SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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78–958PS
2002
SPACE SHUTTLE AND
SPACE LAUNCH INITIATIVE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 18, 2002
Serial No. 107–79
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
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FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
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MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DAVE WELDON, Florida
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BART GORDON, Tennessee
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MARK UDALL, Colorado
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DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
AMANDA PARSONS Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
April 18, 2002
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by the Honorable Dave Weldon, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
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Witness List
Hearing Charter
Witnesses
Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Associate Administrator for Human Spaceflight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Mr. Richard D. Blomberg, Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Mr. Sam Venneri, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Member, NASA Space Transportation Subcommittee of the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee
Oral Statement
Written Statement
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Discussion
Flight Demonstrators
RLV Technology Maturity
Tying RLV Technology Maturity to Initial Operations Capability Dates
Space Shuttle Privatization
Space Shuttle Safety
Space Shuttle Operating Costs
Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Second Generation RLV
Crew Return Vehicle
Budget Requests
Space Shuttle Safety Concerns
Crew Return Vehicle
Space Shuttle Privatization
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Associate Administrator for Human Spaceflight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Richard D. Blomberg, Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Mr. Sam Venneri, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
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Additional Statement Submitted by Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Member, NASA Space Transportation Subcommittee of the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee
SPACE SHUTTLE AND SPACE LAUNCH INITIATIVE
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I hereby call this meeting of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order. And, without objection, the Chair will be granted the authority to recess the Committee in case we have votes, which we are expected to have. Let me apologize for starting a little bit late today. We thought there was going to be immediate votes on the Floor of the House, so we were—my office was informed of that, and apparently they changed their minds.
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Today's hearing will examine NASA's two-track approach for space transportation. The first track is to satisfy—or, excuse me—to safely operate and maintain the Space Shuttle. The second track is to develop and demonstrate technologies for a second generation of reusable pockets. With the undocking of the Space Shuttle Atlantis from the International Space Station yesterday, we look forward to the Shuttle returning safely to Earth. And we have, again, become very accustomed to that, to very safe shuttle flights. We should not, of course, be complacent.
And while I found comfort in knowing that the Space Shuttle's performance since Challenger has been flawless, we must remain vigilant and we must be mindful of the enormous effort and expense that is required to make sure that the Shuttle is flying flawlessly, and that the Shuttle is flying safely. It takes an enormous effort and a tremendous expense.
The Shuttle was designed over 30 years ago, and many of its systems are based on obsolete technology. To be fair, the Shuttle program budget has decreased by more than 40 percent over the last 10 years, while maintaining 100 percent mission success. And that is a terrific example for others—I wish everybody in the government could do that.
But NASA has attempted several times to develop and demonstrate new technologies which would significantly cost—cut the cost and the risk of launch. Unfortunately, none have succeeded. And all of us on this Committee have tried and put our time and effort into that project as well. But setbacks continue to push back plans for a new privately owned and operated vehicle, and we keep pushing these plans further and further back into the future and all, and we don't have anything set even now.
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America needs a commitment from NASA and our aerospace community to come up with a responsible approach for new, affordable, and reliable access to space. In particular, NASA must do a better job in developing realistic plans and programs for achieving low-cost access to space.
And I might add that the first speech that I gave in this Committee—any remarks that I give in this Committee—14 years ago, when I joined this Committee, was talking about how our number one priority had to be low-cost access to space and how a lot of other things would follow. And, yet, we—14 years later, we still do not have it, and we are not—we may be a little closer, but that is what we will find out today from our witnesses.
In order for us to move forward in a positive direction, we must be honest with ourselves and learn from our mistakes. Like the X–33, which was a mistake, but we can learn from it, and there are, of course, elements of technology that we will glean from that program. But we must not make the assumptions based on phony premises or giving ourselves false hopes that something—or being overly optimistic as we plan for the future. We must look to the future with optimism, but also with realism.
I supported the single-stage-to-orbit concept at the time of its inception because I thought that that is what held the promise of getting us into space cheaper and viably. And I felt that was the next step in our evolution into space transportation system of our space transportation system of this millennium. But after seven years of the single—of focusing on the single-stage-to-orbit, and $1.2 billion, I certainly realize that the technology hurdles for the X–33 were insurmountable. And—witnesses to talk about that as well.
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And so perhaps this was not the fault of—wasn't the problem with NASA, but was maybe a problem that we set our sights too high. And, frankly, this Chairman and other Members of the Committee have to accept responsibility for helping set those. And I maintain that—unfortunately, I do maintain, however, that the previous Administration did, perhaps, select the wrong vehicle. I had been pushing another one before, but then again, we all got behind the X–33 and tried to make it successful, but it was not.
Two years ago, NASA unveiled the Space Launch Initiative as a new program, based on a clean sheet of paper approach, which would develop the technologies to meet the country's future launch needs. I don't think it is arrogant to say that I was one of the prime movers behind the SLI and the idea of developing a variety of technologies, rather than focusing on a single concept. I still want the Space Launch Initiative to succeed, but there appears to be increasingly little hope that it will produce any significant breakthroughs.
Pursuing cutting-edge technology does not mean blindly shoveling money and hoping for a miracle. We must ensure that the Shuttle continues to operate safely in the absence of any viable alternative. But then, again, we can't fly the Shuttle forever. So how long should we fly the Shuttle? What are the right goals for the next generation vehicle? Will SLI actually produce technology that dramatically reduces cost and risk? These are some of the issues we will be discussing at this hearing today.
The Space Shuttle program and the Space Launch Initiative are linked and, perhaps, they are part—right there, at this point, at a crossroads. The programs we will discuss today will likely cost the American taxpayers $50 to $60 billion over the next 10 years. Big money. It is big money and that takes—that means we should be taking this extraordinarily seriously as we plot out this course. Issues involving levels of investment for Shuttle safety and upgrades, Shuttle privatization, the credibility of the SLI program will define how this country proceeds in improving its launch capability.
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Today's hearing will provide greater clarity to these issues of importance to the aerospace community, and to this Subcommittee, and to our country, and, yes, to all of humankind. I would like to recognize Ranking Member now, Bart Gordon, from Tennessee, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANA ROHRABACHER
Today's hearing will examine NASA's two-track approach for space transportation. The first track is to safely operate and maintain the Space Shuttle, while the second track is to develop and demonstrate technologies for a second-generation reusable launch system. With the undocking of the Space Shuttle Atlantis from the International Space Station yesterday, we look forward to the Shuttle returning safely to Earth tomorrow. While I find comfort knowing that the Space Shuttle's performance since Challenger has been flawless, we must be vigilant and mindful of the enormous effort and expense required to fly the Shuttle. The Shuttle was designed over 30 years ago and many of its systems are based on obsolete technology. To be fair, the Shuttle program budget has decreased by more than forty percent over the last ten years, while maintaining 100 percent mission success. NASA has attempted several times to develop and demonstrate new technologies to significantly cut the cost and risk of launch, but none have succeeded. Setbacks continue to push plans for a new privately-owned and operated vehicle further into the future. America needs a commitment from NASA and our aerospace community to come up with responsible approaches for affordable and reliable access to space. In particular, NASA must do a much better job in developing realistic plans and programs for achieving low cost access to space.
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In order for us to move forward in a positive direction, we must be honest with ourselves, learn from mistakes like the X–33, and not make assumptions based on phony premises as we plan for the future. I supported the single stage to orbit concept at its inception, because I thought that it held the promise of getting us to the next step in the evolution of space transportation. After seven years and $1.2 billion, I realized that the technology hurdles for the X–33 were insurmountable. I maintain that the previous Administration sold the Congress on an unobtainable, high-risk bill of goods.
Two years ago, NASA unveiled the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) as a new program, based on a ''clean sheet of paper'' approach, which would develop the technologies to meet the country's future launch needs. I don't think it is arrogant to say that I was the prime mover behind SLI and the idea of developing a variety of technologies rather than focusing on a single concept. I still want SLI to succeed, but there appears to be increasingly little hope that it will produce any significant breakthroughs. Pursuing cutting-edge technology does not mean blindly shoveling money in and hoping for a miracle. We must ensure the Shuttle continues to operate safely in the absence of a viable alternative, but we can't fly the Shuttle forever. How long should we fly the Shuttle? What are the right goals for the next generation vehicle? Will SLI actually produce technology that dramatically reduces cost and risk?
The Space Shuttle program and the Space Launch Initiative are inextricably linked and perhaps they are at a crossroad. The programs we will discuss today will likely cost the American taxpayer $50–60 billion over the next ten years. Issues involving levels of investment for Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades, Shuttle privatization, and the credibility of the SLI program will define how this country proceeds in improving its national launch capability.
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Today's hearing will provide greater clarity into these issues of importance to the aerospace community and this Subcommittee.
Mr. GORDON. Good morning, and my welcome to all of our witnesses to today's hearing. Your perspectives will be helpful to us as we examine the Administration's fiscal year 2003 NASA budget request. The two programs we are examining today represent major investments by the Federal Government. Not only does the Space Shuttle account for a significant share of NASA's budget, it is the only U.S. means of getting humans into space. And it is critical for the assembly and support of the Space Station.
The Space Launch Initiative, on the other hand, is a multi-billion dollar initiative to develop the next generation launch system. It is intended to dramatically lower the cost and increase the reliability of future launch systems. And it is intended to meet both NASA and commercial needs. Given their importance, we need to understand what the Administration's plans are for both the Space Station and the Space Launch Initiative. At present, I think we are getting mixed signals.
For example, the Administration sent over a fiscal year 2003 budget request that cuts more than half a billion dollars from the Shuttle's safety and supportive upgrades. As the Independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has concluded—and I quote—''The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle.'' And while on the same budget, NASA somehow finds nearly a billion dollars, over the next five years, to fund a speculative R&D program in the nuclear power and propulsion for missions to the outer solar system even though the Administration has canceled the only two robotic missions currently planned for the outer solar system.
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Next, Administrator O'Keefe testified at the Committee's February 27 hearing that no decisions will be made regarding the shuttle privatization until the end of the summer at the earliest. And, yet, NASA has just put out for contractor comment an International Space Station contract consolidation strategy that—and I quote—''assumes a privatized shuttle vehicle.''
And the fiscal year 2003 budget request states that the Shuttle flight rate had to be cut, as did funds for safety upgrades due to increases in the Shuttle operation cost. However, during the same period, the Space Flight Operations Contract was underrunning its projected cost.
Finally, Congress has told the Space Launch Initiative—was told that the Space Launch Initiative was to help meet commercial and NASA needs for lower-cost reliable space transportation. Now, though, it appears that the Space Launch Initiative program will undergo a major restructuring to turn it into a joint DOD–NASA program to meet, as of yet, undetermined goals.
I hope the witnesses will be able to clarify what seems to be a murky situation. We will need a clearer picture if we are to make rational funding decisions this year. Again, I welcome the witnesses and look forward to your testimony.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. We appreciate Mr. Gordon's comments. And the fact is that the Administration has got to get its act together in space. And there are some confusing signals that are being given, and it's very well taken. And we appreciate you bringing them up. This is very important.
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We need some attention on this space program. Of course, it's only going to spend $50 or $60 billion over 10 years, and people's lives are at stake. When they are confusing signals, things are not happening by leadership in the Executive Branch. It can lead to some—I was in the White House when the Challenger blew up, and I never want anything like that to happen again. We take this very seriously and I think the Administration needs to pay more attention. So thank you very much.
And the opening statements of other Members will be put into the written record so we can get right to the testimony today. And so without objection, so ordered. The Chairman also requests unanimous consent for the authority to recess this hearing at any point. Hearing no objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent to insert in the appropriate place in the record, the background memorandum prepared by the majority staff for this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DAVE WELDON
I want to thank Chairman Rohrabacher for calling today's hearing. Aside from the problems we are facing with ISS, the Space Shuttle's future and its eventual replacement is the most pressing issue NASA is grappling with. I look forward today to getting some answers about this important question.
To be blunt, NASA has to come clean about what its plans are for manned rated vehicle operations. For the better part of the past decade NASA has been working under the assumption that a Shuttle-class replacement would be on the near term horizon. This caused for the Space Shuttles to have upgrades deferred or cancelled. This glide path toward expected retirement of the Shuttle within the first decade of the 21st century also caused the literally crumbling Shuttle related infrastructure to be given patchwork improvements or trauma center-like repairs.
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Unfortunately a new, robust Shuttle replacement is not on the horizon for at least another decade-and-a-half. With that being the case, NASA needs to present a cogent policy and funding strategy that will lead to common sense upgrades for the Shuttle to enable operations to continue safely and efficiently until around 2020. The same goes for the Shuttle related infrastructure. With a roadmap like this in place, we in Congress can appropriate the sums needed and overall space policy can be managed in a coherent fashion with respect to man-rated vehicle operations.
Sean O'Keefe's commitment to developing new propulsion systems should be applauded. He is on the right path which will hopefully set the stage for much more aggressive space exploration. SLI is part of that effort. This does not mean, however, I am without reservations regarding SLI.
I am becoming skeptical of the need to develop a 2nd generation RLV. Namely the cost benefit we would gain from such a vehicle. Let's be honest, a 2nd gen RLV would cost tens of billions of dollars. In the current budget predicament, NASA does not have the luxury of spending that kind of money for a vehicle that in the end would only offer marginal improvements over the Shuttle. Whereas taking a proven vehicle such as the Shuttles and making, in comparison to the cost of 2nd gen RLV, modest upgrades, we can see efficiencies realized much sooner.
Much has been made by DOD about wanting to do ''leap ahead'' technologies and systems. Today, I will publicly call on NASA to look seriously into canceling 2nd generation RLV work and focus on 3rd generation, ''leap ahead'' RLV R&D all while making sensible upgrades and infrastructure improvements to the Shuttle. I think we can all look toward the 2020 timeframe of being able to bring 3rd generation RLV to the forefront and the phasing out of the venerable Shuttle fleet.
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HEARING CHARTER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Space Shuttle and
Space Launch Initiative
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2002
10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
1. Purpose of Hearing
On Thursday, April 18, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2318 Rayburn, the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing on the Space Shuttle and Space Launch Initiative (SLI) programs. The hearing will examine NASA's plans to operate and maintain the Space Shuttle and NASA's strategy for developing a second generation reusable launch vehicle (RLV) to replace the Space Shuttle.
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Specifically, the hearing will review NASA's plans for Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades, proposed reductions in Shuttle flight rate, the status of Shuttle launch infrastructure, plans for competitive sourcing of the Shuttle, ability of the workforce to support planned missions, and the status of studies to extend the operational life of the Space Shuttle beyond 2012. In addition, the hearing will review NASA's plans to develop and demonstrate technologies for a second generation reusable launch vehicle to replace the Space Shuttle under the Space Launch Initiative. Taken together, NASA's space transportation programs may cost $50–60 billion over the next ten years.
2. Major Issues
NASA Space Transportation Advisory Panel Criticizes SLI Program's Credibility. Last year, a NASA space transportation advisory group report concluded, ''The basic structure of the SLI (program orientation, objectives, schedule, technology) renders the program impossible for successful completion. The elements are so obviously lacking in credibility as to discourage best efforts by either government or industry.''
Safety Advisory Group Warns Against NASA's Human Space Flight Safety Risks. An Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel report in March 2002 concluded, ''The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle.''
How long will the Space Shuttle need to safely operate and when will the second generation RLV be ready? NASA's FY03 budget request for Space Shuttle upgrades, infrastructure refurbishment, and the Space Launch Initiative assumed that the Shuttle would be phased out by 2012. Subsequent to the budget submittal and based on advice by its Advisory Panel, NASA is now reassessing this assumed 2012 phase-out year and the possible need to safely fly the Shuttle through 2020. This change will affect investment decisions for Space Shuttle upgrades, launch infrastructure, and the Space Launch Initiative.
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Deteriorating Launch Infrastructure. Kennedy Space Center infrastructure was built almost 40 years ago and has been refurbished numerous times to keep the facilities ''launch ready.'' NASA's FY03 budget request plans $76 million in FY03 and over $365 million in Shuttle infrastructure revitalization for FY02–07. This infrastructure revitalization budget assumes cost savings in other areas of the overall Space Shuttle budget of $3.2 billion per year. Much of these cost savings assume a reduced flight rate of 4–5 flights per year and Shuttle upgrades cuts. It is not clear what will happen to infrastructure revitalization plans if those cost savings aren't realized.
Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing/Privatization. The FY03 President's Budget Request announced plans to pursue Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing to enable the transfer of Shuttle operations and possibly some portion of infrastructure ownership to a private entity. The FY03 Budget Request identifies possible benefits of competitive sourcing as: greater flexibility to recruit and retain a skilled workforce necessary to safely operate the Shuttle, cost savings, and making NASA a purchaser of services rather than an operator of infrastructure. The impacts of Shuttle privatization on the NASA workforce and budget plans have not yet been fully explored.
3. Witnesses
Mr. Fred Gregory, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight Enterprise, has been asked to address the following—
What is the rationale behind proposed reductions in Space Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades in the FY 2003 budget request?
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How might these reductions be affected by the recently announced study to safely operate and maintain the Shuttle to 2020?
What options and criteria are being considered for Space Shuttle commercial sourcing?
Mr. Richard Blomberg, Chair of NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, has been asked to address the following—
What are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's findings and recommendations about Space Shuttle plans and budget request?
What are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's specific concerns and recommendations for Space Shuttle ground infrastructure and launch workforce?
Mr. Sam Venneri, NASA Associate Administrator for Aerospace Technology Enterprise, has been asked to address the following—
What is the impact to the Space Launch Initiative program if NASA decides to operate and maintain the Space Shuttle to 2020?
What are the objectives and investment strategy for the Space Launch Initiative for each year (FY 2003–06)?
What information is required before a decision can be made to proceed with full-scale development of a second generation reusable launch vehicle?
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Mr. Gerard Elverum, Member of the NASA Space Transportation Subcommittee of the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee, has been asked to address the following—
What are the Space Transportation Subcommittee's specific concerns and recommendations for NASA's Space Launch Initiative program objectives, schedule, technology, and need for program orientation?
If NASA decided to extend operations of the Shuttle to 2020, what changes to SLI would you recommend?
4. Background
Integrated Space Transportation Plan
The Space Shuttle is the first generation reusable launch vehicle and is the sole means for the United States to launch humans into orbit and provide cargo to the Space Station. While the Space Shuttle has successfully launched 109 times since 1981 and is the most reliable space launch vehicle, the specter of the 1986 Challenger accident, the increasing costs to operate and maintain the Shuttle fleet, workforce reductions for Shuttle operations, deteriorating launch infrastructure, and budget cuts to safety and supportability upgrades have led to questions about its continued viability past 2012 when NASA currently plans to begin phasing out Shuttle operations. Operating the Shuttle safely while developing a more reliable and lower cost second generation reusable launch vehicle (RLV) under the Space Launch Initiative is a major NASA endeavor. The FY03 budget request for the Space Shuttle program is $3.2 billion, and the Second Generation Launch Vehicle/Space Launch Initiative FY03 budget request is $759 million.
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1n 1999, NASA developed an integrated strategy for space transportation. The objective of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) was to integrate NASA's diverse space transportation activities. At that time, the ISTP stated the following five goals: 1) Ensure continued safe access to space through the Space Shuttle with upgrades until the second generation RLV is operational; 2) Conduct safety, reliability, cost, and NASA mission definition trade studies; 3) Enable a competition at an acceptable level of risk for development of a second generation RLV no later than 2005; 4) Develop an integrated architecture to meet NASA-unique space transportation needs on a commercial RLV and potentially provide NASA assured access to space on more than one launch vehicle; and 5) Ensure secure, safe, reliable, and cost-effective access to space in the far-term through investments in third generation RLV technologies.
While there is consensus on the top-level goals for the Integrated Space Transportation Plan, two NASA advisory committees are concerned with the way NASA is implementing its strategy, cost growth in Shuttle operations and upgrades, NASA's budget cuts to Shuttle upgrades, and the time-phasing of investments between the Shuttle and a second generation RLV. Further, some analysts question NASA's credibility to execute this plan given its record over the last several years with reusable launch vehicle development.
Space Shuttle Safety and Supportability Upgrades
What safety and supportability upgrades as well as infrastructure refurbishment are needed for the Space Shuttle to safely fly to 2012 or 2020? Investments in Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades are predicated on when a Shuttle replacement will be developed and operational. While the 2012 phase-out year for the Shuttle has been called into question by two NASA advisory committees and many space transportation analysts, NASA decided to cut Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades based on this 2012 phase-out year. Debate over shuttle upgrades became more intense during the FY02 budget cycle after NASA decided to terminate what it earlier had described as its highest priority safety upgrade, the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit.
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The FY03 budget request further cut how much NASA planned to spend on safety and supportability upgrades in the FY02–07 time period. In the FY02 request, NASA planned to spend $1.836 billion on Shuttle upgrades. In FY03, the budget request is $1.220 billion, a 34 percent reduction. A detailed budget comparison between FY02 and FY03 is provided below.
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Space Launch Initiative
From 1995 to 2000, NASA approached development of a new Reusable Launch Vehicle with ''X'' (for ''experimental'') flight test programs. The X–33, a large RLV based on single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) technology, was to fly at 13–15 times the speed of sound with a new, technically challenging aerospike engine and a new composite hydrogen fuel tank. After several technical problems and schedule slips, NASA terminated the X–33 program in March 2001. NASA spent $1.2 billion on the X–33, while Lockheed Martin invested $356 million.
Rather than continuing with the X–33 program, NASA restructured its second generation reusable launch vehicle (RLV) program and established the Space Launch Initiative. NASA initially selected 2005 as the next time when it would decide to proceed with full-scale development of a second generation RLV. NASA now refers to that decision timeframe as either ''mid-decade'' or FY06. NASA began the Space Launch Initiative program to develop the technologies needed for a full-scale second generation RLV. Rather than focusing on a single vehicle design like the X–33, the SLI program develops generic RLV technology and system designs. The SLI is designed to encourage development of a variety of reusable launch vehicle technologies for lower cost to orbit and higher reliability than the Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle's cost per pound to low-Earth orbit is approximately $10,000, while the SLI goal is to develop RLV technologies to enable only $1,000 per pound for the Second Generation RLV. The Space Shuttle's current reliability is approximated at a 1 in 265 Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF), and with the Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades, the reliability is expected to be 1 in 620 MTBF. The goal of SLI is a 1 in 10,000 MTBF for the second generation RLV. However, NASA advisory committees and space transportation analysts have expressed great skepticism about reaching these SLI cost and reliability goals. Further, these observers are skeptical of the development timeframe and NASA's ability to develop a Second Generation reusable launch vehicle successfully in the wake of the X–33 and X–34 program failures.
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At a House Science Subcommittee hearing on June 20, 2001, the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified about a study (GAO–01–826T) it conducted on the X–33 program, and cautioned NASA against making similar mistakes with SLI. GAO cited a lack of ''realistic cost estimates, timely acquisition and risk management plans, and adequate and realistic performance goals'' with X–33. It identified three critical areas: the technical complexity of SLI requires realistic cost estimates and risk mitigation plans and appropriate funding; NASA must ensure that the numerous interrelated, complex efforts involved in developing the technology move forward with effective coordination and communication; and performance measures must be implemented and periodically validated.
Total planned SLI funding for FY01–06 is $4.8 billion and a detailed breakout is provided below. After FY06, total costs for a Second Generation RLV are unknown, but the costs will likely range between $10–$30 billion.
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Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing/Privatization Studies
In 1996, NASA decided to choose a single prime contractor for the Shuttle, and the United Space Alliance, a Boeing and Lockheed-Martin joint venture, was chosen. Some observers view the transition of Space Shuttle operations and maintenance from NASA to the United Space Alliance as the first step toward Space Shuttle privatization, although the precise meaning of that term remains subject to debate. Competitive sourcing may enable the full transfer of Shuttle operations and some portion of infrastructure ownership to a private entity. Some advocates for privatization envision the Shuttle one day being operated entirely by the private sector, similar to an airline, with the government as only one of several customers. Others believe that the Shuttle's high operational costs will not attract private sector customers, and it will remain a vehicle primarily used and paid for by NASA.
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With the FY03 budget request, NASA announced that it is assessing different options using specific criteria such as safety, cost savings, and the business base for competitive sourcing or privatization of the Shuttle. According to the FY03 President's Budget request, the potential benefits of competitive sourcing include greater flexibility to recruit and retain the skilled personnel necessary to safely operate the Shuttle, the ability to avoid potential cost growth for Shuttle operations, and the ability to bring about significant culture change in human space flight at NASA by making it a purchaser of services rather than an operator of infrastructure. The RAND Corporation is currently conducting a study to support NASA's decision-making process for Shuttle privatization later this year.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Warns Against Shuttle Safety Risks
The independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) annually reviews NASA's human space flight safety plans. In its March 2002 report, the ASAP issued several findings and recommendations to bolster NASA's Shuttle safety plans. The ASAP concluded that ''current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk levels of operating the Space Shuttle or the ISS.'' Citing shuttle upgrades as an area needing more attention, the ASAP noted that the commercial and military sectors have product improvement programs to extend the life of older aircraft. The panel argued that the Shuttle should take a similar approach with product improvement, but is ''not able to follow this proven approach'' because of budget constraints. Further, the ASAP found that the Space Shuttle ground infrastructure has deteriorated to such an extent that it will not be capable of supporting the Shuttle to 2015–2020. In addition, NASA needs to ensure the continued technical viability of its specially-skilled workforce to operate and maintain the Shuttle. The ASAP also recommended that Space Shuttle privatization plans include an assessment by safety professionals.
