SPEAKERS       CONTENTS       INSERTS    
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25, 2002
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Serial No. 107–68

Printed for the use of the House Committee on Science and
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM

80–340PS
2002
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

OF THE
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COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25, 2002

Serial No. 107–68

Printed for the use of the House Committee on Science and
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
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DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
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LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
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JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
RON WYDEN, Oregon
MAX CLELAND, Georgia
BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
TED STEVENS, Alaska
CONRAD BURNS, Montana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
GORDON SMITH, Oregon
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director
MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel
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JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
ANN D. BEGEMAN, Republican Deputy Staff Director

Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

RON WYDEN, Oregon, Chairman

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
MAX CLELAND, Georgia
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
BILL NELSON, Florida

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
TED STEVENS, Alaska
CONRAD BURNS, Montana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois

JEAN TOAL EISEN, Democratic Senior Professional Staff
FLOYD DESCHAMPS, Republican Senior Professional Staff
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C O N T E N T S

June 25, 2002
    Witness List

    Hearing Charter

Opening Statements

    Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement

    Statement by Senator Ron Wyden, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
Written Statement

    Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement

    Prepared Statement by Representative Constance A. Morella, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives

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    Prepared Statement by Representative Nick Smith, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives

Witnesses

    Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb, Emeritus Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management; Emeritus Director of Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

    Dr. Richard D. Klausner, Executive Director of Global Health for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

    Joint Written Testimony of Dr. Branscomb and Dr. Klausner

Discussion
New Technology and Innovations
Under Secretary for Research and Development
Cyber Security
Security of the Energy Sector
NIST and Information Security
Recruitment/Retention of Science and Technology Professionals
First Responders
Public/Private Research Partnerships
Quick Response Capacity
Psychological Aspect of ''Terrorism''
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Science and Technology in Identifying Priorities
Women and Minorities in Science and Technology
Local Responses
Eliminating the Source of the Threat
Openness of Information and Security Concerns
Roadblocks to Sensor Research, Development, and Deployment
Information Sharing and Foreign Scientists
Openness of Information and Security Concerns
DOE Labs and the Department of Homeland Security
Information Sharing
The Marketplace and Homeland Security
Protecting Communities
The Role of NASA in Combating Terrorism

Appendix 1: Biographies, Financial Disclosures, and Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb, Emeritus Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management; Emeritus Director of Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Biography

Dr. Richard D. Klausner, Executive Director of Global Health for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Biography

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    Joint Financial Disclosure for Dr. Branscomb and Dr. Klausner

    Joint Witness Response to Post-Hearing Questions

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

    Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2002

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2002

House of Representatives,

Committee on Science,

Joint with U.S. Senate,

Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space,

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,

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Washington, DC.

    A Joint Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m., at 2318 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert (Chairman of the House Science Committee) presiding.

80340a.eps

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

U.S. SENATE

Science and Technology

to Combat Terrorism

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TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2002

1:00 P.M.–2:30 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

    On Tuesday, June 25, 2002 at 1:00 p.m., the House Science Committee and the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation will hold a joint hearing to examine how science and technology can best be utilized to defend our nation against the threat of terrorism. The hearing will focus on a comprehensive study by the National Academy of Sciences (that will be released on the day of the hearing) on science and technology to counter terrorism. The two co-chairs of the study—entitled Making the Nation Safer: Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism—will testify at the hearing.

    The hearing will explore several overarching questions, including:

1. What kind of a research program do we need to comprehensively address the threats posed by terrorism, including bioterrorism, cyber attacks, and threats posed by nuclear and radiological devices?

2. What research and development is required to enable us to harden civilian infrastructure systems, such as communications, information, and transportation systems, against terrorist threats?
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3. How does the threat of terrorism impact research, the university environment, and the participation of foreign nationals in the American science and technology enterprise?

4. Are there avenues of research that could help us understand and counter the motives, sociology, and psychology of terrorist activity directed against the United States?

2. Background

    In December 2001, the National Academy of Sciences, using its own funds, initiated a study of science and technology to counter terrorism with the purpose of helping the Federal Government effectively mobilize the Nation's scientific and technical resources to respond to the threat of terrorism.

    The Academy assembled a committee of 24 of the Nation's leading scientific, engineering, medical, and policy experts to conduct the study. To supplement the committee's own expertise, eight panels were separately appointed and asked to provide input on the specific topics as identified in the committee's charge. The panels covered (1) biological sciences, (2) chemical issues, (3) nuclear and radiological issues, (4) information technology, (5) transportation, (6) energy facilities, cities, and fixed infrastructure, (7) behavioral, social, and institutional issues, and (8) systems analysis and systems engineering. The panels brought the expertise and experience of approximately 90 additional scientists, engineers, and medical professionals to the study.

    The focus of the Committee's work was on improving our nation's resilience to likely or emerging terrorist threats. The committee's approach was to identify current and likely threats to the Nation, understand the most likely vulnerabilities in the face of these threats, and identify opportunities for science and technology to contribute to counter-terrorism in both the near- and long-term. Such contributions can occur at any point along a time line that extends from before a terrorist act to its aftermath and includes intelligence and surveillance, prevention, protection, interdiction, response and recovery, attribution, and analysis.
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    Each panel developed a set of recommendations that ranged from long-term research and development to immediate, or near-term, deployment of existing technology or application of available knowledge. The committee also examined multidisciplinary research topics that cut across disciplines and infrastructures.

3. Witnesses

    The two co-chairs of the Academy study, will testify at the joint hearing:

Lewis M. Branscomb is the emeritus Aetna Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management and Emeritus Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program in the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Branscomb, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, has a background in physics and public policy. He was a research physicist at the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and also served as its director. He was the founder and first director of the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics at the University of Colorado and an at-large director of the Associated Universities for Research in Astronomy. He served on the President's Science Advisory Committee, where he chaired the PSAC committee on Space Science and Technology during Project Apollo. Dr. Branscomb served as vice president and chief scientist of IBM Corporation until his retirement 1986, and is a former president of both the American Physical Society and of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society.

Richard D. Klausner is Executive Director of the Global Health Programs at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Dr. Klausner, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine, is well known for his contributions to multiple aspects of cell and molecular biology and is highly cited for work in biology and biomedical research. His work has been recognized with numerous honors and awards including the Outstanding Investigator Award from the American Federation of Clinical Research and the William Damashek Prize for Major Discoveries in Hematology. Dr. Klausner was chief of the Cell Biology and Metabolism branch of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development from 1984 until 1997, and director of the National Cancer Institute from 1995 until 2001. He has served on numerous advisory committees, including chair of an NRC project charged with writing standards for science education for the United States from kindergarten through 12th grade. Dr. Klausner is the past President of the American Society for Clinical Investigation and is the author of over 280 scientific articles and several books.
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    Chairman BOEHLERT. Come to order. Before we start with my opening statement and that of Senator Wyden, I want to acknowledge in our presence 15 young people from the Herkimer County, New York Junior Police Academy. They are on either side of the aisle. These are young people who are very concerned about public safety and securing our nation's future, so we are glad to have them here with us. Welcome.

    It is a pleasure to welcome everyone here today for the first of two hearings the Science Committee will hold in preparation for drafting our portions of the bill to set up a Department of Homeland Security. Thursday morning we will be hearing from Administration witnesses, but these hearings build of course on work we have done throughout the Congress on security issues, particularly on cyber security. And I am especially pleased to have next to me today my partner in crime, or should I say crime prevention when it comes to cyber security, Senator Ron Wyden. We have worked closely with Senator Wyden and Senator Allen on Cyber Security Legislation, and I'm delighted we are able to hold today's hearing jointly with the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space.

    The fact that this is a Joint Hearing underscores the importance we both give to the report from the academies that we are reviewing today and to the nexus between R&D and Homeland Defense generally. Indeed, I think I think the most important conclusion to take away from this report is that R&D is a critical aspect of Homeland Defense. That may seem like an obvious point, but it is one that often gets obscured in discussions of counter terrorism strategy, as we understandably focus on direct and immediate steps that must be taken, like improving border control.

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    The Committee's task, our duty really is to assure that R&D stays high on the Homeland Defense agenda. That means that any Department of Homeland Security must have the expertise, the scientific heft, the mind set and the resources to develop and implement an R&D strategy to counter terrorism. As I have said repeatedly, the War on Terrorism, like the Cold War, will be won in the laboratory as much as on the battlefield. That means that, as in the Cold War, we must properly organize our Government to put the most into and get the most out of academic, Government and industry laboratories.

    For starters, we have to be sure that there is a clear focus on and locus for research in the Department of Homeland Security. We are still working through exactly how to accomplish that, but I suspect we will change the organizational structure that the Administration has proposed. Most likely, we will create a top level position and a clearly defined unit relating to research and development.

    We will also take a close look at the proposal we will hear about today to create a non-Governmental institute to assist the Department however its R&D efforts are organized. We will also have to make sure that the Department has a broad portfolio of research from long-term basic research to short-term efforts that can accelerate the deployment of counter-terrorism tools that are already under development.

