SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
Wednesday, April 30, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m., in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lamar Smith, Sonny Bono, Edward A. Pease, Christopher B. Cannon, Ed Bryant, Melvin L. Watt, and Zoe Lofgren.
Also present: Representative John Conyers, Jr.
Staff present: Cordia A. Strom, chief counsel; George Fishman, counsel; Judy Knott, staff assistant; and Martina Hone minority counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SMITH
Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims will come to order. In America, the highest title we can aspire to is that of citizen. Unfortunately, the integrity of the naturalization process broke down in 1996 during the Citizenship USA initiative. As a result, we will never know for sure how many individuals were naturalized despite having been convicted of disqualifying crimes or who were naturalized having already been ordered deported.
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We will not be going over that ground in this hearing. What we will do is consider the promises made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, promises that integrity would be restored to the naturalization program by the implementation of needed reforms.
The first promise was made on November 29, 1996. That was the date INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a memorandum to the field, mandating steps to overhaul and improve the naturalization process. The second promise was made on March 5, when Commissioner Meissner testified, ''we made mistakes in Citizenship USA. We have corrected those mistakes.''
This hearing could have been about an INS success story, about how decisive and effective leadership from headquarters and teamwork in the field restored some of the lost integrity in the process. Instead, we are forced to have yet another hearing about INS failure, failure at headquarters and failure in the field. INS's promises of naturalization reform have not yet been fulfilled.
Recall that in 1994, the Department of Justice's Inspector General and the General Accounting Office warned INS of a gaping hole in its security measures surrounding the finger-printing process for naturalization applicants. There was found to be little control over the entities taking fingerprints and little assurance that aliens with criminal records were not submitting friends' clean fingerprints as their own. If such a practice was widespread, and no one knows if it was or not, the entire criminal background check process was compromised.
Three years later, the INS is finally acting on the Inspector General and GAO reports by instituting a Designated Fingerprint Service, ''DFS,'' Program. Only INS-certified businesses and organizations will be able to take fingerprints. And only employees trained by INS and having passed criminal background checks themselves will be able to take fingerprints. Persons seeking fingerprints will have to prove their identities to DFS employees.
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So far so good. Then we learned that the INS can authorize as fingerprinters DFS employees who have been convicted of aggravated felonies and crimes involving dishonesty. This was discouraging enough. But then we looked at an INS printout of approved DFS's and pending applications. We have liquor stores, Harbor Liquors in Baltimore. We have photo shops, One Hour Photo Express in Los Angeles. We have advocacy organizations, Hermandad Mexicana Nacional in Los Angeles. We have hairstylists, Biscayne Haircutters in Miami. We have bridal shops, Humberta's Bridal Shop in Los Angeles. We have professional services, Lulu's Professional Services in West Covina, CA. And we have Susie's Helping Hands in Glendale, CA. As for the hundreds of storefront businesses, it is doubtful whether the INS will be able to effectively monitor them all. This may well be another scandal waiting to happen.
The Commissioner's memo of November 29, 1996, outlined seven ''naturalization quality procedures which will enhance and monitor the quality of the present process.'' The procedures were to be implemented immediately. The memo included a crucial step, halting all naturalization until word came back from the FBI that the applicants had no disqualifying criminal record. This was a vital and necessary step to help restore credibility to the naturalization process, but it didn't happen.
Several months after this subcommittee was told that the reforms had been implemented, the accounting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick ventured into the field to evaluate how the reforms were in fact being implemented. Peat Marwick found that, of 23 sites investigated, 15 were found in noncompliance. Seven were marginally in compliance. Only one was fully in compliance. That's a terrible report card. One A, 7 D's, and 15 F's. Made more terrible by the fact that INS headquarters was assuring us that all was well. As a result of its evaluation, Peat Marwick states that it ''cannot provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.''
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Once again, the INS has failed the American people. Once again, it is up to Congress, overseeing the INS and through legislation, to make sure that integrity is restored to the naturalization process.
[Opening statement of Mr. Smith follows:
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
The Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims will come to order.
In America, the highest title one can aspire to is that of citizen. Unfortunately, the integrity of the naturalization process broke down in 1996 during the ''Citizenship USA'' initiative. As a result, we will never know for sure how many individuals were naturalized despite having been convicted of disqualifying crimes or who were naturalized having already been ordered deported.
We will not be going over that ground in this hearing. What we will do is consider the promises made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, promises that integrity would be restored to the naturalization program by the implementation of needed reforms.
The first promise was made on November 29. That was the date INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a memorandum to the field mandating steps overhaul and improve the naturalization process. The second promise was made on March 5 when Commissioner Meissner testified, ''[w]e made mistakes in Citizenship USA. . . . We have corrected those mistakes . . . .''
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This hearing could have been about an INS success story—about how decisive and effective leadership from headquarters and teamwork in the field restored some of the lost integrity in the process. Instead, we are forced to have yet another hearing about INS failure—failure at headquarters and failure in the field. INS's promises of naturalization reform have not been fulfilled.
Recall that in 1994, the Department of Justice's Inspector General and the General Accounting Office warned INS of a gaping hole in its security measures surrounding the fingerprinting process for naturalization applicants. There was found to be little control over the entities taking fingerprints and little assurance that aliens with criminal records were not submitting friends' ''clean'' fingerprints as their own. If such a practice was widespread, and no one knows if it was or not, the entire criminal background check process was compromised.
Three years later, the INS is finally acting on the Inspector General and GAO reports by instituting a ''Designated Fingerprint Service''—DFS—Program. Only INS-certified businesses and organizations will be able to take fingerprints. And, only employees trained by INS and having passed criminal background checks themselves will be able to take fingerprints. Persons seeking fingerprints will have to prove their identities to DFS employees.
So far, so good. Then we learned that the INS can authorize as fingerprinters DFS employees who have been convicted of aggravated felonies and crimes involving dishonesty.
This was discouraging enough. But then we looked at an INS printout of approved DFSs and pending applications. We have liquor stores—Harbor Liquors in Baltimore. We have photo shops—1 Hr. Photo Express in Los Angeles. We have advocacy organizations—Hermandad Mexicana Nacional in Los Angeles. We have hairstylists—Biscayne Haircutters in Miami. We have bridal shops-Humberta's Bridal Shop in Los Angeles. We have professional services—Lulu's Professional Services in West Covina, California. And we have Susie's Helping Hands in Glendale, California.
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As for the hundreds of storefront businesses, it is doubtful whether the INS will be able to effectively monitor them all. This may well be another scandal waiting to happen.
The Commissioner's memo of November 29, 1996, outlined seven ''naturalization quality procedures which will enhance and monitor the quality of the present process.'' The procedures were to be implemented immediately. The memo included a crucial step—halting all naturalizations until word came back from the FBI that the applicants had no disqualifying criminal record.
This was a vital and necessary step to help restore credibility to the naturalization process. But it didn't happen.
Several months after this Subcommittee was told that the reforms had been implemented, the accounting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick recently ventured into the field to evaluate how the reforms were being implemented. Peat Marwick's findings: of 23 sites investigated, 15 were found in noncompliance, seven were marginally in compliance, and one was fully in compliance. That's a terrible report card—one A, seven D's, and fifteen F's—made more terrible by the fact that headquarters was assuring us that all was well.
As a result of its evaluation, Peat Marwick states that it ''cannot provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions. '' Once again, the INS has failed the American people. Once again, it is up to Congress, overseeing the INS and through legislation, to make sure that integrity is restored to the naturalization process.
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The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I read the title to this morning's hearing, oversight hearing on safeguarding the integrity of the naturalization process, and one could only think of apple pie and Chevrolet. If I had any inclination that that's really what we were here about, I would be the first to say let's talk about doing something to safeguard the integrity of the naturalization process. I think we all would.
At the last hearing, the chairman said I had a way of putting things in a partisan political context, and said I was politicizing issues by accusing him and the Republicans of doing things. I don't want to not live up to his expectation today because I have to say what my perception is about what we're doing here. The chairman is correct that there were some problems obviously with the Citizenship USA undertaking, but he makes it sound like this naturalization problem that we're having is some kind of new phenomena that started only last year during the Citizenship USA episode. One has to view that in context if one is to understand what this hearing is probably all about.
The very same procedures that the Reagan administration was following, which was if you didn't hear back from the FBI about fingerprints within 60 days, you were presumed to be OK. Therefore, don't investigate, don't ask, don't tell. That policy didn't start with this administration. It started sometime back. I'm not trying to justify it, but it needs to be put in a political—in the context that is appropriate. We need to understand and recognize the facts associated with that process. Democrats didn't start that process. It was started under the Republican administration. Actually, we have been trying to clean it up, if anything. So at least put it in context if we're going to talk about it.
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Additionally, we can call off all of these funny names of private enterprises that are doing fingerprinting now, but understand that privatization of the fingerprinting process was not our idea. It was an idea that sprang from the whole notion that we ought to privatize everything that we could privatize in the Federal Government. Guess whose notion that was? It wasn't our notion. We have been saying all along that the fingerprinting of people who are seeking naturalization is one of the most important steps in the process, and there ought to be an absolute degree of integrity about it. While the Republicans were saying oh no, let's privatize this. So when we get Sally Lou's Hairdresser or Kinko's or somebody out on the corner who is set up in private industry to do fingerprinting, and that process lacks the integrity, guess what happens? We come right around full circle and we start second-guessing those policies which probably never should have been implemented in the first place, if we were going to have the highest degree of integrity to the system.
Now understand that none of us wants anybody naturalized as a citizen without going through the appropriate process. If we are in fact here to talk about the integrity of the naturalization process, I am all for that. But if we are here to just beat up on folks and politicize this whole issue, which is I think substantially what we have done with the Citizenship USA thing, and done to the point I might add, that the INS has gotten to the point where it's looking over its shoulder every time we try to proceed with the naturalization process and we're back now to a 2-year backlog in processing applications.
So then we will be having a hearing next week about--in fact, we had that hearing already, I'm sorry. We already had that hearing about why we're so far behind in the naturalization process. So we can't win, regardless of which way we go. If we adjust too much one way and try to protect the integrity of the process, then you are a failure. If you adjust too much the other way and try to speed up the process, then you are a failure. So this is about declaring that the INS is a failure, and that this failure has taken place under a Democratic administration and we ought to call the spade the spade, and if I sound like I am being political about this, it's because I believe this committee is being political about it. I have to be honest in my assessment of it, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Watt. I certainly would agree with you that it's possible that Citizenship USA has been politicized. As for the INS, by the way, I hope that they will show us the right way by process of elimination, if no other way.
Without objection, your kinder and gentler other opening statement will be made a part of the record.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, sir. I kind of strayed from it this morning.
Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from California, Mr. Bono, is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can only speak for myself and for the time that I have been here in Congress, which has been relatively short, my feelings and communications with the INS. I can assure everybody in this room that I am really not interested in the political aspect. If I understand the INS correctly, they have two functions. One is the naturalization of people who want to become American citizens through a system that we have structured. Evidently that is backlogged.
But I think the second function, as I understand it, correct me, is to not let people enter this country illegally. Thus we also have an equivalent problem at least. In my State, it threatens it into bankruptcy. That's a big problem.
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On this issue of fingerprinting, I don't care if Reagan or whoever started it. It baffles me, coming from private enterprise and coming from the street, that when you have an operation and it's bad and inefficient, generally you have a head of a department that says this doesn't work. It's not effective, inefficient, and totally wrong that to continue to do something like that I don't frankly understand that. I don't understand why the Government or Government agencies can do it. So where it started and why, I'll certainly grant Mr. Watt his statements on where it started and even why, if he wants. But my question is, why do we keep doing it. It is not obvious, as I understand it, and again, the other problem is I'll ask a question, get one story, and have to dig into that story to find out whether it's accurate or inaccurate. So far, I must say on the fingerprinting, everything I have been told is inaccurate. I still don't know the whole story on fingerprinting and can't get it. I'm going to try one more time privately in my office, to hold a hearing on fingerprinters, find out exactly how it's done and can we fix it.
So good guy, bad guy, forget that. Can we please fix that portion of the INS agency so that at least we can be effective there both ways, for the naturalization and for keeping out illegal aliens. But why, gentlemen, we have just gentlemen right now, why do when we have these hearings, Ms. Meissner herself told me something that's inaccurate about fingerprinting. I would prefer not to ask the question and just go ahead and dig into it.
There is no need to not say OK, it's screwed up, let's fix it. If we are going to say it's screwed up, let's fix it, then it's screwed up, and please let's fix it. I don't want to do anything political about it. I just want to fix it. It's broken. It's disaster. Can we fix it? Can this hearing get to can we now fix it, both in naturalization and illegal, both systems don't work. Both are being tested. One has a pilot program by people who don't do fingerprinting, but they are going to assemble a pilot program. The other, I was told by the Justice Department. I was told by the Justice Department that they took their own fingerprints. There are so many stories here. Could we just get an accurate story? Can we just say what's the problem? Can we confront it? Then can we fix it. That's all I ask. No politics. Just common logical sense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bono. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, is recognized.
Ms. LOFGREN. I'll be brief. I do think that this is a serious matter before us. There is always good news and bad news. The good news, I guess, is that in the review of the actual files undertaken, we didn't find any case where someone had been improperly naturalized, which is good. Of course the bad news is that the systems are insufficient to give us ongoing continuing assurance that all is proper, which is what we all want and need.
I think the discussion of the history of the inefficiency in the agency is appropriate, and certainly it goes back long before the Reagan years. This agency needs to come forward into the modern information age. I was thinking actually earlier this morning of the amount of information, just bits of information that the INS and FBI have to deal with in processing not just naturalization, but all of the variety of matters that need to be processed. The procedures and the technology that is present in each agency to accomplish the tasks they face, there isn't a private entity in the country that would attempt to manage this much information with the technology available to this agency. You wouldn't find a credit card company trying to manage that much information with the technology available to the INS and the FBI. You wouldn't find insurance companies.
So I think we need to take a look. We need to be serious. We need to ask tough questions. But we need to look at this as an opportunity to bring this agency forward into the information age and to give it the tools and technology to manage the vast amount of data available to it. That should be a bipartisan effort. I am hopeful that it will be, listening to the chairman and Mr. Bono, I have hopes that this will be a collaborative effort to make this work better. We don't need to change the law of naturalization. All of the barriers are in place. This is an administrative issue that faces us. I am hopeful that working with the Commissioner, who I guess will be talking with us later, that we can set achievable but high goals for ourselves, both the committee and the agency, make sure that the funding is in place to bring the technology forward.
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I would add also that I think we need to look very carefully at the role of the FBI in this. It's very easy to be critical, and I often am, of the Immigration Service, but the role of the FBI, I mean I think the INS is the biggest customer of the FBI for this type of information. The FBI is not providing data in a timely fashion. That needs to be examined. We need to look at how we can help improve that situation as well.
As I mentioned to the chairman, I do have a pressing obligation at the beginning of this hearing, but I will return. I am eager to participate with all of you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. I appreciate that opening statement.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant, is recognized.
Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will have to be in and out today. I have two other subcommittees meeting at the same time, but I did want to make a brief opening statement.
After our last hearing on March 5, the situation at the INS is beginning to seem a little to me like the owner of a dog which is constantly jumping over its fence and running loose in the neighborhood and getting into everyone's garden and garbage. The damage is done. The neighbors complained and the owner promised everyone that she would fix it so that the dog wouldn't be able to get out of the yard anymore. The owner promises to build a taller fence to tie up the dog and to set up an electric fence so that the dog can't do anymore damage, all good ideas which the neighbors think will work. Except that the owner never checked to see if the electric fence was plugged in, if the dog could dig under the new fence or if the dog could chew through the rope that was used to tie him up.
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Mr. Chairman, it has now been 6 months since the Commissioner issued her memo outlining the changes she expected to make within the INS in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the Citizenship USA fiasco we examined at our last hearing. New and tougher procedures, higher fences, electric fences, tying up the dog, those types of things by way of analogy, were promised in order to ensure reliability of the fingerprints used for the background checks and to restore the integrity and security of the naturalization procedures.
Yet according to Peat Marwick's findings, only 1 INS site in 24 was found to have been in compliance with the Commissioner's directive. Given these discouraging results and the amount of time which has passed since the changes were called for, I am beginning to question the sincerity of this agency's promises to reform itself. It seems to me that if the INS attacked these administrative problems with half as much zeal as it displayed in attempting to naturalize one million new citizens in time for the 1996 elections, the processing time for new applicants could be dramatically, cut back without sacrificing the quality of the background checks.
Mr. Chairman, the mistakes of Citizenship USA and a lack of agency oversight in correcting these mistakes has cheapened the value of becoming a naturalized citizen. I think we owe it to those immigrants who have diligently followed the rules in hope of becoming a U.S. citizen to hold the INS responsible and to ensure that the appropriate changes are not only made, but that they are actually carried out in a proper fashion. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bryant.
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We will go to the first panel, who are already in place. We welcome Stephen Colgate, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Department of Justice. Gary Ahrens, Principal, KPMG Peat Marwick. Norman Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, General Accounting Office. And Dennis Kurre, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I thank you all for being here. We will start off with Mr. Colgate.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN R. COLGATE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ADMINISTRATION, JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. COLGATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Watt. Last fall, the Attorney General asked me to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service to respond to questions raised by your subcommittee and others concerning whether persons with disqualifying criminal records were improperly granted citizenship. At that time, I recommended using an independent accounting review can certify the appropriateness of INS' case review process.
KPMG Peat Marwick was subsequently tasked with this project. In addition, KPMG was also asked to conduct an internal control implementation review at INS field sites to assess whether the naturalization quality procedures INS developed last fall were in place and working. On November 29, 1996, INS instituted new naturalization quality procedures (NQP), covering seven key enhancements. To assess whether these new procedures were implemented correctly, KPMG conducted NQP implementation reviews at 24 INS field sites that account for approximately 85 percent of the naturalization workload.
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On April 17, 1997, KPMG reported that the NQP increased internal control and significantly reduced the risk of incorrectly naturalizing an applicant. But it also reported that the criminal history validation, a key control to NQP, remains ineffective.
KPMG also found that the NQP standards were unevenly applied across the INS as a result of the lack of standardized training and an ineffective communication of the NQP requirements. Because of these findings, KPMG could not provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.
In response to KPMG's report, INS is revising its NQP and will soon train field representatives on the revised procedures. KPMG will conduct a more formal and detailed followup audit beginning in midsummer to assess the implementation of the revised NQP.
The Department is taking a number of other actions to further strengthen the naturalization program. First, the Attorney General and Commissioner Meissner assigned two individuals to assist INS in improving the integrity of the naturalization system. Robert K. Bratt, currently with the Department's Criminal Division, has been assigned to INS to serve as Executive Director for Naturalization Operations. Working directly under the Commissioner, he will oversee the operations of the naturalization program and develop an action plan to correct the systemic problems within the program. The Attorney General and Commissioner Meissner have pledged to give Mr. Bratt whatever resources he needs to get the job done.
Charles Bowsher, formerly the Comptroller General of the United States, will serve as a Special Advisor to the Commissioner on a part-time noncompensated basis. He will assist in the development of the action plan and advise the Commissioner on the best ways to implement the new procedures.
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Second, the Attorney General recently established the Fingerprint Coordination Group. I chair monthly meetings of the group which consist of high level officials from INS and the FBI. The group is dedicated to identifying ways to expedite the criminal background checks performed as part of the naturalization application process and ensure that INS is provided with accurate and timely information on each applicant. The group's efforts will ensure an integrated approach to all process improvements and automation efforts.
Third, the Department and INS are taking a major step toward safeguarding the integrity of the citizenship program, while ensuring that INS customers receive competent and timely consideration of their applications. This will be accomplished through the joint Department of Justice/INS Naturalization Reengineering and Change Management Project.
The accounting and consulting firm of Coopers & Lybrand was selected to lead a reengineering effort to revamp the entire naturalization system. The scope of this strategic effort, reengineering, implementation, training, and evaluation is significant. The project will last 18 to 24 months. The data gathering phase will include the solicitation of views from Members of Congress. It is critical to maintain the integrity of the naturalization process by providing reasonable assurances that all persons naturalized meet the legal and regulatory requirements. The Department will dedicate the resources required to reinvent and strengthen the naturalization process. Our work is still underway and we remain committed to this task. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Colgate follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN R. COLGATE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ADMINISTRATION, JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss our efforts to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in its efforts to improve the naturalization program.
Last Fall, the Attorney General asked me to help INS respond to questions raised by your Subcommittee and others concerning whether persons with disqualifying criminal records were improperly granted citizenship. At that time, I recommended that an independent accounting firm review and certify the appropriateness of INS' case review process, and KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (KPMG) was subsequently tasked with this project. In addition, KPMG was also asked to conduct an internal control implementation review at INS field sites to assess whether the Naturalization Quality Procedures INS developed last Fall were in place and working. KPMG would then conduct a more detailed follow-up audit at any sites where shortcomings were found.
On November 29, 1996, INS instituted new Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP) covering seven key enhancements, including: (1) standardization of work process; (2) fingerprint check integrity; (3) enhanced supervisory review; (4) instructions regarding temporary file use; (5) implementation of a standardized quality assurance program; (6) guidance regarding revocation proceedings; and (7) requirements for increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test sites. To assess whether these new procedures were implemented correctly, KPMG conducted NQP implementation reviews, between February 19, and March 26, 1997, at all four INS Service Centers, eight Citizenship USA sites and 12 other District Offices, which together account for approximately 85% of the naturalization workload.
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On April 17, 1997, KPMG issued its report. It stated that while the majority of the field sites were implementing the intent of the NQP, implementation of the required procedures was very inconsistent. The most critical finding related to the quality of fingerprint cards received by INS and forwarded to the FBI for criminal background checks.
The KPMG report indicates that the NQP increased internal control and significantly reduced the risk of incorrectly naturalizing an applicant. But the report also states that the criminal history validation, a key control of the NQP, remains ineffective. KPMG also found that the NQP standards were unevenly applied across INS as a result of the lack of standardized training and an ineffective communication of the NQP requirements. Because of these findings, KPMG could not provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions. Mr. Gary Ahrens, KPMG Principal, will discuss the KPMG report in more detail.
In response to the KPMG report, INS is revising its NQP and will soon train field representatives on the revised procedures. Commissioner Meissner will describe the INS response in more detail. KPMG will conduct a more formal and detailed follow-up audit, beginning in June 1997, to assess the implementation of the revised NQP.
I would also like to speak to several other actions the Department is taking to further strengthen the naturalization program. First, as announced last Friday, the Attorney General and Commissioner Meissner have assigned two individuals to assist INS in addressing the need to improve the integrity of the naturalization system.
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Robert Bratt, currently with the Department's Criminal Division, has been assigned to INS to serve as Executive Director for Naturalization Operations. Working directly under the Commissioner, he will oversee the operations of the naturalization program and develop an action plan to correct the systemic problems within the program. His first priority will be to ensure that current naturalization case processing complies with the revised NQP requirements. Mr. Bratt will directly manage the field operations staff responsible for implementing those procedures. He will also supervise implementation of recommendations stemming from the ongoing INS and KPMG case review. The Attorney General and Commissioner Meissner have pledged to give Mr. Bratt whatever resources he needs to do the job.
Charles Bowsher, former Comptroller General of the United States, will serve as Special Advisor to the Commissioner on a part-time, non-compensated basis. He will assist in the development of the action plan and advise the Commissioner on the best ways to implement the new procedures.
Second, the Attorney General recently established the Fingerprint Coordination Group. I chair monthly meetings of the Group, which consists of high level officials from INS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Group is dedicated to improving the processing of INS fingerprint cards, the largest single customer of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division. Through exchanges of information regarding each organization's processes, sharing of technical expertise, increased reliance on automation, and assignment of personnel to the other agency's facilities, these two organizations are identifying ways to expedite the criminal background checks performed as part of the naturalization application process and ensure that the INS is provided with accurate and timely information on each applicant. The group's efforts will ensure an integrated approach to all process improvements and automation efforts. The resulting improvements will help both INS and FBI reduce current workload backlogs.
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Third, the Department and the INS are taking a major step toward safeguarding the integrity of the citizenship program while ensuring that INS customers receive competent and timely consideration of their applications. This will be accomplished through the joint DOJ/INS Naturalization Reengineering and Change Management Project.
On March 20, 1997, the Attorney General announced that the accounting and consulting firm of Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) had been selected to lead a reengineering effort to revamp the entire system through which immigrants become U.S. citizens. The scope of this strategic effort—reengineering, implementation, training and evaluation—is significant. The project will last 18–24 months and consist of three phases: data-gathering and process redesign, implementation, and evaluation.
Since this project is still in the early stages of data-gathering, there is little to report. Please be assured that the data-gathering phase will include the solicitation of views from Members of Congress.
During the life of the project, C&L will examine many aspects of the naturalization program including program organization, technology, facilities, organizational culture, internal and external communications practices, management structure and planning capacity. They will also look at civics and language testing, partnerships between INS and community-based organizations, operating guidelines and employee training. The Attorney General has specifically directed that C&L focus its attention on the coordination between INS and FBI related to criminal background checks.
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The Department's Justice Management Division is responsible for the overall administration of the C&L contract. However, we are working closely with INS management, key staff and a full-time team of INS naturalization experts who are responsible for the substantive areas of the project.
It is critical to maintain the integrity of the naturalization process by providing reasonable assurance that all persons naturalized meet the legal and regulatory requirements. The Department will dedicate the resources required to reinvent and strengthen the naturalization process. Our work is still underway, and we remain committed to the task.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Colgate. Mr. Ahrens.
STATEMENT OF GARY M. AHRENS, ON BEHALF OF KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP
Mr. AHRENS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Mr. Watt. I am Gary Ahrens, a principal in KPMG Peat Marwick's public service's practice, based in our Dayton, OH, office. I am the firm's senior representative responsible for the INS' naturalization quality procedures implementation review recently completed for the Department of Justice. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. In the interest of time, I will summarize the statement which I have submitted to this subcommittee.
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Mr. Chairman, between February 19 and March 26, 1997, we conducted a review for the Department of Justice of the INS's implementation of its November 29, 1996, naturalization quality procedures, or NQP. It is important to emphasize from the onset that this was a review and not an audit. This review was intended to provide the Department of Justice with a snapshot look at the progress INS was making throughout the country with respect to implementing its newly instituted NQP requirements.
As you will see from the results of our findings released in our final report to the Justice Department on April 17, and provided to this subcommittee, the INS is a vastly decentralized organization, partially explaining its problems in fully implementing the NQP which were issued by memorandum on November 29.
Although these controls are a significant improvement over previous methods, they are not without potential error. Because FBI billing information may need to be manipulated to fit into INS tracking systems, potential errors remain a possibility. Specifically, we have identified the INS's lack of quality control in the processing of FD–258 fingerprint cards as the root cause of potential matching errors between the FBI and INS. Matching failures have resulted in a growing backlog of INS cases classified as not found.
Further, to ensure that no pending cases are processed until a definitive criminal history or response from the FBI is received, a unique system generated control number has been required. However, in our review, we were unable to verify that this mandatory check had always taken place. Since this is the validation step of this critical control, we feel this constitutes a material weakness in the criminal history validation process. To further compound this validation problem, it is important to note that the State and local agencies are not required to report criminal arrest data to the FBI.
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As you will see from our report, our remaining findings reveal two other areas of concern, dissemination of the new procedures and staff training. With respect to the dissemination of the new NQP issued last November, we discovered three different versions of the memorandum had been distributed throughout INS. Further, upon reviewing the training records related to the NQP memorandum, we discovered that INS headquarters had decentralized NQP training down to the individual office level. As a result, we have concluded that the NQP standards outlined in the implementation memorandum have been unevenly applied across the INS, perhaps as a result of a lack of standardized training and an inability to communicate effectively the importance of the NQP requirements or their intended purpose.
Mr. Chairman, while I can not emphasize enough the importance in clarifying that this review of the INS was by no means a complete and thorough audit of its operations, internal systems, methodologies or controls, a number of general conclusions could be surmised from this review process. Generally due to the potential weakness in the FBI and INS matching procedures and the continued lack of adequate controls within the fingerprint process, as well as the overall implementation of the NQP, KPMG cannot provide this committee with any assurances that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.
Again, I appreciate being able to appear before you today. I'll be happy to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahrens follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY M. AHRENS, ON BEHALF OF KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP
Chairman Smith and members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Ahrens, a principal in KPMG Peat Marwick's Public Services practice based in our Dayton, Ohio office. I am the firm's senior representative responsible for the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Naturalization Quality Procedures implementation review recently completed for the Department of Justice. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I am prepared to answer any questions you may have about the work that we performed during this review project.
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP is one of the world's largest and most diversified professional firms, with more than 76,200 professionals in 147 countries and annual revenues in excess of $8 billion. KPMG's Public Services practice, where I am engaged, employs more than 2,300 people and operates in 90 geographic locations throughout the United States. The Public Services line of business is dedicated to serving the diverse needs of federal, state, and local governments.
