SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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77–748PS
2002
NASA'S FISCAL YEAR 2003
BUDGET REQUEST
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FEBRUARY 27, 2002
Serial No. 107–58
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
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HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
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MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
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C O N T E N T S
February 27, 2002
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by the Honorable David Weldon, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan
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Prepared Statement of the Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerry F. Costello, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
Witness:
Mr. Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Discussion
Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades
Financial Audit
Crew Safety
Space Station Research
International Obligations
Funding Shortfall
Space Launch Initiative
Nuclear Power and Propulsion
Core Complete Space Station
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Shuttle Privatization
Strategic Resources Review
Shuttle Launch Rate
Earth Science
NASA Budget
Space Station
X–33
Aeronautics
Space Shuttle
Space Shuttle Privatization
Universities and Small Businesses
Space Grants
Space Station
NASA Centers and Infrastructure
Future of Human Spaceflight
NASA/DOD Cooperation
Crew Return Vehicle
Science Funding
Aeronautics
Pluto
Funding
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers submitted by Mr. Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman Ralph M. Hall
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman Bart Gordon
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman Lamar S. Smith
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman George R. Nethercutt
Responses to questions submitted by Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson
Responses to questions submitted by Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman Nick Lampson
Responses to questions submitted by Congressman Mark Udall
NASA'S FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
HEARING CHARTER
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA's FY 2003 Budget Request
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
1. Purpose
On Wednesday, February 27 at 10:00 am, the House Science Committee will hold a hearing on President Bush's budget request for NASA. The Committee will receive testimony from the Honorable Sean O'Keefe, NASA Administrator. He has been asked to describe the scientific priorities reflected in the FY03 budget request, the criteria by which these priorities were established, the high priority technologies that will be developed, and the program and management changes contemplated to support the President's Management Agenda.
2. Issues
President's Management Agenda: The budget outlines five government-wide management challenges that were used to assess the performance of each agency. In addition, performance criteria were used to evaluate the effectiveness of selected research programs. It is not clear how these criteria were developed and what role they played in establishing research priorities. NASA, whose financial management has received consistent criticism from the GAO, Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and which will not receive a clean audit opinion on its FY01 financial statements, received a better financial management evaluation than most other agencies.
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International Space Station (ISS): The budget reduces funding for ISS by $229 million (13.3 percent). OMB is developing performance criteria to judge NASA's progress in implementing management reforms and a credible cost-estimating capability. Decisions, if any, to expand the capability of ISS beyond U.S. Core Complete will be based upon implementation of management reforms and NASA research priorities determined in consultation with OMB, OSTP and the scientific community.
Space Shuttle Privatization: NASA plans to release competitive sourcing plans for the Shuttle later this year. The competitive sourcing plan is the first step towards greater or possibly complete privatization of the Space Shuttle. Some of the issues that need to be addressed include: what goal is served by privatization, the appropriate role, if any, of the government, and policies regarding commercial uses of the Shuttle.
Shuttle Upgrades: Space shuttle upgrades are planned on only those improvements that can be implemented by 2007 within reasonable cost estimates (Cockpit Avionics Upgrade Increment 1, Space Shuttle Main Engine Health Monitoring System Phase I, and External Tank).
Elimination of Pluto/Kuiper & Deferral of Europa Missions: Due to significant growth in cost, the Pluto and Europa(see footnote 1) missions were not funded in the FY 2003 budget. Instead, NASA proposes to restructure the outer-planets program based on science priorities developed by the National Academies of Science. The new program, called ''New Frontiers,'' will feature a cost of cap of $650 million for each mission. Last year, the Senate provided $30 million for a Pluto mission; however, it did not include a commitment for further funding. To meet its launch deadline in 2006, the Pluto mission would require more than $200 million in FY 2003.
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Nuclear Power/Nuclear Propulsion: Proposes $125 million for research into nuclear power and nuclear electric propulsion initiatives.
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP): NASA is part of the interagency U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), which is currently under review by the Administration to determine the best government-wide approach for global climate change studies. NASA will not pursue any new Earth Science missions until the Administration has completed this review (development will continue on previously started projects like the Landsat Data Continuity Mission).
2. The Administration's Program Scorecard for NASA
The FY 2003 Budget introduces five government-wide management reform areas representing the Administration's view of the ''government's most glaring problems.'' Each Agency was evaluated in terms of their compliance with these programs and provided with a green, yellow, or red score. An agency was provided a green score if it met all of the standards for success, yellow if it achieved some but not all of the standards, and red if it had any serious flaws.(see footnote 2)
The five management reform areas include:
Human Capital—attracting talented people to the Federal Government;
Competitive Sourcing—increasing the number of programs subject to market competition;
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Financial Management—increasing the timeliness, quality, and usefulness of financial data;
E-Gov—increasing the number of Federal transactions that can be conducted online; and
Budget/Performance Integration—setting performance targets and shifting resources to effective programs.
It is not clear from the budget how these management ratings were applied and what role they played in the budget process. NASA's financial management, which has been the topic of intense criticism by the General Accounting Office, Congress and the Administration and which could not generate the FY01 financial records needed to receive an opinion from its auditors, received a yellow light.
NASA scored Red in Human Capital, Competitive Sourcing, E-Government, and Integrating Budget and Performance and Yellow for Improved Financial Management. NASA plans to address OMB's criticisms with several corrective strategies. For example, while NASA's financial management and accounting was criticized for not supporting daily operations, NASA plans to accelerate a new Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP). Other corrective measures include converting or competing at least 50 percent of NASA's civil service positions to ''commercial'' positions and to reduce NASA's role as owner of infrastructure by competitively sourcing shuttle operations.
In addition, the Administration developed performance criteria for applied R&D designed to ensure that research programs fulfill an essential Federal role, have well-developed plans to achieve objectives, and achieve results that benefit the Nation. The budget documents do not provide a complete description of these criteria and how they were applied.
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4. NASA's Budget Request
NASA's FY03 budget request is $15 billion, $98 million—or 0.7 percent over the FY02 appropriation. The Human Space Flight (HSF) Account budget is reduced by $699.2 million (10.2 percent). The Science, Aeronautics and Technology (SAT) budget request is increased by $796.7 million (9.9 percent). The primary reason behind the shift in accounts is that the costs for Space Communications and Data Systems operations of the Deep Space Network, Ground Networks, and Western Aeronautical Test Range were transferred from the HSF to the SAT budget lines.
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International Space Station
The budget request for the ISS is reduced by $229 million (13.3 percent) to $1.49 billion. The reduction primarily reflects the fact that 98 percent of the hardware for the U.S. Core has been developed. Based on substantial completion of the U.S. Core, the ISS budget is within the Congressionally mandated $25 billion cost cap. Consistent with the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force chaired by Tom Young, NASA plans to implement several management reforms over the next two years and develop a credible cost estimate by September 2002. OMB, OSTP, and NASA are currently developing management criteria to judge NASA's progress toward implementing these reforms. If these criteria are successfully met over the next two years, the Administration will address expanding ISS capability beyond the U.S. Core.
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Expanded ISS capability, if any, will be based on research priorities and ISS utilization criteria that OSTP and NASA develop in consultation with the scientific community over the coming year. Over the next year, NASA may select a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to manage biological and physical research aboard the Space Station, similar to the NGO created to manage Hubble Space Telescope research. An implementation plan on how NASA will enter into an agreement with an NGO to conduct ISS research and commercialization was due to Congress on September 30, 2001.
Biological and Physical Research
NASA proposes to increase Biological and Physical Research by 3 percent to $842.3 million in FY03. The Space Radiation Initiative will study the radiation environment beyond low-Earth orbit and develop countermeasures for long-duration radiation exposure to humans. The Generations Initiative will study the capacity for terrestrial life to evolve in the zero gravity, high radiation environment in space. NASA will be further defining its plans to optimize and competitively select biological and physical research experiments.
Space Shuttle
NASA proposes to reduce the Space Shuttle budget by 2 percent to $3.21 billion from the FY02 operating plan. As part of this reduction, the number of shuttle flights will be reduced from six or seven flights per year to four or five flights. NASA is currently studying the necessary commercial business, policy, and legislative conditions to privatize the Shuttle and transfer operations responsibility from government to the private sector. Shuttle competitive sourcing criteria are outlined in the President's Budget Request to address safety, cost savings from reducing NASA infrastructure, commercial business plans, and other criteria. Space shuttle upgrades are planned on only those improvements (Cockpit Avionics Upgrade Phase I, Space Shuttle Main Engine Health Monitoring System Phase I, and External Tank) that can be implemented by 2007 within reasonable cost estimates. Shuttle upgrade plans anticipate an operational next generation space transportation system by 2012. This second generation orbiter is under the development of NASA's Space Launch Initiative with a go-ahead decision planned in 2006. The budget request also increases funds to repair the aging Shuttle infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
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Space Science
NASA proposes to increase the Space Science program by $547.3 million (19.1 percent) over the FY02 operating plan. The FY03 budget request eliminates the Outer Planets Program (those planets beyond Mars in the solar system), cancels Pluto-Kuiper Express and defers the Europa Orbiter mission. Last year, the Senate provided $30 million for a Pluto mission; however, it did not include a commitment for further funding. To meet its launch deadline in 2006, the Pluto mission would require more than $200 million in FY 2003. New initiatives in the Space Science budget include the ''Nuclear Systems Initiative,'' designed in cooperation with the Department of Energy, to develop nuclear power and nuclear electric propulsion systems for exploration of the outer solar system and Mars. The ''New Frontiers Program'' would develop mid-size planetary missions (each under $650 million in cost) in accordance with outer planets exploration science priorities currently under development by the National Academy of Sciences. The missions would build on the power system developments of the Nuclear Systems Initiative. The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter would enter the development phase in FY03 to build on the results of the Mars Global Surveyor and Odyssey missions.
Earth Science
NASA proposes to increase the Earth Science program by $2.7 million (.02 percent) to $1.63 billion. Included in the Earth Science budget request are funds for the National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) and funds for an Ocean Topography Mission to follow the Jason mission launched in 2001. NASA, as part of the interagency U.S. Global Change Research Program, is currently reviewing its program plans after the Administration's recently announced approach for global climate change studies. Since the Administration directed NASA not to formulate any plans for new missions until this review was completed, NASA did not initiate any new Earth Science programs beyond the current systems already underway in time for the release of the FY03 President's Budget Request. The budget request continues previously initiated projects such as the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a commercial data purchase designed to ensure the continued availability of data to the research community.
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Aerospace Technology
NASA proposes to increase the Aerospace Technology Enterprise budget by $308.1 million or 12 percent. The increase is primarily directed to the Advanced Space Transportation/Space Launch Initiative. Based on Congressional direction in the FY02 appropriations, the Aerospace Technology account is restructured into four sub-accounts to better distinguish aeronautics research from other space transportation, technology development, and commercial technology efforts. The FY03 budget request proposes spending $541.4 million for aeronautics R&D, a $58 million reduction from the FY02 appropriation that continues several years of declining budget requests for aeronautics R&D.
While NASA's budget request proposes an aggressive collaboration in aeronautics R&D with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), recent technology developments ended only in mixed results for transfer to the FAA and industry. The Aerospace Commission, created by Congress and chaired by former Congressman Bob Walker, recently recommended that the President and Congress create a multi-agency coordinating council with the responsibility and authority to implement an integrated plan to reach the national objective of meeting air traffic capacity demands. Coincident with the release of the President's FY03 budget, NASA issued a new ''Aeronautics Blueprint'' that will serve as its strategic roadmap for research and development, tracking closely the programmatic structure incorporated in the Administration's budget request. The ''Blueprint'' identifies four primary focus areas: The Airspace System; Revolutionary Vehicles; Aviation Security and Safety; and State of the Art Educated Workforce. The FY03 budget request eliminates the Rotorcraft R&D program.
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The Advanced Space Transportation Program, which includes the Space Launch Initiative 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Space Transfer and Launch Technology programs, requests $880 million in FY03. The Space Launch Initiative has a three-pronged strategy: 1) to invest in technology development and other activities needed to enable full-scale development by 2006 and operations by early next decade of a commercially competitive, privately owned and operated launch vehicle that will be cheaper and safer than today's rockets; 2) to develop a coordinated approach that leverages commercial launch systems to the greatest extent possible to meet NASA's needs while NASA focuses development funds on its unique requirements; 3) to purchase cargo resupply services for the International Space Station using near-term commercial launch vehicles to serve as a backup capability for the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian Progress vehicles. However, issues have been raised about the SLI's ability to meet optimistic expectations for cost and safety and the lack of investments in space demonstrations. NASA is currently in discussions with the Air Force about collaborating on certain technology developments. NASA and the Air Force will complete their ''120 day'' study on options for a joint program later this spring. The President's Program Scorecard recognized the need for SLI to better understand key requirements and manage risk.
NASA Academic Programs
The FY03 NASA Academic Programs budget request is $143.7 million, 36.8 percent below FY02 enacted funding due to $73.6 million in Congressional earmarks to various academic institutions.
Inspector General
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The FY03 Inspector General budget request of $24.6 million increased 3.8 percent primarily for inflation.
Institutional Support & Federal Pensions
The President's Budget Request for Institutional Support at all ten NASA Centers is $2.91 billion in FY03. This cost represents personnel, travel, operations support, construction, and environmental management. Since FY02, Institutional Support costs for the NASA Centers are allocated against the appropriate Enterprises based on the number of federal employees in each NASA Enterprise. Institutional Support also includes emergency security funding requested in FY02 and continued in FY03 in order to pay for additional space shuttle security at the Kennedy Space Center and other NASA centers.
Emergency Response Funds
In FY 2002, NASA received $108.5 million in Emergency Response Funds for increase security following the September 11th tragedy.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The hearing will come to order. There is still an open vote on the Floor, but all but 30 members—oh, it just closed. And then they are going to introduce a new Member of Congress and swear him in, so some of our colleagues will be over for that ceremony. But this is a more important activity.
I want to welcome everyone here today for the third of our hearings on the President's proposed budget. And I particularly want to welcome Sean O'Keefe to his first Congressional appearance as NASA Administrator.
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I should note that when Mr. O'Keefe last appeared before us, he was just the lowly Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget with control over nothing larger than the federal budget. Today, as NASA Administrator, the entire universe is under his purview. It is, of course, a position anyone would envy.
In all seriousness, though, NASA is, indeed, our gateway to the universe. It is through NASA's efforts, in some cases, exclusively through these efforts, that we will understand our planet, our solar system, and the vastness beyond it, and our place in the cosmos. It is through NASA's efforts that we will maintain a healthy aerospace industry, develop path-breaking technologies, and put space to use, good use, for human good. When grappling with the mundane, yet difficult, questions about the future of the Space Program, we must not lose sight of the exciting and fundamental challenges the program is designed to address.
But we must grapple with the earthly, everyday dilemmas that plague the Space Program. And I think Mr. O'Keefe has been raising the right questions to try to figure out how to structure NASA to be a vital agency for the foreseeable future. The frustration for us is that, of necessity, many of the questions have yet to be answered.
There are some obvious examples of these questions. Will the Space Station be expanded beyond core complete? What kinds of experiments will be conducted on the Space Station and who will select them? What missions will be sent to the outer planets? What will the future role of NASA and climate change research be? What will the role of the private sector be in operating the Space Shuttle in the future? How will the Space Launch Initiative proceed?
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These are all questions on which studies or reviews are underway. That is a logical and an appropriate way for NASA to proceed, but we will have to probe today to get a greater sense of how these reviews will be structured and what NASA is likely to look like a year from now.
This Committee wants to be an active partner with Mr. O'Keefe in shaping NASA for the future. With that in mind, we will be following up this hearing with a Subcommittee hearing next week on aeronautics research, with Subcommittee hearings in March and April on specific NASA issues and with legislation to reauthorize NASA, which we hope to approve by Memorial Day.
Today's hearing, which, among other things, will expose the wide range of opinions on the Committee on NASA issues is a first step toward preparing legislation. We will have more to say as that process moves forward. But I am going to keep my comments brief today. I share Mr. O'Keefe's vision of shaping NASA into a well-managed, affordable, science-driven agency—well-managed, affordable, science-driven agency. And that is going to be a tall order that we have to work closely together to achieve. But we will work closely together and we will achieve that tall order.
With that, I yield five minutes to my distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Hall of Texas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boehlert follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT
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I want to welcome everyone here today for the third of our hearings on the President's proposed budget, and I particularly want to welcome Sean O'Keefe to his first Congressional appearance as NASA Administrator.
I should note that when Mr. O'Keefe last appeared before us he was just the lowly deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, with control over nothing larger than the federal budget. Today, as NASA Administrator, the entire universe is under his purview. It is, of course, a position anyone would envy.
In all seriousness, NASA is indeed our gateway to the universe. It is through NASA's efforts—in some cases, exclusively through those efforts—that we will understand our planet, our solar system and the vastness beyond it, and our place in the cosmos. It is through NASA's efforts that we will maintain a healthy aerospace industry, develop path-breaking technologies, and put space to use for human good. When grappling with the mundane yet difficult questions about the future of the space program, we must not lose sight of the exciting and fundamental challenges the program is designed to address.
But we must grapple with the earthly, everyday dilemmas that plague the space program. And I think Mr. O'Keefe has been raising the right questions to try to figure out how to structure NASA to be a vital agency for the foreseeable future. The frustration for us is that, of necessity, many of the answers to those questions are not yet in.
There are some obvious examples of these questions: Will the space station be expanded beyond core complete? What kinds of experiments will be conducted on the space station and who will select them? What missions will be sent to the outer planets? What will the future role of NASA in climate change research be? What will the role of the private sector be in operating the space shuttle in the future? How will the Space Launch Initiative proceed?
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These are all questions on which studies or reviews are underway. That's a logical and appropriate way for NASA to proceed, but we will have to probe today to get a greater sense of how those reviews will be structured and what NASA is likely to look like a year from now.
This Committee wants to be an active partner with Mr. O'Keefe in shaping NASA for the future. With that in mind, we will be following up this hearing with a subcommittee hearing next week on aeronautics research, with subcommittee hearings in March and April on specific NASA issues, and with legislation to reauthorize NASA, which we hope to approve by Memorial Day.
Today's hearing, which, among other things, will expose the wide range of opinions on the Committee on NASA issues, is a first step toward preparing legislation.
We'll have more to say as that process moves forward, but I'm going to keep my comments brief today. I share Mr. O'Keefe's vision of shaping NASA into a well managed, affordable, science-driven agency. That's going to be a tall order that we have to work closely together to achieve.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and good morning, Mr. Administrator. Today's hearing, of course, is our very first time to hear from you as the new Administrator about your vision for NASA and to review the fiscal year 2003 budget request. It is, as the Chairman said, also your first public opportunity to hear from Committee members about our interests and concerns. Now, actually, it is your second time. The last time you were here, you were the only one that knew that you were going to be the NASA Administrator, or some of us might have been a little easier on you with our questions.
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But I hope that today is going to be a constructive dialogue because that is what we have to have and what we need. And while I am convinced that the President of the United States is committed to a National Space and Aeronautics Program that is second to none in the world, at the same time, I just know and believe that the President recognizes Congress's responsibility to ensure that NASA is on the right track. And in that spirit, I want to make a few initial observations about this year's budget request.
Given the time constraints, I think I would like to say a few words about some problems that I think need attention. It is probably no surprise to anyone that I put the Space Station at the top of that list. It is now more than a year since OMB directed NASA to redesign the Space Station and almost a third of the year since the Tom Young Task Force delivered its report. So far as I can see, I don't want to say nothing has happened in that change—in that time, but not enough has happened in that time to change my view that OMB is taking the Space Station in absolutely the wrong direction. Perhaps this new chairman can give us a better view. I certainly hope so.
The Space Station research budget has been slashed by 40 percent, with some research disciplines suffering a lot deeper cuts. Even the International Space Station Research Facility racks that survive are going to be only partially used on orbit since insufficient funding has been provided for experiments. And the size of the crew has been cut to the point where the remaining three crew members will be able, in my opinion, and in the opinion of a lot of people that know more about it than I do, to do a little more than just maintain the Space Station's operational systems.
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There is no commitment that I see to complete the Space Station. I hope I hear a commitment from you today on that. The program remains in limbo with its fate to be decided or determined by a set of subjected so-called metrics that remain undefined. I hope those will be defined. The United States is failing, in my opinion, to live up to its commitments to its international partners, and I think that is bad. I think that is bad for several reasons. But it is bad for the first reason—is that we are in the course of trying to have good relations with other people to help us with a sorry war that we didn't ask for, to help us to carry out some of our wishes that—in a war that we are not accustomed to, didn't want, and are having to suffer through. I just don't think it is a time to turn our back on international friends and people that have been our friends forever and ever.
And all of the well-crafted phrases in your testimony today just, frankly, don't do a lot for me to negate the simple facts that I have set out here. I hope you can clear that up. This is your opportunity to. I am not questioning your desire to get control of the costs. I know your background and I know your ability and I know your aims there. However, I think efforts to demonstrate cost savings by eliminating the very capabilities that make the Space Station worth doing in the first place seem a little bit misguided to me.
So what is the answer? At a minimum, I think—I think you need to tell this Committee and to tell this Congress, unambiguously and immediately, if you can, that this Administration is committed to completing the Space Station defined in the international agreements governing the program. I don't think that is asking too much. That simple declaration would go a long ways toward eliminating the confusion and the concern that the Space Station supporters, our international partners, and the American taxpayers are feeling about where the Space Program is headed.
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That declaration wouldn't prevent you from taking whatever appropriate steps are required to better manage it in the future, and the remaining cost of the program, and it would allow the Administration, Congress, and the international space partners to work together to achieve a common goal that we thought we were headed in that direction. And I am talking about a Space Station that is completed and utilized in a manner that brings credit to all of us.
And if we can't get such a commitment, and I fear we are left with a station that is hard to justify to the American taxpayers as being worth the billions of dollars that we have already put into it. And I said billions of dollars that have already gone into it. Instead, we will have a station whose purpose seems to be a little more than serving as the latest—and I don't mean to be ridiculous, but sometimes you have to be to make a point—serving as the latest end destination for pop music celebrities and South African millionaires like Mr. Shuttleworth, who says he has a contract and he is going, to the NSYNC that I can't stand to listen to. As a matter of fact, I don't trust any musician under 60.
One of the boys is Lance Bass—and I could make a rhyme with that, but I am not going to. But thank you for allowing me that bit of humor. And let me just briefly turn to another area, Mr. Chairman. And I just have a little—I have another 10 minutes here if you don't mind—15.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time is drawing to a close.
Mr. HALL. Well, let—then let me briefly turn to another area that I think needs attention, and that is the Space Shuttle Program. While we are critically depending on the shuttle for human access to space until at least the middle of the next decade, we don't have a credible alternative that I can see. And that is why I am troubled with the $500 million cut to the Safety Upgrades Program. The difficulty of achieving some of the upgrades should not be an excuse for reducing our commitment to increasing shuttle safety. I know no one can have an argument with that. And while there are other issues I could raise, I will yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL
Good morning. I would like to join the Chairman in welcoming Administrator O'Keefe to our hearing. He has the privilege and responsibility of leading NASA, and I am sure that all Members join me in wishing him well.
Today's hearing is our first opportunity to hear from the new Administrator about his vision for NASA and to,review the agency's FY 2003 budget request. It is also the Administrator's first public opportunity to hear from Committee Members about our interests and concerns. I hope that today's hearing will be the beginning of a constructive dialogue between Administrator O'Keefe and this Committee.
I am convinced that the President is committed to a national space and aeronautics program that is second to none in the world. That gives me reason for optimism about the future of NASA. At the same time, I believe that the President recognizes Congress's responsibility to ensure that NASA is on the right track to achieving the potential we all see for it. It is in that spirit that I want to make a few initial observations about this year's budget request.
There is much that seems reasonable in this budget request. There are also areas that give me a great deal of concern—among them the overall funding level for NASA—and I hope we will be able to address some of them today. Finally, there are a number of issues that are not addressed in this budget request that we know are under consideration—including some things that could have major consequences for the future of this agency. From your previous public statements, it sounds as though there are a series of proposed changes that may be coming as we proceed through this year. However, we cannot adequately evaluate NASA's budget request nor can we meet our oversight responsibilities if Congress is kept in the dark about such things as NASA's Strategic Resources Review and what is being planned for the future of the NASA institution. We will need straight talk about your plans sooner rather than later if we are going to achieve any consensus on the best way forward.
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Given the time constraints, I'd like to say a few words about some problems that I think need attention. It's probably no surprise to anyone that I put the Space Station at the top of that list. It is now more than a year since OMB directed NASA to redesign the Space Station and almost a third of a year since the Tom Young task force delivered its report. Nothing has happened in that time to change my view that OMB is taking the Space Station in the wrong direction:
The Space Station research budget has been slashed by 40 percent, with some research disciplines suffering much deeper cuts;
Even those ISS Research Facility racks that survive are going to be only partially used on orbit, since insufficient funding has been provided for experiments;
The size of the crew has been cut to the point where the remaining three crew members will be able to do little more than just maintain the Station's operational systems;
There is no commitment to complete the Space Station—instead, the program remains in limbo with its fate to be determined by a set of subjective ''metrics'' that remain undefined; and
The U.S. is failing to live up to its commitments to its international partners.
All of the well-crafted phrases in today's written testimony do nothing to negate those simple facts.
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Mr. O'Keefe, I am not questioning your desire to ''get control'' of the costs of the Space Station. However, efforts to demonstrate cost savings by eliminating the very capabilities that make the Space Station worth doing in the first place seem misguided at best. As you acknowledge in your written testimony, ''our priority should not be to simply build a space station to a specific hardware complement and then seek research and experiments to make use of that hardware.'' Unfortunately, that is just what you are doing by changing the goal of the program to be OMB's ''Core Complete'' configuration.
What is the answer? At a minimum, I think that you need to declare unambiguously and immediately that this Administration is committed to completing the Space Station defined in the international agreements governing the program. That simple declaration will go a long way towards eliminating the confusion and concern that Space Station supporters, our International Partners, and the American taxpayers are feeling about where the Space Station program is headed. That declaration would not prevent you from taking whatever appropriate steps are required to better manage the remaining costs of the program; rather, it would allow the Administration, Congress, and the International Partners to work together to achieve a common goal: a Space Station that is completed and utilized in a manner that brings credit to all of us. If the Administration is unwilling to make such a commitment, I fear we are left with a Station that is hard to justify to the American taxpayers as being worth the billions of dollars that have been invested in it. Instead, we will have a Space Station whose purpose seems to be little more than serving as the latest ''in'' destination for pop music celebrities and South African millionaires.
Let me briefly turn to two other areas that I believe need attention. One is the Space Shuttle program. We are critically dependent on the Shuttle for human access to space until at least the middle of the next decade. We have no credible alternative. As a result, I have supported appropriate upgrades to the Shuttle to increase its safety and reliability. We should do no less for the brave men and women that depend on the Shuttle to get them safely to and from space in the service of this nation. That is why I am troubled by the $500 million cut to the safety upgrades program. The difficulty of achieving some of the upgrades should not be an excuse for reducing our commitment to increasing Shuttle safety. If OMB is not prepared to fund adequately safety upgrades for the Shuttle that we will be depending on for the next 15 years or more—but somehow can find additional money for research related to the next generation of reusable launch vehicles—we may have to consider whether that is an appropriate balance of priorities.
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A similar situation is occurring in the area of aeronautics R&D. By its own accounting, NASA acknowledges that funding for aeronautics and aviation research has dropped by a factor of two since FY 1998. At the same time, it has become increasingly clear how important investments in aeronautics and aviation R&D are for maintaining our international competitiveness, our national security, and our quality of life. Unfortunately and inexplicably, OMB would have NASA's budget in this area remain depressed for at least the next five years. On the other hand, OMB would have the already sizable space science budget increase by a third during that same period. I do not question the importance of investing in space science; it has been an important source of new discoveries that are changing our views of the universe. However, if additional funding can't be made available for NASA, we will be forced to examine the balance between investments in these areas, too.
Well, I do not wish to take up any more of the Committee's time this morning with my opening remarks. You have a delivered a budget request for NASA that deserves serious consideration, and I believe that this Committee will give it that consideration. Nevertheless, I see problems with some of the directions that this budget would have NASA take over the next five years. I think we will have to address those problems in the days ahead. We will be doing a NASA reauthorization bill this year, and I expect that these issues will be central to our deliberations.
