SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1998
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. This hearing of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee is called to order, and I'd like to welcome the witnesses and the guests. To start things out I think what we will do is rather than having an opening statement on my part, the Chairman of the full Science Committee is with us, and we'll pay him the courtesy of allowing him the first opening statement.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I think the Chairman for recognizing me. Mr Chairman, we all probably have seen the movie ''Titanic'' by now. There are very few people who haven't seen that movie. As we all have watched the film it's hard not to be angry with the ship's captain. He was warned that there were icebergs in the area, but he arrogantly ordered ''Full speed ahead,'' and then he went to bed.
The Titanic struck a single iceberg with tragic consequences. The Space Station seems to be careening from one to the next, none of which has been big enough to sink the program, but we should be worried.
From Russian funding problems to U.S. cost overruns, from an inability to finalize the design to an insatiable appetite for raiding science funding, from a never-ending game of budgetary smoke and mirrors to an ever receding completion date, there are clear warning signs that this program is not being managed well at all.
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In 1993 when the President redesigned the Space Station and invited the Russians in, he promised the taxpayers that it would cost $17.4 billion from Fiscal Year 1994 through June 2002 and then do 10 years of science. Now we hear that the program is almost $4 billion over that total. Completion has been delayed by as much as a year and a half, while the program now only commits the eight-and-a-half years of full scientific research.
Rather than fix the problem the President has cut NASA's budget and forced it to rob one program to fund another. The Administration promised the taxpayers that Russia would not be in the critical path. The President's Science Advisor and the NASA Administrator confirmed that in testimony to this Subcommittee in 1993.
In response to my concerns that Russia could not honor its commitments to the program, the President in 1994 promised me in writing that the United States would, ''retain in-line autonomous capabilities,'' aboard the Space Station.
Those promises were not kept, and as a result every time the Russians miss a milestone or fail to make a payment, that costs the American taxpayers money, and Russian nonperformance has looted—looted—the reserves that this Congress has very prudently budgeted for unexpected contingencies in the construction of the American elements of the Space Station.
And the Russians have never failed to miss a milestone. That's one thing we can count on. When Congress raised the concern with the Vice President in 1996 he got the Russians to promise they would do better, and I was given a piece of paper with milestones signed by Misters Goldin and Koptev, Vice President Gore, and Prime Minister Chernomydrin.
Not one of the Russian milestones contained in that signed document has been kept. The same thing happened in 1997. The Vice President got another promise. The Russians broke that one too.
Now the head of the Russian Space Agency told the Associated Press in Moscow 2 days ago that the 1998 budget for the Russian Space Agency is not enough to honor Russia's commitments, but the problem rests with the Americans because we've been behind in one of the element's construction.
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You'd think that the White House would impose some consequences on the Russians for their continued failures. Instead it has passed the bill onto NASA and to the American taxpayers. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, we should not use the NASA budget as a way of giving foreign aid to the Russians, and this has got to stop.
NASA can't fix these problems with the policy guidance and the declining budgets that the President has given it. Mr. President, Congress has kept its end of the bargain. We've gone along with your decision to include the Russians, and we've given the Station Program every dime you've asked for, but your Administration has not kept up its end of the deal. That needs to change, and it needs to change now.
We've tried to warn the Administration that there were icebergs ahead, but the President of this Titanic has ordered full speed ahead and retired to his cabin for the night. It's past time for him to return to the helm and fix the problems that his policies have foisted on the International Space Station Program before it collapses and the American taxpayers are out even more money.
I thank the Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Sensenbrenner. Today we should have a spirited hearing on NASA's Human Flight Programs as is indicated by the Chairman's opening remarks. Our subject is the progress NASA is making in turning Space Shuttle over to the private sector. This subject is how we are assembling and using the International Space Station and NASA's plans to demonstrate new technologies which will enable further exploration and development of space.
Of course, NASA isn't doing any of those things, at least not yet. So instead we'll be talking about cost overruns of the International Space Station. We'll be talking about the Russians and some of our successes or most of our failures in dealing with the Russians. Scheduled delays are again on the list of issues to be discussed, and finally we'll be talking about spending billions of dollars that we don't have in order to keep 1970's technology around for another 30 years. To continue Chairman's Sensenbrenner's metaphor, I don't know if it's the ice that's going to kill us or if it's just plain old sea sickness, but at this point we seem like we're drowning and we're looking for some kind of relief, even if it's drowning we're willing to get out of this mess. I don't know how much more of the International Space Station Program we can stand, if it's going on like this.
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No matter what we do NASA just seems to keep coming back and asking for more. How many more times can we handle that?—just over and over again—it just—while we're moving the goal post. We're moving the goal post.
And then if some of us here question that, we end up having our own commitment to the Program and to NASA and to manned space flight questioned. Well, first of all, let's say there wouldn't be an International Space Station without this Committee, and there might not be one with this Committee if we knew 5 or 10 years ago what we know today.
I daresay former Chairman Hall wouldn't have fought so hard to save the Space Station had he known that NASA was going to slash the time available for scientific and medical research on that Station. Former Science Chairman Bob Walker wouldn't have fought so hard if he knew how much effort would have been spent in ignoring commercial opportunities rather than trying to foster new commercial opportunities.
And there is an International Space Station, and there it is, and we're stuck with it, and yet it just keeps going on and on with a higher and higher price tag. Well, they say it's better to light a candle than to curse the darkness, so Mr. Rothenberg, I am putting you and your colleagues on notice that today we are turning on the lights, not just lighting the candles but putting the spotlights on, and we're going to examine these issues.
You want $173 million in transfer authority for Fiscal Year 1998, but our support is going to come at a price. We've already put strong language in the house bill mandating a fix to the Station Research Program.
As far as commercialization, I have written testimony here which Boeing gave to the Senate, saying that there are significant near term prospects for the International Space Station and Shuttle commercialization, which I could very well—which they could very well provide needed cost-sharing, not just during the Space Station operations but over the next 6 years in the development of Space Station.
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After all, we've watched the Russians keep their space agency afloat by making and selling advertising and selling rides. Maybe it's time for the land of Madison Avenue and Hollywood to take a hint from the Russians as to how to raise some money for their program and so for our program.
So I will seek to put language into the Conference Authorization which will enable and mandate NASA to have its Space Flight operations contractor and its Space Station prime contractor pursue opportunities to generate commercial revenue which could reduce the taxpayer's burden on these programs without competing for existing commercial service providers, like launch companies.
Hopefully, this will allow us to further increase the level of scientific and technological research that we're doing with the Shuttle and with the Station, including some long term goals.
Whatever happens over the next year, there is no reason that commercial activity cannot help make the situation better, and I want to hear how it can be made better. There is no reason for us to restore and not to go in that direction and not to restore the research accounts that are under attack. So that's what we're going to do.
Without objection, written statements of other members of the Subcommittee will be in the hearing record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Roemer and Mr. Lampson follow:]
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS:
FY 99 NASA AUTHORIZATION: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
MARCH 19, 1998
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Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for calling this hearing to review the Fiscal Year 1999 budget request for the Human Space Flight program, including the International Space Station and the Space Shuttle. It is very important for this Committee to examine the ongoing problems associated with the drastic cost growth and overruns associated with bad planning and our increasingly shaky partnership with the Russian government.
I regret to say I told you so, but it is becoming increasingly clear that with the cost at over $100 billion and climbing, the Space Station looks more like a black hole for taxpayers' dollars than a scientific research facility. When the Administration approved the Space Station redesign in 1993, NASA promised the taxpayers that no more than $2.1 billion would be spent each year for the program. At that time, it was estimated that Russia's inclusion as a partner would reduce costs by $1.6 billion. Last year, NASA told us that the cap should be broken, despite Russia's repeated promises that the money and the critical hardware components like the Service Module would be delivered. At this time, NASA has ten weeks to decide whether Russia can be counted on to hold up its end of the program before we turn to the Naval Research Laboratory to supply the interim control module.
Last month, Administrator Goldin testified that additional cost overruns will cost the American taxpayers an additional $4 billion and that the first element launch will be pushed back by another two years. I believe this 21% cost overrun may be the worst example of mismanagement involving a federal technology program in recent history. Moreover, NASA testified before this Subcommittee that the Service Module was still several months late and that the FGB and Node will be launched later as a result of these continued delays.
Meanwhile, NASA is being forced to cut mission control, shuttle safety, and more deserving programs such as Mission to Planet Earth, space education grants and aeronautics. Already this year, $227 million has been diverted from Space Station science and $200 million has been shifted from the Space Shuttle payload and utilization operations. Additionally, NASA has requested $100 million more to be diverted from the Space Science and Earth Sciences accounts in supplemental appropriations request.