    When we look for ideas on how to set up the new Department, we cannot just look at one Federal Agency, say DARPA or NSF or even DOE as a model. We need to look across the entire Federal research enterprise and draw on many approaches at once. I think we should be clear that no one is suggesting locating all Federal R&D related to Homeland Defense in the new Department. That would be extremely unwise and probably impossible. But the Department and the Office of Homeland Security will have to coordinate research throughout the Government.
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    At the same time, we need to assure that the Federal Government continues to support a rich mix of research, much of it is investigator initiated, that can thrive in an open environment. We cannot allow our legitimate concerns about homeland security to result in a national research agenda that is overly directed toward narrow concerns, or one that is hobbled by excessive secrecy. Finding that balance is no mean trick and in general, it cannot be legislated. So we have our work cut out for us in very little time.

    The Science Committee will meet the House leadership's deadline of forwarding a proposal by July 12. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, some of the most prominent experts in the country on science and science policy, on how to finish that on time. Thank you and now I'm pleased to recognize my distinguished colleague, Chairman Wyden.

    [The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT

    It's a pleasure to welcome everyone here today for the first of two hearings the Science Committee will hold in preparation for drafting our portions of the bill to set up a Department of Homeland Security. Thursday morning we'll be hearing from Administration witnesses. Both these hearings build, of course, on work we've done throughout this Congress on security issues, particularly on cyber security.

    And I'm especially pleased to have next to me today, my partner in crime—or I should say crime prevention—when it comes to cyber security, Senator Ron Wyden. We have worked closely with Senator Wyden and Senator Allen on cyber security legislation, and I'm delighted we're able to hold today's hearing jointly with the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space.
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    The fact that this is a joint hearing underscores the importance we give both to the report from the Academies that we're reviewing today, and to the nexus between R&D and homeland defense, generally.

    Indeed, I think the most important conclusion to take away from this report is that R&D is a critical aspect of homeland defense. That may seem like an obvious point, but it's one that often gets obscured in discussions of counter-terrorism strategy, as we understandably focus on direct and immediate steps that must be taken, like improving border control.

    This Committee's task—our duty, really—is to ensure that R&D stays high on the homeland defense agenda.

    That means that any Department of Homeland Security must have the expertise, the scientific heft, the mindset and the resources to develop and implement an R&D strategy to counter terrorism. As I've said repeatedly, the war on terrorism, like the Cold War, will be won in the laboratory as much as on the battlefield. That means that, as in the Cold War, we must properly organize our government to put the most into, and get the most out of our academic, government and industry laboratories.

    For starters, we have to be sure that there is a clear focus on—and locus for—research in the Department of Homeland Security. We're still working through exactly how to accomplish that, but I suspect we will change the organizational structure that the Administration has proposed. Most likely, we will create a top-level position and a clearly defined unit relating to R&D. We'll also take a close look at the proposal we'll hear about today to create a non-governmental institute to assist the Department, however its R&D efforts are organized.
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    We will also have to make sure that the Department has a broad portfolio of research—from long-term basic research to short-term efforts that can accelerate the deployment of counter-terrorism tools that are already under development. When we look for ideas on how to set up the new Department, we can't look just at one Federal agency, say DARPA or NSF or even DOE, as a model; we need to look across the entire Federal research enterprise and draw on many approaches at once.

    I think we should be clear that no one is suggesting locating all federal R&D related to homeland defense in the new Department. That would be extremely unwise, and probably impossible. But the Department and the Office of Homeland Security will have to coordinate research throughout the government.

    At the same time, we need to ensure that the Federal Government continues to support a rich mix of research, much of it investigator-initiated, that can thrive in an open environment. We can't allow our legitimate concerns about homeland security to result in a national research agenda that is overly directed toward narrow concerns or one that is hobbled by excessive secrecy. Finding that balance is no mean trick, and, in general, it cannot be legislated.

    So, we have our work cut out for us, and very little time. The Science Committee will meet the House Leadership's deadline of forwarding a proposal by July 12th. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, some of the most prominent experts in the country on science and science policy, for advice on how to race to that finish line. Thank you. Chairman Wyden.
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STATEMENT OF RON WYDEN, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

    Senator WYDEN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and it is a real pleasure to be here with you. We have had a chance to team up on a whole host of issues; cyber security issues, mobilizing the science and technology sector. So it is just a great pleasure to be with you, and how you and I have felt if you want to get anything important done in this town, it has got to be bipartisan, and that is the way we have gone about business. And I also, before I give my opening statement, want to give a special hello to my old friend, Ralph Hall. He and I sat next to each other for 15 years in the Energy and Commerce Committee, and it is great to be with you, Ralph and I don't want to even go into the stories. I just appreciate being with you.

    Let us turn, colleagues, to developing technologies that help America get a jump on the terrorists and disrupt their network is critically important to this country. And I want to make just three points with respect to what I think it is going to take to get a jump on the terrorists. First, it seems to me we need a technology roadmap that can strengthen our capacity to fight terrorism. And here we ought to be focusing on everything from the simple sounding chore of improving the government's e-mail capability to the exotic science of identifying new bioterror pathogens.

    Second, I believe our government must do a much more aggressive job of capping the technology treasure-trove that resides within our private industry sector. More than anything, this stands out on the basis of the work that we've done, Mr. Chairman, because the terrorists are not technological simpletons. Right now, they are out there trying to figure out what the state of the art is in the private commercial world, and for our government to stay ahead of them, there must be a closer alignment between our government and the private sector. It seems to me that leaders of the technology field in the private sector must constantly be in the position of furnishing government their ideas and suggestions for winning this war.
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    Third, a new generation of technology experts has to be cultivated to meet future threats. The dearth of science and technology students in our schools today signals a major problem for tomorrow. I am especially troubled at how few women are going into the field. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that of the two million scientists and engineers working in the United States, only 10 percent are women. I want to grow the number of women in science in technology and grow the number of scientists and technologists in this country overall. It seems to me we have got to produce enough experts to win this fight, and that is why it is going to be important to get more women to go into the field.

    First with respect to the technology roadmap, the report today is a major step in identifying how to do that. It helps us to locate the roadblocks that we need to address. Roadblocks, in my view, work both ways. We have got to make sure that we keep the terrorists out, and we have got to make sure we remove roadblocks and impediments to our winning this fight. The National Academies jumped in quickly after the events of September 11. We look forward to their testimony with respect to those points.

    Second, with respect to the private sector, here we are going to have to look at products ranging from sensors that would detect and identify biological agents to inter-operable communications technology that enables first responders from different jurisdictions to talk to each other at a disaster site. What was striking is when private sector leaders wanted to help after 9/11, and you look at a company like Intel, a major employer in my state that sent people and equipment to New York, the private sector was not even in a position to tap those resources.

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    So my view is we have got to use technology to fight fire with fire, securing computer and communication systems from cyber terrorists and detecting cyber intruders. You and I, Mr. Chairman, have teamed up on legislation to support basic cyber security research. My hope is that bipartisan legislation is going to get to the President's desk and get to the President's desk soon.

    In addition to that, it seems to me that we ought to be making it clear that mobilizing the private sector does not mean spending vast sums of money, but largely uses the Government as a coordinating tool to tap the energy and talents of the private sector. Towards this end, I have introduced legislation establishing National Emergency Technology Guard, a Net Guard, and I was glad to see this idea echoed in a report that is presented today. Between page 5 and 8 of the report, it says, and I quote, ''In the short term, a practical option for providing emergency operational support would be to exploit IT expertise in the private sector, much as the Armed Services draw on the private sector—the National Guard and Reserve Forces—to augment active duty forces during emergencies.''

    I don't want to accuse Dr. Klausner of being lobbied on this point so that there would be some attention to it, but I think he and I understand that there is an opportunity to mobilize a whole generation raised on these important technologies, and I am grateful that he has put a focus on that issue as well.

    I also look forward to discussing the Homeland Security Institute, because one purpose of that Institute mirrors another part of our legislation, and that would be to create a test bed for new technologies. As we know, after 9/11, the Federal Government was flooded with thousands and thousands of proposals, unsolicited, for new products and new ideas, and yet there was no central place to have these products evaluated. We have included that in the Net Guard Legislation, and I intend to work in consultation with the Bush Administration, with Chairman Boehlert and all concerned, so that by the end of the markup of Homeland Security Legislation, we can say to every entrepreneur and every technology leader in this country that you can go to one place in the Federal Government, one place and get a review of your products and your ideas. And from that place, you will be in a position to have your ideas evaluated.
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    Finally with respect to the last point, growing a new generation of experts to meet the terrorists threat, at a Science Subcommittee hearing on NASA and education last week, we focused at some length on this significant shortage of women with degrees in math, engineering and hard sciences. In my view, Mr. Chairman, I think we should be trying to triple the number of graduates in these overall areas, with a specific focus on women.

    Mr. Chairman, I would ask the rest of my statement be placed into the record, but I look forward to continuing our effort on a bipartisan and bicameral effort to work on these issues, and appreciate your giving us a chance to do this with you today.

