Segment 2 Of 3     Previous Hearing Segment(1)   Next Hearing Segment(3)

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OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS:
EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2002

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

    Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee will come to order, and the first thing to do is to thank our witnesses for their patience. I think you all know we had a markup in the full Judiciary Committee and it just was finished and that is why we are running about 30 minutes late. However, if you think this was bad, the alternative was meeting at 2:30 this afternoon, so you are probably grateful to go on now, even if we are running a little bit late.

    I have to also say that when we get to your testimony, I'm going to be very strict about the 5-minute rule, which in the past I have not been, and the reason for that is, first, that we're expecting a vote in about 40 minutes and I'd like to get as much done as we can before then, and second of all, several Members have luncheon commitments starting at 12 or 12:30, so we are going to try to expedite and adhere to the rules as much as possible.

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    I appreciate the attendance of all the Members who are here and I will recognize myself and other Members for opening statements and then we'll proceed.

    Today, the Crime Subcommittee holds our second hearing on the Justice Department grant programs administered primarily by the Office of Justice Programs. We are here to examine the quality of evaluations of the effectiveness of over $4 billion of Federal grant funds for State and local law enforcement officials.

    The use of Federal grant funds to accomplish law enforcement objectives is subject to legal requirements that determine whether those objectives are achieved. Regular evaluations using valid methodologies are essential to the President and Congress in assessing where Federal resources can be used most effectively.

    The Office of Justice Programs was established to provide funds for State and local governments to develop innovative ways to fight crime. Evaluations of the programs are essential to determine what works and what doesn't.

    In recent years, evaluations seem to have become less important as Congress began to earmark certain programs and other programs became politically charged. We will examine the management and evaluation procedures at OJP to determine whether grant programs are being operated as they were intended by Congress and whether the programs are effective in reducing crime.

    The goal of this hearing is to gather information about OJP's performance and how Congress might assist the OJP. The Committee on the Judiciary is responsible for oversight of all Justice Department grant programs, including those administered by OJP and the Office of Community Policing Services, COPS. It is our responsibility to ensure that taxpayers' dollars are being wisely spent.
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    To that end, this Committee has begun to examine studies and evaluations prepared by the agency regarding these programs. It has become apparent that the evaluations and data collected by OJP left many unanswered questions. The testimony provided at this hearing will help the Committee to determine how and when OJP should apply performance standards to measure the effectiveness of grants and grant programs.

    Since Federal funds will continue to be provided to State and local governments for crime prevention programs, it is reasonable for Congress to require accountability from OJP for grant management. It is also appropriate that Congress require OJP to establish criteria for distributing grants as well as for measuring the effectiveness of grants. Congress should be able to answer questions from taxpayers about who has received Federal dollars and how those Federal dollars improved communities by reducing crime.

    That concludes my opening statement. The gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, is recognized for his.

    Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you in convening the second oversight hearing in the series of hearings you have scheduled on the Office of Justice Programs. At our hearing this past Tuesday, we focused on the issue of duplication of programs in OJP and heard varying views on the need for consolidation of programs versus the need for continued and even further separation of programs in OJP.

    I suspect, Mr. Chairman, that we may hear more of the same today with respect to whether a particular program operates better in a consolidated context or in a separate program, and from what we have heard so far, I am beginning to think that some of the issue of the value of consolidation versus separation may be in the eye of the beholder and that we may do better to focus on ways to ensure that OJP operations achieve their legislated purposes and mandates and not worry so much about their organizational structure.
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    I don't form to serve to prevent or hamper substance, but we also don't want to focus on changing the organizational structure if the real problem is failure of the people responsible for oversight of the programs to implement appropriate management, monitoring, and evaluation. No matter what the organizational structure we have, if we don't enforce it, it won't be effective.

    Mr. Chairman, the issue of today is evaluation of effectiveness of programs funded through OJP. Frankly, I'm not as concerned about the organizational structure of OJP as I am concerned about funding effective programs and not wasting money on programs which do not work. We know, for example, that some prevention programs are effective in reducing crime, so effective, in fact, that they save more money than they cost. Other programs are called prevention programs or they're popular, so they get funding, but, in fact, they have no effect at all on crime. Evaluations will help us know the right programs to fund, and this is more important than the organizational structure.

    So, Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to the testimony of the witnesses on the question of how much of the problem is form as opposed to failing to implement the proper management, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure program effectiveness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

    Are there other Members who wish to make opening statements?

    [No response.]
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    Mr. SMITH. If not, let me introduce the witnesses. They are David B. Muhlhausen, political analyst, Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation of Washington, D.C.; The Honorable John Cary Bittick, president, National Sheriff's Association, Washington, D.C.; Laurie Ekstrand, director, Justice Issues, General Accounting Office in Washington, D.C.; and the Honorable David B. Mitchell, executive director, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nevada.

    We welcome you all, look forward to your testimony. We'll look forward first to hearing from Mr. Muhlhausen. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, POLICY ANALYST, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, of course, my name is David Muhlhausen and I'm a policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation specializing in crime policy and program evaluation. In beginning my testimony, I must emphasize that the views I express are entirely my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. With that understanding, I am honored to be asked by the Subcommittee on Crime to testify today on reforming the evaluation process at the Office of Justice Programs.

    In 1996, Congress directed the Attorney General to conduct a review of State and local crime prevention programs funded by the Department of Justice. The resulting report by the University of Maryland examined 500 evaluations of crime prevention programs. Of particular interest, the report concluded that policing activities with clear strategies of targeting crime risk factors, such as high-crime hot spots, can be effective in reducing crime. The report also noted that many of the Department of Justice crime prevention programs either were evaluated as ineffective or escaped scrutiny altogether. The report called on Congress to devote more resources to evaluating crime programs.
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    It is still the case that Congress needs to mandate that the Office of Justice Programs needs to evaluate its programs and disseminate its findings to the public. For instance, or exactly, by determining impact evaluation, I mean a study design to measure a program's outcomes on the social conditions that it is intended to improve.

    To improve the ability of OJP to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs, Congress should take the following steps: First, Congress needs to specifically direct OJP to measure the effect of crime reduction programs. Second, recipients of OJP grants should be required to demonstrate through scientific means the effectiveness of their programs; before grants are awarded, applicants need to develop a clear plan on how they are going to use the funds to prevent crime; a system to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of the grants must be in place before the awarding of funds; and third, as originally proposed by the University of Maryland report, a minimum of 10 percent of OJP grant funding should be earmarked for evaluations.

    In conclusion, impact evaluations offer significant benefits for society because they measure how programs affect the social conditions they are designed to improve. Impact evaluations offer two improvements over process evaluations that agencies typically produce.

    First, impact evaluations reduce uncertainty in deciding which programs should be funded. Funding only those programs that are effective will save taxpayer funds by freeing up resources for programs that actually work. If an OJP program is found to be ineffective, then its elimination has only a limited effect on its intended beneficiaries. An ineffective program does not make your constituents safer. In fact, continuing an ineffective program can harm grant recipients because of their continued participation wastes time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.
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    Second, impact evaluations can improve the quality of public debate about the factors that are responsible for various social problems. Too often, when a community receives Federal funding and crime simultaneously declines, it is asserted that the funding caused the decline. Simply observing that the crime rates dropped when Federal grants flowed to a particular community does not help us understand the reasons why crime rates declined. Socio-economic factors need to be considered in understanding why crime rates change.

    To accomplish this task, Congress should boost the ability of OJP to conduct its evaluations. Thank you.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Muhlhausen.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Muhlhausen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN

    Mr. Chairman, my name is David Muhlhausen. I am a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis specializing in crime policy and program evaluation. In beginning my testimony I must emphasize that the views I express are entirely my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. With that understanding, I am honored to be asked by the Subcommittee on Crime, to testify today on reforming the evaluation process at the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

EVALUATIONS OF CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS
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    In 1996, Congress directed the U.S. Attorney General to conduct a review of state and local crime-prevention programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The resulting 1997 report by the University of Maryland looked at 500 evaluations of the crime-prevention programs.(see footnote 2) While the study did not evaluate specific programs, it reviewed scientific studies of programs and judged them on their scientific merit. Congress can use this report as a starting point for identifying effective and ineffective programs.