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Throwing more money at the Space Station is adding fuel to the fire. We should not grant NASA's request for supplemental funding. Rather, we should hold NASA and the Russian government's feet to the fire. The American taxpayers deserve accountability and demand that the integrity of our space program be maintained. We should therefore not encourage this backdoor foreign aid program known as the International Space Station, we should demand that the spending cap not be exceeded, and we should work quickly to keep costs overruns and schedule delays to an absolute minimum.
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN NICK LAMPSON
NASA'S HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
MARCH 19, 1998
I, too, share the concerns of many of my colleagues concerning the increasing costs and numerous delays of the International Space Station (ISS). I certainly believe that this Subcommittee must have accurate cost estimates to advise the Congress on our future policy toward ISS. We need to know the immediate future of the ISS efforts both in the United States and abroad. I am hopeful that our witnesses today will provide us the information we require to do our jobs. However, I remain convinced of the importance and the magnitude of this project. Pioneering provides neither an easy nor inexpensive path to follow. With 60,000 pounds of flight hardware undergoing testing at the Kennedy Space Center, we can see that significant progress continues toward a launch. While there are a number of developmental issues that need to be addressed, at the same time, we must not allow these problems to distract us from the goals that President Ronald Reagan envisioned when he called upon NASA to launch a Space Station. The future of humankind will be greatly enhanced by this enterprise.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now I turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and I want to welcome the witnesses today. I intend to have very brief remarks so we can hear from you. NASA's Human Space Flight Programs directly account for about 40 percent of NASA's budget or more than $5.5 billion a year. That's a lot of money by anybody's reckoning, and this Subcommittee needs to ensure that those funds are being used wisely.
As we hear from our witnesses, NASA's two main Human Space Flight Programs are the Space Station and the Space Shuttle. This Subcommittee is devoted to—has devoted a lot of attention in the past to both the Station and the Shuttle Programs. And I think the need for continuing oversight of these programs is even more important today than ever.
I am very concerned about the Space Station Program. By NASA's own account the Space Station Program has been experiencing significant cost growth and schedule delays, in part because of the funding problems of our Russian partners, in part caused by problems with the U.S. program.
I have to question whether we are headed—or I question where we are headed with the Space Station Program. Using NASA's own numbers, the cost of the redesigned Station has increased by more than 20 percent, and some of the most challenging phases of the program still lie ahead.
NASA needs to remember that taxpayers' tolerance has its limits. Moreover, the Russian government continues to fall short on meeting its Space Station funding commitments. Does NASA have a definite point at which it is prepared to say, ''Enough is enough?'' We want to continue our partnership with Russia, but we cannot delay our launch schedule any further. If so, what is that point?
NASA needs to be able to convince this Subcommittee it understands the problems, that it's prepared to get the Space Station costs and schedule under control, and that is has a credible plan for dealing with the Russian delays, and that it is not going to directly or indirectly raid the rest of NASA's programs to pay for the Space Station problems.
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I hope today's witnesses will address these concerns. Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. First of all I'd like to ask for unanimous consent that if we have a vote during this hearing that we can call a recess and then we come back after the vote. So without objection that will be made an order.
Mr. Rothenberg, it is part of our duties to swear in now. We didn't always swear people in, but we have all three of you. I thought Joe was the only one. So, if you'll all stand up, we'll swear you in.
Raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. I do.
Mr. HOLLOWAY. I do.
General CHILTON. I do.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay, and the reporter shall note that each witness responded to the affirmative. Thank you very much.
And now that we will proceed and Mr. Rothenberg, I understand that we usually have a 5-minute rule, but today, whereas you are the witness, we'll give you a little leeway on that, but you don't have to say everything in your written testimony, but certainly let us know the important areas and feel free to explain them in detail.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH H. ROTHENBERG, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY TOMMY HOLLOWAY, PROGRAM MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, AND GENERAL KEVIN CHILTON, U. S. AIR FORCE, DEPUTY PROGRAM MANAGER, SPACE STATION PROGRAM OFFICE, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have tried to summarize and keep it as close to 5 minutes as I can. It should be very close, okay, and let me start out by saying, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss NASA's Fiscal Year 1999 budget request for the Human Exploration and Development of Space enterprise.
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I'd like to focus first on the Space Station and three specific issues. One, we are making excellent progress towards the launch and assembly of the Space Station. The Functional Cargo Block was delivered to its Russian Launch facility at Baikanour and will be ready for—launch ready for a June launch.
The U.S. Node 1, delivered to the Kennedy Space Center 8 months ago, is undergoing final integration and test—will also have launch readiness for a July launch.
We expect the U.S. Laboratory to be delivered at Kennedy in August of this year. It is currently about 6 weeks behind schedule. It was 8 weeks. We've already recovered 2 weeks, and we believe we have a plan to keep that on schedule for a launch in May of 1999.
During the course of 1998, virtually all of the flight hardware for the first six flights will be at their launch facilities.
The Phase 1 Mir Program has continued to play a successful role in minimizing risk, ensuring safety, and increasing the operational efficiency that we expect in an International Space Station, and I have included in my written testimony a list of specific lessons learned.
We are now turning more of our attention to utilization and research activities for the Station. We are committing to doing as much research during assembly as possible and have added some flights to do that. We are equally committed to ensuring the best possible research capability once the Station is completed. Again, my prepared statement outlines—the testimony submitted rather—outlines several initiatives we are taking in this area.
Each year in the Station so far we've faced problems and challenges, and each year we have been successful in meeting them. I have no doubt that we will continue down this path with the help of Congress and the Administration.
Your support underscores my second point I'd like to make about the Station. The President's Fiscal Year 1999 budget request along with the additional transfer authority proposed by the President meets the current needs of the Space Station Program. The proposed budget provides in run-out projections for key future requirements such as the Crew Return Vehicle, sustaining engineering, as well as restores reserves.
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As you are aware, in September of 1997, NASA outlined for Congress a requirement for an additional $430 million in Fiscal Year 1998 for the International Space Station, which largely could be accommodated through our additional budget—through our existing budget. We are grateful and thankful that you supported the transfer of $230 million and added some amount above the President's request in this, but I feel it is imperative that the remaining $200 million be made available to the program through the transfer authority proposed by the President, and I seek your support for this transfer authority. That funding, Mr. Chairman, will permit us to respond to unforeseen technical challenge, provide us with a prudent level of reserves, and will save us money in the long run by avoiding the need to stop or defer work in other areas.
My final point is the Russian commitments. It's undoubtedly aware to everybody in this room that the Russian commitments must be met. The Russians have made some very impressive technical progress in the Service Module development during the past year. In fact they've got somewhere around 1,420 out of 1,500 components already on the flight article.
We've never questioned their technical ability. It's securing consistent funding that's been a problem and continues to be. The Service Module is currently 2 to 3 months behind schedule, against the December 1998 launch date. In my testimony I detail the steps currently underway by the Russians: A, to try to recover some schedule; and B, the plan that we have for meeting with them and making some decisions relative to the launch date.
In April I will be attending the General Designer's Review in Moscow and in early May make a recommendation to our international partners as to the launch date for the FGB, Node 1 and Service Module.
Now turning my focus to the Space Shuttle, the Space Shuttle is flying safely more flights at less cost than ever before in the history of the program. Reliability has improved and risk of loss of vehicle on ascent has been reduced significantly. With the exception of two weather-related launch scrubs, we have now launched 16 Shuttle missions within a constrictive 5-minute launch window.
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As you are aware, the investments we have made in the Shuttle upgrades are paying off. Our primary objective is to keep the Shuttle flying safely and efficiently. The Phase 1 projects, which emphasized safety and increased performance during the Space Station era are nearing completion. By incorporating the Phase 1 improvements, we have reduced the risk on ascent from 1:248 in 1995 to 1:438 today.
Additionally we have nearly doubled the Shuttle's payload capacity to Space Station orbit to 3,600 pounds—36,000 pounds—excuse me. We are continuing program restructuring activities including requirements reduction, reducing civil servants, and privatization planning.
Our first step towards privatization, the consolidation of contracts to a single prime contract, is progressing successfully since the award of the Space Flight Operations Contract to USA in October 1996. Phase 2 in transition is now underway with the first production hardware contract, the Solid Rocket Booster contract, transferring to SFOC this Spring.
In 1999 the manifest reflects eight flights, including the Shuttle Radar Topography Mapping Mission, a joint Department of Defense/NASA mission to study the Earth. We are also working with our customers to increase flight opportunities.