    [The prepared statement of Senator Wyden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RON WYDEN

    I'm glad to be here today. There are few challenges more important than developing the technologies that can disrupt the terrorist networks that threaten our nation. To get a jump on the terrorists, it's essential to do three things.

    First, I believe America needs a technology roadmap that can strengthen our capacity to fight terrorism. It should consist of everything from the simple-sounding chore of improving the government's e-mail capability to the exotic science of identifying new bioterror pathogens.

    Second, our government must tap the technology treasure trove that resides within private industry. That priority stands out from all I've learned from this report, and from my work as chair of this Subcommittee and the Senate Intelligence Committee. The terrorists are not technological simpletons. At this moment, they are figuring out what the state of the art is in the commercial world. For our government to stay ahead of them there must be a closer alignment with the private sector. Leaders of technology must constantly furnish government their ideas and suggestions for winning this war.
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    Third, a new generation of technologies and technology experts must be cultivated to meet future threats. The dearth of science and technology students in our schools today signals a major problem for tomorrow. The lack of students in scientific disciplines is especially troubling when you consider that many women, particularly, feel discouraged and discriminated against as they try to enter these fields. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that of the two million scientists and engineers working in the United States, only 10 percent are women. I want to grow the number of women in science and technology, and grow the number of scientists and technologists in this country overall. America's war on terrorism will be won over the long haul. It is vital that America produces enough experts to continue the fight.

    America needs a technology roadmap to fight terror today. Terrorists will try every avenue to identify an open path for attack. This country needs a plan to shut down those avenues one by one. The report being released today is a major step forward in identifying how to do that. Hopefully, it will show where the roadblocks need to be to keep the terrorists out.

    The National Academies jumped in quickly after the events of September 11, to start some deep thinking about areas of technology that ought to be explored. They looked both for technological vulnerabilities and at technology's potential for protection. I am pleased that the Academies convened this expert team to analyze the Nation's research agenda in terms of counter terrorism. This joint panel is fortunate to have the team's co-chairs here today.

    I will defer to wiser minds than mine to go over the details of this report. I'm looking forward to our witnesses' testimony today. But I will say that this report is simultaneously troubling and promising. It is troubling because of the challenges these experts found. It is promising because of technology's potential to meet those challenges.
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    Our government must tap the technology treasure trove that resides within private industry. I know the great promise this country's private technology sector holds. From my seats on the Senate Commerce and Intelligence Committees, in just a few short months I've heard of many technologies with enormous capabilities. They range from sensors to detect and identify biological agents, to interoperable communications technology that enables first responders from different jurisdictions to talk to each other at a disaster site. Computer database systems can promote information sharing between different intelligence and law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorist strikes before they occur. Better authentication and identification technologies, such as biometrics, can control access to sensitive areas at airports and power plants. Better, cheaper and faster explosives detection technology can help secure our airports as well.

    Technology can even be used to fight fire with fire—securing computer and communications systems from cyber terrorists, and detecting cyber intruders. The country's pool of cyber security experts needs to keep pace with the evolving risks. Congressman Boehlert and I have teamed up on legislation to support basic cyber security research. The Senate Commerce Committee recently approved that bill as well, and it already has passed the House.

    Even as this hearing convenes today, innovative startup companies are developing new ideas. For that matter, someone may be creating a new gizmo in their garage that could eventually save American lives. The government should organize structures to help creative ideas find their way in. It is essential that our government institutions help, and do not hinder, the movement of these technologies to the front lines against terror.

    To that end, earlier this year I introduced the Science and Technology Emergency Mobilization Act. This legislation would create a Center to serve as a single contact point and clearinghouse for evaluating promising security and emergency response technologies. The Senate Commerce Committee recently reported this legislation, and Congressman Boehlert has agreed to champion this in the House.
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    My bill also offers America's experts in science, technology and medicine the chance to form rapid response teams ready for deployment to disaster sites. This part of the legislation has become popularly known as the National Emergency Technology Guard, or NET Guard. I was glad to see this idea echoed in the report being presented today. Let me read you the excerpt that caught my eye:

'In the short term, a practical option for providing emergency operational support would be to exploit IT expertise in the private sector, much as the armed services draw on the private sector (National Guard and reserve forces) to augment active-duty forces during emergencies.' (NRC Report p. 5–8)

    The National Academies' report, I know, proposes a Homeland Security Institute to aid technology research, development and deployment. One purpose of the Institute mirrors another aspect of my legislation: aiding in the creation of test beds for new technologies. I will be interested today to see how ideas for NET Guard, as well as a technology clearinghouse, can dovetail with the concept of a Homeland Security Institute.

    This report urges various agencies to set aside their institutional pride and collaborate on new solutions. In the same way, folks in Congress have to be willing to blend ideas to fight terrorism efficiently and effectively. I'm ready to do that.

    I am also ready to help address another concern the Academies' experts have raised. The time is now to grow a new generation of experts to meet the terrorist threats of the future. The Academies' report notes that there are fewer cyber security researchers today than 10 years ago. To ensure our success in the war on terror, I want this country to have an abundance of experts across the spectrum of the sciences.
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    I have already mentioned legislation that Congressman Boehlert and I are promoting. The Cyber Security Research and Development Act has a strong educational component, providing funds to improve academic programs and to offer scholarships to deserving young researchers.

    Just last week, I also announced an initiative to encourage the development of science and engineering expertise.

    At a Science Subcommittee hearing on NASA and education, I made it known that I want the number of women with degrees in math, engineering, and other hard sciences tripled in the very near future. In fact, I want the overall number of graduates in these areas tripled.

    The young witnesses at our hearing on science education were so eager, from the middle schoolers who built a rocket launcher to the young woman from Oregon working on a NASA project for college. The desire to study and work in the sciences is already there for many young Americans. For others, it just needs to be cultivated. I believe the fact that work in these fields may save American lives can draw much-needed attention to these noble professions. My goal is to ensure that when students wants to enter the science and technology sectors, they find the encouragement and the means to do so.

    For those of you already in these noble professions, the work continues today. The National Academies can continue to help the government take full advantage of this country's great technology capabilities in the fight against terror.

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    The committees Congressman Boehlert and I lead will continue to explore this topic as well. I am glad to join my good friend today for this important joint hearing. It is my hope that this bipartisan and bicameral hearing will set the tone for ongoing congressional efforts. The war on terrorism is too important to be hindered by partisan or jurisdictional bickering. Today's hearing should send the clear message that on our watch, Congressman Boehlert and I will take a collaborative, productive approach.

    I intend to hold a hearing in July to examine technology and counter terrorism a bit further, and I look forward to an ongoing bipartisan and bicameral effort, and look forward to our witnesses' testimony today.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden, and I hesitate to grant you that permission to have the rest of your statement included in the record in its entirety, because I so much enjoyed your presentation. It is very thoughtful and it is a pleasure to work in partnership with you. The Chair now recognizes a distinguished gentleman from Texas, the ranking Member, Mr. Hall.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE RALPH M. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

    Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Wyden said it very well that no law of war justifies a deliberate targeting of civilians. I know our nation has seen war brought to our shores by an enemy that runs and hides through caves and desolate parts of the world. An enemy that has no Navy we can sink, that has no Capital we can bomb. The ability of the very crudely trained assassins to kill hundreds or even thousands of people in an instant is a very dark consequence of the spread of science and technology.
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    Their assault on New York and on the Pentagon, their assault absolutely cost them no money. They flew our airplanes. I'm sure they didn't even make good the credit card for their tickets. They used our people as missiles. They flew into our buildings, killed our folks and they did that all in the name of God. And I think all of us know that if it's wrong to blasphemy God, how much more wrong is it to kill innocent people; young men and women and children in the name of God? And that's what we have got going on.

    The weapons of such devastation that they would have single-handedly turned down the tide of war in any human history prior to the 20th Century. Airliners as missiles, dirty bombs, bio-agents all seem to be within the reach of the enemy that we have. So I think it is obvious that we have to work to keep these weapons beyond their grasp. We have to develop the means to identify enemies as they prepare to attack. You know, I am not sure that what we are doing hasn't been working. We have not had an incident that we can point to. I would like to think the hardship and privation and the many hours of work that men and women that are sent forth to protect us have protected us. Thank God we have not had an incident, so something is working. We are doing something right, and I think the thing that we can do more right, though, is to recognize that we have a young man that is Commander in Chief of our country, and we are at war, and Republicans and Democrats alike ought to be supporting him and ought to be helping him.

    I think the House and Senate, and particularly the Senate, could work a little harder to support and be in support of the President's request. He had I think seven bills and we have sent seven over there, and I think maybe one has made it through, and it was watered down to where I would have vetoed if I would have been him. But we just have to—you know, some in my area claim that we ought to ask the President, suggest to him, those of us that talk to him that you ought to leave Afghanistan now. We have got a free election. We have them on the run over there. We have done pretty well what we wanted to do. We ought to come on out of Afghanistan, take care of Iraq and then come on home and declare almost a new Monroe Doctrine. Help Israel to the nth degree and come home and tap a Monroe Doctrine against terrorism in this hemisphere, and particularly in the northern part of this hemisphere.
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    So the National Academies have undertaken a tough question of how do we organize our science and meet these security challenges or meet all these suggestions that we have, and there's something wrong with my suggestion. I haven't thrown it out yet to, you know, see what comes back. But I know that we looked to the National Academies for their advice, both because the question is fundamentally important, but also because the President's proposal for a Department of Homeland Security provides an opportunity to create a structure that can reflect the prescriptions of the Academies, and I think we have to do that.