Again, I wish to welcome you, Administrator O'Keefe, and I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I thank the gentleman. And in keeping with the Committee tradition, to allow the maximum time for witnesses, we will confine all opening statements to five minutes from the majority and the minority. Mr. Hall has used his five minutes generously. The Chair would yield the balance of his five minutes to the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher. You have 2b minutes, Mr. Rohrabacher.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First and foremost, welcome to Mr. O'Keefe, and at last you are here. I mean, this has been better late than never. Let us put it that way. And I think the Administration should, and does, deserve some criticism over the fact it took so long to get someone here on a permanent basis to head NASA. And that over this last year we could have used someone who knew that they were in for the long haul.
We face some very serious challenges. And when I say we, that means you and us. Together we face serious challenges. And Mr. Hall is exactly right, the Space Station is the most severe challenge that we face. And if we don't handle it correctly, we are going to lose the allegiance of the American people to America's space effort, and that would be a real tragedy.
Well, let me just note that the last—and now, you are having to face a situation that was handed not only to you, but handed to this Administration. The challenge we face with Space Station is based on poor judgments and incompetence in the last Administration, when basically the Vice President was allowed to use NASA as a playpen, and we ended up using all of our contingency money in Russia, of all places, which we ended up with seeing nothing for that contingency money.
So let me just say, those of us who do believe in Space Station, on both sides of the aisle, have to be willing not only to suggest that there is a tough stand to be made by the Administration, but we need to make some tough stands and say what needs to be cut out of the NASA budget in order to make Space Station a success. Otherwise, we are just using a bunch of rhetoric. And I would suggest that we cut out some of the—what I would consider some of the last Administration's own, what I—well, they had their prerogatives and they supported some of the things that put us in this spot—let us cut some of their areas now that they have gotten us in this trouble.
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And last—let me just make this one point—I am very happy that you are here, Mr. O'Keefe, because we need some good management. Dan Goldin was a fine man. But during the last Administration, now we find out that we didn't—the books aren't even able—people can't even audit the books of NASA. When it comes to this Committee and when it comes to this Congress, I think that the fact that NASA's books are in such disarray should be a cause of real alarm. And when people start thinking about Enron and the problems that it has caused the people of the United States, perhaps we should start looking at some of the problems that NASA and the bookkeeping and maybe know that that is the heart—at the heart of some of the financial challenges we face right now.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So thank you very much, Mr. Boehlert, for giving me that opening statement.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. And we will go right to our very distinguished guest. Traditionally, we ask for a 5-minute summary. That is hardly adequate in view of the importance of the subject. And you—since you are our only witness, the Chair will be generous in allowing you such time as you may desire to summarize your statement with the hope and expectation there will be plenty of opportunity for a good exchange of dialogue.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Administrator, the floor is yours. And I want to remind the Chairman—the Ranking Member that he is the Administrator.
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Mr. HALL. Chairman is okay.
Chairman BOEHLERT. He keeps trying to get that. That is the Administrator.
Mr. HALL. This one right here.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Right here. Yeah. Mr. O'Keefe, the floor is yours.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID WELDON
While I was glad to see NASA receive a slight increase for FY 2003, I was very disheartened in where it went. Apparently, Human Space Flight will not be the beneficiary of such an increase. I am well aware of the systemic problems with the ISS program. I stand ready to assist Sean O'Keefe, the OMB and our international partners to see how we can mitigate these problems and go on to execute world-class science research on ISS. But today, I remain dubious of the commitment the Administration is willing to provide to the crown jewel of America's space efforts—Human Space Flight.
So far, we have been told that ISS is on probation and we are focusing on ISS ''U.S. core complete.'' I was very concerned to see a recent Congressional Research Service report that provides an analysis of the NASA budget stating that not enough funds are available to build a core complete version of ISS. Namely between FY03–06, there is a $603 million shortfall for ISS. NASA apparently feels that internal savings can be achieved to cover such a shortfall. I'll be interested in hearing how such savings will be realized.
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I am excited about Mr. O'Keefe's commitment and enthusiasm for research into new propulsion technologies, namely his commitment to SLI. I agree that we must conduct research into new propulsions systems and materials technology in order to reduce the cost to orbit and thus allow a more cost effective exploration of the solar system. We must, however, not neglect the Space Shuttle. It will continue to be our civil space workhorse for at least another 15 years and will require upgrades while a new system is developed. As well, because of the importance of SLI, it is vital that the expertise of all NASA field centers, not just a single center, be used in the R&D efforts being funded through SLI. Kennedy Space Center has underutilized R&D capabilities and the experience of the KSC workforce makes it a natural fit with several major elements of the SLI program.
As a person who has a fiduciary duty to the taxpayers' money to be spent wisely, I do not like seeing poor management, and programs that are over budget. NASA, however, is by its very nature a unique entity that is called upon each and every day to execute missions that are both high technology and high risk. NASA's budget for too long has been anemic at best and has been called on to perform more missions while not enjoying a reasonable increase in funding. We must work to reduce programmatic missteps, project mismanagement, achieve fiscal clarity and at the same time provide NASA the resources to perform its varying missions. I look to this Administration for leadership on these fronts and will stand ready to assist in all that I can do.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith of Michigan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH
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I would like to thank Chairman Boehlert for holding this hearing today on NASA's FY 2003 budget request. Our fiscal outlook that lies before us today is vastly different from just one year ago; however, President Bush should be praised for creating a budget that makes difficult choices, but ones that are essential to our domestic security.
The current recession and war on terror have shifted our priorities, but budget requests for programs such as NASA have responded to the circumstances. NASA has a number of worthy initiatives. For example, the Discovery and Explorer Programs have been very successful in keeping within the constraints of the given budget. Unfortunately though, NASA continues to be plagued by ineffective programs that fail to meet cost or risk objectives.
I am pleased to see that NASA is working towards implementing management reforms, with a scheduled cost estimate by September 2002. NASA is also making significant progress by converting at least 50 percent of its civil service positions to commercial, and by competitively sourcing shuttle operations. This is appears to be a positive step to improving management and accountability to the American taxpayer.
NASA's overall FY03 budget request of $15 billion, 0.7 percent over the FY02 appropriation, is modest, but NASA must make more of an effort to do their part in creating a balanced budget. While NASA has reduced the Human Space and Flight budget by 10.2 percent, all but 0.3 percent is shifted to the Science, Aeronautics and Technology sector. By factoring in the 3.8 percent inflationary increase for the Inspector General, we arrive at a FY03 budget that is higher than the FY02 appropriations.
I think that it has become clear that space research is accomplished more effectively through unmanned spaceflights. Given that, it is reasonable that NASA will decrease the number of unmanned space shuttle flights. All areas must have a thorough cost benefit evaluation in order to phase out the ineffective programs and solidify the most useful.
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Additionally, I suggest the international space station has cost more money than its worth. With a loss of interest and funding from other countries, we should hold spending scarce funds on the station. Many of the details in this budget proposal are still unclear, but I am hopeful that today's hearing will help to resolve these questions, and I am looking forward to a productive discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RANDY FORBES
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Hall, for holding this important hearing today. And, thank you Administrator O'Keefe for appearing before the Science Committee this morning. On a side note, last week I had the privilege of touring NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. I can tell you that I left the Kennedy Space Center with a greater appreciation for the fine work of NASA and it's employees.
Earlier this month, the President presented his budget to Congress for the fiscal year 2003. Within the President's budget, he has proposed a modest increase in NASA's funding for next year. With that said, however, I must voice my concern for the deep cuts proposed to NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton, VA. While the Langley Research Center is just outside my district, the facility does employees many of my constituents.
NASA's Langley Research Center was established in 1917 as the Nation's first civilian aeronautics laboratory. Today, 70 percent of its work is in aeronautics research, focusing on ways to improve current aircraft and develop concepts for future aircraft. In fact, the Center's primary mission assignments are devoted to structures and materials, airframe systems, and atmospheric sciences. NASA Langley leads the agency in aviation safety, quiet aircraft technology, small aircraft transportation, and aerospace vehicles system technology.
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I regard the work of the facility and its employees to be invaluable in forging new frontiers in aviation and space research. Langley's contributions to aerospace, atmospheric sciences, and technology commercialization are improving the way the world lives. Its research has a significant impact on the global economy, making the skies safer, quieter and more efficient.
I fully understand and recognize that many of our priorities have shifted since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and that our economy has slowed down—resulting in lower revenues to the Federal Government. We should not, however, ask NASA Langley to bear the brunt of this short fall. If we were to do so, we would be killing the goose that lays a golden egg.
I look forward to working with the President and Administrator O'Keefe to see that the NASA Langley Research center receives the funding it so richly deserves.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JERRY F. COSTELLO
Good morning. I want to thank Administrator O'Keefe for appearing before our committee to discuss the President's FY03 Budget for NASA. Today's hearing serves as an opportunity for oversight of certain departmental programs. NASA's budget is supposed to reflect a strong commitment and emphasis to continue to build on the agency's core foundation of aeronautics and aerospace research and development and its missions of exploration and discovery to educate and inspire. However, I was disappointed to see serious reductions for aviation research and development, safety and supportability upgrades, the space shuttle budget, and elimination of the Pluto/Kuiper & Deferral of Europa Missions. I was pleased to see a proposed $125 million for research into nuclear power and nuclear electric propulsion initiatives.
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The budget for NASA leaves many significant questions unanswered and Congress needs more specifics as we consider the FY03 budget request for NASA. The Administration introduced five management reform areas, human capital, competitive sourcing, financial management, E-Gov, and budget/performance integration, representing the Administration's view of the ''government's most glaring problems.'' Each agency was evaluated in terms of their compliance with these programs and provided with a green, yellow, or red score. It is not clear from the budget how the five management reform ratings were applied to NASA and what role they played in its budget process. It is also evident from the budget that NASA finds much of its science and human spaceflight accounts dependent upon further rumination and consideration and the dollars requested in this budget imply few commitments by the Administration to the continuation of the Space Station, Mission to Planet Earth, or the Outer Planetary Program.
I welcome our witness and look forward to his testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE
Mr. O'Keefe, Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall thank you for this opportunity to review the President's budget priorities for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for Fiscal Year 2003.
Mr. O'Keefe, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you here today and say that I look forward to working with you in the future and I have no doubt that your impressive credentials will translate into a successive tenure at NASA.
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The overall request for NASA is $15.0 billion dollars in FY 2003, which represents a 0.66 percent increase over the FY 2002 appropriation. I would like to take this opportunity today to voice my concerns about several aspects of the budget request and also to highlight the areas of interest to the 18th Congressional District of Texas, which I represent.
Firstly, I am gravely concerned about the fact that NASA has stated that funding for several programs falls short of achieving its desired goals. In fact, some programs, such as the Triana mission receive no funding whatsoever although the spacecraft itself is completed.
Secondly, the Pluto-Kuiper mission and the Solar Probe missions would be canceled, meaning that we will miss an opportunity to learn about space travel utilizing celestial mechanics. Taking into consideration the position of the planets in our solar system on the proposed launch date the estimated travel time of Pluto-Kuiper would be less than a decade, however should we miss this important window the flight could take a maximum of twenty years to reach Pluto.
One of the major lessons we must learn in space travel is how to reach a particular point in space by a date and time certain. With our limitations in the knowledge of space travel it is important to use every opportunity presented by God in his brilliant design of our universe as well as those possibilities offered by research in this area to stretch the limits of our human potential.
Thirdly, the Shuttle flight rate is to be cut from two to four flights a year. $500 million is being cut from the Shuttle's safety upgrades budget. In the meantime, no replacement for the Shuttle is envisioned to be available before the middle of the next decade.
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It is also my understanding that a Strategic Resources Review (SRR) has been underway for some time now. However, the Administration has yet to reveal any details about the SRR study. Because the SRR is considering workforce rules changes and facility closings, I am obviously curious as to when the details of the Review will be released.
I am concerned that NASA's commitment to continue to create and expand ties with small and disadvantaged businesses will be injured by this budget. NASA's Office of Equal Opportunity Programs and the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization have supported programs for $58 million, which have been used to actively reach out to Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions and Native American Colleges to include them in research and development, training, internships, fellowships and tuition assistance.
Furthermore, Congress had decided to increase funding for the Space Grant college and fellowship program by $5 million (for a total funding of $24.1 million) in the FY 2002 NASA appropriation. In the FY 2003 budget request, OMB cut the program budget back to its previous level of $19.1 million.
NASA's Space Grant program, which promotes strong science, mathematics, and technology education—especially women, under-represented minorities, and persons with disabilities—for careers in aerospace science and technology for undergraduate students throughout the State of Texas, may be hindered by this budget in its efforts to mentor more scientists.
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Mr. O'Keefe, again I thank you for your time this morning and look forward to working with you.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hall, thank you very much for your very thoughtful and generous opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and, Congressman Hall. If you would permit, Mr. Chairman, I will submit the statement for the record and, as you have invited——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. O'KEEFE.—I will quickly summarize. And I want to thank you again personally for your personal sponsorship at the confirmation hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee. It was beyond—above and beyond the call, and I appreciate your endorsement, sir. That is very, very generous of you, and I will not let you down. I will do my very best to carry on in the tradition in which you are expecting here.
It has been an exciting 8 weeks since I have been at NASA. And in the course of that time, I have had an opportunity to visit all ten of the centers around the country. And it has been a real whirlwind tour, but it is still—at the same time, I have had enough time at each location to delve into some of the issues, as well as the primary topics that are the expertise and constitute the core competency of what is the composition of the storied agency that we all, I think, think so much of and admire that has been in business for the last 44 years.
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And I guess as a summary of that excursion, there is lots of opportunities to talk about that a little more, to not only all ten of the centers, but, indeed, to one of them twice. I was at Johnson Space Center for the second time yesterday and went through with the NASA Advisory Council a range of issues pertaining to as many of the topics here of subject today.
But I can characterize for you, I think, in general, that in the course of the visits to each of those centers, that the aspect I find most surprising, most interesting, most—that I did not anticipate seeing quite to the degree that we saw, is the unbridled energy, enthusiasm, creativity, and innovation that is alive in every one of the centers out there. It is an extraordinary organization and there is tremendous energy and enthusiasm for what we will be continuing with ahead in terms of what the overall agency strategy will be.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Will you pull the mike a little bit closer, please?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Yeah. Thank you. That would be helpful.
Mr. O'KEEFE. So in the course of—in each of those visits, it really has been an enlightening effort to realize that there is an awful lot of enthusiasm for pressing on with a really aggressive strategy. And as we proceed in that regard, I am delighted that the Committee is interested in working with us as we get through that, and we will need all the guidance and assistance we can muster in order to accomplish that task.
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Let me highlight just a handful of initiatives and then some of the fiscal year '03 priorities, and then, as you have invited, Mr. Chairman, turn this to more of a dialogue. So I want to touch on just four very quick areas just to give you a sense of the general direction we are taking. Again, in my vast experience of 8 weeks on the job, this is the focus we have been trying to set and establish as the approach that we will continue with.
First and foremost, and paramount among all others, is a vigorous, aggressive implementation of the President's Management Agenda. There are five major items on that agenda—apply to all the federal agencies and departments—and to be sure each of these five agenda items have specific application to NASA in a very unique way, in terms of the kinds of issues we are sorting with and issues we are wresting with.
On that agenda are the Strategic Management of Human Capital, of which we certainly have got some challenging issues on that front given the age and experience level of the predominance of our workforce where we have probably the most experienced level in terms of the overall median capability within the workforce of NASA today.
But the downside is, the—a very substantial proportion, approaching a third, are eligible to retire within the next three to five years. So we have got to be thinking very directly in terms of how we wrestle with that senior leadership and workforce management challenge.
The second element of the President's Management Agenda is competitive sourcing and looking at the very best ways we can go about motivating a competitive sense of how to deliver on performance and results for specific outcomes we seek to achieve. And so aggressively implementing that particular initiative at NASA is again on our—highest on our priority list as well.
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Including a very specific attention to the information technology and e-government initiatives contained in the President's management agenda is a further effort to simply reduce the transaction time that it takes in order to produce the kind of activity that we are engaged in on a day-in-and-day-out basis.
The fourth element of the President's Management Agenda, which has particular application, and particularly in light of, I think, the opening statements of all three members here today, is on the issue of improved financial management. Aggressively implementing our integrated financial management program, we are now in the third year of that implementation schedule. It is intended to very aggressively get at precisely the issues that I think Chairman Rohrabacher referred to of having a greater visibility over what costs are. And I am pleased to report today that we are well underway and aggressively implementing that schedule, which I am sure we will explore here a little more today.
And lastly is the budget and performance integration effort, which is, I think, bringing life or breathing life into the Government Performance Results Act of 1993, which Congress provided the tools to establish that linkage between the resources and outcome objectives that are established. And so we are putting a tremendous amount of attention to the performance plan that will be delivered here in the weeks ahead with the objective of identifying, with precision, what we seek as outcomes and performance criteria to achieving that, and, therefore, the resources to achieve that effort. So those are—that is the primary effort is to get about implementing the President's Management Agenda in a very aggressive way.
The second area, I guess, in terms of just program highlights and budget initiatives that I think we will explore again as a matter of discussion here this morning, as well. Some of the accomplishments is a continuation of our Mars Odyssey effort and the continued observations that we will be coming back with to include a press conference tomorrow at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory out in Pasadena, California, the JPL Center, that will be announcing some of the findings that have been accrued just in the course of the last few weeks. So stay tuned for some of the results on that one. It is—we are going to collect up all those and discuss it tomorrow as part of that discussion with those principal investigators involved.
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We are also preparing in fiscal year '03 for the—to launch the Mars Lander, which is due for deployment, you know, about midyear and expected for arrival there in the early part of fiscal year '04.
Continuing efforts on the Hubble Space Telescope, to include specifically tomorrow's flight of the STS-109 orbiter—the orbiter Columbia—to service the Hubble Telescope for the fourth servicing mission, which will have the effect, according to the folks that are looking at the composite approach of what we are planning for that unprecedented, historic five space walk effort that will be required in order to upgrade and service that telescope, will improve the clarity and definition and capability of that telescope by a factor of ten. So all the astounding developments we have seen merge from that particular instrument in the course of the past year, I think we need to strap in and be ready for some really extraordinary improvements even to that.
And in the continuing aggressive shuttle launch rate that will occur over the course of the next 18 to 24 months to support the continuation of build-out of the International Space Station, to support things like, again, tomorrow's mission to Hubble, as well as a range of other science objectives that will be supported by specific launch missions that will be pursued. So those are the continuing efforts that we are about.
But the new initiatives that we are also introducing as part of the fiscal year '03 President's Budget Request dominated by two primary areas, the first of which is to look at power and propulsion initiatives, to decrease the time it takes to traverse the extraordinary distances just within our own solar system, to overcome what has been characteristically our capacity to get to exoatmospheric condition in 10 minutes from earth and then be on cruise control or coast from that point forward. We are trying to put as much of our energy as we can into looking at propulsion systems which could then conquer some of the extraordinary distances, just again within our own solar system that we seek to launch as part of the effort in fiscal year '03 to include examination of nuclear power, power propulsion efforts, and power generation systems that would achieve that objective.
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And then a very vigorous implementation, and an effort to begin on the Space Launch Initiative to seek what alternatives we may see down the road for orbiter replacement, as well as our opportunities to continue in near-earth orbit as well as in a wider range of exploration opportunities in the decades ahead.
The third area of focus is on our education initiatives. This is an area that I know many members of this Committee are very, very interested in, have spent a lot of time contributing to NASA's efforts to extend and, indeed, part of our effort that I have become convinced in talking to several members of the Committee of what is really important about what we do as contributing to the larger education objectives.
There are opportunities and things that we do every day that can contribute to that agenda in creative ways. And part of it, I think, comes down to the simple proposition of bringing in folks who have a familiarity with what the education objectives will be and understand what the—really extraordinary science and technology achievements are that we are capable of producing and making available in those kinds of environments and in those kind of settings.
And so, as a consequence, one of the two-fers that I have managed to succeed in doing here in the course of the last two months is recruiting a gentleman to be the General Counsel at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, who is an accomplished lawyer, never served in Federal Government before. So that is truly astonishing development, is dragging anybody into the federal service who has not had that opportunity. And had a very successful practice that he has resigned and come to work for us. But his primary effort in this regard, on the education agenda, is served as the President of the State of Louisiana School Board during the course of the last couple of years. And as a consequence of his focus on that area, I am looking forward to Paul Pastorek's contributions not only on the legal agenda, which is so important, but more importantly on the education agenda as well.
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Finally, the—on the International Space Station itself, which I am sure we will explore in great depth here this morning, let me just touch on a couple of different points of what we are seeking to focus there. Certainly, guided by the Young Panel recommendations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Advisory Council's panel effort that Tom Young led last fall, very clearly laid out a series of recommendations which I consider to be the more pointed of recommendations I have seen emerge from any commission or any effort that has been undertaken in any association I have had in public service. It really is an incredibly well thought out and very thoughtful blueprint to how to proceed.
And we are implementing and about the business of implementing much of what is contained in the Young Panel recommendations to achieve at least the near-term objectives of reliably, safely, and with certainty, accomplishing the U.S. core complete objectives for International Space Station.
But more importantly, the approach that we are about as a means to implement that set of recommendations is to look at five parallel tracks of what are necessary to identify the areas we need to focus on for Station and to assure that we can accomplish core complete and then examine and explore what those excursions would be to accomplish the larger assembly complete objectives that may be feasible.
The first one is to—as, Mr. Chairman, you identified, in your opening statement, as well, is to be driven by the science and have a very clear understanding of what those science priorities are that we seek to have explored in this very unique atmosphere and capability that Space Station provides for us. And so to ask the scientific community within NASA, as well as the larger external community outside of the agency, to concentrate, focus, and be very clear about what the priorities are, that we seek to have our professionals who are deployed in that very challenging atmosphere, as the astronauts, to conduct in that atmosphere and to be clear about what it is they think they can achieve by this action, is our first objective.
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So taking the Young Panel's recommendation and proceeding with a very disciplined approach to assemble leading members of the scientific community, to organize and prioritize what the science and research agenda will be on Station in this span of time, is our first effort. And we expect to see the results of that, according to the Chair and Vice Chair's report, as of yesterday, by the middle of—certainly late spring, early summer time frame.
The second area is to look at what the engineering and systems integration challenges are. This is no mean feat to try to fill out what the basic elements of U.S. core complete will entail over the course of the next couple of years.
It bears mentioning right now that it is an engineering marvel of historic proportion that we have managed to have an operational capability that operates today seven days a week, 24 hours a day, with two Americans aboard today and one Russian commander who is aboard at this moment for the Space Station team in a continuous orbit effort that is still requiring of at least two more years of very challenging systems integration work that needs to go on before we achieve what is referred to as node 2 in order to build out the assembly complete opportunities for all the international pieces yet to come, as well as our own.
So a lot of what is going to have to happen in the course of these next two years, and spending a lot of time yesterday, as a matter of fact, at Johnson with the engineering team, is to get with precision all the issues that are required to integrate the systems and components and modules to achieve that result.
The third area is to get a real handle on, I think as Mr. Rohrabacher referred to as well, what the cost is going to be. And there is no question that part of our effort in parallel of establishing a NASA cost estimate, as well as an independent cost estimate, which supported the Young Panel findings, is to achieve that by this summer to have a firm fix on exactly what the cost is to accomplish U.S. core complete in that time span that we are looking at.
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Fourth, is to really examine the international partnerships. And, Mr. Hall, I can assure you that my reading of the international agreements at this juncture is, we are complying to the letter of those agreements. And everything we are planning to do through U.S. core complete through the next couple of years certainly comports with that set of agreements to the letter. And we have gone through that at great detail.
I have met with a lot of our international partners. And our discussions are about what do we do to look at excursions beyond U.S. core complete that can be achieved from an engineering standpoint, that can meet the science and research objectives and priorities that we are attaining, and do that in a way that we can reliably, safely, and certainly accomplish those tasks.
And the last piece of this effort in parallel is to look at what the operational requirements are to support the International Space Station and the launch rate that is required of the U.S.—or shuttle orbiter requirements, as well as the Russian progress launches, and to make that compatible with what the sequencing is going to be of the engineering and the systems integration challenges yet to be accomplished here for U.S. core complete.
But there is a range of other science operations that are required there too, which is to try to figure out exactly how we can achieve the best, most useful time on the part of each of the astronauts and to get that science objective down.
So those are the five areas on Space Station which I suspect we will talk about a lot more. Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with just one observation, I guess, as well, and to at least announce to the Committee that we are also pressing on with establishing and filling out the leadership team at NASA. The President has announced his intention and, indeed, has sent up the nomination papers for General Charles Bolden to be the Deputy Administrator. And we hope the Senate will act on that particular recommendation expeditiously, because I could sure use the help.
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And, number two, the President also announced his intent to nominate, and provided the paperwork as well to the Senate Commerce Committee, of Mr. Robert Cobb to be the Inspector General. He is currently on the staff of Judge Gonzales in the White House Counsel's office. So we welcome him and look forward to his early confirmation and appointment by the President.
And we also announced, in the last two weeks, the appointment of Jefferson Howell to be the Director of the Johnson Space Center, an accomplished gentleman of 35 years of experience in the United States Marine Corps, having retired as a Lieutenant General. He is a leader, a proven demonstrated manager, and a gent, who in the last four years has been in industry and knows an awful lot about safety considerations as well as how to run a big operation.
I mentioned Paul Pastorek, and certainly others that have been appointed here as well. Glenn Mahone is the Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs; Jeff Bingham is the Legislative Affairs—two very seasoned professionals, and a lot more to come.
The only downside that I have seen in the course of the last couple of weeks is the announcement of the intent of Mal Peterson to retire, our Comptroller of the better part of 30 years of experience at NASA. He is a gentleman I have come to admire and know in the course of the past year. But we are not going to let him get far. We are hoping to keep a tether on him even after he departs from NASA from his great service——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.
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Mr. O'KEEFE.—in a month or so. Mr. Chairman, again, that summarizes and concludes the statement I have submitted for the record. And I thank you very much for your indulgence this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It is a great honor for me to appear before you today in my new capacity as NASA Administrator. As you know, this is my first hearing in this role, and I look forward to working with this Committee as, together, we help shape the future of NASA.
It has been said by many—and I agree—that NASA is a ''crown jewel'' of the Federal Government. I have used that description many times as I have traveled around the country these past eight weeks visiting all of NASA's primary centers of operation. But I have also learned, as I have met and visited with NASA's employees and contractor support personnel, that, while NASA may be a ''crown jewel'' of the Federal Government the ''crown jewels'' of NASA are its people.
I have heard and felt their excitement and seen their technical and scientific competence first hand, and it has instilled in me a great sense of pride—and a good measure of humility—to have been given the opportunity, not only to join them in this storied Agency, but to lead it.
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My testimony today will catalogue the vast and varied range and scope of NASA's current undertakings and describe some of the many important advances and achievements accomplished during the past year. It will summarize the President's FY 2003 Budget Request, for which we are seeking authorization. It will not, however, attempt to chart the full course of the future for NASA or the Nation's space program. It will not do so, because I believe that must be a collaborative undertaking, joined in by the leadership and the people of NASA, the NASA and scientific advisory communities, the interested individuals and organizations among our citizenry, our aerospace community, other agencies and offices within the Executive Branch, our international partners and, importantly, those Members and Committees of the Congress with jurisdiction over and interest in the future activities and budgets of the Nation's space program.
As I begin my tenure as Administrator, you will see me take steps to reach out to all of these communities of interest to help us chart the course for the future, at the same time we are addressing the important and pressing challenges before us today. I will return to this Committee, both formally and informally, to seek your input and guidance as stewards of the public trust and partners in the fulfillment of our shared responsibilities for the future space policy of this Nation.
NASA was created as an agency of the Government: to do those things that are beyond the horizons and capabilities of individuals and the private sector in the realm of aeronautics and space exploration; to develop and demonstrate capabilities and possibilities that, quite simply, would not be done if we did not undertake them. In so doing, we often go where no one has gone before, and in that effort there are risks and uncertainties. But we have a responsibility to our ultimate stakeholders—the taxpayers—to make every effort to manage those risks and understand those uncertainties. The FY 2003 budget that we present to you today reflects the Administration's commitment to fulfill those obligations. It builds on the current budget and policies to give us all greater confidence in the directions we are taking with our existing programs, such as the International Space Station.
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The President's budget proposal of $15.1 billion (including full funding of Federal retiree costs) for fiscal year 2003 also reflects the Administration's commitment to NASA's core research efforts and its fundamental mandate to advance aeronautics and aerospace science and technology, and initiates exciting new efforts in the realms of space transportation and propulsion. It builds upon our abilities to measure and understand our home planet and the natural—and unnatural—forces that shape our environment. I believe it is a well-balanced and progressive budget that allows us to set the stage for the future directions that—together—we will define.