In closing, these two programs are now joined together, and together they will enable our discoveries about out world and the universe that we can only dream about. The dedication of our workforce has enabled significant strides in the face of unforeseeable difficulty in both of these programs.
The strength of this team is reflected in their pride and confidence that they make the final steps towards the First Element Launch of Space Station this year. I am very proud of our HEDS team and thrilled actually to be a part of it now. I expect a lot of new challenges as we proceed forward with the Space Station's Phase 2 on-orbit assembly activities, but I am confident that with your continued support, this team, along with out international partners, are ready for this enormous undertaking.
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I thank you for this opportunity to speak today, and my team and I look forward to trying to answer all of your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement and attachments of Mr. Rothenberg follow:]
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. It was about a year ago, on March 4th in fact, when NASA Administrator Dan Goldin testified before this Subcommittee that the Station Program, ''continues to perform with the annual funding cap of $2.1 billion and the $17.4 billion completion estimate.''
Now it's only a year after he made that statement, and we're learning that assembly complete will be at least 18 months late and the total cost from Fiscal Year 1994 to assembly complete has risen by almost $4 billion.
The original estimate of the Station was $8 billion. The cost has risen in 1 year $4 billion. What happened, Joe? Tell me it ain't so.
[Laughter.]
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, there are some circumstances, but I really have a chart I think can help explain this and maybe clarify where we are and what the problem——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. The chart has a big cover on it there I think. Okay.
[Laughter.]
It's in a brown paper wrapper. Right.
[The chart referred to follows:]
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EXPLAINING COST GROWTH
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Okay, I have a couple of things to say about this chart. I really would like to use it to make two points. Number one, I think the—yes, indeed the Shuttle costs have grown, but I think what you count and how they grow could penalize us forever.
And I think what I really would like to do is explain that I feel is—number one, identify where it's grown and why it's grown; and number two, identify what I believe is a practical management strategy and hopefully enlist your support in this that allows us to control the costs in the future and also count the costs properly associated with growth and development.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay, Joe, before we go on with this, let me ask unanimous consent that Joe's explanation not come out of my 5 minutes of questioning, time questioning, because otherwise I will have no questions.
[Laughter.]
With unanimous consent, I think you may proceed.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Thank you for your indulgence. I really do appreciate it. Let's see, the first point, and I am trying to stay close to this mike, and I guess it is limited.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. There we go.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Let me start with—I think it may be easier for me to step behind.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. One of those fancy laser pens, you know, that's modern age stuff.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. There's other agencies with more modern technology I think. Okay. Let's see. Let me start. The first point is if we look at where we are today, we did commit to a $17.4 billion cap. Subsequent to last year a number of things have changed in the program. Some haven't been identified.
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Number one, last year we still had the Phase 1 Mir Program in the program. That was outside the $17.4 billion number that it was originally capped at. That's a perception problem, whether one wants to count that against the total cost of the Station—development of the Station—or not is someone else's choice, but the point is that number was not included in the $400 million that was for the Phase 1 Mir Program was not in the $17.4 billion.
Clearly, the launch has slipped 18 months. The program has slipped 18 months. We believe that the $17.4 billion really did produce a 6-person capability on orbit and at this point we believe the cost to produce that same capability to do research is $19.7 billion.
There is one lien against that, that we're well aware of, is that is in order to actually have six crewmen up there we need to finish in negotiation on an additional Soyuz capsule to provide crew return in the event of emergency. So that is a lien against that.
So one measure of where we are today could be the $19.7 against the $17.4 truly overrun. To get there what we added to the problem was a Crew Return Vehicle in that time, and that adds about $625 million to the program. We've added in the Russian Assurance Program which includes the Interim Control Module worth about $250 million.
We have truly an overrun of—that is, increased cost for the work performed—bad management, any way you want to count that—of about $900 million into the program, although there's a difference between the contractor's estimate and NASA's estimate. We are maintaining $900 million against the contractor's estimate of about $600 million for Boeing, and we're holding $800 million against that. And there's another $100 million of other contractors.
In addition, the other thing that adds into that, that program, depending on where you move it to, that starts running the number up is the additional year of operations and research that automatically gets applied to the program.
One other thing that was added into the program is sustaining engineering in the years 1999 and 2001. There was an under budget for sustaining engineering. There wasn't enough sustaining engineering.
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Those are the reasons, and there's a detailed breakout—I can give you the adds—but that's not the point I want to make with this chart. What I do want to make with this chart—point I make with this chart is—my own personal experience on Hubble, Tommy's and other people's experience on the Shuttle, is the following: Number one, we are going to have a sustaining engineering workforce on board.
Assuming we meet this date to be measured against, 80 percent of the program cost in that year are really going to be towards doing the true research the program was set out to be and the operations in supporting it.
The development to deliver the final U.S. HAB Module, which actually adds the capability to have a seventh crewman up there, along with a Crew Return Vehicle is there, increasing the capability of the Station is what is produced in this time, but during this year we have the original six-man crew and the ability to do research.
What I would like to propose is somehow we get this to a baseline where we're measured against either one of these marks. I don't care which one. Or either one of these marks are fair to measure us against, but I do argue that the development cost are trickling down and are a very small portion of the program.
If we achieve what we really set out to do with this Station, I believe they'll be a continued low level of development going on, much of it funded I hope by commercial industry who wants to do more on the Station. They may or may not choose to procure that through NASA, but more importantly I mentioned we identified sustaining engineering. There are about 1,200 people onboard in this time who are part of the sustaining engineering workforce.
If you look at what we did with Hubble, you look at what we did with the Shuttle—we need to put that sustaining engineering workforce to productive work over and above waiting for problems to happen and responding to problems. What I would like to propose is we develop an upgrade program that's consistent with industry requirements for commercialization of the Station as well as scientific requirements that are currently not on the baseline, live within this cap for these out-years and be measured clearly by when we complete development against either one of these milestones.
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And if it stretches out, clearly we're doing operations and research, and we can't just keep adding in the operations and research budget just as the time-line moves. So my proposal is that we revisit how we are managing this program in these years, manage out against the fixed cap in the operations years, be measured against the amount of science and research content that we have in there and this development be added where truly is development that wasn't completed.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. You say there would be 1,200 people waiting for——
Mr. ROTHENBERG. No. There are 1,200 people in the sustaining engineering workforce. Many of them are doing in-depth analysis on the performance of the Station, looking at parameters on subsystems or it's not unlike many of them are writing procedures. Others are validating—supporting the validation of new hardware that's being brought up on board.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay, but you're just saying that 1,200 people you're going to strive to see are put to work doing other things rather than just waiting.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Right. As well as supporting the ongoing activity. I think you need that from a practical viewpoint if you want to retain good talent that understands the Station, you really need to give them development challenges and technology challenges to incorporate into the Station.
CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now let me go into my 5 minutes. Your contractor performance—I think it—from what you just said that contractor performance resulted in a $900 million increase of this $400 billion—$4 billion, excuse me.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. To be fair to the contractor, their estimate is $600 million. We have retained another $200 million in reserves against that because our estimate was $800 million is what it would take. In addition we kept another $100—there's another $100 million of overrun in the non-prime contractors.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. So somewhere between a minimum of $600 million and a billion dollars perhaps contractor performance—these were cost overruns due to that. How do other agencies handle that? Do they just take the federal truck and shovel the money out the back and somebody didn't do their contract?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, I don't want to defend the overrun because I can't. It was probably—some of it was growth internally and understanding of the job.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I mean is this—maybe I am—am I ignorant of the way the Federal Government does all of its work? If a contractor signs a contract, every time the contractor doesn't perform he doesn't eat it? None of these people are responsible like in the private sector?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Unfortunately it's a cost plus contract with an award fee and they were appropriately penalized in their award fee.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. All right.
Okay, there will be two recorded votes. I am going to finish my questioning with the permission of the Committee, and then we will break, unless—well, as a courtesy if Ralph Hall, former Chairman of the Subcommittee, would like to say just a couple—would you like to say something, Ralph? Do you have something to come back to?
Mr. HALL. I'll come back if we're coming—are you going to come back?
Chairman ROHRABACHER. We are going to come back right after the vote.
Mr. HALL. Yes, I have some questions.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. I'll just finish a few questions now. Then we'll break and then come back right after the second vote.
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So it's costing us about a billion dollar—in between $600 million and a billion dollars for contractor performance, and these are cost plus contracts so they've got us by the throat, rather than the other way around.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well it's a high risk development contract, yes.