From a more personal perspective, I have been with the firm for more than 7 years where I have developed considerable expertise in the areas of management improvement, business process re-engineering, information systems, financial modeling, organizational analysis, and the development of financial and organizational policies and procedures. This expertise has led to extensive hands-on experience in various organizational and process improvement initiatives in both government and industry.
Because of the extensive level of experience that KPMG has throughout the public services sector, the Department of Justice had engaged our services under federal contract to perform a number of INS specific review tasks. Between February 19 and March 26, 1997, we conducted a review for the Department of Justice of the INS implementation of its Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP).
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It is important to emphasize from the onset that this was a review and not an audit. By its very nature, this review was intended to provide the Department of Justice with a snapshot look at the progress INS was making throughout the country with respect to implementing its newly instituted NQP requirements.
As you will see from the results of our findings released in our final report to the Justice Department on April 17th and provided to this subcommittee, the INS is a vastly decentralized organization, partially explaining its problems in fully implementing the Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP) which were issued by memorandum on November 29, 1996.
Our review further indicates that, of seven areas addressed in the November 29th memorandum, the INS continues to have significant control problems with its fingerprint process and the identification of statutorily-barred applicants. For example, a key control implemented under the NQP is the establishment of a data match between INS naturalization tracking systems and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) billing system to identify aliens with a disqualifying criminal history. This procedure is intended to prevent the INS from scheduling interviews for or granting citizenship to any applicant before first being notified of the applicant's FBI criminal history record.
Although this control is a significant improvement over previous methods, it is not without potential error. Because the FBI billing information might need to be manipulated to fit into the INS tracking system, potential errors remain a possibility. Specifically, we have identified the INS lack of quality control in the processing of FD–258 fingerprint cards as the root cause of potential matching errors between the FBI and the INS. Matching failures have resulted in a growing backlog of INS cases classified as not found.
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Further, to ensure that no pending cases are processed until a definitive criminal history response from the FBI is received, a unique system-generated control number has been required. However, in our review, we were unable to verify that this mandatory check had always taken place. Since this is the validation step of this critical control, we feel this constitutes a material weakness in the criminal history validation process. To further compound this validation problem, it is important to note that both state and local agencies are not required to report criminal arrest data to the FBI.
In addition to the review findings summarized above, our remaining findings revealed two other areas of concern: dissemination of the new procedures and staff training. With respect to the dissemination of the new NQP issued last November, we discovered three different versions of the memorandum had been distributed throughout INS. Furthermore, upon reviewing the training records related to the NQP memorandum, we discovered that INS Headquarters had decentralized NQP training down to the individual office level. As a result, we have concluded that the NQP standards outlined in the implementation memorandum have been unevenly applied across the INS, perhaps as a result of the lack of standardized training and an inability to communicate effectively the importance of the NQP requirements or their intended purpose.
While I cannot emphasize enough the importance in clarifying that this review of the INS was by no means a complete and thorough audit of its operations, internal systems, methodologies or controls, a number of general conclusions could be surmised from this review process. Generally, due to the potential weaknesses in the FBI and INS matching procedures, and the continued lack of adequate controls within the fingerprint process as well as the overall implementation of the NQP, KPMG cannot provide this committee with any assurances that the INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.
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Again, I appreciate being able to appear before you today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have about this review project.
| KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, |
| Washington, DC, April 28, 1997. |
Hon. LAMAR S. SMITH, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Re: April 30 Hearing—Compliance with Section 10, House Rules.
DEAR CHAIRMAN SMITH: On behalf of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (KPMG), I am writing in conjunction with your April 30, 1997, hearing on the effectiveness of changes in the naturalization process to comply with the requirements of Section 10 of the rules of the House of Representatives, as amended by the 105th Congress.
KPMG understands that, under the new Section 10, it is to provide to your Subcommittee information about government grants and contracts which our firm has been awarded during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Through this letter KPMG herewith provides the most complete information that we can amass on the government contracts which we have been awarded.
KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP
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KPMG Peat Marwick LLP is one of the world's largest and most diversified professional firms, with more than 76,200 professionals in 147 countries and annual revenues in excess of $18 billion. KPMG's Public Services practice, which employs more than 2,300 people and operates in 90 geographic locations throughout the United States, is dedicated to serving the diverse needs of Federal, state, and local governments.
COMPLIATION OF KPMG'S GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS INFORMATION
Because KPMG's internal record-keeping systems do not correspond to the consolidated reporting structure for government contracts as envisioned by Section 10, we have made every effort to generate a new base of information in order to calculate KPMG's work for Federal entities. To do so has required individually contacting our numerous partners responsible for Federal government contracts.
Generally speaking, KPMG provides a wide range of services to Federal entities in the broad areas of auditing and performance improvement consulting. In a number of instances, these services assist Federal agencies in complying with the CFO Act and the Government Performance Results Act. In addition to traditional auditing tasks, KPMG's services to Federal entities include process re-engineering, activity-based costing, budget analysis, program management, systems integration, and economic modeling and analysis.
GOVERNEMNT GRANTS: SUMMARY
KPMG has received no government grants during any of the fiscal years in question.
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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
KPMG received a total of $6.6 million in Federal government contracts from the Department of Justice during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997. During that period, KPMG received a total of $286,386 in contracts from the INS and $1,897,746 in contracts from the Justice Management Division.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: SUMMARY
KPMG received a total of $134 million in Federal government contracts during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997.
CONCLUSION
KPMG hopes that this information provides the Subcommittee with all information necessary to comply with the Rules of the House. We look forward to continuing to work with your Subcommittee on this or any other issue within your jurisdiction.
Sincerely,
| S. Daniel Johnson, |
| National Director, Federal Services. |
cc: Hon. Melvin Watt.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ahrens. Mr. Rabkin.
STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. RABKIN, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. RABKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss INS' process for naturalizing aliens, including its fingerprinting process. My prepared statement discusses the problems that we and others have identified with these processes and the changes INS has made, including the internal controls INS has designed in its revised processes.
In 1994, both we and Justice's Inspector General identified problems with the fingerprinting process. For example, we reported that under INS' procedures at that time, examiners could not determine whether FBI fingerprint checks had been completed because at INS' request, the FBI returned a report only if a criminal history record was found. Accordingly, we recommended that INS obtain the results from the FBI of all of its record and fingerprint checks, including those for aliens who did not have criminal history records. We also recommended that INS monitor the district offices' progress to comply with the INS directives. At that time, INS agreed to implement both of these recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, if INS had implemented the Inspector General and GAO recommendations before September 1995, it could have avoided many of the problems associated with the Citizenship USA initiative. However, it was not until November 1996, after problems with Citizenship USA were disclosed, that INS established procedures that were designed to deal with the problem we identified in December 1994.
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The Commissioner ordered that no aliens were to be approved for naturalization until INS positively knew that they had no disqualifying felony convictions. The Commissioner also ordered that no naturalization cases were to be scheduled for hearings or oath ceremonies until these changes were in place and working.
The Inspector General's February 1994 report recommended needed changes to the fingerprint process. In May 1995, INS issued proposed changes. The final changes were not announced until June 1996. Basically, INS implemented a system that relies on a combination of its own offices and designated fingerprint services. That is, law enforcement agencies and private fingerprint entities that INS would certify as being acceptable. This system became effective on March 1, 1997, when INS began accepting fingerprint cards prepared only by designated services.
Finally, Peat Marwick's report 2 weeks ago showed that INS had not ensured that its field offices were carrying out the Commissioner's instructions. It also highlighted the need for INS to do a better job of monitoring its field offices to ensure that they are properly and completely meeting the Commissioner's expectations.
We have not examined the extent to which INS has carried out its plans to monitor the performance of the outside organizations involved in the naturalization process or its own field offices. However, our past work on the fingerprinting aspects of the process and other aspects of INS management, as well as the recent Peat Marwick report, raise questions about the extent to which INS can today assure itself and the Congress that it is granting citizenship to only those applicants who qualify for it.
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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. RABKIN, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) process for naturalizing aliens, including its fingerprinting procedures. My statement will outline the problems that we and others have identified with these processes and the changes INS has made, including the internal controls INS has designed in its revised processes.
To prepare this statement, we reviewed (1) INS regulations and internal instructions regarding the naturalization and fingerprint processes; (2) the February 1994 report issued by the Justice Department's Inspector General (IG) and our December 1994 report on the fingerprint process; and (3) the April 17, 1997, report by Peat Marwick on INS' implementation of changes to its naturalization process. We discussed a draft of this statement with INS officials and incorporated their comments where appropriate.
BACKGROUND
Aliens who apply to INS to become naturalized citizens have to meet certain requirements, such as residing in the United States for at least 5 years as legal permanent residents, demonstrating a knowledge of the English language and American civics, and being of good moral character (e.g., not being convicted of certain felonies). To demonstrate adequate knowledge of English and civics, aliens are tested by either INS or testing entities approved by INS. To determine whether aliens applying for citizenship have been convicted of a crime that would preclude them from being naturalized, INS submits the aliens' fingerprints to the FBI, which is to determine if the person with those fingerprints has a criminal history record on file.(see footnote 1) Depending on the severity and timing of their felony convictions, aliens with criminal history records may be denied citizenship.
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Aliens applying for naturalization are to be scheduled for hearings after they submit their applications. According to INS, the current policy is that the hearing dates are not to be set until a definitive response has been received from the FBI on completed criminal history checks.
PROBLEMS WITH THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
Between September 1995 and September 1996, INS received about 1.3 million naturalization applications; almost 1.05 million aliens were naturalized. During that period, INS initiated a number of changes to its procedures in an effort to streamline the process and reduce growing backlogs. While these changes greatly increased the volume of applications processed and approved, some aliens with certain disqualifying criminal felony convictions were improperly naturalized probably because INS adjudicators were not made aware of the results of the aliens' criminal history records.(see footnote 2)
In addition, other problems associated with the naturalization process have been identified. Media reports in mid–1996 alleged that private companies on which INS relied to test applicants' knowledge of English and civics had been submitting fraudulent results; in congressional testimony last September, INS acknowledged that it had a problem.(see footnote 3)
PROBLEMS WITH THE FINGERPRINT PROCESS
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Prior Justice IG and GAO audit reports have identified problems in the naturalization process that relate to obtaining and checking fingerprints. In February 1994 the IG reported that (1) individuals intent on hiding their criminal records could have someone else complete the INS fingerprint card and then submit the prints as their own, (2) INS examiners had inappropriately approved some applications after assuming that applicants had no criminal history because no criminal history records were included in the aliens' files when the examiners adjudicated the cases, and (3) INS frequently did not submit new sets of fingerprints to the FBI when the original sets of prints were rejected by the FBI as illegible.(see footnote 4)
In our December 1994 report,(see footnote 5) we described how INS was planning to correct the problems reported by the IG. We noted, however, that INS had not been monitoring its offices' progress in correcting the problems. We also pointed out that INS' assumption that no record of a criminal history in an applicant's file meant that the person had no record could prove to be incorrect because the results of criminal history reports might have been delayed or not filed in a timely manner. We found that under INS' procedures at the time of our review, examiners could not determine whether FBI fingerprint checks had been completed because, at INS' request, the FBI returned a report only if a criminal history record was found. According to INS district officials, without a control to ensure that the FBI had completed a fingerprint check, some aliens with disqualifying felony convictions had their naturalization applications inappropriately approved.
Accordingly, we recommended that INS obtain the results from the FBI of all its record and fingerprint checks, including those for aliens who do not have criminal history records. Because INS had told its district offices to correct problems identified by the IG but had not monitored the district offices' efforts to follow those instructions, we also recommended that INS monitor the district offices' progress to comply with INS directives. At that time, INS agreed to implement both of our recommendations.
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CHANGES TO THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
In a November 29, 1996, memorandum, the INS Commissioner announced changes designed to enhance the naturalization process in several key areas. To try to ensure that the problems discussed previously had been corrected, the Commissioner ordered that no naturalization cases were to be scheduled for hearings or oath ceremonies until all changes were ''in place and working.'' To try to deal with the problem of adjudicators making decisions without having a definitive response from the FBI on the completed criminal history checks, the Commissioner ordered that no aliens were to be approved for naturalization until INS positively knew that they had no disqualifying felony convictions. In addition, the Commissioner's memorandum ordered the following controls:
Adjudicators were to complete a work processing sheet for all naturalization applications to record the specific steps taken during the naturalization process (e.g., that the adjudicator determined that the alien met the English requirement).
Supervisors were to conduct enhanced supervisory reviews for such situations as applicants with criminal histories or complex cases involving other statutory determinations.
Quality assurance reviews were to be conducted monthly until a permanent quality assurance program was developed and validated by the Office of Programs. The interim program was to involve, among other things, a review of the procedures and eligibility determinations of a number of randomly selected cases at every INS site processing naturalization applications. A headquarters team was to visit each of the five major naturalization sites (Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and San Francisco, which processed about 75 percent of all pending naturalization cases) and other offices as deemed necessary to review the quality assurance program and completion of the checklists.(see footnote 6)
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In September 1996 INS established controls regarding the process for testing applicants' knowledge of English and civics. The national organizations INS relies on to conduct the testing were ordered to strengthen their monitoring and quality control plans, submit monthly reports to INS, and conduct at least one annual inspection visit to each testing site. Further, INS hired a contract inspection service to conduct about 80 site inspections during 1996.
Finally, Justice contracted with Peat Marwick to review the implementation of the November 1996 changes to the naturalization process and with Coopers and Lybrand to propose an overall redesign of the naturalization program.
CHANGES TO THE FINGERPRINT PROCESS
On June 4, 1996, INS issued regulations regarding who could take fingerprints of applicants for immigration benefits. Basically, INS implemented a system that relies on a combination of its own offices and ''designated fingerprint services''—law enforcement agencies and private fingerprint entities that INS would certify as being acceptable.(see footnote 7) Beginning March 1, 1997, INS was to accept fingerprint cards prepared only by designated services.(see footnote 8)
The regulations establish the conditions under which the private entities are to be certified. For example, each employee who would be allowed to take fingerprints had to be trained in fingerprinting procedures by INS or the FBI. In addition, these employees were to undergo an identification and criminal history check. The regulations also provide instructions on how to verify the identity of the person being fingerprinted.
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Also, INS set up several internal controls to help ensure that fingerprints are properly taken:
Employees of the outside organizations must receive the training from INS or the FBI to properly take aliens' fingerprints.
Monitoring is to be done by INS district and regional directors and by the national contractor INS hired to provide monitoring support.
People who take aliens' fingerprints are to check their identity by comparing the information on the aliens' fingerprint card with the aliens' passport, a driver's license or state-issued photo identification, or some other INS-acceptable document.
PEAT MARWICK'S REPORT
On April 17, 1997, Peat Marwick issued its report on its interim survey of selected INS offices'(see footnote 9) implementation of the changes ordered by the Commissioner last November. Among its findings were:
There was continued lack of quality control in the completion of the fingerprint cards. Peat Marwick reported that INS was experiencing a growing backlog of cases that were classified ''not found'' as a result of the failure of the matching effort between INS and FBI.
The use of the designated fingerprint services had done little to increase the accuracy of the data on the fingerprint cards.
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Despite the requirement that adjudicators were not to schedule a naturalization case for a hearing until they received a definitive response from the FBI regarding the criminal history record search, Peat Marwick was often unable to verify that this control was being followed by the adjudicators.
In addition, Peat Marwick identified two other findings dealing with the dissemination of the November 1996 procedures and staff training. First, Peat Marwick discovered three different versions of the procedures had been distributed throughout INS.(see footnote 10) It pointed out that generally staff at the first-line supervisor level and below were not informed of the reasons for the changes. Second, with respect to training, Peat Marwick reported that there were no policies or curriculum established regarding the recording of attendance for accountability purposes. According to the report, this was a major contributing factor in INS' inability to implement fully the November 1996 procedures.
As a result of Peat Marwick's report, INS announced that it would be making improvements in three general areas to ensure that each district is effectively implementing the November 1996 procedures: (1) strengthening communication, coordination, and oversight; (2) improving training of all staff involved in implementing the new procedures; and (3) improving fingerprint processes. According to INS, a full-scale, 60-day audit is being planned.
OBSERVATIONS
The Peat Marwick report shows that INS has not ensured that its field units were carrying out the Commissioner's instructions. It also highlighted the need for INS to do a better job of monitoring its field offices to ensure that they are properly and completely meeting the Commissioner's expectations.
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We have not examined the extent to which INS has carried out its plans to monitor the performance of the outside organizations involved in the naturalization process. However, our past work on the fingerprinting aspects of the process and other aspects of INS management, and the recent Peat Marwick report, raise questions about the extent to which INS can today assure itself and the Congress that it is granting citizenship to only those applicants who deserve it.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Rabkin. Mr. Kurre.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS G. KURRE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. KURRE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I previously submitted a statement for the record which I would like to summarize at this point, with your permission.
The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division, otherwise known as the CJIS Division, is primarily charged with the responsibility to provide the criminal justice community with fingerprint identification and related information services. This involves the positive identification of individuals based on fingerprints, and a provision of criminal history record information on a national and international basis to authorized users of our services.
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The CJIS Division today is the world's largest repository of this type of information. Our current file holdings of fingerprint cards in possession total over 219 million. These include over 132 million criminal cards, and nearly 87 million civil cards, or those seeking applications for licensing and employment purposes.
The 132 million criminal cards represent 36.1 million individuals who had been arrested and/or convicted of a criminal offense in the United States. This figure grows by over 5,000 new records added to that repository per day. In fiscal year 1996, CJIS Division received over 11.2 million fingerprint cards, both criminal and civil. That represents an increase of 12.5 percent over the previous year, fiscal year 1995.
The processing of these fingerprint cards resulted in over 3.5 million identifications being made against existing records, including over 66,000 fugitives being identified. Even though the submission of arrests and disposition data is strictly voluntary, the volume of fingerprint and related data is unmatched anywhere in the world.
A criminal history record begins when an individual is arrested by a law enforcement agency. At that time, the officer takes multiple fingerprint cards, one of which is eventually provided to the CJIS Division for processing. Once the arrest fingerprint card is received, it is compared against our criminal history data base to determine if this individual has been previously arrested. When an existing criminal history record is positively identified, that information pertaining to the new arrest is added to the already existing record. If no match is made against an existing record, a new record is then added to the file. Once the case is adjudicated, an appropriate disposition notice should then be sent to the CJIS Division to update the record.
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The FBI, under the auspices of the Public Law 92–544 may provide criminal history record information to criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes, and to noncriminal justice agencies for noncriminal justice purposes that have been authorized by Federal executive order, Federal law, or State law approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Today, the CJIS Division provides these critical identification services to over 70,000 authorized customers nationwide, including all levels of criminal justice, licensing, and regulatory agencies. The CJIS Division also exchanges records with the military, the banking institutions of this country, securities industry, futures associations, and nuclear power plants. Record checks are also conducted on individuals seeking employment as childcare workers, educators, and foster care providers, among others. These services play a vital role in the identification and apprehension of dangerous criminals, as well as being a critical component of the process of ensuring the safety and well-being of all of our citizens who come in contact with people in positions of trust and confidence in these agencies and institutions.
Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Aliens and Nationality, requires aliens to submit a complete set of fingerprints when submitting applications for many purposes. Among them are naturalization. Also a registration as a permanent resident, requests for asylum in the United States, and applications from American citizens seeking to adopt foreign children.
FBI fingerprint checks are the only practical and positive means for determining if an individual has an arrest record on file with the FBI. The INS has historically been one of the largest contributors of fingerprint cards. In fiscal year 1996, INS submitted over 1.8 million fingerprint cards to the FBI. For the first half of this fiscal year 1997, we have received over 1.3 million fingerprint cards from the INS. If this rate of submission continues, this will represent an increase of over 35 percent in just one year.
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To address this burgeoning workload, CJIS Division is moving ahead with the development and implementation of the integrated automated fingerprint identification system, otherwise known as IAFIS. When fully operational in 1999, IAFIS will enable us to handle a larger workload and provide for a tremendous reduction in the time required to process and positively identify subjects based on fingerprint data. IAFIS is designed to respond to fingerprint submissions within an average timeframe of 2 to 24 hours. In the interim, Director Freeh has authorized the hiring of 1,100 new employees to reduce the process time.
I am pleased to advise the subcommittee that to date, 629 of those employees have been hired and are being trained in our West Virginia facility to address this heavy workload. I would like to thank you for inviting me to appear before your subcommittee. I am ready to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kurre follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DENNIS G. KURRE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am Dennis Kurre, Deputy Assistant Director of the Operations Branch of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division, otherwise known as CJIS. We are now headquartered in our new complex in Clarksburg, West Virginia. Our primary mission is to provide the criminal justice community with fingerprint identification and related information services. This involves the positive identification of individuals based on fingerprints, and the provision of criminal history information on a national and international basis to authorized users of our services.
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In 1924, the United States Attorney General was authorized by Congress to begin collecting fingerprint and arrest record information voluntarily submitted for Federal and State arrests. The Attorney General then delegated this responsibility to the FBI. At that time, our operations began with 810,000 fingerprint cards. Today the CJIS Division is the world's largest fingerprint repository. Our current file holdings of fingerprint cards in our possession total over 219 million. These include over 132 million criminal cards and almost 87 million civil cards. The 132 million criminal cards represent 36.1 million individuals who have been arrested and/or convicted of a criminal offense in the United States. This figure grows by over 5,000 each day.
To capsulize this data into a one–year time frame, during fiscal year 1996, the CJIS Division received over 11.2 million fingerprint cards, both criminal and civil, an increase of 12.5% over the previous year. This was a significant milestone for us, marking the highest number of fingerprint card receipts since the height of World War II. The processing of these fingerprint cards resulted in over 3.5 million identifications being made against existing records, including over 66,000 fugitives being identified. Even though the submission of arrest and disposition data by contributing agencies is strictly voluntary, the volume of fingerprint and related data submitted for processing and associated with the CJIS Division's data base is unmatched anywhere in the world.
I would now like to briefly outline for you CJIS's role in maintaining and distributing criminal history records for authorized users. A criminal history record begins when an individual is arrested by a law enforcement officer. At that time, three fingerprint cards are generally prepared by the arresting agency. One card is kept at the local level. Two cards are forwarded to the State identification bureau for processing prior to one card eventually being submitted to the CJIS Division. Today, this fingerprint card contains the arrestee's inked and rolled or electronically scanned fingerprints, personal descriptive data, and relevant data identifying the arresting agency and the offense(s) charged. Once the arrest fingerprint card is received, it is compared against our criminal history data base to determine if this individual has been previously arrested. When an existing criminal history is positively identified, the information pertaining to the new arrest is added to the already existing criminal record. If no match is made against an existing record, the new record is added to the file. Once the case is adjudicated, an appropriate disposition notice should then be sent to CJIS reflecting the final outcome. Upon receipt of this criminal history record information, the corresponding record is updated to include the most recent information.
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The FBI, under the auspices of Public Law 92–544, may provide criminal history record information stored in the identification records system to criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes; and to noncriminal justice agencies for noncriminal justice purposes that have been authorized by Federal Executive order, Federal law, or State law approved by the United States Attorney General. Today the CJIS Division provides these critical identification services to over 70,000 authorized customers nationwide, including all levels of criminal justice, licensing and regulatory agencies. The CJIS Division also exchanges records with the United States military, and agencies such as federally chartered or insured banking institutions, segments of the securities industry, registered futures associations, and nuclear power plants to promote or maintain the security of these institutions. Record checks are also conducted on individuals seeking employment as child–care workers, educators, and foster care providers, among others. These services play a vital role in the identification and apprehension of dangerous criminals, as well as being a critical component in the process of ensuring the safety and well being of all our citizens who come in contact with people in positions of trust and confidence in these agencies and institutions.
Now that I've presented a brief synopsis of the work we perform in general within the CJIS Division, I would like to detail the type of work we perform at the request of, and in support of, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, aliens and nationality, requires aliens to submit a complete set of fingerprints when submitting applications for many purposes, among them are naturalization (citizenship), registration as a permanent resident, requests for asylum in the United States, and applications from American citizens seeking to adopt foreign children. It is under the auspices of this authority that the CJIS Division conducts fingerprint based record checks against its data base for the ins. FBI fingerprint checks are the only practical and positive means for determining if an individual has an arrest record on file with the FBI.
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The INS has historically been one of the largest contributors of fingerprint cards to the FBI's CJIS Division. In fiscal year 1996, INS submitted 1,812,893 fingerprint cards to the FBI for checking against the CJIS criminal history data base. For the first half of fiscal year 1997, we have received 1,367,379 fingerprint cards from the INS. If this rate of submission continues CJIS will receive approximately 2.8 million fingerprint cards from the INS during this fiscal year. This represents an increase of over 35% in just one year.
To address this burgeoning workload, the CJIS Division is moving ahead with the development and implementation of the integrated automated fingerprint identification system, known as IAFIS. When fully operational in 1999, IAFIS will enable us to handle a larger workload and provide for a tremendous reduction in the time required to process and positively identify subjects based on fingerprint data. IAFIS is designed to respond to fingerprint submissions within a time frame of two to twenty–four hours. In the interim, director Freeh has authorized the hiring of 1,100 new employees to reduce the process time. I am pleased to advise the subcommittee that to date 629 new employees have been hired and are now being trained to address this heavy workload.
In closing, I would like to thank you for inviting me to testify before your subcommittee regarding our fingerprint identification and related information services. I am ready to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Kurre.
Mr. Ahrens, let me start off my questioning by mentioning the conclusion that Peat Marwick came up with that you mentioned a while ago. That is, that you can not provide this committee with any assurances that the INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions. Doesn't that mean therefore, that the INS may still be naturalizing convicted criminals who have no right to naturalize?
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Mr. AHRENS. That's correct, sir. What we're covering is all four criteria for naturalization.
Mr. SMITH. You answered my question when you said that's correct. I also wanted to ask you a little bit about the process. When Peat Marwick visited various sites, how did they determine which cases to look at in their sampling?
Mr. AHRENS. Again, as a part of our review, we didn't follow a formal sampling plan. We asked the representatives at the INS at each site we went to for cases that they felt that the new procedures applied to and that they felt were compliant with.
Mr. SMITH. So in other words, you didn't pick a random sample. The INS provided you with the cases themselves? Is that right?
Mr. AHRENS. Yes, sir.
Mr. SMITH. Is it possible that your conclusions might have even been stronger if you had had a random sample rather than being provided with cases by the INS? Do you think there was any bias there?
Mr. AHRENS. Statistically there's a bias since it was not a random sample.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ahrens.
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Mr. Colgate, I know you share our frustrations in the process. You have been at it and investigating it for many many months. You mentioned that two individuals are coming in with strong backgrounds to try to solve the problems. I guess my two questions to you would be one, do you think this is in fact going to solve the problem. Second, why wasn't the INS itself able to solve the problem?
Mr. COLGATE. First, I have the full confidence in the two individuals. Robert K. Bratt is a distinguished career civil servant in the Department of Justice who we have used in the past to tackle tough issues. We sent him to Criminal Division when it faced significant problems. We asked him to set up the reparation payment program for those individuals of Japanese descent who were wrongly interred. We had him work on such issues as establishing training programs for Haitian police. He is someone who has received the highest awards within the Department of Justice, as well as the highest award a member of the senior executive service can receive for his performance. He is truly an outstanding individual.
Mr. Bowsher brings in unique experience given his 15 years of dedicated service as Comptroller General. He is truly doing a public service by providing us a sounding board. As senior official, with tremendous integrity, who can provide us advice and counsel on an unpaid basis. Commissioner Meissner has strong support for this. She has embraced this readily, and in some ways, even wanted to push me a little harder on this whole process. The Attorney General has made two commitments. One, we'll give Mr. Bratt whatever authority he needs to get this fixed. Two, we'll provide him whatever resources that he needs to get this fixed. With the commitment of the Commissioner and the Attorney General, I feel that we will be able to address this.
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Mr. SMITH. OK. Thank you. Mr. Colgate, also under the designated fingerprint system, as I mentioned a while ago, we have got individuals and organizations who might be running that program who might be owned by overseas companies. They might be individuals who had been convicted of aggravated felonies themselves. You might have liquor stores, beauty salons, and so forth. Does that give you any concern about the ability of the INS to monitor those individuals in those organizations?
Mr. COLGATE. I think I want to put it in perspective. The DFS is just an interim phase. We are working through Fingerprint Coordination Group to address the issues of internal controls, because there are weaknesses regarding this process.
Mr. SMITH. Speaking of weaknesses, let me ask another question of the same general sense. Do you think that we should be giving liquor stores the ability to determine whether we are going to bestow the highest title we can on an individual, that is, citizenship, and allow them pay a determinative role in that process?
Mr. COLGATE. I think if we have confidence in the integrity of the individual who is taking the print, it doesn't matter what the store is.
Mr. SMITH. What if they were convicted felons? Would that give you pause?
