SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS Tables
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THE FBI INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AND FOREIGN FBI INVESTIGATIONS
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill McCollum (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Bill McCollum, Stephen E. Buyer, Steve Chabot, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, George W. Gekas, Howard Coble, Charles E. Schumer, and Robert Wexler.
Also present: Paul J. McNulty, chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel; Audray Clement, secretary, and David Yassky, minority counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MCCOLLUM
Mr. MCCOLLUM [presiding]. The Subcommittee on Crime will come to order.
This is the first hearing of the subcommittee in the 105th Congress, and I want to take this opportunity to welcome the returning members to the subcommittee and to point out that we do have some new members who are not yet here this morning, but we're very happy will be joining us. Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Gekas are on the Republican side, and Mr. Meehan, Mr. Wexler, and Mr. Rothman on the Democrat side. Of course, Mr. Gekas and Mr. Meehan are veterans of prior Congresses, and we particularly welcome them to this hearing and to this subcommittee.
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Continuing the pattern established by my good friend, Mr. Schumer, the former subcommittee chairman, the Subcommittee on Crime has remained one of the busiest subcommittees in the U.S. House. The subcommittee held 48 days of hearings in the 104th Congress and received testimony from hundreds of individuals from all walks of life. Of the 246 bills referred to this subcommittee during the 104th Congress, 23 bills were passed by the House and 14 were enacted into law. While I hope that the subcommittee's work is not as exhausting as it was during the 104th Congress, I believe it will be as exhaustive in terms of matters that come before it, and I look forward to working with all of my colleagues, especially Mr. Schumer, on these matters during this Congress.
Today, our first hearing of the new Congress focuses on the investigative activities of the FBI outside the United States, and specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation into the bombing of the military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Recently, FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General Janet Reno have both made public statements that the Saudis are withholding information necessary for the FBI to make findings and draw conclusions concerning the investigation. Today, I hope that we will be able to ascertain why this is and why this type of problem exists between two countries which have close ties.
In recent years, the FBI has been involved in an increasing number of investigations outside the United States. Many of these, like the Saudi bombing, result in injury to, or the death of, United States citizens. Others, however, like the 1995 investigation into the murder of an opposition leader to President Aristide in Haiti, did not involve violence to Americans or American property.
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As the subcommittee with principal oversight responsibilities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is our responsibility to review these operations to ensure that they are appropriate undertakings for the FBI. Specifically, the subcommittee must examine the criteria the FBI uses in determining whether to spend scarce time and taxpayer dollars to conduct investigations on foreign soil. Does the Clinton administration secure a guarantee of cooperation from the host country before American law enforcement officials arrive, and if not, why not? How often does the Federal Government successfully prosecute someone for committing a violent act against a United States citizen abroad? And is the money that we spend on foreign investigations, on 30 FBI offices in foreign countries, and on an international law enforcement training academy, providing the return that we expect?
In short, we can pass all of the international crime legislation we want, and we have passed a substantial amount in the past decade, but if it cannot be enforced, it will not protect the American public it was intended to do. Last year the administration requested and received over $157 million in additional funding to the FBI to help prevent and investigate terrorism activities and incidents. We have to wonder whether this money is going to be the best possible use when investigations are terminated without success or when they appear to be stonewalled by the host country officials. Additionally, this subcommittee must consider whether the comments of Justice Department officials concerning the status of these investigations have an effect on our foreign policy. If so, this development raises challenging new questions about the role of U.S. law enforcement in shaping foreign policy.
I must say that with regard to terrorism, in particular, there is no question it is one of the most pressing and important crime-fighting issues that this Nation faces, not to mention foreign policy issues. American citizens, whether they are here at home or abroad, deserve the strongest effort possible to protect them from these savage acts. But, on the other hand, one has to wonder how this is going to be accomplished, especially abroad, if countries such as Saudi Arabia are not cooperating with us as they are supposed to, or at least as we'd like to believe they're supposed to, to bring about justice, to find out who's causing these terrorist acts and what justice that can be done can be wrought to those individuals or to nations, if, in fact, it is a country that is the perpetrator of the acts like the bombing in Saudi Arabia.
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So today I'm very, very pleased that we're opening our session of this subcommittee with this very critical and important topic, and I yield, for what comments he might make, to my good friend and the ranking minority member, Mr. Schumer.
Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, welcome the opportunity to begin our next year in the Congress. Of course, I had wished that I was sitting there and you were sitting here, like in days of old, but the pattern of cooperation which existed both when I chaired the committee and when you have chaired the committee I know will continue, and that will make us an effective committee. Even on fractious issues which come before this subcommittee, we have had a great deal of bipartisan cooperation. I think it sets a good model, and I thank you for it.
I'd also like to welcome our new members to the committee. They're not here at the moment, but we have some excellent new members. We have Mr. Meehan, who is well-known as an active member on this side, and two freshmen members who will really bring credit to the committee, Mr. Wexler and Mr. Rothman. And I can tell them that over the past several years this has been one of the most productive subcommittees in the Congress. I say to them, in absentia, I hope you enjoy working on this committee as much as I do.
Now today's hearing asks a profoundly important question: are terrorists who target American citizens in foreign countries beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement? It's that simple. The terrorists who murdered 19 American soldiers at Khobar Towers more than seven months ago remain unapprehended and unpunished. With every passing week, it's becoming less and less likely that the killers will be brought to justice.
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Now I don't want to minimize the difficulty of conducting an investigation on foreign soil in a closed society and in an unfamiliar language, but in the Khobar Towers case the FBI has not even been given a chance. American law enforcement agencies are the best in the world, and our policy should be clear: when terrorists attack U.S. citizens overseas, our agents must be given the chance to solve the case. We should expect this much of every country with which we have diplomatic relations. After all, this is one of the things that diplomatic relations are all about. So it's all the more distressing when our law enforcement efforts are thwarted by a country that purports to be our close ally; indeed, by a country that owes its very independence to American military leadership in the Gulf War.
The questions raised by the Khobar Towers case will not go away. As long as we continue to be a super-power and to oppose regimes like Iran and Libya, terrorists will continue to attempt to take their revenge on vulnerable U.S. citizens in foreign countries. We in the Congress have allocated a great deal of money for fighting terrorism. Chairman McCollum and I have spearheaded that. I'm concerned that this may be wasted if even our allies refuse to give our law enforcement agencies a free hand.
In conclusion, I would say this to the Saudis: history shows that when you play footsie with terrorists, you reap the whirlwind, and when the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General feel compelled to speak out publicly because of a lack of cooperation, something is seriously wrong. I would note that the Saudi Arabian Defense Minister is coming to Washington later this month to meet with U.S. officials. I hope he will bring with him a real commitment, a new commitment, to do everything possible to work with the FBI to solve this heinous crime.
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And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this timely hearing and look forward to the testimony.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Schumer, and I do look forward to working with you this Congress. As I said before and as you said, it's been a very cooperative spirit, and I'm sure that it will continue.
I do notice that Mr. Gekas has come in, our other new member to this subcommittee. He's not a new member to this subcommittee historically, though, and we're delighted that you're back with us again this Congress, George. Welcome.
Mr. GEKAS. Yes, I thank the Chair, and having heard part of the presentation of the chairman and of the ranking member, I concur in the overweening question that is being raised by the incidents in Saudi Arabia as to the level of cooperation that we should expect, could expect, must expect, of our partners in the Middle East, of which Saudi Arabia claims to be one. So when the FBI and other portions of the American Government seek cooperative measures in that country and others, we must, as Members of Congress, find out explicitly what preparatory measures are being taken on a daily basis, as it were, when American personnel are placed on foreign soil, as to their living quarters, as to their lifelines, as to the support that they can expect to receive from their own Government, and the level of cooperation that they must obtain from the host government, wherever they may be situated. These are large questions, but focusing in on the incidents of terrorism that are at hand, we'll be able to learn more about the acts of terrorism and about the acts of preparation that should have gone a long way in preventing them in the first place.
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So I look forward to the hearings for possible beginnings of answers to these very, very immense questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Gekas.
Anybody else have an opening statement they wish to make?
[No response.]
If not, I'd look forward to welcoming today Robert Bryant, who is our witness today. He is the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He heads the Bureau's National Security Division. Mr. Bryant has been a Special Agent for over 28 years. He's served in the Seattle, Dallas, Kansas City, Missouri, and Salt Lake City field offices, rising to the position of Special Agent-in-Charge of the Salt Lake City office. In September 1989, he was appointed an Assistant Director of the FBI for the Criminal Investigative Division. In 1991, he was named to head the Washington Metropolitan Field Office, one of the largest FBI field offices in the country. In October 1993, Mr. Bryant was designated by FBI Director Louis Freeh as an Assistant Director of the FBI and named to his present position in charge of the National Security Division. Mr. Bryant received his bachelor's degree in 1965 and his law degree in 1968, both from the University of Arkansas.