RUSSIAN COSTS TO THE UNITED STATES
Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Excuse me. I already got that one. Okay, how much of the cost do we indicate this $4 billion came from problems with Russia?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Our estimate is the total cost, if you used the $4 billion, is about a billion dollars.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. About a billion dollars. And the other is—the rest of it you're saying actually we've actually improved the products somewhat, and there's the new Crew Escape Vehicle and things like that.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Correct.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Would that be—is there another factor I am missing beside those three?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, you know, I do have a tally of the numbers over there, if I might return to the table at this point I can give you the——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Why don't you do that?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Let's see. My breakout of the numbers is as follows. If I start at the $17.4 and you can—we'll go back and attribute it—there's about $400 million due to the Mir Phase 1 that's been added in this number which was in the budget last year but bookkeeped on a separate line. So that, when we talk about this $3.6 billion dollar growth that you read out, the $400 for Mir Phase 1 is added into that.
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The second point is there's a Russian Assurance Program of $250 million, and that's directly attributable to the schedule insurance we bought. There's $625 million and the CRV, Crew Return Vehicle, through the budget year Fiscal Year 2003. There's about $900 million that we talked about for the overrun, and there's about $1.3 added in strictly because of the stretch of the schedule one year. The entire budget was added in for that year, regardless of the fact that in 2003 we began our research program. So that's how you get to the $4 billion.
TOTAL COST TO TAXPAYERS
Chairman ROHRABACHER. When this program is complete, what will be the total cost to the taxpayers of Space Station?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. In——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Of the American taxpayers.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Through the operations years?
Chairman ROHRABACHER. No. Not in operations but the cost of building the Space Station.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Okay. Going back to this chart, if I——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I mean total cost. I mean what the taxpayers will have taken out of their pocket in order to put that Space Station up here.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, the only question I am trying—the only thing I am trying to understanding a little bit is if I measure against one of those two numbers for development, if I look at where the development of the HAB Module which is the last data on there right now—I think that shows at $21.4 billion if I can read the number correctly on the chart—if I go back and say where I measure myself against the original commitment, it's $19 billion.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Repeat that again.
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. It's $19.6.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Nineteen point six. Now this is $19.6—that's since when? This isn't $19.6 since the beginning of this program?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. No. No. There are costs prior that——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. What did we spend? Someone went to Ronald Reagan in 1984 and lied to him and said it was going to be $8 billion. How much did we spend to the point that it became then, then you start again, and then it was——
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, there was a $10 billion——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Ten billion dollars.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Ten billion.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. So $10 billion was spend from 1984 to when?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. 1994.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. To 1994. So we spend $10 billion there, and then from 1994 till the time it is up, it's $19.6.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. If you choose that——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay, so it's—well—that's what I am asking. So we are talking about a $30 billion expenditure. That's what we need to know. We need to know how much we are spending, and frankly that—I don't know who went to the White House in 1984 and intentionally lied to the President of the United States to get the United States hooked into a program that was going to cost three times as much just to get it up as what the President was told.
But whoever it was, if someone in this room was part of that team, you should be ashamed of yourselves. You've just violated the primary rules of democracy. We're based on truth and you have to have people who are elected representing the people, basing their judgment on truth.
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So if anybody in this room was involved with presenting that $8 billion figure to Ronald Reagan, shame on you, and right now we're left with trying to make this program go because we've been lied to so often in the past, and we're trying to find out what the truth is now to make sure we can get the job done and protect the interests of the American taxpayer.
Now with that we are going to recess. We are going to come back right after this next vote—the last vote here—and Mr. Gordon and Mr. Hall will be given their opportunities, as well as the rest of the members. We're in recess.
[Brief Recess.]
Chairman ROHRABACHER. The Subcommittee will be called to order.
We now would like to turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon, for his time.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rothenberg, I think in a nutshell I would summarize your testimony as saying that mistakes have been made in the past, you're here to 'fess up, try to give some numerical explanation, ask a new benchmark be set, and then hopefully also to say that, ''I am going to take responsibility from now on.''
And since the Chairman was the only I think person up here that was in the White House at the time in 1984, we'll let you do the search for the culprit of that gave the bad earlier information.
[Laughter.]
But is that a fair, a fair summary of your statement?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, sir.
RUSSIA'S ROLE
Mr. GORDON. Okay. And let me say that I think there are a variety of reasons to have a Russian partnership, but also there are limits. In your testimony, as you were trying to put forth some of the reasons for the additional expenses, a part of it was slippage, and part of that is the Russians. Part of it was the so-called insurance module, and that's the Russians too.
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Again I am not here to say that there's some benefit there, multiple benefits, but somewhere I assume enough is enough, and particularly if you are going to take responsibility for this, and that slippage is going to cost you money.
Since you have spent the money for the ICM, when are you are going to use it? I mean when are you going to say, ''We're going to have to get on with this,'' assuming that the Russians don't come forth?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, as you may or may not know, originally it was intended to have that ready I think this coming November, and any of my staff can correct me if I am wrong, this November 1998 to back up the Service Module.
As we watched it progress along—as we watched the Service Module progress last year, in spite of the funding problems they made significant progress technically—in early part of this year we made the decision that instead of spending money to back up something that was more than likely going to happen, we ought to target it to protect against the next important Russian milestone, and that is the Progress vehicles.
PROPELLANT RESUPPLY
Mr. ROTHENBERG. These are the resupply vehicles to supply propellant to the Space Station, and so we targeted it for a later flight. We, subsequent to that the Russians are still making progress with the hardware but we also had to develop a contingency plan as we did that, that looked at several possible slips. If it doesn't come, and our current projection internally is somewhere 2 to 3 months behind the December date is when we're likely to see it.
At that point we have a plan now that is laid out between now and May 15th which says we are going to make some measurements of their progress number one, technically at design review; number two, financially in terms of have they received the remainder of the 1997 funding as well as some of the 1998 funding or the 1998 funding.
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If at that point our assessment is they're going to be 2 to 4 months late or even up to 6 months late, we still think it's a better bet on insurance to target the ICM for protecting against downstream slippages of Progress, because we get it up there, we're going to need to resupply propellant, and so in May we will make a decision whether we—if we don't see progress and we don't believe we're going to get it by June—that's putting some cushion in our pocket of Fiscal Year 1999—at that point we will pull the Interim Control Module back and exercise that option.
However, if we believe it will never come, and that's the next worse case, at that point we're going to have to come back because there's no way at that point we can carry out the program without their participation within the funding we have, no matter where we are, because we need to provide, as I point out, the capability to put propulsion on board and provide propulsion to the Station. That alone is a fairly expensive option.
We have to resupply the propulsion capability downstream. So the point is today we are on target for the middle of the next—not the middle but March of 1999 as the most likely date. We've put 3 months more margin on that. We are going to assess where we are in May and make a decision relative to where the ICM should fly and also potentially depending if things are worse than they are today whether the Russian service module will meet any date.
Mr. GORDON. So in May you are going to determine whether the Russians are going to be—if they are 2 or 3 or so months later than even you think now, then you are going forward?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, sir. There's a number of significant tests between now and then that will demonstrate.
DECISION POINT
Mr. GORDON. And then when do you determine that they're not going to be able to perform at all? What is that criteria? I mean when I say that, in general terms when do you expect that? When is that demarcation line that you're going to have to get on with it or you're going to have additional slippages, you're going to have additional overruns, and then the assurance that you gave us today that it's going to make you look bad?
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. I think the first time we can try to answer that question based on the evidence and information we have on that date based on fiscally being there, understanding the funding situation, will be May 15th. I mean if they're still——
Mr. GORDON. Oh, you think you are going to know that by May 15th also?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. If they're still where they are today, a couple months behind schedule, they're making progress and gotten through all their tests, I think we have a fair confidence that they'll be there sometime in February or March of next year.
They have a work-around plan actually to get them back until December of this year, of pulling the schedule back. We're not confident that they can pull it off, but we're watching it. So what I am saying is they have a plan that's earlier than our contingency plan of next March at this point, and we are going to see where they are in May, and at that point we may have to pull the string and say from our view they're not going to make it.
Mr. GORDON. And with the Space Station in general, without arguing about the 8 to 20, you know, where we are going to go, somewhere there has to be a, you know, this is too much. Where is that for you? When do you—when do you say that it's just getting out of hand?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Again, from my viewpoint, I think we need to see where we are in May. At that point if we don't have confidence that we're going to get the Service Module at all I think at that point we need to come back and revisit how we can recover the remainder of the program, what it cost and what the program is and try to make the case one way or the other where we're going.