FY 2003 Budget Request Detail:
International Space Station
The International Space Station (ISS) is without precedent in the history of the U.S. space program. The ISS Program has had a year of spectacular technical achievement, which includes ground preparation and checkout, launch integration, and on-orbit assembly and operations. In the unique environment of space combined with research, exploration, human innovation and creativity, the ISS holds the potential to forever improve the quality of life on Earth. Soaring overhead every ninety minutes is the largest human-engineered object ever to orbit the Earth; a fully functioning international spacecraft with contributions from almost all of the international partners and a fourth Expedition crew currently conducting 26 research investigations, operating the onboard systems, and participating in the ongoing assembly and outfitting of the space station. Since the launch of the Service Module (SM) in July 2000 there have been 20 successful U.S. and Russian missions to the ISS.
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To date, the ISS Program has achieved remarkable technical successes; however, it has not been equally successful in controlling cost growth. Last year, NASA projected an overrun in the amount needed to complete the space station, as then planned, of up to $4.8 billion. While some of that may be attributable to such factors as inadequate initial requirements definition, added content, late element delivery, development problems leading to cost variance, and a relatively flat annual budget profile rather than the typical bell-curve of a development program, there are clearly areas of fiscal management and program control that need improvement.
The President's Budget Blueprint for FY 2002 laid the groundwork for attaining cost control and regaining credibility for the program to fulfill its true potential. As a result, a course was prescribed to get cost growth under control and restore confidence in NASA's cost management, and to achieve the science priorities for which the Nation has made a large investment. We are continuing with the intensive reassessment and review activities that we began last year that followed the blueprint, but did not eliminate the cost challenge. The President's FY 2003 budget projections include about $500 million of savings that NASA will realize through implementation of identified program initiatives, and a process that continues to seek additional savings while containing the threats to further ISS cost growth. This process allows the balancing of savings and cost threats as NASA continues to achieve U.S. core complete within available resources. While steps taken last year were designed to contain cost growth and to gain better understanding of its source and nature, this year will be one of corrective action—putting in place the right processes, tools, management controls, and measures to improve and evaluate the ISS program.
Thanks to the efforts of the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force, led by Mr. Thomas Young, we are well along in effecting proper cost controls and regaining credibility. The IMCE Task Force was instituted to perform an independent external review and assessment of cost and budget and provide recommendations on how to ensure that the ISS can provide maximum benefit to the U.S. taxpayers and the international partners within the Administration's budget request. The Task Force concluded that, while there has been unequivocal technical excellence in the execution of the ISS Program, there must be an equally high level of competency in the management of financial resources for which they are entrusted. I have reviewed the Young team's recommendations and have endorsed them as a roadmap to improve the ISS Program management. As a result, the ISS management has already taken actions to develop implementation strategies. To maintain continuity while we implement the recommendations provided by the IMCE Task Force (endorsed by the NASA Advisory Council), I have asked Mr. Young and the members of the Task Force to continue to be available in an advisory capacity as we move forward to implement their recommendations and make other necessary changes. I strongly believe that NASA will benefit from their expertise and guidance.
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Guiding our efforts at reform and revitalization of the space station program will be the following five points:
1. Research Priorities—Establishing an integrated portfolio of science and technology priorities that maximize the benefits of space-based research within available resources.
2. Engineering Development/Deployment—Development of a program road map that focuses on successfully achieving a ''core complete'' configuration. Should NASA demonstrate that reforms are implemented and cost credibility is regained, this will enable future decisions towards a requirements-driven ''end state'' that will, defined in terms of science priorities, allow an expanded research potential for us and our international partners.
3. Cost Estimation and Analysis—The ISS is the largest and most complex program ever pursued by the United States. Implementation of improved methodologies, tools and controls are underway and will allow us to regain credibility and improve our ability in financial forecasting and strategic planning capabilities. These projects will be beneficial across the Agency.
4. International Partnerships—Maintaining cooperative international efforts and reaffirming NASA's strong commitment in understanding their concerns and continuously working with them in the spirit of cooperation.
5. Mission and Science Operations—Advanced planning for Space Shuttle and ISS operations to maximize the productivity of on-orbit research and ensure the safety of real-time operations.
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An important challenge before us is maintaining the ISS international partnerships. Our partners have expressed their concerns stemming from NASA working to first get the fundamentals right to achieve U.S. core complete; and then to identify options beyond U.S. core complete that realize the full potential of the ISS. Although the configuration of the ISS has been modified to meet the cost challenges we face, the fundamental purposes remain—research and international cooperation. To reaffirm NASA's strong commitment to its international partnerships, I have formed a team to meet with representatives of all our partners to understand their concerns and to work with them in the spirit of cooperation. We seek the same level of excellence in managerial and fiscal performance that we currently demonstrate in the technical realm on orbit.
The program is vigorously pursuing a clearly defined set of cost requirement and estimation capabilities that will lead to a complete life-cycle cost estimate for remaining space station work and continued operations. As you know from my previous testimony before this Committee, I have been among those most concerned by and critical of the cost challenges facing the ISS, and you can be assured that no stone will remain unturned within the program and the Agency as we seek the answers and capabilities needed to bring this situation under control.
But there is even more that must be done to achieve the realization of the space station that many on this Committee have fought for many years to support and sustain. I believe that, in addition to addressing the cost challenges of the ISS, we must make a renewed determination of the research goals and on-orbit capabilities that we want the space station to achieve. Our priority should not be to simply build a space station to a specific hardware complement and then seek research and experiments to make use of that hardware. Rather, our emphasis should be on redefining the scientific and technological goals we have for the space station and then shaping the vehicle to enable us to meet those goals. Only when we have agreed on those goals can we be fully equipped to determine what capabilities are needed to achieve them and, more importantly, what resources are needed—whether in crew-time, crew-size, module content or other platforms—and whether committing the funds to make them available is the best investment for advancing NASA's science and technology objectives.
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Space Shuttle
NASA is proud of its historic record of 106 missions and, in particular, the accomplishments of the last year in support of the ISS. Last year, seven Shuttle missions were flown with five of those missions launched during a six-month period. The Shuttle has delivered to the ISS the U.S. Laboratory module; solar arrays for power generation; the ISS robotic arm, Canadarm2; the Joint Airlock that was used to performed the first ISS extra-vehicular-activity; several tons of logistics; and the delivery of three Expedition crews.
However, there are major challenges for the Space Shuttle Program: to structure its cost, technical and operations management processes, procedures, and infrastructure for the future; to meet planned launch requirements within available resources; to prioritize and implement safety upgrades as planned; and, to continue pursuit of competitive sourcing. These challenges will be addressed within the FY 2003 budget request of $3.208 billion, as the Space Shuttle program continues to meets its goals of: 1) flying safely, 2) meeting the manifest, 3) improving supportability, and 4) improving the system.
The budget request reflects an IMCE Task Force recommendation adopted by NASA that reduces the number of Shuttle missions to ISS to four per year. This allows NASA to fund increases in the cost of shuttle operations, while still meeting ISS assembly requirements for core complete in FY 2004. The FY 2003 budget provides for four flights in FY 2003, five flights in FY 2004 (four ISS and one Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission), and four flights per year thereafter. NASA is working to ensure that limiting the flight rate will not have undesirable cost and technical impacts to Agency programs and to determine whether any additional flights are necessary.
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During the development of the FY 2003 budget last year, significant cost growth was identified in the FY 2002 baseline Shuttle operations program. To mitigate this growth, NASA cancelled or deferred a number of shuttle upgrades—one of which was experiencing technical difficulties and cost growth. Consistent with the IMCE recommendations for the ISS, NASA reduced the Shuttle flight rate to four which provides additional savings. In addition, NASA Headquarters developed Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) site selection criteria to evaluate the OMM capabilities for both the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the Palmdale facility. Safety being the primary objective, NASA evaluated the risks associated with performing OMM at KSC and decided to consolidate OMM operations at the launch site.
The FY 2003 budget request continues to invest in the Space Shuttle to ensure it remains viable for meeting NASA's needs for at least the next decade. These investments, which total $1.35 billion over the next five years, are an integral part of NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) which also includes investments in the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) for NASA's next generation reusable space transportation system. Space Shuttle investments include $148 million for high priority safety improvements for the Space Shuttle ($596 million over five years), $93 million for Space Shuttle supportability upgrades ($410 million over five years), and a $76 million investment in revitalizing the aging Shuttle infrastructure ($340 million over five years).
Funding is provided to continue work on several of the planned safety upgrades. Specifically funded in this request are the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU), the Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) and the External Tank Friction Stir Weld. The CAU will enhance crew situational awareness and reduced crew workload. The AHMS will improve the monitoring of engine performance in real-time; Phase I of this has been approved for first flight in 2004. The External Tank (ET) project office is implementing friction stir weld technology that improves flight safety by increasing barrel reliability for weld joint strength. ET manufacturing processing time and procedures will also decrease and improve, respectively, because of this upgrade. Finally, several ''Industrial Engineering for Safety'' projects (work tools, processes, infrastructure enhancements) have been identified and are proceeding towards approval and implementation.
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The Space Shuttle is a national resource, and is the only U.S. vehicle that can launch humans into space and return experiments from orbit. A replacement vehicle for human transportation to space is not expected for at least another 10 years. Since the early 1990s, NASA has reduced the annual budget for the Space Shuttle by approximately 40 percent (adjusted for inflation) by completing major upgrades (such as the advanced turbopumps), implementing operations efficiencies and completing a series of contract consolidations. In FY 1997, NASA turned over a significant portion of the fleet operations responsibilities to the Space Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC), the United Space Alliance, thus transferring management of day-to-day operational activities for the Space Shuttle from NASA to industry. With the President's FY 2003 budget, NASA will continue to pursue Shuttle competitive sourcing that could enable the further consolidation of Space Shuttle operations with the possibility of privatizing the program based on the following criteria:
1. Safety. Maintain safety over operating life for at least the next 10 years. Provide for appropriate Government role to ensure essential safety features.
2. Competitive Sourcing. Transfer appropriate NASA personnel, assets, and facilities needed for Space Shuttle operations to a private entity. Enable NASA to focus on advancing the state of science, technology, and exploration.
3. Competition. Ensure a competitive environment to satisfy Government space launch requirements and maintain a robust U.S. space launch industry.
4. Cost. Establish a baseline and conduct cost comparisons based on the full cost (operations, maintenance, upgrades, infrastructure, personnel) of the Shuttle program, not to exceed the President's 2003 five-year budget for the Shuttle.
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5. Business Base. Enable pursuit of other Government and commercial business opportunities consistent with principles of a level playing field and international trade policy. Business risks from dependence on outside business will be borne by a private entity, not the Government.
6. Future Plans. Ensure consistency of Shuttle launch commitments, upgrades and infrastructure investments with future decisions on development of new launch systems.
The benefits of competitive sourcing are: 1) greater flexibility to recruit and retain the skilled personnel necessary to safely operate the Shuttle; 2) potential for continued efficiencies in Space Shuttle operations by moving to a private organization that has greater flexibility to make business decisions; and, 3) significant culture change at NASA by making it a purchaser of services rather than an operator of infrastructure. Adapting such an approach may allow NASA to focus on advancing the state of science, technology and human exploration. At the same time, pursuit of this objective will require careful and deliberate analysis of the potential benefits and challenges to the Government.
In October 2001, NASA chartered a Shuttle Privatization Task Team to perform a top-level definition and assessment of potential business models for privatization. The team identified potential issues in implementing privatization that are being further refined by an independent external Business Review Team, chartered in January 2002. The Business Review Team is comprised of industry experts from a variety of disciplines, including insurance, investment, financial, and technical fields. The team is to develop a family of alternative business models for consideration, and to test each business model with assumptions appropriate for Space Shuttle operations, such as ensuring continued safe operations with adequate safety checks, and ensuring continuity of flight capability during any transition to a new business model. A fundamental premise is that options for future competition will be preserved. The team will also assess legislative and policy changes that may be required for implementation of a new business model. NASA expects to use the assessment of the Business Review Team to prepare for NASA interaction with industry through a Request for Information. NASA is working to an ambitious schedule for Space Shuttle competitive sourcing, targeting to be poised for a possible transition to this new business arrangement in FY 2004.
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Space Access
NASA continues to rely on commercial launch services to meet the demand of NASA's free-flyer missions. NASA's FY 2003 budget request of $87.5 million will support a variety of Space Access requirements. NASA has 12 dedicated Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) launches and one secondary payload launch planned in FY 2003. Seven missions are planned for launch from Florida and three from California. NASA's ELV program continues to afford the Agency a high level of launch success, with an impressive flight record of 98 percent (55 of 56 missions were successfully deployed from ELV's since 1987). We continue to work with industry and the DOD to assure reliable cost effective access to space for NASA missions, despite the current stagnation of commercial demand. The Payload Carriers Program plans to award the Checkout Assembly and Payload Processing Services (CAPPS) contract in June 2002. The major elements of the CAPPS contract are Payload Processing and Integration at KSC to include ISS re-supply and return, Multi-Purpose Logistic Module (MPLM) processing, payload and experiment processing, test and integration, and host services for ISS Shuttle, and unique NASA ELV payloads that cannot be processed through commercial facilities. NASA has structured this acquisition to enable transition to increased commercial operations in the near future.
Space Science
NASA's Space Science Enterprise seeks to answer fundamental questions concerning: the galaxy and the universe; the connection between the Sun, Earth and heliosphere; the origin and evolution of planetary systems; and the origin and distribution of life in the universe. The Space Science Enterprise comprises many research and development activities, including flight missions, major space-based facilities, technology and mission development programs, and research and data analysis.
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In 2001, the Space Science Enterprise produced many notable scientific results: the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) discovered a supernova blast that occurred very early in the life of the Universe, bolstering the case for the existence of a mysterious form of ''dark energy'' pervading the Universe. The Chandra X-ray Observatory took the deepest X-ray images ever and found the early Universe teeming with black holes, and captured the first X-ray flare ever seen from the supermassive black hole at the center of our own Milky Way galaxy. High-resolution images obtained by the BOOMERANG (Balloon Observations of Millimetric Extragalactic Radiation and Geophysics) mission were the first to bring the cosmic microwave background (the radiation remaining from the ''big bang'') into sharp focus.
In addition to these discoveries that have enhanced our understanding of the origin, evolution, and structure of the Universe, many discoveries were made in the rapidly growing field of extra-solar planet (planets outside our Solar System) detection. NASA and National Science Foundation-funded astronomers discovered eight new extra-solar planets, bringing the total number to about 80. Observations from the Submillimeter Wave Astronomy Satellite (SWAS) provided the first evidence that extra-solar planetary systems contain water, an essential ingredient for known forms of life. And astronomers using the HST have made the first detection and chemical analysis of the atmosphere of a planet outside our Solar System.
Within our Solar System, NASA spacecraft made stunning achievements. In a risky flyby, the Deep Space-1 (DS–1) spacecraft successfully navigated past comet Borrelly, giving researchers the best look ever inside the glowing core of icy dust and gas. DS–1 passed just 1,400 miles from the rocky, icy nucleus of the more than six mile-long comet. In the culmination of the NEAR (Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous) Shoemaker mission, the spacecraft achieved the first landing ever on an asteroid, the asteroid Eros.
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A pair of spacecraft, the Mars Global Surveyor and the HST provided astronomers with a ringside seat to the biggest global dust storm seen on Mars in several decades. The Mars Odyssey 2001 spacecraft successfully achieved orbit around Mars following a 6-month, 286 million mile journey. Odyssey entered its science-mapping orbit in early 2002, following completion of the aerobraking operation, and will characterize the composition of the Martian surface at unprecedented levels of detail.
The Sun-Earth Connections program, which seeks to develop a scientific understanding of the physical interactions in the Sun-Earth system, had several important scientific accomplishments in 2001. The Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) observed the largest sunspot in ten years, with a surface area as big as the surface area of thirteen Earths.
The year was capped by the successful launch of the TIMED (Thermosphere, Ionosphere, Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics) mission, which will study a region of the Earth's atmosphere that has never been the subject of a comprehensive, long-term scientific investigation.
NASA's FY 2003 request of $3.414 billion features two very significant changes from the previous baseline program: a reformulated planetary program (New Frontiers program) and a program to develop safe and reliable nuclear power and propulsion systems. In the field of planetary exploration, the FY 2003 budget takes a fundamentally different approach from previous years. Given cost growth and schedule delays, all funding for Outer Planets missions is eliminated in FY 2003 and subsequent years. These missions will be replaced by a revamped planetary program, structured along the lines of the highly successful Discovery program, that will include a clear set of goals and science priorities, and mission selection through a fully open and competitive process.
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A new element of the space science program will be the research, development and incorporation of new nuclear electric propulsion and nuclear power technologies. Although these technologies are complex, the objectives are simple: nuclear power will dramatically increase the operational lifetime of landed spacecraft and enable exploration of regions inaccessible with solar power, thereby greatly increasing the scientific return from missions of exploration. Nuclear propulsion greatly increases mission flexibility, enabling new science missions, more in-depth investigations, and greater flexibility in reaching and exploring distant objects.
Nuclear power technology will also be incorporated into the Mars Exploration Program, specifically in the Mars Smart Lander/Mobile Laboratory mission. Mars Smart Lander will now be launched in 2009 to allow the incorporation of nuclear power, instead of 2007, as previously planned. The nearer-term missions in the Mars Exploration Program remain essentially unchanged. In May and June of 2003, two highly capable surface rovers will be launched to Mars, with landings on the surface expected in April and May of 2004. The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO), to be launched in 2005, will analyze the surface at unprecedented levels of detail to follow tantalizing hints of water detected in images from the Mars Global Surveyor. MRO will measure thousands of Martian landscapes at 8–12-inch resolution. In 2007, a competitively selected Mars Scout mission will be launched, and the Smart Lander will follow in 2009. This robust program of orbiters, landers, and rovers is poised to unravel the secrets of the red planet's past environment, the history of its rocks, the role of water and, possibly, evidence of past or present life.
The FY 2003 budget supports the completion of development of many significant missions, including Gravity Probe-B (GP–B), the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), and the Stratospheric Observatory For Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA). GP–B, which will verify a key aspect of Einstein's theory of general relativity, will be launched in October 2002. SIRTF, the fourth and final Great Observatory, is scheduled for launch in FY 2003. SOFIA development activities will continue, with the telescope being installed and tested in 2003. Development activities supporting the Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO), the Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST), the final HST servicing mission, as well as several key payloads such as Solar-B and Herschel, will also continue in 2003.
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The FY 2003 budget request also provides funding for focused technology programs, including early technology development of strategic missions such as the Next Generation Space Telescope and the Space Interferometry Mission. By testing new technologies and providing key science data, missions like these are on the critical path to developing future capabilities to achieve long-term space science goals, such as detecting and imaging Earth-sized planets outside our solar system. Funds are also provided to continue operations of approximately 30 spacecraft; for New Millennium Program flight validations of new technologies; and to conduct robust research and analysis, data analysis, and suborbital research campaigns.
Earth Science
These are exciting times for NASA's Earth Science Enterprise. New NASA satellite views of Earth from space are providing new perspectives on how Planet Earth works. New observations measure how the Earth is changing in response to natural and human forces. Our Nation and the world community are confronted with the prospect of future climate change and its myriad potential consequences. Substantial uncertainties remain in our understanding of the Earth's climate, and our ability to predict change and make sound decisions based on reliable predictions is hampered by these uncertainties. The global view afforded by the vantage point of space and the scientific expertise to translate these views into useful knowledge is NASA's unique and essential contribution to the Nation's global change research endeavor. And these views of Earth are finding increasingly broader application to challenges faced by businesses, agriculture, and local governments across the Nation.
NASA is well along in deployment of the Earth Observing System (EOS)—humankind's first attempt at an ordered study of the major interactions of the Earth's continents, oceans, atmosphere, ice cover, and life. Daily global observation of winds over the oceans by NASA's QuikSCAT satellite are being used by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to improve marine weather forecasting. The improved NOAA forecasts will predict the onset of storms and hurricanes up to 42 hours in advance over both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The first globally-consistent, 30-meter resolution data set based on Landsat imagery is nearly complete, allowing global assessments of land cover change and its impact on the cycling of carbon through the Earth system. In addition, global radar topography data from the Shuttle Radar Topography missions will improve the imaging of the land surface from 2–D to 3–D , with direct applications to national security, natural hazard mitigation (e.g., volcanoes and earthquakes), and transportation and water resources management. NASA-sponsored researchers discovered that aerosols (i.e., particles suspended in the atmosphere) can enhance or retard precipitation depending on their origin and type. NASA also provided the first detailed radar maps of Antarctica showing rates of movement of ice from the interior to the oceans. Through innovative partnerships between industry and NASA, we achieved a 10-fold increase in our capability for computational modeling of climate change over the best that was available in early 2001. This is but a sampling of the wealth of new knowledge streaming from the Nation's investment in NASA's Earth Science Enterprise.
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The President's FY 2003 request for Earth Science of $1.628 billion extends this trajectory of success. It supports review, coordination, and planning with other Federal agencies as NASA completes the deployment of the first series of EOS satellites. The budget provides for Major Development, Research and Technology, Mission Operations, and Mission Support. All elements of the Earth Science Enterprise are aimed at the goal of answering science questions of societal importance as documented in our Research Strategy. This Strategy, endorsed by the National Academy of Sciences, lays the essential foundation for progress toward the President's goal of addressing the uncertainties in climate change, as well as in improving the Nation's ability to predict weather and natural hazards. The FY 2003 budget request for Earth Science will assure public and private sector leaders and citizens have the information they need to make sound decisions wherever climate, weather, natural hazards and other global and regional changes play a part.
Earth Science Major Development comprises the development and launch of Earth science satellites, and the development of the EOS data and information system (EOSDIS) to acquire, process and distribute the resultant data and information. The FY 2003 budget request reflects the completion and launch of several EOS satellites, and transfer of EOSDIS operations requirements to Mission Operations. In FY 2002, NASA will launch Aqua and SORCE, and complete development of ICEsat and SciSAT for launch in early FY 2003. Aura will be completed and launched in FY 2004, marking the full deployment of the EOS first series of satellites.
The FY 2003 budget request continues funding for next generation of EOS missions, including the continued development of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP). NPP serves simultaneously to extend essential measurements begun by Terra and Aqua and demonstrate new technology for NPOESS, the converged civilian and military weather satellite system. This budget also funds the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), which is being planned as a commercial data purchase. Landsat data are the most widely used land imagery data, and are employed in agriculture, forestry, and urban and regional planning throughout the United States. This budget also funds the formulation of an ocean topography mission to follow the Jason mission launched in 2001. This new mission is being implemented in partnership between NASA, NOAA and their European counterparts as another transition mission (along with NPP) between research and operational mission agencies. We will also undertake study of a potential global precipitation mission (GPM) to measure rainfall worldwide for both climate research and assessment of impacts on fresh water availability around the world.
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The Administration is conducting a review of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and its alignment with the President's Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI). Consequently, NASA has deferred initiation of any new major EOS missions in FY 2003 until the Administration has completed its review.
The Earth Science Research and Technology budget funds basic research, applications activities, and technology infusion. The research program funds competitively selected, peer-reviewed proposals from universities, Government labs, and industry, and comprises the intellectual capital to plan and exploit Earth science missions to answer science questions of societal importance. Products planned for FY 2003 include the characterization of global sources of carbon monoxide, and integrated data sets for the study of sources and sinks of tropospheric aerosols. Both are important factors in influencing the Earth's climate system. We will also use satellite and in situ observations to develop a high-resolution model of the Pacific Ocean to assess the impact of seasonal and decadal variations in ocean dynamics on Earth's weather and climate.
The goal of the Applications, Education and Outreach activities is to expand and accelerate the realization of economic and societal benefits from Earth science, information and technology. NASA has developed a new Applications Strategy to guide plans over the next ten years to partner with local governments, academia, and the commercial remote sensing industry to demonstrate new applications of remote sensing data. Central to this Applications Strategy are partnerships with service provider organizations such as NOAA, FEMA, and USDA who define the needs, work with NASA to demonstrate new applications, and implement them with various commercial and local partners. For example, the Administration believes that a powerful opportunity exists to develop and apply Earth Sciences capabilities to solve important aviation challenges. Air travel in the U.S. and worldwide is seriously limited by poor short-term (0–6 hour) weather forecasts, vaguely defined icing and turbulence boundaries, and other weather issues. High resolution sensing and precision forecasting using advanced space-borne systems offer breakthrough opportunities for improving the operational efficiency and safety of air travel. Two competitive solicitations for new applications ideals will be issued in FY 2002, resulting in selections of new partners in FY 2003. Such partnerships are anticipated to result in new products to enhance aviation safety, efficiency in agricultural production, and lower-cost planning of infrastructure by U.S. cities and states. The Earth science education programs train hundreds of new graduate students and thousands of new and in-service teachers each year, giving rise to the next generation of scientists and engineers to power the U.S. economy.
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NASA's Earth Science technology infusion program is making possible the next generation of Earth observing satellites to study climate, weather and natural hazards. These will be cheaper and far more capable than today's satellites due to technology investments in new instruments, new communication pathways, and new spacecraft systems. Our investment in advanced technologies will also help shorten the development cycle of satellites and hence their overall life cycle costs. This budget continues development of Earth Observer-3, leading to the next generation of geostationary weather satellites that will measure atmospheric temperature and humidity for weather and climate research.
The Earth Science Mission Operations budget supports operation of twelve satellites, operation and maintenance of the ground system for command, control and handling of data and information resulting from them. The request reflects the transfer of the EOSDIS operations requirements from Major Development, given the near-completion of EOSDIS development and the shift in emphasis to operations and technology evolution. The EOSDIS has been serving millions of Government and private-sector users by providing data and information from NASA satellites during the past two years. In addition to operating spacecraft the EOSDIS acquires, processes, and distributes data gathered by the EOS missions. This data will lay the groundwork for the government as well as commercial and academic partners to generate the higher-level data products. These higher-level data products will make it easier for researchers, educators, policy-makers and the public to understand and use ESE satellite data and information. We are now demonstrating, for the first time in the history of civilian remote sensing, formation flying and a constellation of multiple satellites whose collective power is greater than their sum, and act as a super-satellite.
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Biological and Physical Research (BPR)
NASA's Biological and Physical Research (BPR) Enterprise seeks to exploit the space environment to conduct research and to develop commercial opportunities, while building the vital knowledge base needed to enable efficient and effective systems for protecting and sustaining humans during extended spaceflights. The FY 2003 budget request for BPR is $842.3 million, which includes $321.8 million for Biological and Physical Research Programs, $347.2 million for ISS research capabilities, and $173.3 million for Institutional Support. BPR addresses the two fundamental challenges associated with human spaceflight: (1) understanding nature's forces in space; and (2) understanding the human experience in space.
Established in FY 2001, the BPR Enterprise closes its first year with a significant record of accomplishment. Congress and the White House have shown their strong support for the new organization by increasing its FY 2002 budget and by adding the ISS research hardware development program to its responsibilities. The FY 2003 budget includes funding for new initiatives in space biology and space radiation research. During FY 2001, BPR initiated a program of research on the International Space Station to take advantage of available resources during the construction phase, released three separate solicitations for research proposals, and strengthened its research investigator community.
BPR also established a new Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Agriculture, conducted a joint research solicitation with the National Cancer Institute, and continued work under 18 other agreements with the National Institutes of Health. In a truly auspicious sign of things to come, a BPR investigator received the Nobel Prize in physics for ground-based research that he and other Nobel laureates plan to extend and expand on the International Space Station.
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ISS Outfitting and Research
ISS outfitting for research began with the delivery of the Human Research Facility in March 2001. NASA delivered to orbit two research equipment racks in mid-April and an additional two at the beginning of Expedition 3 in August. The Agency is on-track to deliver another five research equipment racks by the end of 2002. In spite of a significant unscheduled load of ISS upkeep and troubleshooting activities, the ISS team was able to meet the minimum research objectives of the first three research increments. Expedition 4 is currently ongoing.
After a year of continuous human occupation, the ISS now has five research racks. There are 25 unique payloads and 29 investigations currently underway aboard ISS, representing research from government, industry and academia. By the end of Expedition 4, 34 payloads and 51 investigations will have been carried out since ISS construction in orbit began. This is a balanced program of scientific exploration that will contribute, along with ground-based research, to the fields of biology, physics, chemistry, and the long-term effects of spaceflight on humans. Included are several experiments sponsored by the private sector and focusing on bone loss treatments, plant growth, pharmaceutical production, petroleum refining, and education.
BPR investigators reported a series of important findings in 2001, including research with applications in space and on the ground. Results from earlier flight investigations suggest that the human brain contains an internal model of gravity and that this model may be very difficult or potentially even impossible to ''unlearn'' (Nature Neuroscience, 4, 693–694, 2001). This experiment raises the possibility that the nervous system may contain a ''hardwired'' model of gravity. If confirmed, this would be a fundamental discovery that could influence medical treatments for people with damaged or impaired nervous systems. In addition, this finding has important implications for the design of safe and efficient environments and systems for human spaceflight.