You've been before us previously, Mr. Bryant, and we're very glad to have you back today in this new Congress to testify about what is happening or what has gone on with the Saudi Arabian investigation. So welcome, and you may proceed to give us your testimony.
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. BRYANT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ALAN RINGGOLD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Chairman McCollum, Representative Schumer, and members of the subcommittee. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the FBI's role in combatting terrorism and international crime, particularly our role overseas. I thought I would begin by discussing our jurisdictional authorities and highlighting some recent cases. I would, then, like to address the importance of our legal attache program in carrying our mission abroad.
The FBI counterterrorism problem has become increasingly international in scope. The FBI's extraterritorial responsibilities date back to the mid-1980's when Congress first passed laws authorizing the FBI to exercise Federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists or certain U.S. interests are attacked.
More specifically, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created a new section in the U.S. Criminal Code for hostage-taking, and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 established a new extraterritorial statute pertaining to terrorist acts conducted abroad against U.S. citizens and interests. Upon approval by the host country, the FBI has the legal authority to deploy FBI personnel to conduct these investigations where criminal acts have been committed, enabling the United States to prosecute terrorists or criminals for crimes committed against U.S. citizens.
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During the past decade, the United States has successfully apprehended 10 international fugitives and brought them to the United States to stand trial for acts of terrorism against Americans. These particular acts resulted in the killings of 7 Americans and the maiming of hundreds, with even more placed in jeopardy and held hostage at the hands of these terrorist extremists. We do our very best to apprehend and convict terrorists, to see that justice is served, and we will not rest until terrorists are where they belong—behind bars.
In many ways, the history of our extraterritorial cases is a history of terrorism against Americans. Since the passage of these statutes in 1984 and 1986, more than 300 extraterritorial investigations have been opened. Our priority in all these cases is to return the suspected perpetrators to the United States and to present clear, lawfully-obtained evidence against them in a court of law. Let me go through some of the cases.
Two projectiles containing a high-explosive device were fired at the U.S. embassy compound in Jakarta, Indonesia on May 14, 1986. Tsutomu Shirosaki, an alleged member of the Japanese Red Army, was charged by the U.S. Government for his role in the attempted bombing. On September 21, 1996, Shirosaki was turned over to the FBI without incident and brought to the United States to stand trial. Although 10 years passed before Shirosaki was brought to justice, this case represents ''you can run, but you can't hide.''
Pan Am 73 was attacked and hijacked at Karachi International Airport on September 5, 1986, with 380 passengers held hostage. During the siege, 22 people were killed, including two Americans. At least 120 more were injured. The FBI investigated by searching the aircraft for forensic evidence and interviewing hostages. Pakistani authorities arrested and sentenced five terrorists to death for their crimes. The case is on appeal. Pakistani law prohibits the extradition of these individuals to the United States.
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Pan Am 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, killing 270 people, including 189 American citizens. The FBI was asked by the British and Scottish authorities to participate in the criminal investigation. Two Libyan intelligence officers allegedly responsible for this bombing are currently on the FBI's 10 most wanted list.
More recently, on January 6, 1995, it was determined that top ten fugitive and suspected World Trade Center mastermind Ramzi Ahmed Yousef had been residing in the Philippines. The FBI dispatched a team of investigators to conduct interviews, take custody of evidence, and pursue leads. Combined FBI and the United States intelligence community efforts culminated in the arrest of Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan on February 7, 1995. His return to the United States to face trial on terrorism charges clearly demonstrates the long arm of the law.
In response to the March 8, 1995 shooting of three U.S. Consulate employees in Karachi, Pakistan, in which two individuals were killed, the FBI again dispatched a team to conduct a criminal investigation of this incident, and we still have a presence there investigating this issue.
On November 13, 1995, a bomb exploded near the Saudi Arabian National Guard Building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Five Americans were killed and several Americans were injured. An FBI investigative and forensic team was dispatched to Saudi Arabia that same day in order to assist in this investigation. Four Saudi nationals were executed for their participation in this bombing, and our investigation continues to identify other participants.
Similarly, on June 25, 1996, an explosive device detonated outside the Al-Khobar Towers Building in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen American servicemen were killed and numerous others were hurt. The FBI has dedicated a vast amount of resources to this investigation. In the immediate aftermath of this investigation, we sent 125 FBI employees to Dhahran, including a Special Agent-in-Charge who directed the crisis response and our investigative effort. Personnel in Dhahran were supported by our legal attaches from Rome.
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I would like to point out that prior to conducting a criminal investigation internationally we obtain permission from the host country and coordinate with the United States Department of State. Once in the country, we act under the authority of the chief-of-mission and we coordinate closely with the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI's legal attache program also plays a critical role in facilitating our criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction. This program permits FBI Special Agents to conduct liaison directly with foreign police agencies, further developing law enforcement relationships in the fight against terrorism and crime.
The FBI currently has 30 legal attaches overseas, where FBI agents work hand-in-hand with law enforcement officials from the host nations to assess the growing and joint problems of terrorism. The success of the legal attache program has resulted in the establishment of offices in Tel Aviv, Israel; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Islamabad, Pakistan, and Cairo. The current expansion of our legal attache program to 46 offices by Fiscal Year 1996 is based in large part on the need to support and facilitate the FBI's critical investigation. These FBI agents are our first line of defense overseas. If we are to be effective in fighting terrorism and international crime, the FBI must have a worldwide presence to push the perimeter of defense and prevention as far back from the United States as possible.
The FBI has also been instrumental in combatting international terrorism through investigative assistance to many foreign countries. This assistance has resulted in the convictions of persons who have conducted terrorist acts against U.S. nationals within their own countries. One prime example is the FBI's assistance to the Government of Kuwait following the arrest of 16 subjects by Kuwaiti authorities as conspirators in a plot to assassinate former United States President George Bush in April 1993. Following the arrests, the Department of Justice determined that the assassination attempt was a violation of the criminal extraterritorial statutes. As a result, and in cooperation with the Government of Kuwait, we sent a team over there to conduct an extraterritorial criminal investigation. Interviews of subjects and examination of the available forensic evidence by the FBI supported the final evaluation by the U.S. Government that the Iraqi Intelligence Service was responsible for the plan to assassinate former President Bush.
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There are a broad range of threats confronting the United States. Many are external—the results of changes around the world which have brought unrest, armed conflict, and political instability. The U.S. Government continues to fight terrorism in five traditional ways: diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, military options, and law enforcement action. It is the FBI's role in the law enforcement effort which I have highlighted today.
In the modern era of law enforcement, much is expected of the FBI. Through continuing efforts placed on developing effective intelligence and plain hard work, we strive to detect and prevent terrorist acts and international crime from occurring against the United States and the American people. However, we cannot accomplish this alone. Only through continued cooperation of Government agencies, the Congress, and the American public, can we be prepared to defeat the menace of terrorism.
I would just like to add that, on the subject of the Khobar Towers bombing, this is an ongoing criminal investigation, and some of my responses will be somewhat limited due to that fact. I would just point that out.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robert Bryant follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. BRYANT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Good morning, Chairman McCollum, Representative Schumer, and members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the FBI's role in combatting terrorism, particularly, our role overseas. I thought I would begin by discussing our jurisdictional authorities and highlighting some of our recent cases. I would then like to address the importance of our legal attache program in carrying out the FBI's mission abroad.
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The counterterrorism problem has become increasingly international in scope. The FBI's extraterritorial responsibilities date back to the mid-1980's, when Congress first passed laws authorizing the FBI to exercise Federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or certain U.S. interests are attacked.
More specifically, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, created a new section in the U.S. Criminal Code for hostage taking and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 established a new extraterritorial statute pertaining to terrorist acts conducted abroad against U.S. citizens and interests. Upon approval by the host country, the FBI has the legal authority to deploy FBI personnel to conduct extraterritorial investigations in the host country where the criminal act has been committed, enabling the United States to prosecute terrorists for crimes committed against U.S. citizens. During the past decade, the United States has successfully apprehended 10 international fugitives and brought them to the United States to stand trial for acts of terrorism against Americans. These particular acts resulted in the killing of 7 Americans and maiming of hundreds, with even more placed in jeopardy and held hostage at the hands of these terrorist extremists. We do our very best to apprehend and convict terrorists—to see that justice is served—and we will not rest until terrorists are where they belong—behind bars.
In many ways, the history of our extraterritorial cases is a history of terrorism against Americans. Since the passage of the 1984 and 1986 laws, more than three hundred extraterritorial investigations have been opened. Our priority in all these cases is to return suspected perpetrators to the United States and present clear, lawfully-obtained evidence against them in a court of law. Let me list the most notable of these cases.