What Works

    Given my time constraints, I will concentrate on the 1997 report's findings on what works in policing. Policing activities with clear strategies of targeting crime-risk factors are effective in reducing crime.(see footnote 3) Some effective strategies include: (1) targeting crime ''hot spots,'' (2) targeting illegal possession of firearms by criminals, and (3) the proactive targeting of repeat offenders, which increases the likelihood of the arrest and incarceration of dangerous criminals.(see footnote 4) When the police develop clear strategies, they can make a difference in reducing crime.

    The 1997 report suggested that problem-oriented policing is a promising approach. Since the report was published, new evaluations, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), have become available which indicate that some types of problem-oriented policing are effective in reducing crime. A 1999 randomized study found that where specific plans developed to reduce crime in Jersey City, such as aggressive order maintenance and changes to the physical environment, produced significant reductions in crime.(see footnote 5) Another study, published in 2001, found that Boston's Operation Ceasefire led to a dramatic drop in the number of the city's youth homicides.(see footnote 6) Operation Ceasefire successfully reduced youth homicides by targeting a small number of chronically offending youth gang members.
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    What we have learned from problem-oriented policing and other policing strategies is that local law enforcement can make a difference. Developing a clear plan for using local resources to solve problems is more effective than having local law enforcement agencies spend federal dollars.

What Doesn't Work

    The 1997 report concluded that neighborhood watches where volunteers watch their neighborhoods in an effort to deter criminals are ineffective.(see footnote 7) In addition, community policing with no clear strategy for targeting crime-risk factors has been ineffective in reducing crime.(see footnote 8) While the federal government has encouraged community policing the report states, ''there is no evidence that community policing per se reduces crime without a clear focus on a crime risk factor objective.''(see footnote 9)

What's Unknown

    The 1997 report noted that many of DOJ's crime-prevention programs either were evaluated as ineffective or escaped scrutiny altogether. It added: ''By scientific standards, there are very few 'programs of proven effectiveness.' ''(see footnote 10) The 1997 report called for Congress to devote more resources to evaluating crime prevention programs.(see footnote 11) Yet Congress still has not given sufficient attention to this request to ensure that federally funded crime prevention efforts are in fact preventing crime. It is still the case that our understanding of which OJP programs work can be significantly increased through the use of evaluation research.
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THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION'S RELATED RESEARCH

    The Heritage Foundation has recently begun to evaluate the effectiveness of federal programs. While The Heritage Foundation has not individually studied OJP grants, its evaluation of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has shed light on the program's success.(see footnote 12) Some observers claim that the COPS program is a proven success because crime has declined every year since the program's creation.(see footnote 13) This assertion does not account for the fact that the nation's violent crime rate began to decline before the program was created.

    In May 2001, The Heritage Foundation published an impact evaluation of COPS, which found that grants to hire additional officers and purchase technology were ineffective in reducing violent crime.(see footnote 14) The analysis suggests that simply continuing funding for the COPS program will be ineffective in reducing violent crime.

    In contrast to hiring and redeployment grants, which were not shown to be effective, the analysis found that COPS grants which were targeted on reducing specific problems—like domestic violence, youth firearm violence, and gangs—were somewhat effective in reducing violent crime. Narrowly focused COPS grants are intended to help law enforcement agencies tackle specific problems, while COPS hiring and redeployment grants are intended simply to pay for operational costs of police departments. The Heritage Foundation analysis builds on research that shows how the police are deployed is more important in reducing crime than the number of officers funded.
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RESEARCH BY THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

    Approximately six months after the publication of The Heritage Foundation COPS evaluation, the University of Nebraska at Omaha published a federally funded evaluation of COPS.(see footnote 15) The University of Nebraska report was financed through a COPS office grant of over $116,000.(see footnote 16)

    The University of Nebraska study found that two types of COPS grants—hiring and narrowly focused grants—reduced crime rates in cities with populations over 10,000.(see footnote 17) The study also found that redeployment grants failed to reduce crime. In addition, for cities between 1,000 and 10,000 residents, the study shows that COPS hiring grants are associated with an increase in violent and property crime while redeployment grants are associated with an increase property crime. The results of the COPS-funded study have been used to support claims about the program's effectiveness.(see footnote 18)

    The University of Nebraska study was critical of research that did not ''control for extraneous factors that may be correlated with both increases in the number of police officers and increases in crime rates, such as local politics, or fluctuation in the local economy of cities.''(see footnote 19) Unfortunately, data limitations did not permit the authors to make significant improvements to the existing research. For example, city-level data for five out of six socioeconomic variables in the study was not available on a yearly basis.(see footnote 20) Instead of using data for each year between 1994 and 1999, the following control variables were held constant at 1990 levels: minority population percent, single parent household percent, young people percent, homeownership percent, and percent of people in the same house since 1985.(see footnote 21)
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    Given that the University of Nebraska study covers the period 1994 to 1999, the use of data exclusively from 1990 for most of their control variables is inappropriate and likely to reduce the validity of the findings. Holding control variables constant at 1990 levels ignores important changes that occurred on a yearly basis between 1994 to 1999. For example, from 1990 to 1999, the nation's minority population grew from 24.3 percent to 28.1 percent of the total population.(see footnote 22) The University of Nebraska study's use of 1990 data means that it cannot account for many of the important changes during the last decade that influenced crime rates.

    Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the University of Nebraska analysis is that state and local law enforcement efforts are assumed not to influence crime rates. The statistical model used by the researchers only considers the effect that federal funding has on crime rates. The impact of omitting state and local expenditures can be seen by examining the size of the COPS program in comparison to state and local police expenditures. During the period of 1994–1999, the COPS program had a combined budget of $6.9 billion, while during the same period state and local governments devoted over $280 billion for police agencies.(see footnote 23) For every $1 spent on COPS, over $40 was spent by state and local governments for police protection.

    An alternative approach can be found in The Heritage Foundation study where the statistical model accounts for state and local policing. In order to take account of the state and local expenditures, The Heritage Foundation used county-level data, which has more complete information on local spending (and important socioeconomic factors that are available on a yearly basis). The Heritage Foundation study found that state and local police expenditures significantly reduce crime. The approach taken in the University of Nebraska study tends to bias the results towards a finding that COPS is more effective than the program may be.
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WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO

    Advancing the evaluation capability of OJP is important to the promotion of public safety. Congress should take the following steps to improve the evaluation of OJP programs: (1) mandate impact evaluations, (2) require grant recipients to collect data and evaluate their programs, (3) make NIJ an independent agency within OJP, (4) reserve 10 percent of all OJP grant funding for impact evaluations and have the agency review the research design before approving grants. These steps are explained more fully in the sections below.

Mandate Impact Evaluations

    If Congress wants OJP to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs, it will have to mandate it. There is no substitute for Congress making its intentions clear. Congress must specifically direct OJP to measure the effect of its programs on crime.

    Too frequently, process evaluations, which answer questions about the operation of a program and service delivery, are substituted for impact evaluations. Process measures that report how much funding was dispersed and how many people were served are not measures of a program's effectiveness in improving the targeted social condition.

    A case in point is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which required an evaluation of the COPS program. The law suggested that the effectiveness of COPS in reducing crime should be evaluated, but the law left open the possibility of the Department of Justice not doing an impact evaluation.(see footnote 24) The resulting Nation Evaluation of the COPS Program failed to determine the program's effectiveness in reducing crime. Instead, the study looked at process measures, such as how many officers were hired. Some of the study's findings were informative. For example, the study concluded that a program goal of adding 100,000 additional officers would not be met. However important questions about the program's effectiveness were never even considered.
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    The National Evaluation of the COPS Program and the University of Nebraska studies illustrate a larger problem with bureaucracies. In general, given the opportunity, bureaucracies will emphasize those aspects of administrative operations that put them in the best light. In cases where they are forced into measuring their effectiveness, bureaucracies will tend to conduct process evaluations or studies designed to produce the most favorable results. From an administrator's perspective, process data are the most readily available type of information about a program, so it receives the closest attention.

    To counteract the natural tendency to avoid impact evaluations by government agencies, Congress should clearly mandate OJP to evaluate the impact of its programs on crime rates. An example of this type of legislative language mandating an impact evaluation is contained in the Coats Human Services Amendments of 1998.(see footnote 25) The amendment specifically mandates a randomized impact evaluation of Head Start. Today, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is moving toward determining if Head Start is an effective program based on rigorous social science methods. Without the congressional mandate, it is very likely that the HHS research would be more process-oriented rather than focused on the impact of Head Start.