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In what may be a breakthrough for astronauts and osteoporosis victims alike, researchers were able to prevent bone loss using mild vibrations (FASEB J, October 2001). BPR researchers were able to counteract the bone loss in rats when their hind limbs are relieved of the weight of the body by exposing the rats to mild vibrations. This study opens the door to a new method for controlling the one percent per month loss of bone that astronauts experience in space, and clinical studies are planned to determine the usefulness of vibration for treating or preventing osteoporosis on Earth.
Early in the year, BPR researchers reported that they had ''brought light to a full stop, held it, then sent it on its way'' (Physical Review Letters, January 29, 2001, Vol. 86, Issue 5). Researchers used lasers they developed under BPR funding to bring a beam of light to a complete stop in a specially designed trap, and then released it again. In atomic physics research, Dr. Wolfgang Ketterle, a BPR-funded investigator, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics for his seminal BPR-funded work on Bose-Einstein Condensate, a new state of matter in which a large number of individual atoms behave as one.
In biotechnology research, a research group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology grew heart tissue with ''significantly improved'' structural and electrophysiological properties, using NASA bioreactor technology (Journal of Physiology-Heart and Circulatory Physiology, Jan. 2001). The NASA bioreactor allows researchers to grow tissues in the laboratory that much more faithfully reproduce the properties of natural tissues in the body. These tissues allow researchers to explore mechanisms of disease and may ultimately improve processes for creating engineered tissue for use in treatment and transplant.
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An important discovery from Space Station research has revealed growth patterns in microscopic crystals that could lead to improved manufacturing for pharmaceuticals and other materials.
In addition, StelSys (a joint venture of FVI and In Vitro Technologies) signed an agreement with NASA to explore commercial applications of bioreactor technology research specifically in areas related to the use of tissue cultures for the in-vitro testing of the efficacy of medical drugs. StelSys will fly liver cells as part of an ISS experiment this year.
Expeditions 4, 5, and 6 will fly during FY 2002 and experiments continue in the areas of biomedical research, biotechnology, microgravity fluid physics research, materials science, agriculture, and Earth observations. NASA continues to prepare for ISS on-orbit research through the preparation and testing of five additional research racks and ongoing payload crew training. In addition, NASA looks forward to launching STS–107, a Space Shuttle mission dedicated to biomedical and biological research.
NASA is pleased to report that, in support of the strategic goals of the BPR Enterprise, the President's request includes funding for two new initiatives: ''Generations'' and ''Space Radiation.'' The Fundamental Space Biology Program will initiate a new ''Generations'' project to study the adaptation of organisms to the space environment over several generations and the capacity of terrestrial life to evolve in space. The project will employ ground based research and both the ISS and autonomous ''free-flyer'' platforms in different orbits, including High Earth Orbit beyond the Van Allen radiation belts. This will enable researchers to study the effects of the spaceflight environment on biological systems and processes, adding to fundamental knowledge, and may enable the development of countermeasures and life support technologies for future space missions. On an interdisciplinary basis, Bioastronautics Research, Physical Sciences Research, and the Fundamental Space Biology Programs will accelerate BPR's efforts to develop knowledge, tools, and techniques to address space radiation health issues. This ''Space Radiation'' initiative was prompted by the need for an increased understanding of the effects of the radiation environment in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and beyond, and the establishment of more restrictive guidelines for astronaut radiation exposure levels. The ground based research initiative will generate knowledge, assess health risks to astronauts, and develop radiation shielding design tools and strategies, and countermeasures that can be employed aboard ISS and future space missions.
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The FY 2003 funding plan for ISS Research is consistent with last year's determination to reduce funding for Research equipment and utilization to fund the cost growth in development and operations of the ISS Program. The ISS Research program is being adjusted to maximize science return based upon the ''U.S. Core Complete'' configuration and reduced Space Shuttle flight rate. Consistent with recommendations from the IMCE Task Force, BPR is undertaking a thorough research reprioritization activity employing a committee of outside experts to focus the research program on the highest priority investigations requiring access to the space environment. In addition to stressing the maximization of research return from the ISS, BPR will actively seek options for broadening its access to flight platforms in pursuit of the answers to its driving scientific questions. NASA will work with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to engage the scientific community and reestablish clear high-priority, affordable science objectives with near-term focus on improving scientific productivity. The results of this review will help set the BPR science agenda that will, in turn, drive how the ISS is used. It should increase the efficiency and output of ISS research and realign NASA's ISS research portfolio to reflect current priorities. NASA expects to release details of the plan for this activity soon.
NASA has carefully considered the option to establish a non-governmental organization (NGO) to manage the U.S. share of ISS utilization, as previously recommended by the National Research Council and directed by both the White House and Congress. These considerations have included three external studies and one internal study conducted over the past three years and posted to public web sites in an effort to keep all of our stakeholders informed of progress. The study phase is now concluded, and NASA is prepared to begin the competitive sourcing process this year, in order to complete the process in FY 2003.
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During FY 2003, NASA expects to coordinate with the Administration and Congress, as we undertake steps necessary to finalize the scope and conduct formal information exchanges with an external community that has demonstrated a strong interest in pursuing the most efficient and effective approach to ISS utilization. NASA is enthusiastic about this opportunity and the potential it holds for achieving the fullest possible engagement of our Nation's intellectual resources across the Government, academic, and industrial sectors. In preparation, we have nearly completed a preliminary NGO Implementation Plan, which addresses Congressional requirements. NASA plans to submit the plan to the Congress shortly.
Aerospace Technology
NASA's FY 2003 request for the Aerospace Technology Enterprise is $2,815.8 million. We are striving to bring about the future of flight through revolutionary science and technology. The Aerospace Technology Enterprise mission is to advance U.S. preeminence in aeronautics and space research and technology, and we aim to radically improve both air travel and access to space. A modern air and space transportation system is fundamental to our national economy, quality of life, and security of the United States. Because the U. S. air and space transportation system serves both critical national security needs and the public good, ensuring the continued health and preeminence of that system is a key issue for the future of the Nation. To this end, the Aerospace Technology Enterprise has reorganized its program management and budget structure, consistent with Congressional direction. There is now a clear linkage between national policies, Enterprise strategic goals and the program management structure that provides a foundation for transparent, measurable performance reporting. The new management approach is now fully aligned with Aerospace Technology Enterprise goals: Revolutionize Aviation, Advance Space Transportation, Pioneer Technology Innovation, and Commercialize Technology.
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Although major technical advances have made our Nation's air and space transportation system the largest and best of its kind, the future holds critical challenges to its continued growth and performance. In parallel with the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) that guides our space transportation programs, NASA has also created an Aeronautics Blueprint that comprises an integrated, time-phased cohesive strategic vision that can solve today's challenges and lead to a new era of aviation progress in the 21st Century. Our programs are conducted in cooperation with other Federal agencies, primarily the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Defense. NASA is strengthening these partnerships to take advantage of the national investment in aeronautics and space capabilities and eliminate unnecessary duplication.
Revolutionize Aviation
Without a revolution in the aviation system, it will be impossible to accommodate the projected tripling of air travel within two decades in a safe and environmentally friendly manner. Revolutionizing the aviation system to meet the demands for growth means we must provide a distributed flexible and adaptable network of airways—within the physical and environmental constraints of today's system. We must and will address the civil aviation system's fundamental, systemic issues to ensure its continued growth and development, thereby giving backbone to the global transportation system and assuring global economic and cultural success and vitality.
The Revolutionize Aviation goal to enable, in both the near- and long-term, the safe, environmentally friendly expansion of aviation is supported by three programs—Aviation Safety, Vehicle Systems, and Airspace Systems—each of which makes an essential contribution to the fulfillment of this goal. The Aviation Safety program is developing and demonstrating technologies and strategies to improve both aviation safety and security by reducing both aircraft accident and fatality rates. The focus of the Airspace Systems program is on safely increasing air traffic capacity with fewer delays and expanding the potential for a small aircraft transportation system to augment a system dominated by large commercial transports. The Vehicle Systems program is focused on developing the airplane technologies that will reduce the environmental impacts of both noise and emissions from increased aviation operations, and applying emerging technology, such as nanotechnology, to new, 21st Century airplane concepts.
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The Aerospace Technology Enterprise has made great strides in the reduction of NOX emissions, a known pollutant that degrades local air quality and adversely affects human health. In FY 2001, NASA-developed technology that reduces NOX emissions by 50 percent became available in new production jet engines. The extremely rapid incorporation of this technology into production systems demonstrates the importance of reducing NOX emissions as well as the professionalism of the NASA development team. The team has already begun working on technology that will reduce these emissions by an additional 20 percent. Sub-component testing of these technologies is already completed, and in FY 2003 testing of major components, such as combustor sectors, will be completed.
NASA is working closely with the FAA and the airlines to increase the capacity and efficiency of the National Airspace System. In FY 2001, NASA completed all work associated with the Collaborative Arrival Planner that provides the airlines with Air Traffic Management (ATC) situational awareness previously available only to the FAA. Currently operational in the American Airlines operations center and the Delta ramp tower at the Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport, it provides increased accuracy in the prediction of arrival flights to enable better decisions regarding flight diversions and pushback times, leading to improved efficiency of operations.
During FY 2003, the Aerospace Technology Enterprise will continue to work with the FAA in developing additional support tools and will deliver a toolbox of state-of-the-art models of the airspace system. NASA will also be conducting flight tests of concepts that will lower the required minimum space between aircraft during landing and increase the volume of operations at landing facilities without towers in non-radar airspace during instrument meteorological conditions.
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Advance Space Transportation
NASA is pursuing improvements in space transportation through a phased approach embodied within NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan. NASA recognizes that privately owned and operated launch vehicles lofting NASA payloads on a regular basis is the right strategy to free up the Agency's resources for scientific pursuit on the new frontier. The Aerospace Technology Enterprise has also been aggressively improving our partnership with the Department of Defense and working to identify their requirements and seeking areas of technology development that can be leveraged.
Last year, the 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (RLV), also known as the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Program, implemented the first phase of technology development and architecture concept definition efforts, awarding more than $800 million in contracts to industry and academia. The program goals are to significantly reduce the cost and increase the safety and reliability of space transportation systems. In its two-fold approach, SLI is designing complete space transportation systems that can fulfill civil mission requirements on commercially competitive, privately operated launch vehicles while reducing the risks needed to build and operate the systems. To that end, rigorous systems engineering identifies technology gaps and continually focuses the program investments to fewer, more refined architectures and their required technologies, toward a mid-decade decision for full-scale development.
This year, the Interim Architecture and Technology Review will narrow the architectures investigated in the first phase of the program for detailed concept development. During the scheduled November 2002 Systems Requirements Review there will be further integration and synthesis of NASA and commercial requirements for the 2nd Generation RLV. This important review will result in more focused attention on fewer space transportation architecture options and technology areas associated with them. Each industry partner will go forward with their most promising architecture, thereby driving technology maturation investments for the program while maintaining competition.
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SLI's vehicle airframe technology activities will continue in FY 2003 with the integration of an advanced Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring sensor and completion of the corresponding structural analysis algorithm development. Also undergoing extensive thermal modeling and analysis is the Ultra High Temperature Ceramic thermal protection system. This material has been developed to reduce thermal loading experienced on a vehicle during orbital reentry without adding additional weight.
In FY 2003, the propulsion project will see component testing of multiple main propulsion and on-orbit maneuvering systems leading toward full-scale tests in the following years. Vehicle propellant tank development activities will proceed with component level tests of new tank joint concepts. The test results will lead to new joint designs enabling dissimilar materials and geometries to be joined for strength while eliminating leaks.
The Space Transportation and Launch Technology Program, or 3rd Generation RLV, endeavors to improve launch system safety, reliability and cost leading to airplane-like operations in the decades to come. This effort is aggressively pursuing technology development and demonstration of multiple air-breathing rocket engines for hypersonic flight. NASA is teaming with the Nation's preeminent research organizations across the DOD, industry and academia to develop a National Hypersonics Science and Technology Plan. This investment strategy outlines a National roadmap for the research and development of operational hypersonic vehicles. By FY 2003, this program will have matured three revolutionary hypersonic propulsion systems to the point where an independent review team may make an assessment for the integration of the leading system candidate into a flight demonstration vehicle.
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Pioneer Technology Innovation
Under this goal, NASA aims to revolutionize the developmental processes, tools, and capabilities of the aerospace industry. In cooperation with all NASA Enterprises, our investment decisions are based on rigorous systems analysis of future systems needs. As the aerospace transportation systems of the future become increasingly complex, we need to develop a new approach to engineering that can examine and test safety, reliability and mission assurance before building hardware. Collaborative tools and human-like intuitive environments are critical to allowing us to ''virtually'' build and test vehicles and systems before we spend money on expensive hardware. System characteristics such as intelligence, rapid self-repair, and adaptability will come about through innovation and integration of leading-edge technologies, such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology systems. Pioneer Technology Innovation focuses on both specific technology innovations and the processes that drive them.
Three programs work in concert to pioneer technology innovation. The Computing, Information and Communications Technology (CICT) program focuses on developing and demonstrating revolutionary computing, intelligent and thinking systems, and advanced communications technologies that will enable, among other things, smarter, more adaptive systems and tools that work collaboratively with humans. The objective of the Enabling Concepts and Technologies program is to provide revolutionary aerospace system concepts that can enable other NASA programs to achieve their goals faster, cheaper and with more capability and expand future mission possibilities. This program aims to develop high pay-off/high risk technologies. An example would include advanced energetics technology to provide power and propulsion for enhanced mission capabilities and to enable missions beyond current horizons.
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The Engineering for Complex Systems (ECS) Program is a new and exciting initiative, (reformulated from Design for Safety), that will significantly advance our goal to pioneer revolutionary technology. ECS is a systems design research and technology program addressing the complex issues and methodologies concerning the next generation of NASA missions. ECS is a significant shift in the process of how systems engineering and operations are performed, and aims to place risk estimation and risk countermeasures for overall mission and human safety on a more rigorous, explicit, and quantifiable basis. This would allow design trades to be evaluated based on a risk factor, with the same fidelity and confidence used for other mission or system properties such as cost, schedule, and performance. In FY 2002, we will test a new generation of vehicle health management systems in a laboratory environment and in FY 2003 we will deliver an initial organization risk model and initial high dependability computing testbeds.
Commercialize Technology
Since its inception in 1958, NASA has been charged with ensuring that technologies resulting from its technology creation activities are shared and jointly developed with the U.S. industrial community, thereby contributing to the Nation's competitive position in the world market. The FY 2003 budget request supports continuation of this important aspect of our mission. The Agency's commercialization effort encompasses all technologies and innovations created at NASA Centers by NASA employees. About 75 percent of the amount requested for NASA's Commercial Technology Program effort is for NASA's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, which is focused on developing innovative technology needed for NASA missions. Simultaneously it has contributed to the U.S. economy, fostering the establishment and growth of over 1,100 small, high technology businesses.
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We are increasing our emphasis on establishing technology development partnerships that are relevant to NASA missions that could contribute to the fulfillment of NASA's unique mission needs and foster the creation of market driven technology products. We are focusing our partnership activity in those technology industry sectors important to the U.S. economy and whose technology needs map very closely to NASA's core competencies. These include sectors such as advanced materials, sensors, biomedical technology, and information technology. One objective of these high-value R&D partnerships is to accelerate the development of new technology by innovative leveraging of each partner's unique capabilities and to consequently reduce development costs and risk for both.
In addition to NASA's technology partnership initiatives, we are also continuing to transfer NASA technology beyond the aerospace sector and into the broader economy. For example, both market and national needs were addressed through a licensing agreement when Intergraph Government Solutions of Huntsville, Alabama, adapted a technology originally developed at Marshall Space Flight Center for mission critical enhanced video imaging. Marshall's scientists developed the Video Image Stabilization and Registration (VISAR) technology to help FBI agents analyze video footage of the 1996 Olympic Summer Games bombing in Atlanta, Georgia. VISAR technology enhanced nighttime videotapes made with hand-held camcorders, revealing important details about the explosion. Adaptable to many uses, Intergraph's Video Analyst System meets the stringent demands of the law enforcement industry in the areas of surveillance, crime scene footage, sting operations, and dash-mounted video cameras.
Strengthening Management
Consistent with the Government-wide President's Management Agenda, NASA is seeking to improve Agency management in a number of areas that will benefit all NASA activities.
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1. Improving Human Capital
Currently, NASA's work is accomplished by approximately 19,000 civil servants and 30,000 on-site and near-site support contractor employees. In earlier workforce reviews, NASA reduced the civil service workforce by approximately 25 percent between FY 1993–2000, including a 50 percent reduction in Headquarters FTE, and reduced supervisory positions by 52 percent, thereby increasing the Agency-wide supervisory ratio from 1:6 to 1:10. The foremost principle that arose from these earlier workforce reviews was that NASA, as a premier research and development agency, should do only those things that no one else can do. Work that can be done in the private sector should be performed there.
NASA is pursuing management reforms that will improve the ability of its workforce to meet the challenges of the future. NASA must continue to attract and retain employees with critical skills while depending on outside organizations for most others. However, NASA currently has skill imbalances in some key areas and new imbalances could occur as management reforms are implemented and much of the workforce is eligible to retire; NASA also currently has limited capability for personnel tracking and planning, particularly across the agency. To address these challenges, NASA is developing and will implement an overall human capital strategic plan. A component of this plan will be an Agency-wide workforce analysis and planning system. To the extent transformations of Agency efforts are implemented, such as Shuttle competitive sourcing and/or a non-government organization for ISS Research, the Agency must couple such transformations with human resources strategies that: transition necessary skills; minimize adverse impact on the NASA employees directly affected by the transformation; and ensure that the remaining NASA workforce has the necessary skills and dedication to accomplish the mission. Such human resources strategies may include a variety of tools, such as traditional tools of early retirement, buyouts, outplacement assistance, and reassignments, and may include new authorities such as benefits portability through legislative initiatives. NASA will continue to maximize its use of existing tools and flexibilities to recruit and retain critical talent and will pursue additional authorities as needed. Finally, NASA continues to take steps to further strengthen workforce development and knowledge management efforts, as well as to assure a qualified pool of potential future leaders. NASA recognizes mission success depends on a high performing diverse workforce. The Agency has devoted considerable attention and resources to assuring the availability and development of top quality talent and will continue in these efforts consistent with the Strategic Management of Human Capital Initiative in the President's Management Agenda.
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2. Competitive Sourcing
In order to effectively implement the President's Competitive Sourcing Initiative, NASA has consolidated the responsibility for FAIR Act Inventory and OMB Circular A–76 implementation under the cognizance of one office. The Office of Procurement will be the focal point for Agency-wide implementation of the Competitive Sourcing Initiative. Within the Office of Procurement, a competitive sourcing team has been established to coordinate activities at the various Centers to promote training, provide guidance for developing the 2002 inventory, and assist in selecting candidates for performing public/private competitions. We are currently developing the organizational infrastructure and establishing the necessary processes that will fully implement the Competitive Sourcing Initiative. NASA will incorporate the three major outsourcing efforts for Space Shuttle competitive sourcing, Space Station non-government organization, and Strategic Resources Review initiatives into its next FAIR Act inventory analysis. NASA will also develop an integrated competitive sourcing plan in 2002 to achieve long-term goals, including specific targets, costs, schedules and competitive sourcing mechanisms.
3. Improved Financial Management
The financial management element of the President's Management Agenda focuses on three Government-wide problem areas: erroneous benefit and assistance payments, a ''clean'' financial audit of the Federal Government, and accurate and timely financial information. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance states that an agency must meet the following criteria in order to execute the financial management initiative successfully:
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1. Agency receives an unqualified and timely audit opinion on the annual financial statements; there are no material internal control weaknesses reported by the auditors;
2. Financial management systems meet Federal financial management system requirements and applicable Federal accounting and transaction standards as reported by the agency head;
3. Financial information is timely and accurate;
4. Financial and performance management systems supporting day-to-day operations are fully integrated.
In evaluating NASA's performance against these criteria, OMB determined that NASA was making progress, but more work was needed before NASA fully achieved the objectives of the financial management initiative.
NASA has received a ''clean'' or unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements for seven consecutive years; the auditors have not identified any material internal control weaknesses. However, the audit of NASA's FY 2001 financial statements was conducted using new, stricter audit standards and the auditors did not express an opinion on NASA's financial statements. The auditors asked for more data than had been requested previously. NASA is working with the auditors to develop a better understanding of what data the auditors need and to work out a process for providing requested data to the auditors on a timely basis.
Due to the use of individual, non-integrated systems at Headquarters and Centers to meet statutory and regulatory reporting requirements, NASA reports its financial systems as a significant area of management concern in its annual report pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. While financial management systems are not integrated, NASA has implemented compensating policies and procedures that provide appropriate assurance regarding the fundamental completeness and integrity of internal accounting and administrative controls related to financial statements.
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NASA has underway a major effort to implement a single, integrated financial management system across the Agency. The Integrated Financial Management (IFM) Program consists of a series of projects that, when fully completed, will result in a single, fully integrated financial management system encompassing core finance, including budget execution; travel; resume; position description; budget formulation; human resources, including time and attendance and payroll; asset management; and, procurement. The resume project is complete and the remainder, except asset management and procurement, are underway. While all components of the IFM Program are important, the successful completion of the core finance project is particularly critical to the satisfaction of the four OMB criteria. Core finance will provide the cost accounting capability NASA needs to fully implement its full cost initiative and manage, budget, and account on a full cost basis. The core finance project is on budget and on schedule and adequate financial resources are available. Core finance will be fully implemented across NASA by June 2003.
In summary, NASA's IFM Program is on schedule and will enable NASA to meet OMB's criteria for the financial management initiative and better manage the taxpayer's investment in NASA. NASA will use IFM to improve budget tracking and program execution and increase the transparency and visibility of budget and performance data across the Agency and at all levels of management.
4. Expanded Electronic Government
OMB identified weaknesses in NASA's IT planning processes and documentation justifying IT investments. NASA is strengthening capital planning and investment control process to provide a balanced portfolio of investments not only for core business systems but also critical mission systems. The governance model for IT investment planning and control is being strengthened based on best practices in other Federal agencies and industry. NASA is also implementing a Government-wide IT investment control and reporting system to capture and document investment decisions through the entire life-cycle.
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Expanded electronic Government is a critical element of the President's Management Agenda. NASA is prepared to aggressively advance this call for citizen-centered Government and increased value to the citizen. As one of the four Federal Agencies that brought the Internet into being, NASA became an early adopter of the Internet for communicating science and engineering information. The Pathfinder web site held the Internet daily volume record for over 8 months and NASA web content has received numerous awards. NASA provides over 4 million web pages on FirstGov—more than any other Federal agency. NASA has implemented a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and has demonstrated technical interoperability with the Federal PKI bridge to promote digital signatures and increased security and privacy. NASA was the first Federal agency to provide our partners and suppliers with comprehensive online procurement opportunities, which provided the technical foundation for FedBizOpps—the Federal e-procurement portal. In partnership with industry and other government agencies, NASA has established a strategy to unify, simplify and web-enable our core business, engineering and scientific process to increase effectiveness, reduce costs and increase customer focus.
NASA will advance the E-government strategy through strengthening our information technology capital planning and investment control process to provide a balanced portfolio of investments not only for core business systems but also critical mission systems. As called for under the Government Information Security Reporting Act, NASA will aggressively implement the agency-developed IT security corrective action plan to strengthen our IT security posture. NASA recognizes the weaknesses called out by OMB in its analysis of our Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA) report and is working to remedy them. Examples of the actions we are taking include:
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1. Enhancing, by October 1, 2002, our existing performance metrics associated with scanning of our computer systems for vulnerabilities and how we respond to computer security incidents
2. Developing and implementing a standard Center IT Security incident reporting procedure by June 1, 2002
3. Developing and implementing a training measure for contractor system administrators by July 1, 2002
4. Strengthening our Disaster Recovery Plans and associated Corrective Action Plans documentation associated with Special Management Attention systems by July 1, 2002
5. Ensuring that 100 percent of our computer systems have security plans by July 1, 2002. Providing training on developing IT Security plans by October 1, 2002.
Finally NASA will pursue three key efforts to further the President's E-government agenda:
1. Transition and strengthen common IT infrastructure and shared services based on industry best practices to support ''one NASA''—a move from distributed business processes to federated, shared services;
2. Exploit the power of a single commercial off the shelf (COTS) solution for integrated financial management, executive information, budgeting, human resources, procurement, supply chain management. This accelerated agency-wide initiative unifies and simplifies business and management processes across the Agency; and,
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3. Deliver coordinated education themes and messages through a comprehensive set of exciting electronic linkage campaigns and research-based web experiences. These capabilities will be offered throughout the year to the general public, responding to citizen-based educational needs.
5. Budget/Performance Integration:
In further integrating budget and performance, NASA will be developing its FY 2004 budget in a full cost format with linkages between its main budget elements and performance metrics. In a full cost budget, all institutional funds will be allocated with the appropriate project. NASA is also working with OMB and other agencies in developing more appropriate means for evaluating the performance of basic and applied research programs.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I believe the programs, initiatives and Budget I have described represent a strong commitment to a healthy and forward-moving NASA. I believe it is deserving of the Committee's strong support and I look forward to working with the Committee to achieve authorization legislation that supports the President's budget request and includes the authorities and guidance that are needed to help restore the lustre of this ''Crown Jewel'' of our Government.
I believe we are at the beginning of a new dawn for NASA as we begin to address the challenges before us and continue in our efforts to expand the horizons of science and our understanding of our home planet and the solar system and universe of which we are a part. I know that the NASA family is eager to keep moving forward and that it is up to the tasks set before us in this budget and in our plans for the future.
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At the beginning of my statement, I mentioned the opportunity I have had to meet the men and women of NASA, working in our installations across this land. I have visited the Centers where they work and the communities they call home. We have a diverse and resilient workforce, and they are proud and excited about the work they are doing. They are our greatest asset and I believe our greatest hope for the future of this Agency.
Rather than finding them divided among separate, unique institutions, I have found them yearning for the important contribution of their work to have even greater meaning in the larger dreams represented by the Agency they serve. I have told them, as I now tell the Committee, that I have found one NASA as I have traveled the country; one Agency with one charter in which their programs, projects, and Centers play important roles, and a charter which—together—we will define to meet the challenges of our time and seek the opportunities of our future. They have shown me their desire to be a part of that one NASA and their expressions of support and the strength of their resolve, coupled with their eagerness and dedication, tell me that we can accomplish what we have set out in this budget to accomplish—and more.
Thank you.
77748d.eps
Discussion
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. And the Chair has been very generous with the time allowed for——
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
Chairman BOEHLERT.—your opening statement, because it is your maiden appearance and you have a lot to say, and it is important that we hear what you say.
Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades
Perhaps a whole lot of questions, but one that is of particular interest to me—a whole lot of them are. But the reduction that Mr. Hall referred to in the Space Shuttle Safety Upgrade Program—can you give this Committee assurance that that is not going to compromise safety?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Absolutely. And I think——
Chairman BOEHLERT. And that is critically important.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Absolutely. The approach that we are taking here in the coming fiscal year is a program of about $150 million. And, indeed, over the course of the next several years, we are planning a level approaching about 200 million a year to continue what are the safety upgrades required in order to achieve safety of flight.
In addition, there is supportability upgrades, which is another 100-plus million each year to achieve that goal as well. And I have met, just in the course of the last two weeks, with the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Safety Board, who are the external folks who look at what the safety standards need to be and what the condition of the assets need to be, and asked them to give us some recommendations on how we could be more aggressive about looking at modifications to improve safety of flight and——
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Chairman BOEHLERT. So your point is that safety remains first and foremost——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Absolutely. By all means.
Chairman BOEHLERT. And you don't feel that any way, shape, or matter safety is being compromised——
Mr. O'KEEFE. No way, sir.
Financial Audit
Chairman BOEHLERT.—by—all right. Fine. Now, this is a town that is paying a lot of attention to auditors of late by sins of omission or commission. But, you know, the Price Waterhouse Audit of NASA was incomplete because they said, in essence, they didn't have the information they needed to sign off on it. Respond to that, please.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Chairman BOEHLERT. We are concerned, obviously.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Me too. Ten days ago, the Price Waterhouse Cooper audit, where retainer managers came into my office and with the Inspector General and announced as how they would have to disclaim. After seven years of clean audit opinions that had been submitted, they would have to disclaim this year because the Federal Accounting Standards Board requirements went up in the course of this previous fiscal year. Again, this is the audit that concluded in September 30, 2001. That the audit standards had changed and that there was greater documentation required. And they advised us how they had not received all the documentation they thought was necessary to provide anything other than a disclaimed or qualified opinion.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. And are you proceeding and responding to that?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. We are indeed.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I mean, do you agree with that analysis?