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Two projectiles containing a high-explosive device were fired at the U.S. Embassy compound in Jakarta, Indonesia, on May 14, 1986. Tsutomu Shirosaki, an alleged member of the Japanese Red Army, was charged by the U.S. Government for his role in the attempted bombing. On September 21, 1996, Shirosaki was turned over to the FBI without incident and brought to the United States to stand trial. Although ten years passed before Shirosaki was brought to justice, this case represents the ''you can run, but you can't hide'' approach of the rule of law.
Pan Am Flight 73 was hijacked at Karachi International Airport on September 5, 1986, with 380 passengers held hostage. During the siege, twenty-two people were killed, including two U.S. citizens. At least 120 more were injured. The FBI investigated by searching the aircraft for forensic evidence and interviewing hostages. Pakistani authorities arrested and sentenced five terrorists to death for their crimes. The case is on appeal. Pakistani law prohibits the extradition of these individuals to the United States following conviction for the same offense.
Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, killing 270 people, including 189 Americans. The FBI was asked by British and Scottish authorities to participate in the criminal investigation. Two Libyan intelligence officers allegedly responsible for the bombing are on the FBI's ten most wanted fugitives list.
More recently, on January 6, 1995, it was determined that top ten fugitive and suspected World Trade Center ''mastermind'' Ramzi Ahmed Yousef had been residing in the Philippines. The FBI dispatched a team of investigators to conduct interviews, take custody of evidence, and pursue leads. Combined FBI and U.S. intelligence community efforts culminated in the arrest of Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan, on February 7, 1995. His return to the United States to face trial on terrorism charges clearly demonstrates the ''long arm of the law'' intent of the extraterritorial program.
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In response to the March 8, 1995 shooting of three U.S. Consulate employees in Karachi, Pakistan—in which two of the individuals were killed—the FBI dispatched a team to conduct a criminal investigation of the incident and has maintained an intermittent presence in Pakistan, working with authorities to pursue leads in support of this investigation.
On November 13, 1995, a bomb exploded near the Saudi Arabian National Guard Building in Riyadh. Five Americans were killed and several Americans were injured. An FBI investigative and forensic team was dispatched to Saudi Arabia that same day in order to assist in the investigation. Four Saudi nationals were executed for their participation in the bombing. Investigation continues to identify other participants.
Similarly, on June 25, 1996, an explosive device detonated outside the Al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. persons were killed as a result of this terrorist act. The FBI has dedicated a vast amount of resources to this investigation. In the immediate aftermath of the investigation, we sent 125 FBI employees to Dhahran, including a special agent in charge, who directed the crisis response and investigative effort. Personnel in Dhahran were supported by our legal attache in Rome.
I would like to point out that, prior to conducting a criminal investigation internationally, we obtain permission from the host country and coordinate with the U.S. Department of State. Once in country, we act under the authority of the Chief of Mission, and we coordinate closely with the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI's legal attache program also plays a critical role in facilitating our criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction. This program permits FBI Special Agents to conduct liaison directly with foreign police agencies, further developing law enforcement relationships in the fight against terrorism and crime.
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The FBI presently has 30 legal attaches overseas—FBI agents work hand-in-hand with law enforcement officials from the host nations to address the growing, joint problems of terrorism and other international crimes. The success of the FBI's legal attache program has resulted in the establishment of offices in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. The current expansion of our legal attache program—to 46 offices overseas by Fiscal Year 1999—is based in large part on the need to support and facilitate the FBI's critical investigations. These FBI agents are our first line of defense overseas. If we are to be effective in fighting international crime, the FBI must have a worldwide presence to push the perimeter of defense and prevention as far back from the United States as possible. We have found these countries eager to join in the common battle against terrorism. The trust and good faith which have developed are hallmarks of the FBI's relationship overseas.
The FBI has also been instrumental in combatting international terrorism through investigative assistance to many foreign countries. This assistance has resulted in the convictions of persons who have conducted terrorist acts against U.S. nationals within their own countries. One prime example is the FBI's assistance to the Government of Kuwait following the arrest of 16 subjects by the Kuwaiti authorities as conspirators in a plot to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush in April 1993. Following the arrests, the Department of Justice determined that the assassination attempt was a violation of the criminal extraterritorial statues. As a result, and in cooperation with the Government of Kuwait, the FBI dispatched a team of investigators to Kuwait and other countries to conduct an extraterritorial criminal investigation. Interviews of the subjects and examination of the available forensic evidence by the FBI supported the final evaluation by the U.S. Government that the Iraqi Intelligence Service was responsible for the plan to assassinate the former President.
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There are a broad range of threats confronting the United States. Many are external—the result of changes around the world which have brought unrest, armed conflict, and political instability. The U.S. Government continues to fight terrorism in five traditional ways: diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, military options, and law enforcement action. It is the FBI's role in this law enforcement effort which I have highlighted today. In this modern era of law enforcement and counterintelligence, much is expected of the FBI. Through continuing efforts placed on developing effective intelligence and plain hard work, we strive to detect and prevent terrorist acts from occurring against the United States and the American people. However, we cannot accomplish this alone. Only through the continued cooperation of U.S. Government Agencies, the Congress, State and local authorities, and the American public, can we be prepared to defeat the menace of terrorism.
Thank you.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Bryant, we thank you, and we understand that that's the case, but, nonetheless, Mr. Freeh, Director Freeh, has been somewhat public in a couple of the comments he's made, and so has Attorney General Reno, and I think that we deserve some answers to questions we have, even though you may not be able to give all of them to us, and we'll understand why.
I want to quote to you first the comments that Director Freeh reportedly made to the Editorial Board of The Washington Post fairly recently. He said, ''We have not gotten everything we asked for, and that has affected our ability to make findings and draw conclusions.'' Also last month, Attorney General Reno stated publicly that the Saudis were withholding some very important information. What have you asked the Saudis for that they haven't given you?
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Mr. BRYANT. To answer your question, No. 1, we started negotiations immediately after the Khobar Towers bombing on June the 25th. The Director of the FBI and I, myself, have made trips to Saudi Arabia to ensure that the cooperation between our two governments, and particularly between the FBI and the law enforcement authorities there, goes forward as well as possible.
The cooperation that we've gotten from the Saudis has been in some areas exceptional, and in some areas where we've made requests for evidentiary-type information, that information has not been forthcoming to date. I will add, though, there are ongoing serious and sensitive conversations regarding information that we need and seek, and these types of conversations are going forward right at this time.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, I don't want to get into the nuts and bolts literally, because I know you can't answer that, but are you saying to us you've asked them for specific evidentiary matters or you've asked them for names or you've asked them for questions about other country participation or you've asked them to be able to interview witnesses that they haven't let you interview? What is it—I think you can tell us the broad parameters of what you've asked for without getting into the kind of things that reveal names particularly and maybe things that would be evidentiary in nature specifically, but I'm interested in knowing what types of things you've asked for and what you haven't gotten in the broader sense of the word.
Mr. BRYANT. The police authorities of the Saudis have been requested where we exchange information back and forth regarding this investigation. They have given us to date identities and they've given us information regarding why they think these people are involved in this crime. The things that we have asked for are very specific evidentiary items in order—what we've gotten is conclusions; what we want is a more basic evidentiary-type information.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. You want to inspect the evidence; is that what you want to do, and they haven't let you do it?
Mr. BRYANT. We want to see—yes.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. And you'd like to be able to test some evidence, I presume? I mean, a bombing occurred over there.
Mr. BRYANT. We have done that, Mr. Chairman. At the bomb scene we had 125 people there literally sifting that crater, and we have pretty well gone through it. There are other aspects of this investigation which are under continuing discussions with the Saudis where we want specific information as to people that are possibly involved, and those are ongoing.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. And that's where the real problem is?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Has the evidence from the scene been analyzed at the lab, the FBI lab, here in the United States?
Mr. BRYANT. Parts of it, yes, it has.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. And has the type of bomb used been determined?
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Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. All right. Who directed the FBI to begin this investigation in the first place?
Mr. BRYANT. When the bombing was first communicated to the United States, we put together a team and it came from the Director. I mean, this is the type of thing that we have the jurisdiction for. We historically respond to foreign terrorist acts. We viewed it and basically it was a matter of us responding to a terrorist act. We communicated with the State Department, with the agency, with the National Security Council.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. So this is what our law that we put into place, this subcommittee has helped write, with regard to terrorism and the long-arm statute where American interests are involved, this is how our law triggered your investigation? That's why you're over there; is that right?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. And can you describe for us the role of these 125 employees that you said are over there or have been over there? What have they been doing?
Mr. BRYANT. They responded after June the 25th. There aren't near that many now, but——
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. All right, there are not that many now, but there were up to 125 at the time?
Mr. BRYANT. Right.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. What did they do, just in broad terms, as best you can?