Mr. COLGATE. Personally, that would give me pause.
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Mr. SMITH. OK. Thank you, Mr. Colgate.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, is recognized.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been listening intently to the witnesses. Mr. Rabkin and Mr. Kurre and Mr. Colgate, I think if I take the totality of what you all are saying, we have set up an impossible task here. Maybe I am incorrect.
The standard I take it, Mr. Rabkin, is that nobody who we don't have a fingerprint card on that has been processed and made a determination can be naturalized. That's right?
Mr. RABKIN. That's the way I understand it, sir.
Mr. WATT. OK. Mr. Colgate says that even if we have accurate fingerprint cards on every applicant, either FBI in some cases has no fingerprint records because State and local officials are not required to report arrest records, conviction records to the FBI. And if I hear what Mr. Kurre—is it Kurre?
Mr. KURRE. Kurre.
Mr. WATT. Kurre, from the FBI is saying, they are getting so many applications, they are getting so many fingerprints now and so many requests, that they just simply don't have the capacity to process those requests. They don't have the resources. While they are struggling to try to improve that system, they can't do it.
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So am I overstating it? Have we set up a system here that simply can't be complied with without substantial backlogs in the process that then work a disadvantage to people who have no criminal records? Obviously if I understand what Mr. Ahrens says in the report, despite all of these criticisms that have been made of the system, they still have not identified one person who was improperly naturalized as a result of your review. Am I correct in that?
Mr. AHRENS. That's correct.
Mr. WATT. I mean so we have done this elaborate study. We have not identified anybody who was improperly naturalized. We have got a system that may not ever be able to allow you, Mr. Rabkin, to come in and say I can assure you that every single person who has come through this process, none of them are disqualified. So what's the deal here? Can somebody respond to what I am saying? I mean it sounds to me like we have got an impossibility going here.
Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield just for a minute? I just want to correct—I don't know if I want to correct an answer or not, but it is my understanding that the INS has moved to denaturalize dozens of individuals. Maybe they can respond to that later on. Whereas Peat Marwick was not looking at——
Mr. WATT. I think all of that was prior to the Citizenship USA or was prior to this investigation or this snapshot review. That doesn't have anything to do with this review. I'm not saying that we never have in history not naturalized a person that should not have been naturalized. I hope nobody misunderstands that, but out of all of this review and re-review, we haven't found anybody. It sounds to me like we have set up a system that somebody is going to slip through the cracks because either we don't have fingerprint records on them from the State and local judicial officials, I mean criminal officials. They are not required to give us that information. So if it's not in the FBI system, we don't have any way to get it anyway, do we? Is the next step in the process, we're going to require fingerprints from State and local governments to assure the integrity that one or two people don't slip through the process, even though we're holding up processing for over a million people now, with a 2 year backlog?
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Mr. KURRE. Would you like for me to respond, sir?
Mr. WATT. Sure.
Mr. KURRE. First of all, the civil fingerprint card side of the house at the FBI goes through the system much more rapidly because there are much much fewer, many less people who actually have criminal records on file who submit civilian cards for application, licensing and employment purposes. In that respect, there are only approximately historically across the board, 8 to 10 percent of all the civil submissions having an identifying characteristic that matches to a criminal history record that we have on file.
Mr. WATT. But you have got to put every applicant through both the civil and the criminal process?
Mr. KURRE. No, sir. Just through the criminal.
Mr. WATT. How does that solve the problem?
Mr. KURRE. Because that tells you whether or not there is a criminal file on record or criminal record on file for that individual. We don't have to search the civil side of the house.
Mr. WATT. Oh OK. All right. I understand.
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Mr. KURRE. If we have an incoming civil card, we search against the criminal side of the house, but those cards go through that system, currently today they are going through in 50 days or less total time, from the time we get them in on an average to the time we complete our processing and return those.
Now the ones that don't get through to the system in that fashion are those which obviously hit against criminal records or have very early dates of birth, 1928 or earlier, because those records are a total manual part of our file system. Those do take longer. However, in the vast majority of the instances, we are averaging 50 days or less today for the civil fingerprint applications that are coming through the division.
Now in the future, it is true that this is a voluntary system and that for that reason, we don't perhaps have all the cards submitted to us by all the State and local and even Federal agencies. However, the FBI is moving and has been moving for a considerable period of time to what is called a national fingerprint file concept. Four States are already——
Mr. WATT. That's not going to get every criminal in the country in your system, is it?
Mr. KURRE. What that will do though, the States then are the ones who will respond from their State data bases. We will be the central index at that national repository level.
Mr. WATT. So we will then start going to the States?
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Mr. KURRE. That will start going to the State repositories, yes.
Mr. WATT. But we're not there yet.
Mr. KURRE. No, sir. We're not.
Mr. WATT. So we've got at this point, we've got an impossibility, if I understand what you are saying.
Am I overstating the problem, Mr. Colgate? This is the same question, I just want each one of these gentleman to respond to the same question. I won't ask any more.
Mr. COLGATE. There is the issue that there are certain State and local records, because of the voluntary aspect that Mr. Kurre has spoken to, that have not been identified in the FBI check. It's my recollection, based on the draft report that we found in one site where 13 percent of the individuals had indicated that they did have a criminal history, but the FBI check did not reveal that. Many were minor offenses that wouldn't necessarily have been disqualifying. Certain jurisdictions, for example, may not submit petty misdemeanor offenses. I think the largest category, from my recollection, were arrests for driving under the influence.
As Mr. Kurre points out, when we go into this notion of a national index, to the extent that it will be able to hand off from the Federal to the State systems, we will have improved records. But that will be in the future.
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Mr. WATT. How far in the future?
Mr. KURRE. Quite a distance. There are only four States now participating. It requires an interstate compact agreement to be reached within each State and approved by the Congress for us to get there. The four States that are now participating have no preclusion on the release of that information for licensing and applicant purposes.
Mr. WATT. So until that's in place, you are not going to be able to give Mr. Smith the kind of assurance that he keeps seeking. I mean we all would like to have that, but I just want to be honest with the American public. You know, we've got a problem here. We would have a problem regardless of, it seems to me, the failings in the process. I am not trying to excuse the failings in the process. There are weaknesses in the process, but it seems to me we have got a problem even if we had the most elaborate, accurate processes we could possibly have.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Watt. Let me agree with the last point you made to this extent—that I think you are absolutely correct. We will never know the extent of the problem. We will never know how many individuals were naturalized who should not have been naturalized. But to defend the INS here, I know that David Martin recently has promulgated a series of guidelines as to how the denaturalization process should operate. Those I think will be implemented, and we can ask him shortly in the near future. So the INS is just now, frankly, beginning to correct the problem and beginning to denaturalize a lot of those individuals. How many, we'll never know, who should not have become citizens.
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Mr. WATT. We'll get another round. I'll let you answer the question. I wanted to make sure that you didn't think I was——
Mr. SMITH. We'll have time for that. Mr. Kurre, I know that the number of naturalization applications that need fingerprint checks have gone up considerably in the last couple years. In 1994, there's a little over half a million. In 1996, it was 1.2 million. There was a dramatic increase. Did the INS ever ask the FBI if they could meet that demand, if they could meet that 60-day deadline in regard to the almost tripling of the number of applications?
Mr. KURRE. No, sir.
Mr. SMITH. Did the FBI ever inform the INS that because of those increased number of requests, that the FBI would have trouble meeting that 60-day deadline?
Mr. KURRE. Yes. The INS in the past has asked us repeatedly whether or not we could continue to speed up the process, but never knew exactly what it was that was relative to this particular issue here. However, in May 1996, May 20, 1996, Assistant Director Charles Archer wrote a letter to Commissioner Meissner reminding and advising, I guess, of the change in policy and procedure that the FBI was going to implement. At that time, the date was June 30, 1996, which would require us, the FBI, to respond to all civil fingerprint check requests, whether or not there was a positive or a nonident. response to be remitted.
Mr. SMITH. So if the INS wasn't obviously on notice of the problem before, then certainly by the end of May, they had constructive notice that the FBI was not able to meet those 60-day deadlines as they once did?
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Mr. KURRE. In that letter, Assistant Director Archer pointed out the 60-day assumption policy and pointed out that it was an unreliable and an ineffective policy. That had been reiterated in a reference he made to a December 11, 1995, all contributors letter, which we disseminate to all contributors.
Mr. SMITH. That is my point exactly. Final question. Did the FBI realize if the INS knew that if a fingerprint check was not cleared within the 60-day period, that there was an even greater likelihood of a criminal record being in existence?
Mr. KURRE. I am not sure of that, sir.
Mr. SMITH. Were you aware of that? Was the FBI aware of that or not?
Mr. KURRE. That if it took longer than 60 days, possibilities are that there was a criminal history record available?
Mr. SMITH. Right.
Mr. KURRE. Sure, that's very possible.
Mr. SMITH. OK. Thank you, Mr. Kurre. I don't have any other questions.
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Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. I wanted to make sure I wasn't being unfair to Mr. Rabkin. I wanted to get his response to the earlier question that I had.
Mr. RABKIN. Mr. Watt, I wanted to talk a little bit about the theory behind this, as opposed to the actual operations of the fingerprint check. Just to remind that the law requires that the applicants be of good moral character. That is the legal test. Then INS and through its regulations, through additional laws and case law has decided that there are disqualifying felony convictions that would show them that the applicant is not of good moral character. The process that they use is through the fingerprints, getting the fingerprints and checking them to see if there's a criminal record on file with the FBI.
As you pointed out, to the extent that the FBI file does not include information on potentially disqualifying felony convictions, then the system is not up to theory and the controls are not adequate.
Also, to the extent that the fingerprints are not of the person who was making the application, then there is a quality control also. That's what the Inspector General pointed out in 1994. I would assume that the reengineering that Mr. Colgate talked about of the naturalization process will go back and look at whether this is the best process and the best way to determine whether the applicants are of good moral character and if, in fact, the standard is set too high.
Mr. WATT. Until that time, you presume that every single person that comes through the process has got to go through this system in some kind of way. Even if every single person goes through the system, you acknowledge that we still may miss some people.
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Mr. RABKIN. Well, if the——
Mr. WATT. Even if they are processed correctly.
Mr. RABKIN. The good moral character, if the FBI runs a check and the fingerprints are of the person that's applying and the check shows no criminal history record, then I think it is reasonable for the INS to say that that person is of good moral character. Certainly, the person may have committed a disqualifying felony in some State that has not reported to the FBI, but until the FBI can get all of that together—and we just heard it may be a while—then it seems to me the only other option for the INS is to send the fingerprint cards to all of the States and ask them the same questions.
That ends up, INS is in the position of having to balance the timeliness of processing the applications with the quality and the cost involved of doing the same thing.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Colgate, let me ask a couple questions about the proposed Coopers & Lybrand reengineering study, because that's looking forward. I know a lot of this hearing is designed to look at what is happening now, but it seems to me we are not going to solve this problem immediately.
First of all, Peat Marwick I guess seems to have built up a lot of expertise in this area. Why would we go and get a whole new entity and start over with their education curve to do this, as opposed to doing it with the people who are already involved in the process?
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Mr. COLGATE. Let me address it twofold. First, because we wanted to ensure proper competition for such a big project, we essentially ran a mini competition between six firms. My recollection is that KPMG was one of those firms.
When we independently reviewed all the proposals Coopers & Lybrand, it's my recollection, has done quite a bit of work within INS. I know that I have talked to some of their principals regarding INS fee programs. The naturalization program is an examination fee program. So they have a good bit of knowledge about the Immigration Service. We essentially had an independent panel evaluate all the proposals, and we determined that Coopers & Lybrand for this particular aspect of reengineering, designing this process, was the best value to the Government. That is not to take anything away from KPMG.
Mr. WATT. Maybe I should make a disclaimer to my friends at Coopers & Lybrand. I mean I don't have anything against Coopers & Lybrand. I just thought that seemed kind of strange.
You said in your opening comments that one of the things that Coopers & Lybrand would do as part of the process of doing this reengineering is talk to Members of Congress. I assume they will be talking to both majority and minority Members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats across. What kinds of things would you be expecting them to be making inquiry about of Members of Congress?
Mr. COLGATE. First, let me assure you this will be totally bipartisan and good government. This is good government. Essentially there is a tremendous expertise in this body when it comes to the operations of the naturalization program. We are very much committed to the notion of having focus groups look at various different options or various different aspects of the process, considering the knowledge and understanding here. Also, to get a reality check, an independent reality check, we will want to visit with Congress, to say look——
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Mr. WATT. You think you are going to get an independent reality check?
Mr. COLGATE. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. WATT. OK.
Mr. COLGATE. I'm committed to the notion of good bipartisan government.
Mr. WATT. All right. Let me ask just one more question.
Mr. SMITH. As long as it's a bipartisan question.
Mr. WATT. A bipartisan question. You made me forget. This fingerprint coordination group that you are chairing. When was that established and has it started meeting? Do you think that's going to make a substantial amount of progress for us?
Mr. COLGATE. It was established by the Attorney General in January. We have met twice. The key thing here, to address the point that Mr. Kurre made as far as coordination between INS and the FBI, is I have all the senior players at both agencies at this coordination group. I have the Deputy Director of the FBI, I have Assistant Directors of the FBI, I have Deputy Assistant Directors of the FBI, I have the Deputy Commissioner of the INS, I have Associate Commissioners of INS, I have Assistant Commissioners of INS. So I have all the players in one room, all the decisionmakers. We have had two meetings. I am very pleased with what we have accomplished to date.
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The first thing that we accomplished was to get both groups to understand each other's process. In response to I think the chairman's question, of whether there's coordination between the FBI and INS as far as an increase in workload, we have found that, at a lower staff level, the FBI and the INS may be talking. But at the senior levels, as far as those individuals who have the authority to make changes in policies and procedures, to commit the agency's resources, there was not that type of coordination.
We have even had FBI employees go out to the field to see this whole process, because one of the things that has bothered me as a public administrator is that both groups weren't talking to each other. The INS represents the largest customer of the FBI. This is fee for service for the FBI. I think we did not have a full appreciation from a grassroots level on what it takes to get this process through. INS did not have in my view, an understanding of really what happens when that workload hits the FBI Clarksburg facility. We have spent an extensive amount of time flow charting the processes of each agency so that we have a basis on which to sit down and say if we tweak it here, this is the way it's going to affect INS, or, if INS tweaks it here, this is the way it's going to affect the FBI.
We have made tremendous strides. I think that we have a commitment to try to expeditiously move technology as fast and as far as we can, because I think the key issue here, as far as addressing your issue on backlogs and the chairman's issue on internal controls, is enhanced technology that allows you to process quickly, but that also improves the internal controls. We want to get to the point where we're having an individual walk in, put their prints down, transmit that to the FBI electronically, and get their response back so we have confidence that the person who walked in is the person whose application we're dealing with.
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Mr. WATT. How long before we get there?
Mr. COLGATE. We're working on interim phases right now. We're going to start testing the electronic exchange of data this fall between the FBI and——
Mr. WATT. How long before we get there? I'm not trying to tie you down.
Mr. SMITH. That's a good question.
Mr. COLGATE. It's a very good question.
Mr. SMITH. I hope the gentleman can answer it.
Mr. COLGATE. It's exactly the question that the Attorney General keeps asking me. I think it's incremental.
Mr. WATT. I'm not trying to pin you down, but if you get on the record, I assure you if you say 6 months, the chairman will be back here in 6 months having a hearing saying you told me 6 months, so maybe you better give yourself some wiggle room.
Mr. COLGATE. No I think full integration——
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Watt, don't you want your question answered?
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Mr. WATT. Yes.
Mr. COLGATE. We keep approaching this incrementally. I think that we can make significant strides within the next 6 months. But I think, ultimately, you are looking at a 2-year process before you would have this fully integrated notion.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, are you going to do another round?
Mr. SMITH. I'm not.
Mr. WATT. Can I ask Mr. Ahrens? I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. SMITH. Absolutely.
Mr. WATT. I know I'm already over.
Mr. SMITH. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized.
Mr. WATT. I just think it's important to not leave the impression that this hearing may have the possibility of leaving, that the INS has been a complete and abject failure in trying to implement these procedures. I want Mr. Ahrens again to make it clear what they did and what they said as a result of this study.
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Am I correct that what you have really concluded is that these procedures represented a significant improvement over what was being done, despite the fact that some of them were not being carried out to their utmost efficiency? Would that be a correct characterization of where you got to?
Mr. AHRENS. The procedures themselves are sound, correct. Implementation though was where the lacking part was.
Mr. WATT. Even in the implementation, I take it, there were improvements made based on what you found?
Mr. AHRENS. From where they were before?
Mr. WATT. From where they were before.
Mr. AHRENS. That's right.
Mr. WATT. That's what I wanted to be clear on, because I think we run the risk here of leaving the impression that no progress is being made. I think we've got to view this in the totality of what is happening here. These procedures have improved. There are a lot of problems in the system that INS really doesn't have the capacity to solve, even if the procedures were done perfectly. Some of these problems we have just got to keep working on. It sounds like we'll be working on some of them for the next 2 years before we get to the point where we are going to have any absolute confidence in the system. Even then, I am not sure we're going to have the kind of confidence in the system that won't allow some people to come and take pot shots at.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Watt. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease, is recognized.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for my delay in being here. You may have discussed some of these points, so you can be as brief as you like.
My recollection, it's been a week or so since I read the materials here, but specifically dealing with the review, not an audit as I recall you were careful to point out, regarding the naturalization quality procedures, that you reviewed 24 field sites and you found one, Boston, that was in compliance with the expectations and that was all?
Mr. AHRENS. Yes. That was the result. We found that Boston had fully implemented the procedures. The remaining were marginal or had not fully implemented all the procedures.
Mr. PEASE. Did you go so far as to review and make, draw conclusions on why that was the case in terms of was it lack of resources, was it lack of will, did you get into that area of review?
Mr. AHRENS. No. We didn't. The scope of the review was such that it was to give the Justice Department a heads up prior to us doing a formal audit where potential problem areas were.
Mr. PEASE. Did you make any recommendations or just the observation?
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Mr. AHRENS. Primarily observations is what we provided them. That was the scope of what we were to provide at that time.
Mr. PEASE. Are you prepared to make recommendations?
Mr. AHRENS. After the detailed audit would probably be the more appropriate time to make those recommendations.
Mr. PEASE. And when might that be expected?
Mr. AHRENS. We are hoping to, based on the results, my understanding of our review, the INS is revising their new procedures. We are planning on midsummer start with the detailed audit.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Pease. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon, is recognized.
Mr. CANNON. I have no questions.
Mr. SMITH. OK. Let me thank all the panelists for being here, for their testimony. We appreciate your contributions. While Commissioner Doris Meissner is coming forward, let me take a moment here and want to apologize to the members of the media for not having enough chairs, but we are going to try to remedy that and take a short, couple minute break here to allow members of the media to find empty seats. Also, I am going to ask members of the staff if they don't mind yielding their seats and perhaps joining us by sitting behind us up here. We also have three chairs right here that can be moved to the side where both staff or members of the media can sit as well. I have been watching members of the media trying to write standing up, and I don't want to see that go on.
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[Recess.]
Mr. SMITH. We welcome Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. She is accompanied by Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner, and David Martin, General Counsel.
Commissioner Meissner, welcome. We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DORIS MEISSNER, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ACCOMPANIED BY CHRIS SALE, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, AND DAVID MARTIN, GENERAL COUNSEL
Ms. MEISSNER. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I would like to begin this morning by providing some context to the discussions that we have been having about the state of the Nation's naturalization system and the progress that the INS is making toward improving its integrity, while responding to historic numbers of applications.
First, the naturalization agenda at INS has always been my agenda. When I took over as Commissioner at a time when the Nation's eyes, Congress's focus, and most of the new resources flowing into INS were aimed at bringing control to the Southwest border, I continually stated that it was imperative to bring a renewed focus to our naturalization efforts. The Citizenship USA program grew out of that dedication to ensuring that as applications reached an unprecedented level, legal immigrants who played by the rules should not have to endure an unconscionable 2 to 4 year wait for citizenship.
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In the face of extraordinary workloads, INS has continuously made significant improvements to the citizenship process. Last November, I announced further sweeping changes designed to strengthen the integrity of the naturalization process. No one is more disappointed than I that we have not made greater progress in implementing those new quality procedures. No one is more committed to doing it right than I am. The initial KPMG review that we are discussing here provided us with an opportunity to see where and to see why the problems are occurring. While the KPMG team spent only one day in each district office, the report has been a valuable tool in helping us to determine the corrective actions that are needed. It has provided us with real time feedback for the first time on the strengths and weaknesses, and prepares us for a full audit this summer.
Fortunately, the KPMG review reaffirms that the November 29 procedures that we developed to ensure the quality of the process are indeed sound procedures. The difficulty lies in executing the procedures fully and uniformly, and in assuring proper guidance, coordination, and oversight of field operations to effectively ensure implementation. I take full responsibility for the problems that are associated with the naturalization program, but I must rely on many others to handle the day-to-day operations.
I have taken both immediate and longer term steps to ensure that they do what is required of them. First, I brought every District Director to Washington to discuss one on one, office by office, with Peat Marwick where the shortfalls were and what caused them. This was a critical meeting, because field managers were put on notice that I expect effective execution to be taken as a benchmark of their performance as managers.
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Some of you have asked me why certain managers have not been reprimanded. The KPMG report tells us that every office made real attempts to implement the quality assurance procedures correctly. However, it also tells us that critical items, such as training, were deficient. Therefore, we can not make disciplinary judgments based on this snapshot alone. Let me assure you that these managers will be held accountable for the next step in the process, the formal audit.
Second, I ordered that no individual be naturalized without a supervisor once again reviewing and reverifying all applications. This revalidation is a temporary measure until we overcome the important deficiencies that the KPMG report has brought to our attention.
Third, I have directed our Office of Internal Audit to provide immediate support and feedback to field managers as to how well they are implementing the quality assurance procedures. Internal audit is identifying staff naturalization experts throughout the agency to assist in this effort.
Fourth, I have brought new leadership and talent, as well as new accountability into the direction of the naturalization program. A single person is now solely responsible for managing the naturalization quality assurance process. The Attorney General and I agreed that the Department of Justice would loan to INS a senior manager with a record of success in managing complex systems and serving as an effective trouble shooter. Robert Bratt, who has been awarded for his accomplishments as the Executive Officer of the Department's Criminal Division, started in the role of Executive Director for Naturalization Operations, a new position, on Monday. He reports to me and he directly supervises all headquarters naturalization staff working on implementation of the quality assurance efforts. He will be responsible for evaluating their performance. He will also have input into the performance ratings of those in the field who are responsible for the quality assurance implementation.
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Finally, I have also asked the former Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office, Charles Bowsher, to assist in developing an action plan and advise me on how best to execute the new procedures. I am optimistic that this addition of talent, energy, and management expertise addresses the coordination and oversight problems that have been obstacles to effective implementation.
Some of the difficulties that we have experienced in implementing the quality assurance procedures are due to deeper management, structural, and communications problems that have existed for some time at INS, and that need to be addressed in the longer term. As I testified earlier this month, we need to make changes to strengthen the INS headquarters/field relationship. I will soon be forwarding to Congress a plan that strengthens that chain of command at INS and provides for clearer support and oversight of field activities.
In addition, within the next few months, we will be hiring a new team for the most senior field management positions in the agency, the head of field operations, and three regional directors. We have opened recruitment to career public servants from other agencies, including the law enforcement community across the Nation. I have also made certain immediate personnel changes, bringing four highly respected field managers to Washington to improve overall coordination. One of their primary responsibilities is to assist in the naturalization quality assurance efforts.
Mr. Bratt, Mr. Bowsher, and this team will make one of their first priorities appropriate training of the field in the quality assurance measures. This basic need has not been properly addressed.
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''Quality assurance'' is a new concept for the Immigration Service. It represents a dramatic and very positive change. Never before have we put a comprehensive system into place to ensure that our cases are processed uniformly throughout the service. Thousands of employees require training to learn and successfully apply these new procedures. This type of retooling, especially with staff that has been accustomed to procedures that have been in place for decades, can not be accomplished immediately. I wish we were further along, but I also recognize that proper training requires constant monitoring, oversight, and followup.
In addition to improved coordination and training, the naturalization quality procedures require us to take a long hard look at the designated fingerprint services system. While DFS is an improvement over a system in which no controls existed, we are well aware of its limitations and are aggressively pursuing both short and long term options to strengthen the reliability of the fingerprint process.
Again, I wish that our progress had been greater at this point. At the same time, the KPMG report has been a valuable early warning. With the action steps that I have outlined and the new personnel on board, I believe we are taking the necessary corrective actions to effectively implement the quality assurance procedures. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Meissner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DORIS MEISSNER, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I welcome the opportunity this morning to outline for you the comprehensive measures we continue to undertake to ensure the integrity of the naturalization process. At the outset, let me assure you that no one is more committed to restoring the integrity of the naturalization process than the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Citizenship is the most precious benefit that our government—through my agency—can bestow. We have both a duty and an obligation to ensure that deserving applicants attain the privilege of citizenship, and that unqualified individuals do not. We are taking firm, swift, and responsible steps to rectify long-standing systemic problems that the enormous surge in citizenship applications has brought to the surface and to ensure proper implementation of quality assurance procedures that were outlined in the recent KPMG Peat Marwick report.
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I recognize that improving the naturalization process is the greatest management challenge facing the Service today. That was evident when I first learned of the nature of KPMG's findings regarding the troubling, and in some areas unacceptable, implementation of quality assurance measures that I had directed in November 1996. The immediate actions that I initiated 2 weeks ago are focused on correcting communications weaknesses, training deficiencies, and procedural problems that were identified. Last week, the Attorney General and I took further decisive management action to enhance the dedicated management attention that is needed to ensure that naturalization applications are considered in full compliance with the law and INS policy. Our actions are part of many steps we have taken and will continue to take needed to rectify problems that date back well into the 70s and 80s—perhaps longer.
What I will outline this morning should leave no doubt about our firm commitment to properly administer this vitally important process by which this Nation bestows U.S. citizenship.
BACKGROUND
In my March 10 testimony, I provided a detailed perspective of our Citizenship USA initiative, designed to meet the mounting numbers of naturalization applications, including the circumstances at the time and some lessons learned.
In the years before 1992, INS processed fewer than 300,000 naturalization applications per year and relied on paper-bound procedures and meager resources. The system appeared benignly adequate. In retrospect, it was a decentralized program involving dozens of offices across the Nation with few standard procedures, outmoded technology, and only modest management oversight. While we recognized that the system needed a thorough modernization, it seemed sufficient to withstand a short-term expansion of caseloads, with overall changes to be implemented once we had achieved reasonable processing times. As we anticipated, in early 1994 some of the 3.2 million people who had gained legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) began submitting naturalization applications, swelling the backlog as our monthly tallies of application receipts steadily increased. In addition, INS' green card replacement program added to the caseload because many long-time permanent residents filed for naturalization in lieu of applying for an updated green card.
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We moved to keep up with the growing workload as we began investment in redesigning the process. As early as February of 1994, we included in our 1995 budget a $30 million request in appropriated funds to support major revamping of our naturalization program. Ultimate Congressional approval of $7.1 million, underscoring national interest in an effective naturalization program, was the first time appropriated funds had been applied to the naturalization program since a fee account was established in 1988 to fund the program.
However, we were unable to predict the enormous surge in naturalization applications that was seemingly generated by the Proposition 187 debate in California and that keeps increasing, apparently in response to last year's immigration and welfare law changes. Applications exceeded 540,000 by the end of fiscal year 1994 and nearly doubled to more than 1 million by the end of Fiscal Year 1995. By the end of 1996 receipts reached 1.3 million, and our estimate for 1997 is an incredible 1.8 million—a 40 percent increase over last year and up 425 percent since 1992.
As this trend took hold, we moved on an urgent basis in the spring of 1995 to deal with the growing backlog of applications. Our projections showed processing times would reach two-to-four years in some districts if we failed to act. That prospect was unconscionable, and our actions focused on averting such a scenario. Law-abiding, taxpaying contributors to our society were waiting unreasonable periods to receive a benefit for which they were paying, to which they were entitled, and which was in the national interest to bestow. Still, by the time Citizenship USA was formally launched in September of 1995, backlogs had reached 2 years in some districts, confirming the importance of our commitment to continue our efforts to provide better service by reducing our processing times back toward our 6-month goal, the standard used by INS for at least 15 years.
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Using enhanced resources, including the opening of dedicated citizenship centers, improved technology, and more than 900 additional personnel we hired and trained, we achieved our goal of reducing the projected average waiting time from application filing to citizenship oath to an acceptable 6 months by the end of fiscal 1996. At the same time, we continued a number of efforts to find ways to improve the process, including progressive procedural improvements, such as direct mail of applications and strengthened community partnerships.
