism of some of the military actions of the Israeli government during the second intifada, but the government's support for Israel was never in doubt.
Europe was quite willing to participate in the common task of disarming Iraq. What divided Europe into ''old'' and ''new'' as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested—not without condescension, if not even contempt—is in reality a demonstration of the impact of the coalition of the willing-concept in Europe. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is going to divide Europe on a permanent basis. The strong support for the EU in a recent referendum in Poland and the Czech Republic indicates that Europe remains a coveted objective not only for these two countries, but also for those who disagreed with France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the core European countries opposing the war. The lesson from its failure to come to a joint decision on Iraq is that Europe should not have to make a choice between the Atlantic Alliance and Europe. German foreign policy so far always succeeded in bridging its commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation—essential for European integration—with Germany's Atlantic orientation. Ever since the Franco-German Treaty when German Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty of 1963 between Adenauer and de Gaulle, a key role for Germany was to prevent a collision between Europe's foreign policy ambitions and American policy and interests. A better understanding of Germany's role in Europe, particularly vis a vis France would have helped to avoid the kind of collision that unfolded in late January 2003 when France, Germany and Russia, up to this point rather loosely connected in their opposition to the war in Iraq, firmed up their opposition in view of the massive military build up in the Gulf region. In view of the size of US and British forces, in combination with open calls for regime change, this strategy in the perception of many Europeans seemed to make war the only possible outcome of the UN-disarmament process. How much room there was for American foreign policy to influence the position of France, Germany and Russia in the ongoing UN-process in an open question. Some commentators—on both sides—do not even exclude bad faith from the beginning. I disagree. Judging from available facts from today's perspective this is not the case and in essence it is a mean spirited attack on the transatlantic partnership. In theory a compromise was possible, yet none was reached.
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Differences over the correct policy in the case of Iraq will most likely persist. France, Germany and Russia will probably remain convinced that a policy mix of:
inspections, backed by force and permanent if necessary,
support for democratic Iraqi opposition groups and
creating a war crimes tribunal to indict Saddam Hussein
could have been effective if given a chance. Containment worked in the case of the Soviet Union. In the case of Iraq, containment could have been successful in conjunction with enhanced weapons inspections—particularly if the US would have put its full weight and commitment behind such a strategy.
Arms control enforcement below the level of war but in combination with pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein would also have contributed to indigenous regime change, if not immediately, then long-term. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council did not get a chance to prove its effectiveness in implementing arms control stipulations. Arms control inspections will be an important part of any future non-proliferation policy. North Korea and Iran could be cases where the UN Security Council might have to play a key role again. The German government was also convinced that without war we would have had a better chance to prevent terrorist attacks and to protect our citizens at home and abroad. In fact, attacks of al-Quaeda or its networks continued after September 11, for example in Djerba, Tunisia; Bali, Indonesia; Riadh, Saudi Arabia; Casablanca, Morocco; and most recently in Kabul, Afghanistan. The war against terror as of today is far from being won. The following concerns are also shared by many Americans:
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economic costs,
loss of human life,
new recruitment opportunities for terrorism including suicide terrorism and
encouragement for anti-Western Arab nationalism.
III
In US government circles as well as in the media the concern was that during the German election campaign in the spring and summer of 2002 the Iraq issue was often discussed with anti-American overtones, and led to a new wave of anti-Americanism in Germany. There is no widespread anti-Americanism in Germany, but a strong anti-war sentiment. This is illustrated by the fact that more than 200,000 people showed solidarity with the US at the Brandenburg Gate immediately after the attacks of September 11. And less than twelve months later you saw many people in Germany, Europe and all over the world demonstrate against a war in Iraq.
Anti-Americanism in Germany has never been a serious or long-term problem despite major policy differences such as the war in Vietnam in the 1970's or the Missile Crisis in the 1980's, when it was often difficult to distinguish between legitimate criticism of US policies and anti-Americanism. Germany is still one of the most pro-American countries in Europe. Two thirds of the German population or more would still say that they like Americans. But this generally positive attitude towards America has seen some dramatic changes. In the past, the vast majority of Germans believed the United States to be the most important partner for Germany. The US was always seen as more important than any other country, including France. Since 2001, the number of Germans who see the US as the most important partner has declined from 58 percent of the population in October 2001 to 47 percent in June 2003. In contrast, the numbers for the same question for France have increased from 36 percent to 43 percent. In May 2002, 88 percent of the German population still believed the relationship between Germany and the US to be good. Only 9 percent believed it to be bad. In June 2003 a majority of Germans, 56 percent, believed relations were bad and only 39 percent believed they were good.(see footnote 3)
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The most recent polls of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, published in June 2003 confirm this fundamental change. Key developments in the Pew Research Center study of June 2003 conducted from April 28–May 15, 2003 in the US, Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere are:
In most countries, opinions toward the US are markedly lower then they were a year ago.