Mr. BRYANT. We sent laboratory people. We sent Special Agent Investigators to interview the people in Khobar Towers, the military personnel. We sent—most of the work, frankly, Mr. Chairman, was there was a tremendous crater there, and this crater was about 60 yards outside of the Khobar Towers complex, and that's a rough estimate. We had to go through and sift the sand and the debris and collect evidence around that bomb crater to put together as much of this bomb as we could.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. One question I'm concerned about, and I think all of us are—and I'm going to yield to Mr. Schumer after I ask this one: can you tell us whether or not another country besides Saudi Arabia was involved in terms of the influence over this act? Do we have any evidence to indicate that that's the case or have you ruled it out or is it still an open question, or what? What's the status of whether another country, a nation, might have been involved in this bombing or encouraging or supporting this bombing, besides insurgents inside Saudi Arabia?
Mr. BRYANT. It's still an open question.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Mr. Schumer.
Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; just three remarks that I didn't mention in my opening.
This is our first hearing, and joining us—or re-joining this subcommittee—as the Chief Minority Counsel is David Yassky. Many of you may remember him who were on the subcommittee before. He was the Chief Counsel to the subcommittee in not the last Congress, but the one before that, and he did a great job then, and I think we're all lucky to have him back.
Second, I guess, my first question is: Mr. Bryant, you know, we've not only had a public statement by the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General about a lack of cooperation—that's never happened in my memory. So that means things, the level of cooperation, must be pretty, pretty low. Also, I was surprised to see that the State Department said that the Attorney General was speaking for the administration. I was delighted to see that because, as you know, there's often a view in the State Department that diplomacy is more important and the nice relations between countries is more important than U.S. interests. Again, that leads me to feel the level of cooperation between the Saudis and us must have been terrible, not just grudging, but awful.
Two questions related to that: first, can you describe that a little bit to us, as to how bad it was, what were they not doing that they should have been doing? And, secondly, has it gotten any better since Director Freeh and Attorney General Reno made their public statements?
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Mr. BRYANT. OK, in answer to your question, when you go into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and try to conduct an investigation, it's a different situation than it is in the United States or a lot of other countries. We've never had a legal attache in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, or anywhere in Saudi Arabia. The relations between the FBI and the MACBATH were basically covered out of Rome. And so one of the things when you—I would not characterize the cooperation as awful or terrible. I would say that we've had good cooperation in some areas and where we've mutually assisted each other and worked together. I think the thing that we have to be mindful of is when we deal in another society with other laws besides ours, that we have to be a little bit patient to work through some of these issues, because I think the United States and Saudi Arabia have a long history of working together on mutual issues, but I——
Mr. SCHUMER. But, obviously, Mr. Bryant, something caused the Director to lose his formidable patience.
Mr. BRYANT. His formidable patience, perhaps where we made specific requests for items of evidentiary information and we had not gotten them, and all I can say right now is, there are ongoing negotiations on obtaining basis evidence, not conclusions but evidence, and that's where we are.
Mr. SCHUMER. For instance, have they let you interview any witnesses that were not on the base itself, that were not under United States control?
Mr. BRYANT. No.
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Mr. SCHUMER. No? OK. Have they handed over any evidence that, again, was not on the base itself, but that you think you need and was not in United States control as of yet? I don't want you to tell me specifically; I don't want to interfere with the investigation, but I think these are general questions that help the——
Mr. BRYANT. I mean, these are general issues that we're discussing right now. I mean, we're trying to make sure that by our standards that we can put together a criminal investigation.
Mr. SCHUMER. Right. So they haven't allowed you—I would assume from your avoiding the answer that they have not allowed you to look at evidence that you think is necessary for the investigation.
Mr. BRYANT. We have seen evidence, some parts of it, but there are other things that we would like to see.
Mr. SCHUMER. OK. Let me ask you this question: has this level of cooperation been typical for an ally in an investigation of this sort? You catalogued, with good reason, crimes that occurred in Pakistan, crimes that occurred in other countries—I believe Egypt was one—where you've gotten to the bottom of things. How did the level of cooperation in those countries, also not democracies, compare—not with a constitution or bill of rights—compare with the cooperation you're getting here?
Mr. BRYANT. Once again, every country is different, and when you're—we're playing on their turf——
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Mr. SCHUMER. Right.
Mr. BRYANT [continuing]. And we have to work through their system, so that their issues of evidence, and so forth, can be satisfied, as well as trying to satisfy ours. Saudi Arabia has been—well, we've worked on the OPM/SANG bombing, the bombing in November of 1995. It's a matter of patience and working through these issues with them. I mean, it's a different society.
Mr. SCHUMER. OK. Let me ask you this: if the bombing had taken place in the United States or a country that typically gives us full cooperation, would the FBI have made more progress by now?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. SCHUMER. OK. And one other question: does the FBI have a written protocol for conducting investigations in each foreign country? In other words, are there some ground rules that are in existence before the criminal act, or alleged criminal act, occurs that would help smooth things out?
Mr. BRYANT. When we go to a foreign country and deploy, we're under the chief-of-mission authority of the State Department, and so we coordinate closely with the ambassador and in most cases with the Central Intelligence Agency. Do we have a written protocol? We have a written protocol for our investigations generally, and we have protocols regarding foreign investigations, but country-specific, no.
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Mr. SCHUMER. Would that be a good idea maybe?
Mr. BRYANT. I think, frankly, the experience by opening up a legal attache in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in those types of situations those protocols are becoming pretty obvious.
Mr. SCHUMER. And let me just ask you this one final question: you said there were 125 agents at peak; there are now many fewer. Without compromising the investigation, how many agents are there now?
Mr. BRYANT. In the last month it's been Rhamadan in Saudi Arabia, and it's a religious holiday which is——
Mr. SCHUMER. Yes.
Mr. BRYANT. And so it's been at a low ebb for the last month, but there are additional teams going there literally as we speak.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Schumer.
Mr. Gekas.
Mr. SCHUMER. I won't press you on that one.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. You're recognized for 5 minutes, Mr. Gekas.
Mr. GEKAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bryant, the mention you make on page 6 of your written statement and your oral statement about the explosion on November 13, 1995 at the National Guard Building in Riyadh, as I recall that incident, it was the LEGAT's office in Rome that responded for the FBI and went to the scene, et cetera, after receiving cooperative assent from Saudi Arabia; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. I think we also dispatched a team. The LEGAT in Rome covered Saudi Arabia at that time, and he immediately went. We put together a team to go into——
Mr. GEKAS. Yes, yes, that's my point. And in the report that the Director, Director Freeh, issued on June 5, 1996, it made mention of the fact that, because the LEGAT in Rome was geographically farther from Saudi Arabia than, of course, a similar office in Saudi Arabia would be, that the tenor of comfort was not as strong as if we had had a LEGAT or an office in Saudi Arabia, which conforms with some of the things that you've been saying. Now you say in your statement that a LEGAT has been established in Saudi Arabia; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes, sir.
Mr. GEKAS. Because in this report, which this was 1996, the Director says that there is a proposed legal attache at Riyadh. This is 1996—proposed, which means to me that the Khobar incident occurred between these times, is that correct, between the time of the National Guard Building incident——
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Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. GEKAS [continuing]. And the establishment of the LEGAT; right?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. GEKAS. Well, at the time, then, of the Khobar were we still operating out of Rome or did we have a temporary office in Saudi Arabia, or how did that work? I'd like to know how close we were to the scene as an FBI investigative agency at the time that it happened.
Mr. BRYANT. OK. On June the 25th, when the Khobar Towers was bombed, we were still operating out of the Rome legal attache——
Mr. GEKAS. That's what I thought.
Mr. BRYANT [continuing]. But we did have investigators in Saudi Arabia and Riyadh investigating the National Guard explosion immediately thereafter and for a good period of time. I think there were still investigators in the country. We had a team from the Washington field office in Saudi Arabia when the Khobar Towers went down, but they were investigating the previous bombing, because they responded.
Mr. GEKAS. But implicit in what you are saying, and explicit, is that once this new LEGAT has been set in Saudi Arabia, that your level of cooperation should automatically be raised tremendous numbers of decibels, wouldn't you say?
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Mr. BRYANT. Well, the legal attache was funded in October of last year in Riyadh, and the establishment of a permanent FBI legal attache there should, and I firmly believe will, help the relations between our two——
Mr. GEKAS. Well, hasn't it happened? You say it has happened? Let's get that straight again. It has now occurred? I can't get it straight, except what you say, that it has been established; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. It was funded in October of last year.
Mr. GEKAS. Yes.
Mr. BRYANT. Well, it was funded in October of 1996. We selected two Special Agents to go to Riyadh. One had been there TDY on the Khobar Towers investigation, and they will be in place literally—I think in the next—they arrive this week.
Mr. GEKAS. Oh, so it's not been fully fleshed out at the moment?
Mr. BRYANT. No.