IMMEDIATE STEPS
I would now like to concentrate on the comprehensive measures we are undertaking that specifically address the integrity of the naturalization process—an effort that, as I stated earlier, represents the biggest management challenge the agency faces at this time.
In December 1996, DOJ and INS announced a series of initiatives to improve and strengthen the naturalization program in response to systemic weakness that emerged from the Citizenship USA program.
These initiatives included:
Hiring of KPMG to oversee an INS audit of naturalization cases during the Citizenship USA program, an effort that also would be monitored DOJ's Office of the Inspector General.
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A comprehensive reengineering of the naturalization program by INS and an outside consulting group, which in March was announced as Coopers & Lybrand.
Implementation of new procedures to strengthen the current process, including specific guidance that no individual would be naturalized without verified completion of a fingerprint check by the FBI.
Beginning with instructions that I directed be issued on November 29, 1996, the Service put in place new quality assurance procedures:
Use of a uniform worksheet by every INS district to document that all clerical processing and statutory eligibility determination steps have been completed;
Mandatory supervisory review of every case involving criminal history or other complex issues regarding eligibility;
Quality assurance review in every office by INS officers not directly involved in the naturalization program, using a random sample of cases at four different stages in the process;
Field visits by teams of experienced INS adjudicators and managers under the INS Office of Internal Audit to examine the accuracy of overall processing activities;
Tightening of procedures for processing cases when relying on temporary files; and
Updating of the INS Examiner's Handbook, which guides field personnel in processing naturalization applications, using a team of expert adjudicators and supervisors.
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In using these new procedures to process naturalization cases, the worksheets require evidence that an FBI response had been received and acted upon prior to interview. We also required that the monthly quality assurance reviews of each office's naturalization cases employ a standardized checklist to ensure consistency. The completed checklists are sent on a monthly basis to the regions for analysis. The enhanced guidance has improved the process for reporting on the results of the monthly quality assurance reviews. These procedures allow the districts, regions and the INS Office of Internal Audit (OIA) to analyze information in more detail to highlight repeated problems and trends toward improvements that are identified by the reviewers. The districts can focus directly on specific problems to allow for an immediate fix. The regions can assess office compliance with guidance, and the OIA can identify from a Service perspective progress toward compliance and problems that require a national solution.
INS has never had a quality assurance program. Thus, this program is a major improvement that also represents a significant change that will take time to properly institutionalize. We plan to request resources for the districts to establish permanent quality assurance positions to ensure continuous review of all adjudication process in the in district offices.
We asked that KPMG conduct an early-term review of the implementation of the procedures and any proposed changes to them that they recommended. On April 18, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP delivered a report that reviewed our progress in implementing the Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQPs) that we issued last November to improve the naturalization process. The report by KPMG, which is working under contract to the Department of Justice (DOJ), performed on-site reviews of naturalization application processing at 24 key INS districts and service centers over the course of 5 weeks. DOJ and INS had asked KPMG to conduct the interim review so that the firm could objectively assess field implementation of the NQPs, and we could get early feedback on our progress.
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When I first learned the general nature of KPMG's findings, I found the results extremely troubling. I ordered a series of actions, which I will describe below, that are designed to correct deficiencies and to ensure that the Service fully implements the most critical quality assurance procedures. I did so, frankly, because if these naturalization quality assurance procedures were deficient, then the integrity of the entire naturalization process was in question—and INS must be able to assure the American public that INS is committed to upholding the integrity of the naturalization program.
KPMG has reaffirmed that the quality assurance procedures themselves are sound. At the same time, there have been some serious lapses in implementation, and there must be immediate and substantial improvements to ensure that each office was effectively implementing the NQPs. I took the following actions immediately following our receipt of the draft KPMG report:
I ordered that each naturalization applicant scheduled for a swearing-in ceremony would be required to have his or her application worksheet reviewed and reverified by supervisory adjudicators to ensure that quality assurance steps have been followed, including a verified fingerprint check.
I called the directors of all INS regional offices, district offices and service centers to INS headquarters on April 15–16 for face-to-face briefings by KPMG on the review and to develop aggressive corrective action plans to fully implement the NQP.
To improve training of all staff involved in implementing new procedures, we will be conducting training for adjudicators, clerks, and records personnel from all INS district offices and centers. The training is being designed to address the problems encountered to date and strengthen compliance with quality assurance procedures.
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To improve the fingerprint process, we have now readied our ability to assign a unique identifier, in the form of a bar code, to each fingerprint card. INS also sends the fingerprint biographical information on a tape to the FBI using the Machine Readable Document (MRD) FBI format. These new procedures reduce paperwork errors, improve tracking and processing efficiency, and provide a clear link for matching fingerprint check results with the appropriate application. The bar coding program is presently installed at the Vermont Service Center and will be expanded this summer to INS' other three service centers in Laguna Niguel, Calif.; Dallas, Tex.; and Lincoln, Neb.
INS will detail quality-assurance staff to the FBI Fingerprint Processing Center in Clarksburg, W.Va., to monitor and review fingerprint submissions for naturalization applications. In addition, the FBI will provide on-site assistance to key district offices to provide training and assistance in preparing and handling fingerprint cards.
ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND PERSONNEL CHANGES
While these initial steps provide a number of immediate remedies being undertaken in field offices, it is evident that fundamental management, structural, and communications problems have existed for some time at INS and need to be addressed for the longer term.
Last Friday, April 25, the Attorney General and I announced the appointment of two distinguished administrators to further help INS achieve our goals. Robert K. Bratt, who has spent 19 years at Justice, most recently as executive officer of the Criminal Division, began serving at INS this week as Executive Director for Naturalization Operations. Reporting directly to me, he will oversee the naturalization program and develop an action plan to correct existing problems in preparation for a comprehensive follow-up field audit of naturalization quality assurance procedures by KPMG within the coming months.
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In addition, Charles A. Bowsher, retired Comptroller General of the United States, will serve as my special adviser in a part-time, unpaid contract position. He will assist in the development of the action plan and advise me on the best ways to implement the new procedures. We are fortunate to have both of these exceptionally capable senior managers at INS, and I look forward to working with them.
Mr. Bratt's first priority will be to ensure current naturalization case processing follows the NQP instructions we issued in November and any further changes recommended by KPMG. He will also supervise implementation of the recommendations stemming from the ongoing review by INS and KPMG Peat Marwick of the more than 1 million naturalizations granted during from September 1995 to September 1996. Both the Attorney General and I are committed to giving him whatever resources he needs.
As I testified to the House Appropriations Committee earlier this month, over the long term, we need to make some changes to strengthen the INS headquarters-field relationship.
I also have decided on immediate personnel changes within the Office of Field Operations that include bringing four highly respected field managers to Washington on extended detail to improve support to the field. Effective May 15, Brian R. Perryman, Acting District Director for the Chicago District, will become Acting Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, replacing J. Scott Blackman who is serving on an interim basis. Mary Ann Gantner, Deputy District Director, New York District, will report to Mr. Bratt to assist with naturalization activities starting on April 28. Effective May 5, Joseph D. Cuddihy, District Director for the Rome District, will report to Mr. Perryman as Acting Associate Commissioner for Field Operations. Also effective May 5, Joseph R. Greene, District Director in Denver, will manage enforcement activities in the Office of Field Operations. Each of these highly experienced professionals will strengthen communication and coordination between headquarters and the field, and will increase oversight and accountability, with particular emphasis on naturalization quality assurance procedures.
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PROGRAM REDESIGN AND ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM
In addition to work with KPMG, INS naturalization experts are also working closely with Coopers & Lybrand, an independent accounting and management consulting firm, to enhance the integrity of the naturalization program, streamline the application process, reduce paperwork, and improve customer service. That contract, which is expected to last 18–24 months, was announced in March by the Department of Justice. The steps now being taken, including the findings from the KPMG review of quality assurance procedures and the experience of the new naturalization executive team, will be incorporated into Coopers & Lybrand's redesign work.
To ensure uniform implementation of INS policies and program procedures, in fiscal year 1997, INS expanded the capabilities of its Office of Internal Audit (OIA) to identify instances of noncompliance with guidance and to review field office operations and functions for effectiveness. The effort is referred to as INSpect, and is managed by OIA to review each office once every two or three years depending on the office size or known risks. Recommendations are monitored through completion of corrective actions, and repeated problems are analyzed and reported on to ensure effective policies and controls are in place. This continuous and proactive type of review provides strong baselines for internal improvement and for monitoring implementation of changes in the naturalization process.
IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The organizational structure and culture of the agency have long needed updating to meet its present day mission. We took the first steps to do that with the reorganization that I implemented in November 1994. Since that time, we have been assessing how well the new structure meets the agency's management needs. In doing so, we have drawn on the expertise of management experts and senior managers in the field who carry out the agency's immigration and naturalization operations. As a result, we have developed a set of significant changes, which will improve on the 1994 reorganization, that are intended to strengthen the field structure. These specific changes will be proposed to the Congress. These organizational changes will increase effective management of the naturalization process.
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FINGERPRINT PROCEDURES
An essential element in the review of a naturalization application is the background and qualifications under law of a naturalization applicant that is provided by the fingerprint check with the FBI. In the 1970s, the standard procedure for applicant fingerprint checks was for INS to submit the fingerprint card to the FBI and then to wait for a response either in the form of an FBI rap sheet or an indication that the FBI had no record on file. This process historically took about 30 to 60 days.
By the early 1980s, INS found that the routing and associated filing of all FBI responses was more than most offices could effectively handle. So in January 1982, INS changed this practice and advised the FBI to forward only matched records (rap sheets) and rejected fingerprint cards to local offices. At that time, INS adopted a policy presuming the absence of an FBI record if INS did not receive a rap sheet or rejected card within 60 days.
In February 1994, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of INS' fingerprint clearance procedures and identified several weaknesses. The OIG concluded that procedures were not in place to ensure that the fingerprints submitted were those of the applicant, that the processing of rejected fingerprint cards had a number of weaknesses, and that there were instances in which rap sheets were not being placed in case files before decisions were made on the applications. INS advised local offices of the OIG findings so that interim corrective steps could be taken locally to improve the process.
The OIG, the General Accounting Office, and the Senate Appropriations Committee specifically recommended that INS create a system by which fingerprints would be taken by entities authorized by INS. The INS Designated Fingerprint Service (DFS) program, which became effective March 1, grew out of these recommendations.
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At one time, INS took all fingerprints. Large increases in the numbers of people filing for benefits made this impractical, so, since at least 1982, law enforcement agencies, community-based organizations, and other entities and individuals had been permitted to take fingerprints. Our fingerprint program is intended to promote security, quality, and service in the fingerprinting process. The primary ''security'' concern is to ensure that the prints submitted are those of the actual applicant. The key ''quality'' concern is to minimize the number of fingerprint cards rejected because the biographical information included on the fingerprint card is incomplete or inaccurate or because the fingerprints are not of sufficiently high quality to be classified by the FBI. The key ''service'' concern is to ensure that applicants have reasonably convenient access to fingerprinting services.
The DFS program allows us to regulate, monitor, and audit fingerprint takers for the first time. While the DFS program is an improvement over the past, when there were no controls over fingerprinting, we are aware of the program's limitations. In the first few weeks since the program began on March 1, we have seen a high fingerprint card rejection rate at some of our service centers. These rejections were mostly related to deficiencies such as the failure to sign across the envelope seal. We expect many of these problems to be resolved with additional training.
Let me take a moment to explain how the DFS program works.
Under the current regulation, individuals and organizations may become DFS entities by paying a $370 fee, obtaining training from INS on fingerprint security and quality, and having employees who do the fingerprinting pass a FBI fingerprint check. DFS entities must operate at permanent business locations and be licensed as businesses by State or local government agencies. We have certified approximately 3,000 DFS entities across the country. Thirty percent of these are law enforcement agencies, 17 percent are not-for-profit organizations, and 53 percent are for-profit organizations. INS also continues to take fingerprints, subject to available resources.
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When applicants for INS benefits go to a DFS entity to obtain fingerprints, the DFS entity requires the applicant to show an INS-approved form of identification. The DFS takes the fingerprints and signs an attestation acknowledging verification of the applicant's identity, attaches the attestation to the card, seals the completed fingerprint card and attestation in an envelope, signs the envelope across the seal, and gives the envelope to the applicant. The applicant then sends the envelope with the application and application fee to INS. INS rejects the fingerprint card if the DFS has not prepared or packaged the card properly. Assuming the card is properly prepared, we compare the information on the fingerprint card masthead to the application to make sure the information is consistent. We then send the card to the FBI.
INS monitors DFS entities through direct inspections by a compliance contractor, who uses former law enforcement officers for this purpose. This contractor has already completed more than 300 inspections. Inspection worksheets are returned to district office staff for follow-up. We are now in the process of developing a program of inspections carried out by INS field staff to supplement our contractor's inspections. These will be both random and targeted inspections intended to follow up on specific complaints and intelligence reports. DFS certification may be suspended or revoked for failure to cooperate with inspections or to comply with our procedural requirements.
We have already taken steps to further improve the DFS program. We convened a workgroup to develop methods to strengthen the existing system. We also organized a second workgroup to focus on potential alternatives to DFS. This second workgroup included representatives from INS and consultants from the FBI, KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers & Lybrand, and EDS' Government Consulting Services.
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Since we now believe that there are sufficient DFS entities to meet applicants needs, we plan to issue a Notice which sets a moratorium on approval of any new DFS entities (with the exception of law enforcement agencies). We are preparing an Interim Rule that will impose new eligibility and performance standards on DFS entities. We are also beginning a joint review project with the FBI in which we will conduct biometrics verification on a random basis. We plan to publicize this program widely in order to deter fraud. We are also detailing people to perform quality assurance at the FBI facility in Clarksburg, West Virginia and at our four service centers and selected district offices to monitor cards produced by DFS entities.
We are developing tough national standards and will suspend or revoke certification for entities that do not meet these standards. We are preparing a compliance monitoring and site inspection plan for local district offices which increases the number of random inspections by INS officials, and we are considering the number of inspections performed by our compliance contractor as well. Finally, we plan to upgrade training of DFS entities to improve the quality of cards submitted.
It is important to bear in mind that there have been weaknesses in the fingerprint process for many years and that DFS is a brand-new program. Even as we take steps to strengthen the program and to develop alternatives, we are placing a top priority on gathering the information we need to evaluate the program and to benchmark any vulnerabilities that may exist. We want to make sure that any substantial changes or alternatives we commit to have gone through a businesslike analysis and that we have taken full account of the strengths and weaknesses of all feasible options. The integrity of the fingerprint process is our top priority.
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We are currently developing a range of alternatives that have the potential to greatly enhance the security of the fingerprinting process. Each of these options will require substantial investments of time and resources. The alternatives we are considering include the following:
First, DFS entities would continue to take all fingerprints, but we would add an automated biometrics system by which the applicant's fingerprints would be taken a second time at the interview and compared to a copy of the fingerprints that were sent to the FBI. This approach would virtually guarantee security in the fingerprint process, regardless of who took the fingerprints or who controlled them before they were submitted to INS. This biometric verification approach can be applied with any of the alternatives under consideration. A variation of this approach would involve management of the DFS program by a small number of contractors—say 1 to 3—who would run the program for the entire country.
The second alternative we are evaluating involves increasing the role of law enforcement agencies in taking fingerprints.
The third alternative involves INS taking all fingerprints.
We are now finalizing the cost and feasibility of these alternative approaches. Further, as noted earlier, Coopers & Lybrand is working with us to review and redesign the entire naturalization process, including the best methods of obtaining fingerprints and checking them with the FBI.
CITIZENSHIP REVOCATION
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As I indicated during my previous testimony to this Subcommittee, INS is taking strong action to revoke the citizenship of persons found to have been wrongfully naturalized. On October 24, 1996, INS promulgated final regulations implementing administrative denaturalization procedures, which allow INS to avoid sometimes cumbersome judicial denaturalization procedures. The administrative revocation procedures permit INS to revoke citizenship during a 2-year period after naturalization if INS determines that an applicant was granted citizenship in error or if INS subsequently obtains additional evidence bearing on the applicant's eligibility for naturalization. Since October 24, 1996, we have issued 72 notices of intent to revoke naturalization.
Because revocation of citizenship raises numerous complex legal issues and because revocation in the administrative context is an entirely new proceeding, all revocation cases are reviewed and monitored at headquarters by the Office of General Counsel. Cases where we have pursued administrative revocation include ones where the naturalized citizen did not meet the requisite residency or physical presence requirements to naturalize and where individuals were later found to be statutorily ineligible to naturalize because of criminal convictions. In addition, we have initiated administrative revocation proceedings in the requisite time period where we have determined that the individual provided false testimony during the course of his or her naturalization interview. Finally, revocation proceedings have been brought where there was a pending or final order of deportation against the individual at the time of naturalization.
For each of these classes of cases, we are necessarily mindful that there is, to quote Justice Scalia in a leading Supreme Court decision, an ''unusually high burden of proof in denaturalization cases.'' Accordingly, the decision whether to initiate revocation in a given case can be made only after a thorough review of its particular facts. Where the individual is clearly ineligible for naturalization, we have initiated, and will continue to initiate, administrative revocation. In addition, we have initiated, and will continue to initiate, revocation proceedings in less conclusive cases where the facts are nonetheless compelling. Cases where ineligibility is based solely on misrepresentation of facts which in themselves do not statutorily disqualify the applicants, including cases based solely on false testimony, involve a particularly unsettled area of the law that presents unique obstacles to administrative revocation. In these cases, therefore, we plan to proceed with administrative revocation only where the concealed information relates to a felony arrest in order to foster the development of favorable case law. Finally, we are cooperating with a newly formed working group of U.S. Attorneys to develop a sound plan for the targeted use of both civil and criminal sanctions in cases involving misrepresentations, including the use of judicial denaturalization where administrative revocation is not possible.
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This policy towards administrative revocations will be coupled with a strengthened approach towards prospective applications, where the alien applicant bears the burden of proof and where it is far easier to sustain an adverse decision in court based on misrepresentation alone. For example, refinements to the naturalization process will better ensure that where an applicant provides false oral statements under oath, the application will be denied.
By aggressively pursuing administrative revocation in appropriate cases, and particularly by denying naturalization to new applicants who provide false oral testimony, we are sending a clear message that only truly deserving individuals will be granted citizenship.
CONCLUSION
We continue to face an enormous challenge in implementing improved procedures in the face a huge demand. But, as I have stated often, it is vitally important that Congress and the American people have confidence in the integrity of the naturalization process. I feel confident that the scope of our management reforms, new appointments of exceptionally capable senior managers, and a strengthened organizational structure are the right measures to bring about the necessary improvements. Our work on naturalization is a work in progress. Even now, Coopers & Lybrand is in our field offices soliciting their views on how the naturalization process works now and how it can be improved. I hope the scope of the improvements now underway and the actions that we are undertaking demonstrate the seriousness of our intent. I look forward to continuing to work closely with the Committee in this commitment to the American people. I will be glad to take any questions you have at this time.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Commissioner. A few minutes ago, Mr. Ahrens from Peat Marwick testified that the INS may still be naturalizing convicted criminals who have no right to naturalize. When can you assure the American people that individuals who are not eligible to become citizens will not become citizens? When will you be able to assure the American people that the necessary FBI background check will be completed before anyone is naturalized?
Ms. MEISSNER. I believe that I can assure you and the American people today that we are not naturalizing criminals. The Peat Marwick report did not turn up any instances of people improperly naturalized. We have in our district offices——
Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Meissner, that wasn't their function. We all know that individuals are being or were naturalized with criminal records. My question, and I just want to make sure I get the answer or understand your answer, is that you were saying that no individual is going to be naturalized who has not had a background check completed by the FBI. Is that the case?
Ms. MEISSNER. That's correct. All the files in our district offices throughout the country, as verified by our district directors to me face to face 2 weeks ago, that have any kind of an ''ident'' from the FBI are being held aside. Moreover, as I just testified, we have issued a new requirement that all cases be revalidated prior to going to oath. That revalidation is occurring as we speak.
Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Meissner, when you testified before this subcommittee on March 7, that we had corrected those mistakes, what made you think that in fact the mistakes had been corrected?
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Ms. MEISSNER. My testimony went to the procedures. The procedures that we have put into place, I believed then and have had reaffirmed——
Mr. SMITH. Your exact words, if I may interrupt you was ''we have corrected those mistakes.'' That didn't say anything about procedures. The clear impression that I think any reasonable person would have gotten was that you were correcting the mistakes. You weren't just talking about procedures.
Ms. MEISSNER. We were then and are now in the process of correcting the mistakes of past. We are doing that by the procedures that we issued in December and that we are implementing.
What we are talking about here are weaknesses in implementation, unevenness in the implementation, not a weakness in the overall approach. The overall approach is the issue that was in question at that time.
Mr. SMITH. I agree with you there. I think that's the problem. There was a gap between the words and the promises and the actions and the corrections. That's what we are trying to address.
Isn't it true, going to the denaturalization process here for a minute, isn't it true that the INS will never be able to know whether it has denaturalized everyone that should not have been naturalized in the last year?
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Ms. MEISSNER. I think until we complete the audit, the Lincoln audit, and have the final results on that, it is premature to speculate.
Mr. SMITH. So let me get that answer correct. You think it is possible then that the INS would denaturalize everyone who was not eligible to become a citizen?
Ms. MEISSNER. No. That is not what I said. What I said is that we are still in the process of the audit of last year's case work.
Mr. SMITH. OK. Let me ask that question to Mr. Martin, because I want a realistic answer. Is it realistic to expect the INS to denaturalize everyone who was naturalized but should not have been naturalized during the Citizenship USA?
Mr. MARTIN. I think it's also quite appropriate for us to follow on the process that has been outlined, that was carefully set forth when the Peat Marwick process was begun. We should wait until we have the full results from that.
Mr. SMITH. But your own memo, does it not, acknowledges that you will never be able to find everyone who became a citizen who should not have been? Those were the guidelines that I just read a few days ago from you.
Mr. MARTIN. My memo addresses the standards that should be applied to that caseload and to future caseloads as to who we would take forward. It's very clear on the statutory disqualifications, and I'm confident we have a process underway to identify those, and we will initiate the revocation.
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Mr. SMITH. But if you apply the standards that you set up, is that going to snare everyone who should be denaturalized?
Mr. MARTIN. Well, within the limits of the case law that are outlined——
Mr. SMITH. It's a very simple direct question. It should be easily answered by a yes or no.
Mr. MARTIN. It's a set of standards that is meant to outline a process for applying the revocation.
Mr. SMITH. Let's assume that the standards are implemented. Let's assume that the process is followed. Does that guarantee that that is going to denaturalize everyone who should not have been naturalized?
Mr. MARTIN. Everyone who is reported with a statutory disqualification, and let me emphasize what that is.
Mr. SMITH. There are a lot of other individuals who should not have been naturalized. My question again, is that going to at least result in an attempt to denaturalize everyone who should not have been naturalized?
Mr. MARTIN. I'm sorry. It doesn't lend itself to a yes or no answer. I really would like to give a very straightforward answer, but the standards are very complicated in this particular procedure, and the denaturalization standards themselves impose high obstacles under the case law that is established and the statutory standards that are set forward.
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We have done our very best to apply that. We are resolutely going after people who are statutorily disqualified.
Mr. SMITH. That doesn't answer the question. I am going to press you for it because the answer is in your own memo. The clear implication was we'll never know and there's no way to know and there's no way to guarantee that individuals who are naturalized are going to be denaturalized if they were not eligible.
Mr. MARTIN. I believe the clearest cases of those who were not eligible are those with statutory disqualifications. A criminal offense would disqualify them, a pending deportation proceeding——
Mr. SMITH. I know that's the clearest case. I'm not talking about the clearest case. I'm talking about a lot of other cases as well. I think you probably answered the question by evading it, Mr. Martin.
Mr. MARTIN. I am really not trying to evade it. The case law simply doesn't allow us to give that kind of clarity, and if there are clear ones that are——
Mr. SMITH. But do you know, or do you not, that if you enforced everything that you have recommended enforcing as far as the regulations, as far as the procedures go, that is not going to cover everybody who should not have been naturalized?
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Mr. MARTIN. It covers——
Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you this question. Is it possible that it would cover everybody? Now surely you can answer that directly.
Mr. MARTIN. The memo addresses primarily the standards looking retrospectively. For the future, we are tightening up certain of our processes where the burden of proof is different.
Mr. SMITH. I know all that.
Mr. MARTIN. The burden of proof is different, yes, for cases that are going through the process.
Mr. SMITH. The burden of proof is different. Doesn't that make it harder to denaturalize someone at this stage than it would have been not to approve him earlier?
Mr. MARTIN. That's an inevitable function of the different burdens of proof, yes.
Mr. SMITH. So the answer is yes?
Mr. MARTIN. The answer is yes. It makes it harder to denaturalize than to deny a naturalization to begin with.
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Mr. SMITH. We understand the consequences of that. I think that's clear to everybody. Thank you, Mr. Martin.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. I'm not sure what that was all about. [Laughter.]
I thought that was pretty well addressed in the memorandum which seemed pretty clear to me. I am quoting from the memorandum now. ''The case law governing denaturalization for misrepresentation or concealment has followed an especially tortuous path, producing three strongly contested and potentially confusing Supreme Court decisions in recent decades.'' Later it says, ''the net result is that it is highly uncertain that the department could win or sustain a revocation based on a misrepresentation in the absence of proof of an underlying statutory disqualification, whether considered under the rubric of willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact or false testimony that forecloses a finding of good moral character.''
That is the standard. I mean it's like any other Supreme Court standard or a legal standard. You are going to try to do the best you can and sometimes you are going to lose some of these cases. I take it that's what you are saying.
Mr. MARTIN. That's right. The memorandum sets out the standards for deciding which cases we will pursue, in an effort to develop forward-looking case law.
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Mr. WATT. All right. I just wanted to be clear on what was being said here, or at least put it in some perspective. You are not intentionally trying not to denaturalize people. You just have constraints of the law that you are working within.
Mr. MARTIN. That's right.
Mr. WATT. Ms. Meissner, Commissioner, I hate to sound like the chairman is coming at you from one side and I'm coming at you from a different side, but I heard you say that you are taking the necessary corrective action. That was the last thing you said in your statement. You said that you have implemented a process where each supervisor must review and revalidate every application.
I guess the question I am asking is at what cost are we doing this in terms of the backlog of other cases. I mean it seems to me that we are getting so consumed with assuring that there is a fail-safe system in place that nobody gets through the gap that ought not get through that, that we're setting up some standards that are backlogging the system further and further and further. Can you help me address that and maybe reassure me that we have an appropriate balance here in what we're doing?
Ms. MEISSNER. The backlog is climbing. The waiting times are increasing, and obviously as we all know, the application numbers continue to mushroom.
The Service remains committed to a timely processing of naturalization applications. For us, that remains a 6-month processing period. We are well beyond that at the present time. I was very reluctant to impose the revalidation requirement that you are referring to in your question, but I felt I had no choice in the light of the KPMG findings. I have to assure that the system is working properly in order to allow district offices to go ahead and swear people in.
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We will remove that revalidation office by office as soon as we can be sure that the fingerprint process is working correctly. We are intensively working to correct the difficulties and are very very much in search of or working in an effort to find the proper balance between the quality and rigor of the system and timely processing.
I'm not going to make any predictions here in terms of the revalidation.
Mr. WATT. You would be well advised not to. You'll be held to them.
Ms. MEISSNER. The revalidation is an immediate extra quality assurance step. As I say, we want to be able to withdraw that as soon as we feel the level of confidence——
Mr. WATT. Does that revalidation review apply to just the people who have some indication of criminal record or are we revalidating and reviewing every single application that comes through the process?
Ms. MEISSNER. This is prior to going to oath. It is a paper review. It is a supervisory review to be absolutely certain that the worksheet in fact has been fully and properly completed. The key issue in the revalidation is the control number from the FBI that whether an FBI record was or was not received.
Mr. WATT. That sounds like a hellacious task. I never could figure out whether I am supposed to use a or an before that word. That's a major undertaking, to have a supervisor re-review every single application that comes through.
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Ms. MEISSNER. It is a critical safety step. It is not that time consuming. It is time consuming in the aggregate. The whole purpose of this worksheet is to have on one page clear notes that every step in the process has in fact been observed. When a case has been done correctly, one can look at it and very quickly know that it has been done properly. As I say, this control number is the single most important element of that.
Mr. WATT. I was very gratified to receive a call last week from Attorney General Reno the day you all announced the appointment of these two individuals who were the one who is going to really take over direct control of the naturalization process, subject to your supervision of course, and the consultant. Then I was kind of surprised and disappointed to read some newspaper accounts that seemed to suggest that you were not fully supportive of those people coming in.
Would you give us your perspective on the record about those people so we will get the New York Times square about whether you welcome these people or whether they are being forced on you?
Ms. MEISSNER. I absolutely welcome these people. The New York Times account was absolutely in error. You will see today a letter to the editor printed in the New York Times signed by Janet Reno.
Mr. WATT. I figured as much, but I just wanted to hear it straight from the source.