    I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I commend Chairman Boehlert. I thank Chairman Wyden. His claim always was for the 15 or 16 years we have sat here, he sat between me and Billy Tauzin and he said we kept him immersed in oil, and I'm not sure that we didn't do that. But he was a very valuable Member of this Committee and a great public servant, and I am honored to have him over here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for ranking. I yield back the balance of my time.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL

    No law of war justifies the deliberate targeting of civilians. Yet our Nation has seen war brought to our shores by an enemy that calls no nation home; an enemy that runs and hides through some of the most desolate lands on the face of the earth; an enemy that spends all their energy scheming for ways to massacre the innocent. The ability of crudely trained assassins to kill hundreds or even thousands in an instant is a dark consequence of the spread of science and technology. Weapons of such devastation that they would have single-handedly turned the tide in any war in human history prior to the 20th Century—airliners as missiles, dirty bombs, bio-agents—all seem to be within the reach of our enemy.
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    Therefore, we must work to keep those weapons beyond our enemy's grasp. We must develop the means to identify enemies as they prepare to attack. We must develop better methods for engaging those enemies on terms and in times and places of our choosing. Even as we do those things, we have to be ready to react to an attack on our people here at home—to heal, to comfort, to grieve and then go about the hard work of rebuilding lives and communities. New Yorkers have shown us what we are capable of doing. I pray that no other Americans will have to learn from their example.

    If science and technology have set loose the wolf of insecurity, we need to rely on that same science to forge a chain strong enough to rein that wolf back in. Mobilized on a grand scale, science helped us to win World War II and the Cold War. I believe it can do the same for us in this long struggle.

    The National Academies have undertaken a tough question: how do we organize our science to meet our security challenges? We look to their advice both because the question is fundamentally important but also because the President's proposal for a Department of Homeland Security provides an opportunity to create a structure that can reflect the prescriptions of the Academies.

    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I want to commend Chairman Boehlert for arranging this hearing and Chairman Wyden for agreeing to this joint hearing. I yield back the balance of my time.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Morella follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONSTANCE A. MORELLA

    Chairman Boehlert and Chairman Wyden, I want to commend you both for bringing both sides of Capitol Hill together for this important and incredibly timely hearing. The Congress is about to undertake its most important work of the session and testimony from these experts will prove invaluable as we create and charge a new department to secure our nation.

    Today we will review the much-anticipated report from the National Academies. The Academies have just completed an extensive report covering nearly all aspects of terrorism. As terrorists seek to exploit technical vulnerabilities, if is fitting that we harness the Nation's exceptional scientific and technological capabilities to counter their threats. The Academies' thoughts and recommendations will prove critical to our development of a national plan.

    To date, our response to terrorism has been disjointed. A recent GAO report called coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs ''fragmented'' and noted the presence of several different responsible agencies ''limits accountability and hinders unity of effort.'' State and local authorities have not been provided clear direction on how to obtain much needed assistance from Federal sources. Moreover, our research priorities are not clear. At least 11 agencies and departments have efforts dedicated to various aspects of terrorism research, from detection of agents, to countermeasures like vaccines, to emergency response protocols and decontamination procedures and standards. These agencies differ in their focus and even on which agents they choose to study. These efforts need to be coordinated.

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    The Academies have been reviewing these difficulties and will hopefully provide us with some important insights. They have looked at all manners of terrorist threats, from chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, to cyber terrorism, to infrastructure and transportation issues, to behavioral and societal response. Their exhaustive work should provide an excellent roadmap as we begin the important work of creating a new agency to deal with the terrorist threat. Research and development must be part of any counter-terrorism portfolio.

    Generally the National Academies wait for Congress or other agencies to ask before they undertake a study of this magnitude. I suspect that this is not only because they want to maintain their neutrality on political issues, but also because when the government asks, the government pays. Yet in this case, the Academies undertook this endeavor under their own volition and financed it out of their own pocket. Your contribution has not gone unnoticed and on behalf of myself and my colleagues in Congress I want to thank you for your service.

    Finally, I realize that the report did not review the President's proposal for a new department, nor have you likely had time to personally peruse the legislation. However, I would hope that you would comment on how you would implement your recommendations through such an agency, i.e., how it should be structured, what it should focus on, how decisions are made and evaluated, etc. Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK SMITH

    I would like to thank Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for holding this hearing today to review the National Academies report on the role of science and technology in combating terrorism. It is a comprehensive document that will no doubt be consulted at length by the 11 House Committees that will be working on the Department of Homeland Security legislation, including the Science Committee. The size of the report, coupled with the fact that it is focused on only one aspect of the new Department—science and technology, illustrates the complexity of the restructuring challenge that is before Congress. However, as sweeping and unprecedented as these changes may seem, I believe the President's proposal is a positive step that is not only warranted, but is necessary. We must eliminate breakdowns in coordination between agencies, and get beyond turf battles so we can align the Federal Government's highest priority of defending the people.
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    The range of threats that are examined in the Academies report is daunting—critical infrastructure, computer and communications systems, agricultural and food systems, and of course, human lives—are all potential targets of terror on our soil. I am pleased that in the agricultural chapter you have in effect endorsed my bill to establish centers for plant disease control, H.R. 3965.

    However, we have many resources and tools at our disposal to counter potential terror, not the least of which among them is the world's strongest scientific enterprise. As we form the Department of Homeland Security, we must better harness the strength of our science and engineering communities, both inside and outside of government, to help us in this fight. This report provides excellent guidance toward meeting this challenge, and I applaud those scientists that contributed their time and effort to this report so that it could be released expeditiously.

    With regard to formulation of the new agency, I am pleased that the Academies report recognizes that making the Nation safer will require more than just an elaborate restructuring of government. Restructuring is clearly needed to streamline and de-fragment the muddle of government agencies and programs with a role in homeland security. The structural changes will allow us to overlay threat and vulnerability assessments so we can better identify and prioritize areas of need. However, we will also need to develop new programs to comprehensively address the threats posed by terrorism—especially in the areas of research.

    As Chairman of the Research Subcommittee, I am interested in learning how we can best coordinate our research efforts, not just within the new department, but also government-wide and beyond into academia and industry. With non-federal research funding sources comprising 73 percent of total U.S. research and development, finding ways to steer some of this funding toward counter-terrorism efforts will be invaluable. I am also interested in how we can achieve this within a framework that is fair and effective with regard to balancing the interests of relevant parties concerning issues such as intellectual property and policies toward foreign students.
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    These are just a sampling of the many important issues that we will consider in formulating the Department. It is indeed a difficult undertaking, but one that will help ensure we make America safer. I look forward to hearing the witnesses comment on these issues today, and I expect a productive discussion.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

    Mr. HALL. I'll charge you nothing for that advice.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. And the rest of the Committee is—and the record will be open for the submission of statements, opening statements that they may wish. It's my pleasure now to present to the Committee and to the audience two very distinguished Americans who have excelled in public service and academia and science and so many fields, and who have repeatedly given of their time and talent to make this Nation the great Nation that it is. So it is a distinct pleasure for me to welcome Dr. Lewis Branscomb, who is Director Science, Technology and Public Policy Program, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Dr. Richard Klausner, Executive Director at Global Health Programs, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Gentleman, thank you so very much for once again being of service to your Nation. Dr. Branscomb.

STATEMENT OF DR. LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT; EMERITUS DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying that this report is indeed a roadmap, not a plan. It is really intended to try to identify within each of a set of areas of great concern as potential weapons or areas of vulnerability, the highest priority technical activities that we think the Nation needs to deploy.

    Let me begin by pointing out that we were in the final stages of writing this report on June 6 when the President announced his intention to send forward a proposal to create a Department, and so there are some elements in our report, which Dr. Klausner will speak to later, that do address that likelihood. But we did not—we were completed with—the report was being printed when the President's bill came forward, and so the report has no comment on the specific structures recommended in the bill.

    However, our view is that this report, as best we and our colleagues could do, represents a set of criteria, or guidelines, if you like, for the kinds of capabilities that we believe the country can have and must have in order to maximally make the Nation safer by the use of technology and science. And therefore, as you study alternative structures for the Department, we would hope you find this report useful in testing those organizational forms to see if, indeed, they would look like they would be capable or appropriate for trying to carry out the kinds of technical issues we believe are important.