The war in Iraq has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans,
— further inflamed the Muslim world,
— softened support for the war on terrorism and
— significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era—the UN and the North Atlantic Alliance.(see footnote 4)
Seventy-six percent in France, 62 percent in Turkey, 62 percent in Spain, 61 percent in Italy and 57 percent in Germany believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past. Of course, these numbers are snapshots of reality, but a reality nevertheless. They can change, but it will take new initiatives to make them change.
IV
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It is important not to lose sight of the real issue the West will continue to face in the future: How to deal with and ultimately defeat terrorism. Transnational catastrophic terrorism is a new threat, which demonstrated its deadly force and determination on September 11, 2001 with the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in Washington causing the death of more than 3,000 innocent people, a greater loss of human life than the military attack on Pearl Harbor. Terrorist attacks and mass killings by international terror networks using the language of religion for political purposes threaten the entire Western civilization and must be resisted for existential reasons. In this long and difficult struggle Germany stands shoulder to shoulder with the United States and Jean-Marie Colombani spoke for Europe and the civilized world when he said, ''We are all Americans.''(see footnote 5) This initial commonality after September 11 unfortunately lost ground with the European-American disagreement over Iraq. Many Europeans in Germany, France and elsewhere, including in European countries whose governments supported the war in Iraq, did not see the conflict with Iraq as part of the war on terror. If ties between al-Quaeda and the Iraqi government had been proven, Europe would not have hesitated to ultimately support military action.
The existential fight against terrorism is a complex issue and it will take a long time to free mankind of this new totalitarian threat. But we have to realize that this threat is very different from the totalitarian threat of the Cold War:
it is asymmetric,
the enemy is not a state or empire,
the new terror networks fight in the name and the language of faith, attempting to entangle the West in a clash of civilizations in the desperate hope that as a result of such a clash an energized and radical Islam would achieve its final victory.
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This conflict is much more about the hearts and minds of people than the previous one and it needs to be fought on many levels: politically, economically, culturally and if necessary, but not predominantly, also on a military level.
To be sure, Europe shares the serious concern about weapons of mass destruction with the United States and in some cases if proliferation continues and even increases, European territory will be at risk too. That is why particularly non-nuclear European states put so much emphasis on an effective non-proliferation system. It remains to be seen whether weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq. If the search turns out to be negative, a crucial US argument for the war in Iraq would collapse and reinforce the concerns about the lack of legal authority and legitimacy to use force against Iraq.
The strategic reorientation and adjustment of the United States after September 11 allowing asymmetric conflicts, including terrorist attacks, to be addressed more effectively is quite understandable. In Europe a strategic reassessment is also in the making. The new German defense guidelines are an example of a new strategic thinking beyond the Cold War and in sync with the new threats, particularly asymmetric warfare like the September 11 attacks, transnational crime, drug smuggling and trafficking in persons. For the United States, the new strategic focus seems to be the arc of instability that reaches from Latin America, through parts of Africa, particularly northern Africa, the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia. This could have consequences for US troop stationing in Germany.
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The Bundeswehr now focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory. International terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation are now major concerns of the German armed forces. All these issues, according to the new defense guidelines, can only be countered by a comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system. In fact, the German defense minister stated that German defense now begins in the mountains of Afghanistan. The United States is not alone in its strategic realignment and some of the European adjustments are quite compatible with American efforts. However, there is no way that European defense expenditures would ever match the US defense budget dollar for dollar. It is also not necessary. More important will be to undertake the necessary restructuring and transformation demanded by the new threats. To increase defense spending over the next few years will be difficult, given Germany's and other European countries' financial constraints.
But there is also concern in Europe about the direction of the new strategic doctrine. By adopting a doctrine of preemption, meaning that the traditional concept of self-defense, which relied on deterrence, no longer applies for the United States, America seems to shed basic principles of international law. Waiting to be attacked—keeping the experience of the September 11 and the devastating consequences of catastrophic terrorism in mind—is, as President Bush stated, indeed bad security policy and strategy. However, without changing the Charter of the United Nations the legal consequences of the doctrine of preemption would be quite dramatic. Article II (4) of the Charter of the United Nations clearly states:
''All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.''