Mr. O'KEEFE. We have asked them and have received assurances from them of what is necessary in order to assure that we provide the documentation which is a different standard than what we had been adhering to so that when the next audit occurs that they have all the documentation they require is there. Secondly——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, is there anything that we will have to do in the interim? I mean, do we have to wait until the next audit? Do—can't we do something to get this audit completed?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No. They have issued their opinion, again, 10 days ago, advised of this—they have issued their opinion which will be released tomorrow. So we had that period of time to react to what has been underway since they were retained in May of 2001. So we are underway at trying to comply with the efforts they are looking for and for 2002 in order to see what we can do to achieve that.
The second issue that they have raised, though, that I think is very important, is a feature which distinguishes between expense versus investment criteria that has just been implemented by the Federal Accounting Standard Board in terms of what—how do you categorize certain expenses. And they are not, as I have gathered from their discussion of 10 days ago, quibbling over the question of whether we have appropriately lined up the expense versus investment criteria that we have employed in accordance with the rules, but they haven't seen the documentation to support that.
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Now, the purpose of this is to either inform decisions about investment patterns, which we don't do. But we base our decisions on other investment strategies based on requests for appropriations from the Congress for specific investment programs. Or the other purpose is for depreciation schedules for tax purposes. Since we are a public organization and don't pay taxes, I don't see what the objective is there. So either way, I think, as a consequence of this criteria change, this is an interesting element, but it is one that we are providing documentation for a set of statistics. And I am not sure it will change decision-making, but we nonetheless will comply as directly as we know how to and provide the documentation to support that view.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Finally, your statement is rather general in nature—your comprehensive statement. What sort of agency do you envision a year from now? And can you give us as much specificity as you can?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. One that I hope is characterized as being the leading agency in the Federal Government for having implemented and aggressively administered the President's Management Agenda on all five points in a way that is the exemplar of how we should do business to provide, I think, exactly, as you characterized in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, an outfit that is run as efficiently as we know how, that is driven by the science. And that would be a way I would hope to see characterized in a year what our objectives are, that I can give you assurance of what the costs are, as well as what the science priorities are that we seek to pursue.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Hall.
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Crew Safety
Mr. HALL. Mr. O'Keefe, you say it will not compromise safety, and that is an excellent general statement to make. We couldn't live with any other statement and you couldn't afford to make any other statement. But, you know, to look beyond that statement, is that based on the fact that only three would be endangered instead of seven?
Mr. O'KEEFE. No, sir. I think whatever number of astronauts we deploy anywhere, we have an obligation to all of them to ensure that their——
Mr. HALL. And that is a fact, is——
Mr. O'KEEFE.—safety is there.
Mr. HALL. This is a fact, is it not, if you have a calamity up there and you have a Crew Return Vehicle that can bring back only three and you have nine up there, safety is not being compromised for the three that fight their way on the equipment, but you would leave six up there. Wouldn't you?
Mr. O'KEEFE. No, sir. I had a discussion-
Mr. HALL. What would you do? You can't put nine on there unless they hang on all over it like we do when we are going to a fish fry or something down in Texas. But ride all over the car, on the fender and——
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, they would have a difficult time getting the fish fry going up there, that is for sure.
Mr. HALL. Okay.
Mr. O'KEEFE. But they—as a matter of fact, I met with Frank Culbertson——
Mr. HALL. Yes.
Mr. O'KEEFE.—the Commander of the STS-108, yesterday, and Charlie Precourt and several of the astronaut core colleagues down there, and talked to them about exactly this question. And their recommendation to me was that what they are doing within the astronaut office is looking at what is called the safe haven concept of trying to figure out how do we quadrant off segments of Station to work through it. Because their strongest comment to me was—I mean, this was just yesterday—said we would look at departing, leaving, abandoning any vehicle we have as an absolute last resort. And even then——
Mr. HALL. But let me just agree with you——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Okay.
Mr. HALL.—that you are not going to compromise safety.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. I don't think you would. And I don't want you to use up all my time.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Sorry, sir.
Space Station Research
Mr. HALL. I listened to your testimony last November, when you were the number two official at OMB, and I have read your written testimony and listened to your remarks today as NASA Administrator. And because I am really searching—and it seems like sometimes you almost have to be ugly to get your point over—and I am just forced to say that I still don't know what your plan is for the International Space Station. And I don't think I am alone on that. Your written testimony says that, ''Our emphasis should be on redefining the scientific and technological goals we have for the Space Station and then shaping the vehicle to enable us to meet those goals.'' Another good general statement.
And I know it is a temptation for every new agency head to feel that not anything worthwhile has happened up until the time you got there. It might be the impression I would try to leave if I have had your job. But I think it is a fact that there have been 15 or more years of study and prioritizations of the research goals of the Space Station.
And here, sir, are just some of the stacks of reports here from very reliable and reputable—and people that we depend on—this Committee and this Congress, for information from distinguished scientific panels over the last decade that have looked at the research up to this time and looked at the priorities of the Space Station. And I can't believe that you are saying that this 15 years of scientific advice is wrong and that these distinguished scientists and engineers didn't know what they were doing. Now, that is what it seems to me. Maybe I don't read it right.
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But my question to you—isn't it instead the case that you are hand-picking another group to do yet another research prioritization because you cut a billion dollars from the Space Station's research budget and slashed the crew to three?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, you——
Mr. HALL. Can you give me a yes or no on that?
Mr. O'KEEFE. No.
Mr. HALL. Okay. So that is—you deny that.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. And isn't it further a fact that you—and I need to get all this in the record—is one reason I am reading it to you.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. I know you don't care whether it is in there or not, but I would like to have it in there.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. I do. Yes, sir. I do.
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Mr. HALL. And—oh, you do care.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. And——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Absolutely.
Mr. HALL.—now you just can't do the station research that the Nation's scientists and engineers were promised they could do.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No. That is not true, sir.
Mr. HALL. Well, you have talked of an orderly process for determining the priorities of the Space Station over the coming several months with the results to be presented to OMB and OSTP some time in August of this year. However, my staff has been informed—and I can't tell you who informed them—maybe you know—by NASA that you have already identified 140 million in Space Station research contracts that you plan to terminate in fiscal year 2002, a decision you made before your research priorities task forces even started this work. That is true. Isn't it?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know that to be true, sir. I—we——
Mr. HALL. Well, I mean, let me help to remind you of it.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. ISS research terminations here—OBPR has identified 140 million of terminations within ISS research for fiscal year 2002. This is your output. Is it not?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know what the document is you are looking at sir. But——
Mr. HALL. Do the people behind you know? They are——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yeah. But I would be happy to submit it for the record. I don't want to use your time, sir.
Mr. HALL. Okay.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Pardon me.
Mr. HALL. Well, I appreciate that.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. And you have talked of an orderly process for determining the research priorities of the Space Station over the next several months. I guess that your staff has been informed about this, but you are not sure.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. That is correct, sir.
International Obligations
Mr. HALL. Well, let me get right to another quick question here that I think needs to be asked. You—I have a—just a straightforward question. I think you can give me a yes or no on this, and I thank you for the yes or no answer you have just given me.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. Does the U.S. core complete Space Station fulfill U.S. obligations under the existing international agreements? Now, before you answer that, let me read to you something that has been said by the space—that the Space Station may lose their partners—from the Orlando Sentinel, December 7, 2002 [sic], where Jorge Feustel-Buechel of the European Space Agency said that, ''Such scaling back was such an unwelcome news that he had trouble persuading European leaders last month to stay in the program. They decided to block 60 percent of the future funding until the United States signaled it will keep its commitment.'' So that is one thing I want you to listen to.
And then the next is that Canada was quoted in November 16 of 2001, ''A scaled-back station would virtually eliminate the partners' collective ability to use the Station declares a diplomatic note sent on 1 November by Canada to the U.S. State Department. A three-person crew would limit Canada to 30 minutes per week, which is not enough time to conduct any meaningful science.''
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One last statement is by the Japanese, who said—Mr. Sagawa of Japan's Space Program said, ''The smaller crew is not acceptable. If the current three-person crew limit lasts much longer, the United States should offer to renegotiate the deal. The Italians told me just yesterday, we are in the dark as to the future of the Station and don't really know which way to go.''
Now, with those questions there, can you answer me, does the U.S. core complete station fulfill U.S. obligations under the existing international agreements? Just yes or no.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I can't give you a yes or no answer, sir. I am sorry.
Mr. HALL. Just do your best.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate the invitation. The—what we are going to attempt to do in this span of time of the next two years to get to node 2, is to comply exactly with all of the agreements and the pacing item of the systems integration of each component to reach U.S. core complete. Thereafter, what we would look to do is assess what are the right engineering and systems integration schedules with all of us as partners, in consultation.
Mr. HALL. I think my time is up. Maybe I will get back to you.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HALL. And I think we will be allowed to ask additional questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. [Presiding] Well, if I am still sitting here, if Sherry doesn't come back, I would be very happy to have a second panel of questions. But my time is up, so——
Chairman BOEHLERT. [Presiding] Mr. Weldon, the time is yours.
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. Thank you. Mr. O'Keefe, welcome.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. It is good to have you here.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
Funding Shortfall
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. The Congressional Research Service has stated that there is possibly a $603 million shortfall to core complete. Are you familiar with that?
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. I believe your agency has stated that it hopes to cover any such shortfall with some savings. Could you elaborate to the Committee a little bit on your idea of where you will find those savings?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Let me try it this way. I think through fiscal year '03, the President's budget as submitted—the resources are adequate to and acceptable to accomplish the challenging task of reaching and going through to node 2 to accomplish core complete for International Space Station. Beyond that period of time, there is, relative to the previous estimates, a shortfall on the order of magnitude of 600-plus million, which, frankly, I am not sure whether that is the right number or not. Until the independent cost estimate is completed this summer, which supported the Young Panel recommendations—the same team is coming over to NASA now to do an independent cost estimate—I don't know if that is the right number or not.
But it will arrive in time what the total estimate is, and one that I think we can put some reliability in—because I am confident enough in the way this system is being put together to do that—that will then offer to you some ideas as part of the fiscal year '04 recommendations as to how whatever additional costs may come to be.
It may be that they come back with a cost estimate that does not have that level of shortfall contained in it. I don't know what it is going to produce. So until that happens, until we have got a number that I think of on Station that is on the Space Station cost estimate that is reliable, going through the effort of trying to ascertain where the savings will come from is part of what we will reserve for the fiscal year '04 deliberations. For '03, I think you can be confident that the funding the President has requested for International Space Station is what is necessary to accomplish the task we have laid out as part of that budget assumption.
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Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. I realize you have only been in place for 8 weeks. But when I first got elected back in the mid-'90s, your predecessor informed us that there was something on the order of a $2 billion reserve fund in the Space Station program. As I understand it that money is all gone now. Have you looked at where that money went over the last six, seven years?
Mr. O'KEEFE. No. I have not done a forensic on the—on past history. I think, you know, the President's attitude on everything we do in this Administration is time starts now and the future begins immediately. But what I am looking at is the reserves we do have available now through the next several years, which is on the order of magnitude of about 150 billion—million a year. And on—approaching 200-and-some years through the next five. And so, as a consequence, there is a reserve there. So please be assured there is a reserve funds that are set aside.
So what you are talking about, that you have gotten from the CRS is a shortfall after accommodating what that reserve may be. And the choice is whether you use the reserve to cover that difference or until we wait to see what that cost estimate reveals as of now, as of this summer, that will inform what kind of changes we may want to make or whether we want to dip into the reserves to accommodate that. We will see. But we will definitely be back with you this summer for sure to walk through what those options and alternatives would be.
Space Launch Initiative
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. You and your boss, the President of the United States, have decided to apply a significant amount of money now and in the years ahead to the Space Launch Initiative. And certainly I support efforts to develop new technologies that would ultimately be applicable for reducing the cost of getting to orbit. It is something we have talked about and had many hearings on over the years.
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However, NASA does have a track record of consuming large amounts of money on programs that don't really bear much fruit at the end. When I came here in '95, there was still a lot of, I would say, bitterness about the NASP program and then, of course, we have gone through X–33 and X–34. Significant amounts of money have been spent on those programs. How can you assure us that SLI is going to be different? You have a track record of running a tight agency when you were with the Navy. It sounds like you are trying to do that again with NASA. How are we going to be different with SLI?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, Congressman, thank you for that assessment of my history and certainly my intentions are in that vein. And I will do my best in order to give you as strong an assurance as we possibly can. I guess the reaction wasn't that good to that comment.
Mr. WELDON OF FLORIDA. That was the Alabama delegation.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I was hoping for a more favorable view than that one, but what the heck. Nonetheless, I will do my best to give you that guarantee. One of the things we have to bear in mind, though, is the portfolio, the very nature of the things we do at NASA involves risk. And what is involved there is looking at what the current limitations of technology provide and how do we overcome those limitations by technology leap-ahead capabilities or trying to transcend what those limitations might be. And that involves risk.
And so as a consequence—but while I can't speak to what the past, you know, experience has been with any direct managerial involvement, I can tell you that what we are preparing to do in the portfolio and the program that the President has proposed here, is going to involve some risk. And it means we have got to look at some options that may not be as good as what we expect them to be. And the bigger challenge in my mind is making decisions early enough to, you know, cut bait and move on, if you will, in cases where it doesn't produce. That we not go so far down the road that we have invested an awful lot in what may be not as promising a technology advance.
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Nuclear Power and Propulsion
But, for example, in the issue I mentioned in the opening statement, of power generation and power propulsion capabilities, to get through the distances of just our own solar system, it takes the better part of 11 years to get from earth to the edge of our solar system under the current technologies of using the techniques and propulsion systems we have available today.
Part of what we have in this particular budget is a proposal to spend upwards of almost a billion dollars over the next five years to examine different technologies, nuclear-related, fusion, and fission systems as a means to cut down that distance, or to cut down the time that it takes to traverse that distance in a way that is more acceptable to inform the research, exploration, and discovery objectives. And to do that is going to take some risk. And the likelihood that I could sit here and tell you that there is guaranteed going to be success at that is—I think you ought to wonder whether or not I could do that. We are going to give it our best effort.
There is some great history to this. There is a lot of experience that both NASA, the Department of Energy, the Naval Nuclear Reactors Programs—all these different outfits have had in dealing with that. So I think our chances are pretty good. And on SLI, I would give you the same qualified assurance. We are going to look at what the most logical alternatives are and make determinations and down-select to options based on the most technologically achievable efforts we can get.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Gordon.
Core Complete Space Station
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe, welcome. As everyone has said, we recognize you have been on the job only a short time and you are probably still making some decisions. However, if we are to do our job with the reauthorization this year regarding NASA's programs and personnel, we need to know what decisions have been made.
Last fall when you were here, you were—I asked you, because of shortness of time, to be crisp, and you commented very well and you have done the same thing today. I thank you. So I will ask you to try to do that again. Again, last fall, I think, although maybe not unanimous, certainly the consensus opinion, both in this country and I think internationally, is that if we don't go beyond the core complete in the Space Station, all we are doing is maintaining a, you know, multi-billion investment and not really getting its full use.
You were not able, at that time, understandably to tell us when you were going to make a decision about going beyond the core complete, but you said you would try to do that this spring. We are sort of getting into spring. So let me ask you, when specifically will you make a decision on whether we are going to go beyond the core complete?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I think in order to position ourselves for any excursion from core complete to the number of permutations up to assembly complete, which is the original objectives, we would have to start framing what those options would be this summer as a way to put forward the fiscal year '04.
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Mr. GORDON. Excuse me. So clearly, I mean, if you don't get it this summer or late or early fall, then you have——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Right.
Mr. GORDON.—then you have taken yourself out of the next budget cycle.
Mr. O'KEEFE. It gets sportier. I think that is right. But——
Mr. GORDON. So then does that mean will you get it done by this summer?
Mr. O'KEEFE. That is our fondest hope, sir.
Mr. GORDON. Okay.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No doubt about it. And I am hopeful that we will see enough progress to support that kind of decision. That is my real hang-up right now.
Mr. GORDON. I think that is—I think that is fair.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
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Mr. GORDON. And we really—well, you know, this is a real threshold question and we look forward to hearing that in time for this next budget.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.
Shuttle Privatization
Mr. GORDON. In your testimony you also talk about—or in the written testimony you talked about potential privatizing the shuttle in fiscal year 2004. That means you will have to make decisions in time, once again, this summer or early fall. When will you report your intentions to Congress on the shuttle privatization?
Mr. O'KEEFE. The current business case analysis, I am told, is underway and should be due for completion by the time the current contract expires in September. There are a set of contract options that may be exercised thereafter and a number of alternatives that could be pursued.
Mr. GORDON. So you are still on track to do it for——
Mr. O'KEEFE. I think that——
Mr. GORDON.—the 2004 budget cycle.
Mr. O'KEEFE. We will see. I mean, I really want to see what the business case comes back with. And any competitive sourcing alternative that gives us some interesting ways to go about doing business we want to examine. And that is what the business case will examine between now and September.
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Mr. GORDON. So then when would the—when would government employees working on the shuttle program expect to receive layoff notices if you decide——
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know if—I don't know if they should expect that at all, sir. I don't know what the business case will——
Mr. GORDON. If you go to—if you are going to privatize though, wouldn't that be a logical assumption?
Mr. O'KEEFE. That is one of several different tools that could be employed in any competitive sourcing alternative, and until that business case is done, I wouldn't want to prejudge that outcome.
Mr. GORDON. But isn't that pretty logical, that if you are going to privatize, that would be the case?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I would not want to prejudge that outcome, sir.
Mr. GORDON. Well, in most things you have done in the past, has that not been the case?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know what has been done in the past. I——
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Mr. GORDON. Well, those things you have been involved in, in the past where you have privatized.
Mr. O'KEEFE. There have been any number of cases where folks have moved from one company to another——
Mr. GORDON. But the——
Mr. O'KEEFE.—or from one agency to another as a consequence.
Mr. GORDON. Right. But they wouldn't—and that might very well happen, but they wouldn't be government employees any longer.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Might not. I have seen all kinds of permutations of this.
Mr. GORDON. But that is not—but the usual is that they would not be around. Last fall, staff——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, I concur with that, sir, but, you know, again, I—well, you know there is a lot of options there.
Mr. GORDON. Well, that would be great if you can privatize and not—I am not saying you shouldn't privatize. But what I am trying to point out, though, if you do, then there is going to be government employees who will no longer be government employees.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, you can't—I think you have made a selection of which choice or which tool you would use in a competitive sourcing——
Mr. GORDON. Yeah.
Mr. O'KEEFE.—that I am not sure we are going to do. So I would hate to have a view out there——
Mr. GORDON. Well, again, and I am not saying that you shouldn't do it——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. GORDON.—and I am not saying you are going to do it.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes.
Mr. GORDON. I am just saying if you do do it, then there is going to be government employees that won't have a—or are going to no longer be government employees. Or how else can you privatize?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, if the function is no longer performed by the government, that is exactly right.
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Strategic Resources Review
Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well, again, which it may not be a bad thing. But I am just—let us just, you know, be honest about it. Okay. Last fall the staff were told that the results of the Strategic Resource Review would be released when the Fiscal year 2003 budget was submitted. We still have not seen those results. The fiscal year 2002 operating plan just arrived for our review. It proposed transferring up to $21.2 million to implement one of the recommendations of the SRR, a recommendation we haven't seen.
We have heard rumors that the SRR may contain recommendations about closing one or more NASA centers and shifting civil servants out of the government, among other things. Are these reports true?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Not to my knowledge, sir. And you are right, we are delayed in reaching closure on the Strategic Resource Review and——
Mr. GORDON. So when would you expect to release the set of SRR recommendations that you intend to implement?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I am hoping to in the course of the next few months. But again, with two months there, I am just becoming familiar with what the recommendations were and what the options are.
Mr. GORDON. So we won't get——
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Hopefully get them soon.
Mr. GORDON.—them for this budget period. But they will be in for the next budget period.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I think that is right. Yes, sir.
Mr. GORDON. We would have——
Mr. O'KEEFE. That would be my fondest hope.
Mr. GORDON. So we are going to have to go through our authorization this year without knowing those decisions.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I am sorry, sir. Pardon me.
Mr. GORDON. You want us to go through our authorization this year without knowing those decisions.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No, sir. I hope to be able to give you some visibility as we make them. As a matter of fact, one of the recommendations, for example, was on the—in an issue that Congressman Weldon was very instrumental in working through over the last several years, of looking at orbiter major modifications and how we consolidate those efforts. And that was one of the recommendations that has been made and it is included——
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Mr. GORDON. I am sorry. I meant—I don't mean to be discourteous.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Okay.
Mr. GORDON. I am just trying to——
Mr. O'KEEFE. I apologize.
Shuttle Launch Rate
Mr. GORDON.—get us—no, no, no. No. You are doing what you are supposed to do. In your testimony you said you were going to take an aggressive approach to the shuttle launches with four launches. Yet we are doing seven or eight now. So how is the four going to be an aggressive approach?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Four is what is required to support International Space Station systems integration, engineering, development efforts, and deployment.
Mr. GORDON. But if we are doing seven or eight now, how would you categorize four as an aggressive, using your words?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I am sorry, sir. I didn't finish the statement. I apologize.
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Mr. GORDON. Okay. Excuse me. No. No. No. Go ahead.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I apologize. That is the four that are required for International Space Station. Recall again, tomorrow we are doing one for Hubble. And throughout the course of the next two years, there are several launches that what we have set up is a——
Mr. GORDON. Okay. So there is going to more than four a year then.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Could be.
Mr. GORDON. So the aggressiveness was just you are going to be aggressive in supporting the Space Station.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. GORDON. But you don't know yet whether you will go beyond that.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I think we do.
Mr. GORDON. When do you think you will—when will you—be more—when do you think you will know?
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Mr. O'KEEFE. For each program that is to be launched, it will bear the cost of the launch costs. And as those particular programs are ready to be launched, that is when we will launch them, independent of Space Station. So it could be more than four.
Mr. GORDON. Because the budget only supports four. So you are saying if you go beyond four, how—where will that money come from?
Mr. O'KEEFE. The budget only supports four in the Human Space Flight, International Space Station line.
Mr. GORDON. Uh-huh.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thereafter, each of the individual programs that will be launched—for again, in the next Hubble servicing mission two years out, you will see that cost incorporated in the space science costs. For each of those individual programs that are launching using shuttle, those costs will be borne by the program.
Mr. GORDON. So that is going to be even more savings that will have to be necessary to incorporate those funds in there.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't think so. I think it is more that as we look at what the launch requirements are, the programs will bear those expenses to do that. And then, again, if you give the Congress total—and us, total cost visibility of what it takes to actually deploy missions.
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Earth Science
Mr. GORDON. And then no out-year funding is provided for the new Earth Observing System Missions pending completion of review of the Global Change Research Program. When will that review be completed?
Mr. O'KEEFE. My understanding is that the Department of Commerce, Secretary Evans has taken over, or has been assigned the lead responsibility for that initiative. And I have got to be updated. I have got to give him a call to find out where——
Mr. GORDON. But we are in the same situation. If we don't know by this summer or really early fall, then it is bumped over another budget cycle. Is that——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, it could be. But, again, there is a fair amount of flexibility given the fact that we have got some option and some maneuver room here. But let me check into it and I will get back to you.
Mr. GORDON. All right. Thank you. And I guess just to quickly sum up, Mr. Chairman, if I could.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair has been most generous.
NASA Budget
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Mr. GORDON. Well, you—he has been and I—and, again, we don't expect Mr. O'Keefe to have all the answers to everything. But we—again to do our job, we do need to know what you know when you know it so that we can move on with our responsibilities of reauthorization. And I think we have come to a—pretty much of a consensus, I think, haven't we, that any decisions that we don't know by this summer really are decisions that, I guess you say the result is no because they can't be in the next budget.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I think we have got to begin that debate this summer, but the budget development, as you recall, goes through the fall and the President's budget is then submitted for your consideration.
Mr. GORDON. Unless you are going to put some holders in there, there is not a lot of money to be—and particularly in this budget, this NASA budget, there is not a lot of money just sloshing around.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No, sir. That is true.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I think the point is well made. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time is expired. The distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Space Station
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I share my colleagues frustration over the Space Station and I would agree with Mr. Hall and my other colleagues who have suggested that it should be your number one priority to try to work out a situation where the Space Station is a success and the success will not be there unless we have a working laboratory and with a working laboratory we need at least a six-man crew. So I mean, I would suggest that out of all the NASA projects, this has to be a success or it is going to undermine our public's support for the entire space effort and hurt NASA dramatically.
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With that said, let me just say, those who are putting pressure on you now should admit not only that if you not—you have only been in 8 weeks, but the problems that you face were handed to you and were handed to this Administration. The contingency money that we are talking about that no longer exists was not spent during the last year. It disappeared in the years during the latter years of the Clinton Administration. So we need to understand that. And, yes, we can't spend a lot of time just talking about blame, but accountability is certainly important.
Also, let me suggest to my colleagues that when we are trying to follow through in making this Station a success, our goal is to work with Mr. O'Keefe in making this a success. What we need to do is offer him some alternatives. And if there is any number one rule of the universe, it is, you can't do something with nothing. And so if we don't want him to—you know, when he says that we only have so much money and this is what we can do with it, let us either find a new source of revenue by cutting another project or find a new source of revenue that we can channel in this direction. So let us work together on this rather than just thinking that we are going to put Mr. O'Keefe on the hot seat and make it look like he is the bad guy. Well, he isn't the bad guy. We have got to work together on this——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, you were doing just fine until you got to that point, Congressman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So——
Mr. O'KEEFE. I was going right with you all the way.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. But I personally put a lot of effort out, as you know, to try to find some other sources, and we will go through that some other time. But it—some of it has turned out to be pretty good and some of it is not. But let us work together, Mr. O'Keefe.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
X–33
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I would hope that my colleagues also try to find alternatives in how we can find those funds. You know, we spent over a billion dollars on X–33. And I will just have to say that I tried my best to make that program a success after the Vice President designated that that was the reusable system that we were going to try to do. And I didn't try to undercut that at all, but it did prove to be a bad judgment, and it cost us about a billion and .3. And I think we need to make sure, and I agree with you, Mr. O'Keefe, that there are risks in everything. But I think that we need to make sure that we minimize those risks. And I think that there were some mistakes made during the last Administration that—and were made because the risks weren't minimized.
For example, in the X–33 Program, it was selected even though the only thing we had was a—computer charts about the technology, where they had a—they did have an alternative where they had a g working model and they chose the computer charts with no hardware versus the company that had gone with the g working model.
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Aeronautics
One note about aeronautics—let us not forget that American industry and the aeronautics business is so important to our economic well-being in the United States. And I think it is up to NASA to try to finance those projects that would give us leap-frog technology over the competitors. As you know, there is a project that I have spoken to you about—the development of a new type of aircraft that could be used in commercial as well as military aviation. So I would hope that that would not be forgotten, and it is not an expensive proposition.
Finally, let me just note to all my colleagues that if we are going to be successful with Space Station and these projects, we have got to find ways of working with the Defense Department in making sure that NASA and the Defense Department are working in cooperation in the development of these new technologies. And if we are going to have—and if we are going to meet this budget challenge, we have got to really work hard to try to find the ways in which NASA can work with the DOD in this development. And maybe you have a comment on that and that is my question, as well as answers. Thank you.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Congressman. I—you know, on your last point I concur. I think we really need to explore technologies together with the National Security Establishment and a variety of different efforts that are underway there. We may end up, and we will, with different end-use objectives. But at least the technology, if we leverage it together, can really do some extraordinary things. And I have pursued that with Secretary Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, as well as other members of the National Security Establishment to get that kind of relationship solidly underway. And it is—it has been very healthy at NASA and I think we are just going to continue that. But I thank you. I appreciate your——
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Mr. Moore. Mr. Matheson.
Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe, I appreciate you coming here today——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes.
Mr. MATHESON.—and recognize you face some interesting challenges moving ahead. I would like to ask you just a series of questions about the Space Shuttle Program if I could.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Space Shuttle
Mr. MATHESON. In your testimony you did refer to significant cost growth that was identified in the '02 baseline program for the shuttle. But I wanted to ask you if it is—it is my understanding that the shuttle contractor has, in fact, been underrunning the projected cost of its contract.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yeah. I understand that to be the case, but I couldn't—let me respond to that for the record if you want me to give you a more precise number.
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Mr. MATHESON. If that is the case, and we refer to overall the significant cost growth, where is the—do you have a sense of where the significant cost growth is taking place?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Again, primarily in the support requirements, the upgrades we have talked about a little bit, some of the issues we may be looking at for modifications necessary. But as a general—let me give you a better, more comprehensive review for the record rather than consume your time here.