Require Grant Recipients to Evaluate Their Federally Funded Programs

    Recipients of OJP grants should be required to demonstrate through scientific means the effect that the programs have had on crime. Anecdotal examples or measures other than actual changes in crime should not be substituted for rigorous impact evaluations that include control variables.(see footnote 26)
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    First, before grants are awarded, applicants need to develop a clear plan on how they intend to use the funds to prevent crime. Second, a system to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of the grants must be in place before the awarding of funds. Third, after the funds have been spent, the OJP-funded activities should be evaluated for their effect on crime. Finally, the results of the evaluation should be submitted to OJP for dissemination to Congress and the public.

    To summarize these steps: Devise a plan that includes measuring the outcomes of the plan. Implement the plan. Then evaluate the program. Plan. Implement. Evaluate. If grantees cannot take these responsible steps, then they should not receive federal funding.

Make NIJ an Independent Agency Within OJP

    NIJ is uniquely situated to be the impact evaluation arm of the Justice Department. To become an independent and truly effective agency, NIJ's budget needs to be directly funded. Currently, NIJ's budget is derived from contributions from its sister bureaus within OJP. NIJ's ability to objectively evaluate OJP programs is seriously jeopardized, because NIJ could suffer budget retaliations if the agency's findings are not favorable to its sister agencies. Direct funding of NIJ will help inoculate it from pressure not to evaluate the effectiveness of OJP programs.

Reserve 10 Percent of All OJP Funding for Impact Evaluations

    As originally proposed by the University of Maryland report, a minimum of 10 percent of OJP grant funding should be earmarked for impact evaluations.(see footnote 27) The implementation of these impact evaluations should be done through a mix of in-house NIJ studies and out-source grants to academic researchers and independent research firms.
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    Determining the impact of a program requires a rigorous study design. The net outcomes of a program can be determined when the conditions of the intervention group are compared to a similar group that has not received the intervention. Studies based on experimental design, or random assignment, are preferred because their results are less ambiguous.

    Because the criminal justice system operates in the context of legal constraints—namely, individual rights and due process—true random experiments are frequently impossible. In these cases, quasi-experimental designs are required, where the intervention and control groups are selected nonrandomly, but some controls are used to minimize threats to the validity of the findings.(see footnote 28) The inclusion of proper control variables is crucial to the validity of findings of studies that are not based on random assignment.

CONCLUSION

    Impact evaluations offer significant benefits for society because they measure how programs effect the social conditions they are designed to improve. Impact evaluations offer two improvements over the process evaluations that agencies typically produce. First, impact evaluations reduce uncertainty in deciding which programs should be funded. Funding only effective programs will save taxpayer funds by freeing up resources for programs that actually work. If an OJP program is found to be ineffective, then its elimination has only a limited effect on the intended beneficiaries, because the program failed to reduce crime. An ineffective crime reduction program does not make your constituents safer. In fact, continuing an ineffective program can harm grant recipients because their continued participation wastes time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.
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    Second, impact evaluations can improve the quality of public debate about the factors that are responsible for various social problems. Too often when a city receives federal funding and crime simultaneously declines, it is asserted that the funding caused the decline. Simply observing that the crime rates dropped when federal grants flowed to a particular community does not help us understand the reasons why crime rates declined. As the Congressional Budget Office has noted, socioeconomic factors need to be considered in understanding why crime rates change.(see footnote 29)

    Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick.

STATEMENT OF JOHN CARY BITTICK, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. BITTICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm Sheriff John Cary Bittick from Georgia and I appear before you as President of the National Sheriff's Association. The National Sheriff's Association is surprised and deeply concerned about the proposal by OMB to eliminate the Office of Domestic Preparedness at the U.S. Department of Justice and to shift these responsibilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

    This is a time when the American people need continuity and coordination, not the disruption of unnecessary reorganization. For this reason, I appear before you today to add the voice of the nation's sheriffs to other law enforcement organizations that likewise oppose this OMB proposal. While we appreciate the efforts of OMB to consolidate functions and enhance efficiency, this proposal would unintentionally undermine the efforts of American law enforcement.
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    I will submit for the record a formal resolution adopted by the National Sheriff's Association last week in which we set forth the reasons for opposition for this proposed reorganization. Let me explain each of these reasons for opposition to the OMB proposal.

    Sheriffs have worked with the Department of Justice on funding for anti-crime efforts since the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Over these 34 years, the Department of Justice has established expertise that cannot be replicated by an agency that is new to law enforcement. Nothing more need be said here, but it is apparent that there is no substitute for these 34 years of relationships and experience.

    The sheriffs of our nation applaud your courage and leadership in passing the Patriot Act, but we are confused by the OMB proposal since it seems to repeal sections of the Patriot Act even before some of those provisions have been implemented. For example, the OMB proposal seems to rewrite sections 1005 and 1014, which direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to make grant to sheriffs for first responders, terrorism prevention, and anti-terrorism training.

    Look at the record of terrorist attacks around the globe. Terrorists attack with automatic weapons, bombs, and often take hostages. Side by side with Federal law enforcement, we will face these terrorists, most probably with deadly weapons. We will never ask nor can we expect our fire, EMS, or health personnel to face gunfire, explosives, or other deadly assaults. That is the job of the police and sheriffs and it is ours alone.

    Once the threat has been addressed and public safety has been restored, only then is it possible to turn the scene over to FEMA agencies. To do anything else would be contrary to a sheriff's oath of office and contrary to the laws of his State. To subordinate our crisis response to FEMA would compromise the statutory obligation of law enforcement officials to protect their community.
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    Mr. Chairman, we are grateful that your Committee has rightfully acknowledged that this is the reality of both policy and practices across the nation. I quote from the Subcommittee on Crime's views and estimates on the budget. ''The Committee is concerned that FEMA is not the appropriate agency for these responses. A terrorist attack is a criminal event, not a national disaster.''

    The prevention, detection, and apprehension of terrorists are law enforcement functions. It is not appropriate for training or coordination to be assigned to the FEMA regime where there are no such responsibilities. If there were to be another terrorist attack, responding to the immediate crisis would be a law enforcement responsibility. Sheriffs and police chiefs are shocked that OMB would propose that FEMA should assume responsibility in these areas, where there is neither experience nor legal authority to act.

    Perhaps most confusing is the contradiction of the January 2001 CLECs Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, known as the CONPLAN, which states, ''Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public safety and health.''

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    Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62, and 63 direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to assume the lead responsibility for the Federal Government. It is the U.S. Department of Justice, not FEMA, that serves as the central agency in a crisis.

    Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, are you getting to the end of your testimony?

    Mr. BITTICK. Just about, sir.

    Mr. SMITH. You can't see that red light because a water pitcher is in the way, but——

    Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I am just about through it.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. You had me worried when I saw six more pages, so—— [Laughter.]

    Mr. BITTICK. No, that is mostly notes. I apologize.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay.

    Mr. BITTICK. At this time of national crisis, sheriffs want to support the efforts of the President and Governor Ridge. However, we cannot support the OMB recommendation to remove the Office of Domestic Preparedness from the U.S. Department of Justice and transfer this function from FEMA. While this plan may appear to serve the interest of efficiency, it fails to recognize the reality of law enforcement responsibilities at the time of a terrorist attack.
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    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by offering my assurances that the National Sheriff's Association strongly endorses the words of your Committee, and I quote, ''A case has neither been made for current proposed transfer of the Office of Domestic Preparedness nor for the prior transfer of the National Domestic Preparedness Office.'' Thank you, sir.

    Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, it was worth waiting for that endorsement. Thank you. [Laughter.]

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bittick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN CARY BITTICK

INTRODUCTION:

    Mr. Chairman, I am Sheriff John Cary Bittick and I appear before you as President of the National Sheriffs Association. The National Sheriffs' Association is surprised and deeply concerned about the proposal by OMB to eliminate the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) at the U.S. Department of Justice, and to shift these responsibilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

    This is a time when the American people need continuity and coordination, not the disruption of unnecessary reorganization. For this reason, I appear before you today to add the voice of the Nation's Sheriffs to other law enforcement organizations that likewise oppose this OMB proposal. While we appreciate the efforts of OMB to consolidate functions and enhance efficiency, this proposal would unintentionally undermine the efforts of American law enforcement.
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    I will submit for the record a formal resolution adopted by the National Sheriffs' Association last week, in which we set forth the reasons for our opposition to the proposed reorganization.