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It would be a good idea to initiate a reform process of international law as well as the UN system so that the new threats, particularly terrorist threats, could be dealt with more effectively. The US decision to use military force against Iraq without a UN mandate is often defended with the argument that in Kosovo—knowing a UN mandate could not be obtained—NATO did intervene. This is not quite the same situation and does not necessarily support the argument that an intervention in Iraq should have been supported by America's European allies. Not only was the rationale for war in the case of Iraq different. It was also a different category of war. Kosovo is a case of coercive diplomacy. Iraq is a classical war.
After WWII the international community considered the UN-ban on wars of aggression as an important step forward to a more civilized world order. Preemption, however, borders on illegality. One can safely say that prevention in general is part of the concept of self-defense. The meaning of prevention is obviously an act to remove a clear and present danger, an example being the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility of Osirak in 1981. Preemption, however, is at best an act of putative self-defense, e.g. taking action on the assumption of a threat that might not even be real. Putative self-defense is a dangerous concept, because it removes all practical legal hurdles and inhibitions to wage war. Europe is not against prevention. In fact prevention in a civilian context is an important development tool. European powers have demonstrated their willingness to act preventively, for example in the case of Kosovo. Our differences reside in the concept of preemption. It would be better not to adopt a questionable concept of putative self-defense without at the same time changing the UN Charter.
Another even more important issue is that by adopting a policy of creating coalitions of the willing depending on which issue is at stake, the United States creates a dual world order where the UN, NATO or other multilateral institutions can be replaced at any given moment by a coalition of the willing. The result of a wider use of this concept would mean that a coalition of the willing can be super-imposed upon the UN, NATO or any other multilateral institution. Europeans, after many devastating conflicts, came to the conclusion that to give away the right to wage war—the right of self defense notwithstanding—is a major step forward and not an encroachment upon national sovereignty. By replacing permanent allies with ad hoc coalitions of the willing the United States would give up an enormous amount of normative power—rule setting capacity or soft power—for a narrow purpose.(see footnote 6) Coalitions of the willing—willingly or not—will waste away existing permanent institutions. As a result, maximum flexibility for the United States would come with a high price. It is not only the loss of American normative power that is at stake here. Maximum flexibility for the US can also be a source of new instability.
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VI
It is not difficult to put together an agenda for transatlantic cooperation. In the recent past, several think tanks and experts both in Europe and the US have made a number of suggestions for renewed and strengthened transatlantic cooperation. The G8 AIDS initiative launched at the most recent G8 meeting in Evian, France is also an agenda item for transatlantic cooperation. And there are more, for example in the area of energy policy, particularly renewable energy. Another idea is to create a whole new architecture for the transatlantic relationship ushering in a new Transatlantic Charter. In order to solve the current transatlantic crisis architectural designs, however, should not be our first priority. There are many urgent problems that need to be addressed. In addition to Iraq a primary concern is the stability of Afghanistan. Stability in this war-torn country is far from assured. It might be necessary to increase substantially the security commitment of the anti-terror coalition. So far only the city of Kabul enjoys a measure of protection that allows the current provisional government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai to function. The rest of the country is still not at peace. And even in Kabul, al-Quaeda attacks are possible. Warlords are still a real threat. Germany and the Netherlands have taken over the leadership of ISAF. This will end in August after which the lead function will be handed over to NATO and NATO assets. The open question is how to create long-term stability in Afghanistan. The Provincial Reconstruction Trams (PRT) may be the answer to this question. Germany sent a team to Afghanistan to address the question of a possible German participation in the PRT. A decision will be made on the basis of the team's report after its return.
The Alliance potential could also be brought into play for the necessary peacekeeping tasks in Iraq under a UN-umbrella. Since the Prague Summit an evolutionary process is underway within NATO to strengthen the European pillar. This evolutionary process is essential in order to apply NATO's full weight in the long struggle for peace and stability in Europe and beyond. The EU will take over a number of peacekeeping operations that no longer require the hardware of a military alliance. Europe's hybrid security and defense forces can step in where NATO's military assets are no longer required or are needed elsewhere. The first step in that direction took place in Macedonia where NATO's responsibility has been seamlessly transferred into the hands of EU forces. Bosnia is a potential next transfer opportunity from NATO to EU forces. An EU operation, backed by a UN mandate, is taking place in the Congo today where a genocide of major proportion happened without the international community even taking notice. Yet it ranks as one of the worst cases of genocide since 1945.
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The EU is now on its way to creating the first modern constitution of a confederation with strong institutions. This unique post-national effort of pooling national sovereignties is in itself an important contribution to peace and stability in Europe. The United States should recognize the enormous potential for stability and economic progress embodied in the work of the European Convention and the process of enlargement and should take the advice not only from Europe, but also from many Americans: let Europe be Europe.