    The report was a major effort. There were 119 contributors to this report, 24 authors on the Senior Committee and 46 expert reviewers of the manuscript to try to poke holes in it and improve its quality. We have three kinds of recommendations in this report. First, we identified as best we could in each of the areas we studied what technologies are out there today that, if they were deployed and put in the hands of the people who can use them, could reasonably quickly make a difference in our security. These are items that don't require R&D, but they may well require some fairly complex organizational collaborations, compromises, cross-sectoral collaboration and the like.
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    The second is a very large series. I must say I think there's something like 134 recommendations in the technical body of the report. These are the priority technical recommendations for each of these sectors. That number actually includes both the available technologies to be deployed and the new research activities. The majority of them deal with research, and so that is the body of the report's recommendations.

    There's another dozen recommendations that address the fact that we felt very strongly that if we served up to the Government simply an outline of all the research areas we thought were important and the technologies that were important, we would not serve our purpose well. The real task is not only to get this work done, but to find out how to get it deployed, who is going to build it, who is going to pay for it. Is it going to be designed so that all those magnificent firemen and policemen and emergency health workers can use it effectively? That set of issues is so important in this very new kind of threat that we thought that had to be addressed.

    We also want to emphasize that this is a technology and science report. It is not a report collecting together all the vulnerabilities that we could find. Indeed, we tried very hard not to do that, for the obvious reason that we didn't want to put anything in this report that anyone might fear could be used to advantage by those who would attack us. So we have—sometimes you will find the description of the vulnerabilities frustratingly vague. That is on purpose.

    Secondly, there are some cases where we have identified a vulnerability that quite properly justifies a technical investment. That technical investment, if accomplished, might also address a bunch of other vulnerabilities we did not write about. And finally, let me note that there is one area in which that strategy was not sufficient, and that is in the nuclear area. Dr. Happer, who is with us, chaired the panel that did that work and they also wrote a classified document, which is available to Government Officials who have the appropriate clearance. But the rest of the report is unclassified.
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    We tried to ask all our experts and authors to look at the whole sequence of events involved in terrorism, not just the question of how do we make the United States harder to attack or easier to respond and recover. Starting with intelligence, prevention, protection, interdiction, response, recovery and even attribution, finding out who did it, technology can play a role in every one of those. But it is a fact that most of our recommendations in fact do address the questions of protection, interdiction, response and recovery as the primary places where that leverage can be found.

    With respect to priorities, let me note that in each of the specific areas, let me enumerate what they were. They are chapters two through nine deal with nuclear threats, biological threats both in agriculture, food supply and in health. Chemical issues, which includes not only toxic weapons, but industrial chemicals and explosives and other things. Information technology, like chemicals and like transport, is both a weapon and a target. Energy is a very sensitive area of infrastructure, since everything else hangs on its availability. Transportation: we know too much about one piece of that now, but many other parts of the transportation system need attention. The cities are infrastructure in themselves, very complicated infrastructure, and the people who live in those cities whose reactions to terrorism we have to understand and respond to in a proper way.

    And finally, a chapter we added on complex systems, because one of the principle conclusions of the technical work is that we are dealing here with a much more complicated problem than conventional war where you know the enemy, you know where the battlefield is. You know pretty well who has what weapons, and you have a highly trained military to take care of it, and in some sense a kept industry that is designed to respond to the needs of that military. This is a very different world.
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    So when you get to the use of priorities, you will find that in each of those chapters we have indeed tried to bring out what our experts believe are the highest priority things to do. But when you ask well, what out of all of that list of 134 priorities, what are the top ten, that's a much tougher question. Because to answer that correctly, we would not only have to know the technical priorities, we would have to know what do the terrorists—what are they capable of and what are their objectives? If you knew those two things and you also knew what we could do technically, we could indeed set the overall priorities.

    Nevertheless, having said that, it is not easy to do. We have used our subjective judgment to try to provide, as we do in the executive summary, though not in the text, a list of seven things that really could be done now with existing technologies or processes, and another seven research activities that obviously won't pay off for a little while, but ought to be started immediately because they should have been started some time ago.

    My final comment is that as we went through all these chapters, we discovered, a little bit to our surprise, that the same technologies and same capabilities cropped up in almost every one. We called those ''cross-cutting'' issues and we have a chapter devoted to describing them. They are not too surprising to you, I don't think. One would be, for example, the whole issue of how do you handle information from complex sets of sources of information? How do you do information fusion, putting together all the bits that you have? How do you do data mining, figuring out what conclusions can you draw from all this complexity of stuff? There has been a lot of discussion of those two needs in recent days in the Congress, as we have talked about our intelligence experience of the last few years. That is an area where there is capability today, but there could be a lot more with the right research undertaken.
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    Another area is sensors and sensor systems. The sensors can be used in principle to detect almost everything we want to find, but the sensors alone are not enough. They need to be in a system that can deal with the sensors being knocked out, with sensors giving false positives or false negatives, collecting the information and using it by the people who need the information. I would just like those two examples to suggest that you can't deal with this problem by slicing it up in little stovepipes. You have to have an analysis that looks across all the vulnerabilities and all the threats and recognize the threats may come more than one at a time, simultaneously indeed to magnify their effect.

    So that is a quick overview of sort of the technical picture we drew. Now let me ask Dr. Klausner to take it from there.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Branscomb, just let me just say you were exactly 10 minutes to the second. That is really amazing. Usually, as we all know, we restrict opening statements to five minutes to allow ample opportunity for questioning. But we are doubling that time because of the importance of the testimony and the expertise that we have before us. Dr. Klausner.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD D. KLAUSNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL HEALTH FOR THE BILL AND MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION

    Dr. KLAUSNER. I will try to be brief to allow the Committee to ask the many questions I am sure you have. As my colleague, Dr. Branscomb, said, we set out not only to attempt to illustrate how science and technology can be accessed, used, deployed and developed to make the Nation safer against what is a set of unique, persistent and unfortunately evolving threats, many of which as we have heard are the result of advances in science and technology. And in their misuse, many of our vulnerabilities are built into the fact that we live in a technologically very complex society, but a society with values that we cherish, such as openness, freedom of movement, availability of access.
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    So in addition to laying out a roadmap of what capabilities we have and what capabilities and knowledge we would like to develop, we also made a set of recommendations attempting to assign responsibility or approaches to how to negotiate that roadmap, how to make sure that the Nation is able to act on these sorts of recommendations, and importantly to act well. There are a series of principles that emerged from the report. Let me just talk about one of them.

    One is this concept of dual use. It is our belief that the most productive and the most beneficial approach to research and development, to science and engineering aimed at counter-terrorism must be integrated as much as possible into civil society R&D. There are many reasons for that including the fact that we have a very successful and robust science and engineering enterprise. And, as is the case as you know, Mr. Chairman, with science and with discovery, innovations come from unexpected places. We must maintain our conductivity.

    In addition, the dual use issue makes sure that the investments we will be making will benefit our society, not only by making us safer, but making us healthier, hopefully making us more efficient when possible. Most of our recommendations are aimed at the Federal Government, even though it is clear that we all recognize that this report and all of our actions toward making the Nation safer involve many partners, particularly State and Local Governments, industry and the universities. However, the Federal Government has a unique and very special role not only in convening, but in also funding and overseeing the Nation's research enterprise.

    One of the critical challenges is not only what we discover, but what and how we choose to deploy, and that is where the expense is and that is where we need to know whether we are achieving benefit and what are the multiple levels of costs. For that reason, one of our strong recommendations is that as soon as possible, we move to set up a new independent entity, which we have entitled a Homeland Security Institute.
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    The Nation has experience with similar such structures that advise the Department of Defense, such as Myter Corporation or the Aerospace Corporation or the Air Force program at Rand. We look to this to be an independent entity to advise the Government at the highest levels capable of doing independent analytic work on what our vulnerabilities are. What our vulnerabilities are, as Dr. Branscomb said, in these complex and interlocking systems, what the technologies are that are available or need to be developed. Do the technologies work? What standards need to be set? How do we go about testing our proposed solutions by red teaming and blue teaming, and how do we provide advice and communication to those who will need to use these technologies, such as earth's responders?

    We believe this Homeland Security Institute can and needs to be set up as soon as possible. How it will function in terms of the configuration or the reconfiguration of the Government we can discuss. One of the critical challenges that Homeland Security raises, vis-à-vis science and engineering and technology, is the fact that many agencies of the Federal Government responsible for many aspects of our lives, borders, immigration and the Coast Guard, etcetera, will need to be able to have the capability to identify technological problems, to engage the appropriate science and technology and engineering communities, and to be able to evaluate whether or not to deploy those technologies.

    This is a real challenge. Our Government has multiple agencies rich in science and engineering capabilities and managerial history, but this is not true of all of the entities that will be responsible for science and technology. This is a challenge that has to be paid attention to as we think of configuring the Government.

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    Finally, as I said, as we all know, all of this has to take place with the recognition that first of all, most of what we want to protect is not owned by the Government. It is owned by the private sector. The Government is going to need to figure out the ways to engage the private sector in a variety of ways that may require re-looking at regulation, at antitrust issues, at indemnification issues, etcetera, and we raise those issues in the report.