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Space Transportation Subcommittee Questions SLI Credibility
The Space Transportation Subcommittee of the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee has been advising the NASA Aerospace Technology Enterprise for several years. The last report of the Space Transportation Subcommittee stated, ''The basic structure of the SLI (program orientation, objectives, schedule, technology) renders the program impossible of successful completion. These elements are so obviously lacking in credibility as to discourage best efforts by either government or industry. Major restructuring is needed along the lines of the four recommendations below.'' According to publicly available Advisory Committee meeting minutes, NASA management's response to the Space Transportation Subcommittee was that its recommendations ''would get the Program into trouble and would not get it any OMB and Congressional support.'' The four recommendations of NASA's Space Transportation Subcommittee are summarized:
1) NASA should give the Space Launch Initiative a program orientation by making an early, firm decision between the only two real alternative programs: (a) Design and produce a new multi-stage vehicle system (probably two-stage-to-orbit) to replace the Space Shuttle about 2015; or (b) Continue to operate the Space Shuttle (with upgrades, and possibly replacement Orbiters) for several decades.
2) NASA should officially change its cost reduction objective for the Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle program from one-tenth of current cost to a fraction of that reduction. Similarly, NASA should change its safety improvement objective of the 2nd Generation RLV Program from one-hundredth of the current risk of crew loss to a small fraction of that improvement.
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3) NASA should officially change their ''Initial Operational Capability'' (IOC) date for the second generation RLV from 2010 to about 2015. Wisely chosen IOC dates are of inestimable importance to any development and acquisition program.
4) At the first opportunity, NASA should shift the early (FY02–03) emphasis of the SLI from a very large number of wide-ranging R&D initiatives to a focused systems analysis effort to define the second generation RLV Program. Little will be gained by pursuing multiple, broad-scope R&D new starts without having a clear view of the desired system or the development time available.
In addition to this report, the Space Transportation Subcommittee previously made the following recommendations:
NASA should establish the second generation reusable launch vehicle program office at NASA Headquarters, reporting directly to the Administrator;
NASA should focus its efforts on NASA-unique manned space needs without duplicating Space Station capabilities;
NASA should rigorously restrict the R&D efforts funded by the SLI; and
NASA's systems analysis should explore the possibility of cost savings from commonality with commercial cargo reusable launch vehicles, as commercial space activities must remain market-driven.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Lastly, I request unanimous consent that the record for this hearing remain open until April 25, 2002, so that the additional testimony may be inserted into the record. Without objection, so ordered.
We have a distinguished panel of aerospace experts with us today to give us their perspective on both the Space Shuttle and SLI programs. We have asked them to summarize their testimony in five minutes, if possible, so that we can engage in dialogue with you. And we have witnesses that have a tremendous amount of background and resources available to maybe explain some of the questions raised by Mr. Gordon and calm some of the fears that I expressed a few moments ago.
Our first witness is Fred Gregory, NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight. An astronaut who has piloted and commanded three Space Shuttle flights and had a distinguished Air Force career before that. He is here to testify on NASA's current plans for Space Shuttle. And I can't think of someone who would know this program from nuts and bolts better than this gentleman. So, Mr. Gregory, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERICK D. GREGORY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. GREGORY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and other members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you all for inviting me and to allow me to discuss the status and future of NASA's Space Shuttle program. It is a privilege, and I am honored to be asked to assist in communicating NASA's message on space exploration.
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As the new Associate Administrator, let me emphasize new, for the Office of Space Flight, and the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise, that is the HEDS Enterprise, I bring almost three decades of aerospace experience, including serving as an experimental test pilot for NASA prior to being a Space Shuttle pilot and commander. And until very recently, I was the NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance.
I can assure you that I am fully committed to the safety of our on-ground and space activities, the hardware and the folks, while we meet the manifest, improve supportability, and improve the Space Shuttle program.
It is my personal goal that we take advantage of the Space Shuttle's tremendous capabilities for meeting NASA's mission to understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of explorers, as only NASA can.
Twenty-one years ago this April, the United States raised the standards for space exploration when it inaugurated the world's first reusable launch vehicle, the Space Shuttle. With a successful liftoff of Columbia, America showed the world that it could take those bold steps when it came to pioneering the final frontier.
Today, my colleague, Sam Venneri, the Associate Administrator for the Office of Aerospace Technology, and I will describe and respond to your questions on NASA's plans for our next bold steps as outlined in the Integrated Space Transportation Plan, the ISTP. The ISTP is the governing framework that coordinates and guides NASA's various space transportation investments, including the Space Shuttle improvements, the Space Launch Initiative, and the long-term technology investments.
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The Space Shuttle will continue to meet the Nation's human-rated space transportation needs as long as we are asked to fly and/or until the next human-rated reusable launch vehicle, RLV, is operational. An upgrade program that is accompanied by supportability upgrades and infrastructure revitalization will ensure that the Space Shuttle will remain highly reliable and safe.
To provide a better perspective for understanding why NASA must continue to make the Space Shuttle safe, I will use the following safety yardsticks for comparison. The U.S. heavy lift launch vehicle, the Titan IV, has a launch safety level of 1 in 20; an American fighter, approximately 1 in 20,000. A commercial airliner has a safety level of 1 in a million or more.
The Space Shuttle's current Loss of Vehicle ascent or LOV, is 1 in 556 and, for overall mission, 1 in 265. These statistics show us that while we can be proud of our accomplishments, we must continue in our efforts to upgrade shuttle safety. Our goal is to implement timely upgrades.
One of the key challenges this year will be competitive sourcing of the Space Shuttle, ensuring that the safety is not compromised, while, at the same time, achieving potential cost benefits to the government. We have chartered a Space Shuttle Business Review Team to identify a family of alternative business models, test the models, determine conditions for implementation, identify issues, and evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each of the models. The Business Review Team report is due this summer. Based on this report, we will release a request for information and engage with industry by the end of this fiscal year.
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Retaining a capable Space Shuttle workforce of NASA civil servants and contractors will continue to be one of our major challenges for the coming years. Experience has shown that an organization that provides job safety, job security, and a challenging work environment will promote employee retention and work innovations. These are keys to making any program or project a success.
Knowing this, NASA will continue to ensure that an adequate staff of Shuttle workforce, especially critical skills, will be available. A capable Shuttle staff will provide the corporate knowledge to train the next generation.
External and internal reviews will continue to be part of the Space Shuttle program's normal business. We will maintain our ongoing interaction with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the NASA Advisory Council, and its Space Flight Advisory Committee, and the NASA Independent Program Assessment Office that provides us feedback on improving the Office of Space Flight Programs.
Accountability for the program resides at headquarters with me. I chair the Flight Readiness Review for each Shuttle mission. And I have started plans to implement three internal advisory councils to formulate policies for program management, institutions, and scientific and technical goals. We are also reorganizing our office to revitalize corporate headquarters' accountability.
In conclusion, the business of human exploration is not risk-free. As long as the Space Shuttle is required to fly, it needs adequate funding for its upgrades program and to maintain a well-trained workforce. The men and women of NASA are committed to structuring the Space Shuttle program as a world-class transportation system that supports important scientific research to improve life here on earth.
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America can be proud of its space program. No other country has ever matched the Space Shuttle's accomplishment. So I have a much longer testimony that I would like to enter into the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregory follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK D. GREGORY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the status and future of NASA's Space Shuttle Program (SSP).
As the new Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight (OSF) and the Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) Enterprise, I am excited about sharing with you my vision and plans for the Space Shuttle program. As a former Shuttle pilot and mission commander, and also NASA's former Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, I have spent a great deal of my career focusing on the safety of NASA's precious resources—our workforce of on-orbit and ground crews, and our Shuttle fleet. There is nothing more important to me than the safety of the men and women who dare to risk their lives in service to our country. They deserve nothing less.
I am committed to continuing to meet the Space Shuttle goals of: 1) flying safely; 2) meeting the manifest; 3) improving supportability; and, 4) improving the system. It is my personal goal to ensure that we take advantage of the Space Shuttle's tremendous capabilities for meeting NASA's mission to understand and protect our home planet, to explore the Universe and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of explorers, as only NASA can.
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It has been twenty-one years since the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia made its maiden voyage. This first flight was evidence that the U.S. space program was continuing its leadership in human space exploration. NASA knew then that it had developed the most reliable, capable, and versatile space transportation system in the world. It remains the world's only human-rated reusable launch vehicle. No other country's space programs have come close to matching the accomplishments of the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle enables humans to live and work in space, provides the opportunity for commercial development of space, and allows us to enjoy the benefits of discovery. The Space Shuttle maintains the capability to deliver crew and cargo to the International Space Station (ISS). It can act as a research platform for microbiology, pharmaceuticals, material science, mapping, service our spaceborne telescopes, retrieve disabled satellites, and serve as a testbed for the reusable vehicles of the future.
In FY 2001, NASA flew seven Shuttle missions, five of those launched during a six-month period in support of the ISS. The Space Shuttle delivered to the ISS solar arrays for power (STS–97); the U.S. Laboratory Destiny module (STS–98); the ISS Robotic Arm, Canadarm2 (STS–100); the ISS Joint Airlock Quest (STS–104); and three ISS crew transfers (STS–102, 105, 108). Additionally, the Space Shuttle accomplished its 60th space walk, the 100th by an American, and it flew its first improved Block II flight engine (STS–104). Last month the Space Shuttle successfully serviced the Hubble Space Telescope (HST).
This first decade of the new millennium will see new challenges to the SSP. We will be implementing a prioritized list of Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades, revitalizing the Shuttle infrastructure, successfully assembling the ISS, and retaining a skilled workforce of both civil servants and contractors. At a minimum, the new challenges include investigating options of competitive sourcing for Space Shuttle operations, and using the Space Shuttle as a possible pathfinder to developing new technologies that could be used in a next generation reusable launch vehicle (RLV).
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The current SSP budget supports flying four flights in FY 2003, five flights in FY 2004 (four ISS and one HST servicing mission), then four flights per year. The transition to an adjusted flight rate of four flights per year does not require that this rate will remain constant for the coming years. NASA is working to ensure that limiting the Shuttle flight rate will not have undesirable cost and technical impacts to Agency programs. The SSP can support additional flights assuming the requesting organization (NASA Enterprise, DOD, other) provides the necessary funding. Attachment 1 shows the launch schedule for FY 2002 through FY 2003.
Each Space Shuttle orbiter's structural airframe was designed to fly approximately one hundred missions, and as of today, the entire orbiter fleet still has almost three-fourths of its usable life remaining. This means that we can fly the Space Shuttle through 2012 or beyond if necessary. Currently, airline companies and the military are flying 737 and F–18 aircraft whose airframes are 25–30 years old. These aircraft began flying before the Space Shuttle and they are still flying today because as new technologies were developed these aircraft were updated to enhance their capabilities. Shouldn't we be doing the same and provide the Nation with the best, most capable human access to space until our next RLV is available? While others are working to overcome the limitations of current space travel, we in the Space Shuttle program must continue to provide a safe and reliable vehicle for human access to space.
Space Shuttle Upgrades: Safety and Supportability
For the Space Shuttle to successfully continue accomplishing its goals, it must implement Shuttle upgrades that will increase flight safety and improve systems reliability. NASA has established a goal of developing and certifying the current suite of safety upgrades by 2005 with implementation into the fleet by 2007. Additionally, I have tasked the Space Shuttle Program to assess upgrade investments required to safely fly the Space Shuttle through FY 2020. This does not in any way indicate an agency decision to fly Shuttle until 2020; however, we believe it is prudent to understand this information as a contingency.
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Space Shuttle Upgrades fall into two categories: high-priority safety upgrades (to improve system safety) and supportability upgrades (to mitigate obsolescence issues). The Space Shuttle Upgrades Program is a strategic and proactive program designed to keep the Space Shuttle flying safely and efficiently in order to meet Agency commitments and goals for reusable human access to space.
The selection process for establishing the Space Shuttle upgrades content is based on prioritization of candidate upgrades that undergo a rigorous systems analysis. The goal of this process is to develop and maintain an integrated suite of baselined upgrade projects that have been selected for optimal compliance with the Space Shuttle Upgrades Program objectives.
Space Shuttle safety upgrades provide significant reductions in operational risks in the orbiter flight systems—the main engine, external tank and solid rocket boosters. These risk reductions are achieved by implementing design or manufacturing changes that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate significant hazards and critical failure modes, and therefore, significantly increase the overall reliability of the Space Shuttle system. Attachment 2 depicts the ''Loss of Vehicle-on Ascent'' probability curve for the various safety improvements made to the Space Shuttle over the life of the program.
Supportability upgrades provide replacement equipment for those existing flight element systems which are becoming obsolete and which will not reliably support Space Shuttle operations in the coming years. These upgrades are generally in response to an increasing failure rate or decreasing efficiency due to age and wear, increasing repair time due to component or technology obsolescence, a reduction of serviceable spares through attrition, or a lack of vendor support for repairs or replacement parts.
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The current suite of upgrades candidates is in various stages of formulation and implementation. Authority to proceed for each upgrades project is not given until a thorough definition phase has been completed, an independent assessment of project cost, schedule and technical feasibility has been performed, and the NASA Headquarters HEDS Program Management Council has given its approval for implementation.
A list of safety and supportability projects is provided (Attachment 3). This list outlines projects that will be implemented, the potential improvement to the particular flight element, and the project status.
Space Shuttle Upgrades and the Space Launch Initiative (SLI)
NASA's strategic goals for a next generation space transportation vehicle are to significantly reduce the risk of crew loss, reduce ground processing times in addition to other life cycle cost drivers, and thus reduce the overall costs of access to space. The plan for achieving these goals is the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP). NASA currently spends nearly one-third of its budget on space transportation; the ISTP is NASA's strategy for reducing these costs and thereby making these funds available for NASA's core science research, technology development, and exploration activities. Note, plans are currently underway for an Agency update to the ISTP where NASA will revisit our current and future technology investment decisions.
ISTP is the governing framework that coordinates and guides NASA's various space transportation investments, including Space Shuttle improvements, SLI, and far-term technology. ISTP is the decision path by which NASA ensures continued access to the International Space Station, invests to reduce its human space flight transportation costs, and avoids duplicative or unnecessary human space flight transportation investments. ISTP consists of three major components:
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1. Space Shuttle Improvements—Improvements to the safety of the Space Shuttle through ground and flight system upgrades, and facilities revitalization;
2. Space Launch Initiative—Risk reduction and development of a lower cost, safer, privately operated space transportation capability to replace the Space Shuttle early next decade; and
3. Far-Term Technology—Investments in far-term space transportation technology to maintain a technology base for future vehicles.
ISTP calls for a decision at mid-decade (2006), depending on progress in SLI risk reduction, on whether to undertake full-scale development of a new human space flight transportation available by early next decade.
As the only reusable human-rated launch vehicle, the Space Shuttle is being used as the ''lessons learned'' reference point for the SLI program. The Shuttle integrated operations models are the starting point for developing SLI architectures and assessing proposed and maturing technologies. In addition, the Space Shuttle offers a potential platform for evaluating and demonstrating the performance of SLI prototype equipment.
Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing
Since the early 1990s, the annual operations cost of the Space Shuttle has remained flat, absorbing the costs of inflation by implementing operations efficiencies and completing a series of contract consolidations. In FY 1997, United Space Alliance (USA) was awarded the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) to transfer day-to-day operational responsibility for the Space Shuttle from NASA to industry.
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The President's Management Agenda provided the guidance for NASA to evaluate competitive sourcing initiatives for the Space Shuttle. In October 2001, NASA chartered a Shuttle Privatization Task Team to perform a top-level definition and assessment of potential business options for competitive sourcing. This team identified potential options that are being further researched during follow-on activities. The key challenges to competitive sourcing of the Space Shuttle are centered on ensuring that safety is not compromised while at the same time achieving further cost benefit to the Government.
NASA is continuing the Space Shuttle competitive sourcing effort, having chartered an independent external Space Shuttle Business Review Team in January 2002. This team consists of predominantly industry expertise in financial, banking, investment, insurance and technical disciplines. The Business Review Team will investigate the business case models, market, and challenges for competitive sourcing of the Space Shuttle. NASA intends to use the Business Review Team's evaluation to prepare for interaction with industry in mid to late summer 2002.
Space Shuttle Infrastructure
In addition to investing in Space Shuttle upgrades and consolidating Space Shuttle operations, investment in infrastructure revitalization is a priority for NASA, given that much of its infrastructure is over forty years old and in need of repair or replacement. Infrastructure includes facility structures, ground support systems, and test support equipment. The SSP infrastructure extends across all aspects of the SSP from manufacturing, assembly, testing, transportation, processing, launch and landing. Over the past ten years, the investment in Space Shuttle infrastructure was severely limited, due mainly to annual budgets that were unadjusted for inflation, and other Agency priorities.
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SSP maintains a prioritized list of Space Shuttle infrastructure investments required at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), Stennis Space Center (SSC), White Sands Test Facility, and the Michoud Assembly Facility. The highest priority projects are at the Launch Complex 39 (LC–39) area at KSC for both Launch Pads A and B, and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The Program's prioritized list of projects is reevaluated yearly during the Program Operating Plan cycle.
Space Shuttle Workforce Status
NASA is making key investments in recruiting, training, and retaining a dedicated and skilled workforce. At the end of FY 1999, OSF undertook an assessment of its staffing requirements at the field centers. Our internal assessment of core civil service workforce requirements at the four Space Flight Centers revealed that full-time equivalent (FTE) targets would have to be adjusted upwards. In late December 1999, each Center was directed to address critical SSP workforce shortfalls. The objective was to hire employees to support flight safety and the Space Shuttle Upgrades program, including addressing critical skill shortages. Since January 2000, we have seen our Space Shuttle FTE levels grow from a FY 1999 base of 1819 to a planned FY 2002 level of 1986 FTEs.
The SSP has made significant progress in addressing the skills imbalance identified in 1999; however, like other programs its has been impacted by normal attrition. Having completed two consecutive years of hiring, our FY 2003 hiring efforts will target critical skills.
Space Shuttle External and Internal Reviews
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NASA continues to maintain a strong interaction with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), the Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC), a subcommittee of the NASA Advisory Council, and other external groups that will provide valuable assessments on improving the Space Shuttle system. We are currently reviewing the March 2001 ASAP report and we will provide input to ASAP in the coming months. Also, the SFAC is scheduled to provide the Office of Space Flight an assessment on the SSP this coming May.
Aside from managing Agency programs and projects using formal NASA procedures and guidelines, OSF is establishing three new internal review groups. First, an OSF Management Council will be formed to integrate and streamline the management processes between the field Centers and OSF. The membership of this council will include the Associate Administrator (chairperson) for OSF, the directors for the Code M Centers (JSC, KSC, SSC, and MSFC), and the OSF Program Executive Officer (PEO). The program managers for both the Space Shuttle and the ISS will be under the authority of the PEO.
Second, the Institutional Advisory Council will provide recommendations on improving the management of institutional resources (facilities modification, facility and ground support equipment utilization, workforce planning, etc.) that support OSF Programs. And third, the establishment of a Scientific and Technical Advisory Council will be responsible for providing recommendations on integrating the scientific and technical goals of OSF Programs.
Finally, Leadership of human space flight must start at the top—at NASA Headquarters, and specifically in the Office of Space Flight. To that end, I have resumed chairing the Flight Readiness Review for each mission, which had been delegated down to the center.
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Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, safety continues to be our top priority at NASA. The National leadership and every American taxpayer have every right to expect the Space Shuttle Program to safely and effectively implement program plans, operate efficiently, and provide the Nation the benefits of space exploration and discovery. The men and women of NASA are committed to maintaining the Space Shuttle Program as a safe world-class human-rated space transportation system. This will be accomplished with timely investments in safety and supportability upgrades that will be required for as along as we are asked to fly. Additionally, investments will be needed in maintaining a strong corporate knowledge workforce of civil servants and contractors who will operate and improve the present system, and thus train the next generation RLV workforce.
I look forward to working with members of this Committee and the Congress, in structuring the Space Shuttle Program in a manner that will provide the greatest scientific and social benefits to the Nation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Of course. So ordered. And you were only 29 seconds over. That is terrific. Did you miss that envelope that you have to get through the round?
Mr. GREGORY. Actually, I left off the last two or three pages.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. Our next witness is Richard Blomberg, who is Chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and has been for the last four years. Mr. Blomberg, we welcome you and are interested in your insights.
STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD D. BLOMBERG, CHAIRMAN, NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
Mr. BLOMBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Just to clarify, I am recently retired as Chair of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Ms. Shirley McCarty, who is sitting behind me, is the new Chair. But I am pleased to appear before you today to summarize the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's Annual Report for 2001.
The report contained both praise for the safety of Space Shuttle operations and the strongest safety concern the Panel has voiced in recent memory. This seeming dichotomy arises because of the unrealistically short planning horizon being used to make decisions.
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Let me now turn to the four specific questions the Committee posed. The first was, what are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's findings and recommendations about Space Shuttle plans and budget request? As Mr. Gordon quoted, the Panel concluded, in Finding 1 of the report, that the current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle and ISS. Needed restorations and improvements cannot be accomplished under current budgets and spending priorities.
This conclusion was prompted by a disturbing pattern of the cancellation and deferral of future improvement projects in order to fund current operations. Adopting a realistic planning horizon with commensurate funding would reduce the Panel's concerns with respect to Shuttle plans and budgets.
The Space Shuttle is a robust vehicle of enormous capability that has the potential to serve for decades to come. The Panel, therefore, believes it is realistic to base planning and funding on a phase-out date in the 2022 to 2025 timeframe.
The second question dealt with Space Shuttle ground infrastructure and launch workforce. First, let me address infrastructure. In order to fly safely, the Space Shuttle requires support from a variety of infrastructure components. These assets, like the vehicle itself, are aging. Much maintenance and improvement has already been deferred resulting in a large backlog of work. If restoration continues to be delayed, it may become impossible to recover. It is, therefore, necessary to take immediate action using a realistic planning horizon to reverse the trend and begin catching up.
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Now, let us turn to workforce. Workforce issues have been a concern of the Panel for several years. Cutbacks in NASA and contractor personnel, coupled with hiring freezes and retirements, have resulted in critical skill shortfalls. The Panel's concern is that current remedial programs may not be adequate as the system continues to age and problems of retaining critical skills and in-depth system knowledge expand. If critical skills are lost, the ability to anticipate new problems and to mount innovative safety efforts will inevitably diminish.
The third question inquired about the Panel's view of privatization. The Panel observed that any plan to transition to significant privatization would inherently involve an upheaval with increased risk in its wake. Thus, the Panel recommended that NASA include safety professionals in any assessment of privatization plans.
Also, every concept of Space Shuttle privatization I have seen so far involves the government indemnifying the private contractor. This leaves the government with significant financial and safety risks that can only be managed properly by a skilled, trained, and experienced government workforce. The dilemma is that protecting safety in the government's financial interest requires the government to remain intimately involved with Shuttle operations, even though the very objective of privatization is to extricate the government from an operational role.
I am not suggesting that privatization is a poor concept for a newly developed human space vehicle. The salient issue is whether it is wise and beneficial to safety to transition the well-established Space Shuttle program to privatization.
The final question inquired about the rationale behind the recommendation to continue the X–38 space flight test and Crew Return Vehicle. The Panel has steadfastly maintained its position that the ISS needs a CRV as a lifeboat. In recent years, the X–38 has been the basis for the needed CRV. The Panel also believes that any human-rated vehicle for space flight should have at least one flight test. Therefore, when consideration was being given to deferring or eliminating the X–38 space flight test, the Panel urged that the test be continued.
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In closing, I would like to add a personal note. It has been a privilege to work with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for almost 15 years and an honor to serve as its chair. Most of my career has been devoted to the improvement of transportation safety, and I can honestly say that I have never seen an operation as safety conscious and safety effective as the NASA human space flight programs.
Flying humans into space is an extremely complex and dangerous endeavor that NASA and its contractors accomplish with an apparent ease that can disguise the true extent of expertise and effort required.
In all my years of involvement, however, I have never been as worried for Space Shuttle safety as I am right now. All of my instincts suggest that the current approach is planting the seeds for future danger. The concern is not for the present flight, or the next, or perhaps the one after that. In fact, one of the roots of my concern is that nobody will know for sure when the safety margin has been eroded too far.
I appreciate the Committee's invitation and attention, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blomberg follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. BLOMBERG
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:
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I am pleased to appear before you today to summarize the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's findings from the Annual Report for 2001. Although my term ended on March 31, 2002, I have been asked to speak on behalf of the Panel because the material being presented was developed while I was its Chair.
The Panel's report contained both praise for the safety of NASA's Space Shuttle operations and the strongest safety concern the Panel has voiced in the 15 years I was involved with it. This seeming dichotomy arises because of the unrealistically short planning horizon being used to make decisions about Space Shuttle flight system improvements, the restoration of aging infrastructure, personnel succession planning and logistics.