Mr. MATHESON. Okay. I appreciate that.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATHESON. I think that—you state the Tom Young Task Force had made a recommendation about cutting the annual shuttle flight rate down to the four flights per year. Was that Task Force recommendation made in the context of identifying savings that could be applied to the Space Station program?
Mr. O'KEEFE. There were two elements of their recommendations as I read that report, and in discussing it with Tom Young. The first one was that a rate of four flights per year is what was necessary to support the systems integration effort to finish core complete, as well as to provide the logistics and support requirements to the crew aboard International Space Station. That any additional savings from whatever launch rate would be in excess of that should be applied. And there is not a direct linkage between those two, between Station and shuttle the way we are looking at it here.
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We are trying to figure out, to accomplish core complete in the next two years, what is the launch rate necessary to support the systems integration challenge to get the engineering effort successfully and safely accomplished? And that is going to be the launch rate that we are going to be pursuing. It turns out to be four to five per year for the next two years, dedicated to International Space Station.
Mr. MATHESON. So the recommendation to cut it to four was not necessarily a cost-cutting recommendation. Is that what you are telling me?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Not necessarily. Yeah. There was a consequence of that as the way they described the report itself. But it—the primary issues that have really been working in the last couple of months here with the International Space Station Project Management Team is to look, independent of that, what is the launch rate necessary to deploy the nodes, the sequencing of components and modules, to fill out the International Space Station to core complete status through what is defined as node 2. And independent of the question of what the launch rate is, you guys tell me what it is that is there and that works out to be about four to five per year is what needs to be dedicated to that task based on that engineering analysis.
Mr. MATHESON. Okay. We have talked about, and it has been mentioned earlier, the reduction of 500 million in expenditures from the shuttle upgrades account. And at this point we don't know what our replacement is going to be for the shuttle in the future. We don't know—something is not being available until some time in the middle of the next decade probably. Are you concerned, or what would you describe is the rationale for cutting the safety and Supportability Upgrades Program in the context of where the undefined future we have for whatever is going to replace the shuttle?
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Mr. O'KEEFE. I guess my quibble would be with the term cutting it. It is, again, a fairly aggressive effort of 150 to $200 million per year for safety upgrades alone. And we have also asked the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Safety Board essentially, the external group that reviews this, to come back with what they think we should be doing to assure safety of flight through the service life that we are anticipating, at least through 2012, that would support the current schedule for Space Launch Initiative. So if there is a different number than that, I am looking to be informed by them, the external experts that are looking at this, as to how we ought to pursue that differently.
Space Shuttle Privatization
Mr. MATHESON. Do you believe that privatizing the shuttle is going to result in NASA saving significant money beyond what has already been achieved with the spaceflight operations contract under which NASA contracts for shuttle operations?
Mr. O'KEEFE. You know, in the dialogue I just had with Congressman Gordon, I guess I am not convinced until we see the business case what the right answer is and what competitive sourcing alternative we ought to pursue. But as soon as that business case comes in, that is when we really need to enjoin on the question, and then that will inform, in terms of what kind of efficiencies or savings or whatever may be achieved by doing it a different way. And one of the neat things about a competitive sourcing option of any variety is that it always yields, be it public or private, a definition of what you want the outcome and performance goals to be and then liberates folks to look at different ways to accomplish that task. That is what this business case is going to do for us.
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Mr. MATHESON. Can you remind me again—I know Congressman Gordon was asking you this—but do you have a sense of what the timing is going to be on that information?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Certainly by September, because that is when the contract renewal issue or the option to exercise needs to be initiated, and the business case is underway between now and then.
Mr. MATHESON. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. [Presiding] It just so happens it is my turn. And I am filling in for the Chairman. I will be brief. And I want to welcome you to the Committee. And listening to some of the line of questioning, I thought I should at least advise you and remind you that you are a volunteer. I mean, you are—so we appreciate your coming here and it is a tough job. Behind you I would suggest probably $100 billion worth of market capitalization corporations are represented who have an interest in what you do.
Several of the other questions that I was going to ask have already been asked and—but I do want to follow up with something that Mr. Rohrabacher said. And that is, not only do I think we want to see more cooperation between you and the Department of Defense, I would hope as—and let me get this plug in—I would hope that you would also not ignore small companies, because the big companies—and they do a great job. And I don't want to say anything negative about them. And some of the things that you do have—really have to be done by big companies. But there is an awful lot of interesting technology out there that small companies are involved with, and I hope you won't ignore them. And because I know some who have done work for NASA in the past and are sort of being crowded out right now. And I hope that won't happen.
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Universities and Small Businesses
And the second point I would make—and that is that there are a number of great universities here in the United States that I know participate in various research programs with NASA. And, again, I don't want to say anything negative about those large universities, but there are also some great little small universities, and some of them—minority colleges that do some very interesting things. And so, as you go forward, I hope you won't forget about them as well. Simply because, you know, they may not have the kind of representation that sits behind you, it doesn't mean that they are not important and that they can't contribute. And in some respects, small companies and small colleges may, in fact, be much more cost effective.
So I really don't have any other questions. Other than that, I just wanted to make that plug, and if you would like to respond, we would be more than happy to hear.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, sir. I could not agree more. The small business activities we are engaged in, I have been stunned to realize, were on the order of about a third of our contracting dollars are, you know, through either direct or by subcontract to small business concerns. Roughly 20 percent of our contract actions are with small business or set-aside interests as well. So it is really an incredible record.
But I—the central part of your observation, I think, is exactly right—is, it is the small businesses and some of the new upstart entrepreneurial outfits that are exactly in line with the kind of mission and charter of what NASA is all about—find new ways to look at the problem and to conquer the challenges that are out there. And I could not concur with you more. I think it is—that is where we find some really fascinating results and different ways to beat what are limitations of technology that exist today. And they have really been very creative and some great consequences of what we have been doing with them.
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Mr. GUTKNECHT. Well, thank you, Mr. O'Keefe. And we will—I, for one, will continue to remind you. Because we had a very interesting display yesterday of some interesting technology from my home state, here in the Science Committee room, and I want to thank all the members of the Science Committee staff for helping to make that happen.
But it—some of these companies are real small companies, but they have come up with some very, very interesting new ideas that may have application, whether it is national security or domestic security or in many other areas. So I want to thank you and welcome you and we look forward to working with you on the Committee. The bells have gone off. Can we go to one more?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, if you permit me real quick, as a further comment? Just last week, we did a small business awards effort and I would love to send you some of the really neat highlights of that. And I was just amazed at some of the things that some of our small business outfits are doing.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Well, Mr. O'Keefe, we are going to have to break to take a vote. Can you stick around until after the break?
Mr. O'KEEFE. At your pleasure, sir.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. I think what we will do, if Mr. Etheridge can limit his questioning to the 5-minute rule, we will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina.
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Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will. And let me, if I may, Mr. O'Keefe, say ditto to what the Chairman has said. I agree with him and there are a lot of small businesses. So many times they get left. And we give them awards and thank them for what they have done, but they don't get an opportunity to step up to the table when it comes to contracting time because they don't have the resources, and I hope that you would keep that in mind.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Let me also add my voice of grave concern to what you have already heard this morning as it relates to the crew size on the International Space Station. Because if we do not have the people to do the research—and I am going to bring you from a little different perspective—because we have an awful lot of school children—and I was a State Superintendent before I came to this body—and a lot of children compete to get an opportunity to have experiments. And if we cut those back, you cut out the opportunity for future young people getting involved in the Space Program and create—cut out the creativity that I think is so critical and important to doing the things in the future. So I hope you will comment on that.
Space Grants
But before I stop for that, let me move to one other issue and get all my questions in before my time runs out. Congress decided to increase funding for the Space Grant College and Fellowship Program by about $5 million in the 2002 NASA appropriation. Additional funding allowed competition for additional designated Space Grant consortia. In addition, it was used for—and I quote—''Competitive awards focused on workforce development to improve the NASA workforce pipeline and to strengthen the relationship between the consortia and NASA centers.''
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The increase in the Space Grant funded was to promote activity that OMB had said it supported mainly to increase the workforce development. Why did OMB cut the funding for the Space Grants? And, secondly, do you agree that Space Grant should be cut? And would you support the increased funding if Congress added the money?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Let me look into the Space Grant issue. I have—you are educating me on this and nuances to it that I am not aware of. So let me look into it and give you a call back or an answer for the record to be more specific because I would hate to wing it with you here.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. I would appreciate that. Thank you.
Space Station
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir. On the International Space Station, I agree that we really are focused on the science and research priorities. And our objective is to assure ourselves, our partners, our allied partners, are allied interests, all the international players, and the American public, and the Congress, that we can accomplish that task by looking at the ambitious objective of getting the U.S. core complete and then look at what excursions are necessary to accomplish assembly complete thereafter to maximize that science, technology and research objective. So we are after it and we are trying to pursue that as far as we know how to get—also to give you the reasonable assurance we can do it right.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Well, let me put an exclamation point that I think you will find this Committee, on both sides of the aisle, deeply interested and gravely concerned about that issue.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. And when the report comes in, we will be looking very closely, because I think to meet our international commitment, but more importantly to meet our scientific community and our education initiatives, that is a critical issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. We thank the gentleman from North Carolina. We will recess subject to the call of the Chair, which should be in about, I would say, 20 minutes. This is—there is one vote. It is on a rule. It is a closed vote, so I suspect they want us to go over there and vote on it. So we will recess subject to the call of the Chair.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
[Recess]
Chairman BOEHLERT. [Presiding] The Committee will resume. The Chair recognizes, for five minutes, Mr. Smith of Michigan. You are recognized.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nethercutt has to leave. So for one question, I would yield to Mr. Nethercutt.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Smith, and, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, sir. Glad to have you here. I am headed over to see your old boss. So I am under a crunch.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Give him my best.
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Good to see you, Congressman.
NASA Centers and Infrastructure
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Same here, Mr. O'Keefe. I want to just ask a quick question, and if you care to answer later for the record, in the interest of time. I don't want to infringe on Nick's or the Committee Chairman's time. We have a lot of—we have ten regional field centers for research. Langley just did a project in my district and it was just fabulous.
My question is, based on your predecessor's consideration of excess capacity or trying to make sure we are, you know, economizing appropriately, there has been some thought that it might be wise to maybe have fewer than ten. Have you given that any thought? And, if so, what would be your judgment? And, if not, would you think about whether we might look at sort of a BRAC (Base Realignment And Closure) of field centers and research centers that, perhaps, could save the agency some money to put to priorities that might be more acceptable or suitable in these times of difficult budget pressure?
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure. Well, again, in my vast experience of 8 weeks on the job here, I have yet to make an extended determination of what the infrastructure demands are. So trying to determine what capacity or excess capacity would be is kind of tough. But there is no question that what we have to be constantly mindful of, whether it is our own internal U.S. Government capability or by contract or whatever else, that the overhead or the indirect costs not exceed by a lot the direct cost we spend for research and development activities. So that is a metric we have really got to think about and set up a standard for. And in this particular case, it is about h to g indirect to direct that I think is roughly an R&D standard that is not way out of whack.
So for—as a crude measure, it is not way off the mark. But looking at every individual element of our capacity, I think we have really got to take a close look at that down the road, but I am going to need a lot more time than a couple of months to do that.
Mr. NETHERCUTT. I appreciate that. I will submit some questions for the record. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for that.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Mr. Smith.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman.
Future of Human Spaceflight
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Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Looking—reviewing what has happened in the 9 years since I have been in Congress, a lot of cost overruns. As Chairman of the Research Subcommittee, many scientists have suggested that our research scientific effort could be more efficiently accomplished with unmanned spaceflight and the use of robots or robotics to accomplish some of those tasks.
Likewise, the tremendous cost overruns and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Space Station in terms of where we go in the future, I want to sort of conclude by suggesting that a real evaluation, the cost benefit of everything that we are doing in NASA is justified, including a review of what is happening in the Space Station and the effectiveness and efficiency of those—that scientific endeavor plus where it might lead us in the future in terms of space exploration.
I would use the comparison of going 20 miles beneath the ocean surface and having some of that same effort at exploration in terms of understanding the world that we live in. I guess my question is, is in the time table of your review, what do you see as the logical review and analysis for what programs you are going to evaluate for effectiveness and less effectiveness?
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, in terms of to the first part of your question of what should be human spaceflight, I think the primary criteria we have got to think about is how do you do it safely? And it was only until——
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Well, just—and see, I would say the primary is what is the objective? What do you want to accomplish? Sending man in space is—for lack of a better description, is a sexy way to get public interest in an effort that is legitimate.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Okay.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. But what is our ultimate goal? And our ultimate goal certainly isn't safety of these individuals. Our ultimate goal has got to be what do we expect to accomplish in terms of research, in terms of better understanding that the world we live in.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No. I concur, sir. I apologize. As I was leading right to that question.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. But, anyway, your point is well taken.
Mr. O'KEEFE. No. It is——
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Safety is certainly——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yeah.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN.—a priority with manned spaceflight.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, it is the first thing we have really got to weigh in the back of our minds whether or not there is an objective or not. If you can't do it, I mean, it is one of the issues that dominates the debate now in terms of any other destination beyond where we have gone for low-earth orbit, is the effects of radiation. Can we really conquer that? And the answer is, I think that you have got it right on. There has got to be a purpose, a set of objectives, a reason why you would expose individual to the risk—individuals to the risk of that kind of activity that couldn't be accomplished by any other means unless you had a human in the loop.
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And then, in turn, to be thinking in terms very specifically of how do you guarantee that safety regime. So as a default proposition, unmanned vehicles, probes, and capabilities that provide information, data, you know, whatever, is a far-preferred approach given that really rigid requirement for human spaceflight.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. And the tremendous advantage of the new development of nanotechnology——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN.—that can accomplish the robotic mission in a much more efficient and less costly way. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Terrific point. You are right.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Lampson.
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Administrator O'Keefe, back to the Science Committee. I want to thank you for the trip you made down to my Congressional district and visiting Johnson Space Center. And I understand that again yesterday the visit was another successful one and look forward to many, many more.
I would like to formally extend an invitation through you, if I may, to President Bush for a visit to the Johnson Space Center, as well. And it is my understanding that he didn't have an opportunity to visit when he was—when he sat as the Governor. But I think that there is an opportunity presenting itself. And I have mentioned that before and I would hope that we might take the opportunity to work through you in making that happen. But the 40th anniversary of President Kennedy's speech at Rice University in Houston is in September of this year, and it would make an excellent occasion for him to be there and perhaps to somehow reissue some type of a challenge to the United States of America and to its citizens about what we can, indeed, be doing in space. And, again, welcome as Administrator, and I look forward to working with you on these issues. I want to make a comment——
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you.
NASA/DOD Cooperation
Mr. LAMPSON. Earlier the comment was made about working with the Department of Defense and bringing it in—more of a partnership on some of the activities with regard to NASA. And I would like to mention that they have had some difficulties also with their acquisition programs. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office made a comment that I don't want to say that all space programs and acquisition is in trouble, but I can say that there are some serious problems right now. Went on to say that they have experienced significant cost growth and scheduled delays and also said that there is a mix of unclear requirements, inadequate funding, and poor program management.
So if they are coming over, hopefully it won't be through NASA putting money into their activities, but it will be something that they will be bringing into NASA that could—that can boost it up significantly.
When you were here before, you were a member of the team at OMB. And OMB directed NASA to lead the Space Station's Crew Return Vehicle and Habitation Facility. And, at that time, you said that there hadn't been a final decision made and whether the ultimate end state of the Space Station would be OMB's core complete configuration.
Crew Return Vehicle
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Given that, did OMB do an analysis to indicate what the cost to the program would be if the work on CRV were stopped for two or more years and then restarted after a decision to go beyond core complete were made? Was there an analysis made?
Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know, sir.
Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. It would be helpful to know because if, indeed, there were such, then we could obviously look at the costs in terms of dollars, but also in terms of loss of expertise, loss of potential international contributions, and delay in realizing utilization capabilities on the Space Station. And there is an awful lot of talk that there would be significant shortcomings in additional costs to us in trying to come up with the dollars necessary to make that happen. And then, on the other hand, if there was not such an analysis, we really need to find out why there wasn't.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, exactly.
Mr. LAMPSON. And we would really like to know why there hadn't been. It would certainly, in my opinion, be prudent program management——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. LAMPSON.—to accomplish that.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, I appreciate that. My response was simply I am just not aware of what that analysis was. But let me give you my own view, okay, independent of whatever analysis occurred previously. The Crew Return Vehicle is an important objective to think about what the circumstances would be under what you would require the capacity and necessity to withdraw the crew.
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And, again, I spent a little time as I was dialoguing with Congressman Hall a little bit earlier, with Frank Culbertson and Charlie Precourt and a number of other astronauts yesterday down at Johnson. And their assertion to me that just really stunned me was that the number of circumstances under which they would consider the abandonment of the capacity are so limited as to be virtually no. And then instead, what they are looking at in the astronaut office at Johnson Space Center, is what they are referring to as the safe haven concept of how do you—essentially the same kind of thing that the Navy nuclear submarine community has looked at, which is how do you close compartments in a way that guarantees the safety as you are working through the sets of problems.
And the real issue then comes down to a very minimalist kind of circumstance of which you would have the opportunity and the disposition on the part of the astronauts to abandon the capability. And that is one they say is such a low probability that the greater prospect that they argue is the capacity for a crew transport vehicle capability that has a response time that is adequate in order to meet that mission, that exigency, as well as a range of other possibilities. So I am really persuaded that they are thinking through this one. And I want to be informed by their operational assessment of what is going on as well as the engineering issues you rightfully refer to.
So to the extent there was an analysis—and, again, I will make myself familiar with what it was that went on last year—my guess is, it was strictly from a program analysis standpoint, not as much from this operational standpoint, which I find pretty persuasive.
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your patience.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to this Panel. And I have to say I was very concerned at first to have someone who is a bean counter in charge of NASA, a scientific enterprise. But I do have to tell you that my friends at NASA say you are doing a wonderful job.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
Mr. EHLERS. So I appreciate your serving there. I——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Bean counters are people too.
Mr. EHLERS. Well, I know. And I always get the same reaction from me as a scientist. Now, what in the world is a scientist doing in Congress? And I assure them I am a person too even though I am still a nerd.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, no, sir. You are enlightening us.
Mr. EHLERS. And I still carry my badge of honor, my pocket protector, to prove that I am a nerd. But aside from that, the budget that the President has——
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Mr. O'KEEFE. We could form a guild.
Science Funding
Mr. EHLERS. That is right. The President's budget outlines some objectives for the—for NASA and also allocates money for that task. Now, I am very confident that you can do a good job of cutting waste and doing things there, but I don't think you can do magic. And I simply don't think you can do what you are expected to do with the amount of money that you are going to be given under the President's budget.
And I am very concerned, just, for example, about the scientific side. Recently I compiled a graph over the past decade of what has happened to science and research in the Federal Government over the past decade in real dollars. NIH, of course, has gone out of sight. NSF trudges along very, very slowly, increasing. DOE took a dip and is coming back up and is about where it was. NASA is the only one of the major laboratories that is spending less on science today than it did 10 years ago in real dollars. And that is a downward trend we have watched. Now, we know that a lot of that is caused by the expenses of the Space Station.
But I think it is extremely important for the emphasis of NASA to be on scientific research, and that has been going down. My question is, how do you hope to solve this problem? How do you hope to increase funding for science, return NASA to that part of its mission, and maintain the space effort, whether manned or unmanned, with the money that is being proposed for your organization? And I would appreciate your comments on that.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, thank you for that very important question, Congressman. It—and it really is an issue we have got to wrestle with all the time, because it really cuts to the same issues I think Congressman Nethercutt was touching on, which is, the more you spend on capacity and the more it takes to maintain that capacity, the more difficult it then becomes to really target and focus on what the objectives are for the science and research agenda that is required. And really, that is the side of the equation I think we are very focused on in trying to determine how to minimize the cost for the indirect overhead and all the things it takes to run the operation.
And, for example, on International Space Station, it is an infrastructure. It is a capacity. It is a capability. It is a means to an end. And so any amount of time, all the amount of time we spend thinking about the science and research priorities and how to organize them right to utilize that capacity correctly, in this atmosphere, as well as in that one, is such—I think, critical. You have to do it that way. So in my mind, the more we are able to achieve efficiencies in the cost of operations, the more we can dedicate to the important science and research agenda, which is the very core of what we are supposed to be about as a mission and a charter of what we do.
So I couldn't concur with you more. And I am driven by the proposition of trying to find the most efficient way we can operate the capacity in order to provide the capability.
Mr. EHLERS. If I may add, I think what has to be done is to have as much imaginative thinking about cost reduction as we have imaginative thinking about what the tasks are, what experiments can be performed, and so forth.
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Mr. O'KEEFE. Right.
Mr. EHLERS. You have a—well over half of your budget is simply infrastructure.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Right.
Mr. EHLERS. And we certainly have to do better on that if we are going to really carry out the science. I am not sure where you can do it. I don't think you can do magic. But clearly, there—yeah, this is the major challenge you are going to have to tackle. And I hope that you are successful at it. I don't—you know, and cutting the crew in half certainly saved a lot of money. The question is how much has it done to damage the objectives to achieve some science with the Space Station which already was dubious in terms of the return of science based on the cost of it.
But don't forget all the other non-Space Station efforts, which will——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Absolutely.
Mr. EHLERS.—produce much more science per dollar invested than the Space Station ever will.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, to your central proposition, you know, if I could, Congressman, the—it is one of the reasons I have been absolutely dogged about implementing and the commitment to implement the President's management agenda. That is—you know it is five very recognizable initiatives. It is three yards in a cloud of dust. It is not real, you know, exotic stuff. It is the kind of things that are just fundamental management principles and getting back to basics. So—and as a consequence that is where the real focus is in trying to work through the capacity and the infrastructure that you refer to, to maximize the research and scientific objectives that—you know, on the charter, the mission of what we are after.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Larson.
Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Administrator O'Keefe. A friend of yours, Peter Kelly, from Connecticut, who served with you——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, Jesus.
Mr. LARSON.—sends—asked me to send his regards along.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that. He is a great friend.
Mr. LARSON. I have three questions that I want to frame for you. And in the broadest context, they all have to deal with aeronautics R&D and the competition in that area. Two of them are mine. One of them is from Congressman Udall.
Now, let me start by saying that we were most fortunate, due to our Chairman, to experience last year in Europe and get a real flavor and appreciation for the vision that Europe has with respect to something they call 2020 in the aeronautics field whose target is ultimately to grab the market share in the commercial arena of both space and commercial air travel.
Aeronautics
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It is alarming in that extent, but heartful to see the—when NASA issued its ambitious blueprint for aeronautics, that at least there seemed to be hope on the horizon, especially in the area of R&D. But days after this is issued, we find the funding is being cut to the tune of 58 million. And there is concern that this will remain flat.
The OPM score card indicates that NASA needs to improve the rate at which industry makes use of NASA's aviation technology developments while OPM refuses to provide the funding necessary to take the technologies to a level at which they could be adopted by industry.
In addition, some others in the Administration reportedly argue that R&D, to benefit the aviation industry, is tantamount to corporate welfare. We know, firsthand, that when you take a look at direct subsidy on the part of the Europeans, when you take a look at their indirect subsidy, by way of the military, and in the case of Rolls Royce, when you take a look at their direct, indirect, and indirect from the United States, that our foreign competitors maintain an enormous edge on us.
And finally, and I guess what is most mystifying to us, is that the White House issues a Presidential directive earlier this year establishing an interagency working group to develop a comprehensive vision for air transportation, again, providing a great deal of hope, and then subsequently withdraws the directive without explanation.
Now, I asked these same questions of the Director of the Office of Science. There was little to explain. They said to make sure that when you were here I prevailed upon you for these answers. And that is the—my first concern is whether or not you are prepared to support significant increase in NASA's aeronautic budget that would be required over the next five years in order for us to compete, or is this blueprint for aeronautics just a placating feel-good wish list?
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Second question I have comes by way of the Air Force Undersecretary for Space, who stated recently, and including this past week at a National Defense Industrial Association meeting, that he was concerned about the Nation's access to space. And he specifically questioned the reasonableness of depending upon a single design of an upper-stage engine, the RL–10. I wonder what your opinions and thoughts are on that.
And my third and final question, again dealing with competition, relates directly to the Pluto Kuiper Belt mission. And this apparently was canceled because of skyrocketing costs. But given your and OPM's stated desire to reward programs that perform well, why would NASA not continue the funding of this program, which has reduced costs by more than $200 million? So those are my three questions, and I would appreciate if you would start the——
Chairman BOEHLERT. You have 36 seconds to answer, but we will allow some additional time for your response.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess on the first, as it pertains to the aerospace technology, the request this year is for $2.8 billion. And I think you are referring to a subset piece of the aeronautics part of that. But that larger aerospace technology request is better than $300 million more than what Congress appropriated a year ago.
So how we organize that, I think—I would welcome the opportunity to discuss that in terms of what you think the higher priorities are. But we have got the opportunity——
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Mr. LARSON. But doesn't the scoring still indicate that it is a $58 million cut in the proposal?
Mr. O'KEEFE. No, sir. If we are a much smaller subset of this larger aerospace technology—the aerospace technology request is $2.8 billion, which is 300 million bucks more than what was appropriated. And—so how we organize those line items, that is something I would welcome the opportunity to debate with you and work though——
Mr. LARSON. Sure. I am not so much interested in a debate, but in the—right in the aeronautics R&D program, specifically, that is where, in looking at the budget, we see that specific cut.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Again, within that sub line item, of which there is a lot of flexibility to work through some of these initiatives, that larger objectives for aerospace technology, I think that is the area that I think is more the focus of what the blueprint was concentrating on—really concentrates in that area as well. So it depends on, you know, where you look at the baseline, but I am willing—I am happy to work with you to figure out what the right priorities are as we get through this, as a means to emphasize the areas that we collectively think are the most appropriate to work through.
The second area, I don't know enough to really be dangerous. So rather than make something up, let me submit something for the record for you because I am really not as conversant as I should or like to be.
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Mr. LARSON. Well, you—well, and I am sure based on previous questions that others have asked about greater cooperation with the Department of Defense——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. LARSON.—and NASA, that this is—you know, this is an appropriate——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. LARSON.—attack. And, again, I think it runs true with this threat of competition—global competition that we face.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yeah.
Mr. LARSON. So——
Mr. O'KEEFE. No. I—but you asked a very important question and I just am not conversant enough. So let me take a look at it and then let me get back to you and certainly give you something for the record for sure.
Pluto
On the third issue, on Pluto, it—there is a lot of debate back and forth over what the cost is. And, frankly, I am not sure we really know enough right now to have a real firm grip on that. There is a lot of estimates out there. The larger reason that drove me to conclude that we really want to defer, for the moment, even though, again, the National Academy of Sciences and everybody else that has been involved in looking at the validity of the mission, say, yes, it is a really good idea to try to examine the objectives of Pluto and the Kuiper Belt and to be informed by some of those choices, it nonetheless—the limitation, in my mind, is that if we start a program that could get moving no earlier than 2006, is the current—that is the earliest achievable date—you have to launch in order to reach the slingshot effect around Jupiter in order to get to Pluto by 2016, I think it is, or 2017, that time frame—and the best you can get is a resolution or a degree of definition of the—of observations and so forth, for about a 3- to 4-week period of time, would be greater than what we could achieve by other means.
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So you look at it and say the problem isn't the Pluto Kuiper Belt mission or the—or what we could learn and what we could have—to discover from that opportunity. It is, we don't have the technology to really leverage our ability to learn anything significant in a span of time that we collectively could still be around to be informed by.
So the objective we took instead was to say, let us set that aside just for the moment and look at how to examine the power and propulsion system technology limitations that force us into that particular transportation mode, distance, time limitation we have, to get to the edge of the solar system. Conquer that, and then go renew our commitment to Pluto Kuiper Belt examination so that we can either get there sooner or maintain on orbit to inform and for a longer period of time, like we are doing in Mars Odyssey efforts right now.
So that was the tradeoff. It was less the question of the current mission. It is just—even if it was deemed by everybody to be affordable, the time span that it would take to actually achieve this is so long as to make it something that we ought to defer and set aside just for the time being until we can conquer those propulsion technology limitations that currently exist.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you.