In a unipolar world, multipolarity can hardly be a threat for the United States. Today, multipolarity is at best an aspiration or a preference for a different world order. Whether multipolarity can create a more stable and secure world order than the present system is an open question. Not every multipolar system must be by definition more stable than unipolarity. More importantly, multipolarity is the result of a process of power distribution. It is impossible to claim multipolarity and it is important to realize that multipolarity is not a question of will, but rather an issue of capability. For the stability of an international system—multipolar or unipolar—multilateralism is the more important principle. Without multilateralism, NATO and the UN cannot function and a European Confederation would not work either. Rules are essential for stability and so are permanent allies. This is what the US as a superpower should be interested in, too.
CONCLUSION
On April 29, shortly after the military operations in Iraq ended and the transition to civilian restructuring began, four European countries—France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, core participants of the original integration process in Europe—met to consider their own situation and at the same time the situation of Europe after the war in Iraq. This ''Belgian Chocolate Summit''—as it was nicknamed in the press—did not take place under the best circumstances, time-wise or otherwise. Its background was a mixture of high politics and low politics. Low politics was involved because of pending elections in Belgium and a perfect opportunity to help the sitting government add to its prestige by holding a high-level meeting with enormous media attention. In this respect the meeting was indeed successful. The high politics aspect was much more important, though, because this small caucus meeting of like-minded governments favoring deep integration including a European Security and Defense Union was an excellent opportunity to provide the European Convention with some basic concepts for deeper integration, particularly in the area of defense. In the US, this meeting of the four countries which opposed the war raised quite a few eyebrows. The assumption was that this core Europe would try to design a European foreign policy not based on Atlanticism but anti-Atlantic Gaullism. The fear in Washington was indeed that the Four would be willing to give up the strategic partnership with the United States. The communiqué, however, states quite the opposite, namely that ''the transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe,'' and continues, ''that this partnership is a precondition for security and world peace.''
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Chancellor SchroAE4der sees the initiatives that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg started on April 29, 2003, not as an effort of decoupling, but rather as an effort of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar. Despite much American concern, it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the Four is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. It is the old two-pillar concept first suggested by President Kennedy that drives the ambitions of the Four, and this is not a bad concept for a strong Atlantic Alliance in the future. For it is true that we do not have too much America. We have too little Europe in the Alliance. The revival of the old idea of a European Security and Defense Union is hardly a strategic challenge for the United States. On the contrary, it will emphasize compatibility with NATO activities, including Rapid Reaction forces. The only new message from the ''Belgian Chocolate Summit'' is the creation of a nucleus of collective capacity for planning purposes of the European Union. It remains to be seen how far this nucleus will advance in reality. The transatlantic context of all European operations—if the plan of the Four is going to be implemented—will be maintained. The Nice Summit created the foundation for NATO compatibility of European Forces. If the results of NATO's Prague Summit are implemented and Europe gets its constitution for the enlarged European Union, the Alliance will be much better prepared for the future and it will be a change for the better.
Mr. BEREUTER. We will next hear from Justin Vaisse. We are pleased to have you with us today. You may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF JUSTIN VAISSE, VISITING FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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Mr. VAISSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very honored to submit this testimony before your Committee.
Many of the questions that your letter invitation listed aimed at interpreting what went wrong in the transatlantic relationship this winter. I would like first to give an interpretation from the French side and distinguish what actually motivated French foreign policy and what did not; and, in the interest of time, I will skip and summarize some parts of this testimony.
Was that on the French side a defense of commercial interests? No. Was that about anti-Americanism? Even less so. And here I would completely agree with my distinguished colleagues. I think the recent poll by the Pew Center released earlier this month confirms this view and has a very interesting number to give. Seventy-four percent of French people think that the problem is with the Bush Administration—and this is the highest rate among the 20 countries surveyed—and only 21 percent think that the problem rests with America in general, which obviously defines anti-Americanism, and this is the third lowest rate of all the 20 countries surveyed. So I think that is interesting.
Was that about the Muslim community in France? I don't think so.
Was that a quest for multipolarity? You referred to this question in your introduction, and so I will elaborate a bit on that.
I think that the preference for a multipolar world does influence French foreign policy but only as a secondary and rhetorical factor, a sort of reinforcing one. It is not in my view a prime source of French foreign policy. Take an issue like Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. There was no talk at all about multipolarity, because the United States and Europe agreed on the necessity of routing out the Talibans and that it was a key part of the war on terrorism. President Chirac sent troops, fighter jets, an aircraft carrier battle group, and 73 percent of the French public opinion approved this American-led war, another demonstration that France is neither pacifist nor massively anti-American. So the French position about Iraq was, in my view, issue-specific and not general.