It is important to stress that the Panel believes that safety has not yet been compromised. NASA and its contractors maintain excellent safety practices and processes as well as a world-class level of safety consciousness. It is also evident that the Space Shuttle is an extremely robust vehicle of enormous capability that can continue to serve the nation and the world for years or even decades to come if it is cared for properly. Replacing the Space Shuttle with a significantly more capable vehicle will require years of enabling technology development, particularly in the areas of propulsion and materials. Prudent risk management therefore suggests that the Space Shuttle should be maintained and improved on the assumption that it will fly into and beyond the next decade. Moreover, to maximize safety, decisions related to improvements for the Space Shuttle should be based on a pessimistic rather than an optimistic view of when a suitable replacement vehicle will be fully certified and ready to take over. Safety is better served by having excess life in a vehicle when it is retired than by attempting to run the vehicle until it is no longer serviceable.
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The Panel's concerns stem from the necessity for the Space Shuttle program to use most of its resources to support current operations. Because of a budget shortfall, many already planned and engineered improvements have had to be deferred or eliminated. Some of these would directly reduce flight risk. Others would improve operability or the launch reliability of the system and are therefore related to safety. Moreover, the current plans and budgets are not adequate even to retain the present Space Shuttle risk levels over the entire likely service life of the system.
Simply stated, the Panel believes that the repeated postponement of safety upgrades, the delay in restoring aging infrastructure and the failure to look far enough ahead to anticipate and correct shortfalls in critical skills and logistics availability will inevitably increase the risk of operating the Space Shuttle. The problem is that the boundary between safe and unsafe operations can seldom be quantitatively defined or accurately predicted. Even the most well meaning managers may not know when they cross it. This is particularly true for an aging system.
As a complex human-machine system such as the Space Shuttle ages, the managers and engineers operating it gain significant knowledge about its idiosyncrasies. They develop great insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the system and, hence, its risks by characterizing system behavior over repeated missions. That is the present situation with the Space Shuttle. After more than 100 successful missions and the intense introspection following the Challenger accident, the present Space Shuttle team has an excellent understanding of what it takes to operate safely with the system in its present condition. As a result, the defined requirements for operating at an acceptable level of risk are always met even if doing so requires innovative approaches.
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Unfortunately, as systems continue to age, they tend to change. Some of these changes are predictable. Others, however, are subtle and often unpredictable. As components and subsystems age beyond their design lives, they may fail more often and with new and unanticipated failure modes. Thus, the well-established characterization of the system is no longer fully valid: The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that the Space Shuttle is heading in this direction.
The problems that arise with an aging complex system can be exacerbated if critical skills are lost. Even with the best documentation and succession planning, some expertise is lost as experienced personnel retire. In the case of the Space Shuttle, repeated Government and contractor hiring freezes during its operating life have led to a lack of depth in critical skills. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the ability of the Space Shuttle workforce to anticipate new problems and to mount innovative efforts to maintain safety will inevitably diminish.
Before turning to the four specific questions posed in the April 9, 2002 letter of invitation from Chairman Rohrabacher, it is important to clarify the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's view of Space Shuttle risk. In addition to the obvious safety concerns of loss of crew, vehicle and mission, the Panel views anything that might ground the Space Shuttle for an extended period during the life of the International Space Station (ISS) as an unacceptable safety risk due to the potential loss of the ISS and associated risk for people on the ground.
What are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's findings and recommendations about Space Shuttle plans and budget request?
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The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is chartered to provide an independent review of issues related to safety. As such, it does not engage in detailed reviews of budget requests. Clearly, however, if an attempt is made to fly a high-risk system such as the Space Shuttle or ISS with inadequate resources, risk will inevitably increase. Effective risk management for safety balances capabilities with objectives. If an imbalance exists, either additional resources must be acquired or objectives must be reduced.
In its Annual Report for 2001, the Panel concluded in Finding 1 that:
The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle and ISS. Needed restorations and improvements cannot be accomplished under current budgets and spending priorities.
This conclusion emanated not from a detailed line item review of the Space Shuttle budget but, rather, from observing and analyzing a disturbing pattern of the cancellation and deferral of projects for the future in order to conserve sufficient resources to operate in the present.
Foregoing or delaying upgrades also raises supportability concerns. In its second finding in the most recent report, the Panel observed:
Some upgrades not only reduce risk but also ensure that NASA's human spaceflight vehicles have sufficient assets for their entire service lives.
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Obviously, the Panel recommended retention of as many safety-related upgrades as possible. It was also recommended to NASA, however, that:
If upgrades are deferred or eliminated, analyze logistics needs for the entire projected life of the Space Shuttle and ISS and adopt a realistic program for acquiring and supporting sufficient numbers of suitable components.
Many Space Shuttle components are long lead-time items that require years to acquire. Procurement times for many items could likely be further increased either because the original suppliers are no longer in business or because of a loss of capability by the manufacturer. The Panel believes that the Space Shuttle program must plan to obtain adequate quantities of long lead-time components to sustain safe operations. A failure to be proactive could lead to increased cannibalization or even to the grounding of the Space Shuttle. In either case, safety could be compromised.
Overall, the Panel's concerns with respect to Space Shuttle plans and budgets could be reduced if all involved parties—NASA, the Congress and OMB—adopted a realistic planning horizon and funded the program commensurate with the need to operate for that entire period. Based on currently available technology, the demonstrated lead times for developing new large-scale programs and the likelihood that the ISS will require support for at least another 20 years, the Panel believes it is realistic to adopt a Space Shuttle phase-out date in the 2022 to 2025 timeframe.
What are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's specific concerns and recommendations for Space Shuttle ground infrastructure and launch workforce?
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Infrastructure. In order to fly safely, the Space Shuttle requires extensive support from a variety of infrastructure components including facilities, training devices, ground support equipment (GSE) and special test equipment (STE). These assets, like the vehicle itself, are aging. For example, some of the STE still employs vacuum tubes. Much maintenance and improvement of this infrastructure has already been deferred to conserve resources for current operations. As a result, there is a large backlog of restoration and upgrade work. If restoration continues to be delayed, it will reach a point at which it may be impossible to recover.
The recent failure of a weld in a fuel line during the launch count for STS–110 is a good example. The mobile launch platform (MLP) on which the line was mounted was originally designed and built for the Apollo Program and then refurbished for the Space Shuttle. It is not reasonable to expect the MLPs and similar vintage infrastructure to continue to support Space Shuttle operations for another 20 years unless significant effort is expended on renewal, upgrade and life extension. The weld rupture in this instance had no safety consequences, but it did delay the launch. The program may not be so fortunate in the future.
Also of note is the fact that the fuel line weld that failed had not been inspected for many years. This suggests that it was not considered to have a high probability of failure. Perhaps with advancing age, the MLP is beginning to display unanticipated weaknesses.
The Panel's Recommendation 3 in the current Annual Report addresses the infrastructure needs and urges NASA to:
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Revitalize safety-critical infrastructure as expeditiously as possible.
Each year the program falls further behind. It is therefore necessary to take immediate action to reverse the trend and begin catching up. As with the flight elements, NASA must adopt a realistic planning horizon for the infrastructure to maximize the likelihood that it can continue to support safe Space Shuttle operations throughout the life of the program.
Workforce. Workforce issues have been a concern of the Panel for several years. A highly qualified launch workforce is critical to ensuring that all requirements are met before a flight is attempted. Processing the Space Shuttle for launch is a complex task requiring an appropriate mix of critical skills, training, on-the-job experience and clear, complete and accurate work documentation. Cutbacks in NASA and contractor personnel coupled with hiring freezes and retirements have resulted in some shortfalls in critical skills. In response, hiring and training programs have managed to fill the gaps. The Panel's concern is that these programs may not be adequate as the system ages and problems of retaining critical skills and in-depth system knowledge expand.
As the Space Shuttle system ages, it will require even more innovative technical and management actions to continue flying safely. The definition of these remedial efforts will require extensive experience with the system as well as appropriate technical training. As experienced government and contractor personnel retire, some of the ''tricks of the trade'' needed to compensate for newly emerging problems may be lost.
The Panel believes that there is no fully adequate substitute for direct experience with the Space Shuttle. Training can develop skills and knowledge. Good documentation and processes can simplify work tasks. Minimizing risk, however, also involves a feel for a complex system's unique strengths and weaknesses that can be acquired only on the job by working with more experienced members of the workforce. This is a process that cannot be greatly accelerated.
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These considerations led the Panel to its Finding and Recommendation 6 in the current report. The finding acknowledges that:
The safety of NASA's human spaceflight programs will always be dependent on the availability of a skilled, experienced and motivated workforce.
The recommendation suggests that NASA:
Accelerate efforts to ensure the availability of critical skills and to utilize and capture the experience of the current workforce.
The Panel has seen no safety shortfall attributable to launch workforce or labor negotiation issues. Feedback from both NASA and its contractors over the past few years suggests high sensitivity to the potential safety problems that could arise from workforce issues. Nevertheless, continuing and increasing efforts to correct workforce problems must be a high priority part of future Space Shuttle operations.
What are the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's preliminary findings and recommendations about privatizing the Space Shuttle?
The notion of privatizing the operations of the Space Shuttle to improve safety and operational efficiency has been discussed in a variety of preliminary issue papers. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has examined some of the available documentation. Since the idea is in its infancy, the Panel has yet to develop any specific findings and recommendations with respect to the advisability of privatization. The Panel did, however, observe that any plan to transition from the current operational posture to one involving significant privatization would inherently involve an upheaval with increased risk in its wake. It must be remembered that the Space Shuttle program is over 20 years old and has already undergone several transitions that were disruptive and distracting for the workforce.
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From the Panel's perspective, any transition of the operating approach for the Space Shuttle will likely be accompanied by at least a temporary increase in risk. This is because the workforce is thrust into a new operating environment with some unfamiliar processes. Under these conditions, even the best trained and most well-intentioned people can become more prone to error. These considerations led the Panel to its Finding 5 which cautions that:
Space Shuttle privatization can have safety implications as well as affecting costs.
The associated recommendation was to:
Include in all privatization plans an assessment by safety professionals of the ability of the approach to retain a reasonable level of NASA technical involvement and independent checks and balances.
I would like to make two other points about privatization from my personal perspective and experience. First, every concept of Space Shuttle privatization I have seen so far involves the government indemnifying the private contractor. This leaves the government with a significant financial risk that it can only manage properly if it retains an adequate workforce of appropriately skilled, trained and experienced people. The dilemma is that it is difficult to cultivate and maintain this government workforce when all operations have been turned over to the private sector. Thus, protecting safety and the government's financial interest if it indemnifies the contractor requires the government to remain intimately involved with Space Shuttle operations even though the objective of privatization is to extricate the government from an operational role.
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On the other hand, if the government chooses not to indemnify the Space Shuttle contractor, I do not see any way that a firm would be willing to accept a privatized Space Shuttle system. Given the magnitude of infrastructure revitalization needed and the associated financial and legal liability if failures occur, the risk would be too great for the associated rewards.
My second point relates to safety. As discussed above, transitions of large, complex organizations involve upheavals that can increase risk, at least until a new steady-state and fully characterized operating environment emerges. The Space Shuttle has been flying for over 20 years. If it were to be transitioned to a radically different operating posture without the traditional government/contractor checks and balances, I am convinced that risk would increase significantly at least for a time. Moreover, even when a steady-state was reached, I cannot envision any reduction in risk from the current, well understood levels simply as a result of privatizing.
Just to be clear, I am not saying that privatization is a poor concept for a newly developed human space vehicle. If there is a business case for private sector support and the system is designed from the start to be privately operated, there should be no safety problems other than those inherent in starting any new venture. The salient issue is whether it is wise and beneficial to safety to transition the Space Shuttle program to privatization. Currently there are significant long-term safety issues that are best addressed by a fully engaged and highly experienced government/contractor workforce operating in a familiar environment.
What is the rationale behind the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's recommendations to continue the X–38 spaceflight test and Crew Return Vehicle?
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The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has steadfastly maintained its position that the ISS needs a ''lifeboat'' to provide the capability to protect the onboard crew under three design reference missions:
Return of a sick or injured crewmember
Total evacuation of the ISS in the event it becomes uninhabitable, e.g., after a total decompression
Unavailability of resupply for a prolonged period, e.g., due to grounding of the Space Shuttle.
Appendix D to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's March 1993 Annual Report presents a detailed assessment of generic crew return vehicle (CRV) requirements and reaches the conclusion that the lowest risk configuration for a space station is one with two return vehicles each of which can accommodate the entire crew. Subsequently, NASA decided to use a three-person Soyuz as a return vehicle until a full-crew CRV was available, and the Panel concurred with that approach as an interim expedient.
In recent years, the Panel has followed the development of the X–38 because it was presumably the basis for a CRV. As part of the X–38 development discussions, the Panel understood that consideration was being given to deferring or eliminating the spaceflight test included in the program. The Panel believes that any human-rated vehicle for spaceflight should have at least one flight test. Since the Panel also remains firmly behind the need for a crew return function for the ISS and the X–38 was presumably the only CRV candidate, the most recent Annual Report contained Recommendation 17a that stated:
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Continue the flight test program for the X–38 and proceed to the space test of the V201 prototype.
It was also noted in Recommendation 17b that NASA should:
Press to restore the CRV production program or find a substitute rescue vehicle approach to permit expansion of the ISS crew.
Thus, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was not supporting the X–38 per se but, rather, the necessity of having some continuously available return capability to meet all three design reference missions.
The Panel is concerned about the protracted delays in fielding a more capable return vehicle than the Soyuz. This is not only because the high landing loads involved in a Soyuz return may not be compatible with a maximally effective medical mission but also because of the uncertain future availability of an adequate supply of Soyuz capsules and the fact that a single Soyuz deployment limits the ISS crew to three.
Concluding Remarks
In closing, I would like to add a personal note. It has been a privilege to work with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for almost 15 years and an honor to serve as its chair. Most of my career has been devoted to the improvement of transportation safety, and I can honestly say that I have never seen an operation as safety conscious and safety effective as the NASA human spaceflight programs. Flying humans into space and supporting extended on-orbit stays is an extremely complex and dangerous endeavor that NASA and its contractors accomplish with an apparent ease that can disguise the true extent of expertise and effort required.
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In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for Space Shuttle safety as I am right now. That concern is not for the present flight or the next or perhaps the one after that. In fact, one of the roots of my concern is that nobody will know for sure when the safety margin has been eroded too far. All of my instincts, however, suggest that the current approach is planting the seeds for future danger.
I appreciate the Committee's invitation and attention, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. We—I appreciate those—that sober assessment—let us put it that way. We have got 10 minutes before this journal vote is over. I would—I think rather than just rushing, what we are going to do is we are going to break now and come back for the last two witnesses. Immediately, if I could ask the members to vote in the beginning of the second vote and not the end of the second vote, and just come back as soon as soon as possible. So this hearing was—let us say adjourned for 15 minutes.
[Recess]
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. This hearing is called to order again. Our next witness is Sam Venneri, Associate Administrator for Aerospace Technology and Chief Technologist at NASA. He has been the principal advisor on agency-wide technology issues and one whom we have worked with many years. And, Sam, we look forward to your testimony. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. SAM VENNERI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
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Mr. VENNERI. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I proceed, I would like to actually acknowledge your vision and leadership. I would not be here talking about this Space Launch Initiative if you were not such a proactive leader in making this happen. So thank you for the many years of working with you.
I would like to start off by talking about something we did three years ago at NASA that was a framework for the Space Launch Initiative. It was really this Integrated Space Transportation Plan that really looked at the Shuttle, the Shuttle upgrades, the second generation launch, and actually technology that goes beyond the second gen, as well as the activities under in-space, in terms of propulsion that leaves earth orbit.
This is the first time for NASA. The framework that—we use this a framework to launch into this SLI activity. And we are in the process of working with all of the NASA folks, including my colleague, Fred Gregory, in updating this during this summer, since this was done three years ago.
And actually, what I want to do now is get into this Space Launch Initiative program and address some of the issues that I heard in your opening statements, as well as the questions we got. This is a different program. We have taken a lot of lessons learned from programs in the past that date back to the National Aerospace Initiative that the Air Force/NASA did in really what was third gen, a single-stage air-breather, the X–33, and so forth, and we looked at where the problems were.
You alluded to something that we don't do very good in the aerospace industry at all, a realistic understanding of what does it cost to do something. Our track record on saying, ''what does it cost to do something?'' is not good.
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And so, how we started out is, is to look at this from a requirements-driven process. And I concur with your decision on X–33. We have talked about why we did cancel X–33. It was a premature down select. It was going to a point design without understanding requirements in a technology base.
What we have done on the second gen program was really to start a process that is technology requirements-driven, architectural concepts that wasn't just vehicle, but operational architectures as well. The Space Shuttle is the only—and we started with this Space Shuttle as a vehicle, as an operational entity, what KSC does to process and fly the shuttle. So it is an end-to-end approach.
We looked at hundreds of concepts and that—and what we have done recently, as an accomplishment, in terms of an interim architectural review that was done this year, is that we down-selected to basically around 15. We are taking those forward now as part of the total system study, along with the technology program. Now, I will point out a few things that came out of this just in the first year of effort.
One of the things that came out of these studies was the fact that we don't need to look at composite tanks as a driver for this concept. The advancements in metallic tanks on a two-stage system allows us to actually put our effort into advanced metallics and put the composites as a follower, not a leader.
Also, we looked at the idea of what the first stage should be. We are back looking at kerosene. Rocket propellant—not hydrogen for the first stage—but RP.
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Also, we looked at the idea of a fly-back booster. And the idea of putting jet engines on there changes the staging concept, and it actually increases the safety envelope of what we can do to actually get the vehicle downrange further with fly-back jet engines. This opens up the options of trade space. That drives the technology portfolio leading toward this '06 timeframe that we are going to make. And the key word is competition, not premature down-select to a point design.
We want to take three architectural concepts, along with the technology portfolio, to a high enough level that includes engines on test stands to address the cost credibility of the technology. No more of the paper studies and the unknown variables of cost.
So what we are looking at, in effect, then is a program that addresses what you heard in the opening statements. The Shuttle is a wonderful machine, but it is at that left-hand bar of risk to humans. It is 1 in 250. What SLI is about is assured human presence in space and also addressing commercial needs, as well as bringing Department of Defense requirements in. Not a radically restructuring of the program, but working with DOD to factor their requirements into the program.
So there are no plans to make major changes other than to understand DOD needs as we push this architectural study. So our goal is basically what you see there.
A two orders of magnitude improvement in safety. What we are about is human space flight, so this program is about getting cost credibility. A technology base does not exist today, and moving toward a decision gate that the leadership of this—of—the national leadership today, Congress and the Administration, that as we invest the money in the areas that you see depicted here, we can make a decision in the '06 timeframe of whether we move forward with shuttle upgrades, or we invest in a 2012, roughly 2012, IOC date for a next generation system that actually meets the requirements of human space flight, commercial, and factors in the Department of Defense requirements in a technology change state with cost credibility and uncertainties bounded.
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So thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Venneri follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAM VENNERI
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to share with you a few of the many technical and business accomplishments that NASA's Space Launch Initiative (SLI) has delivered in its inaugural year.
The United States has more than 40 years of experience in space and is the only country with reusable launch vehicle (RLV) capabilities. The Nation has enjoyed the benefits of scientific discovery that new forms of transportation have historically made possible. In practical terms, space transportation enables not only the robust civil exploration of space, but also the critical capacity to defend National assets, while it fosters economic and technological growth across many commercial sectors—from communications to navigation, from weather forecasting to global environmental research.
NASA's Space Launch Initiative (SLI) began in February 2001, with the first Nationwide contracts awarded in May 2001. It recently underwent a comprehensive evaluation through the Interim Architecture and Technology Review (IATR) process, and realigned its organization for accountability and innovation. This report gives specific business and technical accomplishments, as well as outlines the SLI business plan and puts it into a greater strategic context.
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Background on the NASA Integrated Space Transportation Plan
NASA's strategic goals for a next generation space transportation vehicle are to significantly reduce the risk of crew loss, reduce ground processing times in addition to other lifecycle cost drivers, and thus reduce the overall costs of access to space. The plan for achieving these goals is the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP). NASA currently spends nearly one-third of its budget on space transportation; the ISTP is NASA's strategy for reducing these costs and thereby making these funds available for NASA's core science research, technology development, and exploration activities. Plans are currently underway for an Agency update to the ISTP where NASA will revisit our current and future technology investment decisions.
ISTP is the governing framework that coordinates and guides NASA's various space transportation investments, including Space Shuttle improvements, SLI, and far-term technology. ISTP is the decision path by which NASA ensures continued access to the International Space Station, invests to reduce its human space flight transportation costs, and avoids duplicative or unnecessary human space flight transportation investments. ISTP consists of three major components:
1. Space Shuttle Improvements—Improvements to the safety of the Space Shuttle through ground and flight system upgrades, and facilities revitalization;
2. Space Launch Initiative—Risk reduction and development of a lower cost, safer, privately operated space transportation capability to replace the Space Shuttle early next decade; and
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3. Far-Term Technology—Investments in far-term space transportation technology to maintain a technology base for future vehicles.
ISTP calls for a decision at mid-decade (2006), depending on progress in SLI risk reduction, on whether to undertake full-scale development of a new human space flight transportation system available by early next decade (planned initial operational capability by 2012).
Space Launch Initiative Overview
The SLI program is an integral part of NASA's strategy to help refocus the Agency's resources on core scientific research by reducing the operations budget that NASA spends annually on space transportation. The SLI program is working with the U.S. aerospace industry to design a privately operated 2nd Generation RLV that will reduce ''loss of crew'' and mission risks and is more cost-effective compared to today's Space Shuttle. By reducing costs, improving reliable access to space, and allowing NASA to focus its workforce on its core missions, SLI will impact scientific and technological goals that are critical to improving U.S. leadership in space exploration. The SLI program is not only reducing the technical risks involved in developing new launch vehicles, but also reinventing the basic program-project management processes and procedures for fielding a new space transportation system. The Space Launch Initiative is reducing the risks inherent in an advanced research and development program of this magnitude, while fostering a fair business environment for industry and ensuring the wise use of valuable resources. Through teamwork with its partners in the U.S. aerospace industry, academia, and the military complex, NASA contributes its experience in space transportation systems research and development to enable a new generation of space transportation capabilities for a stronger America.
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The fundamental work funded by the SLI program is the initial stage required to reduce risk and formulate plans with a high confidence of success for the full-scale development and flight stages to follow. Activities now underway across NASA and the country will result in two competing space transportation system architectures—complete to the Preliminary Design Review—supported by a portfolio of advanced, high-payoff technologies such as long-life rocket engines, robust thermal protection materials, sophisticated diagnostic software, and crew-related enhancements. SLI encompasses a two-fold approach: conceptually designing complete space transportation systems that can fulfill basic civil and commercial mission requirements, while reducing the risk of building and operating the system finally chosen for full-scale development around mid-decade.
To ensure success, NASA has brought together some of the Nation's most talented scientists and engineers, while making available its extensive research, test, development, and evaluation facilities, some of which are one-of-a-kind. Comprehensive top-to-bottom systems engineering and the cost-control process ensure that the Government gets what it pays for by measuring technical progress at regular intervals. A central SLI tenet is that the research funded must be directly relevant to SLI goals to reduce the risk of developing a safer, more reliable, and less expensive space transportation system that will enable NASA to pursue its ultimate strategic goals. The Program's acquisition strategy allows it the flexibility to add new tasks to fill technology gaps and spur competition, or to rescope and descope efforts.
SLI is much more than just another hardware program; it embodies the expansion of business, scientific, and technological capabilities for a new century of privately operated, efficient and cost-effective space access, and a transition that will see NASA as a buyer of services rather than as an operator of infrastructure.
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This Agency-wide and, indeed, Nationwide initiative was founded on studies jointly conducted with industry in the late 1990s. From the beginning, SLI was planned to meet fundamental National science and technology research priorities using systems that are privately operated and compatible with commercial payloads. Launch market research and technology readiness continues to influence the direction taken by SLI.
A Year of Business and Technical Success
The SLI program plan is designed to ''buy down'' technical and business risk, and puts NASA in a position in 2006 to have high confidence in the success and cost of a new system, with the detailed blueprints for both a reusable launch vehicle and its complete operational infrastructure. An important part of this deliverable will be detailed cost estimates, including defined uncertainties, for building and operating the system, and a procurement opportunity to move into the next stage of developing this new National capability.
The SLI Team approaches the business of building a complete space transportation system with clearly defined phases that have major reviews as milestones. The top-level plan is patterned after the highly successful Apollo and Shuttle programs. Table 1 shows how, in the bigger scheme, SLI encompasses the initial two-part Formulation Phase (preliminary concepts, requirements definition). When realistic blueprints are laid for the Implementation Phase to follow, during which the system enters a detailed design phase, then is built, operated, and eventually retired.
In its inaugural year, the Space Launch Initiative has delivered numerous technical and business accomplishments, a few which are discussed below. After the recent Interim Architecture and Technology Review, architectures were focused from hundreds of concepts to 15 of the most promising candidates to go forward into more detailed development. As technology trade studies are focused and validated through a rigorous systems engineering process, the two will merge again in the Systems Requirements Review milestone in FY 2003. This further narrows the field to one design from each of three prime contractors, and defines which technologies require further investment to enable the eventual winner to be built and become operational.
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As the SLI Program progresses from FY 2003 through FY 2006, at least two competing space transportation system architectures will be developed to the Preliminary Design Review stage, ready for a full-scale development decision around mid-decade. These designs, which will support basic Government and commercial mission requirements, will be backed up by a portfolio of advanced technologies such as long-life rocket engines, robust thermal protection materials, sophisticated diagnostic software, and features that will enable crews much greater safety and protection. In this way, America will have a new capability to explore the Earth and beyond sometime early in the next decade that can eventually replace the capabilities now provided by the Space Shuttle.