    Let me explain each of the reasons for our opposition to the OMB proposal:

Experience With Counterterrorism:

    Sheriffs have worked with the Department of Justice on funding for anti-crime efforts since the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Over these 34 years, the Department of Justice has established expertise that cannot be replicated by an agency that is new to law enforcement. Nothing more need be said here, as it is apparent that there is no substitute for these 34 years of relationships and experience.

Contradiction of the Patriot Act:

    The Sheriffs of our Nation applaud your courage and leadership in passing the Patriot Act. But we are confused by the OMB proposal, since it seems to repeal sections of the Patriot Act even before some of those provisions have been implemented. For example, the OMB proposal seems to re-write Sections 1005 and 1014, which direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to make grant to Sheriffs for first responders, terrorism prevention and anti-terrorism training.

Law Enforcement Responds to a Deadly Threat, Not FEMA Agencies:

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    Look at the record of terrorist attacks around the globe. Terrorists attack with automatic weapons, bombs, and often take hostages. Side-by-side with Federal law enforcement, we will face the terrorists, most probably with deadly weapons. We will never ask nor can we expect our Fire, EMS or Health personnel to face gunfire, explosives or other deadly assaults. That is the job of police and sheriffs, and it is ours alone. Once the threat has been addressed and public safety has been restored, only then it is possible to turn over the scene to the FEMA agencies. To do anything else would be contrary to a Sheriff's oath of office and contrary to the laws of the States. To subordinate our crisis response to FEMA would compromise the statutory obligation of law enforcement officials to protect their communities. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful that your committee has rightly acknowledged that this is the reality of both policy and practices across the Nation.

''The Committee is concerned that FEMA is not the appropriate agency for these responsibilities. A terrorist attack is a criminal event, not a natural disaster.''(see footnote 30)

FEMA Role is Limited to Consequences Management:

    The prevention, detection and apprehension of terrorists are law enforcement functions, and it is not appropriate for training and coordination to be assigned to the FEMA regime, where there are no such responsibilities. If there were to be is another terrorist attack, responding to the immediate crisis would be a law enforcement responsibility. Sheriffs and Chiefs of Police are shocked that OMB would propose that FEMA should assume responsibility in these areas, where there is neither experience nor legal authority to act. Perhaps most confusing is the contradiction of the January 2001 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, known as the CONPLAN, which states:
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''Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public health and safety.''(see footnote 31)

Contradiction of Presidential Decision Directives:

    Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63 direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to assume lead responsibility for the Federal Government. It is the U.S. Department of Justice, and not FEMA, that serves as the central agency in a crisis. This is what our local laws now reflect and this is how our personnel have been trained. The Nation's Sheriffs and Police have established operational agreements with ODP and the FBI at the Department of Justice, and we should not be asked to scrap all of our policies, plans, and agreements so that we can work under the authority of an agency that has no law enforcement role.

Disruption of Current Programs Threatens the Public:

    Last year, the House raised the funding for the ODP from $250 Million to $650 Million, and we are now engaged in the planning for allocation of these funds to law enforcement. Just as we are launching these new programs, OMB would have us terminate the effort and move everything over to FEMA. The disruption that such a shift would cause is nothing less than catastrophic at a time when the safety of the American people is at risk. As elected Sheriffs sworn to protect the public, we cannot support a recommendation that may cause enormous disruption and a potential hiatus during this period of unprecedented threats to pubic safety in America.
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Department of Justice Should be Commended:

    The National Sheriffs' Association believes that Congress should commend the Attorney General, the FBI and ODP for a job well done, and not consider the transfer of their duties to agencies that lack the experience, training and authority to get the job done. As directed by Congress, the Department of Justice has worked with all 50 states on preparedness plans, and I am advised that 44 have been received. Relying upon decades of experience with review and approval of such State plans, ODP has already approved 40 of these State Strategy documents. I asked the Department of Justice to provide me with a listing of what they have done to assist law enforcement and first responders, and I am pleased to submit these figures for the record.

Bittick.eps

CONCLUSIONS:

    For all the reasons set forth here, the National Sheriffs' Association commends the Committee for your position that these functions must remain at the Department of Justice.

''The Department of Justice is clearly authorized to provide grants to states and locals for crisis and consequence management training, equipment and technical assistance. FEMA does not appear to have the same authorization. More importantly, FEMA is not in the business of crisis management and the Department of Justice is. Because of the primacy of crisis management, the Department of Justice has been designated the lead agency in establishing a single entity to oversee both crisis and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack.''(see footnote 32)
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    At this time of national crisis, Sheriffs want to support the efforts of the President and Governor Ridge. However, we cannot support the OMB recommendation to remove the Office of Domestic Preparedness from the U.S. Department of Justice and transfer this function to FEMA. While this plan may appear to serve the interests of efficiency, it fails to recognize the reality of law enforcement responsibilities at the time of a terrorist attack. This sort of forced consolidation can only lead to confusion, and that is not what our Nation needs right now.

    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by offering my assurance that the National Sheriffs' Association strongly endorses the words of your Committee,

''A case has neither been made for the current proposed transfer of the Office of Domestic Preparedness nor for the prior transfer of the National Domestic Preparedness Office. Accordingly, the Committee believes it would be appropriate to direct the $3.5 billion to the Department of Justice for coordination, training, technical assistance and equipment for state and local first responders.''(see footnote 33)

    Mr. SMITH. Ms. Ekstrand.

STATEMENT OF LAURIE EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR, JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. EKSTRAND. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, as you know, during the last 5 years, GAO has reported on a number of programs run by OJP bureaus and offices. One overarching theme over these reviews is the need for improvement in monitoring and evaluating their grant programs.
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    Monitoring and evaluation identify whether programs are operating as intended, whether they are reaching those who should be served, and ultimately whether they are making a difference in the fight against crime and delinquency, and these are major elements of assessing results. Our recent work has focused on the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Violence Against Women Office, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Executive Office of Weed and Seed, and the Drug Court program.

    Let me start by discussing our findings concerning monitoring. Site visits, phone contacts, and reviews of grantee progress reports are all examples of the kinds of monitoring activities that are intended to ensure that grants are spent as they are supposed to be.

    Since 1996, we have testified and reported on grant monitoring problems in some of OJP's bureaus. Most recently, we reported that grant files for discretionary awards granted by OJJDP, VAWO, and under BJA's Byrne program did not always contain required documentation of monitoring activities. As a result, neither OJP, OJJDP, VAWO, BJA, nor we were able to determine what level of monitoring had occurred.

    These are problems similar to those we identified in 1996 testimony on OJJDP and in a 1999 report on the Weed and Seed program. OJP itself has identified similar problems, and the DOJ Inspector General has recently declared OJP grant management a major management challenge.

    Now let me turn to impact evaluations. These are studies that are intended to assess the impact of a program compared to what might have happened—had the program never existed. They are not easy to design and carry out, but they are vital to determining whether a program works or not.
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    At the request of Senators Sessions and Grassley, we recently reviewed the soundness of the sole Byrne grant impact evaluation and three VAWO impact evaluations that were undertaken since 1995. We found the Byrne evaluation to be well designed and implemented. However, all three VAWO impact evaluations suffer from major sampling and design problems that compromise their ability to provide definitive results. Data collection and analytic problems were also evident. We are releasing this report today in conjunction with this hearing.

    We also recently reported on the soundness of ten impact evaluations of OJJDP funded programs. Of the five that had passed the early stages, two had design issues and three had experienced data collection problems that could also compromise the validity of their findings.

    Finally, our preliminary review of an effort to design a national impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of Drug Court programs is showing that that effort has not yielded its intended evaluation plan. A new national impact evaluation effort for Drug Courts is planned, but it is unlikely that it will provide the needed information on results until 2007.