Mr. GEKAS. That's what we're—that's what I'm trying to get for the record.
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Mr. BRYANT. Yes, sir.
Mr. GEKAS. So we're in the stages of fulfilling a complement in Saudi Arabia; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. GEKAS. All right. The only other question that I have, then, is to learn whether or not the FBI has any role in the decisionmaking made by the military on billeting or the State Department, or the CIA, or whoever is responsible for choosing Khobar Towers as a billeting facility for U.S. personnel. Does the FBI in the preparation of deployment have any role in saying, well, this place will be tough to guard against terrorism or this other place is too near some other danger point? Does the FBI have any role in making a decision on where U.S. servicemen should be billeted?
Mr. BRYANT. No.
Mr. GEKAS. So that it's only the aftermath of incidents that would launch an FBI investigation that would really define your role; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes, sir.
Mr. GEKAS. I have no further questions. I thank the Chair.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coble, you're recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Wexler, excuse me, I see Mr. Wexler's come. I go to the other side of the aisle. Mr. Wexler, you're recognized? Do you want to yield to Mr. Coble for now?
Mr. WEXLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Coble, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know that I'll take 5 minutes.
This is very general because the investigation is ongoing, and I have no problem with that. Mr. Bryant, let me share some ideas with you, and then let you comment and see if you think I'm on-course or maybe I'm headed for the shoals.
The gentleman from New York and the chairman both touched on this. I can appreciate the importance of diplomacy, but when you're weighing it against the interest of the United States, I opt for the latter. A hundred and twenty-five agents, I'm not adverse to having the 125 agents over there conducting the investigation, but if they're chasing wild geese, I'd rather have them back here in Carolina and New York and Florida and Pennsylvania on the ground.
Mr. GEKAS. Well, thank you.
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Mr. COBLE. You're, indeed, welcome. [Laughter.]
I realize that the Saudis need us to afford them some degree of protection because, after all, they live in a neighborhood that is not consistently harmonious. In fact, they live in a very hostile neighborhood, as you know. We, on the other hand, need their oil. So, in a sense, we need each other. We have a significant investment in that part of the world, and I think that investment ought to result in an atmosphere of openness rather than operating in a vacuum of secrecy. And my fear is that secrecy is their high card, and they let us—they pretty well let us know what they want us to know.
Now, having said all that, Mr. Bryant, am I off-course or am I pretty much on a true course?
Mr. BRYANT. My only comment to that, Congressman, is the fact that the FBI conducts investigations not only in Saudi Arabia, but wherever we have a logical lead, and we have developed some degree of cooperation with the Saudis on, hopefully, what happened and trying to develop a criminal case, trying to firm out our national security interests. There's a whole lot of interests here, and we're trying to pull as much information as we can. There are conditions and rules and laws in the Kingdom that are foreign to us, but we're in Saudi Arabia and we've had 125 people there down to a small number, trying to make sure that we get pertinent facts that are basically evidence. And I just think that it's an issue that we're going to have to work through. We've done it in other countries, and sometimes it's a degree of familiarization; sometimes it's liaison. I mean, we're there to support and help. Certainly, we're there for American interests, but we're also there—if the Saudis have a law enforcement issue in the United States, there's a reciprocal issue, and that works pretty well, but it takes some time.
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Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I think that's all I have for the moment. I hope that this will lead somewhere; I believe it might. Thank you, sir.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble.
Any time, Mr. Wexler, you want to be recognized, you may.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. If you want to continue to yield, we'll go to Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.
I know that you're restrained to some extent in what you can say here today, and it's obvious you're kind of dancing around a little bit, but let me just pose this question, and maybe you can answer it; maybe you can't. It seems to me that there's a fairly good likelihood that one of two things may be happening in the Saudis' unwillingness to be more open with our folks about the investigation of the situation. Either they're concerned that there is involvement from some other country, probably in the area, perhaps Iran, perhaps others, or there may be something going on in Saudi Arabia itself which at this point they feel may be destabilizing if it comes out into the open. There may be other scenarios, but those are two that come to mind as possibilities.
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What, if anything, can you say about that; or would you like to comment?
Mr. BRYANT. The only thing I think that I would just add to your comment is let's not forget they have pride in their confidence, they have pride in their system, and they want these people apprehended also. And it would be like if we had a bombing in Fairfax County, Virginia, and the Saudis want to come over and investigate it. I mean, there are issues here that we have to work through of coordination and cooperation, and it's not perfect and never is. But the FBI and the United States are going to go wherever terrorists are and try to develop cases to make sure that we bring them to justice.
Mr. CHABOT. Of course, one difference with them coming over here to investigate is that they've never been asked to send troops or have troops stationed over here to protect us from other——
Mr. BRYANT. That's correct.
Mr. CHABOT [continuing]. Aggressors in the area. So, I think there's some distinction. And, of course, it's my understanding that the FBI would like to establish other offices and other resources in other areas of the world, and I think we're certainly inclined to make the FBI as effective as it can be around the world, where necessary. But, on the other hand, if we're going to be stymied in investigations and be prevented from investigating the murder of our citizens in some of those very countries that we're trying to help, that's something I think we have to factor into this. That's a comment, but perhaps you'd like to comment on that as well?
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Mr. BRYANT. Well, the only thing I would say to that is opening offices like a legal attache in Riyadh will help future events that happen in Saudi Arabia because there will be knowledge of the system and liaisons that are already established between law enforcement agencies, not covert relations, but overt relations, and I think that will help. There are going to be difficulties in working any case overseas, but sometimes it has to be that we have to establish those liaisons and know the culture and the language and some of those issues.
Mr. CHABOT. I think we all agree, at least here, and I would hope the Saudis do as well, that we want to find these people and bring them to justice as expeditiously as possible. If guilty, I think they should be dealt with very harshly, and the Saudis have certainly a track record in doing that.
I'll yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Hutchinson, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to thank you for conducting this hearing. I believe this is an important issue.
And there are two areas I wanted to follow up on. One, Mr. Bryant, if you look into the future a little bit, and if you had a perfect scenario in which this investigation would result in the identification of the responsible parties and appropriate charges being filed—in other words, you make your case and the investigation is successful—do you have a prior agreement with the Saudis that the perpetrators can be brought back to the United States?
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Mr. BRYANT. No, there's no agreement like that.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, if you identify the individuals and indictments in the United States are brought, then where do we go?
Mr. BRYANT. Well, whenever we bring an indictment, many times it's sealed under grand jury rules, and if those person or persons are ever located in a country where we can get access to them, then we'll bring them back. I mean, some of the renditions that I mentioned in my prepared remarks were the historical goal here is to prepare a criminal case, get an indictment, and then seal it, and then if this person shows up in some place that we can get access to him to bring him back here to stand trial, that's what we'll do. We're very patient on that issue.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. And that you should be, and I think it's very, very important to pursue the investigation. I agree with Mr. Coble that a cost-benefit analysis has to come in at some point. And as a former prosecutor, I know that we don't devote resources unless we believe that we can successfully bring someone to justice.
I also wanted to inquire in a more broad, general area about your legal attache program. I believe there are 30 overseas and then the goal is to have 46 by Fiscal Year 1999. What is the criteria for where those LEGAT offices are established?
Mr. BRYANT. Congressman, could I introduce Alan Ringgold, who is in charge of our International Relations Branch, and he supervises them. I'll let him answer that question.
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Mr. RINGGOLD. The criteria, quite simply, is: where do we need help and where do we need better dialogues than what we have right now? Where are there services out there that can be of assistance to American law enforcement, and vice versa? Where are the biggest problems coming from that face us from outside the United States?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, I mean, if you look at our international problems, one of them is in international terrorism; another one is in the problem of drugs flowing into our country from international sources. So I want to look more specifically. Is the drug problem in a particular area a factor in the FBI developing a LEGAT office there?
Mr. RINGGOLD. To answer that question, you have to understand also that the DEA is primarily responsible for drugs overseas, and rarely are we motivated by drugs in establishing offices, with the exception of Mexico.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. So the answer is that it is not a priority with the FBI in setting up the LEGAT offices?
Mr. RINGGOLD. With the exception of Mexico and Italy, yes, that's correct.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. And so is the primary factor international terrorism?
Mr. RINGGOLD. No, it's not. It's the combination of white collar crime, organized crime, fugitive work, everything that the FBI has in its repertoire.
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. And so the FBI, in setting up the LEGAT offices, puts a higher criteria on white collar crime than international drug smuggling?
Mr. RINGGOLD. If you take—let's give you a ''for instance''—Hong Kong, the majority of what we do in Hong Kong is white collar crime. Again, the FBI has domestic responsibilities for drug enforcement, but there's an agreement with DEA that DEA will be the single point of contact for foreign governments overseas in drug matters.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I know that domestically anyway that, particularly in the eighties, the FBI into the drug war for the first time and provided enormous assistance in fighting that battle, and I wanted to see if the same relationship existed with the DEA in foreign countries. I think your answer is that you look to the DEA as carrying that battle, and the FBI is really not involved in it.