78958h.eps
Business Risk Reduction
In its first year, the SLI plan has been validated and its investments are now focused on enabling current mission requirements, such as servicing the International Space Station and delivering satellites to orbit. The research and development of technologies critical to meeting safety, reliability, and cost goals is well underway.
As part of the SLI philosophy, program management has established processes and procedures to examine the Program's progress from top to bottom. In its first year, the SLI Team applied proven business practices and the latest engineering analysis tools to ensure that investments directly apply to specific mission requirements and the Agency's overall goals of increased safety and reliability, coupled with lower operations costs. An Advanced Engineering Environment has been brought on line to allow remote technical data to be collected and analyzed. Each year, SLI will continue to systematically examine its technology research, bringing content in line with the needs of competing space transportation architecture concepts.
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The SLI Team nurtures both human capital and business acumen, as it offers knowledge gained to other Government agencies and private industry. Unlike previous programs where the contractor retained data rights, SLI is buying information and sharing that across the industry platform to enrich the playing field with ripe ideas and disciplined innovation. The Team honors the lessons learned from programs that came before and is being guided by independent review panels and subject matter experts. It has a well-defined and integrated cost accountability system that pays for performance based on clearly stated objectives and schedules. Through its innovative acquisition strategy, the team has created business systems and accountability reviews that ensure the Government gets what it pays for. And SLI makes available what it learns for the common good of other Government agencies and the private sector. For example, NASA recently participated in a joint study with the Department of Defense (DOD) to discover where we might better cooperate and share launch technologies.
Designing a safer, more reliable, and less costly space transportation architecture is not just about hardware. Fundamentally, it is about sound business decisions based on proven business models. Within its first year, SLI has been structured to closely resemble the highly successful Joint Strike Fighter program, which employs lean thinking concepts and acquisition strategies. Although SLI stops short of a prototype flight vehicle, it does include integrated flight demonstrations to validate multiple technologies in real-world environments.
The Program will ultimately succeed because it employs sound business practices and a rigorous systems engineering process, which is the pivotal point where the architectures and technologies converge. Through systems engineering, the Program has the proper insight into the many designs and development areas funded in the first year, and has made critical decisions based on risk reduction, the cost-to-benefit ratio, and relevance to the Agency's overall goal of dramatically improved access to space. Systems engineering defines and integrates key components that enable the credible development and operation of a safe and cost-efficient 2nd Generation RLV and support infrastructure. It provides the tools by which to project how much it will cost to field the new system and make it fully operational next decade.
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Technical Risk Reduction
Already, risk reduction activities have yielded valuable information that a year ago could not have been predicted without the fundamental research performed by the SLI Team. Over this past year, architecture concepts were validated and technology development data were analyzed against those credible designs. Each mission requirement was challenged and refined. For example, crew and cargo have been separated to build in safety and cost efficiencies. Autonomous operations, self-diagnosing health monitoring systems, and quicker turnaround processing will allow launch rates to rise and reduce the cost per launch. Fly-back booster propulsion can potentially simplify reusable operations. These are just a few of many meaningful developments.
Program reviews are comprehensive examinations—the IATR at the end of the first contract period gave the insight needed to exercise some options and redefine others. For example, a contract was exercised to develop a propulsion first stage using liquid oxygen and kerosene as a fuel, and that helped drive the decision not to pursue composite tanks, so that work was scaled back in favor of metallic tanks. These examples also underscore that the Program is not rushing to solutions before fully understanding the questions, as these two developments could not have been predicted a year ago without this Government-funded research.
Propulsion Is Key
Experience shows that propulsion is the single largest contributor to unreliability during ascent. Based on assessments of available data, the thermal protection system, main engines, and toxic propellants used in on-orbit maneuvering engines affect 50 percent of the Space Shuttle processing time. Since two of these three cost factors relate to propulsion, and because propulsion takes a long lead time to develop, it holds the key to meeting safety, reliability, and cost goals. For these reasons, propulsion is SLI's top risk reduction area.
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In keeping with the Program's lean enterprise theory, propulsion risk reduction will increase each year in correlation with competitive selection of propulsion systems and subsystems, which will ultimately save millions of dollars in overall development cost. SLI has sought to baseline and benchmark itself against a number of similar technology investment programs. Program-wise, we have benchmarked against the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and its use of lean thinking to reduce variability in design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E). That program has proven that 70 percent of the total leverage to improve life cycle costs (LCC) is an up-front design. Prototype design eliminates and/or reduces failure modes and design uncertainty, and enables requirements control and proper materials selections.
In our propulsion technology research, we used the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) cost of $3.6 billion as a baseline. Engine development improvements since the development of the SSME are estimated to bring down new engine development to about $3.0 billion. Seventy-five percent of SSME development test/fail/fix approach, with the majority of costs being unpredicted—resulting in cascading uncertainty within the cost models. Based on SLI's approach and propulsion investment of about $500 million, are expected to be as low as $1.5 billion.
During the past year, completion of significant milestones such as the Propulsion Systems Requirements Review, ensured that high-priority propulsion systems are on track toward the development of prototype main booster engines, on-orbit non-toxic reaction control thrusters, advanced materials, and environmentally safe propellants. Decisions were made on how to better focus investments to reflect the needs of potential vehicle architectures being designed in parallel. Examples of major propulsion accomplishments include design reviews on main engines and system tests on reaction control thrusters that use non-toxic propellants to create a safer environment for ground operators, lower costs, and increase efficiency with less maintenance and quicker turnaround time between missions. Electromechanical actuators, which offer improved safety and handling features over hydraulics, were tested using the X–33 engine that was already in a test stand.
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During FY 2002, the Propulsion effort is continuing technical risk reduction of high-priority technologies, which will include Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) of major hardware components. PDR will define a clear design process with 10 percent of design drawings complete. These risk reduction activities will allow preparation for the architecture Systems Requirement Review in FY 2003.
Efforts will continue to select viable main engines from several competing designs—engines with greater thrust capabilities, safer operations, and lower maintenance costs than the Space Shuttle Maine Engine. Propulsion projects have been refocused at the beginning of the SLI Program's second year to ensure seamless integration with vehicle requirements. Based on architecture needs outlined in the IATR, contract options have been exercised to include designing an engine that uses easier-to-handle liquid oxygen and purified kerosene (LOX/RP) instead of cryogenic liquid oxygen and hydrogen (LOX/LH2). Using LOX/RP in the first stage of launch will lower the maintenance costs and result in a safer overall architecture capable of drastically reduced turnaround time for the next launch.
Risk reduction activities for propulsion systems will demonstrate improvements over existing technologies such as propellant cross-feed systems and engine health maintenance features. Additional high-priority technology efforts will include jet-powered propulsion for return of the first stage. Jet-powered return of the first stage allows booster flight further down range and to higher velocities. Use of jet-powered propulsion will also reduce the overall weight of the vehicle's second stage. Plans are underway to staff a Crew-Escape and Survival Propulsion Office by the end of FY 2002, which will focus on reducing the risk of safe crew-escape propulsion systems that use advanced solid, liquid, and hybrid propulsion techniques.
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Based on successful initial testing of the two competing Reaction Control Systems (RCS), thruster approaches and basic technology for high-concentrate peroxide, propulsion RCS will focus on less toxic peroxide/RP and LOX/ethanol propellants, which will ultimately lower costs of ground operations. Through a partnership with the U.S. Air Force, studies will continue to develop safer peroxide and fuel combination for use in the upper stage propulsion system—basic research is complete and requirements have been identified through successful testing of materials compatibility and detonation. In the upcoming year, additional research will determine the appropriate environmental safety hazard risk reduction. Use of a peroxide fuel combination in the upper stage propulsion system will allow the vehicle to meet very long on-orbit stay requirements, and will be safer for the environment than the toxic storable used in today's systems.
In FY 2003, propulsion elements will begin the advanced phases of sub- and full-scale testing, which will culminate in a Critical Design Review (CDR) of competing engine systems. The CDR will establish finalized design concepts with 90 percent of prototype and existing hardware drawings completed to build the overall engine system. This will ensure that the propulsion systems and architecture concepts are parallel and ready to proceed on budget and on schedule for ground testing beginning in FY 2004 and continuing through FY 2006.
From FY 2004 to FY 2006, significant prototype hardware development and testing of main engines, RCS thrusters, non-toxic propellants, and crew-escape propulsion aimed at formulating a full-scale development decision will take place. Major milestones planned for completion during this period include prototype subsystem testing of the auxiliary propulsion test article, and prototype main engine design, manufacture, test, and integration, resulting in initiation of flight engine design. Having propulsion systems at this point in the research and development cycle will ultimately allow the Agency to go forward with full-scale development of the optimum architecture design.
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Learning from the X–33 Project: Tanks
SLI's recent composite tank decision, which was a result of the IATR process, hearkens back to the X–33 flight demonstrator whose business model bypassed the logical progression of technology evolution being followed by the SLI Program. In theory, lightweight composite tanks could translate to huge cost savings. The X–33 experience revealed that the boundaries of such materials were not yet at a point where composites are suitable for certain applications. Building on lessons learned through the X–33 flight demonstrator project, SLI composite tank research validated that the cost-to-benefit ratio of developing that capability may not provide significant advantages over metallic tanks. SLI will continue to monitor the development of composite propellant tanks, and will install such tanks when it feels that the technology is matured enough, safe, reliable, and cost-effective to implement. For the moment, SLI is investigating the unanticipated strides that are being made in aluminum-lithium tank manufacturing.
Based on preliminary architecture assessment results, metallic tanks have been moved from backup to the leader position. As such, the metallic tank effort has been increased and restructured to focus on critical technology needs such as a self-reacting friction stir welding circumferential and complex curvature demonstrations. Preliminary results using composite tanks in cryogenic applications show only minimal weight savings over metallic tanks, but with increased operation and maintenance issues. Therefore, the composite cryotank effort has been moved to a follower position, descoped to a single contractor, and realigned to focus on the operability issues and overall benefit to the architectures.
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Since RP has emerged as a primary first stage propulsion option, the need for composite cryotanks is also reduced. Composite tanks are being continued in a follower mode to further study the issues related to risk as well as non-cryo application for RP engines. Again, the IATR was the tool that facilitated gathering and analyzing overall program data, and yielded valuable information on which to base critical decisions.
Thermal Protection System Developments
The vehicle's thermal protection system (TPS) is also part of SLI's extensive airframe research. Significant improvement has been made in hot-powder process manufacturing that helps eliminate flaws in monolithic ceramics, known as Ultra-High Temperature Composites (UHTC). This material, when used as TPS on the sharp leading edges of a Crew Transfer Vehicle, provides increased abort options, thereby improving crew safety. Essentially, UHTC possesses a unique set of material properties including unusually high thermal conductivity, good thermal shock resistance, and modest thermal expansion coefficients that make them particularly well suited for sharp body applications in hypersonic flows. Sharp leading edges (: centimeter) could enable an entire new design space for hypervelocity vehicles with decreased drag, increased cross-range capability, and reduced cost-to-orbit.
NASA Research Announcement 8–30, Cycle II
The IATR process also provided the insight needed to conduct a second round of procurements to fill design and technology gaps. The SLI's first round of awards (NASA Research Announcement (NRA) 8–30, Cycle 1) in May 2001—valued at $791 million—went to 22 prime contractors and over 150 subcontractors. An additional $94.6 million was awarded in December 2001. In addition to propulsion, Cycle II will focus on crew enhancements, coordinated by the NASA Unique Systems Project, and integrated flight demonstrators to further mitigate the risks associated with developing a 2nd Generation RLV to serve both NASA and commercial needs. The investment is estimated to be about $500 million over the next year.
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NASA-Unique Systems
In spite of advances in aerospace technology, human space flight remains a challenging endeavor because of the need to provide flight crews with a safe vehicle. The NASA-Unique Project deals with all aspects of astronaut safety. It includes escape and survival enhancements, a weight-saving inflatable airlock, and the operational features unique to human space flight. This is the Program's top design risk area and the competition is wide open.
The Johnson Space Center is working to understand and simplify upper-stage vehicle designs for servicing the Space Station in the post-Shuttle era. NASA-unique technology projects are also looking at ways to ensure safe extraction of the crew across the flight envelope from pre-launch to landing, akin to similar systems found in jet fighters. Such a system will interact with the crewed vehicle via flight performance health detection sources that can initiate crew escape in the event of an in-flight anomaly.
Flight Demonstration to Supplement Ground Testing
SLI is supported by multiple integrated flight demonstration projects, including the X–37 technology demonstrator. The X–37 demonstrator integrates key SLI advanced technologies for testing in real-world flight environments. The X–37 Project has recently completed a highly successful series of seven drop-tests in the initial atmospheric phase, using a prototype look-alike vehicle called the X–40A. These tests contributed valuable data needed to complete the X–37 design that are now part of the reusable launch vehicle knowledge base.
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In technical areas like airframe and thermal protection systems, the X–37 Project could serve as a testbed for support the Space Launch Initiative by demonstrating key technologies needed to develop a 2nd Generation RLV. The next phase of the X–37 Project would conduct a series of five unpowered approach-and-landing flight tests. These tests are a necessary precursor to orbital flights and are currently targeted for 2004. To fulfill that role in supporting the SLI, the X–37 Project will need funding for FY 2003 and beyond and will compete for those additional funds in the NRA 8–30, Cycle II procurement.
Buying Down Risk
As SLI progresses, it will continue to deliver accomplishments that buy down the business and technical risk of full-scale development. In the 2002 to 2003 timeframe, the Systems Requirements Review process will focus the field to a single architecture design from each of three contractors, while further defining the specific technologies that require selected investment to enable a full-scale vehicle to be built and become operational. Independent reviews will be conducted to validate the SLI Team's progress and approach. As SLI moves into this second phase, a Request for Proposals will be released in 2003 to advance the two architectures chosen and specific technologies needed.
In the 2004 to 2005 timeframe, architecture plans will be refined; both technology and business cases will continue to be analyzed; and strides will be made to focus on ground and flight testing of prototype engines, NASA-unique safety features, airframes, and automatic vehicle health monitoring, among others. A Systems Design Review establishes another level of fidelity among the architecture designs and technology readiness levels. Again, independent reviews will be conducted.
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In 2006, the two-part Formulation Phase of space transportation development covered by SLI ends and the Implementation Phase begins with a full-scale development decision, based on two competing launch vehicle concepts that have passed the Preliminary Design Review. In the years leading up to the full-scale development decision, the Space Launch Initiative Cost Credibility Team, formed in February of this year, will review the current state of cost estimation for development, production, and operations in the aerospace industry and formulate recommendations for the life-cycle cost estimates for the next generation of RLVs. The team consists of key experts in this field from NASA, Department of Defense, Aerospace Corporation, Rand Corporation, Institute for Defense Analysis, and the COTRs for each Architecture Definition Office of SLI. The team is collecting data from each industry led architecture development team to serve as the basis for the initial estimates. The preliminary results will be completed in time to support the SLI Non-advocate Review and will be refined as the key technologies are matured. The estimates for full-scale development will directly depend on the results of the systems requirements review process and the contract awards from the RFP scheduled for late calendar year 2004.
Engine prototypes will be in the test stands, new thermal protection systems will be in development, and flight demonstrators will have integrated and tested multiple technologies. Most importantly, the fundamental question of what kind of vehicle the U.S. launch industry can produce and what its requirements should be will have been resolved. Additionally there will be a great measure of assurance as to how much it will cost to build and operate the new system.
Goals such as a $1,000 per pound to orbit cost and a 1-in-10,000 probability of loss of crew are ambitious targets, but they are not the only measures of success. For example, attaining a $2,000 per pound cost and a 1-in-5,000 safety factor would not indicate failure; rather, it would reflect the realities of current analysis of both Government and contractor team members while still achieving great strides over today's Space Shuttle.
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Conclusion—We Can Get There from Here
The United States and the world have benefited from scientific discovery and breakthrough exploration that new forms of transportation have historically made possible. In practical terms, space transportation system enables the robust civil exploration of space, while it fosters economic and technological growth across many commercial sectors. The really exciting part of SLI is not just new technologies—it is the promise of a revitalized scientific community and aerospace industry supported by efficient, reliable vehicles from a NASA Program that is deeply committed to cost accountability and delivering value for the money entrusted to its keeping.
The Space Shuttle has served with distinction for over 20 years, but the system requires labor-intensive work and is costly to operate. It also offers an extensive knowledge base upon which to build a firm foundation for a new generation of safer, more reliable, and less expensive space transportation specifically designed for a new generation of missions and markets.
In summary, NASA's Space Launch Initiative is reducing the risks inherent in an advanced research and development program for space transportation while fostering a fair and competitive business environment for industry, and ensuring the efficient use of valuable resources. Through teamwork with its partners in the U.S. aerospace industry, academia, and other Government agencies, SLI is on course to reduce the risk of developing a safer, more reliable, and less expensive space transportation system that will enable NASA to pursue its ultimate goals—to understand and protect our home planet; to explore the universe; and to inspire the next generation of explorers.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. There is a lot of discussion that we have to have over the points that you have raised and what that 2006 is going to be. Prepare for that. So we will talk about that in a moment. And we have now with us Jerry Elverum. And Mr. Elverum has been a member of the Space Transportation Subcommittee of NASA's Advisory Council since its inception in 1996. And we welcome you and we look forward to your testimony. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. GERARD W. ELVERUM, MEMBER, NASA SPACE TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Mr. ELVERUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, members of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. I am here this morning representing the Space Transportation Subcommittee of the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee. In these opening remarks, I will give some brief answers to the three questions that were raised in the invitation to testify.
The first question was: What are the Subcommittee's concerns and recommendations for NASA's Space Launch Initiative Programs (objectives, schedule, technology, and the need for a program orientation)?
Information regarding the context for our reviews and criteria for our recommendations is important. The Subcommittee was created in 1995 at the request of the NAC to focus on NASA's efforts to achieve what was considered an urgent goal of developing a replacement for the Shuttle.
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From 1995 until 2000, the Subcommittee focused its reviews almost exclusively on the SSTO program. With the demise of SSTO in 2000, and effectively the loss of five years in real progress toward the specific goal, we recommended that NASA should launch an urgent multi-stage RLV program designed to meet the goal by about 2012.
We reported on what, in our judgment, were the necessary elements of such a program. We stated that the program needed to be constrained to match its total system requirements and its implementation plan to a targeted cost and an achievable funding profile. In November 2000, and in May of 2001, we received briefings from NASA on what was called the Second Generation RLV program. This included the newly funded SLI.
In our reports following these reviews, we offered our opinion that the effort lacked credibility for assuring the delivery of a near-term replacement for the Space Transportation System.
A few of our reasons for this view were, first, we did not perceive a real RLV program in which the government had made a commitment to fund the development and production of a Shuttle replacement against a firm set of realistic requirements.
Second, a required threshold target of a reduction in ten in launch costs from the current STS is not capable of being translated into any kind of specific second-generation RLV design criteria. The current Shuttle total operating costs are only partially driven by vehicle and total system design characteristics.
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Nor is there a qualified current risk uncertainty profile of crew loss rate that is attributable to STS vehicle characteristics that can be translated into specific design criteria to meet a target requirement by a reduction by a factor of 100 in crew loss rate for a new RLV system.
Third, we sensed what seemed to us a significant drift in the program's character toward a broad, new technology orientation. The Subcommittee's judgment was that a credible near-term RLV to replace Shuttle would need to maximize the use of existing technologies and known materials through an innovative systems engineering process.
Our recommendation is for NASA and the government either to commit to an effective program for achieving a near-term Shuttle replacement or to make a firm decision to upgrade the Shuttle and commit to it as the Nation's primary manned and flexible on-orbit space transportation system for the next 20 years.
The second question was: What actions has NASA taken in response to recommendations of the Subcommittee over the past few years? Following shelving of SSTO, NASA formulated the Second Generation RLV program as part of its ISTP. We had many discussions with the second generation program management about the weaknesses of that program as we saw it.
I think NASA worked hard in getting the SLI funded and aimed at more adequate resources to the front-end engineering phases of a program. I thought that the second generation program management, therefore, was quite responsive to some of the Subcommittee's recommendations regarding the front-end of that program, but I have already commented about the lack of a total program in which to feed that front-end.
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A number of managers in NASA, for a variety of reasons, simply disagree with many of our views on the program. I, personally, do not consider that to be non-responsive.
The third question was: If NASA decided to extend operations of the Shuttle to 2020, what changes to SLI would I recommend? I would apply a significant part of SLI resources to additional specific, detailed risk assessments on an upgraded STS and into defining more complete system engineered options for both improvements in continuous health monitoring of the vehicle and its system, and increasing margins against the safety failure modes that are controlling the most critical risks to the upgraded STS.
The remainder of the SLI funds could be used for completing the systems analysis work currently underway under SLI and orienting the new technology of the SLI toward a commitment to a firm RLV system program that could be the initial operating setup around 2020 in order to replace the Shuttle at the end of its current planned life span. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elverum follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERARD W. ELVERUM
Mr. Elverum is testifying based on his own expertise and representing the documented views of The Space Transportation Subcommittee of The Aero-Space Technology Advisory Committee of the NASA Advisory Council.
The Subcommittee was created in 1995 to assist the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) in oversight of NASA's efforts to achieve America's #1 space goal—a significant reduction in the cost of manned access to space. Subcommittee members participating at the time of its apparent phase out at the end of 2001 were:
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Initial reviews focused on the down-select process for proceeding with a single technology demonstrator vehicle. Despite the Subcommittee's objections that the selection criteria were inadequate to justify the extreme risk of a Single-Stage to Orbit, NASA committed to reaching the goal of replacing the Space Shuttle through the X–33/Venture Star Program. As a result, the Subcommittee under the guidance of the NAC focused almost exclusively on X–33/Venture Star for five years. However, as our reports continuously cautioned, it became apparent even to NASA by mid-2000 that an operationally viable SSTO vehicle would not be achievable in the near-term. No justification could be made to implement the NASA's goal of a ''decision to proceed'' to an RLV full development program by 2000. In our Report of September 6, 2000 we stated:
''It now appears, however, that two central parameters of the original program cannot be met: (1) Industry cannot fund the planned RLV without considerable (probably several types of) Government support (loan guarantees, anchor tenancy, indemnification and/or insurance, possibly direct funding, etc.);
and (2) the mass-fraction demands of a useful SSTO appear to be out of reach, not only with current technology, but with any technologies expected to be available for a Next-Generation RLV.''
Because of the loss of almost six years chasing the SSTO concept, the Subcommittee believed the original goal of a Shuttle replacement by about 2008 was completely out of reach. We therefore stated as one of our recommendations:
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''NASA should immediately launch an urgent, competitive 'Next-Generation TSTO RLV Program' designed to meet the Nation's manned space flight needs with a reliable, robust, lower-cost replacement for the Shuttle by about 2012.''
''The first phase (FY01–02) should be detailed systems analysis and implementation planning to match requirements to achievable funding, and to structure realistic Government-industry cost sharing approaches.
Rationale: (some) Studies have indicated that a TSTO system using modern technology and rapid-turnaround, reduced ground-crew operations can save billions of dollars. The Nation is long overdue in validating this by serious, in-depth systems analysis. If this initial phase is successful, subsequent phases of the program might be: one-year, industry-wide conceptual design competition (FY03), with down-select to two teams; three-year, well-funded systems engineering and technical validation competition (FY04–06), with down-select to one team; and five-year full-scale engineering development (FY07–11). All phases should include well-funded engine programs. NASA should assume a substantial part of Next-Generation TSTO RLV development costs, as a necessary expense of reducing the overall cost of manned space flight.''
Although it was not specifically highlighted in the written report, one of the most important parts of the second sentence in the recommendation was:
''to match requirements to achievable funding, and to structure realistic Government and industry cost-sharing approaches''
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At the time, the Committee had fundamental concerns based on our reviews of the ISTP program as to how NASA was going to proceed with a viable Shuttle replacement vehicle. Given the grave difficulties with X–33, we saw no real alternative ''program approach'' in the relatively unfocused technology projects that could provide any hope of leading to a justifiable path to replacement of the STS. We were given to understand that NASA had realized that fact, and had proposed a more realistic $4.5 B. funding wedge that it termed the ''Space Launch Initiative.'' It was our opinion that all of those dollars if realized (and more) needed to be strongly constrained to focus on a single program. This was based on our understanding of a national commitment to replacing the STS as soon as practical. Target IOC in the 2010 timeframe was indicated. The justification for this need presumably derived from risk concerns about the aging STS vehicles.
Our understanding was that because of the NASA need, the purpose of the SLI was to enable NASA to establish at least two credible (system engineered) RLV system candidates for a competitive down-select by about 2005. In the judgment of the Subcommittee, the only hope of achieving such a goal would be if the system and operating requirements controlling the design of a new RLV were conservatively matched to a possible viable funding profile. Any RLV design concepts that could have low development schedule and cost risk profiles should be driven primarily by systems engineering trades, and not by optimistically incorporating unvalidated new technologies. In fact, stage velocity requirements for multi-stage earth-to-orbit RLVs do not demand cutting edge new technologies! Such technology projects may be fun to do, but they are not necessary. As clearly demonstrated by the Shuttle, pushing extreme technology limits to save take-off weight for a reusable Launch Vehicle is exactly what you don't want to do.