    OJP is a $4 billion operation. We have not reviewed all of OJP's program areas, but our work to date raises serious questions about the quantity and the quality of information OJP has available to gauge results. In relation to monitoring and evaluation, OJP has plans to reorganize and to develop a new management information system and cites these as the foundation for positive changes in grants management. Reorganization and information systems are only tools and they are only as good as the management that wields them. Commitment to improvement and oversight is needed to ensure progress.
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    Chairman Smith, we are looking forward to starting work on a broad review of the National Institute of Justice's impact evaluations as you have requested as part of your oversight. Thank you.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Ekstrand.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Ekstrand follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURIE E. EKSTRAND

    Mr. SMITH. Judge Mitchell.

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MITCHELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RENO, NV

    Judge MITCHELL. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the Subcommittee, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges appreciates the opportunity to testify at your request on the proposed reorganization of the Justice Department's Office of Justice Programs.

    The National Council addressed this issue in the past at the request of the Subcommittee and will respond in the future to assist the Committee in its review of this topic. The subject of the reorganization and the impact we anticipate it having on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the programs administered by OJJDP, and the juvenile and family courts of the nation makes us anxious to discuss this matter.
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    My name is David B. Mitchell. To my rear and with me today is Judge Ernestine Gray, the Chief Judge of the Juvenile Court in Orleans Parish in New Orleans, Louisiana. Judge Gray is President of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the nation's oldest and largest voluntary organization of judges. I am the Executive Director of the National Council. I assumed that position on January 3, 2002, after serving 17 years in the State of Maryland as a trial judge on a court of general jurisdiction.

    I appreciate the need for organization and elimination of duplicative efforts that prove ineffective and wasteful and waste precious public resources. I came from the private sector to the court and now return to that venue. Those experiences make me quite conscious of duplication, lack of efficiency, the customer, and above all, the bottom line.

    The National Council does not take a position on the need to reorganize OJP relative to the questions of line of authority or Presidential appointments or the process of centralization of the process of management. We certainly are sympathetic to the espoused goals.

    I struggle with the notion of what I could say today to convey the concerns of juvenile court judges with the concept of reorganization of OJP and why it sends shock waves through us. The juvenile court in your districts represents an entire court system whose jurisdiction encompasses so much more than criminal acts by children, yet that limited work of the court appears as the only concept of what we do.

    Judges in juvenile court address challenging determinations of whether a child is dependent because of the acts of his caretaker, the issues of abuse and neglect. We determine whether this child should be placed back with that caretaker, a relative, or into the foster care system because of abuse or neglect. Difficult decisions such as determination of parental rights are daily experiences of juvenile court judges. We decide adoptions and emergency medical procedures for children.
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    The work of the court is not limited to criminal behavior. We work with children to prevent them becoming disaffected, sullen, and angry because of violence perpetrated upon them. Young people who commit violent acts today too often trace the origin of that anger toward society back to their experiences as abused children. Each judge faces children whose life facts shock the conscience. We see children, as I did, where visitation arrangements for the incarcerated child and parents involved producing all in guard under court because all were in custody.

    I am not confident that the Bureau of Justice Statistics or any other entity that we are discussing today will devote its energy to research and analysis of children justice matters, that is juvenile justice matters, in competition with the need to focus on crime by adults. Crime will rule the day and consideration of justice for children, juveniles, will receive short shrift. It has always been that way. It will not change despite assurances to the contrary.

    It is true today as it was under LEAA in the 1960's that the horse that eats all the oats in the barn is the criminal justice system. Juvenile justice matters are not as important in the minds of many as the latest information on what criminals do and why they do it.

    We implore you to leave OJJDP inviolate in this process because juvenile justice, justice for children, is so much more than adult criminal behavior. The analysis and treatment of children must receive support from this body and not be carved up in the name of efficiency.

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    We submitted more lengthy remarks, which I request at this time be inserted into the record, and thank you, sir.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Judge Mitchell. Without objection, both the complete testimony of yourself and the other witnesses will be inserted into the record, as well as the resolution that Sheriff Bittick mentioned in his testimony, as well.

    Judge MITCHELL. We appreciate that.

    [The prepared statement of Judge Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MITCHELL

    CHAIRMAN SMITH, MR. SCOTT, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES (''NATIONAL COUNCIL'') IS PLEASED TO TESTIFY TODAY ON THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (''OJP'').

    MY NAME IS DAVID MITCHELL. I AM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES. FOR 17 YEARS, PRIOR TO JOINING THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, I WAS A JUDGE IN THE BALTIMORE CITY CIRCUIT COURT, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND. I SERVED AS THE JUDGE-IN-CHARGE OF THE COURT'S JUVENILE DIVISION FROM 1984 TO 1995.

    ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, I THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE EFFECT THAT THIS REORGANIZATION WOULD HAVE ON OJP AND ITS PROGRAM OFFICES, INCLUDING THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (''OJJDP'').
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    THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS THE LARGEST ORGANIZATION OF JUDGES THAT DEALS WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FAMILY VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, AND CHILD SUPPORT. OUR MEMBERS COME FROM 49 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND SEVERAL TERRITORIES.

    FROM THE FOUNDING OF NCJFCJ IN 1937, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN AMONG THE ORGANIZATION'S MOST IMPORTANT MISSIONS. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS THE ONLY ORGANIZATION THAT PROVIDES THE VAST ARRAY OF TRAINING PROGRAMS NEEDED BY JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES AND EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RELATED ORGANIZATIONS. NO SINGLE STATE IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THIS TRAINING. IN A TYPICAL YEAR, TRAINING SPONSORED, CO-SPONSORED OR ASSISTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS PROVIDED TO MORE THAN 20,000 INDIVIDUALS. MANY OF OUR OVER 150 TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE ASSISTED BY FEDERAL GRANT FUNDING.

    OVER 100 YEARS AGO, THE FIRST JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT WAS ESTABLISHED IN RECOGNITION THAT THE REALM OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS IS A WORLD APART FROM THAT OF DELINQUENCY AND CHILDREN. WHILE THE LINES BETWEEN THESE WORLDS HAVE BEGUN TO BLUR IN THE LAST DECADE, ALL OF THE REFORMS THAT HAVE PASSED IN THE STATES TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS OVER JUVENILES HAVE AFFECTED LESS THAN 3% OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE STILL 1.7 MILLION COURT CASES REMAINING IN THAT SYSTEM, PLUS A HUGE AND GROWING WORKLOAD OF ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN, A POPULATION THAT THOSE CONCERNED WITH CRIME AND CRIMINALS SELDOM, IF EVER, ADDRESS.

    THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OFTEN PRESENTS SOCIETY WITH ITS LAST MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO TURN A JUVENILE AWAY FROM A CAREER OF CRIME. IT IS FOR THAT OVERARCHING REASON THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM DIFFERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ITS MISSION AND APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE JUVENILES THAT COME WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION.
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    IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH ITS MISSION, THE JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS OF THE NATION DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL DEPEND ON THE FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITH FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY YOU AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. THIS ASSISTANCE HAS ENABLED US TO MAKE IMMEASURABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAST DECADE DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF OUR NATION'S CHILDREN AND FAMILIES. WE AND OUR CONSTITUENTS ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THIS ASSISTANCE.

    THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS HAVE TO CONTINUE TO BE REASONED, TARGETED, MONITORED AND EVALUATED. TO DO SO, THE PERSONS STRUCTURING, MONITORING, AND EVALUATING THESE PROGRAMS MUST BE COMPLETELY CONVERSANT WITH THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE THAT UNDERLIES THE RATIONALE AND STRUCTURE OF JUVENILE AND NOT CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

    THE CONTINUING AND GROWING NEED FOR THIS ASSISTANCE SHAPES MY TESTIMONY TODAY. WHILE THE NATIONAL COUNCIL SUPPORTS THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE REORGANIZATION, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAS DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF OJP ON ITS PROGRAM OFFICES.

    THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAS FOLLOWED THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND BELIEVE THAT IN ITS CURRENT FORM IT WILL SERIOUSLY ERODE THE FOCUS ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY ISSUES MANDATED BY THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974 AND OTHER ACTS THAT HAVE A SPECIFIC PROGRAM EMPHASIS. UNDER THE REORGANIZATION, VITAL EXPERTISE AND FOCUS WILL BE LOST, AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THAT IS BEING PROVIDED TODAY WILL BE GREATLY ERODED.