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Ms. MEISSNER. That states exactly what I have said. The Attorney General and I have worked very collaboratively on this issue, as well as on many other issues. We in the Justice Department are in very close coordination. The Justice Department supports what we are doing at INS and certainly supports me. The assignment of these individuals, both Mr. Bratt and Mr. Bowsher, was a decision that we made together that we both agreed to and welcome.
Mr. WATT. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Watt. On the way to recognizing the gentleman from Indiana, Commissioner Meissner, I just want to ask you, it seems to me that I just read an article in the last few days that the projected number of applications for citizenship were expected to decline next year. If that's the case, that might allow you to catch up and reduce the waiting time. Do you know if that's the case as far as projections go?
Ms. MEISSNER. I have not read that article and I don't know that we have any projections for next year, but if we do, I will be certain to ask about that. We'll be happy to——
Mr. SMITH. Do you have any idea whether the trend has been down for the last month or two or not? It seems that it has been.
Ms. MEISSNER. I would have to check. I have not been advised that it's down, but I would be happy to check that.
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Mr. SMITH. OK. Perhaps you can give us an answer before we finish today.
INSERT OFFSET RING FOLIOS 1 HERE
Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease, is recognized.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner Meissner, I have a tremendous personal and professional respect for Mr. Bowsher. I am delighted that he is going to be part of your team. But it wasn't clear to me, because I know you were summarizing, what you anticipate his role will be, his responsibility, and whether he will be advisory or whether he will have authority to implement recommendations that he will come forward with.
Ms. MEISSNER. His role will be an advisory role. He is assisting us on a nonfee public service basis. He will function obviously on a part-time basis, but he will serve as a sounding board and as a guide, drawing on his career, with decades of experience in Government. I met with him Monday. I'll be meeting again with him this afternoon and again with him tomorrow, along with Mr. Bratt, who will be in charge day to day. What we are really asking him to do is help us to understand realistically what we can expect to accomplish with changes that are as sweeping as any changes we have put into place, how fast we can press ourselves to reach particular expectations, and what steps we need to take to be assuring ourselves that we are thoroughly percolating these procedures all the way down into the agency.
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We have a set of procedures here that involves everything from our SES managers to our GS–3 and –4 clerks. The fact of the matter is, thousands of people are involved in making this new procedure work. To institutionalize a procedure like that takes some time. In the case of the fingerprints, which is the core issue here, it ultimately takes proper coding by thousands of clerks in offices all over the country getting it right. So Mr. Bowsher I think will be very helpful in allowing us to draw on his experience.
Mr. PEASE. Do you anticipate that he will still be with you when KPMG Peat Marwick completes its work and assists you in implementation of any recommendations they might make, or is this a very short-term relationship that will conclude by then?
Ms. MEISSNER. He is willing to be of assistance to us for a reasonable period of time, as long as we need him. I wouldn't imagine that to be years, but he will be sticking with us in the near term.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Pease.
The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon, is recognized.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the odd things about this committee is that we have a lot of lawyers here. I was on the resources yesterday and had the opportunity to ask Secretary Babbitt of the Department of the Interior if he was a lawyer, and he made some sort of demeaning comment about the fact that he had been at one point in time. I don't want the confusion over the chairman's last question and the comments by my friend Mr. Watt—what I think I heard was the conclusion from that, which is essentially that it is a lot harder to denaturalize someone who has gone through the system and not been caught with mistakes than it is to avoid the naturalization in the first place. Isn't that true, Mr. Martin?
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Mr. MARTIN. That is true.
Mr. CANNON. In the last hearing on March 7, I was very impressed with what I heard and with the plans of where we were going. Commissioner, let me say that a couple of the things you have said here cause me concern. I would like you to have the opportunity to explain that.
You said that quality assurance is a new concept at the INS. Personally I had been a lawyer long in the past, but quality assurance is what I think are the great tools of modern management. I can understand how it would be difficult to take a bureaucratic organization like INS and actually implement quality assurance, although that has been done fairly well at—I mean there are many examples of how that's been done thus far. I can't believe that many of your people don't understand it.
It would also seem to me that the INS by nature is an operation that is given to a bureaucratic and therefore quality assurance prone process. So I would like you to talk a little bit about what you are doing along that line. But let me just say that the real concern that I had in your subsequent answer to a question was that you said that Peat Marwick turned up no incidence of criminals who were naturalized. It seems to me that that statement flies in the face of quality assurance. In other words, quality assurance is going through each of the steps and making sure you do them properly, not saying we're OK because an external agency that came and looked at the process found the process defective, didn't find a particular incident. In other words, the incident flies in the face of the concept of quality assurance.
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Ms. MEISSNER. OK. Thank you. When I talk about quality assurance in the way that I did in my statement, I certainly don't mean to imply the employees of the Immigration Service have not been concerned or that the agency has not been concerned about quality in its work. What I meant was that a formalized system of internal random sampling of cases——
Mr. CANNON. Let me just interrupt you and say that when I talk about quality assurance, that's what I am referring to, is that formalized system.
Ms. MEISSNER. Right. OK. We have not in our adjudications program had a formal system for random sampling decisions, denial decisions or approval decisions, independent of the officers who make the decisions or the supervisors who review the decisions. That is one of the key elements in the procedures that we put into place in December. They are for a variety of things, but what I was specifically referring to was the random sampling system whereby officers who were not involved in the work actually looked at the work on a regular basis and provided their feedback as an ongoing tool to correct. So I was citing it by way of trying to illustrate that this is a substantial change that we are trying to infuse in the agency and it takes some time to produce that change.
Mr. CANNON. So when you talk about quality assurance, you are only dealing with the statistical sampling aspect of it rather than the process aspect of it?
Ms. MEISSNER. In addition, obviously the 100 percent FBI fingerprint verification is a crucial part of the changes that we announced in December. That, too, has not been something that we have done before. Nor have we done it in our offices in the ways that we're presently working with getting control numbers off of data tapes with worksheets on top of each file that are the same in all of our offices across the country. There is a regimen of procedures now, through this naturalization quality program, that are being put into place that are simply not customary for our employees. Therefore, a heavy heavy requirement for effective training.
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Mr. CANNON. Would the chair permit one followup?
Mr. SMITH. Please proceed.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I am a little confused. Quality assurance is in fact probably a fairly vague concept. You have others used like zero defects or quality first, where the focus of the manufacturing or the process is in the service system is to act without defect. So you look at the whole system and say how do we assure quality as we go through it. What you have talked about sounds to me either like some statistical sampling to see how you are doing, which you need to do I believe. It's also bits and pieces of procedure. But are you looking at INS from the point of view of how do we go through the whole complex process with the kind of documenting that we need to do so we avoid defects, we avoid the problem of criminals or others who are naturalized improperly? Is there an overarching quality program at INS, which industry has remarkably reduced costs.
Ms. MEISSNER. What we are doing now in the naturalization program provides us with model that we hope to be able to replicate in other areas of our adjudications decisionmaking. Naturalization is one type of adjudication, but as you know, we make a variety of other adjudicatory decisions.
Again, in our entire adjudications arena, we have relied historically only on supervisory review or ad hoc efforts that have been developed within individual offices that are beyond supervisory review.
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This quality program that we're talking about is indeed new for our adjudications program. We will work it out in the naturalization program and we will then replicate it in the rest of our adjudications programs. We have simply never been resourced until this time to do this kind of quality assurance beyond a standard supervisory review effort.
Mr. CANNON. Let me suggest that a few people with understanding of the quality system are relatively cheap. In fact, extremely cheap. Do you have an overall path to get to a quality assurance program in the INS?
Ms. MEISSNER. We are pursuing reengineering the naturalization process on a parallel track, for which we have contracted with Coopers & Lybrand. Quality assurance is very much a part of the reengineering of the naturalization program. Again, this will be the first effort, which we will then export to our other adjudications programs.
Mr. CANNON. The major element of success in every quality assurance program, and I think it's a conclusion by all people who have ever been involved in it, is that you have to have an understanding of quality assurance at the top levels and a commitment to quality. Do you feel that you personally have that and that your senior people have that?
Ms. MEISSNER. I certainly have that. Certainly the people at this table and in the senior leadership of the Immigration Service have that. We have a major task in implementing the ways that we go about achieving that. We clearly have a major need for very substantial training of very large numbers of employees in order to equip them to meet those expectations.
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Mr. CANNON. Have you personally read many books or do you have much background yourself in quality?
Ms. MEISSNER. I don't have a lot of formal background in quality assurance, no. But what I can tell you is that as we faced the real dilemmas last fall of understanding the scope of difficulties that we had had in assuring the integrity of the naturalization process, it was I who said one of the critical fixes here has got to be a formal quality program. Let's start with naturalization. Let's use the naturalization program as the way to get into this, where our adjudications is concerned. That is the origin of the part of this effort that we are talking about today.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cannon.
Commissioner Meissner, thank you for your testimony. We appreciate your appearing before us today.
The subcommittee welcomes our third and last panel. Our first individual to testify is the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, our friend and colleague, a Member of Congress from Florida. Also Rosemary Jenks, senior fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies.
Ileana, we will start off with you. We appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. ILEANA ROS–LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Watt and Mr. Cannon, and all of the members of this subcommittee. It's an honor for me to be here today to address the important matter of assuring the integrity of the Nation's naturalization process.
On Monday, just a few days ago, I was once again witness to the main reason why we must make sure that any and all questions of negligence in the process of naturalization be done away with. For it was on that day when 3,000 new Americans from my area of south Florida swore allegiance to this country to defend our constitution and to uphold our ideals of liberty and freedom for all. It was the same oath that I took some years ago, which makes this naturalization certificate worth its weight in gold. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I commend your efforts to rid the naturalization process of any bureaucratic mistakes or politicizing this process that in any way cheapens the value of this naturalization certificate.
At the same time, however, we could not, must not scare the naturalization process into a standstill. I will give you an example. Monday's ceremony was the first one since October of last year that we had had such a ceremony in an area like Miami where thousands of possible new residents are waiting their turn at taking the oath. The reason has been that INS has been virtually paralyzed by allegations that some people with criminal records may have been granted citizenship.
While I whole heartedly support stripping these criminals of their American citizenship, for it lessens the value of the naturalization certificate that I and millions of others have worked hard to obtain and we're immensely proud of, I believe that this is not an excuse to slow down to barely a trickle the processing of the huge amounts of naturalization applications that are awaiting in Miami and in all of the major metropolitan areas. Just as it is wrong to grant citizenship to criminals, it is also unfair for hardworking, tax paying applicants for U.S. citizenship that INS be burdened with so excessive a regulation that forces persons to wait up to 2 years to complete the naturalization process.
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This process is already straining from many applicants, especially those who attempt to become citizens at an advanced age. Applicants must fill out a burdensome application, and then pay $95. For many inside the beltway, that might be spare change, but it is a great sacrifice for those people with little resources.
Afterwards, the applicants must begin to study for the Government exam. It is by no means an easy test. Let me share with you some of the questions. When was peace declared in World War II? Where was the Constitution written and when? When did the Constitution go into effect? How is an amendment to the Constitution passed in Congress? The list goes on and one. I would venture to say that some of my congressional colleagues may have a difficult time answering some of those questions on the test.
We know that American citizenship is a privilege and not a right. It conveys certain rights as well as serious responsibilities that are the heart and soul of our country of America. New citizens take these responsibilities seriously, especially with the right to vote, which a new American actively exercises.
Under the leadership of Commissioner Doris Meissner, INS has attempted to streamline the citizenship process, and I believe that she has done a great job. The changes have by no means, as some have suggested, created citizenship by assembly line. Rather, it has been a conscious attempt to expedite the sometimes burdensome process of naturalization. Like with any new program, maybe some mistakes were made. However, this should not mean that the whole naturalization process should be turned upside down. The problems must be addressed and resolved, and the changes found to success be expanded.
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Commissioner Meissner has begun to take steps to solve some of these concerns that many of us in Congress have expressed dealing with background checks and the taking of fingerprints. The agency has expanded its efforts to ensure that no persons are naturalized without a complete fingerprint check by the FBI. Commissioner Meissner herself sought the help of the private consulting firm to review the naturalization procedures. She has implemented many of the recommendations from the report.
Commissioner Meissner's rapid response to the findings of the report demonstrate once again, that she is committed to assuring the integrity of the naturalization process, while continuing reforms that make it more efficient.
We should support Commissioner Meissner's efforts to returning the term naturalization to INS, while tirelessly working to keep its integrity. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity again, and Mr. Watt.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to address today the important matter of assuring the integrity of the nation's naturalization process.
On Monday I, was once again witness to the main reason why we must make sure that any and all questions of negligence in the process of naturalization be done away with. It was on Monday when 3,000 new Americans from my area of South Florida swore allegiance to this nation, to defend its constitution and to uphold its ideals of liberty and freedom for all. It was the same oath that I took some years ago and which makes that naturalization certificate worth its weight in gold. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I commend your efforts to rid the naturalization process of any bureaucratic mistakes or politization that in any way cheapen the value of that naturalization certificate.
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At the same time, we should not and must not scare the naturalization process into a standstill. Monday's citizenship ceremony in Miami was the first one since October of last year. The reason: INS was virtually paralyzed by allegations that some people with criminal records were granted citizenship. I wholeheartedly support stripping these criminals of their American citizenship for it lessens the value of the naturalization certificate that I and millions of others worked hard to obtain and are immensely proud of.
However, this is not an excuse to slow down to barely a trickle the processing of naturalization applications. Just as it is wrong to grant citizenship to criminals, it is equally unfair for hard working, tax-paying applicants for US citizenship that INS be burdened with so excessive regulations that force persons to wait up to two years to complete the naturalization process. The process is already straining for many applicants, especially those who attempt to become citizens at an advanced age.
Applicants must fill out a burdensome application. Then pay $95 dollars which for many inside the beltway might be spare change, but it is a great sacrifice for those people with little resources. Afterwards the applicants must begin to study for the government examination. And it is by no means an easy test. Let me share with you some of the questions: When was peace declared in World War II? Where was the Constitution written and where? When did the constitution go into effect? How is an amendment to the Constitution passed in Congress? . . . and the list goes on. I would venture to say that some of my Congressional colleagues may have a difficult time answering many of the questions on the test.
Mr. Chairman, American citizenship is a privilege, not a right. It conveys certain rights as well as serious responsibilities that are the heart and soul of America. New citizens take these responsibilities seriously especially the right to vote which new Americans actively exercise. Under the leadership of Commissioner Meissner, INS has attempted to streamline the citizenship process and I believe she has done a great job. The changes have by no means, as some have suggested, created citizenship by assembly line. Rather it has been a conscious attempt to expedite the sometime burdensome process of naturalization. Like with any new program, maybe some mistakes where made, however, this should not signify that the whole naturalization process could be turned upside down. the problems should be addressed and resolved, and the changes found to be a success expanded.
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Comissioner Meissner has begun to take steps to solve some of the concerns that many in Congress have expressed dealing with background checks and the taking of fingerprints. The agency has expanded its efforts to ensure that no persons are naturalized without a complete fingerprint check by the FBI. Commissioner Meissner herself sought the help of a private consulting firm, KPMG Peat Marwick, to review the naturalization procedures and she has implemented many of the recommendations from the report. Her rapid response to the findings of the report demonstrate once again that she is committed to assuring the integrity of the naturalization process, while continuing reforms that make it more efficient. We should support Commissioner Meissner's efforts for returning the term ''naturalization'' to the INS, while tirelessly working to keep its integrity.
Again, thank you for this opportunity.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your testimony. Let me say also, to my knowledge, you are the only one who has ever testified, and I think this is your second time, to actually bring a naturalization certificate with their own picture.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I was having an extremely bad hair day that day. [Laughter.]
Mr. SMITH. You haven't changed at all.
Ms. Jenks.
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STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY JENKS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
Ms. JENKS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Rosemary Jenks, a senior fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies, a nonprofit, nonadvocacy research institution. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discus an issue that is central to our national identify, the bond that holds us united as one people, U.S. citizenship.
U.S. citizenship is the most valuable and the most cherished privilege our Nation can bestow upon an individual. It is a privilege that is sought by millions around the world. Most of the people in this room are probably aware that there have been flaws in the naturalization procedures for a number of years. I have detailed in my written statement how those flaws were accentuated and exacerbated by the Citizenship USA program. The INS response to these problems has been less than forthcoming. In congressional hearings last fall, top INS officials flat out denied that there were problems in the program, despite evidence that came from their own agency.
Then between late October and late November 1996, INS officials realized that the problems with the naturalization process could no longer be ignored. On November 29, Commissioner Meissner sent a memo to the field offices detailing the new naturalization quality procedures. The recently released KPMG Peat Marwick review of the implementation of these new measures brings into question the ability and the willingness of INS management to seriously address the problems with the naturalization procedures. The fact that three of the 23 offices surveyed did not even have the correct copy of the new procedures clearly points to a severe lack of communication between INS headquarters and field offices.
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It is telling, in my view, that once a draft of the review was given to the INS, Commissioner Meissner called all the District Directors to Washington for a briefing, and sent some 200 naturalization personnel to a training course. Had INS management been serious about correcting the problems, these actions would have been taken when the new policies were first implemented, rather than when bad publicity was imminent. Such actions also may have helped to communicate the sense of urgency the reviewers found lacking at the field level. Moreover, the INS knew about the review in advance. I wonder how much worse the results would have been had the INS not known.
Congress and the American people have been assured repeatedly by the INS that there were no major problems with naturalization under Citizenship USA. Then we were assured that if there were any problems, they had been fixed. Now we know that these assurances were unfounded. The Justice Department is correct that the process needs a major overhaul from top to bottom. However, we must be somewhat cautious in our expectations of the reengineering of the process by Coopers & Lybrand. Afterall, previous reengineering efforts got us where we are today.
The INS was well aware, at least as far back as 1993, that naturalization applications would rise dramatically in 1995, simply because the 2.7 million amnestied aliens would become eligible. Yet all of a sudden in 1995, there was a frantic rush to hire new employees and accelerate an outdated system that had already reached its limits. Had the millions of dollars now being spent on reengineering, reviewing, and auditing the naturalization process been invested in computer equipment, electronic fingerprint scanners, and personnel training, we likely would not be having this discussion.
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The Coopers & Lybrand review of the process is expected to take 18 months to 2 years to complete. The naturalization process cannot wait that long. The INS expects 1.8 million new applications this year, and they must not be adjudicated under the conditions described in the KPMG Peat Marwick review. There are a number of areas that need immediate improvement.
One, in order to process these applications, the INS desperately needs an updated and integrated computer system, just as any business needs to process orders. Scanners, which now have accuracy rates of 90 percent or better, could be used to minimize the data entry workload. Eventually, the INS needs to integrate its numerous data bases to facilitate status checks and ensure that immigrants being deported by one branch of the INS are not naturalized by another. There is no need for temporary files to be created because a permanent paper file cannot be located, when all this information could be more easily stored in an electronic file.
The INS needs to prioritize its electronic fingerprint pilot program. Police departments around the country use electronic fingerprint scanners to identify criminals in a matter of minutes, rather than waiting anywhere from 2 to 6 months as the INS does.
Most importantly, the INS needs to train its personnel adequately. In August 1996, the INS conducted an evaluation of the Citizenship USA training program and found two major deficiencies. One, personnel were poorly trained in doing the computer checks that, among other things, tell whether an applicant is in deportation proceedings; and two, training in the procedures to deny an application were inadequate at best. Each adjudicator must know how to use the computer system to check an applicant's status, and to update the applicant's file. Adjudicators must be trained not only in customer relations, but also in the procedures used to deny an application.
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Finally, every adjudicator must understand that the integrity of the naturalization process is always more important than expediency. A short delay in the process is a much smaller problem for the INS than the granting of citizenship to a child molester. I will conclude there. I have a couple of other recommendations in my written statement that I would be happy to talk about and answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jenks follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY JENKS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Rosemary Jenks, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies, a non-profit, non-advocacy research institution. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss an issue that is central to our national identity, the bond that holds us united as one people: United States citizenship. United States citizenship is the most valuable and the most cherished privilege our nation can bestow upon an individual. It is a privilege that is sought by millions around the world. It carries with it the right to travel freely, to hold certain public offices and to petition for the immigration of family members. Most importantly, however, it carries with it the right, and the responsibility, to take part in shaping and securing the future of this country by voting for elected officials at all levels of government.
The requirements for naturalization are see out in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Among other things, applicants are required to submit an application form, the N–400, a copy of their alien registration card, the ''green card,'' fingerprints, photographs and a fee of $95 to the INS. In general, they must prove that they are at least 18 years of age; that they have resided in the United States as lawful permanent residents for a minimum of Eve years (unless they marry a U.S. citizen, in which case it is three years); that they are able to read, write, speak and understand English; that they have at least a minimal knowledge of U.S. history and government; that they are of good moral character; and that they do not have a serious criminal record. Upon receiving the N–400 and the accompanying papa work, INS enters the information into an INS database and forwards the fingerprints to the FBI for a criminal record check. As of November 29, 1996, INS policy is to wait for a definitive response from the FBI regarding the criminal record check before scheduling an interview with the applicant. During the interview, INS examiners (or District Adjudications Officers, DAOs) review the information on the N400 and test the applicant's knowledge of English, history and civics, unless he or she presents a certificate from one of the non-government testing entities. If all the requirements are met, the application is approved and the applicant is scheduled for a swearing in ceremony. Otherwise, the application is either denied or continued, depending on the nature of the problem.
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CITIZENSHIP USA
At the start of fiscal year 1994, when Commissioner Meissner took office, some 270,000 N–400 applications were pending (not including any that had been received, but not been entered into the computer). The number of N–400 applications received in fiscal year 1994 (543,353) surpassed fiscal year 1993 receipts (521,866) by only 21,487. At the beginning of fiscal year 1995, however, the backlog of applications had grown to more than 314,000 and INS expected a surge in new applications because of a combination of factors, including the 2.7 million beneficiaries of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) amnesty becoming eligible based on the five-years residence requirement, the passage of Proposition 187 in California in November 1994, and legislative proposals to bar noncitizens from certain means-tested welfare benefits.
To prepare for this expected surge, an INS working group conducted a survey in June 1994 of ways to streamline the naturalization process. Then, in April of 1995, Commissioner Meissner contracted a management consulting firm, PRC, to work with INS staff to overhaul the naturalization process. PRC and the INS staff conducted a four-week review of the process and produced a ''radical redesign'' of naturalization. The final report, issued in May 1995, is called Results in 30 Days: Re-Engineering the Naturalization Process. Among other things, it recommends that INS develop strong partnerships with ''Service Providers''—community-based organizations (CBOs) and voluntary agencies (VOLAGS)—which would involve ''total sharing of information, joint decision making, and aggressive coloration aimed at best meeting the needs of the applicant.'' It recommends the introduction of high-tech, fully automated and integrated systems to facilitate data entry and criminal background checks, in addition to automatically triggering ''pre-qualified 'invitations' to immigrants as they become legally eligible for citizenship.'' It adds that ''long-standing interpretations of eligibility laws and regulations will be reviewed to . . . [focus] upon meeting the demands of today's eligible customers.'' Finally, it concludes that processing time from submission ''to approval will be reduced to 'same day service' for 80% of the applicants.''
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In June, 1995, Commissioner Meissner submitted a request that the naturalization program be designated as a ''Reinvention Lab'' under the auspices of Vice President Gore's National Performance Review (NPR). Her request letter and subsequent INS documentation make clear that the PRC report was to provide the basis for the ''re-engineering'' of the naturalization process.
In the meantime, N–400 applications ware on the rise and examiners were being overwhelmed. District Offices lacked the equipment they needed to process N–400s efficiently. Many offices did not have access to the Naturalization Automated Case System (NACS) database, and those that did were experiencing problems with it.
Commissioner Meissner unveiled the ''Citizenship USA'' (CUSA) initiative on August 31, 1995. The stated objective of CUSA, at least initially, was ''to become current'' on N–400 applications, meaning that applications would be processed from start to citizenship within six months, by the end of fiscal year 1996. INS designated five ''CUSA cities,'' including Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Miami and Chicago, which had the largest numbers of pending cases when the program started. Resources, including personnel, equipment and building space, were to be funneled into these five cities, which would serve as the ''Reinvention Labs.''
The naturalization initiative was approved as an NPR Reinvention Lab on September 5, 1995. On September 11, Commissioner Meissner forwarded to all field offices the executive summary of the PRC report with a memo explaining its origin and asking for comments. She wrote that ''wherever possible, we will use validated re-engineering techniques as outlined in the PRC report to attack the caseload.'' She added that the report offers ''a basic road map for change.''
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In January 1996, INS implemented a ''Direct Mail'' initiative in all the CUSA cities except San Francisco. Under this system, N–400s are mailed directly to one of the four INS Service Centers (Vermont Service Center (VSC), Nebraska Service Center (NSC), Texas Service Center (TSC) and California Service Center (CSC)) instead of being submitted to District Offices. The Service Centers are supposed to enter the application data into NACS and pull the fingerprint cards and submit them daily to the FBI.
The implementation of the Direct Mail initiative resulted in almost immediate chaos. Neither Service Center staff nor District Offices fully understood the new procedures. INS offices around the country were being overwhelmed by the increase in N–400 applications the largest group of aliens amnestied in 1986 had met the five-year residence requirement by December 1995. CUSA offices, in addition to being inundated with backlogged and new cases, were attempting to adopt the new ''re-engineered'' and streamlined adjudication process, thus compounding the confusion. Non-CUSA offices had been forced to detail some portion of their resources, mainly personnel, to the CUSA offices, so they, too, were falling behind. The number of N–400 applications pending on October 1, 1995 surpassed 800,000, and new applications were being received in record numbers.
On May 1, 1996, INS Associate Commissioner for Examinations Louis Crocetti announced in a memo to all field offices that the ''new ideas and innovative procedures'' that were tested at CUSA sites with ''remarkable results,'' were to be expanded Servicewide to all offices. As the nationwide expansion of these ''Streamlining Initiatives'' was predicated on the ''remarkable results'' of the pilots in the CUSA cities, a brief look at those results is warranted.
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Adjudication Speed—The five CUSA cities managed to accelerate naturalization processing times from more than one year in many cases to six months. This allowed the INS to meet its goal of adjudicating more than one million naturalization applications in fiscal year 1996, but only at great cost to the integrity of the system.
FBI Fingerprint Checks—February 1994 report from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Justice Department identified three major problems with the INS policy on fingerprint checks: 1) the INS had no way to verify that the fingerprints submitted by an applicant actually belonged to that applicant since the INS was no longer taking the fingerprints itself; 2) some applications were wrongly approved because the FBI had not completed the criminal history check before the interview was scheduled or because the FBI ''hit'' had not been properly filed; and 3) INS often did not resubmit new fingerprint cards when the FBI rejected the original set as illegible. OIG found that 5.4 percent of aliens submitting applications for benefits had an arrest record. The top reasons for arrest were immigration violations/deportation proceedings (32%), assault/battery/rape (19%), theft/robbery/burglary (18%) and drug possession/distribution (10%). A December 1994 General Accounting Office (GAO) report identified the same problems with the INS fingerprint policy.
The ''streamlined'' naturalization process did not address any of these problems, but instead, exacerbated them. The INS still had no way to verify that the fingerprints an applicant submitted actually belonged to the applicant. In May 1995, the INS published a proposed rule to require that all applicants have their fingerprints taken by an INS-certified ''designated fingerprint service'' (DFS). Personnel at these DFSs would be properly trained to take fingerprints and fill out the necessary paperwork, and they would be required to ask for identification showing that the person named on the fingerprint card was the same person being fingerprinted. The final rule, however, was not published until June 1996, and final implementation was delayed from November 1, 1996 to March 1, 1997 to insure that INS had certified an adequate number of DFSs.
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Fingerprint cards were supposed to be mailed by the Service Centers to the FBI on a daily basis to insure that the FBI had adequate time to run the criminal history check. In March 1996, however, the FBI did a sampling of receipts from 20 INS offices. Over 60 percent of the fingerprint cards received from Los Angeles had been at the Los Angeles office for more than 30 days before they were submitted. For the New York City office, 90 percent had been at the office for more than 30 days. At the same time the INS was dramatically increasing the workload of the FBI, it was, in practice, cutting the FBI's response time.
The preliminary results of the INS internal review of naturalization applications approved during CUSA, as presented to the Subcommittee by Assistant Attorney General for Administration Stephen Colgate clearly show that the problems were severe. Of the 1,049,872 immigrants granted U.S. citizenship under CUSA:
71, 557 were found to have FBI criminal records, including INS administrative actions (e.g., deportation proceedings or other immigration violations), and misdemeanor and felony arrests and convictions;
Of these 71,557, 10,800 had at least one felony arrest, 25,500 had at least one misdemeanor arrest, but no felonies, and 34,700 had only administrative actions initiated against them;
113,126 had only name checks because there fingerprint cards were returned to the INS by the FBI because they were illegible;
66,398 did not have FBI criminal record checks because their fingerprint cards wale never submitted to the FBI by the INS; and
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2,573 were still being processed by the FBI.