Mr. GORDON. Well, that's a sensible approach. It's a—now it doesn't seem maybe that tough, but in May that will be, you know, a high standard, but I appreciate you coming forth with that information.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. I'd like to now give an opportunity to the former Chairman of this Subcommittee whose participation we appreciate very much, his continued participation in this Subcommittee, he gives us a great deal of institutional memory on these programs, and he's worked very hard, and during his time as chairmanship he exemplified that bipartisan spirit that I think we've tried to maintain.
So I'd like to recognize Ralph Hall.
Mr. HALL. I thank you Mr. Chairman, and I'll be as brief as possible because as you say and I've tried to be a very strong supporter of NASA. I hope to continue to be, but as you remember, I had problems with some transfers that you were making and that you had actually made and had projected to make.
SCIENCE FUNDING TRANSFERS
Mr. HALL. In our last meeting you suggested, Mr. Rothenberg, that my questions could better be answered at this hearing, and I guess I ask you again, have you miscalculated in taking the total of $460 million from the Space Station's Life and Microgravity Science Payload, and that's not a misstatement of the fact that you have a plan that transferred or is transferring $460 million from Life and Microgravity Science Payloads and even more in the future.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. That is an accurate statement as far as the money being transferred, and if I have the dates right, up through 1996 there was about $450 million I think, $450 million, and I've got the precise numbers; but at the same time we inserted back in the budget $368 million—let me get the exact numbers so I don't—okay, it was $450 million through 1998, $452 million to be precise, was transferred through 1998, and I really do want to give the best numbers I know.
Mr. HALL. Well, let's just take them as you transferred them. You transferred $50 million out in 1996. Now, what's happened to that $50 million? You're carrying it on the books as something that you owe back to this account?
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. What we've carried on the books is we owe back to the account right now and have put in the budget in fact $350 million against the $462 we took. So make no mistake, there is less money going back in. We believe that we're going to have at least the same capability, if not more scientifically, at no loss to the U.S. researchers.
And then let me elaborate on that, if you would bear with me. The offsets from the Europeans and our Japanese partners, the Globe Box, the Centrifuge, adding Nodes 2 and 3, an earth-viewing window, and a number of other things will add back in capability at no cost to us. However, everybody is concerned that, are we bartering away research time from our U.S. researchers in order to money?
And the answer is when you look at the total amount after all of the puts and takes and the technology is number one, we believe we are putting back the same capability, even more, to conduct the research. There is a detailed research plan now that supports that.
The second point is that we actually have increased the time available to U.S. observers—investigators—from 71 percent of utilization of the Station to 75 percent. So we not only added capability, but we haven't bartered away any of the research time in order to get capability to it.
Mr. HALL. Yet you are decreasing by 2 years the life span?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. You mean because of the schedule shift?
Mr. HALL. Yes.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Actually we——
Mr. HALL. How can you do that when you are decreasing it by 2 years?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Actually from my perspective we will be starting to be able to do research and have—again I submitted for the record a fairly detailed research program actually starting in with the capabilities in early Fiscal Year 2002 when we have Utilization Flights 4 and 5 up there.
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The research program will actually start at that point. There's a detailed research program. The fact that the final Lab Module isn't up until a year later, and we've slipped it some time, it didn't take 2 years out of that research program.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Nicogossian prepares the budget—does it for the Microgravity Science Payloads?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes.
Mr. HALL. He's generally the one that you look to there for——
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, I do. In fact, he's here.
Mr. HALL. And he was there when you transferred $50 million out in 1996 and then you transferred $177 million out in 1997. Right? Out of Microgravity Science, out of the Payloads, transferred it to a division that you ride herd on, Mr. Rothenberg? Is that right?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, sir.
POSSIBLE FUTURE TRANSFERS
Mr. HALL. It's a pretty good deal for you. I am not sure how good a deal it is for NASA or for those of us who are very interested in the bioreactor and the thrust that we're seeking up there. And there is a plan still to transfer more out, is that—that's also correct, isn't it?—to the tune of about—let's see, we've move $462 million out of the 1996 to 1998 budget. And what is the projection for moving in the future budget out of this fund?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Okay, in addition there is another set of liens and I don't want to use that because we're actually——
Mr. HALL. There is another what?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Set of—I want to call them liens against our reserves.
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Mr. HALL. That's another plan to transfer.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. No, no, no. In this case it's a plan to pay back. Let me describe it first.
Mr. HALL. Well I am hopeful of that. Doubtful but I am hopeful. Go ahead.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Okay. As far as our budget submittal, there was removed $50 million in Fiscal Year 1999, $35 million in each of years 2000 and 2001 but a put-back of $57 million in 2002.
In addition—here's where the liens word comes in—in addition, we've got against reserves the ability to put back in—we're carrying a lien against reserves that we need to put back into the science program at least $50 million in Fiscal Year 1999, if we can't achieve some of the efficiencies we believe we can in the program.
So my only point is that number one, that we have taken some money, added back in $57 million and have another lien of $50 million, and the net loss in there might be about—if you add these numbers up—are $70, $120 versus $107, about $13 million over that time frame.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Rothenberg, you replied to a question I asked you back a couple or 3 weeks ago. Your answer was about responding to the transfers out and into your fund, the fund you ride herd on, you said, ''Let's see, the fact is that it's true. We moved about a total of $462 million out of the 1996 to 1998 budget and added back in a lesser number of $350 million in 2001 and 2002.''
ACCURACY OF NASA BUDGETS
Mr. HALL. You promised to add back. Those years aren't here yet. But you're still appropriating on the basis that they're going to need that money for the Microgravity and for the Science and Payloads.
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. And yet you appropriate for those very worthwhile projects, but you don't use the money. You appropriate it and get it into a fund, and then you transfer it. Now isn't that a little devious?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, I hope to be here to look you straight in the eye in those 2 years and tell you that money is being spent for science.
Mr. HALL. But how really—how on top of the table is it to appropriate for something that is one of your calling cards, and that's the bioreactor and the biomedical thrust into space and the hopes of a cure for one of the dreaded diseases that people are living for and hoping for and praying for?
How really on top of the table is it to appropriate for that and immediate transfer out of it? And then the next appropriation time you appropriate for it again and then you transfer out of it? Now I have the alternative of saying, ''Let's just don't appropriate anything for the Microgravity Science Payload,'' but that's why I am still here—is hoping that we get some results, something that NASA can tell the American people, ''Here's the result of the vast expenditures of money we've made in space. We've got a cure for cancer, diabetes or whatever it might be.''
And how are you going to get that if you're cutting the time by 2 years and you're transferring all of the money out and then you appropriate more money the next time in order to transfer it back to another level?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Certainly I—my only answer to that is that I, like you, really am in strong support of the scientific community. That's my background. They are my customers. My intent, and I'll use the word ''intent'' because I am here 8 weeks, is to make a partnership with Mr. Nicogossian on how that money, if it ever is touched again, what the process is, but our goal is try to guard that money.
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My goal is—not our goal, but my goal is—to try to ensure that money doesn't get used for other things. I think we are at a point where we are going to have hardware on orbit this year. We will have hardware on orbit early next year that will be able to start the research program and using the Shuttle, and this money is going to be needed, and our job is to try to protect it.
Mr. HALL. I may want to come back and ask some more questions about why you shortened the Space Station's utilization phase and some other things there, but my real problem is whether or not you're going to continue to raid the research dollars for hardware and operations every time the Russians or some other international partner doesn't live up to their commitment.
And I really think that when the Congress really realizes is what you're doing is kind of like in Texas, the farm-to-market road program is a big calling card for their highway construction. It's not 5 percent of what they spend on overall construction, but that's the one they highlight. ''Look at our farm-to-market road program, how wonderful it is,'' and everybody votes taxes for it, and they don't use hardly any of the money for farm-to-market roads.
Well here you are saying, ''Look at the bioreactor thrust. Look at how popular a program and great a program and a wonderful program this can be, and we're appropriating big bucks for it,'' and you immediately send them out to another division. And then the next year, with a history of knowing you weren't going to use that money, you appropriate again and then you send twice that much out.
I think you ought to reconsider that. You know, be honest with us. If you are going to appropriate—if you are going to appropriate for hardware and operations, tell us that's what it's for, and don't let us, those of us that hope for the success of a bioreactor in a weightless environment to produce and produce and produce and get something wonderful out of space, to have our hopes dashed by another transfer.
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I yield back my time.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. When I came to the Congress as a freshman, one of the early votes that I made was to cast the deciding vote of one Majority to make sure that we continued with Space Station. About that same time I also voted for the Superconducting Supercollider.