Mr. RINGGOLD. Well, to be specific, there are three areas in the world where the FBI—four areas in the world—where the FBI does carry its own water, so to speak, in investigations internationally in drug matters. One is Mexico, where we have an FBI agent actually in the DEA office working for the DEA country attache and responding to FBI drug leads in Mexico.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Could not that same policy that you effect in Mexico be applied to other countries where there's a serious problem with international importation of drugs into the United States?
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Mr. RINGGOLD. Well, it has been applied in Bangkok and in Columbia so far.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thought I understood you that the FBI only had a legal attache involved in drug problems in Mexico.
Mr. RINGGOLD. No, I'm sorry, I have to explain further. In the country attache, DEA country attache office in Bogota, Mexico, and Bangkok, there is an FBI agent working for the country attache that's not a legal attache.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I believe my time has expired. I thank the chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Buyer, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for my tardiness. Right now we have Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili down in the National Security Committee. So I wanted to come down and I'm going to have to go back.
But, Mr. Bryant, I appreciate your tap dancing because you are not the State Department; you're not the Department of Defense, and we're in a bit of a quandary. If we had a lapse in force protection or there was an attack upon Camp Red Cloud in Korea next to the DMZ, the FBI, under status-of-forces agreements, you would not be there investigating that; would that be correct?
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Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. BUYER. Right. So when there are status-of-forces agreements throughout the world, whether it's in Europe or wherever we have troops, the military takes care of that in cooperation with whatever country where we are. The problem that I have here, and because I have knowledge dealing with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War, is that we went into Saudi Arabia quickly; we had no status-of-forces agreements. We had had some troops there. We had some exchange of letters between nations, but nothing really set forth. And what has bothered me is that, even up to today's date, we still don't have that status-of-forces agreement. So you are in that bit of quandary.
And, you know, having also recognized that there is a different brotherhood, sisterhood, whatever you want to call it, that's much different from our understanding, Arabs think differently than us. We have to just recognize that. They think differently. Their logic—they don't think in syllogisms. It's just a completely different culture, a different value system. And even when you had the most heinous crimes of man's inhumanity toward mankind in war crimes, they didn't even want to go against their own in war crimes from the Gulf War. So I can understand from that, if, throw out this scenario: that Saudi Arabia being very uneasy, that if in fact this attack upon the force happened to be not as you threw out, well, some kind of a terrorist bombing in the United States—no, take the scenario that this was a country's endorsed act against a U.S. force. If, in fact, that's what we have, then would the United States have a retaliatory strike against that country? I think you would find many of my colleagues from the National Security Committee would be endorsing a retaliatory strike, especially if this were something that was endorsed from Iran. There would be many that would say, well, then you go and you strike the building of their nuclear facility right there on the Gulf.
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And I can also—I'm just talking in supposition—and I think that the Saudis would be very uneasy about how they would be viewed within that part of the world from their other Arab brother nations if, in fact, they participated in that investigation which led to the United States making some form of retaliatory strike. So I understand your tap dance, but what I don't understand is why the United States can continue to operate without status-of-forces agreements actually nailing things down for 5, 6 years down the road now; that there should be cooperation when the President meets there with the levels of his Cabinet for Janet Reno, the Attorney General of the United States, to say to the Secretary of Defense and to the Department of Commerce that we do have leverage in these matters of question. We have the Saudis wanting the purchase of all these fighter aircraft. I mean, for us to think that we don't have leverage in matters of national security that are vital to the interest of the United States, I don't buy.
So if you would, please, take back my counsel here to you to Janet Reno to bring these issues up, because I'm going to leave here, and I get to bring them up with Secretary Cohen, which I plan to do. And I know I just made a statement, not for a question on your side, but these are very important issues.
Mr. BRYANT. Agreed.
Mr. BUYER. OK?
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Buyer.
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Mr. Wexler, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I guess I'm just a little uncomfortable and would take, respectfully, some exception to the characterization of any type of people as being inclusive of what an entire group of tens of millions of people feel with respect to the sanctity of life, and so forth. I think it is not one that I would want to characterize. Even if it is a characterization of the Arab people, I think that that is an unfortunate view of the way in which the American Government should conduct itself.
I guess I would just simply like to ask, hearing the questions and hearing at times your, I think, respectful inability to respond, and the position that you are undoubtedly in, what suggestions might you have so that you can do your job better in the future if, God forbid, a similar situation were to occur? What can Congress do now so that next time the problems that you are experiencing may be overcome?
Mr. BRYANT. My recommendation is the first thing—that I would point out that Congress has been very, very supportive and very generous with the terrorism bill of last year, and that has brought resources to the FBI where the responsibility and the authority on terrorism, at least domestically and to American interests abroad, lies, and the expansion of the legal attache program and getting people there. I think it's a patience thing. I just think we have to work through these issues where we have different societies with different laws and different standards, and I believe that the resources and the responsibility and the authority are with the FBI, and it's up to us to perform. It's not to say it's going to perfect, but I think that our struggle and our efforts to make sure that we develop the facts surrounding what happened in any of these incidents that's permissible in a court of law is a high standard, but it's a standard that we should live by, because that's our way.
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I guess the greatest thing I would ask is stay with us a bit because I think some of these issues we'll work through. It may take some time, but I just think that we will, because there's a lot of effort and there's a lot of just personal dedication to make sure that Americans abroad and American interests abroad are protected the best we can to prevent these terrible acts and the terrible tragedies to the family.
Mr. WEXLER. If I could just follow, then, and you don't necessarily have to answer specifically now, but is there, then, no change or addition to American law that would enhance your ability to investigate in this kind of circumstance? And is there no attempt that either the Congress or the administration could entertain in terms of negotiating future arrangements with other nations that would enhance your ability to negotiate or your ability to investigate in this kind of situation?
Mr. BRYANT. I think there are statutes that we would be supportive, but they're not major changes. I mean, they're more tweaks to the system, but certainly, at least from my view from the intelligence community and the law enforcement community, I feel we have the tools; it's just up to us to perform. I mean, there are things that—that's a very broad statement you made, and there are things that we will probably suggest, but they're not substantial.
Mr. WEXLER. I would, in just closing, I would appreciate—not just to myself; some other people may be interested—if at some reasonable period of time you might enunciate what deficiencies you think either the Congress or the administration is placed in, and what specifically could be done about it, even if it isn't a mind-boggling change.
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Mr. BRYANT. OK, thank you.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. I think, Mr. Wexler, we're all interested in that, and I think that's a very salient point, Mr. Bryant. We need to know if the system is not working, and we obviously feel the results in Saudi Arabia and in Haiti, examples where you've been, up to this date at least, frustrated in the mission, and I don't know that there is a good way out of it, but I appreciate Mr. Wexler's comments very much.
Mr. Barr, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, and also to the witness, for coming in here a little bit late. We did have another committee meeting hearing that I was at, and I had to be there to ask some questions. So I apologize. This is a very important topic.
Mr. Bryant, as I leaf through your opening statement here, I note that you mention a number of incidents in foreign countries in which the Bureau has been involved over the last several years. Is Haiti mentioned in here?
Mr. BRYANT. No.
Mr. BARR. We had a hearing last year, I think in January of last year, concerning the matter of Haiti, and at that time I had asked some fairly, what I thought were, very eloquent questions, of course—[laughter]—but asked some questions about the legal authority under which our Government, and the FBI in particular, was involved down there in Haiti, because it didn't seem to me to fall into any of the either narrowly-or broadly-defined categories of cases and authorities under Federal law that would provide, I think, the more appropriate and clearer jurisdiction, such as those that you've mentioned here, and particularly in Saudi Arabia where U.S. interests are the direct target; U.S. personnel are the direct target, and so forth.
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And I still have some very serious concerns about Haiti. I don't know—I'm not going to ask you to indicate why Haiti isn't dealt with in here. I think it's not dealt with in your remarks because it's clearly something that is different, that U.S. interests were not directly involved. I still do have those concerns, and I think we need to be very careful, and I would hope that the Bureau would be very careful, in not allowing itself to be drawn into involvement in areas of violations of criminal law in foreign countries that have no connection with what our interests really are, because I think it hurts the credibility. I think the involvement in Haiti which yielded no real results, positive results anyway, does also.
Do you take a very hard look at, when you are asked by the political authorities in our Government to become involved in a foreign situation, do you look very hard and satisfy yourselves that there really is clear legal authority and jurisdiction for the Bureau to be involved?
Mr. BRYANT. Absolutely. I mean, Haiti is perhaps the exception, but there was certainly American interests there, but from my standpoint of the National Security Division and from the FBI in general, if we deploy to a foreign country, I want there to be an alleged violation of American laws because that's what we're there for, is to develop a prosecutable case, so it can be prosecuted in an American venue.