As of late February 1997, 168 of these new citizens had been found to be ''presumptively, statutorily ineligible'' for naturalization based on their criminal record, and in another 2,800 cases, it could not be determined based on available information whether they were eligible or not.
It is important to note that none of the numbers given above indicates the degree to which applicants for naturalization lied on their applications, thereby committing perjury, which should make them ineligible for naturalization. They also do not indicate the number of applicants who may have submitted someone else's fingerprints to avoid having their criminal record revealed. Finally, for the 180,000 applicants whose fingerprints were illegible or never submitted, the INS has no way to go back and check because it is not legally allowed to require citizens to resubmit their fingerprints. Thus, unless these new citizens volunteer to have their fingerprints taken, we will never know if they were actually eligible or not.
Personnel—Temporary workers comprised most of the additional personnel for CUSA. Some 900 temporary adjudicators and clerical workers were hired by INS to accomplish the goal of naturalizing over a million people in FY 1996. As of June 1996, the Inspector General was investigating the training standards for these temporary workers, along with those workers who were detailed from other agencies or offices. In August 1996, the INS conducted an evaluation of the CUSA training program and found two major deficiencies in the program: 1) personnel were poorly trained in doing the computer checks that, among other things, tell whether an applicant is in deportation proceedings or has had other administration actions taken against him or her; and 2) training in the procedures to deny an application were inadequate at best.
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These results point to a larger problem that has since been confirmed by INS employees and by the recent KPMG Peat Marwick review of the implementation of the November 29, 1996 naturalization policy changes. A training program that teaches personnel good customer relations, but not how to do computer checks or deny applications sends an implicit message that it is more important to keep the applicant happy and approve the application than it is to maintain the integrity of the process and demand compliance with the regulations. This is precisely the message that many INS adjudicators received, not only from their training, but also from their supervisors. A number of INS employees testified, under oath, last fall that adjudicators feel pressured by their supervisors to ''approve, approve, approve;'' that good moral character are being ignored; that representatives of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) complain to supervisors about adjudicators who continue or deny applications, and that sometimes those adjudicators are removed from their duties; that adjudicators who go on outreach interviews have to provide copies of their tally sheets (showing approvals, denials and continueds) to the CBO representatives; that adjudicators have been told by their supervisors that they are not IRS agents and so shouldn't concern themselves with possible tax fraud, even though it is inconsistent with the good moral character requirement.
Volunteer workers were also utilized by many INS offices. These volunteers included members of CBOs, family members of INS employees, and, in at least one case, legal permanent residents. These volunteers performed clerical duties, including filing, mailed naturalization certificates, and collected Alien Registration Cards and distributed naturalization certificates at citizenship ceremonies, among other {hinge. According to INS employees, this practice continued even after INS Headquarters Counsel notified Regional Directors that it is a violation of Federal law for a government agency to use volunteers to perform duties that are normally performed by agency personnel, as it constitutes an unauthorized augmentation of the agency appropriation.
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TESTING FRAUD
In addition to internal INS problems with the naturalization process, there is well-documented evidence of widespread fraud in the testing of naturalization applicants by outside (i.e., non-government) testing entities (OTEs). In 1991, the INS established criteria under which OTEs, including for-profit businesses, could be authorized to administer standardized tests to determine a naturalization applicant's ability to read and write in English, along with his or her knowledge of history and civics. The INS criteria do not require that administrators of the tests be U.S. citizens or have criminal history checks in order to be approved.
The tests are comprised mainly of multiple choice questions, but applicants also have to write two simple sentences that are dictated to them. Five OTEs currently are authorized to administer these tests: Educational Testing Service (ETS), Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment System (CASAS), Southeast College, Marich Associates and American College Testing (ACT). (There was a sixth OTE, Naturalization Assistance Services (NAS), until earlier this year when its authorization was terminated after repeated instances of fraud.) These OTEs in turn may license community based organizations (CBOs) and other affiliates to administer the tests on their behalf. However, neither INS, nor the individual OTEs, are able to monitor all the affiliates to ensure that requirements relating to the security of the tests or the integrity of the testing are met.
Reports of testing fraud at affiliates of the OTEs, which first surfaced in 1992, began to increase dramatically in late 1994. INS examiners came across increasing numbers of naturalization applicants who, despite having an OTE test certificate, were unable to communicate in or understand English. Some affiliates were charging as much as $850 to prepare and test immigrants. Examples of documented fraud during the administration of the tests include test proctors pointing to the correct answers on the answer sheet, tests being given in the applicants' native language instead of English, and the sentences being written on a blackboard so applicants simply have to copy them. Some affiliates guaranteed that, as long as applicants could sign their names in English, they would pass the test. Affiliates were using print media—open ethnic newspapers—radio and television ads to advertise their services. Some ads included false promises and/or blatant lies, but there was no regulations governing the ads' contents.
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In April 1996, INS Headquarters sent instructions to the field offices on procedures to follow to report and initiate investigations of complaints of testing fraud. In May 1996, after it was notified of an investigation into testing fraud by the television show ''20/20,'' INS Headquarters a memo to field offices with guidelines on conducting unannounced on-site inspections of testing sites. The guidelines required each District Office to visit one site per quarter.
During the past couple of months, I have been contacted by the directors of two separate testing affiliates operating in separate regions of the country. Both told me that fraud in the outside testing entities continues, with unauthorized groups administering tests and issuing counterfeit certificates, applicants cheating on the tests, tests being given in the applicants' native language, and in one case, the director of an authorized affiliate simply filling out the answer forms for the applicants. They also told me about designated fingerprint services (DFSs) selling clean fingerprints to applicants, accepting inadequate identification, such as letters from family members or friends attesting to the person's identity, and accepting blatantly false identification.
Like the criteria for OTEs, those for DFSs do not require that the person taking the fingerprints be a U.S. citizen or have a criminal record check done. While many of the DFSs are police departments, others raise questions about the judgment of the INS in the selection process. Some of the more interesting DFSs are: Harbor Liquors in Baltimore; Biscayne Haircutters in Miami; and Express Courier Service in Passaic, NJ. Hermandad Mexicana Nacional in Ontario, CA and Pookies Post and Parcel in Pasadana, CA had applications pending at the and of February 1997.
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INS RESPONDS
The National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee held the first hearing on the Citizenship USA program on September 24, 1996, after it had subpoenaed and sorted through thousands of pages of INS documents, memos and e-mails detailing most of the problems described herein. Despite the evidence, CUSA Project Director David Rosenberg testified at that hearing that, as a result of CUSA, the INS had ''successfully reduced processing times for citizenship applications nationwide to traditional levels while maintaining the integrity of the citizenship process. We have initiated major improvements to naturalization procedures and operations.''
The Senate Immigration Subcommittee held a hearing on naturalization practices on October 9, 1996, in which the former Executive Associate Commissioner for Programs, Alexander Aleinikoff, testified that, as a result of CUSA, the INS had ''reduced processing times for citizenship applications nationwide to traditional levels while maintaining the integrity of the citizenship process, and [had] initiated major improvements to naturalization procedures and operations.''
On October 18, 1996, in an official INS response to Senator Alan Simpson regarding testimony I presented at the October 9 Senate hearing, Commissioner Meissner wrote that, under CUSA, the INS had ''made numerous improvements to the [naturalization] process, and [had] addressed this workload with efficiency and integrity.''
Sometime between late October and late November 1996, INS officials realized that the problems with the naturalization process could no longer be ignored. On November 29, 1996, Commissioner Meissner sent a memo to the field offices detailing new ''Naturalization Quality Procedures.'' The memo outlined seven ''key enhancements'' to the naturalization process, including: 1) standardization of work process; 2) fingerprint check integrity; 3) enhanced supervisory review; 4) instructions regarding the use of temporary files; 5) implementation of a duality assurance program; 6) guidance regarding revocation procedures; and 7) requirements for increased monitoring of OTEs. The new procedures were effective upon receipt.
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In a joint hearing before this Subcommittee and the National Security Subcommittee on March 5, 1997, Commissioner Meissner testified that the new procedures ''have eliminated the possibility of naturalization cases being completed without verification of an FBI fingerprint check.'' She concluded by saying, ''It is very important that Congress and the American people understand the validity of these corrections we have made to the naturalization process. . . . We made mistakes in Citizenship USA. . . . We have corrected those mistakes and have put into place a series of new measures to prevent them in the future.''
The recently-released KPMG Peat Marwick review of the implementation of these new measures brings into question the ability, and the willingness, of INS management to seriously address the problems with the naturalization procedures. The fact that three of the 23 offices surveyed did not even have the correct copy of the new procedures clearly points to a severe lack of communication between INS Headquarters and field offices. It is interesting to note here that, once a draft of the review was given to the INS, Commissioner Meissner called all the District Directors to Washington for a briefing and sent 200 naturalization personnel to a training course. Perhaps if those actions had been taken when the new policies were first implemented, the review would have found better results. Such actions also may have helped to communicate the sense of urgency the reviewers found lacking at the field level.
Despite the fact that field of rices had been issued guidelines on monitoring outside testing entities in May 1996, as well as the ''enhanced'' monitoring procedures in the November 29 memo, the KPMG Peat Marwick review team was ''frequently informed that INS Headquarters [not the field offices] was responsible for monitoring all outside testing agencies.''
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That three of the service processing centers, along with three field offices, had the wrong FBI address is patently absurd. Most worrisome is the report's conclusion that ''the INS continues to have the most significant control problems with the fingerprint process and the identification of statutorily-barred applicants.''
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Congress and the American people were assured repeatedly by the INS over the last year that there were no major problems with the naturalization process under Citizenship USA. Then, we were assured that, if there were any problems, they had been fixed. Now, we know that these assurances were unfounded. The Justice Department is correct that the process needs a major overhaul from top to bottom. However, we must be somewhat cautious in our expectations of the re-engineering of the process by Coopers and Lybrand; after all, previous re-engineering efforts got us where we are today.
It is important to recognize that many of the problems with the naturalization process have existed for many years. It is equally important to recognize that any attempt to speed up the adjudication of applications without first addressing the underlying problems will only exacerbate them, as happened under the Citizenship USA program.
The INS was well aware at least as far back as 1993 that naturalization applications would rise dramatically in 1995 simply because the 2.7 million amnestied aliens would become eligible. And yet, all of a sudden in 1995, there was a frantic rush to hire new employees and accelerate an outdated system that had already reached its limits. Had the millions of dollars now being spent on re-engineering, reviewing and auditing the naturalization process been invested in computer equipment, electronic fingerprint scanners and personnel training, we likely would not be having this discussion.
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The Coopers and Lybrand review of the process is expected to take 18 months to two years to complete. The naturalization process cannot wait that long. The INS expects 1.8 million new applications this year, and they must not be adjudicated under the conditions described in the KPMG Peat Marwick review. There are a number of areas that need immediate improvement:
In order to process these applications, the INS desperately needs an updated and integrated computer system, just as any business needs to process orders. Scanners, which now have accuracy rates of 90 percent or better, could be used to minimize the data entry workload. Eventually, the INS needs to integrate some of its numerous data bases to facilitate status checks and ensure that immigrants being deported by one branch of the INS are not naturalized by another. Paper files must become a thing of the past. One of the biggest problems throughout the INS is its inability to locate paper files on a timely basis.
The INS also needs to prioritize its electronic fingerprint pilot program. Police departments around the country use electronic fingerprint scanners to identify criminals in a matter of minutes, rather than waiting anywhere from two to six months as the INS does. Electronic scanners could reduce naturalization processing time to a matter of days.
Most importantly, the INS needs to train its personnel adequately. Each adjudicator must know how to use the computer system to check an applicant's status, to ensure the applicant is not in deportation proceedings, and to update the applicant's file. Adjudicators must be trained not only in customer relations, but also in the procedures used to deny an application. They should have a clear understanding of what they should be looking for during the interview. Standardized interview guidelines would be helpful. Finally, every adjudicator must understand that the integrity of the naturalization process is always more important than expediency. INS Headquarters should strongly discourage supervisors from rating employees based on the number of applications they process, instead of the way in which they process the applications. A short delay in the process is a much smaller problem for the INS than the granting of citizenship to a child molester.
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Crimes that constitute a lack of good moral character, including perjury, should be standardized, rather than being left to the discretion of individual adjudicators.
Both Congress and the INS must recognize that the INS will always have less control over the integrity of those parts of the process that it farms out to other organizations, such as testing and fingerprinting.
If the INS is going to continue to use OTEs for language, history and civics testing, it must require: 1) that all administrators of the tests be U.S. citizens and undergo criminal background checks; 2) that the OTEs register all testers and insist that they wear photo identification badges while administering tests; and 3) proof from the OTEs that every affiliate has passed at least one undercover inspection each year.
If the INS is going to continue to use DFSs to take fingerprints, it should certify only law enforcement agencies. INS adjudicators can use the interview to check an applicants knowledge of English, but there is no secondary check if an applicant submits someone else's fingerprints to avoid having a criminal record uncovered. This is too integral a part of the naturalization process to leave it to those who may have a vested interest, financial or otherwise, in allowing fraud.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jenks. We will make a part of the record any statement that you did not finish, as well.
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The chair just wants to acknowledge the presence of the ranking member of the full Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, and thank him for joining us as well.
Ileana, let me not ask you a question, but just make an observation. That is, that to my knowledge, no one in Congress has been more tireless in their efforts to speed up the naturalization process than you have. I recall almost a year ago, your coming to me and our working together to try to get you several thousand applications in your district office back home. But I just appreciate both your efforts to speed up the naturalization process, which I would like to do as well, and your support of what we are trying to do, to make sure that we can restore integrity to the naturalization process.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think that they are compatible. I do not mean to say that when we should streamline the process that that means that we should cut corners, that we should somehow compromise the integrity of the system. Because as I say, that cheapens the value that this has.
I think that both items can be done. However, I think that you would agree that for someone to have to wait 2 years for that application to be processed is especially cruel for that person. Taking an exam for you and I is no problem. I know in my naturalization process, even though I was 20 years old when I decided to become a citizen, I was in there for 45 minutes and they were asking me a lot of questions about history and civics and it's a very haphazard system. Sometimes you just get asked two or three questions, and sometimes if the examiner is having a bad day himself or herself, then you are really in for it. So it's a problem. Word gets around in the community and people panic about this exam. So if they are panicking for 2 years, since the moment they put in their application, it's a real anxious moment for someone who is elderly, someone for whom English is not their native language and they have studied hard.
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In Miami, for example, our citizenship classes sometimes are offered free and sometimes, most of the time there's a minimal charge. They have a long waiting list. They can't accommodate the hundreds and thousands of people who want to become a citizen. Many have not yet applied because they are waiting to get through these classes. So it's a real process and a real hurdle for them to get through.
Sometimes people think that it's like applying for a passport, where you go in, fill out a form. This is a really difficult situation. So I think that 2 years is a long time. I know INS says that in Miami, the normal processing time is 10 months. I don't run into anyone, nor did I in this Monday's ceremony where I had the privilege to speak, and I asked dozens of people how long have you been waiting. There wasn't one person who didn't wait at least as long as 12 months. So this 10-month processing time is a pure fantasy of INS. In reality, it takes a longer time, as they pointed out. Seventy-five percent of all applications come from five major cities. Unfortunately, Miami is one of them. So we don't say cut corners. We don't say short change this. We don't say don't do the proper background checks. But 2 years is an extremely long period to wait. August 22 is the cutoff for Federal benefits. I'm not saying people are becoming citizens in order to not receive their Government checks, but many are elderly, they are disabled. This is the only source of income they have. Come August 22, they will be out of their benefits because they are not U.S. citizens.
Mr. SMITH. Your comment a minute ago about the need for more literacy centers and the need to help individuals learn English was a slow ball over home-plate. That is because Mr. Watt and I have recently introduced a bill that would give more money to literacy centers, and would provide support services like childcare and transportation to individuals to make it easier for them to learn English. So bipartisanship still exists on this subcommittee.
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Ms. Jenks, I have a couple of questions for you. You mentioned in your testimony that fraud still exists both in the testing entities themselves and in the fingerprint services. Is there any realistic way that the INS is going to be able to monitor those entities and those services so that we can assure the American people that we have a system that is true to our sense of integrity?
Ms. JENKS. I don't think so. I think the INS is going to be very busy monitoring itself in the next couple of years. I don't see how it would be possible for them to divert resources to monitor thousands of outside organizations. I don't know that there is any way to really prevent fraud in the outside testing entities or in the designated fingerprint services. I think basically the best way to do it would be for INS to take back those responsibilities. INS used to do the fingerprinting itself years ago. That way an INS officer can look at the identification being presented, make sure that it's not fraudulent, and not accept, for example, a letter from a relative saying yes, this is who this person says he is, which from what I have been told, some of the designated fingerprint services are doing.
If the INS cannot take back these responsibilities, at the very least the INS needs to require that every person authorized to administer the citizenship test or to take fingerprints is a U.S. citizen and has had a criminal background check done. We can not have noncitizen felons giving the naturalization test. I think that in itself cheapens the naturalization process.
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The other thing that the testing entities can do is require that the outside testing entities, the national ones, register all the people authorized to give tests, and insist that they wear photo identification badges while they are administering the tests so that these are clearly and visibly legitimate people.
The INS can also require proof from the OTE's that every affiliate has passed an undercover inspection every year. At least one surprise inspection every year.
With the designated fingerprint services, I don't see how that can be a fraud-proof program unless the INS takes it back. The best way to use the designated fingerprint service program is to only certify law enforcement agencies. The downfall of the law enforcement agencies is that police officers, for example, are not as well trained as INS officers in recognizing fraudulent documents. So someone could come in with a well-made fake green card and present that as legitimate proof of identification.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jenks.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, is recognized.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and thank you, Mel Watt, for letting me just make an observation, which I wasn't going to make when I first came in.
It is so great to be working with my former Member on Government Operations from Florida. She's a great lady and I think we might, between Mr. Watt and the subcommittee chairman, work toward a more quick resolution than anybody suspects. Here's how it might happen. I want to ask for your reaction.
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Suppose, Ms. Jenks, I got you to meet with the Commissioner of INS, who I think would receive many, if not all of your comments. I happen to know Doris Meissner from across the years of her Government service. Let us see what we can do. You haven't said anything that offends people who want efficient Government administration. I would be happy to help arrange something so that the next time we have a hearing, you would be able to honestly praise the commissioner for her efforts.
Ms. JENKS. I would very much like to do that.
Mr. CONYERS. And understand the difficult situation that she's in.
Now then, we would need you to help us work with our wonderful colleague. I have called him the nicest guy that can be mean, from Kentucky. Isn't Hal Rogers from Kentucky?
Mr. SMITH. Yes.
Mr. CONYERS. OK. Let's talk real world. We are in the real world right now, right? He's going to, if we don't make him happy between now and August 22, do you know how many tens of thousands, maybe more, hundreds of thousands of people might not be able to get inside this cutoff date? Now regardless of what all of our issues or views are on immigration, which is a very complex and frequently emotional subject, we don't want to do harm to people that are already here. What the future laws ought to be, I'm willing to debate with anyone. But we're talking about people who came here under the rules that we created, have abided by them, and are now being squeezed inside of a 4-month period. Our good colleague, the chairman on Appropriations, the subcommittee, has said there's not a dime going out until he sees improvements that can't take place until we get some more dimes in there. I mean, this is catch-22 big time.
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So all I am saying is, isn't there a way, Chairman Smith, that we can all work toward at least processing efficiently all of these people? What do you think, Madam Colleague?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. For sure this is a difficult situation for communities like mine in south Florida, who have a great many legal residents. We're talking about people who came to this country legally, who have been working here. No one asked to be old and be alone and be sick and be poor. But yet here they are. I'm not saying become a citizen to get your benefits, but these people because it's $95, because it's a test, because English is not their language, they have been waiting to take these classes. They have been struggling. Now they have got this cutoff, which is going to mean in many communities, a real economic squeeze for our infrastructure needs such as medical care, et cetera, as well as a real crunch for these individuals, who find themselves in dire straights. They are in a panic. They want INS to process their form. Yet at the same time, where the need is even greater, we have had fewer citizenship ceremonies than ever.
Never in Miami have we gone 7 months without one person becoming a U.S. citizen. That's what has been happening in our community. Now we're just going to have a ceremony once a month. It's wonderful, but it's clearly not enough. It's been worse than ever at the time where the need has increased dramatically. It's a shame.
Mr. CONYERS. Excuse me. Mr. Chairman, can I get a couple more minutes?
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Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. I almost said Mr. Chairman myself. But Mr. Conyers.
Mr. CONYERS. Well, you're only a year and a half away.
Mr. SMITH. Wait. I knew I was walking into that one. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 2 more minutes.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. Would you please continue, ma'am?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So what we are asking INS and with Chairman Rogers' help is to give INS the funds that they need in order to put these new safeguards into place, which as you pointed out, cost money. And at the same time, ensure the integrity of the process. I think both things can be done, but we appeal to Chairman Rogers, who understands this issue well. He wants to make sure that the Commissioner is going to implement those changes. I think that once we can convince the chairman that these changes are real, I think that we will see a system that will work even better for all of the communities. That is our sincere hope, that we sell the program to Mr. Rogers, and he then starts funneling the money that they need, because they are hard pressed.
We had to get in the Miami office, in order to get this ceremony going on Monday, INS insisted that even though all of the applications had been verified, that they get reverified before the swearing in. INS Miami said we don't have the people. They had to send five people from D.C. to Miami in order to process once again, the 3,000 applications at a moment's notice. So it's difficult. We are all for verifying and reverifying, but that means that that's less money that's going to go to the process. So we want to make sure at this difficult time that the integrity is there. So that's a fine thing to do. We just worry what the long-term consequences of this will be. These people will not be processed by August 22.
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Mr. CONYERS. No. I don't think so either. Then we want to exempt the disabled, give relief to the disabled through H.R. 667.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Correct, Mr. Conyers. That's a bill that we filed in order to take care of some people who might be falling through the cracks.
Mr. CONYERS. How many of them are there?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We're trying to get the numbers right now, but we're talking about folks who have Alzheimers, folks who have advanced forms of Parkinsons.
Mr. CONYERS. Are we talking about 100,000 or more or less?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Probably around that figure. What has happened is we're not asking for them to become naturalized citizens. What we ask them is to be exempted from the welfare law, because obviously you can not ask someone with Alzheimers to go get a job, become self-sufficient. That person cannot even take care of himself or herself.
Mr. CONYERS. Let me appeal to Ms. Jenks' better nature. You wouldn't really want to inadvertently cut off hundreds of thousands of senior immigrants because through no fault of their own, through congressional redtape and procedural complications, they weren't even able to get processed and would have otherwise in a more orderly circumstance, been able to have qualified. You are not saying that tough, old folks, you didn't make it in time and it's too bad that Congress didn't do more about it. So that's it.
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Ms. JENKS. I have to say, first of all, I don't agree with the concept of becoming a U.S. citizen simply to maintain benefits. I don't think that's——
Mr. CONYERS. Well wait a minute. That's an opinion. Just hold it, hold it, ma'am. Now I don't agree with it either, if that will make you feel better, but that's not the issue.
Ms. JENKS. I realize that.
Mr. CONYERS. The issue, let me restate it so that you respond to what I am asking, not something else you want to say.
Now here's the problem. We've got people that are eligible and there's a date, and they have got to make it. They are poor. They need the benefits. This isn't a handout. They are legally entitled to this if they can be processed.
Now I don't know or care why they didn't come forward earlier or why they didn't learn the language or why they got old, but the problem is that we're faced with several hundred thousand people that are poor. Maybe you have never been poor. Now what do we do? I mean do we just say, do we just get up here and say well, I don't believe people should become citizens just to get some dough, and they are starving, and they came here. They are eligible for it. But you know what? Maybe I can't appeal to your better nature. I mean——
Ms. JENKS. Can I answer the question?
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Mr. CONYERS. Well, I'm wondering if I should just withdraw the question and just let it go at that. But yes, go ahead and answer.
Ms. JENKS. I think it is absolutely tragic that the backlog for naturalization is as Mr. Watt said, in some cases 2 years. I think that is tragic. The INS' original goal for Citizenship USA, to make it a 6-month process, is an absolutely laudable goal. That goal is right on target.
I believe that there are things we can do, things that the INS can do, to speed up the process while maintaining the integrity. I believe we can do it before August 22 in many cases.
Mr. CONYERS. Well, will you please kindly tell Doris Meissner and Congressman Rogers so that when August 22 comes and I hope you are right, because I am going to work with you on that.
Ms. JENKS. I would be pleased to do that.
Mr. CONYERS. But we're talking about people's lives and their condition of living. This is something we don't want to gamble on. That's my goal as well.
I am not talking about, and nobody has talked about compromising the integrity of the system. We don't have to do that. We're large enough, fluid enough, smart enough to figure a way out of a paperwork situation.
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I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Watt, for allowing me to make these interventions.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. We're pleased to have you here, Mr. Conyers. On the way to Mr. Watt, first of all, without objection, we'll make a part of the record a statement, an opening statement by Representative Elton Gallegly.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, over the past six months, this Subcommittee has learned that as a result of either political pressure or sheer incompetence, INS streamlined its naturalization procedures to allow more than 180,000 immigrants to become citizens before the November elections without having their criminal records checked by the FBI.
Approximately 11,000 naturalization applicants actually had felony arrest records. Due to INS mismanagement, they were made citizens anyway.
After last year's elections, INS belatedly issued new procedures with the goal of preventing criminals from becoming citizens—something that should never have been allowed in the first place. But unbelievably, last week an independent report by the firm of KPMG Peat Marwick found that these new safeguards were largely being ignored by the very people at INS who are responsible for enforcing our immigration laws.
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The report found that only one of the 23 INS offices examined were fully compliant with the new regulations. Of these 23 offices, 15 were found to be ''noncompliant'' and 7 were determined to be in ''marginal'' compliance.
I look forward to listening to the testimony of the Peat Marwick officers to learn more details of their findings. But the report is clear on one matter—there is no assurance that INS is not continuing to grant citizenship to persons who have ''disqualifying conditions'' including criminal records.
This disturbing information is couched in the dry language we often hear in studies commissioned by the federal government. However, make no mistake what this means to the people of my district and to law-abiding persons throughout our country—violent criminals and others who prey on victims in our society are being bestowed with the honor of United States citizenship. And as we know, once INS grants citizenship it is rarely revoked.
Two weeks ago, I joined many of my colleagues in supporting an amendment to our Constitution introduced by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde, which will provide rights to the victims of crime. This is important and worthwhile legislation. But how can we claim concern for the victims of crime when at the same time we are naturalizing thousands of new criminals and creating thousands of new victims?
I applaud the work to date of the Department of Justice investigators and Peat Marwick in this matter. I also look forward to a full investigation by the Inspector General. However, one can only wonder how many criminals have already slipped through the system and are now U.S. citizens.
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Also, just for the record, I do want to state, maybe this will answer some of the questions. It is certainly not widely known and quite frankly, it's certainly not widely known by the media, who often times come up with individuals who have slipped through the cracks or rendered unable to become citizens because of a disability. Just here for the record, if an individual has a mental or physical disability or incapacitation, all they have to do is get a doctor to certify that, and they are exempt from the civics test and from the English test as well. I'll be happy to yield to the gentleman from——
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad that you point that out. That was an amendment that we passed in 1994. It's just a few months ago that INS finally got around to writing the regulations.
But I would like to point out that it's not correct to say that then they become a citizen, because naturalization is a two-part process. They are exempt from the history and civics exam, that is true. However, the person has to go for a personal interview to INS and the person has to be conscious of the fact that they are becoming a citizen. They don't have to verbally articulate it, but they have to either with a wink or a touch or some kind of movement answer questions such as, are you sure that you want to become a citizen.
Now let me tell you this, there's not a single person in Miami where we have thousands of legal immigrants who want to become citizens, who have Alzheimers, who has been able to become a naturalized American, because they cannot pass the second part of the interview. So I want to make sure that you understand that when you say that they are exempt from the civics exam, everyone here is thinking oh, so then they become citizens. Absolutely not. You would have to answer the question, do you want to become a U.S. citizen?
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I don't know how familiar you are with Alzheimers patients. I just visited a daycare center before my 1:00 flight on Tuesday, at Little Havana Activities Center, where they have about 25 Alzheimers patients. They don't even know where they are. You could tell them they are in Havana or in Poland or in Jamaica. They don't have a clue what their name is. They can not become naturalized Americans. So I want to make sure that you understand that they are exempt from the test, but they can not become a U.S. citizen.
Mr. SMITH. Let me clarify a couple of things. First of all, I know perfectly well about some of the individuals you are talking about. A member of my family has Alzheimers. They do have their good days and bad days. I was at a swearing in ceremony in San Antonio, where I myself spoke where individuals were sworn in as citizens who had Alzheimers. It is not impossible to have that disease or other diseases and yet become a citizen.