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So now let's try to find the real reason behind the French attitude this winter.
I think that the war on terrorism is the most important one, definitely. The French see the invasion of Iraq as a step backward, not forward, in the war against terrorism, as quite a few experts do. There are many reasons for this assumption: Saddam was never convincingly linked to al-Qaeda. Terrorist recruitment is thought to get a boost from that. The show of force cannot deter a terrorist network that have no territorial basis and cannot coerce the countries that are the real problem behind that global terrorism, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, et cetera. So I think it is really an issue of national security for the French people.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another one, and I won't elaborate on that.
I think there is a cultural background to this divergence also, that there is a sort of European historical pessimism and weariness of war to which my colleague just referred, and I think that is a really important factor.
Last but not least, I think that this war was seen as unnecessarily fueling a possible clash of civilization between the West and the Arab Muslim world.
So I think that, to summarize things briefly, these are the real main reasons behind the French position in the last few months. It has to be acknowledged, though, that a vast majority of experts, including myself, failed to predict that these reasons would be enough for France to attempt to stand in the way of United States action in Iraq. So the question is why did we misunderstand what France would do? I remember the time when we were all forecasting that in the end France would act according to old, familiar patterns.
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In retrospect, my view is that France's action revealed that a new transatlantic system is slowly emerging, where old patterns are increasingly replaced by new ones, old rules by new rules. Many of us apply the old narrative of French-United States relations to the current crisis, the thought that in the end, however reluctantly, France would go along as it did in other instances.
Here, however, France did not conform to this bad-weather friend role; on the contrary, badly overplayed a weak hand. But it seems to me also indicative of the new transatlantic game that the U.S. didn't conform to its traditional role either and from my perspective overplayed a strong hand, if you will.
To put it succinctly, I think that if the Soviet threat had still been present, France would never have so clearly opposed the United States on an issue presented by Washington as vital for its national security, but Washington would also never have claimed that it faced a vital threat from a country without first achieving consensus from its allies on the threat or at least would not have requested absolute loyalty from its allies on this somewhat shaky basis.
So let's try to define the old and the new transatlantic system.
In the old transatlantic system, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and for most of the decade that followed, a set of norms, rules and habits of consultations went hand in hand with an American leadership that oscillated between sharing decisions on matters of common interest and cleverly pretending to do so while acting largely on its own; and I think that it was a good system. A dense network of first- and second-track diplomacy ensured that, even when they disagreed, allies would understand each other's position and make adjustments to avoid conflict and keep the fiction of an alliance of equals.
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The new system has very different rules, which derive from power, not leadership. Basically, Washington decides and European allies are expected to conform without having a say, sometimes even without proper information and discussion. Let me quote this: ''Diplomatic contact across the Atlantic is dropping precipitously in terms of quantity and quality,'' as one observer remarks, based on precise figures of talks and contacts between the two sides of the Atlantic, and in this respect the diplomacy preceding the first Gulf War and the Iraq war have been strikingly different.
So how has Iraq reacted to this new posture by Washington, to this implementation of these new rules? I think we can distinguish in Europe three groups, each of which exists in all European countries.
The first group plays by the new rules, either by necessity like some East European leaders or because the deal is better for them in the new game.
The second group still conforms to the old transatlantic rules, hopes they will return and thinks that the Iraqi crisis was just an exception.
And the third group tries to react to the downgrading of transatlantic relations by fostering European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follows a foreign policy more adapted to its ideals and its interests. This group, feeling that its real interests are not necessarily advanced or taken into account by America anymore, is ready to cooperate with Washington on a case-by-case basis, which leaves room for many joined projects, but doesn't ensure automatic cooperation. President Chirac's policy I think is a symptom of this pragmatic adaptation to the new rules.
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So among these three groups, which one prevails in Europe? I think that one must remember that during the crisis if Chirac was definitely not speaking for Europe, he was certainly speaking for the Europeans, even majorities of the East Europeans he so rudely insulted.
In the long term, opposition to one's own public opinion can translate into electoral losses, and the recent defeats by Aznar and Berlusconi's parties in the Madrid province and Rome would seem to demonstrate this. So the real question for me is: Given its costs, would Blair, Aznar and Berlusconi agree to follow the same path again, the same path they did for Iraq in the next crisis? Would the next government of these countries, maybe from the opposition party, act the same way?