Mr. BARR. Exactly. I appreciate that.
With regard to the incidents in which the FBI is or has in recent years been involved in investigations of crimes in foreign countries involving U.S. interests, U.S. personnel, do you have the resources to your satisfaction, does the Bureau have the resources to do what needs to be done, particularly in light of the recent funds that have been made available through the Counterterrorism Act, for example, last year and in the appropriations?
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Mr. BRYANT. Last year, as a result of the Counterterrorism Act, there were 503 additional Special Agents, as well as support people, and a part of those people and funding and resources will be devoted to cases wherein American interests are attacked abroad, and I would say, yes, we do, to answer your question precisely.
Mr. BARR. OK. Do you have any estimate, does the Bureau yet have an estimate, on how much of its budget and resources, directly or indirectly, were utilized in Haiti? And this was a question that came up again last year, both in hearings with regard to the Bureau's budget and the Department of Justice's budget, as well as in the hearings that we had specifically focusing on Haiti. And the concern that I have, and still have, is that that was a very costly exercise, let's say, at a time when the Bureau—and this predated the monies that were made available later on last Fiscal Year—at a time when the Bureau was indicating to Congress that it did not have sufficient resources to carry out its domestic responsibilities. But do you have an estimate on how much the Haiti episode cost the Bureau?
Mr. BRYANT. I don't, but I can get precise figures on it and get it to you. I don't have it with me. I don't know it.
Mr. BARR. OK. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, if we could receive that.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Sure. We'd be very happy to. I think that's a good approach.
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Mr. BARR. I know that's not the subject matter, directly speaking, of the hearing today, but I think it is relevant and I do appreciate your indulging me in considering that for a few minutes, the question of Haiti.
[The information follows:]
Mr. BARR. But I do appreciate the fact that the Bureau is working in these other areas. I think it is very, very important as an adjunct to our diplomatic and military efforts overseas. Also, I appreciate hearing that, at least at this time, the Bureau does feel that it does have the resources, that Congress has made sufficient resources, to enable it to carry out those missions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Speaking of money, Mr. Bryant, do you have any idea how much money has been spent by the Bureau on the Dhahran investigation to date?
Mr. BRYANT. No. I can get that, though.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. All right.
Mr. BRYANT. We have precise dollar figures; I just don't have it.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. If you would, it would just be helpful, considering the scope of this inquiry.
[The information follows:]
Mr. MCCOLLUM. You indicated in the first questioning that I did with you a few minutes ago that there were pieces of evidence and witnesses that you weren't able to interview. Those were the two areas of the Saudi lack of full cooperation to date that troubled you the most: that you haven't been able to see or examine certain pieces of evidence and interview certain witnesses, and that's broad, and I understand that.
How does their refusal to provide this access or this information, how does it affect the investigation?
Mr. BRYANT. Well, if you—in any investigation, if you're going to have a credible investigation, you need to have precise facts that are not hearsay, but firsthand. And so that's some of the issues that we're trying to work through right now, is to basically get as much evidence and not hearsay.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. So what's been reported in the press is generally accurate, that they've given you summarized testimony of what witnesses have said, but they just haven't given you the opportunity to talk to them; is that not true? That's sort of what the press is reporting, anyway. I don't know if that's right or wrong. Maybe you can't comment?
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Mr. BRYANT. I'd really prefer not to get into it.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. All right, that's fair enough.
Did the Saudis agree to provide the type of information that they have not given you that you've alluded to today when the FBI began this investigation?
Mr. BRYANT. There were initial discussions between the FBI and the Saudi Government and the State Department and the military, and there have been agreements of cooperation on the issues. These agreements, as I said earlier, in a lot of areas they've been very responsive; in some areas, not as responsive as we would like. But there are bases of agreements of full cooperation, and there's different degrees of how their police would view it and how we would view it.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, let me ask you this question: when you first went over to Saudi Arabia with the 1st group of 125 for the Dhahran investigation, was there any understanding that you or anyone else in the FBI believed had been reached with the Saudis specifically spelling out that you would be given the right to question all the key witnesses, regardless of whether they were on the base or not, and that you would be able, as the FBI, to examine and test in the laboratory any material evidence that might be available to the Saudis? Was there any type of agreement that explicit before you got over there or as you began the process when you first got there?
Mr. BRYANT. I think there were initially agreements of cooperation, but you get on into the specifics and that's where perhaps some of the details or some of the disagreements have arisen, and I think those are the issues we're trying to work through. But there was—when Director Freeh and myself went over there in July, there was conversations regarding generally these issues.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, what I'm worried about in this—and I think several members have alluded to it today—is: do we have a need, to have agreements with our allies like Saudi Arabia with respect to criminal investigations involving terrorist acts against American citizens in their countries. Could it even, as a practical matter, pertain to the details of an investigation and to the cooperation levels in specific terms, such as, ''Yes, we agree that you will be permitted to have your FBI actually interrogate personally every witness that might remotely be involved who's in our jurisdiction in our country for any incident that occurs to violate Americans' physical well-being in our country?'' Is that impractical or is that something we should be pursuing?
Mr. BRYANT. Well, I think protocols, like I say, we have protocols for terrorism investigations or organized crime, or whatever, drug cases, or whatever. I think when we enter into those types of agreements with friendly allies, such as the Saudis or whoever, those are going to be reciprocal here in the United States; it's probably going to be one of the issues. And so that's something that I think we can explore, and I think we probably will, but it's going to have to be an issue of diplomacy, I think, rather than a law enforcement issue perhaps.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. And maybe, as you've established these 30 stations abroad, the FBI is going to grow and learn, as we will as a committee, what it is that these parameters need to be, how difficult these are going to be, and how much we can work with the State Department and others to make this more accessible for you. Is that——
Mr. BRYANT. I personally believe in the long term that that will have more success because of liaisons and understanding of each other's systems and legal systems. I think that will really be more productive toward overcoming issues that we have in almost any extraterritorial investigation.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Last question on the Saudi issue: is the solution in the criminal sense of ''who done it'' within the grasp of the FBI now? Is it possible, if the evidence you're negotiating or the witnesses you're wanting to talk to are turned over to you by the Saudis, that you will actually be able to arrest or bring some people to justice, do you think?
Mr. BRYANT. I think that we will develop the facts of what happened and who is responsible, and that's something, whether we do it in the next six weeks or we do it in the next 6 years, we're dedicated to developing the facts of what happened here and some type of criminal sanctions against the perpetrators.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. From what you know today and what you suspect but can't prove with hard evidence, you think there is an ultimate pipeline to the perpetrators, an evidentiary trail that exists out there, if you can get your hands on it; is that true or not?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Mr. Gekas——
Mr. GEKAS. Yes.
Mr. MCCOLLUM [continuing]. You may have a second round.
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Mr. GEKAS. Yes, Mr. Bryant, I wanted to ask you—and I thank the chairman for the second round. One of the questions I asked you before was one in which I already knew the answer; that is, I knew that the FBI would not be in the circle of decisionmaking as to where to billet American service people when we establish a presence or do some kind of deployment in a foreign country. But there is a follow-up question. Once a deployment is made, and billeting, like Khobar, is arranged, does the FBI receive a briefing or floor plans or building specs or perimeter types of charts to determine that if some security breach should occur in the future, the FBI would have at hand firsthand information as to the physical makeup, if nothing else, of the billeting facility? Can you answer me that?
Mr. BRYANT. I don't believe we do.
Mr. GEKAS. Is that right? So that when Rome's office was first contacted in the incident—well, actually, you had somebody investigating already. You already had a presence in Saudi Arabia investigating another incident when Khobar appeared. Then these FBI agents had no idea of the physical makeup of the Khobar Towers and all the perimeter pertinencies; is that correct?
Mr. BRYANT. I'm not really sure about this, but I don't think we did. If it was an embassy or something like that, certainly, diplomatic security would have that type of information on the physical structure, but as far as a military base——
Mr. GEKAS. Yes.
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Mr. BRYANT [continuing]. My thought is, and I'm not positive about this, but I don't think we would.
Mr. GEKAS. I would think, too, that if a new embassy were established, you would get that kind of information firsthand almost immediately in the planning stages.
Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. GEKAS. But then we're talking about a second class of American establishment; namely, the military establishment, where we put our service people at risk, and there is no policy or protocol in place to have the FBI have at hand floor plans and geographic charts as to that billeting facility. I think that's something that we have to determine might be a good preventive measure as we go through our cycle of deploying our fellow Americans in military situations.
Mr. BRYANT. Just a comment on that——
Mr. GEKAS. Yes.
Mr. BRYANT [continuing]. I would suspect that, like at Dhahran, the Air Force military intelligence would possibly have that information, I would guess.