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Funds to reach the stated NASA goal of having two or three credible system-engineered candidate RLVs by 2005 were obviously seriously limited. Therefore, it was the Subcommittee's view that the only major technologies funded by SLI should be those defined by the outcome of detailed, conservative system engineering results for credible multi-stage RLV candidates. Furthermore, those technology efforts should be focused only at validating any specific engineering design criteria that had not already been established by an authoritative source.
The Subcommittee's experienced-based judgment was that a NASA and national commitment to a real Shuttle replacement RLV program based on definitive overall program requirements and an identified funding profile, is necessary if a reasonably near-term replacement of STS is to be achieved. This has been a consistent theme of the committee's reports and verbal advice to the NAC and all levels of NASA, including the Administrator. In many cases it appears to have been misunderstood, and has become a source of dispute. However, I want to make clear that, at the direction of the NAC and the NASA administration, our focus has been on the manned reusable launch vehicle programs to replace the Shuttle as soon as practical. Therefore, our recommendations were always aimed at what needed to be done to achieve that goal. The Subcommittee's role was to provide advice in that regard, not to determine if an operationally flexible manned space capability was no longer a national need.
On November 8 and 9, 2000, the Subcommittee met at MSFC for our first review of the SLI. We focused on program definition, intent, goals and commitment to pursue the first phases of a funded vehicle program to replace the STS in a timeframe that could realistically be called ''second generation'' (say 2010–2012). Although we thought we were told that goal was indeed the desired payoff for the SLI, what we heard about the planned effort was not highly encouraging. There appeared to be small pieces of the action for everyone, and a premise that brand new technology and performance optimization (based on vehicle weight) was going to somehow magically result in higher reliability and a factor of ten lower cost to launch NASA manned missions. Our concerns were presented in a report in January 2001. I have elected to paraphrase conclusion #3 of that Report, which I present below along with several selected recommendations from the Report (also including some editing in italics).
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CONCLUSIONS
3. In a number of vital particulars, the SLI as it was apparently shaped and passed on to MSFC for execution, and as presented to the Subcommittee the end of 2000, appears to lack the basic essentials of a committed System Program (an achievable goal, an overall commitment to a realistic end-item budget, a rough completion date, etc.). The performance improvement 'requirements' for the program which were arbitrarily established are unachievable (because they are simply unmeasurable) for a (near-term) second generation RLV. The SLI as it was presented at the time of the meeting was not adequately structured nor balanced as the front-end of a program truly committed to achieving the goal of providing a credible near-term replacement of STS with a multi-stage RLV. The implementation guidance encourages broad R,T&D in areas that are insufficiently constrained by Systems Analysis supporting the achievement of that goal (or any goal other than broadening the general technology base). The Subcommittee believed the initial focus should be principally on Systems Analysis, and the innovative engineering application of existing technology to the replacement RLV total system. A big-system program, such as we believed SLI was supposed to enable, must be fully defined by a clear mission, practical operational envelopes and an achievable cost profile. These requirements are mandatory so that an engineering process consisting of:
1.) Systems Analysis to define a few truly credible candidate reusable launch vehicle/ground operations total system configurations that are constrained by mission, operational, and life-cycle cost requirements that are fully committed to.
2.) Preliminary Systems Engineering of several most promising candidates, and iteration with systems analysis to arrive at two or three of the most desirable (lowest risk and life-cycle cost) RLV total system configurations.
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3.) Specific identification resulting from steps 1.) and 2.) above, of the highest leverage specific technologies that must be validated to establish the credibility of each of these System Candidates to meet the acceptable ''Requirements'' for a 2nd generation RLV.
RECOMMENDATIONS (Selected)
1. ''NASA (through the Congress) should give SLI a program orientation to produce a robust, low-cost second generation RLV by about 2015. at a specified development, test, and production cost (e.g.: $xx B) managed in accordance with a milestone-oriented 2001–2015 schedule.'' (Note, that this implies a Government controlled and predominantly Government funded launch vehicle development program)
2. ----
3. NASA should scrub the second-generation ''requirements'' document of August 1999 to produce ''softer'' more generic (missions and operational) requirements, relying on the front-end Systems Analysis work to provide the informed decisions on requirements.
4. Most importantly, NASA should commit the FY01 SLI budget effort almost entirely to Systems Analysis of RLV alternatives. Each alternative must have clear credibility as candidates for a near-term second-generation RLV that can specifically satisfy all NASA's committed mission and ground operations needs. These should include multi-stage-to-orbit systems (including enhancing the basic Shuttle with any applicable sub-systems accepted for the other system candidates), etc. top-level needs. These needs (''use requirements'') should be defined totally by NASA's operational needs, not by arbitrary and unmeasurable cost and reliability ratios! To be clearly credible for near-term, candidate RLVs must primarily be based on existing or validated technologies and sub-systems. Truly objective realistic life-cycle cost profiles must be developed for each candidate system. These results will be the systematic inputs required to select a very limited number of RLV candidates for in-depth Systems-Engineering.
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5. NASA should ensure that the entire System Analysis effort is done by one team of experienced systems analysts, (a number of) key members of which should be a professional cost estimator, none of whom have a proprietary interest in the outcome. The same analysts should analyze each system considered truly reasonable as a near-term replacement for the wide range of missions accomplished by the STS to ensure consistency. (Or if not one team, at least assure frequent and open interchange of specific experts among each concept committed to analysis.)
The final report of the Space Transportation Subcommittee, dated June 5, 2001, followed a meeting at the Johnson Space Center on May 1–2, 2001. During this review, the sensitivity of an ongoing competitive procurement activity prevented our inquiry into specifics of the actual planned content and goals of contracts in negotiation under the first phase of the SLI. Thus, the Subcommittee's June 2001 report focused our perception of the SLI program plans as presented to us at the time. We sensed what to us seemed to be a significant shift in the program's objectives and schedule, and what appeared to be a broad unfocused ''advanced technology orientation.'' As a result, we once more had a credibility problem with the SLI actually being able to achieve what we had understood was its objective. That was to provide a justified basis for selecting two or three competitive candidate systems for parallel initial development as a near-term ''second generation'' RLV to replace the Shuttle.
The overall implication of our four (4) recommendations were for NASA either to provide an effective programmatic basis for achieving the goal of enabling a Shuttle replacement RLV, or to make a firm decision to significantly upgrade the Shuttle and commit to it as the Nation's primary (only) manned and flexible in-orbit space transportation system. I have interpreted and edited those report recommendations to provide some further clarification of the basis for our views.
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We pointed out that since the early 1990s, America's #1 space goal has been 'Reduce the cost of access to space.' Previous quick studies (NAC, STAS, ISTP, etc.) have indicated that (under certain assumptions), a new multi-stage configuration had the potential to save tens of billions of dollars over continuing to operate the STS in its current mode and configuration, and at current program limited flight rates. In our opinion, the highest priority job of the SLI's System Analysis effort should be to objectively and credibly validate or refute these estimates using 1.) common assumptions about the capabilities and risks of using new technologies, 2.) incorporating the same available installable subsystems for satisfying similar requirements, and 3.) using common methodology and criteria for establishing required failure mode risk margins.
Non-vested-interest contractors and NASA organizations should perform these Systems Analyses. Results of the analyses, interrogated by a rigorous set of selection criteria, would permit NASA to confidently make a conservative, risk-controlled and justified decision on which RLV candidate systems should proceed into a full systems engineering phase. It would establish a credible total systems life cycle cost comparison between a modified STS and each evaluated candidate system without game playing regarding hidden and equivalent capital amortization costs. It would also compare various risk profiles using common methodology and assumptions.
The Systems Engineering phase would ultimately define for each selected candidate an optimized RLV total detailed configuration (including all ground turn-around and in-space operational modes) which satisfies all of the ''rational'' imposed manned-capable launch system requirements. This systems engineering phase would also identify all remaining non-validated critical design criteria for every subsystem that could not be iterated out during the systems engineering process.
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Assuming NASA retains its commitment to development of a near-term Shuttle replacement RLV (so called second generation RLV), establishing these identified missing design criteria should be the primary focus of essentially all technology funding of the SLI. All other generic technology exploratory or design criteria work (ala the old NACA activities) should be performed only as part of the Advanced Space Technology Program which can be assumed to go on forever.
As in the case of the earlier ''down selection'' process at the system concept level, results from the final systems engineering process, carried out under the total direction of NASA and an independent non-vested systems engineering contractor, and interrogated by a comprehensive set of objective selection criteria, would order the candidate RLV systems against those criteria. The results would also establish risk assessment uncertainty profiles for each system based on that system's validated design criteria status. This would provide objective, credible and justified characterization of the risks associated with: 1.) the engineering development program, 2.) the flight and ground operations, and 3.) the total expected life cycle-costs against a common set of flight rates, and payload integration characteristics.
Only given such an objective set of justified information, can Congress, NASA, and ultimately the potential Contractors make their various decisions with reasonable confidence. This was clearly not done in 1995 when the SSTO selection was made. If it is not done properly for deciding whether to commit to 20 more years of Shuttle operations or to commit to a near-term replacement, the consequences for the nation could be disastrous. The only effective resources the Subcommittee has identified that can be applied to this crucial decision are contained in the SLI.
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If it is acceptable that that decision be quickly made on the basis of assertions by vested interest players both within and outside of NASA, then the SLI funds could be applied to a broad range of technologies.
Discussion
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. First of all, the Chair will be submitting the same questions that we asked. Some of you have had some other points that you needed to make. So for those who didn't specifically address the questions that the Committee had asked in your testimony—you only had five minutes, so I understand why you maybe wanted to make some other points—but we will resubmit those questions and you could answer them in writing.
Flight Demonstrators
It was stated in testimony last year that DC–X development project was—actually resulted in—a demonstration flight and a sort of model, basically, in a relatively short period of time. And I remember that very well. It was about 10 years ago. Similarly, NASA's Space Transportation Advisory Panel concluded that little is gained in pursuing the development of broad-scoped technologies without a sense of RLV development—second generation RLV development now.
But I wanted—the first question is to Sam. What can we do to orient the SLI program so that a decision to develop the next generation of RLV is made sooner rather than later? Is that something that we want to do? Would it be beneficial to us to make sure we make that decision sooner or later? And why does it take so much time? We saw that—to come up with a working model, at least, you know, a g working model or some sort of a technology demonstrator that we can actually look at and touch and feel and examine.
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Mr. VENNERI. Let me—I will briefly give you a short answer to that and you could expand on it. As far as having a working flight demonstrator as part of this program, we believe that is integral to making things happen. That, in itself, won't address the issues of reliability and understanding the system life cycle cost of a system. A demonstrator is showing a technology suite, and, in fact, what DC–X actually did was not so much propulsion, but was some innovation in how to do ground processing and software for the vehicle for flight. That, in itself, does not extend to an operational concept. It is a demonstrator.
RLV Technology Maturity
Demonstrators are integral to this program, both ground and flight. What we are trying to do, though, is not do technology not untargeted for RLV. Where, I guess, we disagree with the last testimony we heard is the technology does not exist today to make a commitment to do a second-generation system. It simply is not here. It is not here in propulsion. It is not here in thermal protection. It is not here in airframe design.
So what we are doing is not doing a technology investment that is just pushing it across the boundaries of doing good technology, but the architectural requirements of a vehicle system concept for two-stage reusable launch. That is what is driving the investment technology portfolio. We simply don't have the technology in hand.
Now, yesterday, we had a review, both my program manager and director talked to the advisory group——
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yeah.
Mr. VENNERI [continuing]. That we currently have. They are going to put a statement out, as far as their input to the NAC, that their view is the technology does not exist. There is a national need to do this, and that the approach that we are taking is different for the first time in this agency. So they concur with the investment strategy that we are doing.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Obviously, we—you know, people who signed the X–33 contract were operating in good faith and I am not at all suggesting bad faith on anybody's part, but we know that there were computer models of everything there and that was it. And that is why we are sort of pushing for the other one, because, at least, I thought that I could see something. On the other one, I couldn't see anything but computer models for the X–33.
Were those computer models just wrong? Was that the problem? And you are saying now we don't have that fundamental technology? What they saw on their computers was not accurate and that we are not at that stage yet?
Mr. VENNERI. In essence, engineering is not an exact science. Engineering is assumptions and trying to bound uncertainties. When you push single-stage-to-orbit, that is probably the most aggressive thing we could do in any launch system to date.
And so, computer simulations do not give you the insight as to all the variabilities of unknown-unknowns that happen when you try to build a large composite tank. And that the problems associated with that is one of over-aggressiveness, both on our part and on contractors that we work with, and a willingness to push the envelope to the extent of where maybe you don't have the uncertainties totally bounded, both in design and in engineering processes that leads to the challenges we face. We want to learn and not repeat from those errors.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. You are suggesting that we should not—that speeding up the process so we make the decision earlier is not really a goal that we should have. We should not be trying to push this decision-making, but—and let me—I am not disagreeing with you, but let me just say that my experience in government, unless you really push somebody, they actually hold off and they—then they don't make decisions until later on what they could make sooner. And, thus, we actually are just postponing decision-making rather than developing a technology. And I would like anybody in the Panel to answer. Sam, you can take first shot at it and then we will go to——
Mr. VENNERI. No. I understand the question. I find myself in a unique position pushing the technology, telling you I think we need to slow down. The problem I have is credibility. And if this was strictly a technology program that we were going to deliver some demonstrations to the Congress, that would be one thing. We are trying to come back to you as an agency saying that we have a decision package for you that bounds what we think the next generation system will cost with verifiable technology at a high enough level, that we know that the tank is going to work to a preliminary design review.
We know the engines are going to work. We have done engine firings at a preliminary design level on test stands. We have had the Kennedy folks integrate operational concepts to a level fidelity that we think we have our handle on processing of the vehicle. So until we have that, I think we would be accused of repeating the mistakes of our past in asking the Congress to accelerate something when, in good consciousness, we don't have the credible data to actually give you the option of whether you should accelerate 2006 decision dates of national leadership to decide what to do in a very aggressive program in the context of an architectural decision gate, not a technology program, but a conceptual where do we go for next generation launch. And that looks at a very aggressive date of 2012 as the time period for an operational system. That is in a non-crisis mode.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Sam, we won't even be around then. I mean, you know, I will be back surfing and you will be off enjoying a margarita someplace. And I know Jerry has something to say about this. So you may——
Tying RLV Technology Maturity to Initial Operations Capability Dates
Mr. ELVERUM. I don't think that we are arguing that you don't want to have the technology criteria in hand before you go off and start cutting hardware or committing to this specific design. What the Committee has been arguing is that in order to get to that system engineering process using the best technology that you have available, you need to put it in a context of a specific program that has a funding profile and an IOC date. Making a decision in 2006 to incorporate a brand new vehicle with lots of new technology, is not going to be qualified to replace the Shuttle by 2012. I don't think there is a single member of our committee that would agree that you can do that.
So our reports over the last few years have been: if you are going to replace the Shuttle in 2012, we already are way behind the power curve in committing to that situation. If we have—basically, I think, by default of that decision for 2012, then you are stuck with going ahead and making sure we can fly the Shuttle until 2020 or maybe even 2025, as Dick Blomberg has suggested we could do, and orient the new technology programs toward what people were calling the third generation launch vehicle, which could truly talk about new technology, not just another SSME engine that we think might be more reliable under reused conditions.
Because the margins that you need in order to talk a reusable vehicle, means that you have got to have configuration controls and things like that that need technology that was proven, not just in the last few years, but that we have proven over the last 20 years. I disagree that the technology that has been available can't produce a two-stage vehicle.
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It is a question of: Do you produce a two-stage vehicle whose gross liftoff weight agrees with what people would like to have it? Or do you produce a vehicle that can produce payload in orbit for the lowest cost with the most stable configurations and something that you can count on to be reliable? I think we have gone maybe past that point now in being able to protect the Shuttle so that you don't want to make dual investments. You don't want to invest in upgrading the Shuttle, and at the same time, in parallel, try to bring on a new vehicle that can't prevent you from having to upgrade the Shuttle in the first place. All systems have, in the past, military and everything else, have shown you cannot carry out this kind of a dual program.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, is there a consensual problem here that, perhaps, that in the future we don't need to have a transportation system that has people on it and cargo on it and that we would have a transportation system for people that would be totally separate than something that had a huge cargo bay, and then any cargo going up could be done on a separate rocket? Or are we tied to something that would prevent—that excludes that as approach?
Mr. VENNERI. Actually, just a short answer. What you have described is really what has come out of the first year of our work on SLI. That in order to achieve the safety and cost goals that we want to go to, separation of crew and cargo is absolutely a requirement.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Do you agree with that, Jerry?
Mr. ELVERUM. Well, I agree that that might be the proper design for the total system. I think the Committee would say if it is, you have got to make that part of the requirement before you start doing your system analysis and system engineering. We have always been working from the SLI requirements goals that were set up before our committee was disbanded at the end of the year.
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So our last briefings and stuff were in May of 2001. Against that set of requirements, you could not devise a real replacement vehicle for the Space Shuttle. What we had under that set of requirements, as we read them, was that we will provide a lot of technology. We will hope that industry will come up with various vehicle concepts, and NASA can buy a ride on various vehicles to do different things—one vehicle for crew escape, one vehicle for just putting big payloads in order, maybe another that would eventually do the space-on-orbit requirements.
At the end of our last meeting, as we understood it, there were added in a lot of the Space Shuttle's man-in-orbit capabilities as a firm requirement, but it didn't show up in the SLI program as such.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Just a couple of our own witnesses are anxious just to throw their two cents' worth. I am sorry for taking too much time here, but go right ahead, and then we will move on to Mr. Gordon. Mr. Gregory—both of you can have a—go for it.
Mr. GREGORY. The discussion is very interesting because—and I have a struggle too with the answer of—and I think I will address the last part—this separation of human from cargo. For some reason, when we build a vehicle that will support a human, it seems to have a higher reliability than a vehicle that has been built for cargo only. And I gave you a statistic on the Titan 4. It may be a consequence of building a vehicle that supports a human that guarantees the support for a cargo or a spacecraft or something of that nature. I am not sure if I have an answer for that, but I am depending on Sam and his work and his committees to, when we come to that crossroad, decide whether it is a two-pronged or maybe more than that.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Blomberg.
Mr. BLOMBERG. Again, I also want to wade in, not necessarily with a specific response to those issues, but to highlight the fact that the salient issues that were raised here need some time to develop. You need some time to understand, whether it is one vehicle or two vehicles, and to develop the enabling technologies. That is not going to happen quickly.
In the meantime, the lead time to do anything meaningful to improve Shuttle safety and to ensure that the Shuttle can fly and support the Space Station for its entire service life is very long. And so if you don't overlap the programs, if you don't start now on dealing with the Space Shuttle, you will be in a catch-up mode that will be detrimental to safety. And that is the origin of our concern that the Shuttle doesn't have a sufficient planning horizon.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. You have put your finger right on the quandary that we are in here. And we have to make that decision. If the Shuttle is going to actually be flying safely, we have to make that decision before we know if the alternative can actually be built or not. And that is——
Mr. BLOMBERG. But, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to realize that grounding a vehicle, taking a vehicle out of service at the end of its life when it still has some life left in it, is not a bad decision for both safety and economics. You are better off retiring a vehicle that still has some life left in it, then running it until it runs out of life. So——
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. You know, I got a flat tire the other night, and that is exactly what I was thinking.
Mr. BLOMBERG. Precisely.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Gordon, you may proceed. I apologize for taking a little more time here.
Space Shuttle Privatization
Mr. GORDON. Mr. Gregory, when Administrator O'Keefe testified before the Science Committee at the end of February, he indicated that he wasn't sure when a decision would be made regarding privatization of the Shuttle. In your written testimony, you talk about preparing for interaction with industry in the middle to late summer of 2002. And I assume you were referring to your models. We are—as we enter the beginning of 2002, can you tell us now when we can expect a decision on when NASA intends, whether NASA intends, to privatize the Shuttle?
Mr. GREGORY. Thank you very much. The issue that we are working on is a question of privatizing, as we had referred to it, or competitive sourcing, as we now compared to—refer to it. Competitive sourcing would be to get the best benefit, the safest program, and something that accomplishes what our role is supposed to be, what the mission happens to be.
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We have looked at a full spectrum of options using this competitive sourcing definition. One of them is full privatization that still puts the government as part of the indemnification liability/accountability portion of it. And the other is, perhaps, an enhancement of the activities we have right now where we have contracted out a significant part of the Shuttle activities.
A set of proposals and options was presented. And, at this moment, we have a business assessment going on. That—the business case should be complete by the middle of the summer, and we should be able to give some, I guess, honest assessments and determinations of what the best way to go, based on a good business model, perhaps, by the end of the summer.
Mr. GORDON. And what would you say is a reasonable period of notification for those folks that are going to be involved?
Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think we have an RFI going out, excuse me just a second, in the August—in the August/September timeframe, sir.
Mr. GORDON. And you mentioned that there would be a joint liability. How would you see that joint liability if there was an accident between the private sector and the government?
Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think that I would be sitting on the side of the table speaking for the government and defending what the contractor did, even though there may be a contractor here with me. In the privatization, as long as the government is involved, as long as the government is the responsible person for acquiring resources for the activity to occur, I think that I would be, NASA would be, held liable for the use of and the safety of that particular activity.
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Mr. GORDON. Well, then so what is the private industry's liability?
Mr. GREGORY. That is something I have struggled with. In the initial privatization model, it appeared as though the contractor would not have as much liability or very little liability compared to the government.
Mr. GORDON. What is their incentive, other than losing the contract, for safety?
Mr. GREGORY. That is a very good question, sir.
Mr. GORDON. Are we just going to write them a check and say good luck?
Mr. GREGORY. Well, that is why I don't like that model.
Mr. GORDON. Yeah. Well, I hope you all will think about that a little bit more.
Mr. GREGORY. Well, we are, sir. And that is why we are looking at a full spectrum of models.
Mr. GORDON. Well, I—certainly, I think that the liability question should be—well, if we are—if the private sector is going to incur the benefit, they certainly should take some of the responsibility.
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Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir. And it would also include picking up the assets. If there were going to be a true transfer, then the transfer would include not only the assumption of liability and accountability, but the maintenance of the assets. And so all of that would have to be as a package if the government, in any way, is associated with that. For example, I have the responsibility of signing the certification of flight readiness. That is an awesome responsibility that I have. It says that I guarantee—and I would put up my three kids—that this thing is going to be safe and it will be successful. If I don't have the proper oversight, insight, and understand the entire process, it would be impossible for me to sign that certificate.
Now, if you want to transfer it all to an industry, then the corporate government, whatever that happened to be, would have to make that signature.
Space Shuttle Safety
Mr. GORDON. Well, I think what we didn't say about transferring was, and you had mentioned, joint responsibility. And I think that is the question. Let us move on now. Mr. Gregory, you stated that safety is your highest priority for the Shuttle program, and, I think, certainly we all agree with that. You also were here, and you heard Mr. Blomberg say—and I quote—''That the current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle.'' He went on to say that it may—you know, at this level, it may be impossible to even recover. Now, how do you feel about doing your job with—Do you disagree with that statement?
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Mr. GREGORY. The Space Shuttle is safe. We will never launch when it is unsafe. And I think——
Mr. GORDON. Well, what about the statement, the current and proposed budget are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle? Do you agree or disagree with that statement?
Mr. GREGORY. We have many active—well, I would agree that if we want to maintain the same level of safety that we have now, that—if we want to maintain the same level, that we have the capability and capacity to do that.
Mr. GORDON. Well, then you would disagree here. The statement is: ''The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating Space Shuttle.'' Do you agree or disagree with that statement?
Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think I would take—I would take exception to the statement that would say that we could not maintain. Because, in fact, if you look at the budget that we have now, we have upgrades in progress, not only on the Shuttle, the supportability of the Shuttle, but also on the infrastructure.
Mr. GORDON. Okay. But now, and keep in mind that there was a half a billion dollars in cuts to this program. So you are satisfied——
Mr. GREGORY. We are.
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Mr. GORDON [continuing]. And ready to take responsibility and you are satisfied with that and disagree with Mr. Blomberg then.
Mr. GREGORY. We have looked at and prioritized the activities that we are doing now. We will continue to assess the priorities to maintain or upgrade safety, maintain and upgrade the infrastructure. And if we have determined that more can be done, then we will propose that in a plan.
Mr. GORDON. But just so—but, again, let me—I just want to try to get clear here. The statement is: ''The current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space Shuttle.'' This is the report from the Independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. And you are saying that you do not agree with that. And—is that correct?
Mr. GREGORY. I would say that I do not agree with that.
Mr. GORDON. Okay. And they also go on to say that it may be impossible to even recover at this level.
Mr. GREGORY. I would not agree with that one.
Mr. GORDON. Okay. So that is—this is your job and you are taking responsibility. Even though you have been warned, you are taking the responsibility.
Mr. GREGORY. Well, we look at the Safety Advisory Committee as a—an indicator of what is——
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Mr. GORDON. Right. They are just—but this is just one opinion.
Mr. GREGORY. Yes.
Mr. GORDON. And you disagree with that opinion and you are taking responsibility for it.
Mr. GREGORY. And we have. I think if you would talk to them, they would tell you that that is a point in time and that what we do is listen to them and then modify or change or assess our programs to correct their opinions.
Mr. GORDON. Mr. Blomberg, if you were in Mr. Gregory's position and had this budget, would you take responsibility for the safety?