    OUR MEMBERS HAVE GAINED SUBSTANTIAL VALUE FROM THE CURRENT INTEGRATION OF SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS WITHIN OJJDP INCLUDING BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH; STATISTICS; PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT; TESTING AND DEMONSTRATION; EVALUATION; TRAINING; TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; AND REPLICATION AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION. IT IS NOT EFFICIENT FOR US TO HAVE TO GO TO THREE (OR MORE) OJP OFFICES IN THE FUTURE WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO ACCESS THE FULL RANGE OF SERVICES FROM ONE OFFICE NOW.
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    THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT EXISTS WITHIN OJP TODAY WAS CREATED BECAUSE CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THAT IMPORTANT ISSUES LIKE JUVENILE CRIME, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND VICTIMS RIGHTS WERE NOT RECEIVING THE PRIORITY AND ATTENTION THEY MERITED. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE WAS TO CREATE SPECIALIZED OFFICES WITHIN THE LARGER AGENCY, STAFFED BY PROGRAM EXPERTS AND HEADED BY PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY AND VISIBILITY.

    IT IS BECAUSE THE REORGANIZATION PLAN DIVIDES THE AGENCY BY FUNCTIONS RATHER THAN BY PROGRAM SUBJECT MATTER THAT THERE WILL BE DILUTED EMPHASIS ON CRITICAL SPECIALIZED SUBJECT AREAS LIKE JUVENILE JUSTICE. TO THE EXTENT DUPLICATION IN PROGRAMS IS OF CONCERN, DUPLICATION CAN BE SOLVED IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AREA BY TRANSFERRING THE DUPLICATIVE PROGRAMS TO THE OJJDP WHERE THE JUVENILE JUSTICE EXPERTISE CURRENTLY RESIDES.

    IN CONCLUSION, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, OR STATISTICS TO ANY OTHER OFFICE OR BUREAU OUTSIDE OJJDP. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A TRANSFER WOULD BE:

 LESS EFFICIENT FOR PRACTITIONERS SEEKING FEDERAL SERVICES AND FUNDING;

 LESS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING EMPHASIS AND EXISTING FUNDING FOR SPECIALIZED SUBJECT MATTERS LIKE JUVENILE CRIME, CHILD ABUSE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE;

    ANY PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF OJP NEEDS THOROUGH STUDY IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE AUTHORIZING COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS TAKEN. AT YOUR REQUEST, WE ARE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE.
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    Mr. SMITH. May I ask you all if you can give very brief responses to my questions just so we can get through as many questions as possible, and Mr. Muhlhausen, let me begin with you.

    First of all, I want to ask you what you think the essential elements are of a credible evaluation and whether those elements were in the evaluations that were made, for example, by the University of Nebraska, by the Heritage Foundation, and by the Thurmond Study, as well.

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. All right. I believe that some of the essential elements, the best studies include a random assignment of the treatment groups and the control groups. Unfortunately, the COPS office, after 7 years, failed to set up a study to evaluate its own effectiveness, even though Congress did instruct the Department of Justice to evaluate the program in the 1994 crime bill. In that case, we cannot do a random assignment. You have to take cases where money flowed to different areas and control for various factors that account. You need to build in proper controls.

    For instance, the Heritage study controlled for the efforts of State and local law enforcement agencies and accounts for socio-economic factors that changed during the COPS office's first four to 5 years, while the University of Nebraska study did not control for efforts of State and local officers and it just assumed that Federal funding only fights crime.

    And also, the socio-economic data was held constant. Most of the data was held constant in 1990. For instance, throughout the country, the minority population has grown from 24 percent to 28 percent from 1990 to 1999 and the University of Nebraska report fails to account for this.
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    Mr. SMITH. What do you think that OJP should require of the grant recipients in order to be able to evaluate the programs?

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. It should require grant recipients to—and these are major grant recipients—to evaluate their own programs. First, when they apply for funding, if it's a juvenile prevention program, they should have some system set up in place before the program is started that they know how they are going to evaluate the program. They should look at kids who receive the treatment and compare them to kids who did not, and if they cannot do random assignment, they need to control for several factors that could influence the child's recidivism, and when the evaluation is over, it needs to be submitted to Congress and that data needs to be available for other people to scrutinize.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Muhlhausen.

    Sheriff Bittick, you mentioned in your written testimony, I believe in your oral testimony, as well, that you thought it was a disruption to move the Office of Domestic Preparedness to FEMA, but would you elaborate just briefly on that?

    Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. One of my concerns, one of our concerns here is that the money, if we move that money now at this time, that some—there's a myriad of things that could happen here. FEMA has historically had little or no relationship with law enforcement and our concern is that FEMA is response oriented and that if the money is moved now, law enforcement is concerned with prevention and detection and FEMA has and is responsive to—not responsive to law enforcement in the past.
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    I can just think of a recent incident in Georgia with the crematoriums, where we've requested assistance from FEMA and not been able to get that assistance, and so we've got some concerns with how FEMA reacts to us.

    Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, another question is that you have, and your department have been connected to a number of grant programs. What kind of evaluation has OJP made of the grant programs that you're involved with?

    Mr. BITTICK. I can think of one circumstance just right off the top of my head, Mr. Chairman, where we've been required to do a domestic preparedness plan, a State—each State has been required to do a domestic preparedness plan, and with that plan, what's happened is the Georgia emergency management unit has worked with the local emergency management directors like myself and the sheriffs and we've each prepared a plan which has been thorough and comprehensive to turn into the State and they've done a State plan, and I think some 44 of those plans have been done.

    I personally have also received grant funding from the Byrne grant money and those grants are regularly evaluated by the Georgia Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you.

    Ms. Ekstrand, my time is up. I have a number of questions for you and a few for Judge Mitchell, as well, but I'll save them for the next round and yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his questions.
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    Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Muhlhausen, you mentioned the COPS program. Do you know anything about the study of Project EXILE and whether or not that has been effective in reducing crime?

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. I have not read any specific evaluations, though I do believe that it's a program that should be evaluated before funding of it expanded across the country.

    Mr. SCOTT. Sheriff Bittick, what experience do you know that FEMA has in law enforcement issues like training, arrest procedures, and things like that?

    Mr. BITTICK. I know of very little experience that FEMA has with law enforcement issues. They generally work with emergency management personnel, such as fire fighters or ambulance persons, people.

    Mr. SCOTT. Would that be a problem in moving the functions to FEMA?

    Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. Obviously, this relationship that we've got with Justice is built on the fact that you have law enforcement people dealing with law enforcement people.

    Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Ms. Ekstrand, you mentioned the difference between monitoring evaluations to see if they are spending the money the way they said they were going to spend the money and impact evaluation, did the program make a difference. What kind of evaluations are you aware of about criminal justice initiatives like mandatory minimums, increasing sentences that may go from 20 years up, like the three strikes and you're out kind of things? Do you know of any evaluations of those kinds of initiatives, the sentencing, incarceration initiatives, as opposed to programs that would prevent crime before they occur?
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    Ms. EKSTRAND. There have been some evaluations, but we have not reviewed them.

    Mr. SCOTT. Of what?

    Ms. EKSTRAND. There have been some evaluations looking at mandatory minimum sentences and trying to assess the relationship between mandatory minimums and other more severe sentencing strategies and crime rates. It's very, very difficult to do that kind of assessment because there are so many other factors in the environment that can affect crime rates—age cohorts, layoffs, booming economy, all kinds of different measures that could also have an impact. So they're very difficult to do.

    Mr. SCOTT. The ones that have been—and you said you haven't reviewed the ones that have——

    Ms. EKSTRAND. We have not reviewed the studies in that area.

    Mr. SCOTT. Would this be part of the evaluation if we did more impact evaluation?

    Ms. EKSTRAND. We intend to look at a broad picture of what the National Institute of Justice is doing in relation to impact evaluation. We're anticipating that they would have funded some studies along those lines and so they would be potentially included in this new work.
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    Mr. SCOTT. Judge Mitchell, what OJP programs were you aware of when you were a State court judge, or were you aware of any?

    Judge MITCHELL. Well, that's a difficult question to answer because I was a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Council for 7 years while I was a State trial court judge. I was, therefore, very much aware of a number of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention programs as it affected the organization of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

    Mr. SCOTT. And were any of those programs evaluated to determine which ones worked and which ones didn't?