I voted for both of these for the same reason: I think that we desperately need something in our country that captures the imagination of our people like putting a man on the moon did, that inspires our young people to go into careers of science, math and engineering because, as you know, we have a great deficit in those areas.
For the moment it threatens our economic competitiveness. Ultimately it will threaten our national security. We cannot continue to have the best military in the world if we do not have the best scientists, mathematicians and engineers in the world. We are not doing very well of exploiting the opportunities we have for using this program to capture the imagination of the American people and to inspire our young people to go into careers of science, math and engineering.
Regrettably, today our best minds are going into social sciences and law, and so forth, and we need to get them in science, math and engineering. And discussions like the one we are forced to have today are no help at all. Our young people need to see that these kinds of programs are going, that they're well-managed, that they have the support of the American people, and that they are successful programs.
So I hope desperately that we can turn this around so that it can be the challenge to our young people that we need to bring them into these areas. Mr. Hall has asked the question very well, much better than I would have asked, about the science part of the program. I remain unconvinced that monies that are borrowed from science are going to reappear in the out years. I hope they do because that is a high priority for many of us.
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THRESHOLD FOR REMOVING RUSSIA
Mr. BARTLETT. Let me ask you, and I don't know how you can answer this question, but at some point in time we have to have a threshold that when it's crossed we are going to realize that the Russians are not responsible partners, they can't pay their bills, and we've got to remove them from the critical path of the program.
When is that going to happen and how do we know that this thing is not going to just creep and creep and creep with the program being delayed with further degrading the challenge this ought to be to our young people?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Let's see, let me start. I think, and when Mr. Gordon asked the same question but slightly differently, my first opportunity really to assess that and look at where we are, and my view into it is this coming May or at the end of April and give me some time to talk to the international partners and by mid-May.
I think that's our first assessment to see where we really are and start to look at it, and if indeed we haven't made the progress we think we have made, at least targeting towards a launch in the first half of the next year; I think at that point we have to reassess the rest of the program, and that's our first measure of it.
Mr. BARTLETT. You'll be prepared to come back to this Committee to give us a recommendation as to whether we need to continue as we are now or whether we need to continue on a program where we control all the critical path elements and the Russians are partners that cannot defeat the success of the program?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. I would hope I would be able to. I am relatively new at this game. I am here 2 months. I am a Project Manager by trade, a Center Director by trade supporting the research community. I know the signs to look for, and I hope to be able to make a measure of that in May, and then I need to work with all of the international partners and see what our—where we go from there.
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SHUTTLE FLIGHT RATE AND SAFETY
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have just one brief question for Mr. Holloway and then I will yield back. The flight rate for a Shuttle during 1998 will be a total of 5 flights. I think the flight rate in 1999—though NASA's 8-flight schedule will probably be 7, at best, providing components for the International Space Station are delivered on time for launch as scheduled within ramp up to 8 or 9 flights a year.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the program to be able to resume that flight rate safely and what is your opinion of the overall safety of the Shuttle Program?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. First of all, we are very confident that we will be able to develop the capability to resume the flight rates of eight to nine flights a years out in the future. Historically the Space Shuttle Program has incurred 31 percent cost reductions over the last 5 years, and during that same period, as a result of doing that, the direct contractors have been reduced from 28,000 to 19,000. Civil Servants working on the program has been reduced from 4,000 to 2,000.
And in 1997 we flew 8 flights and flew them very well. The—we believe that the program is performing exceptionally well during that period. I believe it's a stronger program, more resilient program, and a more responsive program than it was 5 years ago.
To give you an example of the kind of things that have been done in the past, in Florida in 1991 we flew 8 flights at that time, and there were 7,800 people working on processing the Shuttle, and working 9 to 10 percent overtime. During that year they incurred 114 incidences that we track and manage.
In 1997 we flew 8 flights, did basically the same work to prepare the system and did it with 5,000 people, and during that same period we had 14 incidences. So the Shuttle Program relatively, to our history, is gaining strength and increasing its capability and doing a much better job for a lot less resources.
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If we include inflation in what has happened in that last—since 1991—the Shuttle Program is operating with some 40 percent less resources than they have had in the past, and I believe that we're doing a better job. As you may have observed that during the last 16 flights we've launched on time, within our launch window, with 2 exceptions, when we have trouble with the weather and of course only the good Lord can deal with the weather.
So overall things are going exceptionally well. Now where we are today, we have recently incurred a relatively small, at least with respect to the numbers I quoted to you earlier, workforce reduction, I have a great deal of confidence in the Space Shuttle team.
They are a very skilled workforce, highly dedicated and motivated to make this system as good as it can be, and I am very confident that in the remaining months between now and when the higher flight rate will be required that we will be able to more than overcome the reductions in the workforce and we'll be able to operate at even lower costs as we go forward.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
Mr. HOLLOWAY. Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. Just a note that—in light of—when you say lighting a candle there, we are talking about the difference between lighting a candle and shining a spotlight earlier in the hearing. At least I mentioned that.
You lit a little candle there about some of the things that we can look to and be proud of, and you can be amply proud of the accomplishments you're talking about and making the Shuttle more effective and cost effective for the taxpayers and safer because you were using workforce better, but what's sad is that all the good that you're doing is being sucked up by the Station's inability to get its act together, the people in the Station.
And that's just a sad commentary, and we've got to make sure that doesn't continue because when you save the taxpayers some money, it should be of benefit to the whole country and not just something that's sucked up by an inefficiency within NASA. So congratulations but I am sorry that it's not helping the country as much as it could be.
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You can be proud of what you have accomplished, and thank you for those words. Mr. Lampson.
COST REVIEW
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rothenberg, there is a independent cost review that's going on, Mr. Chabrow's cost review. If that independent review comes in with a higher cost estimate for the Space Station than the $21.3 billion that's estimated right now, what will NASA do about that? Will you request additional funding for Congress? Is there a plan in place? Can you comment about that some?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well I haven't seen the final report yet. That's the first thing, and they are having a discussion with that this afternoon with the NASA Advisory Committee. They're presenting the findings.
We had technical discussions with them early and raised some questions about the assumptions they made relative to the cost and schedules they were looking at, at that time.
My view is the following: Most of what they presented on is purely how much cost and schedule insurance we were willing to buy. There was no fundamental differences in what it took if we made the current schedules. Their concern is that something will happen downstream that we can't predict today, and have we put enough reserves in the budget for that.
Right now about $1.4 billion unencumbered reserves available to us, and the possibility of recovering another $300 or so million if some things go right in the future, right now our prediction is that's adequate reserves. They may ask for a higher reserve to protect against failure of the Russians beyond what we are already protecting for today.
And we'll have to look at the data when they see it and make an assessment, but right now I believe the difference will be in what they might present is purely how much insurance is prudent to put into the program in terms of reserves. And given an opportunity, as someone said, ''Do you want to put more reserves in?'' Any project manager would be a fool to turn that down if it was a prudent investment.
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I don't think he wants to sit on a lot of money, but the problem is then we'll be here talking to you about the uncosted carryover, and we'd have the other extreme on it. So we have to see what the data says.
Mr. LAMPSON. Had you all identified additional funding transfers that might come out of certain accounts, and if so, what would they be?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. You mean as a result of what the report——
Mr. LAMPSON. Right.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Again, in the preliminary discussions, even if I took the worst case, it didn't indicated that we should go make some funding transfers. That was not how we would solve the problem, and again, I don't really want to call it a problem, but how we would provide the level of reserves that they think is prudent to have in there.
SHUTTLE USE POLICY
Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Holloway, about the Space Shuttle, we've talked some about trying to bring additional dollars in by allowing some commercial flights to occur. Do you think that's a wise idea?
Can you talk a little bit about what we might be able to do with commercial payloads, and you might also talk about what would happen if for some reasons something happened that affected our ability to use a shuttle to keep on schedule with the Space Station. And if so, what would happen with the liability? Should we be able to buy insurance to cover the loss of the Space Station or what——
Mr. HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. First relatively commercial utilization of the Shuttle, to keep that in perspective I think we need to understand that the efficient flight rate of the Shuttle is higher than what we are currently flying and that might evolve to a different number over time, but at the present time I believe it's in the range of 10 or 11 flights per year.
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At those kind of flight rates we can build external tanks and solid rocket motors at a lower cost and therefore reduce not only the cost for the added flights but the costs for the current flights during that time frame. So the overall idea of flying the Shuttle at a higher flight rate—8, 9, 10 or 11 or perhaps evolving to 12 or so in the future—in terms of managing the total cost and of payload to orbit, I think is technically a sound idea.