    We heard about the question that—the issue relevant to the universities. The universities have been overwhelmingly where the most basic research innovations and discoveries take place. We will not successfully in the long run provide the science and technology to defend the country and make it safer without the engagement of the universities. We must, at the same time, be very careful to make sure that the universities continue to function as they have functioned well, as fundamentally open places of interaction, communication, and research. And our recommendation about that is that the Government needs to examine very carefully and to consult the universities, as well as the private sector, any potential restrictions on the research enterprise.

    In addition, it is clear that we need to make sure that our research enterprise, science, engineering, and technology is continually renewed with new individuals. And I particularly want to emphasize what Chairman Wyden said about the lack of women and minorities that enter science and engineering. We also address and make a recommendation that we look at new mechanisms to stimulate, as we did during the Cold War, the entrance of individuals to the many different disciplines that will contribute to science and technology making the Nation safer.

    I will only say something about some cautionary issues that we addressed. We have no doubt, of course, as scientists and engineers that science and engineering can play very important role in helping make the Nation safe. However, what we choose to deploy and how we choose to deploy it must again be looked at and analyzed independently and carefully, not only for whether it will work or not despite claims, but what are the costs, the economic cost, the cost to our freedoms, the cost to many of the things that we cherish that we are trying to protect? I will point out that we believe that inventiveness and innovation, in fact, can help us achieve safety and protection in ways that may reduce the intrusiveness or the effects on privacy, the effects on restricted movement, etcetera.
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    The bottom line, as we complete this very intense report, is that there is much that we have identified that science and technology and engineering can contribute. The report itself, I believe, is a testimony to the willingness of the science and engineering community to step forward and participate in this new situation this Nation is faced with, and will continue to be faced with. An enormous number of people worked very hard on this report. Several Members of our parent Committee are here and sitting behind me. I would like to introduce them, because some questions may go to them, if I may, in finishing.

    Ambassador Paul Bremer on your left, Mr. Paul from Marsh and Associates, Mr. Paul Gilbert who chaired both our Subcommittee on energy systems and cities in the built—in the fixed infrastructure in the built environment from Parsons Brinkerhoff, the Vice President of Parson Brinkerhoff, Will Happer from Princeton University who chaired the nuclear and radiologic section, that one section in which there is a secret annex. Dr. John Hennessy, some of you know, the President of Stanford University who chaired the subpanel on cyber and information technology, and finally, Dr. Ash Carter from the Kennedy School at Harvard.

    Thank you very much for allowing us this opportunity to present this report to you, and we are all very anxious and willing to answer whatever questions you might have.

    [Joint statement of Dr. Branscomb and Dr. Klausner follows:]

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB AND RICHARD D. KLAUSNER

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MAKING THE NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

    Good morning, Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committees. We are Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb, Emeritus Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management; and Emeritus Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program in the Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University, and Dr. Richard D. Klausner, Executive Director of Global Health for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Together we served as co-chairs of the Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism of the National Academies' National Research Council. We are here today to discuss the contents of this committee's report: Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.

    The study was initiated shortly after September 11 by the action of the three presidents of the Academies—the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine—working through their shared operating arm, the National Research Council. More than 100 scientific and technical experts volunteered to work on this very complex project, completed in a short amount of time. The report also benefited substantially from the expertise of an additional 46 experts who reviewed the report to ensure its accuracy and quality. All of the costs for the project were paid for by the National Academies.

    Our report describes many ways in which science and engineering can contribute to making the Nation safer from the threat of catastrophic terrorism. It identifies key actions that can be undertaken now, based on knowledge and technologies in hand. Equally important, it describes key opportunities for reducing current and future risks even further through longer-term research and development activities.
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    The report is organized around the ways in which science and technology can address the potential threats and vulnerabilities terrorists might exploit. However, it is not simply a catalog of vulnerabilities, and we were careful to describe vulnerabilities only to the extent necessary to justify our technical recommendations.

    Chapters cover the following issues: nuclear and radiological threats; human and agricultural health systems; toxic chemicals and explosive materials; information technology; energy systems; transportation systems; cities and fixed infrastructure; the response of people to terrorism; and complex and interdependent systems.

    We include a box in the executive summary highlighting important actions that should be taken without delay (a copy of this box is attached to this testimony). Seven immediate applications of existing technologies and seven urgent research opportunities are listed there. For example, technologies are available that can be implemented to improve emergency communications, produce vaccines and antibodies, and strengthen security around power grids. The government should also ensure that trusted spokespeople are prepared to inform the public promptly and with technical authority in the event of an emergency.

    However, many of the threats require new technologies which we believe can be developed, given a concerted research effort. For example, vaccines and treatments can be found for infectious agents that currently are untreatable. The distribution of electric power can be made more reliable by developing an adaptive electric-power grid that would be less vulnerable to attacks and widespread failures. Computer programs that make it much easier to 'connect the dots' among apparently unrelated fragments of information can improve intelligence gathering. These are only a few examples.
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    The actions suggested in our report target all phases of counter-terrorism—intelligence and surveillance, prevention, protection, interdiction, response and recovery, and attribution. However, which phase is most important depends on the threat. For example, the nuclear threat must be addressed in the earliest stages through collaboration between the United States and other nations and deployment of effective protection and control systems to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear weapons and materials. For biological attacks, the situation is reversed: an attack is relatively easy to initiate and hard to prevent, but there are many opportunities for biomedical intervention, using new science, to mitigate the effects of an attack. In other cases, such as an attack on the electrical power system, it is possible both to make the attack more difficult to undertake and to lessen its effects after it has been initiated.

    For the existing and future technologies described in the report to make the Nation safer, they will have to be effectively implemented. A piece-meal approach to defending a critical facility or system will be ineffective, and decisions about what technologies to use and how to use them should be based on a view of the problems and solutions that takes the whole system into account. The government can help by increasing understanding of critical systems' vulnerabilities and by setting standards for security technologies and creating testbeds and methods for evaluating their performance under realistic circumstances.

    The government officials running the Office of Homeland Security, or, when it is created, the Department of Homeland Security, will need a strong analytical capability to help them make informed decisions and implement strategies that will work. The committee recommends that a Homeland Security Institute be established as soon as possible to provide technical information to support decisions that must be made by the director of homeland security, and later by a secretary of the homeland security department. This institute would be a dedicated, non-profit, contractor-operated organization. Experts hired by the institute would provide analysis, simulation, and modeling to identify vulnerabilities and assess the effectiveness of steps taken to reduce them.
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    To ensure that all the technical components of a new Department of Homeland Security work together and in collaboration with other agencies, the Department will need an undersecretary for science and technology, to whom the institute should report. However, the current Office of Homeland Security should be given the authority to create the Homeland Security Institute now, rather than waiting for a department to be formed first.

    The close collaboration already taking place between the White House Office of Science, Technology, and Policy and the Office of Homeland Security will become even more critical with the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security. A strengthened OSTP can help ensure that the research-oriented agencies are responsive to the needs of homeland security. This is particularly important since the agencies that will be incorporated in a new department tend not to have the deep-rooted research and development capabilities found in other agencies.

    Although the report is directed primarily to the Federal Government, it is intended to benefit all essential partners in the war on terrorism. A good working relationship is needed between the government and industry when it comes to counter-terrorism. Much of our critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, but the threat of terrorism does not create a market force to which industry easily responds. The Federal Government also needs to work closely with local municipalities who are the first to respond to a terrorist attack and can provide valuable insight into research and development needs.

    The university and industrial research community also represent an enormous creative resource for meeting the challenge of catastrophic terrorism. But for the basic science and engineering laboratories to make their most effective contribution, a balance must be struck between the need to protective sensitive information and the requirements for an open, creative research environment that promotes good science.
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    Finally, whenever possible, researchers should seek out counter-terrorism technologies that have ancillary benefits for society to help make terrorism protection more affordable and to ensure that the public's commitment to the struggle against catastrophic terrorism is sustainable.

    In closing, we would like to thank the committees for their invitation to testify and for allowing us to present our views. Now, we would be glad to answer your questions. Several members of our committee are here to provide expertise in specific areas, and they too would be glad to answer any questions.

    Attachment: Other Members of the Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism present at the hearing:

John L. Hennessy, President, Stanford University; Member, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism; Co-Chair of the Committee's Panel on Information Technology

Paul H. Gilbert, Director Emeritus, Parsons Brinckerhoff Inc.; and Senior Vice President, Parsons Brinckerhoff International Inc.; Member, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism; Chair of the Committee's Panel on Energy Facilities, Cities, and Fixed Infrastructure

William Happer, Professor, Department of Physics, Princeton University; Member, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism; Chair of the Committee's Panel on Nuclear and Radiological Issues

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Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Member, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism

L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman, Crisis Consulting, Marsh and McLennan Companies Inc.; Member, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism

Discussion

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, and I am going to first hear from Senator Wyden because he has a vote in the Senate for questioning. But before his questioning starts, I would like my colleagues up here to join me in thanking all of you for your distinct public service. Senator Wyden.

New Technology and Innovations

    Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Chairman. You are absolutely right. It is a superb report and I thank you for letting me just get into one area before we have a vote coming up. Gentleman, this is really a unique time in American history. You have our key government agencies saying point blank, quoted in the paper, intelligence agencies, for example, saying that they lag behind the private sector in coming up with ways to produce new products and innovation.