    Judge MITCHELL. I was not aware of that procedure then. I'm becoming aware now that there, of course, is a requirement for evaluation for our programs. We welcome that process, I want to say that clearly for the record, and there have been some evaluations of the work that we have done. We also would welcome any constructive comments——

    Mr. SCOTT. But what is the status of those—tell us a little bit about those evaluations, which programs came out well, which didn't, what elements there may be of good programs.

    Judge MITCHELL. I cannot give you that information at this time, but I will be more than happy to supply that to you.
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    Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Can somebody, if we set 10 percent aside for evaluations, can somebody say what we should use that money for?

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Congressman Scott, I think the money should be used to examine the major programs that the Office of Justice Programs funds. For instance, we need to know more about what prevents delinquency. Frequently in the research, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention sponsored a book-length report and looked at 56 evaluations of various delinquency prevention programs, and of those 56 evaluations, only nine looked at whether or not official acts of crime were actually prevented. Other measures were whether or not the teachers thought the person behaved better.

    It's more important to find out if future acts of crime were prevented than somebody's opinion, because I think we need to make sure that the evaluations are done right, and then once you find out when something works, then you can replicate it on a larger scale.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

    The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller, is recognized for his questions.

    Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Sheriff, let me start with you. I know the gist of your testimony was not to shift the Office of Domestic Preparedness from Justice to FEMA, but let me ask you a line of questions on another subject. Do you receive back in Georgia, any funding from the COPS program?
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    Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I don't personally, but—and I can explain why, but other agencies do.

    Mr. KELLER. Tell me why you don't personally.

    Mr. BITTICK. There's a matching grant requirement that comes along with the COPS funding——

    Mr. KELLER. Right.

    Mr. BITTICK [continuing]. And my commissioners have been reluctant to participate in the matching grant.

    Mr. KELLER. So when the—in other words, when the funding runs out after 3 years, you would have that obligation to pick up their salaries and you all don't know if you have the money to do that?

    Mr. BITTICK. And they've been reluctant for some reason over the years too.

    Mr. KELLER. Do you know how your fellow sheriffs and chiefs of police think about the COPS program?

    Mr. BITTICK. I know that there have been a lot of participation Statewide in the COPS program and there have been a lot of officers that have been added to the street because of the COPS program.
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    Mr. KELLER. What do you think of the program? Think it's a good program or a program——

    Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I think it's been an excellent program for putting law enforcement officers on the street. Obviously, if you've got four corners of a street and there are cops on three of those four corners, the crime is not going to be committed on those three corners.

    Mr. KELLER. Okay. Mr. Muhlhausen, let me ask you, and I'm a big fan of The Heritage Foundation, let me just say that, and I appreciate all the good work you all do, but I see a kind of a split in opinion between what you all think of the effectiveness of the COPS program and what the sheriffs and chiefs of police back in Orlando, Florida, think about it. They think the world of it.

    They think it's a good program, and I think the gist of your report is while there's as lot of folks that think that, you think that reduction in crime rate may not necessarily be due to the additional cops. Some folks think that the reduction in crime rate is due to additional cops. Other experts think it's due to the economy being stronger, so there's less crime, and still others think there's been a decline in crack cocaine-related crimes and that resulted in the reduced crime rate since 1994. What do you attribute the decrease in the crime rate since 1994 to?

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Well, I can assure you that it had little to do with the COPS program. I do believe that the economy helped and other factors going on. But one of the most important things I think we need to recognize as distinguishing what types of policies work, it is more important what the officer does than whether or not he's funded from Washington, D.C. I think that targeting crime hot spots is effective.
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    The National Institute of Justice has recently sponsored some evaluations of problem oriented policing in Jersey City and Boston and these programs, the officers went in, identified problems going on. They attacked the problem, went after it, and crime went down. It is more important what the officers do with their time than how many you hire. It's deployment versus numbers.

    Mr. KELLER. You're familiar with the broken windows theory——

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Yes.

    Mr. KELLER [continuing]. That Professor Wilson and others, that Rudy Giuliani kind of employed that practice in—along with they had a police department there—that they put a significant amount of police officers in a crime hot spot and crime went down. But if you wouldn't have the officers in the first place, you couldn't put them in that hot spot, right?

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Well, it is a fundamental role of State and local governments to fill this position——

    Mr. KELLER. Sure.

    Mr. MUHLHAUSEN [continuing]. And I think that what happened with the COPS program, a lot of the money was used for supplanting. For instance, the process evaluation of the program by National Institute of Justice says that, at most, 57,000 officers were hired. That's the most optimistic example. It's well under the 100,000 goal that it was supposed to reach.
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    Mr. KELLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Keller.

    The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for his questions.

    Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the Chairman.

    Mr. Mitchell, or Judge Mitchell, I wanted to thank you for your testimony today and for being here. I really feel that you have the most important job there is in the court system and it's one that is not often recognized. You've got one of the most difficult one, and both in the dependency area and in delinquency area, and probably the decisions you make in the dependency area are even more difficult than the delinquency area.

    I wanted to ask you about your testimony. I certainly concur, I think, with the sentiment of the Subcommittee that each of the programs ought to be rigorously assessed, and indeed, I offered an amendment last year to the Justice Department bill that required grant applications to have an assessment device in it and that became part of the Justice Department bill. But I'm still not sure that I get the gist of the concern over the reorganization. Certainly, on the surface, having an office devoted to a particular area with its own director with a certain status connotes a priority in that area, yet there are, it seems to me, great inefficiencies in the way the DOJ grant process works now.

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    For one thing, I frequently have communities asking what funding opportunities there are, whether it is the juvenile courts or whether it is probation departments or local community-based organizations and they are scatted throughout Justice. They are actually scattered throughout many other departments, as well. And just even finding out what grant opportunities are out there is a hurdle and there does seem to be duplication of effort, and even worse, the left hand not always knowing what the right hand is doing or working on.

    Is there a way that these inefficiencies can be attacked and yet preserving the real priority on juvenile justice and juvenile dependency issues?

    Judge MITCHELL. I believe there is. I believe the National Council supports that process. We want communities to know what is available and what are opportunities to combat crime in their communities as well as improve the system of delivery of service within the juvenile justice process.

    Duplication is something we all abhor, as well as waste, and we ought to continually examine our procedures as well as the process of the Office of Juvenile Justice or any OJP process to determine where there are efficiencies that we can import. We do not oppose that process. We speak to the phrase of remaining inviolate for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. We are not saying, leave it as it is and don't touch it ever. There are efficiencies that obviously can be implemented and should be. We don't oppose that.

    What we are—our point is that when you deal with, for example, statistical gathering and analysis, it goes beyond crime issues to also deal with the issue of the impact of violence within the family upon children and it deals with the issues of the effectiveness of child abuse programs that we implement in terms of being able to improve outcomes, improve results, and save money in the long run, as well as deal with saving the lives of those children.
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    We support those kinds of efforts, of the core issues of research, development, training of judges, which is supported by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Training of other professionals should remain within the ambit of the Office of Juvenile Justice as opposed to being scattered throughout the Department in other areas.

    Mr. SCHIFF. Is there a potential problem, though, even in areas of research or statistics where you might have the office focused on juvenile justice issues pursuing research along the lines of recidivism among early offenders, and then you have another research project going on in another part of Justice that focuses on violent offenders and some of the causes of their violent behavior and the one is not aware of the work the other is doing. They both come back to a common conclusion, potentially, or worse, you don't find a common conclusion because they're being undertaken separate parts of Justice and not coordinating with each other.

    Judge MITCHELL. We certainly support a concept of communication and coordination. We do not support a concept of the elimination of the research and statistical analysis capability within OJJDP, transfer it to other entities within the Office of Justice Programs. There is no reason why the left hand should not know what the right hand is doing. That seems like a management issue. That seems like an internal organizational structure process, and it seems like there should be some level of coordination of the gathering of the information, the dissemination of that information, even the analysis of that information. There is no—I just don't see it possible to have a justifiable excuse for not being in a position to discuss the issues at the time of the development of the script, the plan, as well as the preparation of the report.

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    Mr. SMITH. Mr. Schiff, are you finished? Do you want to squeeze in one more question? I couldn't tell if you were finished or not.

    Mr. SCHIFF. No. The red light is on. I appreciate your——

    Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you, Mr. Schiff.