Mr. BLOMBERG. Well, sir, I think it is a more complex issue than a point solution. What we are saying is that over the service life of the Space Shuttle, the expected life that we believe will be needed, we don't think there is enough budget now to ensure that that safety down the road will be maintained or improved.
Mr. GORDON. Okay. So if you were in Mr. Gregory's position——
Mr. BLOMBERG. If I were in——
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Mr. GORDON [continuing]. With this budget, would you assume responsibility?
Mr. BLOMBERG. I would not be concerned about current operations, but I would be very concerned about future operations. I would be very concerned about the ability of the infrastructure, say, 10 years from now, to support safe flight. The Panel—and the Panel has——
Mr. GORDON. Well, then would you think that—Would your job to be just say I am not going to be around for 10 years and so I am not going to worry about that? I will just take care of it, you know, during my tenure and let somebody else take care of it after that?
Mr. BLOMBERG. No. I mean, I think the Panel is saying very clearly that we think that the—that NASA needs more money right now to spend on the future, not more money to spend on the next flight, flight after that, and so forth, but more money to ensure that, for example, the flight in 2015 will be as safe or safer, especially considering that there are safety improvements that have already been defined and could be installed. We think the opportunity cost is enormous, if it is lost right now.
Mr. GORDON. And, Mr. Gregory, how would you support the Space Station in the event you lost the Shuttle and the rest of the fleet was grounded for some period of time?
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Mr. GREGORY. There would not be a way to do that, sir.
Mr. GORDON. Would you recommend that a replacement Shuttle be built?
Mr. GREGORY. I think that we have an obligation to continue to modify and change and enhance our ability to get to space. We are working very closely now with Sam Venneri and his organization in the SLI program to assure that the development technology that appears in the 2006 timeframe has not only the capability to enhance and upgrade the Shuttle, but also provides a capability for building a replacement vehicle after that.
I would then see a parallel activity as the new vehicle—whatever it is, whatever shape it is—proves itself and becomes, at least as reliable as the Shuttle, before you would make a decision to phase-out the Shuttle.
Mr. GORDON. Well, I need to conclude. But I—let me just—my final sort of—I guess, here is a concern that I am seeing develop from these different comments we are getting here today. On the one hand, we are saying that we are looking seriously at privatizing with apparently those folks that are going to be the private contractors, aren't taking full responsibility in terms of liability. And so I—you know, so on the one hand, you know, we are reducing the—again, the liability, the responsibility, for safety on the one hand. And, on the other hand, we are getting reports and warnings and recommendations that the budget is too low to maintain safety.
So you have this potential collision of a warning, of not adequate resources with a supervisor that doesn't have as much liability. Yeah. Those seems to be, you know, trends that run counter, and that if they run together could be dangerous.
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Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think if you take a single answer to both of those, you would probably run into that collision, as you have mentioned. My role, and the role of NASA and you, as a governing body, would ensure that we don't look at a single path. Privatization, as was defined, and probably the model you are looking at, from my point of view, is not workable. And that is why we are looking at many different models to assure that accountability and responsibility is very clear, very understood.
At the same time, we listen to our panels and we can do course adjustments. As I said, right now, I have accountability and responsibility for each launch that comes up. We will never launch if we are not safe. At the same time, I have extended the look at upgrades, safety upgrades, supportability upgrades, infrastructure upgrades, to follow—to extend that past 2012, because you, like I, realize that on 2012 a vehicle is not going to roll out that will replace the Shuttle. We are not going to put this thing in a hangar somewhere or on a pedestal someplace.
We continue to upgrade the Shuttle. Each iteration improves its probability of success. It is not as high as we would like to, but we like the numbers that Sam Venneri is demonstrating and showing—or showing at this point. We hope all of that stuff works. But that is the situation that we are in. We are looking at short-term issues, but we are also looking at the long-term concerns and trying to solve those also.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I appreciate the observations of liability and the significance of what that means. Thank you very much. Dr. Weldon.
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Space Shuttle Operating Costs
Mr. WELDON. Do I get 15 minutes too, Mr. Chairman? You are going to make up for it with the rest of us. Mr. Gregory, you know, I don't have the NASA budget in front of me, but, you know, as I recall it is about $15 billion, and about half of that is manned space flight or maybe a little less. And a little more than half of the manned space flight account is Station and so Shuttle is about $3 or $3.5 billion. Is that right? Roughly? In that ballpark?
Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir. In that ball park.
Mr. WELDON. Give or take a half a billion, let us say.
Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELDON. But in that budget, there is astronaut training, mission planning, sustaining engineering for the missions, and a whole lot of stuff. It is not just operating the Shuttle. Correct?
Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELDON. So setting the safety issue aside, when we talk about developing a vehicle that is less expensive to operate than the Shuttle, if we were—if Sam Venneri and his group were to produce a shuttle replacement that was half the cost, your expenses would not go from $3.5 or $3 billion down to $1.5 billion. As I understand it, they would go from $3 or $3.5 billion maybe down to $2.5 billion. They wouldn't be cut in half. Correct?
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Mr. GREGORY. That is a little far-reaching for me. I don't—I wouldn't know how—what the impact would be, especially if we ran a dual system for a period of time.
Mr. WELDON. Well, I think if you ran a dual system for a period of time, the cost would actually go up.
Mr. GREGORY. Right.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Second Generation RLV
Mr. WELDON. But let us say we get beyond a dual system. Sam has got a vehicle that, you know, is a hundred times safer and half the cost. I don't think it may be possible to develop a vehicle that is 1/10 of the cost. That was the goal with X–33. But let us—and now, people to save 50 percent is—would still be great, but you would still have to do all the astronaut training, all the mission work. You would have to do all that other stuff. It is not going to go away. The—all the payload issues. They are just not going to go away. Correct?
Mr. GREGORY. That is right, sir.
Mr. WELDON. And we are not going to save a billion and a half, $2 billion a year. Now, Sam, I have got some questions for you. Your budget in SLI is how much?
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Mr. VENNERI. The total budget is roughly—it is close to $5 billion, and we are up at the phase now where it is on the order of a billion a year up through '06.
Mr. WELDON. A billion a year. And if you settle on one design, I saw that flowchart—and—I have heard some figures projected, it is going to be $10 billion to actually take one of those vehicles and get it to a production phase. And then there would be additional costs to produce some kind of a fleet. Is that right?
Mr. VENNERI. Yeah. Except at this stage, I mean, what we are trying to do is not put numbers out because actually no one knows, in terms of projecting what the cost—acquisition cost would be and the life cycle cost. What we do know is what a single data point is. And your point is—I guess, I am going to just emphasize your point.
We have one data point for a reusable launcher, including humans and cargo. From that one data point, we know what that cost is. We know what the infrastructure cost is. We know what the launch operations costs are. And 90 percent of the cost of that Shuttle activity is when the wheels touch down and when we launch it again. It occurs there. And it is not on-orbit. So what we are looking at under this is not a vehicle design in its own right. We are looking at how a national launch infrastructure should be designed to fit within a budget.
Mr. WELDON. Well, I am glad you are doing that. And, actually, I was very pleased to see you were doing that. The point I wanted to get at—to develop the Shuttle, as I understand it, in 1974 dollars was, I don't know, $15, $20, $25 billion. So we are spending a billion dollars a year to come up with some kind of a concept.
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And then we are going to have a multi-billion dollar, 10, 20, who knows? I understand you can't project cost to bring this thing to life. And then we are going to have an increase in cost, because we are going to have to maintain both operations for a while. And then in the end, you are going to say, Fred Gregory—in terms—I am not talking about safety now. You are going to say, Fred Gregory, not 50 percent of his budget. It is going to be some portion smaller than 50 percent of his budget. Because if we are going to still send men into space, we are going to have all the ancillary costs of sending men into space. Correct?
Now, the reason I am getting at all this is, the gentleman from Tennessee was raising a very, very good point. You have got a huge budget to improve safety, but we have Mr. Blomberg here saying that safety is being really jeopardized and the budget is not enough. And the point I want to make is when I listen to all this, you know, I just—I feel like the agency is without a clear vision and a clear direction.
Mr. VENNERI. Well, I guess what I would answer that is, I think we have a clear vision and direction. And it is not an either-or choice. I agree with the two gentlemen here, my friend and colleague, Fred, and the advice we get from external people. I don't think it is a choice of one or the other. We are operating and flying humans to space. Doing what it takes to make sure we do that safely is paramount to this agency. We also——
Mr. WELDON. Well, I—listen, I support what you do. And I have been saying this for seven years. I support research and development to come up with a Shuttle replacement. The point I am making is that we are spending a lot of money to do that, and in the end, we are not going to save a heck of a lot of money. At the same time, in order to be able to do that, we are not doing the safety upgrades we should be doing on the Shuttle. We are not giving the Shuttle the budget it needs. And there are some serious concerns about the safety of continuing ongoing Shuttle operations.
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You know, X–33 was canceled. X–34 was canceled. The track record of the agency on X-vehicles is really bad, at least with this Committee member at this point. And, you know, maybe the questions I am asking need to more properly be directed to Mr. O'Keefe. But notwithstanding all the things all you gentlemen have said, I remain very concerned about the direction we are going on all this. And I guess, really, my primary concern is we are not giving the Shuttle budget the funds it needs to maintain the safety while you try to develop a vehicle that is safer.
And I have had the red light. It looks like I have gone over a few minutes. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, we have been warned about long term, but we have been given adequate warning here. We will do something about that. And we have a very active member who is always on guard—Mr. Lampson—and I am sure he has some poignant questions.
Crew Return Vehicle
Mr. LAMPSON. Well, we will find out. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And then thank you, gentlemen, for being here with your testimony for us today. Mr. Blomberg mentioned the X–38, as did my colleague, Dr. Weldon, and other X-vehicles. Mr. Venneri, at yesterday's VA HUD appropriations hearing, Administrator O'Keefe was questioned about why no money for the X–38 Crew Return Vehicle prototype was included in NASA's fiscal year 2003 budget request.
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And, according to a report in Space News, Administrator O'Keefe went on to explain that NASA is curtailing its investment in the X–38, because he would rather the agency invest in a Crew Return Vehicle that could serve more than one purpose. And the article went on to say that O'Keefe said that any Crew Return Vehicle that NASA should decide to build should be capable of performing other missions.
And that sounds to me as though the Administrator has decided to merge the Crew Return Vehicle, the CRV, and a Crew Transfer Vehicle, CTV, concepts. Is that correct?
Mr. VENNERI. Congressman, what we are doing now is we are evaluating system concepts of crew transfer and crew return from a system requirements, a looking at it from a—of a vehicle not in a point design, all our mistakes we did on the previous ''X'' programs that were mentioned.
And, in fact, within a month or two, we will have a study that we could share with members of this Subcommittee looking at just what are the issues of a CTV, CRV, where are the overlaps, and how to actually look at meeting the needs of a rescue vehicle and a transfer vehicle that would achieve not a—the goal of one or the other, but a suite of technologies and concepts similar to what we are doing in the approach I have described under SLI that avoids the problem of a point design solution. And that is really what the Administrator is talking about doing.
So, I wholeheartedly support and endorse the effort of where we are taking this to. We are not throwing out the value of what came out of X–38. What we are going to do is take lessons learned from the technology and deflating programs to date, but take it to a level of how we can approach this in a little bit more systematic versus a point design solution state.
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Mr. LAMPSON. Well, let me ask then. Under the schedule that you presented here today in your testimony, there won't be a decision on whether to proceed with the crew transfer vehicle until, perhaps, 2006. And there won't be an operational vehicle then until 2011 or 2012, at the earliest. That is 10 years from now. Is the NASA Administrator saying that he has made a decision to defer the U.S. Crew Return Vehicle capability for a decade or more?
Mr. VENNERI. I wouldn't imply that in the statement. What is not being said does not lead to that conclusion. What we are going to bring to the Administrator and to the national leadership are options in technology and a realistic timeframe of what we could look at in terms of a rescue vehicle, transfer vehicle, concepts that would allow decision gates to be made of a timeframe that is not a decade off, but elements of a system architecture that one could make logical choices in terms of a realistic assessment of the readiness, the cost of doing that, and an acquisition cycle.
So one does not have to say that that defers everything for over a decade. But I guess my own opinion, I have seen where we and where NASA has made mistakes of rushing to a design solution ahead of time without the adequacy of all the uncertainties covered. And I will tell you, point designs rushed to judgment is not the way to solve technology and issues related to human space flight, whether it is a launch system or a rescue vehicle or transfer.
So over the next few years, we can have options laid out where this agency can make realistic decisions.
Mr. LAMPSON. What is the earliest we could have such a vehicle?
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Mr. VENNERI. We—as far as an acquisition cycle, I couldn't answer that now. What we could give you is the results of a study that we are going to complete by the end of May where we could then sit down and look at some options from that study and look at where the options can be with a rescue crew transfer vehicle. And we will be working that in conjunction with the folks with Fred Gregory and his leadership. So we are trying to go back to a systematic approach that is based on what I call sound engineering approaches, not a rush to a solution.
Mr. LAMPSON. Well, considering that thing is almost ready to fly, I hope that we have some pretty clear understandings very quickly at this Committee level of what NASA's plans are and what it hopes to achieve.
Mr. Gregory, and, Mr. Venneri, both, I understand from a statement from Mr. DeLay at yesterday's NASA appropriations hearing, that you have an internal document that lays out a plan for an orderly shutdown of the X–38 program. Is that correct?
Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think the plan is being developed at this moment. I have asked the Center Director at Johnson Space Center, General Howell, and the Program Manager for the International Space Station to present that plan to me, implementation plan, and then present progress. So it is not in place at this moment.
Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Venneri.
Mr. VENNERI. Very specifically, what we are doing here is we are making some decisions that are looking at a shutdown of the program, including the activities that we have associated with X–38 in terms of what we are doing out at the Dryden Flight Center in supporting flight tests. The priorities I have are to look at supporting the flight tests with X–37 over continuing a long-term support of X–38.
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And that is a judgment call over where the biggest payoff is for the agency. So we are looking at an orderly transition of acquiring all of the engineering data to date and using that as part of our determination. But I have to make decisions over value to the agency and what is—and so to—in giving you a straight answer here, my decision is X–37 approach and landing tests far outweigh the value to continuing my support for flight testing of the X–38. We have extracted the maximum amount of information from the drop testing that we have done to date.
Mr. LAMPSON. I am awfully, awfully disappointed in hearing that. And I would imagine that there will be a significant number of Members of Congress who will be angry if that is ultimately the decision. I would like to see, at your earliest possibility, a copy of those documents in my office. And I will do everything that I can possibly to do adequately understand what it is that you are attempting to do. But right now, I assure you I don't. Mr. Blomberg, do you have any comments on any of this?
Mr. GREGORY. Let me interject here. And in——
Mr. LAMPSON. And I hope you get the severity of the feeling that I have. And there are some of my colleagues here who have dreamed about things that are happening with the International Space Station. And it is my opinion that you are taking that dream away from us. NASA is not doing what it promised America it would do—or the world. And shame on you for that. Don't take away children's dreams about what we can do in space. And you are not working with Congress in its effort to try to give you the resources necessary for the men and women who have given their lives to NASA to dream and to put those things into reality. Pardon me for interrupting, but I believe in this stuff. And——
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Mr. GREGORY. I do too, sir——
Mr. LAMPSON. Well, show us.
Mr. GREGORY [continuing]. Probably more than you do, sir. Just a minute. As we look at the—where we are heading in space, we, first of all, have to justify why we are there. An end is not to put a human in space. An end is not to put a Space Station there or to put a Shuttle there or a reusable launch vehicle in any way. The drivers are the reasons why we go there. The drivers that we are looking at are the research requirements, the exploration requirements, the commercial requirements.
Once we have made those determinations, then we make a decision on how many people, if people are required, whether they are robotic, if that is what is necessary. Once we have made those kinds of decisions, then we can make the decision on if we have humans, how do we return them safely to earth.
And the—and, as Sam was talking about, what we have started with is a point design. It was a notional idea, but that may not be the answer. What we are talking about is the capability of safely returning crew members to earth. It may be in the form of a CRV, a CTV, or something else. We don't know the answer yet, because at this moment we are trying to decide how many people actually have to go to orbit to do something that would enable us to move to the next step, whatever that happens to be. This is a much, much larger vision than where we are trying to put it as just an end itself. To the moon, that is an end. We didn't have a plan after that.
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Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Gregory, how can you possibly support a cut of a billion dollars then from that research budget?
Mr. GREGORY. A billion dollars from the research budget for the X–38?
Mr. LAMPSON. No, sir. Our Space Station research efforts.
Mr. GREGORY. At this moment, we have a science committee in place called REMAP. And what they are looking at—and these are the Nobel Prize winners representing all of the sciences that we could identify and bring together. By the end of June, they will have identified the kinds of science, the kinds of research that can be done, world-class research that can only be done in space.
Mr. LAMPSON. And they will do it with significantly less money than what we have provided in the past.
Mr. GREGORY. Could be. Or it could be——
Mr. LAMPSON. It could be or it could not be.
Mr. GREGORY. Or it could not be.
Mr. LAMPSON. Well, we are trying—may I indulge long enough——
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Oh, sure.
Mr. LAMPSON [continuing]. To have Mr. Blomberg make his comments?
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead.
Mr. BLOMBERG. The issues that the Panel has looked at, not necessarily related to this—what specific CRV is needed, but rather the capability, the functional capability. As early as 1992, the Panel went on record as saying that what was then the Space Station Freedom, required a crew return capability for three design reference missions. The first was an injured or sick crew person; the second was the need to evacuate, for example, for depressurization or a toxic spill; and the third was the unavailability of ground supply, for example, the grounding of the Shuttle.
Those design reference missions were developed by the Space Station program. They are still valid. The initial look was that the Soyuz was incapable of performing that first mission because of the design landing loads would not be compatible with an injured or sick crew person. That has since been revised and it is marginally acceptable.
The Panel still believes that the Space Station needs a single purpose lifeboat, as soon as possible, to meet those design reference missions and also to provide an assurance of the continued capability and not reliance on some external source to provide Soyuz capsules that is in uncertain supply.
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We also expressed in this year's annual report the concern that as the assembly phase draws to a close and the maintenance phase starts, there may not be sufficient time of a three-person crew to perform meaningful science and maintain the Space Station. So the pressure on increasing crew size is going to be there, and the only way you are going to increase the crew size safely is to have a more capable CRV. So we are disturbed, not necessarily at the cancellation of X–38, per se, or any specific vehicle. But again, the protracted stretch-out of providing that capability to the International Space Station.
Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, colleagues, for your indulgence. Please don't let us stop doing what we are doing.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. All that passion. And what is this—could be or—could be—the question is could be or could not be or something like that. Another very active member of this Committee and Subcommittee, of course, who is always there to ask her questions and be aggressive in her own way, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. And you may proceed.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your timeliness of your hearings are much appreciated by those of us who are very sensitive to the concerns of this challenge that we have. Let me, first of all, convey to the NASA representatives my enormous disappointment in the lack of follow-through and the ability to secure the services of General Bolden. Of course, not reflecting on any of the personnel that are before us, but I hope that you will personally take my message back.
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I believe that the Administration fell short in its argument with the Department of Defense in terms of his utilization. I think you lost a very able and very genius leader, a military person who had been with NASA for a number years. So that is just for the record, and I hope that you will convey back. And if you cannot convey back, Mr. Gregory, or, Mr. Venneri, then should I speak to the Administrator directly, or will you convey my sentiments back to him?
Mr. VENNERI. We will convey it.
Mr. GREGORY. We will convey your sentiments.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate it. Let me—the eloquence of my colleagues, let me pursue the same line of questioning. I think you will have your answers down pat having had the chance to repeat them over and over again. But let me also say, as I have listened to the dialogue, that we ask these questions because we care, and it has no reflection on how much caring you have in your respective jobs. We know that that is the case.
Budget Requests
But the tragedy is that we realize that we are here today simply because there are necessary budget decisions that have to be made. These are, frankly, not better technology that we want to choose between. We are just talking about what do we do without the money that we need to have. And that is a bad position to be in. It is a bad position in light of policy decisions that have been made beyond the pay grade of NASA, frankly. A lot of this dealing with an extended permanent tax cut that none of us can afford.
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And so I am very angry because I believe, if you will, that projects and programs that are crucial are suffering on the basis of politics. Mr. Blomberg, I would ask that you not hold back. I don't know the integral relationship that you have with NASA, but you need to tell it like it is. This is not to say that you are not giving it to us straight. But the problem is, as I look at your testimony here, or some comments that you have made, you indicated current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk levels of operating the Space Shuttle or the International Space Station. I hope I have not taken out your words out of context.
But in your recent answer, as I was in the room, and I am in judiciary markup, and I appreciate the indulgence of the Chairman, and so I was earlier in another committee. But the point is, we don't even have money to do what we need to currently. Your answer that I heard was, we are okay now, but we will be in trouble in 2015. Well, we need ongoing planning and ongoing assessment, and so I think we are in trouble now with the decisions that we have to make. So my question to you is, does that—is that an adequate or good interpretation of what this language says—current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk levels of operating the Space Shuttle or the International Space Station? Mr. Blomberg?
Space Shuttle Safety Concerns
Mr. BLOMBERG. I think the interpretation is correct. But what I am trying to avoid is conveying the image that the next launch, for example, or maybe the ten after that, are unsafe and that people should worry. They are not. Mr. Gregory has said, and I agree with him completely, they will never launch the Space Shuttle if there is any safety doubt. The problem is that with an aging system, sometimes things go wrong——
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely.
Mr. BLOMBERG [continuing]. That we don't know about.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely.
Mr. BLOMBERG. The best way to deal with that is to get ahead of it. So when you deal with an aging system, take an airliner or military aircraft, as an example, you allocate a certain amount of your budget to current operations to ensure that they are safe and a certain amount to getting ahead, to planning on future requirements.
The Space Shuttle is extraordinary in the sense that the lead time for many of the components is extremely long. They are not commercially available items. The manufacturers don't have—many of them don't have—the capability anymore to produce them because they were a one-time production or they have been out of production for so long. So in order to ramp up and replace some of these things, just for logistics needs, will take a significant amount of time.
What we are concerned about is that the budget shortfall has forced the operating arm to say we need all of our money to make sure that the current flights are as safe as they can possibly be. They are doing a magnificent job at that. We have no concerns about the next launch. We had no concerns about this mission. It was done exactly by the book, the way it should be done. But the problem they had on the pad with the weld——
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely.
Mr. BLOMBERG [continuing]. Is a harbinger, perhaps, of things to come.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Blomberg, you have qualified your remarks appropriately and with distinction. I understand what you are saying and I totally agree with it, which is I have enough confidence in the personnel of NASA that they would not jeopardize those everyday heroes and she-roes that go up in the human space flight as they can or if they can. Meaning that they stopped the last one as it related to the particular default that they had to deal with. And rather than do it in the 24 hours, they took through the weekend and they would have taken longer.
You are talking about the day-to-day decisions that have to be made. We can be assured, as Americans, God help us, that we will not send up, or we don't send up, a launch that has some debilitating and underlying problems. It would not go. The point is, however, that we need to be very clear to America is, these things will happen, as I understand that you are saying, and we are on the edge such that we don't have possibly the resources to upgrade, to make the Cadillac a better deal or a better product. We don't have the monies to be able to do the ongoing planning and fix-up and improvement and purchase as we are going along. We have the intellect not to send—not to launch a defective product, a defective Shuttle, if you will, but we don't have the dollars to be able to ensure that that does not happen, frankly. We can stop it, but we can't improve it.
Crew Return Vehicle
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And I think that is what is troubling to us, those of us who are concerned about safety, if the Chairman will indulge me on this—that we are concerned about safety. I believe that is part of the problem. And we had the understanding that the Soyuz was a temporary vehicle. Did you have that understanding, Mr. Blomberg?
Mr. BLOMBERG. Yes. In fact, that was a specific finding of ours in previous years. That as an interim expedient, that the Soyuz was acceptable until a CRV was available.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the CRV would be the enhanced technology that we were looking at so that ultimately we would have an American-made, American-designed, or the best technology-designed return vehicle. Is that your understanding?
Mr. BLOMBERG. Well, in fact, our recommendation was to have the simplest vehicle that met the reliability standards and use it a single-purpose lifeboat. And I believe a former chair of the Panel once said, you know, you don't see Navy vessels using their lifeboats as fishing boats, I believe was the analogy he used.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely.
Mr. BLOMBERG. And so it was our feeling that you were better off with a single-purpose, keep-it-simple lifeboat that would be able to return the crew reliably. That doesn't mean that technology hasn't advanced at this point to a point where a combination CTV/CRV may not make sense. We are just concerned about the continued delays in getting it on orbit.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the configuration of the Soyuz is still that image that most of us have of those type vehicles from Russia, which is sort of the sitting in almost a fetal-type shape as I recollect. Has that expanded or changed? Is that sort of the type vehicle we are talking about?
Mr. BLOMBERG. Yes. My understanding is the Soyuz requires an individualized seatliner for each astronaut that is going to be returned.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. So an injured or someone needing medical care poses, for any of us who think of what happens in medical care, a problem.
Mr. BLOMBERG. It is more of a challenge than the CRV design. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just finish this by throwing this out. I don't want to raise this issue in the context of hysteria, but, you know, I appreciate very much the opportunity to expand space travel. And we are certainly gratified of all of our wonderful teachers. But it begs the question for the Administration to make this announcement and we are in a quandary here about questions of safety. I hope that the Administration thinks very seriously about budget cuts that are coming only because we have no money driven by decisions made by the Administration.