I think I need to conclude. I will leave this question open and just make five concluding remarks.
First, I think that credibility matters, and I don't have time to elaborate, but I think this is a very important asset for the transatlantic relation.
Dialogue matters, and at all levels.
My third point is that French bashing is dangerous for America, because it is misleading. The risk is to misinterpret the reasons for not only French but also European opposition and believe that if France had not opposed the United States the way it did, everything would have been fine. I don't think it is the case, and I am explaining that in the paper.
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Four, the transatlantic agenda is much broader than just Iraq and terrorism, and I am happy to report that from my research there has been no spillover effect from the Iraq issue to other issues of especially French-United States relations, except for specific military exercise cancelled by the Pentagon, but on the rest people are still cooperating, and I think that is very good news.
And five, last but not least, let's keep all of this in mind for the next crisis, which will probably be Iran. I think now is the time to discuss before another crisis arrives which could bear dramatic consequences for the transatlantic alliance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Vaisse.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vaisse follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUSTIN VAISSE, VISITING FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Chairman, I'm very honored to submit this testimony before your committee ; all the more so since I have been teaching a course on American political institutions and American foreign policy back in Paris for the past three years. Getting a chance to actually take part in a hearing in this building is an experience which I do value.
During my testimony and the subsequent questions and answers, while addressing the issue of US-Europe relations as whole, I will focus on France. May I add, Mr. Chairman, that as an independent expert, I will explain, not defend, the French position—whether I personally agree with it or not.
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Many of the questions that your letter of invitation listed aimed at interpreting what went wrong in the transatlantic relationship this winter. Let me first give you an interpretation from the French side and distinguish what motivated French foreign policy and what did not.
Defense of commercial interests ? No—trade with Iraq was somewhere between 0.2% and 0.3% of French trade, and if this had been a factor, the appropriate strategy for France and Germany would have been be to join the coalition, and insist on getting a fair share of oil and other contracts afterwards.
Anti-Americanism ? Even less so—President Chirac is probably the less anti-American of all recent French presidents, and anti-Americanism, from a historical point of view, has been receding in French society since the high points of the 1950's, 60's and 70's. The French were against this particular war and anti-Bush, not anti-American. The recent poll by the Pew Center, released earlier this month, confirms this view : 74% of French people think that the problem (''with the US'') is with the Bush administration (this is the highest rate among the 20 countries surveyed), and only 21% think the problem rests with America in general (this is the third lowest rate of the 20 countries).(see footnote 7)
A lot has been written about the Muslim community in France and how that community might somehow determine French policy in the Middle East. I don't believe that is the case. There are an estimated 4 to 5 million Muslims in France, about 3 millions of them are French citizens, and 2 million or so are foreigners. While there is no doubt that President Chirac did welcome the renewed bond between the Muslim community and the rest of the French population that was a result of common opposition to the war in Iraq, as well as the personal popularity he gained among French Muslims for his stance, that was not a motivating factor in the first place. Chirac was ready to go along with the United Staes and to send troops into the region as late as January 7th—he sent an emissary in December to coordinate possible French participation with the Pentagon.(see footnote 8) Had he felt that French participation was a good policy, he would have gone against the will of most French Muslims—as President Mitterrand did in 1991.
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A quest for Multipolarity ?—this interpretation is fueled by the repeated use of the word in President Chirac's speeches, but there certainly is a vocabulary problem here, just like there was for the word ''hyperpower'', for which you have a negative connotation in English which just doesn't exist in French. Similarly, when you say ''multipolarité'', you describe the way you see the world in general—and the world is certainly multipolar, at least in economic and cultural terms. Here, when someone says ''multipolarity'', you hear ''blocking US power'', a purely negative and confrontational term. I believe that President Chirac's talk about multipolarity is more about multilateralism—deciding together about issues that concern us all—rather than checking American power.
The preference for a multipolar world does influence French policy but only as a secondary and rhetorical factor, a reinforcing one. It is not, in my view, a primary source of French foreign policy. Take an issue like Afghanistan in 2001–2002 : there was no talk about multipolarity, because the US and Europe agreed on the necessity of rooting out the Talibans as a key part of the war on terrorism. Chirac sent troops, fighter jets, an aircraft carrier battle group, and 73% of the French population approved this American war—another demonstration that France is neither pacifist nor massively anti-American. The intervention in Kosovo provides another interesting example in this respect.
On the contrary, when France disagrees strongly with an issue, and feels it is in the mainstream of world public opionin, the idea that the US would decide to go against the will of most other countries naturally creates talk about multipolarity—not the other way around.