And I would support that as long as we did it in an organized and methodical process. So the challenge of course is to determine a process of how we can do that and establish the ground rules and the laws of the country so that we'd be able to do that.
Mr. LAMPSON. How soon might we ought to consider—when might something like that logically be able to occur?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. Well, I believe that you could start flying some commercial payloads, given authority to do so, in the period they would take those payloads to prepare for flight, but that is a function of the complexity of the particular payload and how long it would take for it to be developed and made Shuttle-compatible could range anywhere from as short as 2 years to three or three-and-a-half years, depending upon the payload.
So if we had the authority to proceed I believe we could start flying commercial payloads in 2001 or 2002, for example, and as early as two-and-a-half years from now.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. And Mr. Weldon.
DEFENDING THE SPACE STATION
Mr. WELDON. Joe, I've got a question for you. When I got elected in 1994, one of the primary jobs the people in my District gave me when I came up here was to sell the Space Station to my colleagues up here in the House of Representatives.
They recognized, as I do, the value of the program, not only for the community but as well the whole Nation, and I think we've done a pretty good job selling our colleagues, working with other Republicans and Democrats in the House who support the Station.
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I think last year we had a record vote in support of the Space Station. I think the opponents of the Space Station are now going to be sharpening their knives. What do you recommend I say to that Congressman from say Nebraska who grows soybeans and doesn't have a Center in his District but gave me his vote every year when they hear the noise that we've been talking about here today, you know, cost overruns, multibillion dollar increases.
What do you recommend I say?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well I don't think an answer which I think would work in some places of the difficulty and the challenges of the program would be enough. I think that's a short answer, but on the other hand the fact of the matter is, is that it's a challenging program. It's going to be almost a billion—a million—pounds of hardware up there, two football fields involving 15 different countries.
It's far more difficult than anything we've ever undertaken to assemble on orbit. Given those challenges, I look at a couple of things if I didn't make it clear before. We are actually going to start using the Station and using it for what it's intended to do and doing that scientific program somewhere in the end—in the middle to the end of 2002. At that point it's starting to return—to make some significant return on our investment.
Mr. WELDON. How does it compare to other high risk R&D programs the government has undertaken? Do you have any comparison you can offer at all?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. I guess one of the difficulties we have here, Congressman, is that depending on how you measure the percentage of overrun, whether you measure it against $17.4 billion and add in the operations costs in 2003, the percentages vary; and it's anywhere from 7 percent to 15 percent or 13 percent of the total program.
It depends on how you count, but if one looked at it as 13 percent which is sort of the worst case number I'm counting—I mean everybody may count slightly differently. If we can maintain that, I believe, considering the challenges, it's comparable and better than a lot. And the trick will be to maintain that and try to reduce it in fact.
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PERSONNEL LAYOFFS
Mr. WELDON. Tommy, I have a question for you. Last week Joe came by my office and we had a nice chat. We talked about a lot of different things. One of them we talked about was the layoffs that occurred within the USA Program, and I think it's been pretty well acknowledged by both Mr. Goldin and CEO of USA Paul Smith that whole process was not handled real well, that the communications particularly with the Committee could have been better as well as certainly with the workforce.
And Joe said to me that we could maybe get an after action review out of the agency on what could have been done better so that we avoid these kind of communications breakdowns. Can you commit to me that you'll work with Joe to deliver a product like that in a reasonable amount of time so we can look at what went wrong and what changes are being made?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. I can report to you today that my staff is already working on it with USA on the report, and after it's been developed and appropriately reviewed we'd be glad to share it with you.
CUTS TO SHUTTLE PROGRAM
Mr. WELDON. Great. I am looking forward to getting that, and I hope to see that soon. Let me ask you another question about the Shuttle Program. Do you think if there are any more cuts in the Shuttle Program that it could adversely affect safety?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. Of course that's a wide ranging question. Basically as we have the Shuttle budget baseline over the next 5 years I believe that it's adequate to fly the Shuttle, maintain a focus on our basic four principles of flying safely, meeting the manifest, improving our supportability, and reducing costs as we implement those other three in the range of what's possible to do so.
Additionally, we also believe that with the baseline budget that we'll be able to maintain and implement the Phase 2 Upgrade Program at $100 million a year, which I believe is the required level of funding to keep up the system working toward continually improving the Shuttle system, making changes that will increase the reliability, increase the safety, improve our ability to meet the manifest, and improve our supportability.
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So relative to the basic structure of the budget through 2003, I believe it's more than adequate to take care of flying the Shuttle, flying it safely, and implementing the Phase 2 Upgrades Program.
Now as we look forward to the future of what might happen downstream in terms of the architect for space transportation and think about the Phase 3 and 4 Upgrades if that should be the direction that we choose to go in that may require additional funding.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And now a mean who has been sharpening his knives during this entire hearing, ready to launch, Mr. Roemer.
PROGRAMMATIC PROMISES
Mr. ROEMER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. It really doesn't give me a great deal of joy to walk into this hearing year after year, Mr. Chairman, and see even maybe some of my most outlandish statement of 2 or 3 or 4 years ago come true. You know, NASA told us—Joe, I know you've got a tough job—and as I refer to NASA let me just refer to what they've been telling us over the last several years.
NASA has come up here and told us the Russian participation would save us money, and we're shipping hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money now over to Russia. NASA told us that they would not exceed the $2.1 billion cap. Now we've seen that explode. NASA told us that the Service Module would not slip. It would not slip. It would not slip. It slipped, and it slipped, and it slipped again.
Now we've got $4 billion in cost overruns. $4 billion. Now I would challenge my Republican colleagues, if I was sitting in the Agriculture Committee, if I sitting in the Education Committee, if I was sitting in the National Security Committee, and we had a program sitting there in front of us where their credibility over the years had been wasted away on all these statements, and they had a $4 billion cost overrun—I'll bet it would be the Republicans offering the amendments to kill or shut down the program, and we'll see what happens here.
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And I'll tell you where I really empathize with Mr. Hall, is that you have sold the American people the bill of goods that this is going to solve every problem out there from cancer to Alzheimer's to Parkinson's and then you go back and you take that research money out of those accounts to keep funding a bloated, inefficient, overrun Space Station.
THRESHOLD FOR CANCELLATION
Mr. ROEMER. I guess, you know, my question to you, and I've got a couple of them, is can you, Joe—you're new, you're looking at this with a fresh vision, you've got a difficult job—can you or would you ever recommend to Congress in testimony or in a letter not that you can't do the Space Station but that with all these cost overruns and all these inefficiencies and all the harm it's doing to the rest of NASA, which is doing some great things—and I applaud the hardworking people at NASA who are doing some wonderful things on Mars, recent things on the moon, exploration outside Saturn and Jupiter—could you ever tell us that this budget is just going to hurt NASA too much to continue?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. As I said earlier, I think I need a little more time, and I've asked that—not asked—the process we're going through is over the next 3 months we really want to—and I guess May 15th is our target—to try to assess where the Russians are, truly where they are in the Service Module, at that point understand the capability of launching within what we think is a prudent time in order to continue the program down the path we are going.
And I did say earlier—I am not sure you were in the room—we thought that would be getting the Service Module off the ground, before June of next year would be the outside date.
Mr. ROEMER. But Joe, you can't be optimistic about even that March date. The Duma is not allocating enough money for most of the Russian space programs, monetary support. They continue to slip this program schedulewise. Kopter's recent statements in a host of areas are troubling. How can you be optimistic that they are going to now meet this new schedule?
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, I——
Mr. ROEMER. And if they don't meet it, are you then going to recommend to Congress that it just can't be done?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, as I said earlier if May 15th our assessment is, is that they're not going to be able to deliver the Service Module at that point our only option is to look at what alternatives do we have for continuing the program, but it's a significant hit to any budget projections we have, and we'd have to come back to Congress and have that discussion then and come in with——
Mr. ROEMER. Is that a discussion, Joe, that you're open to make to just ask Congress for more money or then are you open to saying, ''This is not worth the price to NASA and to the rest of the space program that's going so well. We would recommend Congress look at the option of canceling the Space Station,''?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. I guess in all fairness I really can't—I really can't answer that question honestly today.
Mr. ROEMER. Are you open to saying that we could cancel the Space Station?
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Am I open to saying it? If the cost of completing it is significantly——
Mr. ROEMER. Where do we have to go, Joe, to significant? It's over a $100 billion. It's just had a $4 billion cost overrun. The Russians are not going to be on time. It's taken money out of almost every account in the NASA budget. Haven't we crossed that line, and once we get to March, aren't you in a position to then say, ''This is not worth it?''