    In spite of this, if you are an entrepreneur with an exciting technology, say you have a breakthrough in sensors or you have a breakthrough in data fusion technologies, just to take two examples, as far as I can tell, you go through bureaucratic water torture. You just run this in a bureaucratic gauntlet in an effort to try to get your product evaluated and then to find your way to the appropriate government agency. I think what I would like to do for just purposes of this very quick round is get your sense of how serious a problem you think it is, and then what you would recommend in terms of dealing with it.
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. It is a very serious and important problem, and the only solution to it has to begin with the existence of a strategy for how we are going to use—what kinds of technologies are in fact needed and available to deploy against these threats. Because if that set of requirements exists, then the next question is who is the logical customer for that stuff? Is it a Federal agency? Is it FEMA that is going to buy it? Is it the cities that are going to buy it or the counties? Is it going to be sold somehow in—is the private sector going to pay for it, in order to strengthen its own capability? I don't think we can have the answers to that until we have done the analysis of the problem.

    And then of the course the next step, which the Department was designed to fix, is to create those elements of Federal capability that can try to implement the advice that is in that overall strategy in a particular area. The particular kind of sensor to meet a particular kind of application. At that point, you could imagine that Federal agency is not necessarily agreeing to buy the product, although I guess if any of them have the operation or responsibility to use it, they could buy it, but that is not going to happen very often.

    Much more often, a Federal agency is going to need to work with a vendor, or with all the vendors at a given time, to say ''Here is what we believe the requirements are for this kind of capability, and we are prepared to work with State and local governments, collaboratively, to set some purchase requirements, some functional requirements, not design requirements.'' Functional specifications that we are going to recommend to State and local governments, if they are the customers who will be buying your product.

    By the way, when they ask us, we the Federal agency will, also provide the test beds to determine whether your products in fact do what you say they do, because that will also be important information to whoever the institutional customer may be. That is one reason why we are essentially in a rush to get this institute created, because it seems to me that is its primary reason, the front end of that process.
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    Senator WYDEN. Dr. Klausner, do you want to add anything to that?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. I think in addition, something that came up at a hearing that you held, which I think is part of what your question is, and that is when people have ideas outside of the Government, how do they negotiate the Government? How do they navigate through the Government? How do you figure out who might be interested in your idea, and then how does one proceed? And again, this is a very difficult problem. The Government is large. The requirements, the needs are very different across the Government.

    Again, I just want to emphasize that is why we struggled with this problem, and what we realize is needed is one place where you can go and you can see a description of the overall strategy, the overall sense of the types of requirements and capabilities that are being looked for across the Government. And again, this is what the structure that we are talking about that relates a roadmap to a plan to an evaluation process hopefully will facilitate; but it will still be difficult.

    Senator WYDEN. Let me just wrap this up and thank Chairman Boehlert again for everything. I want to see put on the President's desk in the next few months a technology package. It would include the Cyber Security Legislation that has already cleared the House that we are anxious to get through the Senate, and would also include the Net Guard Legislation, which would include this sort of one-stop process to make sure that when an entrepreneur has a problem-saving idea, that they can get it fairly and rapidly evaluated.

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    We would like to work with you, Dr. Klausner and Dr. Branscomb, so we can make sure that that legislation incorporates the thinking that you all have with respect to the Homeland Security Institute. If we do this well, we will in fact have a one-stop, you know, process and it seems to me that one initial stop is where someone goes to be told elsewhere in Government, the Health and Human Services or DOD. This is where you can actually be in a position to negotiate the details about your product. And I think if we do one thing as it relates to technology, making sure that there is a place to fast-track, promising private sector ideas at a time when the Government says it is lagging behind the private sector, we can say we made a difference, as it relates to technology and we will want to work with you on those details, Chairman Boehlert, and I have made a commitment that we want that package on the President's desk in the next few months. And we want to make sure that we are doing it in line from the thinking you have had with respect to the Homeland Security Institute. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and we will return after a bit.

Under Secretary for Research and Development

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you so much. In your testimony, you endorsed the idea of an Under Secretary for Research and Development within the new Department, and as I indicated in my opening statement, that is the direction I think we should go in. Can you give me your rationale for why such a position is needed and what authority an individual would have in that position?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Well, when one looks at what is going to be asked, but we are not sure exactly what the configuration of this will be of this Department of Homeland Security, what is clear is that it is being asked is to take on an enormous amount of technical challenges, a number of technical challenges, meaning it is going to have to be dealing with a whole broad range of the types of issues we are talking about.
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    For that reason, we believe that there needs to be a high-level single person that has actual authority relevant to the R&D agenda associated with this Homeland Security Department, however it is configured. It may well be that that would be a very good place for this independent Homeland Security Institute to report to, as well as a way to make sure that independent scientific advice, again as I said before that has become the norm for the traditional science rich agencies, while brought into the functioning of these new agencies, as they have to deal in an unprecedented way with decisions about science and technology.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Would you envision that person actually running a research organization or being a coordinator? Would that person have maybe a pot of money to give out grants? What would you envision? Let us flush some of this, if we——

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. If you will allow me to go beyond the report, now I am speaking as Lewis Branscomb, not as Co-chairman of this Commission, because we did not study that issue.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. All right.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. We did address the question of whether there needs to be a senior technical officer for the reasons that he described. Now they have more one more reason, and that is that I do not assume that the secretary of this Department is necessarily going to be a scientist. That cannot be contrived on lightly. It [the Secretary] needs to be a manager with strong managerial skills. But there are many, many decisions that the Secretary will have to make that have very complicated technical content, and he or she is going to have a whole array of divisional executives, each of whom have their own technology story to tell.
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    So there is an upward responsibility here to help the secretary make those decisions properly. But to answer your questions, if I were organizing it, and this is partly based on my experience in industry as well as in government, I would have that senior technical officer have the budget for all of the R&D in the Department. And some of that R&D probably done in a central location because it is R&D that is generic, everything the Department does, and part of it would be R&D done in the operating units where the R&D would be managed by the line managers in the operating units, funded by that Under Secretary in charge of the technology, so that he would have some discipline over the quality of the work.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. So you would have the golden rule apply? He who has the gold rule?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Yes.

Cyber Security

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The Administration's proposal quite rightly puts great emphasis on cyber security, which as Senator Wyden has indicated, he and I have been working on for some time now. I must concede that prior to 9/11 it pretty much elicited a muffled yawn when we talked about cyber security. Post 9/11, everybody is interested and we passed an $800 million bill in the House by a vote of 400 to 12. What duties should a cyber security unit in the new Department have, and are the right entities being transferred into the Department?

    Mr. HENNESSY. This is John Hennessy. I headed the Committee that did the cyber security in IT arena. I think that is an excellent question. I think one of things that we were confounded by when we looked carefully was the fact that computer security had fallen off the table as a key research area, as an area where we were investing resources and trying to discover new directions. So clearly, re-establishing and rebuilding the tradition of research and getting new science and technology there is going to be key.
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    But beyond that, there are also issues with respect to setting standards, particularly for agencies, for example, that use telecommunications and computer networking in order to respond to terrorist events that are particularly crucial. So setting standards and helping local agencies establish computer systems which can survive an attack and support responders in responding to a terrorist event is key.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. So I take it that you are very much in support of the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act we have passed in the House. I would hope that you would use your considerable influence in encouraging some of Senator Wyden's colleagues in the Senate to put that on the fast track over there. He is giving an encouraging report just prior to his departure. So a little tweaking that has to be done, but we have got to get moving with this. Thank you very much. Mr. Hall.

Security of the Energy Sector

    Mr. HALL. I will turn to the energy section of it in that I have the oil patch in my District, and Texas is one of the ten producers of energy for the rest of the country. And I would almost like to ask Dr. Branscomb whether or not the very dispersed nature of the Nation's electric power systems make it virtually impossible to defend them from terrorist attacks. I would like to ask that of you, Dr. Branscomb, but I am sure I wouldn't like the answer, I guess, so I won't ask that.

    The Nation's electric power system has a certain amount of redundancy that they built in as it was built and as it was structured to provide for reliability. But I am really doubtful if there was really much built in there to rely on for protection against the type of attacks we are doing. How much more redundancy needs to be built into the electric power system to ensure stability in the event of a terrorist attack? And when I say ''terrorist attack,'' that can mean almost anything anywhere.
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. May we ask Mr. Gilbert to answer that question? He was truly the expert on this.

    Mr. HALL. What would you have done if you hadn't brought him with you?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. I would have given you the answer he is about to give you.

    Mr. HALL. Okay.

    Mr. GILBERT. Indeed he would. The energy system, as you rightly say, is very extensive, and it represents an enormous investment in place of many utilities and even a great many private parties now throughout the country.

    As a result of our strategy for the energy systems, we have a system that was devised and put together in which we rewarded efficiency. We rewarded low cost operation. We rewarded the ability to get a good return on the investment of the private parties and also the investor utilities that put these together.