Second of all, the INS assures us that they are willing to go to hospitals and nursing homes and so forth to facilitate the process as well.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And if I could——
Mr. SMITH. I would be happy to yield back.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Add to that. That's fine on paper, but if you could tell me in Miami, the five major areas, in Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco, ask the District Director of INS how many ACLFs they have gone to, how many nursing homes they have gone to, how many hospitals they have gone to, in real life.
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Mr. SMITH. Let's make a deal.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What happens is they don't do it.
Mr. SMITH. Ileana, if they are requested to do so and do not, let me know and I'm sure we can have their cooperation.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They would like to. I'm not saying the INS is cruel and don't' want to do it. They would like to. They can't even process the papers that come through their desk in the normal way. How can they go to nursing homes? I would like for them to. We have asked them to. They can not.
Sometimes you will see in a major newspaper one person who has been visited by INS, but it's usually in a small community where that may be something odd about it. But in Miami or New York, they are a dime a dozen.
Mr. SMITH. Let me know if there is ever an example and we'll work with you to try to get it resolved.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh boy. I'll give them to you, right away.
Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. I just want to make it clear that I am told that some Alzheimers patients have good days and some have bad days. Some have only bad days. There is some distance between what the two of you were saying.
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If they have only bad days and they can't acknowledge ever the interest in becoming a U.S. citizen, then as I understand what the testimony is, that person is not going to become. I won't belabor that point.
Let me just first of all thank both of these witnesses for being here, and share this bipartisan mood that my colleague started out with, by expressing the same sentiments. There is not a person in this Congress who has more legitimacy on this issue and powerful presence on this issue than you do. We all respect you and admire you for the passion and real world experience that you bring to this issue. I want to thank you for being here.
I was not aware that that was your picture on that. You want to hold that up again?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think I have seen that on post office walls. They usually have the serial number right under this.
Mr. WATT. See, I can't see that far, but I think you testified that that was at age 20. Your hair certainly has changed in the 2-year interval since then. [Laughter.]
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The afro was very much in style then.
Mr. WATT. You were a brunette at that point. I see. OK, I got it.
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Let me on a more serious note just clarify one thing that Ms. Jenks had to say. Maybe I didn't understand what she was saying. She was talking about Ms. Meissner's testimony at some hearing where Ms. Meissner indicated that there was no problem in the naturalization process. What was the date of that hearing?
Ms. JENKS. That was the joint hearing with this subcommittee and the National Securities Subcommittee. I believe it was March 5. Is that right?
Mr. SMITH. March 7.
Ms. JENKS. March 7.
Mr. WATT. March 7?
Ms. JENKS. 1997, this year. Just a month ago.
Mr. WATT. I have to ask you like I ask my wife sometimes, was I there?
Ms. JENKS. I believe you were.
Mr. WATT. Did I like it? Did I have a good time? [Laughter.]
Ms. JENKS. I would say no to the latter.
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Mr. WATT. Was the food good? I have no recollection of Ms. Meissner ever appearing in front of us saying that there is not any problem with the naturalization process. I mean my experience is that every time she has come here, she has acknowledged that there is a problem. She has said we're trying to fix it, we're trying to work on it, we're trying to take steps to address these issues, but I don't think I have ever heard her say that there is no problem.
Ms. JENKS. I think we may be talking about two separate things here, because the quote that I read from Commissioner Meissner does say we made mistakes in Citizenship USA. Before that, I had said that at hearings last fall, top INS officials had flat out denied that there were problems. This was at two hearings of the National Security Subcommittee last September, maybe both in September, and then a Senate Immigration Subcommittee hearing last October, where top INS officials said there are no problems with this program. We have made tremendous steps forward. These allegations are false.
Mr. WATT. OK. Well, I just wanted to be clear that I think we all acknowledge that there are problems. One of the things we want to try to do is make sure we understand whether there are valid quick ways to address those problems, and do it in a way that addresses the problems with integrity, but does not at the same time back up the whole system and grind it to a screeching halt, which is the problem that my colleague has testified about here.
Some of the things that I was trying to make a list of the suggestions that you were making and compare them with some of the things that Mr. Colgate and the FBI had indicated they were trying to do. A lot of those things, the electronic files, the electronic fingerprinting process, the things that you have suggested, apparently are at some pace being moved toward.
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What I wanted to have you address, if you would, is what kinds of suggestions you can make on an interim basis, while we're moving toward these electronic fingerprinting things, which Mr. Colgate just this morning said it would take probably 2 years to get to, even with best efforts. The electronic files I think is going to take forever. It's going to take forever and a day if Mr. Rogers sticks to his commitment not to release a dime until these problems get addressed. So those are things that we all desire to have happen, but they are longer term and we have got a short term and immediate problem in addition to the long-term problem. I don't mean to diminish that. But right now, the process has come to a halt because it appears that we have over compensated in the other direction and nothing is happening there that gets people who ought to be being naturalized naturalized.
So give me some suggestions of things that might be done on an interim basis.
Ms. JENKS. I think the most important thing is a training program for every INS employee who handles adjudications. If they are not trained in the way to conduct the interview, if they are not trained in the way to fill out the paperwork, if they are not trained in every step of the process, including these new quality assurance procedures, the system is going to back up even more than it otherwise should.
Mr. WATT. But let me just be the devil's advocate. I don't know what Ms. Meissner would say if she were here, but I would imagine that if she were sitting beside you, she would say we have that training process in place right now. We're doing it right now.
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I don't mean to minimize the importance of that. In fact, I think I heard her say she was doing that this morning. But what other suggestions do you have?
Ms. JENKS. I want to say on the training, the evaluations of the training programs for naturalization as of last summer were very poor. So the training needs to be improved. I know that after the KPMG Peat Marwick review came out, there was a training program for a certain number of adjudicators. That's too late. The training needs to go on when the new policies are implemented.
The other thing, the other real crisis at the INS is the computer system. The INS has poured millions of dollars into computer systems over the last few years, and still doesn't have an integrated system where you can type into one data base and automatically get information from another data base. There are 6 or 8 or 10 INS data bases, NAX, DAX, and CIS, and the list goes on. Those things all need to be integrated so that someone doing——
Mr. WATT. How long would that take, do you think?
Ms. JENKS. If a serious computer expert were hired to come in and take a look at this and tell the INS what they need to do, it shouldn't take that long. I should be a matter of a couple of months to at least figure out for the five main cities that are handling most of the workload to establish a basic program to begin to integrate these things. At the very least, the NAX system can be fixed so that it's efficient, effective, can maintain all the data. In the five big cities, it can be hooked up to scanners, which the INS can go and buy in a computer store, scan the information into it so that they don't have to worry about the data entry process, which takes so long, and go from there. But they need to start focusing on serious technology.
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Mr. WATT. All right. Is my time up? If it is——
Mr. SMITH. It is, but go on.
Mr. WATT. No. I did want to ask one. You made a suggestion that I didn't understand, something about an undercover inspection each year. What does that entail?
Ms. JENKS. For the national testing entities, the outside groups that then contract with groups around the country to administer the naturalization test, the English and civics and history tests, the national groups could require that each of the affiliates undergoes at least one undercover inspection every year so that somebody from—and provides proof to the INS that this has happened, so that every single affiliate at least once a year has somebody come in when they don't know about it, and sit through the test to make sure that the test is being given in English, that the answers aren't being given to the applicants, that the sentences aren't being written on the chalk board, and things like that. That is a minimal requirement.
Mr. WATT. It's also a pretty radical suggestion. I mean you know, I hear what you are saying, but——
Ms. JENKS. The INS is supposed to be monitoring these agencies anyway. They just don't have the resources.
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Mr. SMITH. Stop there. When Mr. Watt says you have a rational suggestion, that's——
Mr. WATT. I said radical.
Mr. SMITH. Oh. [Laughter.]
Ms. JENKS. That's why I had to keep going.
Mr. SMITH. Wishful thinking.
Mr. WATT. I don't know about these undercover operations. I mean I just——
Ms. JENKS. That was the only word I knew to, you know, go in without anyone else knowing about it. Don't tell the administrator of the test that you are going in.
Mr. WATT. OK.
Ms. JENKS. It's not the Secret Service that would be doing it.
Mr. WATT. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lofgren.
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Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. The gentlewoman from California is recognized.
Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I am sorry I missed so much of this this morning, although I am pleased to be back. I did have a chance to read your statement, Ms. Jenks. I think your suggestions in your written statement have——
Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lofgren, if I may interrupt you. The Congresswoman needs to go on. I just want to thank her officially for being here.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I apologize. We have a markup in our International Relations Committee.
Ms. LOFGREN. Before you go, let me just say I think your bill is very sound. I would love to work with you on it as once more a bipartisan effort.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We're getting a lot of bipartisan support, so I am optimistic that something will come of it.
Ms. LOFGREN. I am proud of you for doing it.
Mr. WATT. They are still working on the chairman.
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Mr. SMITH. That was worth staying for, wasn't it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. WATT. I am still working on the chairman. We're going to get him on it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much again.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I am just going through some of the recommendations, and I have, I think, every hearing that we have had this year, I have mentioned the need to have better technology in the department. So I was pleased to see some of your recommendations in that arena.
I am skeptical, however, the memory requirement for scanning of documents is awesome and doesn't readily translate into optical character recognition anyhow. But I do believe that we can have a better answer to what we're doing in hopefully a paperless office in the future than we do today. I am not sure that we could integrate the information systems within a couple of months. I would love to believe that. I'm not sure we could. But I do believe that we need to make much greater efforts in that area. I also believe that we need to bring in the private sector to assist on a contract basis with the automation efforts. I think it will move a lot quicker if we do.
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The other question I guess I had on your written recommendation had to do with both the OTE's, as well as the fingerprint issue. So far as I am aware, we have not had problems with OTE's in my area, in San Jose, CA. I think the Catholic church has played the lead role, frankly, in doing this with I think a lot of grace and integrity. However, I understand that there is some concern. There may be issues. I think the idea of at least having a quality control process in place is important. I understand none of us like the issue of undercover, but it's really a surprise inspection for quality control. I think that makes sense. It's something I think we ought to work through collaboratively to accomplish.
In terms of the fingerprints, I frankly, given how the problems that have occurred in this area I can just foresee additional gridlock if the INS were to take over the entire function, frankly. I do understand that the concern of Kinko's doing it, you need some credibility in the process, either a stricter licensing and review of the private sector doing it or maybe, and I don't know if there's a way to make this financially viable for local and State governments to play a larger role in that. Certainly I think we can trust the local and State governments processes in terms of fingerprints, as well as the Federal Government. I would love to have the agency look into that in terms of fee structure.
I know local governments never want an additional obligation. But if you put a fee structure in place so that local governments don't lose funds, that might be something that they could accommodate. I would note that especially in California and impacted States on the welfare reform measure, I mean local governments are eager to assist people in pursuing their naturalization because especially with the elderly, it's local governments who will be picking up nursing home costs come August. So there's a high level of anxiety in New York and California and Florida. At least to be of productive use for us.
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I am wondering if you have specific suggestions, not for the committee, but for the agency on how they might pursue the recommendations or the variations on the recommendations I have just discussed so that they could be accomplished in a timely fashion.
Ms. JENKS. I would say first of all, with the designated fingerprint services, I agree with you that switching that back to INS right now would cause chaos. I think that should be the ultimate goal of the INS though. When they have got a process that is efficient and fast, I think that they should move back toward doing the fingerprints themselves, because that is the only way to really secure the system.
If you look at the list of the designated fingerprint services that have already been certified, the vast majority of them are local law enforcement agencies, police departments, sheriffs departments, and so on. I think that is the way to go in the meantime. To leave it with the police departments. They know how to take fingerprints. There is integrity in the process. There is respect. They are less likely to want the fee from taking the fingerprint so much that they are willing to ignore the fact that this person doesn't have identification or has fraudulent identification, things like that. So I think limiting the outside fingerprinting services to law enforcement agencies would be a very good move.
The other thing is, I would strongly encourage not only the INS, but also this subcommittee to bring somebody in from the IRS because it's my understanding that at the IRS, the way they process the tens of millions of tax forms every year is with scanners. They are 95 or 98 percent accurate. They scan the information in. There's somebody sitting there that quickly reads through it. I know there have been a lot of problems with the IRS lately, but I don't think that was one of them. So they may be able to give concrete suggestions on how to ease the data entry workload.
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I think you are right that the INS could not integrate all of its computer systems in a two month period. I don't think there's any question of that. I do think that the NAX system could be vastly improved in a very short time, vastly improved. I think that training the personnel to use it effectively, even without improvements to the computer system, would be a vast improvement.
Ms. LOFGREN. I don't know, and I should have asked, if I had been here I would have asked the Commissioner, but California has 12 percent of the population of the country, and certainly a disproportionate amount of the number of people who have contact with the Immigration Service. Is the Department of Motor Vehicles authorized, one of the authorized agencies for fingerprint collection? Do you know, in California?
Ms. JENKS. Not to my knowledge. I don't remember seeing that on the list.
Ms. LOFGREN. I think that's something that we ought to explore with the INS, because in order to get your license, you have to get your fingerprints taken. They take awesome amounts of fingerprints.
Mr. WATT. Not in North Carolina.
Ms. LOFGREN. No, but in the State of California, they do. It's very convenient. Actually at this point, miraculously enough, the DMV is actually efficient in California. So that's something I would like to refer to the agency to explore.
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I realize we're into the lunch hour. I want to wind up, but so much of what we do here in oversight is critical of the INS and I have great frustrations from time to time. The focus of our hearings have been, and I think understandably what's gone wrong in terms of systems and how we might fix them, which is an appropriate role. But there's another side to this story. I was so touched by this letter that I got. It's very short. I wanted to briefly read it.
It says, ''Dear Zoe. I am 93 years old and will be 94 in 1997. I am a legal refugee in United States about 11 years. I am not a citizen because 3 or 4 years ago I didn't know enough English. I applied for citizenship again in February of this year. The citizenship test will be in 8 months. I got a letter that I will lose my SSI, Medicare, medical, may become a homeless too. I don't hear well. I need to use a walker and at 94, I am unable to go to the work. What can I do?''
There is a lady who is the other side of this story. She can't get her citizenship in time to avoid being probably evicted from the subsidized housing that she occupies that was built by the Presbyterian church in San Jose. So we do need integrity, but we also need to have very swift processes in place for little old ladies like Mrs. Lev.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Jenks, thank you for your testimony today. We thank you all for your interest in this subject. The subcommittee is adjourned.
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[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Appendix 1.—KPMG Peat Marwick LLP Final Report: Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Naturalization Quality Procedures Implementation Review, Without Appendixes
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, NATURALIZATION QUALITY PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW, FINAL REPORT
| KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, |
| Washington DC, April 17, 1997. |
Mr. MICHAEL ARCHER,
Department of Justice,
Management and Planning Staff,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. ARCHER: KPMG Peat Marwick LLP is pleased to present the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Naturalization Quality Procedures Implementation Review Final Report. This report is submitted in accordance with DO 2023 under Contract 6C–K–JMD–0051. The purpose of this report is to document our findings based on our review of selected INS offices to assess the implementation of the Naturalization Quality Procedures.
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We are pleased to have the opportunity to support the Department of Justice in this very important project. If you should have any questions regarding our report please contact me at (937) 259–9850.
Very truly yours,
| Gary M. Ahrens, Principal, |
| KPMG Peat Marwick LLP. |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to review the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP). The Naturalization Quality Procedures address seven key enhancements to the naturalization process. These enhancements include (1) standardization of work process, (2) fingerprint check integrity, (3) enhanced supervisory review, (4) instructions regarding temporary file (T-file) use, (5) implementation of a standardized quality assurance program, (6) guidance regarding revocation procedures, and (7) requirements for increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test sites. The instructions contained within the November 29, 1996 memorandum were effective upon receipt, and affected interview scheduling and oath ceremonies.
DoJ contracted with KPMG to conduct a review of the NQP implementation to evaluate the effective implementation of these procedures. This document contains our review of the NQP directed internal controls implemented by INS to determine if INS field offices and service centers were complying with Memorandum provisions. We conducted our review between February 19 and March 26, 1997. The sites reviewed by KPMG represent approximately 85% of the INS naturalization processing capacity and provide a cross-section of INS offices. Our review indicates that, of the seven areas addressed by the Memorandum, the INS continues to have the most significant control problems with the fingerprint process and the identification of statutorily-barred applicants.
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A key control implemented by the Naturalization Quality Procedures was the establishment of a data match between INS naturalization tracking systems and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) billing system to identify aliens with a disqualifying criminal history. This data match allowed INS to direct that no cases could be scheduled for interview or oath ceremony until receipt of a definitive response from the FBI regarding criminal history had occurred. Although this data match utilizes the same methodology used to determine the number of cases identified for the felony case review, there is one important exception. Unlike the methodology utilized during the felony case review, the production system requires a match of not only the A-number, but also the first and last names of the applicant. This additional requirement should increase the accuracy of the matching results. However, it should be understood that, although this is an improvement over the previous methodology, the introduction of any data manipulation into the matching methodology also introduces potential errors into the results.
The root cause of this potential error is the continued lack of quality control in the completion of FD–258 fingerprint cards. Although the automated matching process does provide some control, a correct identification from the FBI is not assured. Currently, INS is experiencing a growing backlog of cases that are classified ''not found'' as a result of the failure of the FBI and INS matching effort. Additionally, in a sample conducted by INS of 200 cases identified as NON–IDENT by the FBI, 25 applicants admitted to previous arrests during their interviews.
In addition to the potential error in the matching methodology between INS and FBI systems, local and state agencies are not required to report criminal arrest data to the FBI. Although the problem with state and local agency reporting is beyond the control of the INS, the integrity of FD–258 data is clearly within the INS purview, and should be corrected immediately. Based on our review, the use of Designated Fingerprint Services (DFS) has done little to increase the accuracy of this data.
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To ensure that no cases are scheduled for interview or oath ceremony until a definitive criminal history response from the FBI is received, a unique system-generated control number is required to be entered on the N–400 processing worksheet. However, in our review, we often were unable to verify that this mandatory check had taken place. Since this is the validation step of this critical control, we feel this constitutes a material weakness in the criminal history validation process.
Upon further examination of the fingerprint process, we discovered pending case files with fingerprints that had been rejected by the FBI and are currently on indefinite hold pending a policy decision from INS Headquarters. The categories of fingerprint rejections currently being held pending a policy decision include:
Applicants whose fingerprints had been rejected twice by the FBI as unclassifiable;
Applicants who had not responded to a request to be reprinted; and,
Applicants whose rejection notice was undeliverable due to an incorrect address given by the applicant.
The number of rejections we witnessed further supports our conclusion that the DFS initiative is not significantly improving the overall quality and integrity of the FD–258 process.
In addition to the findings regarding the criminal history validation process, our remaining findings focused on two major areas: dissemination of the new procedures and staff training. With regard to dissemination of the NQP, we discovered three different versions of the memorandum had been distributed throughout the INS. One is the Commissioner's signed copy, a second is an unsigned cc:mail version of the Commissioner's memo with different attachments, and the third is an early version drafted for the Deputy Commissioner's signature. The cc:mail version being used did not require FBI verification, completion of a processing worksheet with initials and dates, nor enhanced supervisory review for IDENT, T-file, or complex cases. If a sense of urgency regarding the NQP was communicated from INS Headquarters, it became diminished as it worked its way down the chain of command. In addition, generally staff at the first-line supervisor level and below were not informed of the reasons behind the implementation of the changes.
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In reviewing the training records related to the NQP memorandum, we discovered that INS Headquarters decentralized training down to the individual office level. There were no standards set, no curriculum established, and no policies established regarding the recording of attendance for accountability purposes. This was a major contributing factor in the INS' inability to implement fully the NQP.
As a result of our site reviews, it is now clear that the NQP has increased internal control and helped reduce the risk of incorrectly naturalizing an applicant. But it is also clear that criminal history validation, a key control of the NQP, remains ineffective. In addition, the NQP standards outlined in the memorandum were unevenly applied across the INS as a result of the lack of standardized training and an inability to effectively communicate the NQP requirements.
Due to the inherent weaknesses in the FBI and INS matching, and the continued lack of control within the overall fingerprint process, we cannot provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to review the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization Quality Procedures. These new procedures were to provide key enhancements required to increase the quality of naturalization internal controls. Internal control refers to the design and use of controls that allow managers to administer current operations, plan for the future, and safeguard an organization's assets. Properly applied, good internal control procedures ensure the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of any operation. Our review was conducted between February 19 and March 26, 1997. This report details the methodology and results of our review.
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BACKGROUND
The INS received approximately 1.3 million applications for citizenship between August 1995 and September 1996. During that period, INS initiated a number efforts under Citizenship USA (CUSA) to accelerate and streamline the process for naturalizing citizens. While these efforts greatly increased the volume of applicants processed and approved, the potential for error during this period also increased. On November 29, 1996 the INS instituted new Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP) that covered seven key enhancements to the naturalization process. These enhancements include (1) standardization of work process, (2) fingerprint check integrity, (3) enhanced supervisory review, (4) instructions regarding temporary file use, (5) implementation of a standardized quality assurance program, (6) guidance regarding revocation procedures, and (7) requirements for increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test sites.
The instructions contained within the memorandum were effective upon receipt, and required a halt to all interviews and oath ceremonies until the NQP instructions were read, personnel were properly trained, and procedures were implemented. In addition, the NQP provided for a transition period during the implementation.
For those cases that had been scheduled for oath ceremony in December, 1996, a positive Non–Indent from the FBI was required prior to the applicant being allowed to continue with the oath ceremony. If a case was identified by the FBI as an Ident, the applicant was removed from the oath ceremony and the case continued until disposition of all Ident information was determined. For those cases that were pending, rejected, or not found in the FBI database, the applicant was to be removed from the oath ceremony and the case continued until a positive response was received from the FBI. For those cases scheduled for interview and those cases already interviewed prior to issuance of the NQP but not scheduled for oath, the steps outlined in the NQP were required to be met prior to final adjudication of the case.
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To ensure the effective implementation of these procedures and to provide assurance that known problems were not continuing, DoJ contracted with KPMG to conduct a review of the NQP implementation. In planning the objectives, scope, and methodology, the review subjects and performance aspects came directly from the INS Naturalization Quality Procedures Memorandum.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this task was to conduct sufficient site reviews to determine a general sense of the level of implementation at a point-in-time of the NQP. These reviews were confined to the naturalization process, known as N–400 processing. Our review included the four INS Service Centers, the nine Citizenship USA processing sites, and eleven other District Offices to determine the level of implementation across the INS. Our method was to conduct interviews with appropriate management, clerical, and adjudication officer staffs and to perform a random review of naturalization files retained at each site. This review of A and T files was utilized to determine the practical application of the NQP requirements. Based on the results of our review, we developed a recommendation regarding those sites requiring a follow-up implementation audit.
SCOPE
The scope of this task was limited to the requirements of the NQP Memorandum dated November 29, 1996. The Memorandum stated that effective immediately, no further naturalization interviews or final hearings were to be scheduled until (1) the memo was read, (2) training was conducted in the procedures, and (3) all procedures were in place and working. These limits affected N–400 Applications for Naturalization received and processed after November 29, 1996, but also retroactively affected N–400s that may have already been received and even clerically processed or continued but without final adjudication. Therefore, we focused our scope on assessing the (1) dissemination of the memo and its contents up and down the organizational chain of command, (2) quantity and quality of the training that was conducted at all levels within the organization to facilitate an understanding of the memo, and (3) degree to which policies and procedures had been implemented to comply with the requirements of the NQP.
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The sites selected for review represent approximately 85% of INS' naturalization processing capacity and provide a cross-section of INS offices. Table 1 depicts the sites selected for the implementation review.
METHODOLOGY
In completing our review, KPMG conducted a kick-off meeting with respective site management representatives. After each kick-off meeting, interview sessions and a random review of a minimum of 40 case files were used to verify the implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization Quality Procedures. The reviewers asked each site to identify case files that would be subject to the requirements of the November 29, 1996 memorandum. When reviewing the case files, the reviewers examined various indicators to determine when certain quality procedures should have been initiated. For example, many case files examined had started processing prior to November 29th, but the naturalization interviews were conducted after November 29th, thus the NQP requirements should have been followed. Additionally, if the N–400 had a date stamp after November 29, 1996 (December 2, 1996) the NQP requirements should have been met. Although our case reviews were not accomplished using strict statistical sampling methods, they did provide a general sense of the implementation effort at each site.
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
We utilized a questionnaire previously delivered and approved by DoJ as our primary diagnostic tool. This questionnaire was not intended to be all-inclusive, nor was it regarded as a substitute for the reviewer's personal observation of the effectiveness of a specific system of internal control. The questionnaire also addressed issues that, although not specifically required in the November 29th memorandum, KPMG considers good business practices that should be taken into account in the implementation of the NQP. Specifically, the reviewers determined if the sites conducted internal reviews or assessments to identify the discrepancies in their current processes relative to the new NQP guidelines. The reviewers also examined specific documentation, such as training plans and class rosters to determine the level of training provided on the new procedures. Where a reviewer had to rely solely on the answer of an employee, the name of the employee and the date of the answer was recorded.
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Each reviewer verified all answers independently, and conducted tests of individual transactions and procedures to be satisfied that the system presumed to be in use was actually in use. Depending on the site reviewed, we looked at naturalization transactions at various stages of the naturalization application process. For example at some sites, we reviewed the FD–258s at the beginning of the process by examining the second set of prints contained in the case file. This provided the reviewer with the opportunity to match the FD–258 masthead information with the N–400 information. From this analysis, we attempted to determine the quality of the information that INS received from its fingerprinting activities. At some sites, the FD–258s were reviewed at the end of the process, prior to being sent to the FBI for processing. For this review, we were validating the quality control procedures of the site by looking to see if the FD–258 masthead was filled out properly, the A number had been zero filled, and the reason for processing had been entered.
In addition, we conducted a walking tour was conducted to gain an understanding of N–400 processing at each site. At the conclusion of the site review we conducted a verbal outbrief with site management representatives.
As a part of our methodology, we chose the Chicago CUSA site to standardize our review process and to ensure consistency of review results. As a result, the Chicago CUSA site received a limited review and will receive a more detailed review during our follow-up process audit.
FINDINGS
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Our findings have been grouped into Service Center findings, Citizenship USA (CUSA) site findings and District Office findings. In each of these areas, our findings follow the Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP) which addressed seven key enhancements to the naturalization process. They include (1) standardization of work process, (2) fingerprint check integrity, (3) enhanced supervisory review, (4) instructions regarding temporary file use, (5) implementation of a standardized quality assurance program, (6) guidance regarding revocation procedures, and (7) requirements for increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test sites. We have categorized the implementation status into three areas that measure the level of implementation achieved by each site.
Compliant—The site has clearly established policies and procedures that are being performed and meet all requirements of NQP memorandum.
Marginally Compliant—The site has established fairly sound policies and procedures that meet most of the requirements of the NQP memorandum.
Noncompliant—The site does not meet requirements of NQP memorandum in one or more areas.
The remainder of this section and Table 2 summarize the findings of our site reviews.
INSERT OFFSET RING FOLIOS 2 HERE
SERVICE CENTER FINDINGS
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In reviewing the four Service Centers, we only attempted to determine compliance with the NQP requirements that apply to Service Centers. These include standardization of work processes, fingerprint check integrity, and the standardized quality assurance program requirements. The following documents our findings as a result of our review of the Service Centers.
Service Center Work Processes
Upon receipt of the November 29, 1996 Memorandum, the NSC, TSC, and VSC conducted an informal internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP processes. The CSC did not conduct an internal review prior to attempting the implementation effort.
NQP training requirements were not documented in a training plan, no formal training was conducted, and no class rosters were maintained at any of the four Service Centers.
We focused our review of case files on the clerical portion of the processing worksheet since this is the only section that applies to a Service Center. Based on our review of the Service Centers we observed the following:
5% of the worksheets we reviewed at the CSC were not clerically processed in accordance with the requirements of the NQP. One case file contained only a blank processing worksheet and 9% of the processing worksheets did not follow the file protocol specified by the NQP.
All of the cases we reviewed at the NSC had an N–400 processing worksheet attached and were correctly processed. However, 79% of the cases did not follow the file protocol specified in the NQP.
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At the TSC, we discovered that none of the cases reviewed contained a processing worksheet. This was due to an incorrect interpretation of the NQP requirements and when they applied. TSC staff incorrectly interpreted that the NQP only applied to cases received after December 2, 1996 rather than to all cases processed after December 2, 1996. Since the TSC was working off backlogged cases submitted prior to December 2, they were not using the required processing worksheet.
At the VSC, 39% of the cases showed no evidence of the completion of NAGS/CLAIMS data entry, 32% of the cases were not initialed and dated correctly to validate other clerical processing, and 5% of the cases did not have the A-number on the processing worksheet.