Mr. LARSON. And I want to—I want to thank the Chairman for indulging me. And I—Mr. Chairman, could I just ask you if we could—because sometimes the lines between space launch and aviation get blurred—that if we could have—is it possible to have another hearing or a meeting or follow-up discussion on this, the—on the aviation side——
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, just let me say the Subcommittee is going to have some hearings, and all members are advised that we would be very receptive to submitting questions in writing with the assurance from the Administrator that we will get timely and complete responses.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. LARSON. Thank you and thank the Administrator.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, if I—would you——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just say that my colleague's question—the Subcommittee will be having hearings on this. We will be happy to take—have your input and the direction of those hearings and we will be very anxious to work with you on this issue.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. That is how this Committee works. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To both you and the Ranking Member, I appreciate very much the opportunity for the hearing. This is a regular ritual. So I don't know if the new Administrator appreciates it, but we thank him for his presence.
Let me also acknowledge that we believe your visit to Johnson was extremely instructive. And for those things that you don't appear to be or seem to be as knowledgeable as you would like, take all the information from us. We will give it to you straight. And that is Johnson, Johnson, Johnson.
But let me—let me well acknowledge Glenn Mahone and Charlie Bolden, two folk. I know Charlie has not yet come on. We claim him as a neighbor and don't view that as being biased. He will be extremely helpful and a very competent Deputy Administrator. So we hope that his process will move along. Let me——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Indeed, anything you can do to help encourage the Senate to confirm him expeditiously——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I——
Mr. O'KEEFE.—I would be grateful for.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am working on that, my friend. And——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congresswoman. I appreciate it.
Ms. JACKSON LEE.—I hope to be part of his nominating group to be able to say that I think he is a very strong candidate for this position. Let me give you a little bit of my history and focus pointedly on some issues that I am concerned about. Serving in local government some years ago, I view myself as a victim of the loss of the Superconductivity Super Collider. In particular, though it was going to be housed in the Fort Worth area, I have the University of Houston, Dr. Paul Chu, who was very much involved in that high-energy physics program. As you may be aware, that program would have generated for us, put the United States on the front line, dealing with superconducting materials, and energy transmission would have been very vital right now, and advanced electronics. Unfortunately, the leadership of that is going to the Cern Lab. And, in fact, the United States finds themselves in a position to donating to that lab.
Funding
That brings me to my concern about the Space Shuttle program, pointedly so. I don't know how we can make the representation that what we need to do is that we shouldn't have a Space Station built to specific hardware and then seek research. We should redefine the science and technology goals we have for the Station and then shape the vehicle to meet these goals.
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I think the crisis came frankly—and, you know, we raised this when we were in Houston—the crisis came when the Administration cut this program by a billion dollars. And when we went to the lesser crew size, and preceding your coming to the table, I have made the point that I am really lost for words on the question of safety. It hits home in Houston so much because so many of us—the Nation lived with the loss that we experienced in the 1980s, but in Houston and in Texas, those were our neighbors. And it was a question of the O-ring and the question of safety and a variety of issues that loom very large. And Johnson has looked to focus more than ever—and I know my Ranking Member, Mr. Hall, knows that and the Chairman knows that—on safety.
So how can you respond first to this sizable cut and the idea that we want to now switch the mindset. I believe we had a very good research science and technology complement to Space Shuttle and that the hardware was very much committed and appropriate for that. You have now cut us down. Does it mean now a year from now we will go backwards again and go back to our science and technology model and then build a complement? I would like to know where we stand on that. But, more importantly, I would like to also hear why and will you work with us to put that money back in? Will you—having been around on tour, seen what Space Shuttle means, will you do that?
Let me just give two follow-up. You also did something that we worked very hard on. That is the Space Grant College Program. We had 24 billion put in there. You are down now to 19 billion. Frankly, I want to thank you for some of your staff. I am going to leave them—the names on call working with me on some science and technology programs with Texas Southern University. I am always raising the point, where are our scientists and mathematicians coming from?
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Lastly, I need to hear about the job—I guess you will talk about job cuts in my first answer, but also the question of affirmative action with respect to businesses, small businesses, as it relates to NASA. And I thank you very much for the opportunity to engage.
Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you.
Chairman BOEHLERT. You might say that your timing is perfect. You consumed your five minutes for the questions. And now, I will give you time to respond and——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are very kind. I am delighted that I didn't—I wasn't the first—and my good colleague from Connecticut. But, Mr. Chairman, you have always been gracious and we thank you very much. And, along with the Ranking Member. I think he—I see a joke coming from the Ranking Member, so I am going to step back from the mike.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. O'Keefe.
Mr. O'KEEFE. I was looking forward to the joke. First and foremost, Congresswoman, absolutely, we will work with you and the Committee. Positively I commit that. And any amount of time as necessary in order to work through that, I think we are committed to doing just that. So——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And is that with the 1 billion—getting the 1 billion back in?
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Mr. O'KEEFE. It is—again, whatever it costs to do a program that we can all be proud of that say—that can accomplish the science and research objectives that we set out to do, I think that is what we are all going to be committed to. And that is what the President's budget will sign up to. And when we can achieve a measure of certainty of what the cost is, as well as reliability that we can really integrate this complicated challenge over the course of the next 18 months to two years, to achieve that U.S. core complete and the node 2 that facilitates then an opportunity to build out to the assembly complete capacity, that is when I think we ought to continue to work together, figure out what those resource demands are, and put up what is necessary to really achieve what we think is appropriate for the Space Station and the way it ought to be configured.
So, absolutely, we will continue to work that. And it is just—it is no intent to try to redefine this set of objectives in any other way than I think the way they have been described here this morning, very helpfully, as well as in—throughout the entire effort.
I do owe it to this Committee, to our Administration, to the American public, to our international partners, to assure that we can do this reliably, that the systems integration work can be accomplished. And I met with, just yesterday, in Houston, at Johnson Space Center—with the Program Manager and the Program Management team on International Space Station, to look at each of those individual gates of what it is going to take to deploy all those components and modules that make up that U.S. core complete configuration and then look at some excursions from there on what the capabilities could be from that point.
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But it is a real pull to get from here to U.S. core complete over the next two years and do it in a way that can be done based on the systems integration challenges and the engineering objectives to make that particular configuration work right. And it is going to be—I think it can—it is doable. The Program Manager is very confident about that. I think there are a number of things that should raise our confidence level—it can be done. But is something we ought to also get a fix on what that is going to take in terms of resources, time, energy, as well as the systems integration complications to get there.
As far as shuttle operation and safety are concerned, I couldn't agree with you more. I think you are exactly right. And, indeed, two weeks ago, I spent the better part of a day at Kennedy Space Center, at the Flight Readiness Review for the launch that is due to occur tomorrow morning, and sat there and learned about things like Kirkendall voids and all kinds of stuff that—things that—you know, a lot of technology and scientific and as well as engineering issues that I had never heard of before. So I found it to be a tremendous education.
But just the process they went through to guarantee that every single issue that is at doubt or at risk for any flight is beat to ground by all the participants involved. I mean, it was a big, big crowd of folks that took all day long to get through this. It was really impressive. And it is a direct outgrowth of the Roger's Commission recommendations in the immediate aftermath of Challenger in the mid-1980s. And I want to assure you, just as recently as this flight coming up for tomorrow morning, that folks have really beaten this to parade rest on every one of the issues that go to it. And that is a legacy of that period in the last 15 years that that is what is required. So I think your point is well-taken, and we are really after it.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, you are concluding on a very positive note. Mr. Administrator, I want to thank you for being so generous with your time. I hope you and the audience have noted we had a very good attendance and very active dialogue with the Committee. You have outlined a very ambitious program and we want to help you get there. And we want to go beyond core complete. We want a true scientific investment for the future, and we want to help you get there in any way we can.
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And my only concluding words to you are——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Chairman, would you just indulge me for one moment? I had some questions that I would appreciate——
Chairman BOEHLERT. By all means.
Ms. JACKSON LEE.—if you all could get back to me on the——
Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, positively.
Ms. JACKSON LEE.—affirmative action and the Space Grant Colleges. I appreciate the Chairman's time. And I just wanted to say, I heard a door open on the one billion and working, because I think the research and technology model that was already implemented—if you study it, you will find it was darn good and we can move it forward and we can also be efficient and effective in the budget as well. I thank the Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you so much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
In its Second Interim Report, the Commission on the Future of the Aerospace Industry recommended that FAA and NASA prioritize research and development efforts that are critical to building the next generation air traffic control system. The Commission also recommended that Congress and the Administration fully fund air traffic control modernization efforts.
Q1. What role do you see in the design and development of such a system?
A1. NASA plays a significant role in air traffic management (ATM) systems R&D. First, we are developing air traffic controller (ATC) decision support tools as a part of the FAA's Operational Evolution Plan (OEP). These decision support tools increase the efficiency of the current ATC system. Second, we are performing long-term R&D in new concepts, such as aircraft self-separation (rather than ground-based separation control) and small aircraft transportation. This R&D is exploring some aspects of what would be required to develop a future generation system. Third, we are developing overall operational concepts for a future generation ATM system as well as building high fidelity modeling and simulation tools that are required to analyze and assess them.
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Therefore, NASA is a key partner for any future generation system design. The work we are doing today is the National investment in long-term research, concept development, modeling and simulation. Without this effort, the Nation would have no substantial basis for a future generation system. The FAA recognizes this critical NASA role in their OEP.
Q2. Does NASA have an adequate aeronautics budget to address this urgent need?
A2. We believe we have sufficient resources in our current programs to support FAA's near-term efforts defined in the OEP, to pioneer the definition of future ATM concepts, and to perform the modeling and simulation required to establish the efficacy of the concepts. NASA is pursuing this work under its Airspace Systems program area. NASA's FY 2003 request for Airspace Systems is $125 million ($459 million planned through FY ,2007).
Q3. How does NASA intend to engage private industry in addressing potential design solutions?
A3. NASA actively works with the industry through contractual and other mechanisms to develop and transfer technology, to develop models and simulations and to develop operational concepts. Recently, we have begun an effort to develop broad agreements throughout the CNS/ATM industry to establish cooperative efforts in future generation ATM systems. We are striving to establish a National partnership focused on the long-term challenging issues associated with developing future generation ATM systems.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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Responses to written questions submitted by Congressman Ralph M. Hall resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. I fail to see any clear statement in your testimony of how the Space Station will be graded to determine whether it can ever move beyond the Core Complete. Do you have specific criteria that will be used to judge the success of the Station ''reforms'' and determine whether the Station will move beyond Core Complete? If so, what are they? If not, when will you have them?
A1. NASA is developing a proposed set of success criteria by which to evaluate the agency's progress in implementing necessary reforms and demonstrating effective cost management of the ISS program. In accordance with a recommendation of the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force, these criteria are intended ultimately to guide a decision by the Administration and Congress on whether to expand ISS capability beyond the Core Complete configuration.
The detailed draft criteria are currently under review. In general terms, the draft criteria are designed, first, to assess whether NASA is credibly demonstrating its ability to achieve the U.S. Core Complete program within budget and on schedule. If so, the application of additional criteria will enable a judgment as to whether the agency is prepared to execute an enhanced program, driven by prioritized research objectives and leading to a credible end-state.
We will provide these success criteria to the Committee as soon as they have been reviewed by the Administration, and finalized.
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Q2. You have indicated that both an internal cost estimate and an external cost estimate will be done for the Space Station program.
Q2a.When will those two estimates be completed?
A2a. The results of both assessments will be reported to NASA Headquarters in early fall, 2002.
Q2b. What happens if the two estimates disagree?
A2b. NASA expects discrete differences in the two estimates due to the variations in cost estimating tools and methods employed, and the experience base within each team. The teams are aware of this likelihood and will schedule meetings to understand and reconcile differences. The final outcomes may still have some differences, which will likely reflect various risk levels factored by the teams, attributable to specific areas.
Q2c. What if both estimates project a higher cost to complete the ''Core Complete'' configuration than is currently thought? Will that be sufficient grounds for ending the program at Core Complete? How will you use the cost estimates in your decisionmaking process?
A2c. NASA is committed to using the independent estimates as the basis for assessing its earlier estimates for Core Complete, and subsequent POP estimating activities. The results will be used to help develop the Agency's recommendations to the Administration. NASA will understand the estimates, including risk levels for the Core Complete program, and determine whether a change to our current approach to the station's development is required. Additionally, NASA will assess areas of targeted savings that would also be provided as part of the FY 2004 budget.
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Q3. The National Academy of Sciences is due to report on its priorities for solar system exploration. If Pluto is identified as an important research priority, will you recommend that the Pluto-Kuiper Belt mission be reinstated? If not, why not?
A3. If the National Academy of Sciences clearly identifies Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt as the top planetary research priority, NASA will examine options for conducting such a mission. This could include pursuing the Pluto-Kuiper Belt/New Horizons mission currently under study. However, the launch of the Pluto-Kuiper Belt/New Horizons mission must occur before the end of 2007 so that Jupiter's gravity can be used to give the spacecraft the necessary increase in velocity required to reach Pluto. The mission also requires the launch of a nuclear power source for the first time aboard a new launch vehicle that will have a limited launch history. If regulatory approval for this launch cannot be granted in time to support a launch by 2007, then the mission cannot reach Pluto and there is no scientifically justified alternate destination for the payload.
Alternatively, NASA could pursue a future mission to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt through our New Frontiers Program. Such a mission could take advantage of technologies, such as advanced electric propulsion, that would enable the mission to reach Pluto without the constraint of a Jupiter gravity assist. Under these circumstances, there would be no constraining launch window and the mission could be launched any year in this decade.
Q4. Since its establishment, the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) has done important research on countermeasures. The FY 2002 operating plan cuts funding for the NSBRI, as would the FY 2003 budget request.
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Q4a. What is the rationale for the funding cuts?
Q4b. What is your commitment to the NSBRI? Do you plan any changes to the operation of the NSBRI? What is the proposed five-year funding profile for the Institute?
A4a & 4b: The National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) is an essential element of the NASA's Biomedical Research Program and a key component of our strategy to develop countermeasures against the deleterious effects of spaceflight on humans.
The NSBRI was competitively selected five years ago. Based on the recommendation of a site visit conducted in fall 2000, the NSBRI will soon enter a second five-year period of operation. The report of the site visit committee indicated that the committee ''was impressed by the scientific strengths of the NSBRI, by its progress in developing countermeasures, and by its innovative scientific leadership.'' The report, however, was also critical of the NSBRI in some important areas, such as strategic planning and selection processes for team lead researchers.
The NSBRI is taking corrective action in those areas that were found deficient and is developing an improved management and scientific process. Jeff Sutton, the new Director of NSBRI, has developed and submitted to NASA a proposed strategic plan for the Institute that defines the scope of work for the next five years. The proposed NSBRI strategic plan is currently being externally peer reviewed, With results anticipated by the end of this month.
Based on the results of the peer review of the NSBRI strategic plan and on the results of NASA's Research Maximization and Prioritization (ReMaP) efforts for the International Space Station, expected in early July, NASA will be in a position, by late summer, to make a decision on the appropriate funding level for the NSBRI.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by the Congressman Bart Gordon resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. A South African millionaire is scheduled to fly to the International Space Station on a Russian Soyuz later this spring. Rock stars and others have indicated interest in flying to the Space Station.
Q1a. Who is liable in the event of an accident caused by the presence of a space tourist on the Space Station?
A1a. In the particular case of Mr. Mark Shuttleworth, NASA established arrangements with Rosaviakosmos to ensure that NASA's liability can be virtually eliminated. These arrangements include (1) Mr. Shuttleworth assumed the risk of his activity in his contract with Rosaviakosmos; (2) NASA required that Mr. Shuttleworth purchase an insurance policy for $5 million for injury or death; and (3) Rosaviakosmos required Mr. Shuttleworth to purchase additional personal accident coverage.
If any crew member (including a spaceflight participant,(see footnote 3) such as Mr. Shuttleworth) damages the ISS, the Partners have agreed to waive claims for any loss or damage they sustain. In effect, each Partner self-insures such risks. Cross-waivers have been used for NASA space programs since the 1970's as a way of encouraging space activities by limiting liability for damage and, thus, keeping insurance costs low. However, in light of the unique risks presented by the presence of spaceflight participants, NASA will continue to evaluate this position and may seek a change in assumption of liability for spaceflight participants and property damage caused thereby.
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Q1b. Do you have formal liability arrangements for space tourist visits to the Space Station? If so, what are they? If not, why not?
A1b. Yes, the Partners have established liability arrangements for crew members on ISS, including spaceflight participants. Rosaviakosmos, to date, is the only space agency to have flown space tourists. Mr. Shuttleworth was required to sign an assumption of risk statement and purchase two insurance policies.
Q1c. If you do not have formal liability arrangements now but are in the process of developing them, when will you have those arrangements in place?
A1c. Formal liability arrangements are already in place. (See NASA's response to questions 1b and 1d.)
Q1d. The consequences of an accident that damages the Space Station could far exceed the ability of even a millionaire to pay. However, under the cross-waiver of liability provisions that govern the Space Station, it is not clear if anyone would be held accountable. Is that correct?
A1d. No. As discussed above, liability requirements for the ISS and the Partners' arrangements for spaceflight participants establish clear principles for allocating liability. Since Mr. Shuttleworth's flight was an ISS Partner-approved utilization activity of Russia, the cross-waiver of liability applies and NASA has waived claims against Russia and its users.
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NASA has utilized liability waivers in its programs since the 1970s. Cross-waivers are an essential element of legal arrangements for space activities because insurance may not always be available at reasonable rates and, as a result, potential customers otherwise may not be able to afford to use the Shuttle or ISS.
As noted in response to question 1a, the ISS International Partners have agreed to waive liability for loss or damage they sustain as a result of another Partner's use of the ISS. The waiver also extends to contractors, subcontractors, users and customers of the other Partners.
Q1e. How should liability be handled for potential space tourists on the Space Station or Space Shuttle?
A1e. NASA recognizes that the flight of non-professional crew members, including spaceflight participants can involve special risks to the other Partners, and that additional liability protections may be warranted. NASA will be working with Russia and other International Partners to implement such protections for future flights of non-professional crew members. Arrangements could include additional types and amounts of insurance coverage as well as assumption of additional financial requirements by spaceflight participants and their sponsoring Partners.
Q2. According to the FY 2003 NASA budget request, the new policy is that the cost of any Shuttle flight above the four per year allocated to the Space Station will be borne by the customer for that flight. In your response to my question at the February 27th hearing, you stated that ''in the next Hubble servicing mission two years out, you will see that cost incorporated in the space science costs.'' Does the five-year budget runout for space science contained in the FY 2003 budget request include funds for the cost of the Shuttle flight for the next Hubble servicing mission? If so, how much funding is allocated for that Shuttle mission, arid where is it included in the space science budget, by account and fiscal year?
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A2. The next Hubble Servicing Mission is SM–4, which is scheduled to launch in 2004. This long-planned servicing mission is considered ''grandfathered in'' under this policy, and the projected budget for the mission was included in the five-year budget runout under the Office of Space Flight. The Office of Space Science will have to budget for the Hubble retrieval mission, currently scheduled for the 2010 timeframe.
Q3. With your planned funding profile, what is your timetable for having space nuclear reactors operational? What about for nuclear propulsion systems to power missions to the outer solar system? How confident are you of that timetable?
A3. The nuclear-electric propulsion element of Nuclear Systems Initiative (NSI) is just getting underway as part of the President's FY03 budget request. This element of NSI is considered a research program and will likely remain so for the next few years until enough is known about specific system design trades and technology options to undertake development of an operational capability. NASA currently estimates that an operational nuclear-electric propulsion capability for future planetary science missions would be available early next decade, but this timeframe could be accelerated or decelerated depending on what is discovered during the research phase. OSS is in the process of carefully scheduling a series of milestones to gauge progress in this program.
Nuclear-electric propulsion promises to change the paradigm of scientific investigation for solar system exploration. Solar system exploration is currently restricted to what can be accomplished using low-power solar- or battery-powered spacecraft. Solar power is also inadequate for use past Jupiter and for some planetary surface missions. Comprehensive solar system exploration requires higher power sources, such as radioisotope power systems and space reactor power systems. The nuclear systems initiative will provide much higher power for scientific instruments, much longer-lived spacecraft and rovers and higher power for communications from great distances back to Earth. Alone or together, these improvements will increase science return many fold over today's technology. When teamed with an electric propulsion system, a space reactor power system could: greatly increase science return by allowing spacecraft to spend more time at targets (orbiting missions instead of flyby missions) and enable new classes of missions (such as missions that orbit multiple targets in sequence) that are impossible or extremely expensive to undertake using existing technology.
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Q4. Would you recommend that a Shuttle contractor be allowed to sign commercial contracts for satellite launches? That seems to be an element of the Shuttle privatization proposals being promoted within the Administration.
A4. This is a business option that can be studied by the Space Shuttle Business Review Team (SSBRT). This specific concept would require a change in current U.S. policy and law that require that the Space Shuttle only be used ''for purposes that. . .require the presence of man.''
NASA chartered the Business Review Team in January 2002, consisting predominantly of industry expertise in financial, banking, investment, insurance and technical disciplines. The Business Review Team will investigate the business case models, market, and challenges for competitive sourcing of the Space Shuttle. NASA intends to use the Business Review Team's evaluation to prepare for this interaction with industry in mid-to-late summer 2002.
Q4a. What would be the impact on the U.S. commercial launch industry if a Shuttle contractor were permitted to offer flights to commercial customers?
A4a. The current international launch market is highly competitive and demand is relatively stagnant today. NASA is waiting for the results of our Space Shuttle Business Review Team, prior to charting a specific path for future Shuttle competitive sourcing, however, launch of commercial spacecraft is being considered as candidate payloads within the scope of the assessment. Flight of commercial payloads that do not require the unique capabilities of the space shuttle would be considered in context of current shuttle use policy.
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Q4b. What would be the cost today to the total U.S. space program of another Challenger-like accident?
A4b. NASA is committed and diligently working to ensure that such an accident never happens again. However, should a Challenger-type accident occur, the cost impact would depend on a myriad of factors including cause of the failure leading to the catastrophe, and corrective action required. Aside from the obvious cost in human tragedy, the cost could be significant because of the resultant downtime (which could be years) required to recover and assess the impact to the assembly, operations, research and logistics activities of the International Space Station.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Congressman Lamar S. Smith resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. In 2001 NASA competed the Pluto-Kuiper Belt mission, achieving dramatic cost savings totaling almost $200 million while increasing the mission's planned scientific return. Yet the President's budget deletes this exploration mission. Much of the scientific community believe New Horizons should be funded to go forward for its January 2006 launch, within the newly proposed New Frontiers line of mid-sized planetary exploration missions you are requesting. How are we to justify a new start for New Frontiers if it locks out or delays the New Horizons Pluto mission?
A1. It is important to note that although the Pluto-Kuiper Belt (PKB)/New Horizons mission costs less than the previous Pluto-Kuiper Express (PKE) mission, PKB/New Horizons has not produced real budget savings. NASA cancelled the originally proposed Pluto-Kuiper Express (PKE) mission because the mission's cost had doubled from approximately $318 million to $650 million. However, the Pluto-Kuiper Belt (PKB)/New Horizons mission cost of $480 million (responsive to the NASA request for a mission under $500 million) is still $162 million dollars more than the cost NASA had originally budgeted for the PKE mission.
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Due to interest expressed by the science community, NASA released an Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for a PKB mission capped at $500 million after the cancellation of the PKE mission. Because NASA did not have adequate budget to support a $500 million PKB mission, that AO clearly stated that NASA was under no obligation to select any mission for study. NASA's FY 2002 budget request subsequently cancelled the PKB mission study. However, under Congressional direction, NASA proceeded with the AO and selected two missions for preliminary study. One of these two, the PKB/New Horizons mission, was subsequently selected for design study.
There are four major reasons that NASA has chosen not to pursue the PKB/New Horizons mission:
1) Funding levels for the New Frontiers Program in FY 2003 are not adequate to support the development of the PKB/New Horizons mission, even if all New Frontiers funding were directed to that mission.
2) The National Academy of Sciences is completing the first-ever, comprehensive review of planetary:,science priorities this summer. Proceeding with the PKB/New Horizons mission would require taking funds from other planetary science priorities that may be rated higher or equal to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt.
3) The PKB/New Horizons mission requires the launch of a nuclear power source aboard a new launch vehicle that will have a limited launch history. If regulatory approval for this launch cannot be granted in time to support a launch by 2007, then PKB/New Horizons will not be capable of reaching Pluto since it must have a gravity assist from the planet Jupiter. The planet will only be appropriately aligned if the mission is launched by 2007.
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4) If Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt are clearly the top science priority in the National Academies review, NASA's New Frontiers program can pursue a future mission to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt. Such a mission could take advantage of technologies, such as advanced electric propulsion, that would enable the mission to reach Pluto without the constraint of a Jupiter gravity assist. Under these circumstances, there would be no constraining launch window and the mission could be launched any year in this decade.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted Congressman George R. Nethercutt resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1a. In constant dollar terms, what percent has NASA's budget declined in the last decade?
A1a. In responding to your question, we have compared the budgets of FY 1993 to FY 2002 and have converted the FY 1993 dollars to constant FY 2002.
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In constant year dollars, NASA's budget authority has declined approximately 13 percent over the last decade.
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Q1b. How has the percent of the overall budget allocated for field centers and other NASA facilities changed over this period?
A1b. NASA's total budget for FY 1993 was $14,322.5 million of that amount $2,360.8 million or 16 percent was for institutional support. In FY 2002, NASA's budget is $14,901.7 million and of that amount $2,817.3 million or 19 percent is for institutional support.
Q1c. Of this budget, what is the base annual budget required to operate and maintain these facilities? (Please differentiate between individual facilities.)
A1c. NASA's Research Operations Support (ROS) budget is used to operate and maintain its field centers. ROS includes facility services, technical services and management and operations. The institutional, Construction of Facilities (CoF) budget also provides funds for repair, rehabilitation and modification, minor construction, facility planning and design, and environmental compliance and restoration of NASA facilities.
The table below shows how the Research Operations Support (ROS) and the institutional Construction of Facilities (CoF) budget was allocated to each Center in FY 1993 compared to FY 2002.
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Q1d. Please indicate FTE levels assigned to each Facility over the last decade. For the purposes of this question, please treat NASA Headquarters as a field center, and provide relevant details on budget and staffing.
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Q2. In written testimony, Administrator O'Keefe indicates a desire to see a ''significant culture change at NASA by making it a purchaser of services rather than an operator of infrastructure.'' While this comment was directed to shuttle privatization, would it not equally apply to excess NASA infrastructure?
A2. Yes, the comment applies to NASA infrastructure. NASA is currently pursuing alternatives to owning and operating infrastructure, including privatization, enhanced use leasing, consolidations, and disposal of excess infrastructure, with the objective to reduce NASA infrastructure and its associated costs. The potential for NASA infrastructure reduction is to be evaluated this fiscal year.
Q3. Is NASA considering an A–76 process or any other related initiatives to privatize services at facilities? Are any A–76 assessments underway? Is the A–76 process workable for NASA requirements, or would additional authority be helpful to the Administrator in accelerating the privatization of non-core missions at facilities?
A3. While currently there are no A–76 cost studies in progress, we are in the process of reexamining all NASA functions in accordance with the FAIR Act and the President's Competitive Sourcing initiative. As a result, there may be some activities identified that will result in A–76 cost comparisons.
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Most NASA work falls within the provisions of A–76 that govern research and development, where agencies are given significant latitude to properly structure these activities. In this regard, there are several significant transformational activities being planned. For instance, NASA is considering ways to outsource a greater part of shuttle operations, and to establish a non-governmental organization to manage utilization of the International Space Station. As plans for these activities are crystallized, there may be a need for specific enabling legislative authorities. Should this occur, we will work with the Congressional staff in their development.
Q4. While each field center and other NASA facility serves as a center for excellence for certain specific NASA requirements, many often have other capabilities, some possibly duplicative. Please identify core competencies and other areas of excellence at each facility. Please identify areas of possible duplication, or commonality, between facilities.
A4. The core competencies of each Center are:
Ames Research Center—Aviation Operations Systems and Astrobiology, Information Technology
Dryden Research Center—Flight Research, Atmospheric Flight Operations
Glenn Research Center—Aeropropulsion and Aerospace Power Systems Research and Technology
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Goddard Space Flight Center—Earth Science and Physics and Astronomy
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (FFRDC)—Planetary Science and Exploration, Instrument Technology, Deep Space Systems
Johnson Space Center—Human Exploration and Astro Materials, Human Operations in Space
Kennedy Space Center—Space Launch Operations and Spaceport Range Technologies, Launch & Payload Processing Systems
Langley Research Center—Airframe Systems and Atmospheric Science, Structures and Materials
Marshall Space Flight Center—Space Transportation Systems Development, Microgravity, Space Propulsion
Stennis Space Center—Rocket Propulsion Testing and Commercial Remote Sensing, Rocket Propulsion Testing Systems
There are no primary duplications of missions or capabilities among the NASA facilities. NASA continues to examine potential opportunities for achieving additional economies of scale.