Mr. GEKAS. Well, I don't doubt that somebody has it.
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Mr. BRYANT. Yes.
Mr. GEKAS. What I'm saying is that if, indeed, we're going to spring the FBI into action to assist the CIA, to assist the intelligence agencies of the services, to assist the Pentagon, to assist the State Department, or whatever organ is going to be established for it, that the FBI ought to have possibly right at the outset these floor plans that I'm talking about to make it simple.
Mr. BRYANT. Sure.
Mr. GEKAS. So I think that that's something that I would like to have a recommendation flowing from the FBI to us to see if there's any legislative or cooperative action that can be taken along those lines.
Mr. BRYANT. OK.
Mr. GEKAS. The other question I have is this, and it comes to mind only after I talked to one of my staffers: if we have—we expect Saudi Arabia to cooperate and to host our LEGAT, our attache station, in Saudi Arabia with full cooperation. Do they have a similar right in the United States? Do they have a reciprocal right under our present system to have an investigating body of Saudi Arabia hosted by the United States with an attache office here? Do you know that?
Mr. BRYANT. Well, a lot of embassies do. They have law enforcement representatives assigned, and it's very—and we liaise with them here, and a lot of countries do. We do it all the time.
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Mr. GEKAS. Well, what is the difference between that and what we do in establishing a separate FBI attache office? Well, we have an embassy in Riyadh, do we not?
Mr. BRYANT. Yes, sir.
Mr. GEKAS. And we have law enforcement people there that are the counterparts of the Saudi presence in the United States with their ambassador and their law enforcement and investigators in that office. So we have an extra kind of attache facility, is that correct, with the FBI?
Mr. BRYANT. I'm not sure. What else is——
Mr. GEKAS. What I'm saying is, the type that you described of the presence of an embassy in our country, in Washington, which is accompanied by an investigative body of that foreign country, we already have established in our embassies in those other countries, or do we not?
Mr. BRYANT. I don't think so.
Mr. GEKAS. So that the FBI is the first investigative presence we have in Saudi Arabia?
Mr. RINGGOLD. I'm really not understanding the question entirely, but we have an office in Saudi Arabia now that represents our law enforcement capability here. They do not have the converse of that here. Very often, it's a military attache in Washington who would cover a police account in a general manner. We welcome a policeman from almost any country here in Washington to have the same type of relationship with us that our legal attache——
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Mr. GEKAS. Yes, you do that ad hoc, as requested, et cetera——
Mr. RINGGOLD. Yes, sir.
Mr. GEKAS [continuing]. That you host them and help them and cooperate, et cetera, but there is no LEGAT from Indochina or Romania or France that is comparable to our FBI LEGAT in Rome, for instance?
Mr. RINGGOLD. Oh, yes, there is.
Mr. GEKAS. There is?
Mr. RINGGOLD. There are about 80 of them in Washington.
Mr. GEKAS. All right, that's what I wanted to learn. I thought that—I got the impression from what Mr. Bryant's answer was that the only kind of facility that was hosted was in connection with the embassy.
Mr. RINGGOLD. Well, it is. Each one of the foreign representatives here in Washington works out of his embassy. Take the French, for instance. The French have a French police—two French policemen here in Washington who essentially do the same types of function for the French police that our LEGATs do for the FBI in France.
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Mr. GEKAS. All right.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Wexler, you're recognized for 5 minutes, if you wish it?
Mr. WEXLER. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Barr, do you have any further questions?
Mr. BARR. I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bryant, this committee is also looking at from a domestic standpoint, and I think we'll be holding hearings sometime this spring, on possible jurisdictional problems, turf battles, within our Federal law enforcement community domestically. A number of these allegations or problems surfaced in media reports after—and even today, continue today with regard to the Atlanta Olympic Park bombing case.
I suspect, based on just what little I know from having spent some time up here in the agency and being somewhat familiar with some of our foreign policy mechanisms, that whatever problems there may be domestically in law enforcement probably pale in comparison to possible, potential, or even ongoing turf battles and jurisdictional disputes when we go into the foreign policy arena between State and DOD and CIA and DIA, and a lot of the other domestic agencies that have a presence or force themselves into the foreign arena in terms of formulating foreign policy. So I suspect that there are a lot of problems out there.
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Given the fact that the Bureau really is even now developing a mechanism, I suppose, for handling cases in foreign countries involving foreign nationals overseas, cases such as the Saudi one that directly impacted U.S. interest and personnel and mechanisms, give me some idea about how the coordination process is working between the Bureau and all of these other agencies that perhaps more traditionally have viewed themselves as preeminent when we go into the foreign arena, involving foreign policies. Is the coordination working well? I know that you'd be somewhat limited because some of this may be classified, and we'd have to handle it in a different format, but characterize for me how the coordination and jurisdiction and what problems are developing.
Mr. BRYANT. Are you talking particularly about the intelligence community or just generally?
Mr. BARR. Well, the intelligence community and State Department and DOD, because I'm presuming that in a case like the Saudi case that, to one extent or another, the Bureau would have to have some relationship and coordinate something with these other agencies. Now if they don't, then that's very interesting and would probably make your job a lot easier, but I suspect that you probably do.
Mr. BRYANT. Let me just go down the line and I'll attempt to answer your question. First, when we deploy, we get a legal opinion from the Department of Justice, and then when we go into a foreign country—let's say we go into Saudi Arabia; at the invitation of their government, we come in there. When we're in a foreign country, we're under what we call the chief-of-mission authority. In other words, we're responsible to the ambassador to tell him what we're doing, keep him informed, and make sure that he's involved in helping us, and we'll try to make sure he's not blind-sided.
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We do the same thing with the intelligence community. We've got, certainly with the CIA, where in years past there's been some issues, I think those have been resolved in the last several years with the creation of the Counterterrorism Center at the FBI, where there is literally—in some aspects of intelligence-type cases the CIA is literally there, and so is just about every other agency.
When we deploy on a bombing, occasionally, there's issues domestically with ATF, where we try to work through—if it's a terrorist bombing, the FBI has the lead; if it's a bombing that's not terrorist-related, they have the lead. And I think that issue is going toward a solution by in the Terrorism Center we've—I think an ATF agent arrived today. So at least the coordination on these issues should be tightened up to the point where they don't become turf battles, but let's work through it. And I think through this mechanism I think we've had success, particularly with the agency and State deploying overseas. And when you put 125 people overseas, that's a big burden on the ambassador, and so forth. So I think those problems are working through them.
Mr. BARR. Have you seen, and I know there were some not too long ago, some press reports—a Wall Street Journal article comes to mind—hinting at sort of possible problems between the Secretary of State, the Department of State perhaps, and the Bureau? And the perspective I'm coming from is in these areas the Bureau essentially should be the lead agency, if, in fact, our goal is to get to the bottom of a criminal act against the United States interest. If the goal is to paper things over, just to appear nice, then maybe State should be the lead agency. But is there any substance—and, again, I know you're somewhat constrained here, but, I mean, are there any problems? I really doubt that everything is working perfectly well. I mean, are there some areas that we should be thinking about and looking at clarifying jurisdiction, or what-not?
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Mr. BRYANT. Well, I think it goes back to this chief-of-mission authority in the embassy. In most instances it works pretty well. Occasionally, there are disagreements, but those, frankly, are coming back to the headquarters level to try to resolve them. So nobody wants to see a case or anything papered over. I mean, that's—I think we try very hard to basically make sure the investigative integrity remains intact. Sometimes there's different strategies, and there have been times where there's been disagreements over things that should be done, but I think that's a healthy situation. That's not to say it works all the time perfectly, but generally those issues are resolved, and they're resolved—if they can't resolve them locally, then we bring them back and work them through State and ourselves or Justice and State, or however we work, whatever the issue is.
Mr. BARR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Thank you very much, Mr. Bryant, for coming before us today and presenting something on a very important issue that, of course, is very difficult for you to talk about, but it was important to us, and we thank you for being here today.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
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48–300 CC
1997
THE FBI INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AND FOREIGN FBI INVESTIGATIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE FBI INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AND FOREIGN FBI INVESTIGATIONS
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
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Serial No. 44
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana
SONNY BONO, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
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ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTH, New Jersey
THOMAS E. MOONEY, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Crime
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida, Chairman
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STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
PAUL J. MCNULTY, Chief Counsel
GLENN R. SCHMITT, Counsel
DANIEL J. BRYANT, Counsel
NICOLE R. NASON, Counsel
DAVID YASSKY, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
HEARING DATE
February 12, 1997
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OPENING STATEMENT
McCollum, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Crime
WITNESSES
Bryant, Robert M., assistant director, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, accompanied by Allan Ringgold, deputy assistant director
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Bryant, Robert M., assistant director, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice:
Additional informationL23, 24
Prepared statement