Lastly, I would say, as I just finish this question, Mr. Blomberg, privatization—is that the savior and solution?
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Space Shuttle Privatization
Mr. BLOMBERG. The Panel has not looked at privatization in any detail. What we have looked at is the concept in general and concluded that any such concept would involve a transition. A transition involves an upheaval, and an upheaval involves some increased risk during the transition period. We don't, at this point, from the concept alone, see any basis for a safety improvement or a safety degradation. A good contractor should be able to run the Space Shuttle very safely, but the transition period would be somewhat problematic.
The issue is whether transitioning this vehicle to privatization makes sense or whether it is better to do it with the next vehicle. But until we see some specific plans, it would be very hard to comment on the details.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you have raised the red flags.
Mr. BLOMBERG. Well, we just say that safety ought to be a consideration as well as economics and structure.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. I hope that the sense of the administrators or the personnel, Mr. Chairman, from NASA is not a reflection on their good service to this country, but a great concern of the direction of where NASA is going.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee. There was a report that a plane has crashed into a building in Milan, Italy, but it appears that it was a smaller aircraft and not a commercial airliner.
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Mr. Gordon, do you have some final remarks to sum up today's hearing?
Mr. GORDON. Just real quickly. First of all, I think everyone here, the Panel and the Members of Congress that have been asking questions, are all honorable folks with the same objective, and that is, safety within this program. I don't think anybody can—we may have different views as to how you get there, but I think we all have the same concern.
Here is what I—or how I see and what I am concerned about the recent discussion. I think that Mr. Blomberg is correct in his—or his Panel's position, and that is that there is not adequate funds going into safety for the long-term or intermediate term. Again, as he says, he doesn't expect a safety problem tomorrow or the day after, but somewhere the tread on the tires is getting very thin.
I also completely believe Mr. Gregory when he says that he is not going to send an unsafe Shuttle into orbit. So where does that put us? Well, where it puts us is that the treads are getting thin. Mr. Gregory is likely to pull the plug because he doesn't want to risk a safety problem. This means that we then leave the Shuttle—or rather, the Space Station, in orbit without a means to service it. That is where we are going.
The problem, you know, I think, is not safety, because I think that there are—you know, it could happen—but there are mechanisms to stop that. The problem—the more likely problem, the very likely problem, is unless there is a change, we have a Space Station with no way to service it.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. We are talking about significant issues here. This is not just—we are not only just talking about money. Money is important. And we are talking about a $50 to $60 billion expenditure over a 10-year period. We are also talking about the success of the Space Station project, which, I believe, is vital to the future of the whole entire space program. If we let that project fail, the public will lose its faith in this space program. And—more difficulty in financing our space efforts and man's ascension into space.
So we appreciate all of you giving us your very frank opinions. Let me just state that I have faith, as Mr. Gordon has just stated, that you are doing your very best job and that you are trying hard and that you are sincere in what we are doing. I don't think that all of the things that have not worked in the past can be laid on your doorstep. I think that there are those of us who have been involved with trying to make decisions, in terms of single-stage-to-orbit.
I remember I was the biggest proponent of single-stage-to-orbit, and maybe Sam is exactly right. Maybe, you know, that we are not at that stage yet—that single-stage-to-orbit, and much less having been there 10 years ago. Maybe we did push the envelope a little bit. Maybe that has created new technologies. But perhaps a more systematic approach, like Sam is suggesting, would have been the best—the better way.
I am not an engineer. I—we have got—we have got a lawyer and a journalist here who are trying to do our best jobs in dealing with people who really have this technical expertise. There have been very serious questions raised here and we have got some—we see where the lines are seeming to go and it is not coming together in a very good spot. And we need to take these issues that have been raised by Mr. Gordon and others today very seriously.
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And I would hope that all of us are going to be working together to make sure that it—that the things work out and that we don't come to these crisis moments that have been suggested today. And I think that we can avert those crises, but we have got to do something—you know, make some decisions. And the Administration, at the top level, has to pay more attention. So I would, again, like to thank the witnesses. Thank you very much.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I would just like to ask a question of—to have it back to me in writing, please, if I might, and they could get it back to me in writing.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I understand that when you request the papers and things in writing that it goes to the Committee and then we pass it on to you at that time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. That would be fine. If I—I would just—I would just like to have—it is probably not under your particular jurisdiction to both Mr. Gregory and Mr. Venneri—the utilization of Section 8(a) contractors, please—the percentage we have used, etcetera.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Do you know what? I will—let me—as I was about to say, please be advised that Members of the Subcommittee may request additional information for the record——
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay.
Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. And I would ask other members who are going to do so to submit written questions to these gentlemen within one week so that they can then return those——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right.
Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. In writing——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. And it would be on the record. So we appreciate that. And this concludes our hearing.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Again, thank you all very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Frederick D. Gregory, Associate Administrator for Human Spaceflight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Questions Submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Mr. O'Keefe testified before Congress that NASA is pursuing a multi-purpose vehicle for crew transfer and crew rescue capability.
Q1. Do you expect to reduce the NASA workforce after canceling the X–38/CRV?
A1. The Agency does not plan to reduce its total work force after termination of the X–38 Project. Civil servants currently assigned to X–38 will be reassigned to fill positions within other programs and projects, or within Center institutional offices.
Q2. Would using the Space Shuttle to fly SLI technology demonstrators like the X–37 beg consistent with Shuttle use policy? Please explain.
A2. The Shuttle Use Policy charges NASA to use the Shuttle for primary payloads that require human presence, its unique capabilities and other compelling circumstances. Secondary payloads, including technology demonstration types of payloads can be flown on a space available basis. Determinations for a specific primary payload, such as X–37, are made on a case-by-case basis. NASA's determination for flight of primary payloads is provided to the Congress on an annual basis and it documents that assignments are consistent with the Policy.
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Q3. Does NASA have any plans to use the Space Shuttle as a space flight testbed for SLI technology?
A3. NASA Research Announcements for SLI have included launch opportunities for both Space Shuttle and NASA provided expendable launch services. Actual assignment and flight is dependent on the technologies selected by the SLI Program and identification of requisite launch/test opportunities. While there are no SLI technology requirements in the Shuttle launch queue at this time, there are opportunities for manifesting such requirements.
Q3a. If not, are there restrictions to using the Space Shuttle for SLI demonstrations?
A3a. While requirements for all users, including SLI, need to be consistent with the Shuttle use policy, this policy provides considerable latitude to allow NASA to engage in a wide range of demonstrations that may be required for testing reusable launch vehicle technology. While assembly of the ISS is the priority mission of the Space Shuttle until construction is complete, flight opportunities for secondary payloads are on a space available basis.
Q3b. Have Shuttle use restrictions been clearly and consistently communicated to industry by both the Shuttle Program Office and the SLI program office?
A3b. Industry is made aware of what can and cannot fly on the Shuttle. When there is industry interest in using the Space Shuttle, NASA works closely with the interested parties to ensure that Shuttle use policies are understood. Also, NASA Research Announcements for SLI and scientific Announcements of Opportunity routinely reference NASA's Shuttle Use Policy. Space Shuttle requirements are well documented and accessible to all potential users via the Internet. NASA seeks to consistently apply the use policy across the customer community.
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Q4. Will the Space Flight Advisory Committee review the Space Shuttle and SLI programs as an integrated space transportation plan?
A4. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) is currently being updated. The current plan contains 1) Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades, 2) Space Launch Initiative, and 3) 3rd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Technologies Development. The SFAC is briefed regularly on Space Shuttle, Space Shuttle Upgrades, Expendable Launch Vehicles and Payloads. Since the Space Shuttle is an integral part of ISTP, the revised plan will be briefed to the SFAC once it is updated. Other transportation areas are briefed by request (SLI and 3rd Gen RLV).
Q5. How do the various advisory committees for space transportation, such as the NASA Advisory Committee, Space Flight Advisory Committee, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee, the External Requirements Assessment Team, and others, share information?
A5. Below is a brief description of each group and their relation to NASA and each other. The chairmen of the advisory committees such as SFAC and ATAC are members of the NASA Advisory Council, which serves as a coordinating body where information from the advisory committees is shared and Agency level recommendations are developed. As far as interaction among other outside groups, sharing information is the responsibility of those independent groups. Experts selected for these groups are expected to provide informed judgments which cross the boundaries of their particular group's emphasis. But we recognize that direct interaction among these groups can provide synergy, so the Associate Administrator of the Office of Space Flight has recently requested that the SFAC and ASAP have a member attend each other's meetings to promote better interaction between the two independent groups.
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NASA Advisory Council (NAC): an external advisory group to NASA that reports directly to the NASA Administrator. For more information go to http://www.policy.nasa.gov/poladvisor.html
Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC): a standing, non-paid committee of the NAC. Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Advanced Systems, Launch Services (ELVs), and Space Communications report to the SFAC. The Chairman of the SFAC is a member of the NASA Advisory Council.
Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC): a standing, non-paid committee of the NAC. SLI and 3rd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle report to the ATAC. The Chairman of the ATAC is a member of the NASA Advisory Council. For more information go to http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/aero/atac/.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP): an independent group of experts consisting of nine members who are appointed by the NASA Administrator. Appointments are for 6 years and reaffirmed annually. To provide continuity of service and preserve integrity, not more than one-third of the Panel members may be appointed every 2 years. The work of the Panel is augmented by consultants, who are appointed by the Panel Chair with the concurrence of the Administrator and reaffirmed annually. The Executive Director serves both as Executive Secretary and Technical Assistant to the Panel. The NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance participates as an ex-officio member in Panel activities. For more information go to http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/codeq-1.htm
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External Requirements Assessment Team (ERAT): independent assessment group for the SLI program—reports to the 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program Manager.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
In its May 24, 2001 response to the 2000 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) report, NASA's Office of Space Flight stated that: ''It is prudent to assume that the Shuttle will continue to support human spaceflight well beyond the current planning date of 2012, probably at least until 2020. Industry and NASA studies indicate that there will not be a compelling case for funding, developing, and certifying a Shuttle replacement system for human spaceflight until late in the next decade.'' However, the testimony at today's hearing from Mr. Venneri of NASA's Office of Aerospace Technology states that the Space Launch Initiative envisions a next-generation reusable launch vehicle being ready by 2012.
Q1. These are contradictory positions from the same agency. Does NASA have an agreed-upon planning horizon for phasing out the Shuttle and implementing a next-generation reusable launch vehicle?
A1. The Shuttle's unique capabilities will be required to support the International Space Station (ISS) and other Agency payloads until at least 2012. Although the Space Shuttle program (SSP) is assessing what investments would be required to safely fly the Shuttle through 2020, no commitment or decision has been made regarding Shuttle activities beyond the 2012 timeframe. NASA's Office of Space Flight and Office of Aerospace Technology are revising NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which will provide an orderly transition from the Shuttle to a future vehicle.
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Q2. If so, what is it? If not, why not?
A2. NASA is developing an orderly plan to transition to a next-generation launch vehicle. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) is the governing framework that coordinates and guides NASA's various space transportation investments, including Space Shuttle improvements, Space Launch Initiative (SLI), and far-term technology. ISTP is the decision path by which NASA ensures continued access to the International Space Station, invests to reduce its human space flight transportation costs, and avoids duplicative or unnecessary human space flight transportation investments. ISTP is currently under revision and it is expected to be complete later this year.
As Associate Administrator for Space Flight, the Shuttle program is under your control. However, a position description has been developed by NASA management for a ''Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Human Space Flight,'' apparently in response to one of the recommendations of the Tom Young Space Station Review panel. Under ''duties,'' the position description states: ''The incumbent is responsible for all activities associated with the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, which include overall management, integration, safety, and operations of the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs.''
Q3. This would seem to encompass everything currently being done by you as Associate Administrator for Space Flight. What is to be the distinction between you and the PEO?
A3. The Associate Administrator for Space Flight is accountable, not only for ISS and SSP, but for Launch Services (including ELV), Space Communications, Advanced Systems, Business & Institutional Management, and Policy & Planning. The new position, Deputy Associate Administrator for ISS and SSP, provides leadership and accountability for top-level safety requirements, mission success criteria, overall policy definition, and strategic planning in the direction and administration of the two programs.
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Q4. How will responsibilities for the Shuttle program be apportioned under this arrangement?
A4. Deputy Associate Administrator for ISS & SSP responsibilities includes the corporate level management of program safety, budget, performance and schedule requirements. The program managers for these important programs will report directly to this Deputy Associate Administrator, consistent with the recommendations of the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force.
Q5. When do you expect a Program Executive Officer to be named?
A5. Major General Michael C. Kostelnik, USAF, (RET.) was named as the Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs on 5/14/2002.
The NASA Administrator has announced his commitment to reinstating the ''Teacher in Space'' program, which was cancelled after teacher Christa McAuliffe was killed in the Challenger explosion in 1986. In addition, NASA's draft commercial strategy proposes to establish a program to allow ordinary citizens to fly on the Shuttle. According to NASA's analyses, the Space Shuttle currently has a loss of crew probability over the course of a mission of 1 in 265, which is significantly higher than that faced by crews on combat aircraft and orders of magnitude higher than the risks faced by passengers on commercial aircraft. Even the planned Shuttle upgrades would not change those risk comparisons by very much.
Q6&7. How safe is ''safe enough'' for Shuttle crews and passengers? If NASA determines that the Shuttle is safe enough to carry ordinary citizens into space, what is the rationale for making additional investments to upgrade the safety of the Shuttle further?
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A6&7. Transportation safety, regardless of the mode of travel, is a process of minimizing accident risk through an effective risk management program. Effective risk management requires continuous efforts to reduce accident likelihood thereby improving safety. Where reasonable and cost-effective, NASA does try to make investments to take advantage of numerous advances in areas such as propulsion, avionics, thermal protection and structures that can reduce the risk of flying beyond present levels.
By analogy, many of the commercial jet aircraft developed in the 1970s are still flying today and contain numerous safety improvements that reduce their accident risk significantly when compared to their older versions.
NASA, essentially ''competitively outsourced'' the Shuttle program when it established the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) five years ago.
Q8. What would privatizing the Shuttle accomplish beyond what has already been accomplished under the Space Flight Operations Contract?
A8. Space Shuttle competitive sourcing could potentially lead to fewer NASA civil servants engaging in operational activities, freeing up resources for research and development activities. Cost savings over the current Shuttle budget run out are not anticipated, however, a key benefit of competitive sourcing is that potential continued cost growth for Shuttle operations could be avoided by moving to a private organization that has greater flexibility to make business decisions that increase efficiency. A Business Review Team, comprised of industry experts from a variety of disciplines, including insurance, investment, financial, and technical fields, is performing a study that will identify various business options and their potential benefits for the Space Shuttle.
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Q9. Do you believe there are significant additional cost savings that would be realized beyond those achieved under the SFOC if you privatized the Shuttle? If so, what are they, and what is the analytical basis for your conclusion?
A9. Cost savings over the current Shuttle budget run out are not anticipated, however, a key benefit of competitive sourcing is that potential continued cost growth for Shuttle operations could be avoided by moving to a private organization that has greater flexibility to make business decisions that increase efficiency.
At the Science Committee's February 27th hearing, the NASA Administrator stated that no decisions would be made about privatizing the Shuttle until the fall. However, NASA has just released on its procurement website the agency's planned ''International Space Station Contract Consolidation Strategy'' for contractor comments. The Contracting Strategy states that ''a privatized Shuttle vehicle'' is assumed.
Q10&11. This sounds like NASA has already made its decision, the Administrator's testimony to this Committee notwithstanding. Have you made a decision to ''privatize'' the Shuttle? If so, when was this done? If not, why are you issuing procurement notices that assume that you will?
A10&11. No decision has been made concerning Space Shuttle competitive sourcing. An early release of the contracting strategy document did have this statement included. However, all references to the Space Shuttle privatization were removed in the June release of the document.
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If you are planning to privatize (or ''competitively outsource'') the Shuttle program by FY 2004, you don't have any time to waste. Thus, you have to have a baseline privatization concept and implementation plan in mind already.
Q12. What is NASA's Shuttle privatization concept?
A12. If NASA decides to embrace Space Shuttle competitive sourcing, we will develop an appropriate schedule, which maintains Space Shuttle safety and includes such a plan into the Agency's budget request.
Q13. What is NASA's proposed implementation plan for privatizing the Shuttle, including specific milestones?
A13. NASA has made no decision concerning Space Shuttle competitive sourcing, but we are examining the draft business options developed by the Business Review Team to determine what competitive sourcing options makes sense for the Space Shuttle program.
Q14. Do you believe that you need any legislative authority to privatize the Shuttle, or do you believe you can do it without explicit Congressional consent?
A14. The Business Review Team is assessing legislative and policy changes that may be required for implementation of various new business models for competitive sourcing within the Shuttle program. Once the study is complete, NASA will be in a position to more fully consider what, if any, legislative proposals would be necessary if we adopted Space Shuttle competitive sourcing. NASA will work closely with Congress if we decide to implement Space Shuttle competitive sourcing.
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Q15. If you do not know the answers to these questions now, when will you be able to provide them to this Committee?
A15. If NASA decides to institute competitive sourcing for the Space Shuttle, we will consult with Congress, providing detailed information on the potential plan and implementation milestones.
Questions submitted by Representative George R. Nethercutt
Q1. Does a decision to extend Shuttle life to 2020 alter the decision-making associated with safety upgrades?
A1. The Associate Administrator of Space Flight has directed the Space Shuttle program manager, in a memo dated March 25, 2002, to identify investments that may be required to maintain the Space Shuttle fleet capability to fly safely through 2020. The Space Shuttle program is currently conducting an assessment that will identify human capital requirements in addition to candidates for flight hardware upgrades, ground support equipment, and infrastructure. NASA management will review the program's assessment later this year. No commitment or decision has been made by NASA regarding Shuttle activities beyond 2012.
Q2. Eight projects were identified for funding in the March 2000 Initial Safety Upgrade Plan. Were there other potential upgrades that didn't make that cut? Please identify those other potential upgrades for the record.
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A2. Based on the initial $1.6 billion budget allocation for Safety upgrades there were no other potential upgrades.
Q3. Is NASA considering options for restoring these upgrades, assuming that the Shuttle operational life will be extended?
A3. NASA is currently assessing all of the Space Shuttle's candidates for hardware upgrades, infrastructure, obsolescence investments, as well as reviewing human capital needs to operate the Shuttle beyond 2012. The primary objective of this activity is to recommend how to maintain a safe, reliable Space Shuttle transportation system through 2020, if needed. NASA will review a recommended list of investments later this year. No decisions have been made to extend Shuttle operations beyond 2012.
Q4. What is the cost of restoring all deferred upgrades in FY 2003?
A4. The historical funding originally assessed for deferred Shuttle Upgrades is no longer relevant due to changing technical and financial requirements, so each deleted or deferred upgrade would have to be reassessed if restored.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
In response to my questions regarding the fate of the X–38 Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) project, NASA has provided a fact sheet that states that ''NASA X–38/CRV Project has developed a plan for an orderly shutdown'' and that ''CAV requirements are being incorporated into Crew Transfer Vehicle trade studies as a part of NASA's Strategic Launch Initiative (SLI) Program.''
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Q1. Mr. Venneri's testimony indicated that the earliest that an operational vehicle will be available under the SLI program is 2011–2012. Is that NASA's timetable for meeting the CRV requirements? If not, please indicate in specific terms how you would meet those CRV requirements any earlier under your proposed approach?
A1. At this time there are no additional crew rescue requirements beyond those necessary to support the baseline complement of three ISS crew members. Our major objective from an engineering and operations standpoint is to safely and successfully accomplish the construction of the International Space Station to U.S. Core Complete and be ready for the integration of the International Partner elements. Enhancements beyond the Core Complete will be dependent on several factors, the primary ones being the results of the on going ReMAP (Research Maximization and Prioritization) effort and the independent cost assessments activities.
The Administrator has established a logical process for prioritizing Space Station science requirements, and gaining confidence in our cost estimating ability. When these processes have been completed and evaluated, NASA will be in the position to look at a forward action plan to determine the type and extent of enhancements to the Station beyond U.S. Core Complete. A crew rescue capability is a logical part of that decision package.
Q2. It would appear that the International Space Station (ISS) will have to depend on the Soyuz crew return capability for another ten years under NASA's plan. Is that correct? If not, how long would the ISS be dependent on Soyuz? How many Soyuz would be required during that period, and what would be the estimated cost?
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A2. The ISS Program will require the Russian Soyuz spacecraft for crew rescue capability until another crew rescue capability is provided. The Space Launch Initiative is currently reviewing requirements and feasibility to provide a crew rescue function using the CTV and the impacts and risks of accelerating that schedule.
The current Soyuz spacecraft has an on-orbit life design limitation of six months. Since it is currently undetermined how long NASA would actually require the Soyuz to serve in the crew rescue function, the total number of spacecraft cannot be determined. NASA and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) have an agreement, signed on June 11, 1996, in which Russia has agreed to provide 11 Soyuz vehicles for crew return. Under the currently agreed assembly sequence, the 11th Soyuz crew return vehicle will return to Earth in 2006.
While we have some current indications of the likely Russian pricing of the current version of the Soyuz spacecraft, it would be premature to base any out-year estimates on that data.
Q3. It is our understanding that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the European Space Agency (ESA) and the German Space Agency (DLR) commits NASA, to provide data from the space flight test of the X–38/CRV flight test vehicle in exchange for the hardware provided by ESA/DLR. Is that correct? If so, how does NASA, intend to meet its MOU commitment in light of its planned shutdown of the X–38 program?
A3. NASA, has two bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with ESA and DLR for participation in the X–38 Project. Both of these are cooperative agreements, under which each side commits to the provision of certain items to the other. The provision of data from the planned flight of V201 on the Shuttle, as well as data from the integration and testing of ESA and DLR-provided elements on other flight vehicles, to ESA and DLR was one of the major quid pro quos under the two agreements. NASA has already provided some data from early test flights and from the integration of those ESA and DLR-provided elements. Further data will be generated as a part of the orderly shutdown of the X–38 Project.
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Now that we have notified Congress of the shutdown, we are formally notifying ESA and DLR of our intent to terminate the two bilateral MOUs on X–38 participation. Pursuant to the MOUs, we will consult with ESA and DLR, and if appropriate, negotiate a termination agreement. These consultations will set forth any agreements that may be reached on future cooperation in consideration of the cancellation of the X–38 test flight. It would be premature to speculate what other types of arrangements may be reached with ESA and DLR as we negotiate the termination of the MOUs.
Questions submitted by Representative Gary G. Miller
Q1. In the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) annual report dated March 2002, the panel concluded that the current and proposed Space Shuttle safety and supportability upgrades budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk levels of operating the Space Shuttle or the ISS. Given the potential that the Space Shuttle may have to continue to fly safely for the next twenty years to support the ISS and allow the follow-on system to become operational, what are NASA's current long range plans to insure that the Space Shuttle operates safely and at the lowest operational cost?
A1. The Space Shuttle fleet is safe to fly. NASA invests in two types of upgrades (safety and supportability) to ensure the future operability and safety of the Shuttle. Safety upgrades to Space Shuttle systems encompass design, manufacturing, and process changes that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate significant hazards and critical failure modes. In aggregate, the objective is to significantly increase the overall reliability of the system. Supportability upgrades provide replacement systems for those existing systems which are becoming obsolete and which will not reliably support Space Shuttle operations in the coming years.
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Investments in Shuttle upgrades are coordinated with other NASA space transportation investments through NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP). ISTP lays out NASA's plan for transitioning from the Space Shuttle to safer, lower cost, privately operated vehicles by next decade. NASA's FY 2003 request supports this plan and includes $2 billion from FY 2003 to FY 2007 for Space Shuttle supportability upgrades, safety upgrades, infrastructure revitalization, and reserves. As progress is made in developing new launch vehicles, ISTP will be reviewed and updated and adjustments made in Shuttle upgrades planning at future intervals.
In addition to these activities, NASA is also examining competitive sourcing activities for the Shuttle; consistent with the President's Management Agenda that will ensure safe operation of the Space Shuttle.
Q2. Given the conclusions of the ASAP, can you explain to the committee why the NASA, Space Shuttle upgrades budget is being reduced some 43 percent for the 2002–2006 time period in the FY 2003 budget?
A2. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) cancelled, deferred and reduced safety and supportability upgrades due to technology immaturity, schedule slippages and cost growth in individual upgrade projects. Therefore, NASA redirected these funds to mitigate Space Shuttle operational increases, such as contractor rate increases, and other needs, such as infrastructure revitalization. The SSP has extensive process controls in place to minimize risk during flight and ground operations of these systems. The risk from existing systems that would have been mitigated by the cancelled or deferred upgrades is controlled and manageable.
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Q3. I understand that NASA may be conducting and/or planning to conduct a full Space Shuttle system study of which enhancements and/or upgrades need to be made to the Space Shuttle fleet to keep it flying until 2020. Further, I understand that such a study may take into consideration the replacement of Space Shuttle subsystems that acre beyond their useful life and/or cannot be replaced (obsolete) and the needed improvement to the existing Space Shuttle infrastructure. Is my characterization of this study correct?
A3. Yes, NASA is currently assessing Space Shuttle upgrade candidates and workforce competencies for Shuttle operations beyond 2012. However, no decision has been made to extend Shuttle operations beyond 2012.
Q3a. What is the schedule for reporting out the results of such a study?