Q5. Is there a process underway at NASA to identify potential savings to be realized through privatization and consolidation? Please provide details of any ongoing review or studies, with expected dates for completion.
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A5. There are several initiatives underway with respect to the President's Management Agenda—Competitive Sourcing initiative. Under this initiative, some functions may ultimately be performed by the private sector, which are now being performed by Civil Servants. At this point, it is premature to identify any specific savings since the Agency has not yet completed its FAIR Act inventory for 2002, nor has it submitted the required Competitive Sourcing plans to the Office of Management and Budget. Key areas under examination for competitive sourcing include the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station (ISS) Non-Government Organization (NGO) to manage ISS Research, and the implementation of University Affiliated Research Centers. After completing the FAIR Act inventory and the competitive sourcing plans, NASA will determine other areas of opportunity for efficiencies.
In addition to these initiatives, NASA has already during the past decade taken aggressive steps to the competitively outsource many functions previously performed in house. Examples include the management and operation of certain Center activities, many information technology activities, as well as certain services functions.
Q6. Would NASA support legislation in this year's authorization bill to mandate a review of NASA's field centers and establish an independent process for realigning excess capacity? If yes, please provide details on what such a process should involve.
A6. No. NASA is currently reviewing its mission priorities and activities within the context of the President's Management Agenda, and is continuing to review its institutional capabilities in relation to achieving goals defined in the Agency's Strategic Plan.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. The Earth Science program's Triana mission was originally criticized for being former Vice President Gore's creation, and funding was withheld until the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the mission. The Academy found Triana to be scientifically meritorious and recommended its completion. The $100 million spacecraft has now been completed and is ready for launch. However, the FY 2003 budget request provides no funding to launch Triana, and the spacecraft currently is sitting in storage.
Q1a. Why didn't you include money for launching Triana in the FY 2003 budget?
A1a. NASA planned to launch Triana as a secondary payload on the Shuttle. With the reduction in the Shuttle flight rate, a suitable opportunity does not exist in the current manifest. Switching to an expendable launch vehicle is possible, but acquiring such a vehicle is a new budget requirement on the order of $60 million, in addition to the integration and modification costs. NASA's budget for Earth Science is fully subscribed, and the cost of acquiring a launch vehicle would displace other important projects. We are exploring other launch options, including potential international partnerships. Until we exhaust these possibilities, it is not programmatically or financially feasible to consider displacing currently planned activities.
Q1b. What commitment are you prepared to make to finding a way to launch Triana?
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A1b. The Earth Science Enterprise (ESE) continues to investigate cost effective alternative launch opportunities, including international collaborations; however, a suitable launch opportunity for Triana has not yet been identified. Should such an opportunity arise, Triana could be readied for launch in less than a year.
Q1c. Do you think it demonstrates good financial management on NASA's part to leave a completed, $100 million scientific spacecraft sitting in a warehouse instead of launching it to do what it was intended to do?
A1c. NASA is committed to finding a launch opportunity for Triana. The challenge is to do so in a manner that does not adversely impact other ongoing projects. Triana is being stored in excess capacity in a government facility, and no additional facility costs are incurred.
Q2. The FY 2002 NASA appropriation also increased the funding for the EPSCoR program to $10 million. NASA's own briefing material notes that the increase ''broadens and strengthens (the) NASA EPSCoR program.'' The EPSCoR program has been reviewed and strengthened. Why did OMB cut the funding back to $4.6 million in the FY 2003 budget request?
A2. NASA has requested $4.6 million for the EPSCoR program in FY03. In FY02, Congress appropriated an additional $5.4 million to our original request of $4.6 million, for a total of $10 million. We feel that the FY03 request of $4.6 million fulfills the goals and objectives set for the EPSCoR program.
Q3. One of the many negative consequences of the cuts to the Space Station research account has been the pressure on research grants, which typically help educate the next generation of scientists and engineers. Have you done an impact analysis of the effect of the planned cuts to the Station research program on university research? If not, why not?
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A3. Reductions have been made for funding of future Space Station research grants to pay for the growth in Space Station development and operations. Reductions to Space Station research in the FY 2002 budget were made to equipment and associated utilization, not funding for research grants. For FY 2002, OBPR has kept all research options open pending completion of the Research Maximization and Prioritization Task Force (ReMaP). ReMaP was formed this spring by NASA to reprioritize the ISS research program, and provide recommendations that NASA could consider in the development of the FY 2004 budget request. There has been no termination of research grants in the ISS research program, however, some flight investigations have been converted to ground-based research with a slight downward adjustment in funding. While we expect some realignment, our objective is to maximize scientific productivity within available resources. This summer, for FY 2003 and beyond, NASA will be integrating ReMaP preliminary results with the available ISS on-orbit resources and budget. Once that activity is completed, NASA will have a more accurate picture of potential impacts on university-based research.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. The FY 2003 NASA budget request indicates that future Earth Science missions will remain in limbo until the Administration completes an interagency review of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (as distinct from the Climate Change Research Initiative). You state in your testimony that ''the Administration is conducting a review of USGCRP.'' It was our understanding that it had not yet been initiated. When did it begin, who is chairing it, and when will it be completed? If it hasn't been initiated, why not?
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A1. On April 1, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Director John Marburger and NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher presented a new climate change research and technology management structure that had been announced by the President in his speech on February 14, 2002. The new structure replaces the Subcommittee on Global Change Research overseeing USGCRP with a new Climate Change Science Program Office (CCSPO) to be headed by Dr. James Mahoney of the Commerce Department (Deputy Administrator of NOAA).
The CCSPO held its initial meeting on April 19, and is leading the effort on the Administration's review of the Nation's global change programs. In the next few weeks, the CCSPO will call for a complete inventory of relevant programs for analyzing government research on climate. The inventory will be the starting point for the development of the Climate Change Research Initiative in the FY 2004 budget. NASA participated in this initial meeting and is prepared to support this review and future activities. NASA defers to the DOC for their schedule of when the review will be completed.
Q2. Where does EOS fit into the President's overall climate strategy? If the Global Climate Change Program continues to advance our understanding of climate change, when will the Administration feel that enough is known to justify action on climate change? In other words, what is our goal with EOS and the USGCRP? What are the questions we are trying to answer, and when will this Administration be satisfied that they have been answered?
A2. The Earth Observing System (EOS) is part of NASA's end-to-end strategy driven by Earth system science. ESE's research strategy is based on a prioritized, hierarchical set of science questions, organized by the themes of variability, forcing, response, consequences, and prediction. The objective of this research is to develop a scientific understanding of the Earth system and its response to natural and human-induced changes to enable improved prediction capability for climate, weather, and natural hazards. EOS (and potential follow-on missions) is the Nation's principal tool for detecting and understanding global changes and their local and regional impacts. In his speech on June 11, 2001, the President expressed interest in reducing key uncertainties in our knowledge of climate science identified by the National Academies of Science in its 2001 report: how much effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on past warming; how much our climate could change in the future; how fast change will occur; how our actions could impact it; and what constitutes a dangerous level of warming. In February 2002, the President placed a priority on developing products useful to policy-makers in a 2–5 year timeframe. The new, interagency Climate Change Science Program Office (CCSPO) is tasked with providing the link between Agencies' research and the Administration's decision-making process. Historically, ESE's research strategy has been aligned with the priorities of the USGCRP.
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Q3. Out-year funding for NASA's Earth Science missions was cut by hundreds of millions of dollars in the Administration's FY 2002 NASA budget request. The FY 2003 budget request would further delay follow-on Earth Science missions, with no assurance that those follow-on missions will be allowed to proceed in the FY 2004 budget cycle. A series of indefinite deferrals and reviews can be the same as a cancellation. What is your commitment to NASA's follow-on EOS missions?
A3. NASA is fully committed to extending the key climate data records initiated by EOS through a series of follow-on missions. The Administration is conducting a review of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and its alignment with the President's Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI). Consequently, NASA has deferred initiation of any new major EOS missions in FY 2003 until the Administration has completed its review. However, the FY03 budget request includes funds for developing three of our follow-on missions. These include:
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP), also known as the ''Bridge'' mission. NPP serves simultaneously to extend essential measurements begun by EOS Terra and Aqua and demonstrate new technology for NPOESS, the converged civilian and military weather satellite system.
The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) as a commercial data purchase. Landsat data are the most widely used in remote sensing imaging for agriculture, forestry, and urban and regional planning throughout the U.S. LDCM will ensure the continuity of a vital national resource while marking a significant step in enabling commercial remote sensing capabilities.
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The Ocean Surface Topography Mission (OSTM) to follow the Jason mission launched in 2001. This mission is being implemented in partnership between NASA, NOAA and their European counterparts as a transition mission (along with NPP) between research and operational mission agencies.
The FY 2003 budget also provides funding for the study of a potential global precipitation measurement (GPM) satellite to measure rainfall worldwide for both climate research and assessment of impacts of fresh water availability around the world. Decisions on future EOS follow-on missions will be made following the completion of the Administration's review of climate programs.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Congressman Nick Lampson resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. In your response to my questions at the February 27th hearing, you stated that you did not know at that time whether OMB had done an analysis to indicate what the cost to the Space Station program would be if the work on the Crew Return Vehicle were stopped for two or more years and then restarted, after a decision to go beyond core complete were made. Now that you have had time to check, did OMB or NASA do such an analysis at the time the decision to restructure the Space Station program was made? If so, please submit that analysis for the record.
A1. Neither OMB nor NASA performed a detailed analysis on a scenario where work on the CRV would be halted for a number of years, then resumed.
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Q2a. In your response to my questions at the February 27th hearing, you indicated that NASA was exploring the concept of a ''safe haven'' on the Space Station.
Would that ''safe haven'' be in addition to a Crew Return Vehicle, or in place of it?
A2a. Conceptually, a ''safe haven'' could be used with or without a crew return vehicle. While a ''safe haven'' may be useful in certain limited circumstances for the International Space Station, there remains a requirement for a crew return capability.
Q2b. Your testimony seemed to suggest that NASA is examining a ''Crew Transport Vehicle'' as an alternative to a Crew Return Vehicle. Is that correct?
A2b. After reconsideration of ISS requirements, NASA's strategic needs, alternative capabilities and developmental challenges, the Agency has determined that pursuit of a single purpose vehicle of this investment magnitude is not the best use of taxpayer resources.
Rather, NASA's objective is to consolidate crew return and crew transfer objectives and integrate them into a more efficient vehicle providing a wider range of potential applications.
The plan is to ensure that knowledge and experience gained from work on the X–38 vehicle are applied to multipurpose vehicle concepts or other government projects while minimizing expenditures in closing down X–38/CRV activities. Technology paths demonstrated and the lessons learned through this effort for application to future projects and the CRV requirements are being incorporated into Crew Transfer Vehicle trade studies as a part of NASA's Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Program.
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Q2c. Given that NASA's Space Launch Initiative does not plan any decision on full scale development of a Crew Transport Vehicle or any other form of second generation reusable launch vehicle until 2006, when is the earliest that an operational Crew Transport Vehicle could realistically be available for use with the Space Station?
A2c. The goal of the Space Launch Initiative is to reduce technical risks for full-scale development of a privately operated launch system that is safer and more affordable than the Space Shuttle. The Space Launch Initiative aims to enable a decision by mid-decade (2005–2006) on whether to pursue full-scale development of a system that could replace the Space Shuttle early next decade (2010–2012). A Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) would be the element of such a launch system that carries crew from low Earth orbit to the Space Station and brings crew from the Space Station back to Earth. A CTV would be launched into Earth orbit using a reusable or expendable launch vehicle.
CTV development could be accelerated if a CTV were designed to launch on one or more existing expendable launch vehicles before a reusable launch system becomes available. NASA has a number of activities underway this summer that will help determine whether there is a need for additional Space Station crew return capability beyond that currently provided by the Space Shuttle and the Russian Soyuz vehicle. These activities include: the Space Station Research Maximization and Prioritization task force; the Space Station independent cost analysis task force; and studies of various Station crew safety options such as the safe haven concept. If additional crew return capability is needed, the Space Launch Initiative is undertaking CTV trade studies and is pursuing a number of risk reduction activities for systems that would be incorporated in a CTV, including crew escape and survival systems, vehicle rendezvous and docking systems, and crew transfer systems. These activities will help determine the technical feasibility of accelerated CTV development. The exact timing of when an accelerated CTV could be operational will be determined based on the outcome of all of these activities.
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Q3a. Your FY 2003 budget cuts $500 million from the Shuttle upgrades account relative to the previously planned funding profile. In the meantime, no credible replacement for the Shuttle is envisioned to be available prior to the middle of the next decade at the earliest.
What is the rationale for cutting the safety and supportability upgrades funding
A3a. NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) addresses continued safe operation of the Space Shuttle along with other space transportation investments such as the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) and longer-term technology investments. The ISTP currently includes plans for replacement of the Space Shuttle in 2012. NASA is making a significant investment through SLI in reducing the risk associated with proceeding with the development of a system that could replace the Space Shuttle in 2012. Based on the progress of SLI, a decision is expected in the middle of this decade on whether or not to proceed with development of a new space transportation system.
The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) cancelled, deferred and reduced safety and supportability upgrades due to a variety of reasons, including technology immaturity, schedule slippages and cost growth. In the current budget environment, funds must be balanced across the entire Agency. Therefore, NASA redirected these funds previously planned for upgrade investments to mitigate the Space Shuttle operational increases. The Space Shuttle Program has experienced increasing difficulties in finding additional operational and productivity efficiencies that would continue to cover increases such as contractor rate increases, and other requirements, such as infrastructure, obsolescence, and supportability.
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The Space Shuttle fleet is safe to fly. The SSP has extensive process controls in place to minimize risk during flight and ground operations of these systems. The risk due to the existing systems that would have been replaced by the cancelled or deferred projects is considered controlled and manageable.
Q3b. If the rationale is that some of the technologies have proved more challenging than first thought, why shouldn't funding be shifted to other safety upgrades instead of being eliminated from the budget?
A3b. Technology challenges alone were not the drivers in the decision to cut the safety and supportability upgrades funding. As stated above, the SSP cancelled, deferred and reduced safety and supportability upgrades due to a variety of reasons. At the same time, the Space Shuttle program was experiencing operational program increases such as contractor rates and fringe benefits, and higher energy costs. Therefore, NASA redirected these funds previously planned for upgrade investments to mitigate some of the Space Shuttle operational increases.
Other upgrades were not considered because our objective was to have the upgrades development complete by 2005 and implementation into the fleet by 2007 to achieve return on investment. In order to have a prudent understanding of what may be required to potentially extend the duration and ensure the safety of Shuttle operations beyond 2012, we have initiated an effort to identify potential upgrades and supportability investments. This activity will assess the potential costs, risks, and benefits of additional investments in Space Shuttle elements, ground support equipment, infrastructure supportability and upgrade candidates. The knowledge gained by this assessment will be needed as NASA updates the ISTP, and will provide a prudent backup plan if SLI progress falters. No commitment or decision has been made by NASA regarding Shuttle activities beyond 2012.
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Q3c. If the rationale is that some of the safety upgrades money is needed for safety-related infrastructure problems at the Cape and elsewhere, isn't that equivalent to saying that you have decided to cannibalize one part of the Shuttle safety program to help another part? Wouldn't the more responsible action as Administrator be to increase the overall Shuttle budget so that NASA doesn't have to choose which unsafe condition it is willing to tolerate in the Shuttle program?
A3c. To stay within the President's FY 2003 budget plan, funds must be balanced across the entire Agency. NASA has attempted to optimize the Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades program for maximum safety benefit within the time horizon, the amounts appropriated, and approved funding plans.
Q4a. One of the cancelled upgrades was the Electric APU project.
From the perspective of reducing total risks in the Shuttle program, the Electric APU upgrade has been identified as having one of the highest impacts on mission safety. If the upgrade is so critical in terms of reducing overall risk to the Shuttle, why was it cancelled?
A4a. Today the Space Shuttle fleet is as safe to fly as we can humanly make it prior to committing to each and every launch. Our commitment remains to continually increase safety and reduce risk by implementing high priority upgrades where technologically feasible. NASA determined that the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) upgrade, while having high potential for risk reduction, was not ready to proceed with implementation due to technical immaturity in several areas. Some of that technology may mature in the coming years under the Space Launch Initiative (SLI). Should that occur and a replacement vehicle for Shuttle still be unavailable, NASA may revisit the relative priority of this upgrade.
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Q4b. If it was cancelled because the technology wasn't advanced enough, have you instituted a technology program to enable you to restart the Electric APU program as soon as is feasible from a technical and cost-fidelity standpoint?
A4b. There is a minor technology effort currently under way for FY 2002. This effort includes an EAPU Battery technology assessment requirements reduction study, as well as project documentation to allow for potential reuse at a later date. FY03 direction is dependent on technical results from this year's activities, priority relative to other potential investments and Program needs.
Q4c. If so, what is the annual funding budgeted for that technology program, and when will you be able to restart the Electric APU effort?
A4c. There is a minor technology effort currently under way for $4 million in FY 2002. FY03 direction will be based on results from this year's activities, priority relative to other potential investments and Program needs.
Q4d. If not, why not, given the risk reduction potential of the upgrade?
A4d. FY03 budget direction will be based on results from this year's activities, priority relative to other potential investments and Program needs. The results of this year's activities will not be available until later this year. NASA is currently assessing potential upgrades and supportability investments that may be required to maintain the Space Shuttle fleet capability to fly safely through 2020, and EAPU will be included in that assessment.
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Q5. You refer to ''significant cost growth'' identified in the FY 2002 baseline program for the Shuttle.
Isn't it true that the Shuttle contractor has been UNDER-running the projected cost of its contract?
A5. The Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) was awarded to the United Space Alliance (USA) in October 1996. The contract was originally for a six-year period with two, two-year options. We are currently in contract negotiations with USA for extension of the SFOC contract. SFOC is just one of several Shuttle contractors, and expenditures on the SFOC contract constitute roughly half of the Shuttle operations budget.
SFOC has under-run the planned contract value on a cumulative basis since its inception. The current contract has a cost incentive provision that gives the contractor 35 percent of any contract under-run as an incentive fee, with the Government retaining the remaining 65 percent of the under-run. The cumulative under-run is currently estimated at $250 million, of which 65 percent is retained by the Government, and 35 percent goes to the contractor.
Q5a. If so, where is the cost growth?
A5a. The $250 million USA savings are cumulative across a six-year period and the Government's portion of the savings has already been re-invested back into the program. The cost increases are in the areas of escalation of contractor rates and health benefit increases, core skills and business base erosion. Another significant factor was the vastly increased content of the orbiter Columbia (OV–102) Orbiter Maintenance Modifications (OMM) performed at Palmdale, CA and its extensive wiring inspections.
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Q5b. Isn't the cost growth in fact a matter of growth relative to OMB's long-term projections for the Shuttle program, which were never reasonable in the first place?
A5b. Each year, NASA's budget request includes five-year budget plans that balance the priorities of the Agency. Over the past decade, NASA's Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has had essentially a flat budget for Space Shuttle operations. The program has been very successful in the past at achieving productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. However, the Space Shuttle Program has experienced increasing difficulties in finding additional operational and productivity efficiencies that would continue to cover increases such as contractor rate increases, and other requirements, such as infrastructure, obsolescence, and supportability.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses to written questions submitted by Congressman Mark Udall resulting from the February 27, 2002, hearing.
Q1. I agree with the need that you and OMB have emphasized for credible accounting and budgeting practices. However, when we look beyond the words to see what is being done in practice, a different picture emerges. In the FY 2003 budget request, you transferred the responsibility for ground network systems from the Office of Space Flight to the Office of Earth Science—but you didn't provide enough resources to the Earth Sciences program to cover the cost of that transfer. In fact, according to NASA's own estimates, the transfer will leave the Earth Science program with a $125 million ''unfunded challenge'' over the five-year period that will have to be ''eaten'' by the Earth Science program. What is the rationale for this action?
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A1. The Office of Space Flight has been conducting the Space Communications program for the past five years at the Space Operations Management Office at JSC. Considerable progress toward reducing operations costs and migrating operations functions to the private sector has been accomplished during this time. Significant progress has been made in the education of customers about the cost of services they receive. This cost awareness has led the customers to scrutinize the requirements with attendant cost reductions in mission operations more closely.
An underestimate of the changing mission model has resulted in an increase in cost. Some associated cost reductions did not materialize, adding to the increase in costs. These events have prompted NASA to reconsider the management approach and budget process for conducting the Space Communications program. We have agreed on an arrangement whereby the program elements are aligned with the Enterprise that is the predominant user of the element capacity. Program Executives, within the individual Enterprises, will manage major program elements and their associated budgets. Funding that was budgeted under centralized management for these functions is transferred to the new managing enterprise, but, due to growth in operations costs, is not sufficient to meet funding needs. Therefore, through this arrangement, each Enterprise will incorporate their space communications needs into the priorities and funding allocations they propose for their own Enterprise.
The Office of Earth Science assumes management responsibility for ground network tracking and data acquisition systems as well as mission operations for Earth Science spacecraft. Any budget ,shortfall will be addressed in the course of the current formulation of the FY 2004 budget.
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Q2. The FY 2003 NASA budget documentation states that the Pluto-Kuiper Belt mission was cancelled ''because of skyrocketing costs.'' However, based on the facts, that is an inaccurate statement. The Pluto-Kuiper Belt mission selected in 2001 after a multi-bidder competition reduced the cost of the mission by $200 million relative to the earlier Pluto mission cancelled by NASA in 2000. In addition, it incorporated a shorter flight time and larger scientific payload than the earlier mission would have. Given your and OMB's stated desire to reward program that perform well, why would NASA not continue the funding for this program?
A2. NASA cancelled the originally proposed Pluto-Kuiper Express (PIKE) mission because the mission's cost had doubled from approximately $318 million to $650 million. Thus, the Pluto-Kuiper Belt (PKB)/New Horizons mission cost of $480 million (responsive to the NASA request for a mission under $500 million) is still $162 million dollars more than the cost NASA had originally budgeted for the PIKE mission.
NASA released an Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for a PKB mission capped at $500 million after the cancellation of the PKE mission. That AO clearly stated that NASA was under no obligation to select any mission for study. The FY 2002 budget request subsequently cancelled the PKB mission study. However, under Congressional direction, NASA proceeded with the AO and selected two missions for preliminary study. One of these two, the PKB/New Horizons mission, was subsequently selected for design study. The design study was funded at a level of $30 million per the FY 2002 Congressional direction.
The PKB/New Horizons mission must be launched no later than 2007 in order to use the planet Jupiter as a gravity assist on its way to Pluto. If it doesn't launch by 2007, then the mission will not be capable of reaching Pluto or the Kuiper Belt. To ensure this launch date, NASA has established two conditions that must be successfully met at the conclusion of Phase B. First, the mission must pass a confirmation review that will address significant technical and schedule risks, including regulatory approval for launch of the mission's nuclear power source on new launch vehicle designs. Second, funds must be available. In the event that these conditions are not met, New Horizons has a contract that clearly states that NASA is under no obligation to proceed with Phase C/D (mission development).
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The National Academy of Sciences is undertaking a comprehensive review of planetary science priorities this summer. If this review identifies Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt as the top priority, the New Frontiers Program will provide future competitive opportunities to address these research targets.
Q3. Congress provided funding in last year's VA–HUD appropriation that was sufficient to initiate the Pluto-Kuiper Belt (New Horizons) mission—a competitively awarded mission to send the first spacecraft to the planet Pluto and beyond. OMB has decided not to fund the mission, and instead would propose establishing a ''New Frontiers'' program that would fund a series of as-yet-undefined missions to the outer solar system. Each mission would be capped at $650 million. The rationale for OMB's cancellation of the Pluto-Kuiper Belt mission is very unclear, given that the planned New Horizons mission price tag would fall well within OMB's cost-cap constraint for the New Frontiers program. What IS the logic of canceling a competitively awarded mission that already meets the constraints proposed for the New Frontiers program?
A3. There are four major reasons that NASA has chosen not to pursue the PKB/New Horizons mission:
1) Funding levels for the New Frontiers Program in FY 2003 are not adequate to support the development of the PKB/New Horizons mission, even if all New Frontiers funding were directed to that mission.
2) The National Academy of Sciences is completing the first-ever, comprehensive review of planetary science priorities this summer. Proceeding with the PKB/New Horizons mission would require taking funds from other planetary science priorities that may be rated higher or equal to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt.
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3) The PKB/New Horizons mission requires the launch of a nuclear power source for the first time aboard a new launch vehicle that will have a limited launch history. If regulatory approval for this launch cannot be granted in time to support a launch by 2007, then PKB/New Horizons will not be capable of reaching Pluto since it must have a gravity assist from the planet Jupiter. The planet will only be appropriately aligned if the mission is launched by 2007.
4) If Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt are clearly the top science priority in the National Academies review, NASA's New Frontiers program can pursue a future mission to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt. Such a mission could take advantage of technologies, such as advanced electric propulsion, that would enable the mission to reach Pluto without the constraint of a Jupiter gravity assist. Under these circumstances, there would be no constraining launch window and the mission could be launched any year in this decade.
Q4. As you know, the Pluto-Kuiper mission is on a time-critical path to a 2006 launch because Pluto's atmosphere may soon freeze out and its surface is increasingly being shadowed by a decades-long polar night. You have stated that you would prefer to see the first exploration of Pluto done with nuclear propulsion in order to enable an orbiter mission rather than a simply flyby. However, the first exploration of a planet has never been done with an orbiter because orbiters raise cost, and because the scientific community has long argued that sending orbiter missions before flybys adds risk where risk is not warranted. Moreover, the mission is also specifically intended to explore the Kuiper belt region. Given this, and the documented time-criticality of arriving at Pluto before its atmosphere freezes, I'd like to better understand why the Pluto-Kuiper Belt flyby mission was cancelled. Please also justify the risk to mission success and the added cost that will be incurred by wedding time-critical Pluto exploration to an undeveloped and untested nuclear propulsion scheme.
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A4. The time-criticality of a mission to Pluto is not universally accepted by the scientific community, as it is not clear that the planet's atmosphere will freeze or collapse by 2020.
In fact, some scientists believe that Pluto's atmosphere will never freeze completely. In any case, Pluto will still be a compelling target after 2020; the atmosphere is not the only scientifically important feature of the planet. Although the planet's surface does become shadowed as time passes, this happens at a very slow rate—less than two percent per year. Finally, the time-criticality of the PKB/New Horizons mission is due to its dependency on a Jupiter gravity assist, which can only take place if the mission is launched by 2007 at the latest. The PKB/New Horizons mission will require regulatory approval for launch of a nuclear power source on an as yet untested launch vehicle. If regulatory approval for this launch cannot be granted in time to support a launch by 2007, then the PKB/New Horizons mission will be entirely unable to reach Pluto and the Kuiper Belt.
However, there are other mission designs that take advantage of advanced electric propulsion that could launch any year this decade. If the National Academy of Sciences places a Pluto/Kuiper Belt mission at the top of its science priorities for planetary exploration, then NASA will study all mission concepts to Pluto and the Kuiper Belt. If the study does not recommend Pluto as the highest science priority, then proceeding with the PKB/New Horizons mission would require taking funds from other planetary science priorities that may be rated higher or equal to Pluto and/or the Kuiper Belt.
NASA strives to maximize the science return of a mission to Pluto and one option is to study the benefits of future nuclear power and propulsion. Nuclear capability affords us the opportunity to spend longer periods of time exploring Pluto and other Kuiper Belt objects, rather than just cruising by, and enables us to make more robust scientific observations of Pluto, due to the greater power levels that can be provided to the spacecraft's instruments. The scientific return and benefit to taxpayers is much higher with an orbiter than with a flyby.
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(Footnote 1 return)
Europa is a moon of Jupiter.
(Footnote 2 return)
In the financial management initiative a serious flaw would include having financial records in such poor shape that auditors cannot express an opinion. For more information, see pp. 43–53 of the FY03 Budget.
(Footnote 3 return)
Following Mr. Dennis Tito's flight, NASA and the ISS Partners adopted rules for future spaceflight participants. The Principles Regarding Processes, and Criteria for Selection, Assignment, Training, and Certification of ISS.(Expedition and Visiting) Crew members (attached) provides as follows: ''There are two types of crew members, professional astronauts/cosmonauts and spaceflight participants. These crew members can be designated as expedition or visiting crew members. . .Spaceflight participants are individuals (e.g., commercial, scientific and other programs; crew members of non-partner space agencies, engineers, scientists, teachers, journalists, filmmakers or tourists) sponsored by one or more partner(s). Normally, this is a temporary assignment that is covered under a short-term contract.''