Mr. Bartlett just said we need inspiration and imagination. We're getting it from NASA. We're getting it with the Rover and the Pathfinder. We're getting it from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. And nobody's paying attention to it because of this, you know, ISS. It's not the International Space Station. It's an International Sucking Sound of money evaporating from every good, wonderful thing that NASA's doing.
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Mr. ROTHENBERG. Well, let me just give you—number one, I contend a little bit about the $4 billion number. We did go through the numbers earlier, and I don't call all of that overrun. It—cost growth—a part of it is just due to schedule change, even though we're doing the research program we're getting tagged with development cost as the research program is being tied into the development cost.
Mr. ROEMER. I think my $4 billion is Mr. Goldin's figure in his testimony. My final question——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I am sorry, but if we're going to get—we've only got a few more minutes before the vote——
Mr. ROEMER. Could I just submit some questions on the life of the Space Station in writing and hope to get the some time——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Certainly. In fact any member who would like to submit questions we would hope that you would answer them——
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Absolutely.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. And answer them in a timely manner because sometimes we don't get answers for 6 months. And thank you Mr. Roemer, but I am sorry we have a vote coming up. We have one more member who hasn't had a chance to ask his questions yet. Mr. Cannon.
SHUTTLE UPGRADES
Mr. CANNON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I suspect I'll have some questions to submit as well, but I would like to ask a few. Now the community is concerned, Mr. Holloway, the community is concerned with the direction that NASA appears to be headed with respect to the major Shuttle upgrades. Significant funds have been spent on the Liquid Flyback Booster studies, and it appears that more study work, and therefore more funds, is envisioned.
What are the mission and system requirements for the Shuttle that are driving the need for a new booster system?
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Mr. HOLLOWAY. Currently we have just completed a study on—a system study—on a Liquid Flyback Booster. That study is currently under review through the NASA management system, and the overall requirements, thought process associated with the Liquid Flyback Booster revolves around two basic ideas.
First of all, that we believe that the Liquid Flyback Booster offers a characteristic that catastrophic situations could be managed perhaps better than they can be managed with the Solid Rocket Booster—in the Solid Rocket Booster situation. You have no opportunity to stop the thrust of the solid rocket motor and therefore initiate a successful separation from the system and recover the vehicle and the flight crew.
With the proper design and implementation of a Liquid Flyback Booster, the Liquid engines would be capable of being shut down, should they encounter a catastrophic failure and the resultant configuration could be recovered safely, both from a hardware and from a people point of view.
The second theme, if one chose to implement the Solid Rocket, the Liquid Flyback Booster, and the studies substantiate the suggestion is that it could significantly reduce the operating cost of getting ready to go fly and also improve the process and the amount of time that it took us to turn the system around and shorten one of the critical processes timewise in getting the Shuttle stack ready to go fly.
So in summary those are the three things that we think about when we think about the Liquid Flyback Booster.
Mr. CANNON. Assuming for a moment those are valid—what is the anticipated date for initially fielding a new booster system?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. Well I think first we need to review the studies that have been done and ensure that we're on sound ground, that we have adequate data on both the systems and the integrated system, that we have a good cost proposal, understand that we can build the system, and determine that it's in the best interests for both the program and NASA to do so. So there's more to come on this subject.
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Mr. CANNON. I take it to mean that that's a long time off?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. I don't believe that will be something that we should do in the next several weeks or months. So it's downstream.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. What we—Congressman, we do have a briefing scheduled on the 26th for the staff here.
Mr. CANNON. Great. I look forward that. Thank you very much. Can I just—actually I have several other questions along this line. If you need additional lift, have you considered the development of a larger stretched version of the current booster as a cheaper alternative?
Mr. HOLLOWAY. The 5th segment on the Solid Rocket no doubt could fill some of the requirements that I've spoke of earlier. Certainly it could fulfill the requirement to increase the payload and give us additional performance, and—but the overall concept of being able to terminate thrust—although it might be able to be implemented in the solid rocket motor, it would not—currently I do not believe it would be as—a manageable system.
Also the cost reduction that I discussed would not, I don't believe, would be a substantial portion of a 5th segment Solid Rocket motor. VICALL is suggesting that we continue to look at the possibility of a 5th segment, and of course we will do that. In the long-term, the Liquid Flyback Booster of course fits in the overall strategic plan of the space transportation for the future, and NASA has plans and a committee that deals with that, that Mr. Ottenberger could talk to you about that I——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. CANNON. I will submit some more questions.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right. Ms. Jackson Lee, and I apologize, Ms. Jackson Lee, because we will—she only has a couple of minutes for questions now. We will be adjourning right after those questions.
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JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will put my questions in the record that are rather extensive, but I wanted to pointedly ask and follow the line of my colleagues just briefly. It keeps going up and up and up. My concern is what happens back home and how the increase, the jump, the apparent lack of accountability, all be it having our support, impacts the likes of a Johnson Space Center that is on the edge, that it keeps going up, you don't get the money, and we have problems, such as the loss of jobs with United Space Alliance.
What is the accountability very quickly and how is that going to impact Johnson Space Center? Let me indicate that I am going to put it the record. In light of the President's trip to Africa, what you are doing in including African scientists and African nations in this idea of the Space Station and other research opportunities but just the accountability please. I'd appreciate it, and I'd like to put a statement in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Okay, if I understand your question, and correct me if I don't, I think you're asking who is accountable for the performance of the International Space Station Program.
STATION COST GROWTH
Ms. JACKSON LEE. With the money and the increases. It doesn't look like we have accountability because we keep jumping up in the cost, and that impacts our centers around the Nation.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Yes. Well number one, obviously the buck stops here. I am accountable for the performance of the program. Number two, in carrying out the program and the day-to-day management of it, the actual responsibilities instilled in Mr. Abbey and Randy Brinkley at the Johnson Space Center, who is responsible for the overall program management, but I am accountable.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me do this then. Let me continue this dialogue because I really want to explore—I can't just accept you're accountable. I've got to find out where these increases are coming from and so with that, let me pursue our dialogue at a later time, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much Ms. Jackson Lee, and I'd like to thank Joe for putting up with all of this and the fact is that we're all serious about it. We are, and you're serious as well, and you know that we can't continue to have the situation where you are asking for more and more money and you know that, and we know you know that, and I hope we can correct it.
And everybody in this Committee, Republican and Democrat, is willing to work with you, be as honest as we can with one another and try as hard as we can to make sure that this program is successful and that we saved the taxpayers money if it doesn't need to be spent.
So thank you very much. I appreciate you coming today, and we are going to be in touch—closer touch—with you in the weeks ahead.
Mr. ROTHENBERG. Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
48–186CC
1998
FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
HEARING
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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 19, 1998
[No. XX]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
HARRIS W. FAWELL, Illinois
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CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan**
DAVE WELDON, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK FOLEY, Florida
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois
CHARLES W. ''CHIP'' PICKERING, Mississippi
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
MERRILL COOK, Utah
PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma
PETE SESSIONS, Texas
GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California RMM*
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
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BART GORDON, Tennessee
JAMES A. TRAFICANT, Jr., Ohio
TIM ROEMER, Indiana
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
TODD R. SCHULTZ, Chief of Staff
BARRY C. BERINGER, Chief Counsel
PATRICIA S. SCHWARTZ, Chief Clerk/Administrator
VIVIAN A. TESSIERI, Legislative Clerk
ROBERT E. PALMER, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
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DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DAVE WELDON, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
MARK FOLEY, Florida
CHARLES W. ''CHIP'' PICKERING, Mississippi
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
MERRILL COOK, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
BART GORDON, Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JAMES A. TRAFICANT, Jr., Ohio
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
ZOE LOFGREN, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
*Ranking Minority Member
**Vice Chairman
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(ii)
C O N T E N T S
March 19, 1998:
Joseph H. Rothenberg, Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Accompanied by Tommy Holloway, Program Manager, Space Shuttle Program Office, Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and General Kevin Chilton, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Program Manager, Space Station Program Office, Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Topics Discussed:
Explaining Cost Growth
Contractor Performance
Russian Cost to the United States
Breakout of Cost Growth
Total Cost to Taxpayers
Russia's Role
Propellant Resupply
Decision Point
Science Funding Transfers
Possible Future Transfers
Accuracy of NASA Budget
Threshold for Removing Russia
Shuttle Flight Rate and Safety
Cost Review
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Shuttle Use Policy
Defending the Space Station
Personnel Layoffs
Cuts to Shuttle Program
Programmatic Promises
Threshold for Cancellation
Shuttle Upgrades
Johnson Space Center
Station Cost Growth
(iii)