A3a. If NASA determines that the Shuttle should fly beyond 2012, the results of the 2020 assessment will be factored into the FY 2004 budget process over the next few months.
Q3b. How would a revised, long-term Shuttle upgrades program be integrated with the existing program?
A3b. If Shuttle flies beyond 2012, an integration strategy will be determined after results of the 2020 assessment are complete.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Richard D. Blomberg, Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
The NASA Administrator has announced his commitment to reinstating the ''Teacher in Space'' program, which was cancelled after teacher Christa McAuliffe was killed in the Challenger explosion in 1986. In addition, NASA's draft commercial strategy proposes to establish a program to allow ordinary citizens to fly on the Shuttle. According to NASA's analyses, the Space Shuttle currently has a loss of crew probability over the course of a mission of 1 in 265, which is significantly higher than that faced by crews on combat aircraft and orders of magnitude higher than the risks faced by passengers on commercial aircraft. Even the planned Shuttle upgrades would not change those risk comparisons by very much.
How safe is ''safe enough'' for Shuttle crews and passengers?
If NASA determines that the Shuttle is safe enough to carry ordinary citizens into space, what is the rationale for making additional investments to upgrade the safety of the Shuttle further?
A. Transportation safety, regardless of the mode of travel, is actually a process of minimizing accident risk through an effective risk management program. No specific level of risk is ever sufficient or ''safe enough'' for any mode, including the Space Shuttle. Effective risk management requires continuous efforts to reduce accident likelihood thereby improving safety.
As the question points out, human travel into space is one of the highest risk forms of transportation. The risk of launching into a hostile environment using seven million pounds of thrust will never approach that of flying in the atmosphere in a commercial transport. Astronauts who choose to fly on the Space Shuttle are aware of the risks and accept them as part of their job just as military pilots accept the fact that they fly at a higher level of risk than do commercial passengers. America is fortunate to have astronauts who are willing to accept reasonable risks in order to advance space exploration and scientific experimentation. In return, it is the responsibility of our society to ensure that the risk levels the astronauts face are minimized.
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Minimizing risk in transportation, whether for Space Shuttles or commercial aircraft, requires a process of continuous improvement. Absolute risk level is not the major criterion. In essence, the prevailing risk is an inherent part of the current mission being undertaken and must be accepted by the users of the system. The important factor is that the risk being accepted is as low as can tie achieved with the prevailing state-of-the-art of technology.
The Space Shuttle was originally designed in the 1970s. Since then, there have been numerous advances in areas such as propulsion, avionics, thermal protection and structures that can reduce the risk of flying beyond the present levels. A failure to make ''additional investments to upgrade the safety of the Shuttle further'' foregoes these improvements and forces the brave women and men who choose to serve as astronauts to accept higher risk than is necessary. Also, without continuous improvement efforts, safety can be eroded by factors such as vehicle aging. By analogy, we all willingly flew on commercial jet aircraft in the 1970s and extolled their safety. Many of those aircraft are still flying. However, today's jets, whether new or upgraded older models, contain numerous safety improvements that reduce their accident risk significantly when compared to their older counterparts. In spite of these achievements, however, there are still relentless government and industry efforts to reduce further the risk of commercial flight. The Space Shuttle program must follow the same continuous improvement process lest it expose its passengers to flying at unnecessarily high risk levels.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sam Venneri, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
NASA has conducted several studies and development programs on reusable launch vehicle technologies with the Department of Defense. Mr. O'Keefe's testimony before Congress has also stated that he would hold off the Space Launch Initiative's Architecture/Systems Requirements Review scheduled for November 2002 in order to incorporate Air Force requirements into the SLI program.
Q1. Are NASA and the Air Force on-track to meet this schedule for requirements development?
A1. NASA is on track to meet the Systems Requirements Review (SRR) date in November 2002. The SLI program is working with numerous customers and stakeholders within the Agency enterprises to assess the detailed requirements for potential inclusion into the baseline program. This validation process is expected to conclude prior to the fall. In addition, program personnel are working diligently with the Air Force to develop and communicate their requirements. The Air Force recently submitted their top-level requirements and will provide detailed requirements before the end of the calendar year. NASA is currently assessing the impact of these requirements on the SLI program. As noted, the Administrator has offered to modify the Agency schedule for SLI if it would enable a partnership with the DOD. However, no decision has been made regarding whether to delay the SRR at this time.
Q2. Has the Air Force identified funds in its budget request to meet its unique requirements?
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A2. No, to the best of our knowledge the Air Force has not committed funds to meet its unique RLV requirements. The Air Force Space Command is considering funding an Analysis of Alternatives assessment regarding RLVs and the Military Space Plane as part of the proposed National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) Access-to-Space Science and Technology plan. This assessment is the key starting point for determining any future Air Force funding commitments.
Q3. If the Air Force provides NASA requirements without identifying funds to meet its unique requirements, will NASA fund technology development and demonstrations to meat Air Force unique requirements?
A3. No, NASA could not fund the US Air Force's unique requirements. NASA is using activities such as the NASA/Air Force 120-Day study to identify areas of overlap in requirements and technology needs for both government entities in the RLV arena and will use this information to help guide technology investments. However, while NASA, is encouraging an expanded RLV partnership, it cannot displace funding for NASA, needs to incorporate DOD-unique requirements.
Mr. O'Keefe testified before Congress that NASA is pursuing a multi-purpose vehicle for crew transfer and crew rescue capability.
Q4. Do you expect to reduce the NASA workforce after canceling the X–38/CRV?
A4. The Agency does not plan to reduce its total work force after termination of the X–38 Project. Civil servants currently assigned to X–38 will be reassigned to fill positions within other programs and projects, or within Center institutional offices.
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Q5. Would using the Space Shuttle to fly SLI technology demonstrators like the X–37 be consistent with Shuttle use policy? Please explain.
A5. The Shuttle Use Policy charges NASA to use the Shuttle for primary payloads that require human presence, its unique capabilities and other compelling circumstances. Secondary payloads, including technology demonstration types of payloads can be flown on a space available basis. Determinations for a specific primary payload, such as X–37, are made on a case-by-case basis. NASA's determination for flight of primary payloads is provided to the Congress on an annual basis and it documents that assignments are consistent with the Policy.
Q6. Does NASA have any plans to use the Space Shuttle as a space flight testbed for SLI technology?
A6. NASA Research Announcements for SLI have included launch opportunities for both Space Shuttle and NASA provided expendable launch services. Actual assignment and flight is dependent on the technologies selected by the SLI Program and identification of requisite launch/test opportunities. While there are no SLI technology requirements in the Shuttle launch queue at this time, there are opportunities for manifesting such requirements.
Q6a. If not, are there restrictions to using the Space Shuttle for SLI demonstrations?
A6a. While requirements for all users, including SLI, need to be consistent with the Shuttle use policy, this policy provides considerable latitude to allow NASA to engage in a wide range of demonstrations that may be required for testing reusable launch vehicle technology. While assembly of the ISS is the priority mission of the Space Shuttle until construction is complete, flight opportunities for secondary payloads are on a space available basis.
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Q6b. Have Shuttle use restrictions been clearly and consistently communicated to industry by both the Shuttle Program Office and the SLI program office?
A6b. Industry is made aware of what can and cannot fly on the Shuttle. When there is industry interest in using the Space Shuttle, NASA works closely with the interested parties to ensure that Shuttle use policies are understood. Also, NASA Research Announcements for SLI and scientific Announcements of Opportunity routinely reference NASA's Shuttle Use Policy. Space Shuttle requirements are well documented and accessible to all potential users via the Internet. NASA seeks to consistently apply the use policy across the customer community.
Both NASA HEDS and Aerospace Technology enterprises seem to have different advisory panels for space transportation to provide expert advice.
Q7. Will the Space Flight Advisory Committee review the Space Shuttle and SLI programs as an integrated space transportation plan?
A7. No, the Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC) does not currently review the SLI program. The SFAC is responsible for review of the NASA Office of Space Flight programs for the NASA Advisory Council (NAC), which includes the Space Shuttle, Space Shuttle Upgrades, Expendable Launch Vehicles and Payloads. Other transportation areas, such as SLI, are briefed by request. Since SLI is funded by the Office of Aerospace Technology, it is reviewed by the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC). The SFAC will likely become involved in review of the SLI program as SLI evolves from a technology development focus into flight vehicle design.
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Q8. What is the means of consistent information cross flow between various advisory committees for space transportation, such as the NASA Advisory Committee, Space Flight Advisory Committee, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee, the External Requirements Assessment Team, and others?
A8. The External Requirements Assessment Team (ERAT) is an independent advisory panel chartered by SLI to operate for the duration of the program. It reports directly to the SLI Program Manager, providing programmatic and strategic guidance in addition to an independent review capability. There is no formal coordination between ERAT and other agency review panels, but ERAT reports have been made available to other panels upon request.
The NASA Advisory Council (NAC) is the independent review committee reporting to the NASA Administrator responsible for review of agency's policies, programs and strategies. The NAC contains eight standing committees, including the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC) and the Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC). The ATAC is the independent oversight panel responsible for review of Office of Aerospace Technology (OAT) enterprise programs including SLI. The SFAC has a similar responsibility for Office of Space Flight (OSF) programs. The ATAC and SFAC committee chairs are both members of the NAC, which is responsible for coordination between its eight committees.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is the independent review committee reporting to the NASA Administrator responsible for monitoring safety aspects of all NASA programs. All committees have access to each of the other committee meetings and reports. This access is welcomed and has been exercised in various reviews of NASA programs.
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Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. The NASA Administrator has stated his interest in working with DOD on reusable launch vehicles. What specifically is planned, and how will it affect the program you have testified about today?
A1. NASA is collaborating on several studies and development programs for reusable launch vehicle technologies with the Department of Defense. The National Aerospace Initiative (NAI), which covers air-breathing hypersonics, access to space, and space technology, represents a joint effort between NASA and the Air Force to leverage funding from each agency to satisfy military and NASA space-related requirements. The draft Access-to-Space Science and Technology Plan has been jointly developed by the Director Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), the Air Force, and NASA, emphasizing rocket-based two-stage to orbit development.
NASA and the Air Force completed a 120-day study in early 2002 that led to an agreement to cooperate in the NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program. Follow-up activities are continuing to determine the appropriate level of interagency cooperation. Several areas of technology overlap have been identified, which could maximize both Air Force and NASA investments.
The Space Launch Initiative has a program requirement of a 1 in 10,000 probability of loss of a crew. That is a very ambitious requirement.
Q2. How did NASA determine that requirement?
A2. The 1-in-10,000 probability of loss of a crew is a goal, not a requirement, for a future space transportation system. It resulted from the joint NASA/Aerospace industry Space Transportation Architecture Studies (STAS). In the fall of 1998, the STAS process enabled industry partners to develop concepts to meet NASA's mission needs on commercially viable, privately operated vehicles. Based on these concepts, the SLI program set the 1-in-10,000 safety goal. The SLI program is developing requirements for a future space transportation system as knowledge gained from architecture studies and risk reduction activities informs our analysis. The actual safety requirements developed under SLI are designed to be a substantial improvement over the Space Shuttle's, one of 250 chance of crew loss, but may be higher or lower than the 1-in-10,000 goal.
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Q3. Has NASA done any analysis of the impact of that requirement on the development cost and technological complexity of the proposed new reusable launch vehicle? If so, what was the result, and if not, why not?
A3. Yes. The impact of different requirements, including SLI program goals, on the overall cost to develop and operate a future space transportation system is under review by multiple teams, including internal and external members. An independent group, the Space Launch Initiative Cost Credibility Team, formed in February 2002, has been chartered to review the current state of cost effectiveness for development, production, and operations in the aerospace industry and formulate recommendations for applying the findings to the life cycle cost estimates for future vehicles. The team includes members of the MSFC (Marshall Space Flight Center) SLI program office, MSFC Systems Management Office (SMO), NASA IPAO, Department of Defense, Aerospace Corporation, Rand Corporation, Institute for Defense Analysis, and the COTRs (Contract Officer's Technical Representatives) for each Integrated Architecture team.
The team is collecting the data from each industry-led architecture development team to serve as the basis for the initial estimates. The preliminary estimates will be completed in time to support the Non-Advocate Review (NAR). The estimates for full-scale development will be directly dependent upon the results of the systems requirements review process and the awards from the RFP (Request for Proposals) scheduled for late next calendar year.
Concurrent with the SLI Independent Cost Team, the Systems Engineering and Integration Office is developing a ''bottoms-up'' cost and schedule estimate on the basis of the system design fidelity. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for the investment decisions in the SLI program's risk reduction activities. Preliminary results of this cost estimate will be completed in time to support the Non-Advocate Review. The estimates will be updated as the technologies mature and the requirements are updated and refined.
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Q4. How will NASA be able to demonstrate that its reusable launch vehicle design will meet that requirement?
A4. The SLI systems engineering team employs cutting-edge analysis tools and rigorous processes to ensure that every investment significantly contributes to the Program's overall goals of substantially reducing the technical and business risks associated with redefining our nation's space launch capabilities. The SLI systems engineering philosophy ensures that the technologies developed—such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, dependable crew escape and survival systems, and robust thermal protection materials—will synergistically integrate into the optimum space transportation architecture design chosen for full-scale development. SLI is building a knowledge management capability based on real-world data received from its nationwide contractors and the NASA Centers involved in this work. Therefore, requirements are checked through the program's series of comprehensive reviews such as the Interim Architecture and Technology Review conducted in March 2002. Because of the program's philosophy of agile acquisitions, the content has been, and will continue to be, adjusted to bring it in line with critical requirements, such as safety, reliability, and affordability. Also, flight demonstrators, such as the X–37, will test engineering theory in real-world flight environments to validate ground testing.
NASA's requirement for the second-generation reusable launch vehicle (RLV) is $1,000 per pound to orbit.
Q5. How was that requirement derived?
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A5. Again, $1,000-per-pound-to-orbit is an SLI goal, not a future space transportation system requirement, resulting from the same joint NASA/aerospace industry Space Transportation Architecture Studies (STAS) conducted in the fall of 1998 that was discussed in question 2 concerning the overall safety goal. The objective of the Space Launch Initiative is to develop the architectures and technologies necessary to reach these cost and safety goals and understand where system requirements may need to differ from these goals if architectures and technologies cannot reasonably meet them.
Q6. Does that require a specific flight rate be achieved for the new RLV? If so, what rate would be required? What other assumptions are included in the requirement?
A6. The final cost per pound is directly related to launch rate for analysis of comparable systems. However the final specific rate to close the business case of an operational launch architecture is only one of numerous variables. The launch rate used to calculate cost per pound to orbit depends upon the particular architecture concept. Other variables include, but are not limited to payload volume, crewed vs. non-crewed systems, propellant combinations for booster and secondary propulsion systems, launch site and operations.
Q7. What would be the impact on the cost and technological complexity of the RLV development program if that requirement were relaxed-has NASA done the sensitivity analysis?
A7. The sensitivity studies are part of the ISAT (Integrated Systems Analysis Team) analysis currently underway. The preliminary results will be available to support the System Requirement Review (SRR) planned for later this year. The level of impact is architecture and mission specific.
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Questions submitted by Representative George R. Nethercutt
Q1. Assuming Shuttle can be safely operated until 2020, and that the design contemplated for SLI will be less capable than the Shuttle, with a smaller payload, a smaller crew and a shorter mission duration, what is the need to rush the decision on a second generation RLV that will cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars?
A1. NASA was chartered to be an R&D endeavor not an operational agency. NASA currently spends almost a third of its budget on space transportation costs, mostly on the Space Shuttle operations. These are funds that are not available to pursue NASA's core missions in science research, technology development, and exploration. It is important for NASA to reduce its operations costs so that resources can be focused on NASA's core R&D activities.
In the Space Station era, not all of the capabilities of the Space Shuttle are required or desirable. The Space Shuttle has historically provided temporary research capabilities that are similar to those that will now be provided year-round by the Space Station. While the Space Shuttle is a very capable vehicle, NASA no longer needs a temporary in-space lab that duplicates the Space Station's capabilities. Over the next decade, NASA needs to take the necessary steps to transition from the Space Shuttle to a space transportation system that can support Space Station efficiently and maximize the Station's science return.
The purpose of the SLI program is to identify and reduce the risks necessary to enable the development of a safer, less costly, commercially viable, privately operated space transportation system that can meet NASA's Space Station needs. A decision on whether to proceed with full-scale development of such a system is not scheduled until FY 2006. In the meantime, NASA is making necessary investments to maintain safe Shuttle operations through 2012. NASA coordinates SLI and Space Shuttle investments through its Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which are updated annually. As part of the current ISTP update, options are being developed which provide the flexibility to fly the Space Shuttle beyond 2012.
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Q2. When will technology for the SLI vehicle be frozen?
A2. The baseline program will advance and demonstrate technologies until the full-scale development decision in FY 2006.
Q3. Does NASA expect to have sufficient confidence in the technology to enable an early freeze on technology development?
A3. The Agency does not consider FY 2006 to be an early freeze of technology development toward an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a new space transportation system by early next decade. The SLI program is performing architecture definition studies and has implemented technology development and risk reduction activities in the technical fields that are critical to making a decision on whether to proceed with Full Scale Development in FY 2006.
Q4. What is NASA's objection to further validating technologies and pushing back IOC as the Space Transportation Subcommittee has suggested?
A4. The full recommendation by the Space Transportation Subcommittee actually included an earlier full-scale development decision date than the SLI baseline program. This would require a freeze on the technology development program earlier than current SLI plans. NASA intends to reassess its overall space transportation strategy, including any implementation decision for the SLI program, on an annual basis as part of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. A decision on whether to proceed with full scale development of a new system will only be made after the necessary risk reduction and architecture development activities have been completed.
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Q5. The Space Transportation Subcommittee suggested that NASA should dramatically reduce expectations for cost-reduction and safety improvement for the SLI program. Has NASA recalculated expected Return on Investment for SLI using the downwardly revised numbers suggested by the Space Transportation Subcommittee? Considering life cycle costs for the Shuttle fleet and the fact that the Shuttle fleet has 300 missions remaining within its design life, and assuming a total program cost for SLI of $30 billion with the current schedule, please indicate when NASA would expect to see a positive return on investment from the SLI program.
A5. NASA is conducting an evaluation of its overall space transportation strategy as part of this years update to the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. This includes assessing the cost and safety implications of extending Shuttle operations beyond 2012 as well as evaluating the predicted development and life-cycle operating costs of a new space transportation system.
NASA must balance the considerable design life left for the airframes of the Space Shuttle orbiters against the total Space Shuttle system's significant replacement and obsolescence costs. On the other hand, the total cost of a new space transportation system has not been determined yet as SLI has risk reduction, architecture study, and requirements trade activities still to complete. These are factors that will be included in any return on investment analysis supporting changes to NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Finally, while Return on Investment will be an important parameter in making the decision on whether to proceed with full-scale development of a new space transportation system, NASA will also need to take other factors into consideration such as safety and reliability.
Q6. The SLI vehicle is largely intended to serve as a taxi for crew and cargo between Earth and Station. If we accept criticisms that SLI will not meet its ambitious cost and safety targets on its presently rushed schedule, doesn't it make more sense to consider economical alternatives? Has NASA considered abbreviating current SLI studies and simply proceeding with a design to add crew and cargo vehicles on top of presently available expendable boosters? Please explain.
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A6. NASA is considering several alternatives to meeting its space transportation needs as part of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan update study. This includes evaluating the viability of crew and/or cargo transport to the Space Station using Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs). ELVs could provide an interim capability, including supporting ISS crew rescue requirements. If an ELV system were exercised, the development of a Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle would likely be delayed from the current Integrated Space Transportation Plan and risk reduction activities continued at a lower level to enable eventual implementation of a new launcher while an ELV-based crew and cargo transport vehicle is developed. If crews were to be transported on an ELV, human rating of such a vehicle would have to ensure safety requirements equal to or surpass the Shuttle.
Q7. One of the deferred shuttle safety upgrades was Phase II funding for the Space Shuttle Main Engine Advanced Health Management System. Phase II funding was not budgeted for FY 2003 because these technologies are also being considered for SLI. What is the status for funding for Phase II within SLI?
A7. Technology development for vehicle and engine health management systems is being funded as part of SLI as it applies to a new space transportation system with potential applicability to Shuttle. Specific funding for the Shuttle Advanced Health Management System is being reevaluated as part of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan update study.
Questions submitted by Representative Gary G. Miller
The Congressional Research Services (CRS) Analysis of the NASA Budget points out that the greatest NASA challenge with the SLI program will be establishing credibility with the Congress that the program can transition from technology risk reduction to low cost launch vehicle development on schedule. Previous history has shown us that cost and schedule promises for the development of launch vehicle systems have not been met. The ability of a second generation launch vehicle system to meet its promised operational readiness date will be especially important given the necessity of such a vehicle to provide continued support to the International Space Station (ISS).
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Q1. What safeguards/assurances have been put into place to insure that, if the Nation makes a commitment to a second generation launch system and begins to phase out the existing Space Shuttle, that the proposed cost and schedule for the second generation launch system will be met?
A1. The Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program philosophy relies heavily on lessons learned from past NASA and aerospace successes and failures. Experienced personnel in the fields of accounting, management, and technology are leaders of this nationwide program. SLI is more than a hardware development program; rather, it is looking at how to optimize the space transportation business for NASA science and exploration missions, as well as encourage private industry prosperity in this time of flat commercial launch markets. As part of the program's overriding philosophy, accountability reviews are conducted monthly to aggressively manage cost and schedule. With this culture firmly in place, the program is positioned to deliver a new national space transportation capability within cost and on schedule.
The vehicle development effort that is planned to follow the SLI will be tasked with the development and operation of the next generation reusable launch vehicle architecture. NASA coordinates SLI and Space Shuttle investments through an Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which is currently being reviewed and updated. The ISTP update is evaluating multiple options for the phasing out of the Shuttle as a new system becomes operational. The Shuttle will not be completely phased out until the new system has been adequately demonstrated for safe and reliable operation.
The current NASA estimate for the development of a government funded second generation launch vehicle is in the $10 billion range (in addition to the $5 billion being spent on SLI). This cost estimate seems to take into consideration only the cost of the launch vehicle development and not the cost of the infrastructure that would be needed to support its operational life.
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Q2. Is the $10 billion cost estimate only for the development of the launch vehicle?
A2. It is premature to estimate infrastructure and operational costs for SLI until full scale development costs are determined. The SLI program is conducting technology development and architecture studies to determine the viability of developing a Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle that can dramatically improve life cycle costs and safety over the Shuttle. These studies are not sufficiently advanced to provide a definitive development cost assessment. The $10 billion figure should be viewed as a rough order of magnitude only, at this time. As key technologies are matured and Level I requirements are validated, the program will continue to refine the cost estimates for full-scale development. The initial estimates will be completed later this year in time to support the Systems Requirements Review, with an ultimate target of having sufficient confidence in the technology readiness and cost estimate to make a decision on whether to proceed with Full Scale Development in 2006. NASA recognizes that this development cost must also include the infrastructure cost needed to support vehicle operations.
Q3. If so, what is the current estimate of the additional funding that would be needed to build and maintain the launch and payload processing infrastructure required for an operational second generation launch system?
A3. Please refer to the response to question 2. NASA is currently reviewing the SLI program and intends to have an initial estimate of the development costs in time to support the Systems Requirements Review later this year. Infrastructure costs will be a part of this estimate.
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Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY GERARD W. ELVERUM
Following the hearing of April 18, Mr. Elverum asked that the following statement be submitted for the record.
Remarks Regarding the Shuttle and SLI
Hearing on April 18, 2002
I would like to respond here regarding Sam Venneri's implications in his testimony and remarks that the Space Transportation Subcommittee was recommending a front-end commitment to a ''point design.'' As I stated in my remarks, we were addressing the need for NASA to define and get a commitment to a total plan for manned launch vehicles. That plan should contain all of the activities necessary to:
1.) Upgrade and operate the Shuttle at acceptable risk uncertainty profiles throughout a period of time defined by a realistic plan to develop and fully transition to a replacement RLV.
2.) Carry out the development and introduction of additional elements of the total architecture required for manned flight operational safety. For example, a crew-escape vehicle.
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3.) Establish a real set of requirements for a RLV to replace the Shuttle. These requirements need to include:
A specific IOC date followed by a transition period before Shuttle could be removed completely from service.
A targeted total cost constraint for development, production and life-cycle operations of a new RLV based on a realistic, politically achievable funding profile. That profile must consider the funding needed to support ongoing ISS operations, and the development and operational support of the other elements in 1.) and 2.) above.
Only with such specific constraints on the trade-space can Systems Analyses be useful to screen various RLV total system concepts. Only total system concept/configurations that could be realistically expected to satisfy the programmatic needs and funding constraints should be committed to a rigorous Systems Engineering process. Again, the Systems Engineering optimization trade space would be specifically constrained by the total manned operations program requirements. One of the most important outputs of each Systems Engineering process would be definitions of those technologies crucial to each concept that do not have authoritatively validated design criteria. Those are the technologies that should be invested in under SLI.
We have been saying that in our opinion, any chance of replacing the Shuttle in the near-term (say 12 years) is dependent on a clear definition and commitment to such an overall program. We certainly have not advocated a commitment to any arbitrary point design up front. We have said that in our judgment, any new RLV system that will be able to justify confidence in achieving an IOC in say 12 years, and do so within what surly must be a very constrained resource profile, would need to be based on maximizing the use of existing elements and currently validated technologies.
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