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One more point : when you read about French foreign policy in the American press, it seems like its overriding goal, its daily obsession, its ''grand strategy'' almost, is to derail American foreign policy. Based on my personal experience as a consultant for the French foreign Ministry, I can testify that this is simply not true. There is, in the Quai d'Orsay, a great deal of expertise and knowledge about Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia—much less, unfortunately, about American foreign policy and the American political system. And what could be called the ''American factor'' (''how will it play in Washington ?'') in each regional issue is probably more often overlooked than overemphasized. The French complain, more loudly than most perhaps, about American arrogance and unilateralism, but at the end of the day, it is understood in the French government that the world still needs America—as it has for nearly a century now—for peace and stability, and for confronting the new transnational threats of the 21st century.
Now, let's examine the real reasons behind the French attitude toward the war in Iraq.
War on terrorism is the most important one—definitely. The French see the invasion of Iraq as a step backward in the war against terrorism, as quite a few experts do.(see footnote 9) They feel that the invasion has made their daily life less secure—and they know about islamist terrorism, having been targeted by terrorists many times since the 1980's—and twice last year by Al Qaeda in Karachi and in the Arabian Sea. There are many reasons for this assumption : Saddam was never convincingly linked to Al Qaeda ; terrorist recruitment will be fueled ; the show of force cannot deter terrorists networks that have no territorial basis, and cannot coerce the countries that are the real problem—Saudi Arabia and Pakistan ; etc.(see footnote 10)
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Proliferation of WMD is another one. If even a tiny portion of Iraqi biological material mentioned by President Bush in his State of the Union address has slipped into the hands of terrorists just before or during the invasion, which would, in the French view, not have happened under Saddam's rule, then the danger of catastrophic terrorism has increased. Moreover, there is a worry that exaggerations about Saddam's WMD may decrease the ability of the international community to mobilize public opinion against proliferation in other places, particularly Iran and North Korea.
European historical pessimism and wariness of war—The U.S. strategy in Iraq had many bases, but beyond question one important basis was a peculiarly American optimism about the ability to change the world through the application of military power. Spurred on by their immense power and general historical optimism, Americans seem confident that they can meet the challenge of bringing freedom, stability, and democracy to a post-Saddam Iraq, and maybe even trigger a democratic wave in the region.
In France, and in Europe as a whole, the historical view is more pessimistic. Europeans see little in their long and sorrowful experience in the region—especially the British and French, the Mandatory Powers for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine after World War I—to support the notion that force and occupation can bring democracy to the Arab world.(see footnote 11) A vocal minority of French intellectuals and politicians, however, did emphasize that part of the agenda (democratization), and advocated supporting the US (from Bernard Kouchner to Alain Madelin, Romain Goupil, André Glucksmann, Pascal Bruckner . . .) because as a goal the idea of supporting democracy and conflict resolution in the Middle East enjoys widespread support in France. The question is the means.
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And regime change through military intervention doesn't have much appeal in France. Having experienced military conflict on their continent within living memory, Europeans feel they know more about its consequences than Americans, and their threshold for deciding when war as a last resort becomes necessary is consequently higher—which doesn't necessarily mean pacifism, for France at least. Last but not least, this war was seen as unnecessarily fueling a possible ''clash of civilizations'' between the West and the Arab / Muslim world.
These are the real reasons behind the French position in the last few months. It has to be acknowledged though that a vast majority of experts—including myself—, here and elsewhere, failed to predict that these reasons would be enough for France to attempt to stand in the way of U.S. action in Iraq. The surprise that resulted goes a long way in explaining the bitterness of the aftermath. So the question remains : why did we misunderstand what France would do?
In retrospect, France's actions reveal that a new transatlantic system is slowly emerging, where old patterns are increasingly replaced by new ones, old rules by new rules. This is why, Mr. Chairman, to your question ''Do we really face a crisis in transatlantic relations ?'', my answer would be yes. Some define ''crisis'' as the moment when an old order disappears, and a new order has not taken over yet, and this definition perfectly captures the current moment.
Many of us applied the old narrative of French-US relations to the recent crisis. They thought that in the end, however reluctantly, France would go along as it did in the Cuban missile crisis, in the Euromissile crisis, in the Gulf War, etc. Here, however, France did not conform to this ''bad-weather friend'' role. On the contrary, it badly overplayed a weak hand. But it is also indicative of the new transatlantic game that the US didn't conform to its traditional role either—and overplayed a strong hand.