Based on interviews conducted with government and contractor personnel at the CSC, there appears to be a systemic error in the file retrieval process due to the batch processing in NACS and the subsequent file transfer request through CIS. This error can cause up to a four day delay in the case file request actually being processed. In addition, there is no automated feedback loop to the original requester that the initial A-file request was processed. CSC staff presented data that depicted approximately 30% of A-files as not properly uploaded to NACS. As a result, no record existed that the data was entered, and therefore no request for the case file was made.
No discrepancies were noted with the overall fee handling process at any of the Service Centers other than the failure to consistently initial the N–400 Processing Worksheet to validate receipt of the fee.
Service Center Fingerprint Check Integrity
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To ensure cases are clearly identifiable upon return from the FBI, it is imperative that accurate data is submitted to the FBI. In conducting our review of each of the Service Centers we discovered the following:
At the NSC, 95% of the cards reviewed had been correctly rejected by NSC staff and returned to the applicant for reprinting. This very significant rejection error rate, post-DFS implementation, was a result of the following: 45% of the FD–258s had incorrect biographical data on the masthead; 5% of the FD–258s reviewed did not have the A-number zero filled to nine digits; 70% did not have the A-number in the OCA block of the FD–258; and 45% of the FD–258s did not have ''N–400'' in the remarks block.
At the TSC, we found errors associated with the FD–258 process in the following areas: in 22% of the cases the FD–258 masthead data not match the N–400; none of the cases had the complete A-number zero filled to nine digits; 22% of the cases did not have the A-number in the OCA block of the FD–258; and 44% of the cases did not have the notation ''N–400'' marked in the remarks block of the FD–258.
In conducting our review at the VSC, we discovered errors associated with FD–258 processing. This error was a result of 17% of the cases not having the complete A-number zero filled to nine digits; and 12% of the cases not having the A-number in the OCA block of the FD–258.
In addition, we randomly reviewed 256 additional fingerprint cards at the CSC and found that 51% of them did not have the A-number zero filled to nine digits, and 5% did not have the A-number in the OCA block of the FD–258. In addition, we found one card that did not have the A-number anywhere on the FD–258.
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Further, NSC staff provided data that reported the rate of return for Chicago Designated Fingerprint Services (DFS) for incorrect FD–258s was 98% for the month of March 1997. This indicates an inability by the Chicago District Office, whose naturalization cases the NSC processes, to monitor and control the DFS program.
Finally, we discovered that none of the FD–258s processed through the CSC, NSC, or the TSC were being sent to the FBI processing center in Clarksburg, WV but rather to an incorrect address in Washington, DC. Only the VSC was sending FD–258s to the correct FBI address.
Service Center Quality Assurance Program
Based on our review, only the NSC was found to be conducting an internal quality assurance program in accordance with the NQP. CSC processed cases are undergoing QA review by the Los Angeles District Office rather than by CSC staff. Neither the TSC or VSC are conducting the required review.
Service Center Overall Conclusion
Based on our review, staff at each of the Service Centers understand the intent of the NQP and have made an attempt to implement the new procedures. All but one of the sites conducted an informal internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP. However, the TSC staffs misinterpretation of when to apply the NQP resulted in the incorrect implementation of the NQP. Additionally, the error rate we observed in the clerical processing of N–400 processing worksheets was high. Further, the error rate associated with the FD–258 processing and the use of an incorrect FBI address for FD–258 processing reflect control weaknesses. Finally, at two of the Service Centers, we found no evidence of the required Quality Assurance Program.
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CITIZENSHIP USA (CUSA) PROCESSING SITE FINDINGS
In reviewing the nine Citizenship USA processing sites, we attempted to determine compliance with all seven requirements. It is important to note that the majority of the CUSA site clerical work is conducted by one of the four service centers. As stated in our methodology, we did not conduct a detailed review of the Chicago CUSA sight. The following documents our findings as a result of our review of the CUSA Processing Sites.
CUSA Processing Site Work Processes
The Fresno and San Jose CUSA sites could not.produce the correct version of the NQP. The copy of the NQP Memo which these sites had on file was not the original, signed copy. It was a copy of a cc:mail version of the memo which had been faxed to the district by INS Headquarters and subsequently distributed to all sub-offices and CUSA sites. The primary difference was the lack of a requirement for the INS clerk or officer to initial or date completion of a designated activity. The formal memo, signed by the Commissioner, was never received by these two sites. This significantly impacted our ability to review the implementation of the NQP. Of the remaining sites, only E1 Monte and Laguna Niguel did not conduct an informal internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP processes upon receipt of the NQP.
NQP training requirements were not documented in a training plan, and no class rosters were maintained at three of the CUSA sites—Fresno, Laguna Niguel, and Oakland.
In addition, we found that the internal controls and the physical security of fee receipt and processing require Improvement at the Fresno CUSA site. There is a substantial backlog of mailed N–400 applications that have not been fee-receipted. Several months worth of applications are stored, with payment attached, in a small closet. The closet is opened throughout the day and the payments have not been restrictively endorsed.
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Further, while in El Monte, KPMG staff were shown a backlog of approximately 100,000 case files sitting in crates that had been processed prior to the NQP Memo. Approximately 60,000 of these cases were granted and were pending the oath ceremony but required reevaluation as a result of the application of the amended definition of aggravated felony as defined in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. The remaining 40,000 files require processing to adhere to the requirements of the NQP Memo including the results of the FBI Query being documented on each case.
CUSA Processing Site Fingerprint Check Integrity
To ensure a definitive response from the FBI, a unique, system-generated, seven digit code is required to be entered onto the N–400 Processing Work Sheet. Only the San Jose CUSA site was in full compliance with this requirement. All of the other sites, except El Monte, had double digit error rates due to the cases lacking the FBI Query Authorization Number entered onto the processing worksheet. This resulted in the inability to provide validation that the FBI check had been completed.
During our review, Laguna Niguel staff presented data that revealed a significant error in the FBI Query results. In a sample of 200 FBI identified Non-Ident cases, approximately 13% of the applicants admitted to previous arrests during the interview process. The majority of the arrest reasons we observed were DUI, shoplifting, and domestic violence. All of these cases have been continued, pending judicial disposition. It was not determined if this error was a result of data matching problems in FBI Query or the failure of state and local law enforcement to report these arrests to the FBI.
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Further, we observed a growing backlog of working files with rejected fingerprints at the Laguna Niguel CUSA site. All working files with rejected prints are currently on indefinite hold. The cause for the rejections can be categorized into three areas:
Applicants with prints that have been rejected twice by the FBI as unclassifiable;
Applicants who have not responded to a request to be reprinted; and,
Applicants whose rejection notice is undeliverable due to an incorrect address given by the applicant.
Finally, we discovered that none of the FD–258s processed through the Oakland CUSA site were being sent to the FBI processing center in Clarksburg, WV, but rather to an incorrect address in Washington, DC.
CUSA Processing Site Enhanced Supervisory Review
All of the sites reviewed, except Fresno and Oakland, are meeting the requirements of the NQP in this area. Minor findings included the failure to document by memorandum the appointment of the acting Supervisory District Adjudications Officer (SDAO) as required by the NQP.
CUSA Processing Site Temporary File Use
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All cases being adjudicated based on a T-file were being continued at the time of our review pending completion of A-file retrieval efforts. However, at El Monte we could not find evidence of the retrieval attempts in 15% of the cases we reviewed. In addition, we could find no evidence in the any of the cases reviewed at Garden City of these required retrieval attempts. All other sites were in compliance with the NQP requirements in this area.
CUSA Processing Site Qualify Assurance Program
Based on our review, all of the CUSA Processing Sites were found to be conducting an internal quality assurance program in accordance with the NQP. Of particular note was the methodology observed in Fresno for the selection of case files for review. Files were selected at random using the terminal digit number as the basis. All discrepancies found during the QA review were very well documented, neatly organized, and comprehensively commented upon.
CUSA Processing Site Revocation Procedures
No revocation cases were available for review at the time of our site visit.
CUSA Processing Site Monitoring of Outside English and Civics Testing
Based on our review, only the Garden City and Chicago CUSA sites have taken any role in the monitoring of outside testing agencies. Subsequent to our site visit, we were provided data from the Los Angeles District Office that showed the review of three test sites in December. During our interviews, we were frequently informed that INS Headquarters was responsible for monitoring all outside testing agencies. It is unclear which sites have been tasked with this responsibility.
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CUSA Processing Site Overall Conclusion
Based on our review, staff at each of the CUSA Processing Sites understood the intent of the NQP and have attempted to implement the new procedures. However, only half of the sites had conducted an informal internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP. Additionally, the error rate we observed in the clerical processing of N–400 processing worksheets was high. Further, the error rate associated with the documentation of the FBI Query Control Number and Oakland's use of an incorrect FBI address for FD–258 processing provided evidence of control weaknesses.
DISTRICT OFFICE FINDINGS
In reviewing the eleven District Office sites, we attempted to determine compliance with all seven requirements. The following documents our findings as a result of our review of the District Office Sites.
District Office Work Processes
The San Francisco District Office could not produce the correct version of the NQP. The copy of the NQP Memo that these sites had on file was not the original, signed copy. It was a copy of a cc:mail version of the memo that was faxed to the district by INS Headquarters and subsequently distributed to all District Offices. The primary difference was the lack of a requirement for the INS clerk or officer to initial or date a completion of a designated activity. The formal memo, signed by the Commissioner, was never received by this site. This significantly impacted our ability to review the implementation of the NQP. Of the remaining sites, five did not conduct an informal internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP processes upon receipt of the of the NQP.
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NQP training requirements were not documented in a training plan and no class rosters were maintained at three of the District Offices—E1 Paso, Newark, and Phoenix.
District Office Fingerprint Check Integrity
To ensure a definitive response from the FBI, a unique, system-generated, seven digit code is required to be entered onto the N–400 Processing Work Sheet. Only the Boston District Office was in full compliance with this requirement. All of the other sites, except Dallas, Omaha, Phoenix, and San Diego, had double digit error rates due to the lack of a FBI Query Authorization Number entered onto the processing worksheet. This resulted in the inability to provide validation that the FBI Query check had been completed.
Finally, we discovered that none of the FD–258s processed through the San Francisco and Seattle District Offices were being sent to the FBI processing center in Clarksburg, WV, but rather to an incorrect address in Washington, DC.
District Office Enhanced Supervisory Review
Based on our review, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, and Seattle were not meeting the requirements of the NQP in this area. Major findings included the failure to conduct required reviews of cases with criminal history. This was most prevalent in the Seattle office, where 9% of the cases requiring SDAO review as a result of applicant criminal history were not conducted.
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District Office Temporary File Use
All cases being adjudicated based on a T-file were being continued at the time of our review pending completion of A-file retrieval efforts. However, at Los Angeles we could not find evidence of the required retrieval attempts in 4% of the cases we reviewed. In addition, we could find no evidence in any of the cases reviewed at either Houston or Newark of these required retrieval attempts. All other sites were in compliance with the NQP requirements in this area.
District Office Qualify Assurance Program
Based on our review, all of the District Offices were found to be conducting an internal quality assurance program in accordance with the NQP.
District Office Revocation Procedures
No revocation cases were available for review at the time of our site visit.
District Office Monitoring of Outside English and Civics Testing
Based on our review, only Boston, Houston, and Omaha had taken any role in the monitoring of outside testing agencies. During our interviews, we were frequently informed that INS Headquarters was responsible for monitoring all outside testing agencies.
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District Office Site Overall Conclusion
Based on our review, staff at each of the District Offices understood the intent of the NQP and had made an attempt to implement the new procedures. However, only half of the sites conducted an internal review to identify discrepancies between existing processes and the NQP. Additionally, the error rate we observed in the processing of N–400 processing worksheets was high. Further, the error rate associated with the documentation of the FBI Query Control Number and San Francisco and Seattle's use of an incorrect FBI address for FD–258 processing point to control weaknesses. Other control weaknesses were evident with the lack of implementation of required monitoring of outside testing service. Finally, at two District Offices, we could find no evidence of the correct version of the NQP Memorandum.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this review was to determine the sites that would require a detailed implementation audit due to their lack of compliance with the requirements of the NQP. Based on the results of our review, KPMG recommends that all of the INS sites reviewed be revisited within sixty days to audit the implementation of recommended changes contained in this report.
Improvement to the integrity of the FD–258 process should be DoJ's number one priority. INS must enforce mandatory compliance with the requirements for a nine digit A-number, to be placed in the OCA block of the FD–258 and the placement of ''N–400'' in the Remarks block of the form. This compliance with proper FD–258 processing should be enforced with the immediate kick-off of a major auditing effort at all of the INS naturalization sites and the DFS locations. A baseline assessment should be developed and progress measured. Audits should continue at each site every 30 days until the site and its DFS are fully compliant. Once a site is compliant, the audit time frame should be relaxed to once every quarter. Additionally, INS should develop a consistent policy as to the number of FD–258's that are required/accepted with the N–400 application. The reviewers found the case files sometimes contained no FD258, a FD–258 second set, or a rejected FD–258 from the FBI. INS should develop a consistent policy regarding FD–258 retention in the case file. If INS decides to require a second FD–258 be maintained in the case file, the masthead information must be properly completed.
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In addition, DoJ must develop a comprehensive training program to deploy to each of the sites the changes required as a result of the NQP. This training should be developed within the next 30 days and rolled out via a scheduled naturalization stand-down to promote effective training.
Further, a detailed automated systems review should be conducted to determine the functional requirements of each system used in naturalization, and its integration requirements with other INS and DoJ systems. This review should include the determination of the standard suite of software each naturalization site should have, and its planned implementation schedule. This review should also take into account current known problems with integration and development.
INS field site staff proposed a recommendation concerning easing the time required to find the FBI Query Authorization Number. At the clerical front-end of the process, a printout of the FBI query sheet could be attached to the back of the N–400 processing sheet. This not only shows when the request for an A-file was done, but also shows the authorization number. Thus, finding this number would be easy when the DAO receives the file for interview.
Finally, INS should dictate a consistent policy on how applicants older than 75 or under 14 are to be documented on the worksheet and how to deal with interview termination. The DAOs at the District Office generally do not proceed with an interview if the alien fails to understand English. Thus, many of the worksheets are not filled out beyond that point.
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SUMMARY
The Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to review the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization Quality Procedures. The implementation review revealed a vastly decentralized organization. If a sense of urgency regarding the memo was communicated from Headquarters, it diminished as it worked its way down the chain of command and passed through the District Director's office.
Finally, for INS to correct the problems associated with the FD–258 process, it must act immediately. Formal standardized training is required to ensure that everyone in the organization is fully aware of the new procedures. The final step is the implementation of a formal audit program to ensure the effective implementation of these procedures. Without these corrective actions, KPMG can make no assurance, that although significantly reduced, the risk of improperly naturalizing an individual with a disqualifying condition will continue.
Appendix 2.—Letter Dated March 31, 1997, From Chairman Lamar Smith to Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Doris Meissner
| Congress of the United States, |
| House of Representatives, |
| Washington, DC., March 31, 1997. |
Hon. DORIS MEISSNER, Commissioner,
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
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Washington, DC.
DEAR COMMISSIONER MEISSNER: On November 29, 1996, you issued a memorandum entitled ''Naturalization Quality Procedures'' and distributed it to regional directors, district directors, officers in charge, land service center directors). The memorandum provides the outline of a ''Service-wide standardized structure to insure the integrity of naturalization procedures.'' I would appreciate if you could let me know as to what actions INS has taken to ensure that the policies enunciated in the memorandum have actually been implemented in the field.
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP will be conducting an independent review of the implementation of these policies. However, because they went into effect last November 29, it is important to know what efforts INS has undertaken to ensure they have been complied with since that date.
Please enclose all relevant documents and correspondence. The term ''document'' should be interpreted broadly to include materials that are in hard copy, as well as electronic media (i.e., files on magnetic disk, electronic mail or electronic databases). Please respond by the close of business on April 11, 1997. If you have any question regarding this letter, please have a staff member contact George Fishman, Counsel to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, at 225–5727.
Sincerely,
Appendix 3.—Letter Dated April 15, 1997, With Attachments,1 From Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Doris Meissner to Chairman Lamar Smith,
| U.S. Department of Justice |
| Immigration and Naturalization Service, |
| Washington, DC., April 15, 1997. |
Hon. LAMAR SMITH, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter in which you inquired, and requested documents, about the actions the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has taken to ensure that the policies enunciated in the November 29, 1996, memorandum on Naturalization Quality Procedures have been implemented in the field offices.
Before addressing implementation of the specific policies, we would like to advise you that INS has taken three steps to strengthen the naturalization process.
Implementation of additional interim quality control procedures, including an expanded effort to ensure that no individual is naturalized without the verified completion of a fingerprint check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Hiring by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an independent management consulting and accounting firm, KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, to oversee an INS audit of naturalization cases from September 1995 through December 1996. The audit is also being monitored by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO);
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Initiation of a comprehensive redesign of the naturalization program by INS and an outside consulting firm hired by DOJ—Coopers and Lybrand.
These measures were announced by the Department of Justice on December 4, 1996, and March 20 (Enclosures 1 and 2).
In addition to KPMG's oversight of INS' audit of last year's naturalization cases, their contract also provides for their review and advice on quality assurance procedures. KPMG activities include providing input on the procedures issued in November 1996; surveying INS implementation; and an auditing implementation of these procedures. Preliminary survey results indicate that, although the procedures are in place, there are substantive issues of consistency of implementation at the Regional, District and Service Center level, and of error rates in implementation of certain aspects of the procedures. In response to these indications, this week INS is taking the following steps:
Today, Regional Directors, District Directors, and Service Center Directors are meeting in Washington to receive a detailed review of the KPMG preliminary review, make an assessment of those findings, and engage in a dialogue to define possible next steps.
To ensure Servicewide standardization, Naturalization Quality Procedures Training has been developed, and will take place on April 16–17 in Glynco, Georgia. Each District Office, Suboffice and Satellite office, as well as the Service Centers, will send three representatives (totaling approximately 200 adjudicators, and records and applications clerks) for training by Headquarters personnel. These individuals, in turn, will be responsible for training others in their offices by April 25. Completion of this training will be certified in writing by both the trainers and the employees who have been trained (Enclosure 3).
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A field wire was issued yesterday, April 14, to ensure that no one be sworn in as a naturalized citizen without a supervisor reviewing the naturalization worksheet and verifying complete fingerprint check information (Enclosure 3A).
We continue to refine our procedures and improve implementation of these procedures with input from the field, and will take further action in response to recommendations from KPMG's report on its preliminary review. A copy of the final report on the KPMG preliminary review will be forwarded to you as soon as it is received on April 16. The KPMG report will be used as an accountability tool to identify the sources of the problems, develop solutions, and hold managers accountable.
Headquarters Actions to Implement Quality
The November 29, 1996, memorandum was faxed to all Regional Directors, District Directors, Service Center Directors, and Officers-in-Charge starting on the evening of November 29, 1996. In that memo, I instructed the field to suspend naturalization processing until the staff had been trained on the implementation of the new quality procedures, and not to naturalize anyone without a verified fingerprint check. Districts informed Headquarters that initial training was conducted (Enclosure 4).
I stressed to the District and Regional Directors the continued importance of Quality Assurance at the 1st Quarter Review of the Service's Priorities on February 19 and 20.
To underscore the importance of the new quality procedures for naturalization case processing, the Deputy Commissioner personally chaired two conference calls to all District and Regional Directors in the Central and Western Regions on December 2, 1996. On December 3, 1996, she met with the Regional Director and District Directors from the Eastern Region and discussed these new procedures. In addition, the Offices of Field Operations and Programs held daily conference calls with the naturalization program managers in all Districts, Regions, and Suboffices December 3–6, 1996. The agendas for those calls are enclosed (Enclosure 5). Several conference calls took place the following week, as well. During the calls, we verified that all field offices had received the memo and all attachments, and explained key concepts and procedures. For those offices that indicated that they had not received the proper version, Headquarters immediately sent the correct version. Headquarters staff answered questions regarding implementation, and where clarification or follow-up policies or guidance were needed, began working on additional instructions to the field. These calls each lasted several hours, in order to ensure that all field questions were addressed.
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Based on inquiries and experiences from the field, and findings from field visits, further guidance on implementation of the November 29 guidance was issued today (Enclosure 5A).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPECIFIC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
A. Fingerprint Check Integrity—INS has taken immediate interim action so that no individual is naturalized until the FBI conducts a fingerprint check.
The Office of Information Resource Management (OIRM) modified the automated system which tracks naturalization application processing (NACS) to prevent scheduling of cases without a response from the FBI. Cases with a negative FBI result (''NONIDENT'') can be placed into the interview or oath queue. All other cases, including those with positive FBI results (''IDENTS''), require further review before scheduling. Offices whose cases are not tracked in NACS are running a separate computer screen (referred to as ''FBIQuery'') on each case before scheduling.
The FBI ''Aging Report'' mentioned in the November 29, 1996, guidance has been superseded by the automated FBI status report and the requirement to record a special identification number from the FBIQuery screen.
The automatic ''hold'' placed on naturalization cases in NACS which bars access to scheduling of an interview has been increased from 60 to 100 days and has not been removed, despite the implementation of the FBI status report.
B. Naturalization Processing Worksheet
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After training and dissemination, the extent of use of the new worksheets is verified through the Quality Assurance reviews, standardized in the November 29, 1996, memorandum, and the attestations submitted by each District. (See discussion below.)
Review teams from Headquarters, made up of experienced naturalization adjudicators and supervisors, visited District Offices during December 1996, through March 1997, to ensure use of the worksheets, as well as to review other implementation procedures (Enclosure 6). In addition, Headquarters and Regional personnel also accompanied KPMG on their field visits during their preliminary review of quality procedure implementation.
The Office of Field Operations revised the N–400 processing worksheet and the Quality Assurance Check List on March 19, to account for new regulations concerning English and civics testing requirements for certain applicants with disabilities (Enclosure 7).
C. Quality Assurance and Supervisory Review—INS has implemented procedures to monitor field office compliance with the standardized procedures described in the Naturalization Quality Procedures memorandum.
In accordance with the November 29, 1996, memorandum, the Service implemented a standardized quality assurance program (''Quality Assurance Review''). Each office randomly reviews naturalization files at four different stages of the application process: (1) pending interview; (2) granted; (3) denied; or (4) continued. Each District submits the required quality assurance attestations to the Region. By requiring each office to review a random sample of cases, these attestations provide a check that the procedures are followed and identify problem areas.
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The Regional Offices review the attestations and prepare summary reports which are forwarded to the Office of Internal Audit (OIA) (Enclosures 8 and 9). Copies of the Quality Assurance review reports are maintained at the Regional Offices and will be submitted to the Committee upon request.
The OIA has prepared two summary reports (Enclosure 10) covering the November-December and January quality assurance review findings. A third report summarizing the February findings is being prepared at this time and will be forwarded to the Committee upon completion.
We have updated our automated systems to ensure that completed cases are indicated closed in the INS records system (Enclosure 11).
D. Revocation Proceedings
The field forwards daily revocation reports to Headquarters indicating the number of cases which either are under Service counsel review or where a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) has been issued. A copy of a sample report is enclosed (Enclosure 12). Current statistics reflect 70 in cases which NOIRs have been issued to the individual citizens.
E. Temporary Files—INS has taken immediate interim action to monitor the use of temporary files in the naturalization process and to ensure that a complete A-file is obtained wherever possible.
Monitoring of the use of temporary files has been done primarily through the Quality Assurance Review mentioned in the November 29, 1996, memo, and through on-site visits by Headquarters managers. Ongoing communication is received from various Regional and District managers who are concerned with the difficulties in documenting requests, and delays in processing.
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F. Transition Period Interview and Oath Scheduling—INS took immediate interim action to ensure that individuals who may not have received a fingerprint check were not naturalized.
During the transition period, many oath ceremonies were canceled because applicants did not meet the requirements for response from the FBI. Each office reported to the Regional Offices and Headquarters the number of applicants scheduled for oath ceremony, the number of applicants who were not admitted to the oath ceremony for lack of FBI clearance, and press or congressional requests for assistance or information. Suspension of oath ceremonies and cancellation of applicants' appointments for oath ceremony were verified by daily reports from the Districts to the Regions, a sample copy of which is enclosed (see Enclosure 12). To assist the field in dealing with applicants affected by the policy, Headquarters prepared a form letter advising applicants of the change in procedures and apologizing for the inconvenience and delay (Enclosure 13). Headquarters also provided a special phone line and toll-free number, staffed by experienced Immigration Information Officers, to address questions from U. S. Armed Forces Personnel and other applicants regarding oath ceremony rescheduling.
Where applicants were already interviewed but not yet scheduled for an oath ceremony, already scheduled for interview, or not yet scheduled for an interview in the transition period, the Districts and Service Centers were directed to review and readjudicate these cases pursuant to the procedures in the November 29, 1996, memorandum.
The policies described in the November 29, 1996, memo demonstrate the commitment, at all levels of INS and DOJ, to the integrity and dignity of the naturalization process. I trust that the enclosed documents are responsive to your request and helpful in assessing the tremendous amount of time and effort that managers and staff alike have put into the implementation of this important guidance. This effort is necessarily an ongoing process, and we are committed to its continual improvement. I will work with you on this and continue to provide additional materials as they are developed.
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Sincerely,
| Doris Meissner, |
| Commissioner. |
Enclosures
cc: Representative Mel Watt,
Ranking Minority Member
46–192 CC
1997
SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 30, 1997
Serial No. 36
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana
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SONNY BONO, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
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THOMAS E. MOONEY, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
SONNY BONO, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
CORDIA A. STROM, Chief Counsel
EDWARD R. GRANT, Counsel
GEORGE FISHMAN, Counsel
MARTINA HONE, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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HEARING DATE
April 30, 1997
OPENING STATEMENT
Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
WITNESSES
Ahrens, Gary M., on behalf of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
Colgate, Stephen R., Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice
Jenks, Rosemary, senior fellow, Center for Immigration Studies
Kurre, Dennis G., Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Meissner, Doris, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, accompanied by Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner, and David Martin, General Counsel
Rabkin, Norman J., Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, General Accounting Office
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon., Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ahrens, Gary M., on behalf of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP: Prepared statement
Colgate, Stephen R., Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice: Prepared statement
Gallegly, Hon. Elton, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared statement
Jenks, Rosemary, senior fellow, Center for Immigration Studies: Prepared statement
Kurre, Dennis G., Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Prepared statement
Meissner, Doris, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, accompanied by Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner, and David Martin, General Counsel: Prepared statement
Rabkin, Norman J., Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, General Accounting Office: Prepared statement
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon., Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Prepared statement
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Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims: Prepared statement
APPENDIXES
Appendix 1.—KPMG Peat Marwick LLP final report: Depart of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Naturalization Quality Procedures Implementation Review
Appendix 2.—Letter dated March 31, 1997, from Chairman Lamar Smith to Immigration and naturalization Service Commissioner Doris Meissner
Appendix 3.—Letter dated April 15, 1997, from Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Doris Meissner to Chairman Lamar Smith
(Footnote 1 return)
INS charges a fee to process aliens' applications. Included in the fee is a charge by the FBI for checking its records for a possible criminal history of the alien.
(Footnote 2 return)
Justice has an ongoing study to determine the extent to which aliens were improperly naturalized.
(Footnote 3 return)
Statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Executive Associate Commissioner for Programs, before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice; September 10, 1996.
(Footnote 4 return)
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, Alien Fingerprint Requirements in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Feb. 16, 1994).
(Footnote 5 return)
INS Fingerprinting of Aliens: Efforts to Ensure Authenticity of Aliens' Fingerprints (GAO/GGD–95–40, Dec. 22, 1994).
(Footnote 6 return)
(Footnote 7 return)
Subsequently, according to INS officials, the Peat Marwick review was substituted for the INS headquarters team review.
(Footnote 8 return)
On July 14, 1994, the Senate Committee on Appropriations directed that INS implement a fingerprint collection system which permits only trained INS employees, recognized law enforcement agencies, or INS-certified outside entities to take fingerprints.
(Footnote 9 return)
The June 1996 regulations called for INS to begin accepting fingerprints from only designated facilities as of January 1, 1997. According to INS officials, the effective date was slipped to March 1.
(Footnote 10 return)
According to the Peat Marwick report, between February 19 and March 26, 1997, it visited 4 INS service centers, and 20 sites which represent about 85 percent of INS' naturalization processing capacity. It assessed the (1) dissemination of the Commissioner's November 29 memorandum throughout the organization, (2) quantity and quality of training conducted to facilitate understanding of the memorandum, and (3) degree to which the policies and procedures had been implemented.
(Footnote 11 return)
One version was a copy of the memorandum signed by the Commissioner, another was an unsigned electronic version of the memorandum with different attachments, and the third was an early version drafted for the Deputy Commissioner's signature.
(Footnote 12 return)
Attachments not included in this document.