    Let me recognize myself for questions, and Ms. Ekstrand, first, I want to say we appreciate what the GAO does. You're sort of an objective official calling it as you see it, which is always helpful to Congress.

    You have evaluated a number of discretionary grant programs, and what I would like to do is read you five of them and ask you to grade them for me, if you will. These are the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Violence Against Women, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Executive Office of Weed and Seed, and Drug Courts program offices. If you can, just very briefly say why you are grading them high or low. Are you comfortable with doing that, or——

    Ms. EKSTRAND. Not very, but——

    Mr. SMITH. Well, I shouldn't have given you that as a matter of fact. [Laughter.]

    Ms. EKSTRAND. First, let me say that we have only looked at part of the role of the grants management and not the whole picture, but in terms of monitoring——
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    Mr. SMITH. Yes.

    Ms. EKSTRAND [continuing]. We probably would give a poor grade to all of these except the Executive Office of Weed and Seed and we'd ask for maybe a pass on that one since we looked at them in 1999. They have indicated that they've made some changes for improvement and we have not been back to visit them. But the first three, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Violence Against Women Office, and OJJDP, we have looked at very recently, and as we just indicated, have found some fairly substantial problems in relation to——

    Mr. SMITH. That's why you give them a poor rating, okay. Just the answer I was looking for. Thank you for saying that.

    In regard to the evaluation methods used by OJP, at least in the past, what do they leave to be desired?

    Ms. EKSTRAND. We found in many cases it didn't look like enough up-front planning had been done in terms of how to collect the data. In some cases, for example, there was a plan to collect data from schools and local law enforcement, but when it came time to do that, all of those plans fell through, which perhaps indicates that they weren't solid enough to start with.

    But a major problem, and Mr. Muhlhausen alluded to it, as well, is that many of these studies are designed with a lack of any kind of comparison base, and without that, we can't really ferret out what the program contributed to any change versus what all the other things in the environment might have contributed to change.
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    Mr. SMITH. So not good methodology, among other things.

    Ms. EKSTRAND. Methodology is weak.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. Good. What do you think that we should be requiring from grant recipients in the way of data or information that would help us evaluate those programs?

    Ms. EKSTRAND. It's difficult to make a blanket statement because so many of the grant programs are so different, but right now in the monitoring reports, a lot of what gets reported is in narrative and it's very hard to roll that up to say anything across programs. It does seem like asking them for basic output and outcome information would be a good step in the right direction. At least having very basic information about what they're accomplishing would help.

    Mr. SMITH. Do you feel that sometimes the OJP skews the results of their evaluations just to justify the continuation of those programs?

    Ms. EKSTRAND. I honestly don't think that we found any evidence of that. In fact, if anything, we might say that they had rather loose controls over their grantees, their research grantees.

    Mr. SMITH. You just released, what, today or yesterday, a new GAO report on Justice impact evaluations. One Byrne evaluation was rigorous, all reviewed, Violence Against Women Office evaluations were problematic. Maybe that says it all. Anything you want to add to that title?
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    Ms. EKSTRAND. Only that the problems were, you know, just as we talked about, lack of control group, poor data collection and analysis, you know, the one Byrne evaluation was very solid, but I would point out that there was only one impact evaluation for a very large program.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Ekstrand.

    Judge Mitchell, a couple of questions for you. You mentioned you had concerns about the reorganization proposal. Were you referring to the past reorganization proposal of a year or two ago or were you referring to the current Administration's proposal?

    Judge MITCHELL. The current Administration proposal.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. But that hasn't been completely released yet, so you haven't seen all the details, have you?

    Judge MITCHELL. No, we have not, sir.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. So we'll hopefully evaluate that and maybe that'll reflect some of the recommendations that you and others have made.

    Judge MITCHELL. We would look at that and make comments at that time.

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    Mr. SMITH. I assume that you do feel, though, that all grant programs need to be assessed, need to be evaluated, and need to be looked at in the light of whether they're effective and whether the taxpayers are getting their money's worth?

    Judge MITCHELL. Absolutely.

    Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I don't have any other questions.

    Mr. Scott, do you have any other questions?

    Mr. SCOTT. No, thank you.

    Mr. SMITH. If not, then thank you all for your testimony. It's been very, very helpful and we stand adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Next Hearing Segment(3)









(Footnote 2 return)
Lawrence Sherman, Denise Gottfredson, Doris Mackenzie, John Eck, Peter Rueter, and Shawn Bushway, University of Maryland Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997).


(Footnote 3 return)
Lawrence W. Sherman, ''Policing for Crime Prevention,'' in Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 37.


(Footnote 4 return)
Lawrence W. Sherman and David Weisburd, ''General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime 'Hot Spots': A Randomized, Controlled Trial,'' Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1995), pp. 625–648; Lawrence Sherman, James Shaw, and Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun Experiment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, January 1995); and Susan E. Martin and Lawrence W. Sherman, ''Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders,'' Criminology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1986), pp. 155–173; and Allan F. Abrahamse, Patricia A. Ebener, Peter A Greenwood, Nora Fitzgerald, and Thomas E. Kosin, ''An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix repeat Offender Program,'' Justice Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1991), pp. 141–168.


(Footnote 5 return)
Anthony A. Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski, ''Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment,'' Criminology, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1999), pp. 541–580.


(Footnote 6 return)
Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, and Anne Morrison Piehl, ''Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire,'' Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2001), pp. 195–225.


(Footnote 7 return)
Lawrence W. Sherman, ''Policing for Crime Prevention,'' in Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 37.


(Footnote 8 return)
Ibid.


(Footnote 9 return)
Ibid., pp. 41–42.


(Footnote 10 return)
Lawrence Sherman, ''Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Local Crime Prevention Funding,'' in Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 1.


(Footnote 11 return)
Lawrence Sherman et al., Preventing Crime.


(Footnote 12 return)
David B. Muhlhausen, ''Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect Violent Crime Rates?'' Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. CDA01–05, May 25, 2002.


(Footnote 13 return)
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., ''Bush: Don't Cut COPS,'' The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 2001, p. A7.


(Footnote 14 return)
David B. Muhlhausen, ''Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect Violent Crime Rates?''


(Footnote 15 return)
Jihong ''Solomon'' Zhao and Quint Thurman, ''A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999,'' University of Nebraska at Omaha, December 2001.


(Footnote 16 return)
See Quint Thurman's vita at http://www.cj.swt.edu/Thurman/VITAswt..htm (February 19, 2002).


(Footnote 17 return)
Jihong ''Solomon'' Zhao and Quint Thurman, ''A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999.'' The narrowly-focused grants, which Zhao and Thurman call innovative grants, fund specific activities that address such problems as gang violence, domestic violence, and illegal youth firearms possession.


(Footnote 18 return)
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Press release, December 5, 2001, at http://biden.senate.gov/ biden/press/release/01/12/2001C05740.html (February 19, 2002).


(Footnote 19 return)
Jihong ''Solomon'' Zhao and Quint Thurman, ''A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999,'' p. 6.


(Footnote 20 return)
Ibid., p. 11, Table 1.


(Footnote 21 return)
Ibid.


(Footnote 22 return)
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, P25–1095.


(Footnote 23 return)
Calculations based on Table 2 in Sidra Lea Gifford, ''Justice Expenditure and Employment in the United States, 1999,'' Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, February 2002, NCJ 191746, (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs).


(Footnote 24 return)
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103–322, 108 STAT. 1813.


(Footnote 25 return)
42 USC 9801 et seq. For more information, see http://www2.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/hsb/hsreac/legis.htm. (March 3, 2002).


(Footnote 26 return)
Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, Appendix A, February 2001, at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2731&sequence=33 (April 16, 2001).


(Footnote 27 return)
This recommendation was made originally by Professor Lawrence Sherman, now with the University of Pennsylvania. See Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising.


(Footnote 28 return)
Peter H. Rossi, Howard E. Freeman, and Mark W. Lipsey, Evaluation: A Systematic Approach, (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 309–310.


(Footnote 29 return)
Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, Appendix A, February 2001, at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2731&sequence=33 (April 16, 2001).


(Footnote 30 return)
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ''Amended Views and Estimates''


(Footnote 31 return)
January 2001 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan


(Footnote 32 return)
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ''Amended Views and Estimates''


(Footnote 33 return)
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ''Amended Views and Estimates''