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To put it succinctly, if the Soviet threat had still been present, France would never have so clearly opposed the US on an issue presented by Washington as vital for its national security—but Washington would also never have claimed that it faced a vital threat from a country without first achieving consensus from its allies on the threat, or at least would not have requested absolute loyalty from its allies on this somewhat shaky basis.
This is why, to answer another question of your letter, it has become somewhat difficult to be a French or a European Atlanticist recently. We are ready to support the US, explain and defend its position, fight anti-Americanism (we were enthusiastic about Kosovo and Afghanistan, for example(see footnote 12)), and condemn President Chirac's hardball diplomacy of this winter, but many of us had trouble following the US in its Iraq policy, in its new doctrine of preemption, in its talk of empire . . . and its hardball diplomacy of this winter(see footnote 13). This is not the America we used to know and defend, and many of us aren't sure, in the Iraq case, that it's the America which acts for the public good. On the contrary, some of us think that Washington has somewhat undermined the mobilization and credibility that are necessary to fight proliferation of WMD.
But let me get back to the evolution of the transatlantic game.
In the old transatlantic system, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and for most of the decade that followed, a set of norms, rules, and habits of intense consultations went hand in hand with an American leadership that oscillated between sharing decisions on matters of common interest and cleverly pretending to do so while acting largely on its own.(see footnote 14) A dense network of first- and second-track diplomacy ensured that even when they disagreed, allies would understand each other's position and make adjustments to avoid conflict and keep the fiction of an Alliance of equals.
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The new system has very different rules, which derive from power, not leadership. Washington decides, and European allies are expected to conform without having a say, sometimes without even proper information and discussion. ''Diplomatic contact across the Atlantic is dropping precipitously in terms of quantity and quality'', as one observer remarks, based on precise figures(see footnote 15), and in this respect, the diplomacy preceding the First Gulf War and the Iraq war have been strikingly different.
The best metaphor for the new system is probably the royal court, where the power of each courtier is not based on his capabilities but on its proximity to the person of the king, which in turn is based on his unconditional loyalty to the king. That's why instead of hearing talk of ''discussions, agreements, disagreements, negotiations'', words that imply an alliance of democratic nations, one now hears talk of ''punishment, reward, scolding, the cold shoulder'' words that imply an absolutist central authority that has its favorites and its sycophants.
From an international relations theory point of view, such an evolution is perfectly normal in the absence of the Soviet threat, and only cultural factors can explain the delay in updating the transatlantic relation according to the new repartition of power. Washington maximizes its power by avoiding European unity on important questions (one administration official defines the new policy towards Europe as one of ''disaggregation''(see footnote 16)), and prefers dealing with each European country on a bilateral basis where its relative power is bigger. This, as well as the multiplication of different informal foras where participants are hand-picked by Washington, allows a much freer hand. Of course, one can wonder it this is really in America's long term interest, but that's another question.
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The evolution from the old to the new transatlantic system should also be put in the context of the declining importance of Europe in military and strategic terms for the US, reinforced by 9/11.(see footnote 17) It is, however, noteworthy that when America needs help for something—be it peacekeepers, financial support, intelligence about terrorist networks and the like—the continent where it finds its allies is Europe.(see footnote 18)
So how has Europe reacted to this new posture, to the implementation of these new rules ? We can distinguish three groups—each of which exists in all European countries.
The first group plays by the new rules, either by necessity—like some East European leaders—or because the deal is better for them in the new game.
The second group still conforms to the old transatlantic rules, hopes they will return, and thinks that the Iraqi crisis was a just an exception. Many in Germany and Turkey, for example, wonder why their country is blamed for not having overridden public opinion and parliament, and interpret this as temporary incident, not a new structural environment.
The third group tries to react to the downgrading of transatlantic relations by fostering European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follow a foreign policy more adapted to its ideals and its interests. After all, they say, if Europe is not at the center of America's strategic equation any more, the reverse is true also—Europe doesn't depend on America for its daily security anymore (except for some East European countries). This group, feeling that its real interests are not necessarily advanced or taken into account by America anymore, is ready to cooperate with Washington on a case-by-case basis, which leaves room for many joints projects, but doesn't ensure automatic cooperation. President Chirac's policy is a symptom of this pragmatic adaptation to the new rules.
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So among these three reactions, which prevails in Europe ? As Phil Gordon has noted, ''last month's Security Council vote authorizing the American-led occupation of Iraq was seen by many in Washington as vindicating a certain style of American leadership: ''if we lead they will follow''.''(see footnote 19) But, as the same author notes, this interpretation is only partially true.
One must remember that if Chirac was not speaking for Europe, he certainly was speaking for the European