    But with over 10,000 generating stations and many thousands of miles of transmission and all the distribution systems in all the urban areas, what we have is an efficient, well-run, highly effective system. But in the same time, we can not expect to find in that system devised to meet those Bills also a system that has redundancy, that has resilience, and that has those qualities that the old vertically integrated, regulated industry had as a part of its strategy.
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    So we have gone through this transition as—what is a part of the new regulation. And we have a part now that is in the utility sector, which has regulation, but has some freedom. We have the transmission system, which is now moving toward becoming a regulated system, but is not entirely in place yet. We have the distribution systems, which, of course, have their own rates. So we have a mixed bag. And we have a lot of uncertainty as a result of that in respect to who is going to step forward and pay if improvements to improve redundancy and to improve toughness in the system are going to take place.

    And that uncertainty is one of the early things that we perceive needs attention so that there can be the actions that good people now realize need to be taken. But they don't know whether they would get a rate adjustment allowed under the present rules if they were to make those investments. Or in the case of private sector people, if one private sector unit stepped forward and did such an investment, would that make them price uncompetitive with others who aren't required to do the same thing at the same time?

    Mr. HALL. Um-hum.

    Mr. GILBERT. So there is kind of a global problem here. But beyond that, within the energy system, we are more concerned about a few locations within the grids where there are particularly vulnerable pieces of equipment; equipment which are one of a kind and which, if lost, would be very difficult to replace. They could even—loss of these pieces of equipment could even lead to a cascading failure effecting the whole region of a country. That type of a situation bringing about therefore through the loss of electricity, the loss of food supply, the loss of fuel and the rest of it, is an extremely worrisome situation, and all of this is covered in our report.
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    And we make some fairly strong recommendations about what we perceive to be the actions needed in order to get on top of this, which, if taken, would result in a more resilient system, and a system with more redundancy, a system that would serve the public in a much more confident manner throughout the country.

    Mr. HALL. I think in your recommendation, you talked about near-term studies, and I am sure you addressed the long-term studies, too. But you suggested identifying the vulnerabilities near term. That shouldn't be terribly difficult to do, should it?

    Mr. GILBERT. No, sir, and we have identified some, but because we were carefully avoiding providing any new information beyond what was already available in the general press, and of course, on the Internet, we have not provided certain specific information, you know, with respect to points of particular concern. That information would be available in a confidential discussion with the appropriate people, of course.

    Mr. HALL. I thank you, Mr. Gilbert. And I will save one of the—ask you to answer it. I thank you very much.

    Mr. GILBERT. I think you are very kind, sir.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. The Chair now turns for five minutes to one of the science community's staunchest allies and strongest advocates, the Angel of NSF, the gentle lady, from Maryland, Mrs. Morella.

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    Ms. MORELLA. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and presenting this report. We appreciate having the report and your expertise and the fact that you took the time to be here.

    Dr. Klausner, we do miss you at the National Cancer Institute, and I am sorry you're selling your house in Bethesda, Maryland, my District, but I know that being with the Gates Foundation is opening all kinds of doors for you, and you can utilize your expertise.

    Gentlemen, mention was made, Senator Wyden picked up on it, the idea that we need more women in science, engineering, and technology. And this Committee passed my legislation several years ago that established a commission to do it, and they came out with their result. I am pleased to report that it has now become part of something called Best Building Engineering in Scientific Talent with John Yokelson helping with it, some incredible partnerships with the private sector, public sector, and academia. And the Gates Foundation is very interested in it, too. So they have been involved, so I thank you for that. Okay.

NIST and Information Security

    Since I am very interested in this, in information technology, I noticed that in chapter five, and maybe we should be Mr. Hennessy. In chapter five, suggestion is made that Congress should establish a lead agency while promoting information security. I have introduced in legislation. It passed the House. It is over in the Senate. It is 1259, and you know, along with 3394 that our Chairman has introduced that is over in the Senate, actually the legislation 1259 provides NIST with that role due to its expertise on computer-related issues and the setting of standards.
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    What I would like to ask you is, is this still appropriate or should these operations be moved into the Department of Homeland Security?

    Mr. HENNESSY. I think that is an excellent question. NIST has traditionally had an important role in setting standards. And part of what has to happen in the computer security area is setting the standards, particularly when we deploy computer systems into local communities and states that simply don't have the expertise to know whether or not their system will be secure in the event of some sort of attack. So I think this can continue to play a valuable role. That role has to go hand-in-hand with the development of new technologies and new research to advance the state of computer security.

    Simply put, even if we deploy the best technology we had today against a determined terrorist, that would not provide the level of security that we would really be comfortable in our country. So ongoing research will be needed as well.

    Ms. MORELLA. We need the ongoing research, but you would still—you would keep that operation at NIST?

    Mr. HENNESSY. I think it is fine to keep that operation at NIST.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Ms. Morella, may I?

    Ms. MORELLA. You can do that.
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. As a former Director of the Bureau of Standards, I was the first person at the Bureau—then called the Bureau of Standards——

    Ms. MORELLA. Yeah.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB [continuing]. To create an out-of-house research support program without appropriated money.

    MS. MORELLA. Otherwise called the Outhouse Program, right?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Right. But I would note that NIST is a very fine Federal laboratory, but it doesn't have a lot of experience at supporting research at universities and other places, and it doesn't have the budget to do that. It's never really been asked to do that by the Congress. And I think one of the things that our report was looking to was recognizing that in the university community, a number of faculty people who are experts in how to make approvably secure operating system, for example, has dwindled and dwindled and dwindled.

    And the industry, and I used to work at IBM, has, for years, not really pushed that effort, because the level of security that the industry provides now isn't bad; it is just not good enough for a determined terrorist attack. And there is no market for a lot better security in the ordinary commercial world. So I do think there is a need for a substantial research program in those areas on computer science that are most relevant to security. And I don't think it exists in NASA, in NSF, or in DARPA or anywhere else.

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    Ms. MORELLA. I appreciate that. You know, also the Science Committee has also introduced a Bill to provide extensive research into building standards. There was an article in the Post and the World Trade Center collapse and that Bill will be coming out on the floor imminently. I wondered if you might comment on what extent this Bill would help to fulfill your recommendation with partnership.

    Mr. GILBERT. I guess I am back again. We took a very careful look, Ms. Morella, at the instructive information coming from the collapse of the World Trade Center and make a number of recommendations for a rather explicit research program to answer a number of questions raised by just what took place with the evidence, the forensics, and so on.

    One of the things that we are urging is that we take notice of the fact that our fire code provisions in our design codes have not kept up with the times, with the materials, and with the construction process. Much of that work was based upon research work, excellent research, but it was unfortunately done in 1928. There has been a lot that has happened since then. We are suggesting, which is perhaps a bit of a reach, we are suggesting that perhaps it might even do us all a good deal of benefit if we were to recognize that the European and the Australian and the New Zealand codes, which are post World War II codes, if temporarily put in place, made provisional codes sanctioned.

    Therefore, in this country while we are doing the necessary research to establish our own parametrics for such design, that that then would take us one step in the right direction in the short term and put in place the process that we would have the better code shortly thereafter. So it is a very, very important and an essential part. It not only is the research, but it is also the code-writing parties, which is a local question. It is—these are State and local issues, documents, and so it is an elongated process. And that is why we think it is so important to get started with an early response to the situation.
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    Ms. MORELLA. And it could be that, you know, NIST, as a lead agency, would have the authority to do that and then to be able to utilize those European standards as they are conducting their investigations.

    Mr. GILBERT. It certainly could be so provided they understand the urgency of the situation.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

    Ms. MORELLA. Can I——

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentlelady's time has expired.

    Ms. MORELLA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Gilbert.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey.

    Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to recognize somebody else that is here in this room today, and that is a woman whom I don't think this would have all occurred without, and that is Elizabeth Grossman. So congratulations, Elizabeth.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. You are absolutely right.
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    Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, now, gentlemen, I would like to suggest that if we want to have women, young women, and girls get interested in science, math, and technology, that we give them the credit that is due at the time that it is important. And Elizabeth, thank you. Now Elizabeth has a Ph.D. in Computational Physics from the University of Chicago and has a BA first in Mathematics and Physics. These are the kinds of examples, Elizabeth, you are an example for the young girls and young women in this country that we want to get interested in this kind of education and work, so thank you for doing what you did. And we need more of her.

Recruitment/Retention of Science and Technology Professionals

    And my question to you is in looking at all of this, do we have an adequate number of scientists and technicians and analysts available, and are we educating enough that we will be able to carry out this plan and proposal? I mean, where are we in that? And how are we going to get there if we are not there?

    Mr. HENNESSY. Well, let me take a stab at that. I think we are behind in terms of educating sufficient numbers of young people in science and technology, particularly outside the life sciences. We continue to do well in the life sciences, but if you look across the board in the physical sciences and engineering, we are lagging. And in the last few years, our traditional lead over many other countries both at the Bachelor's Degree and the Ph.D. level has disappeared. And we are quickly being bypassed. And I think a major part of that is the fact that we have not yet attracted a sufficient number of women and minorities in. So that is going to have to be a goal of any process that we go through. And in order to accomplish what is here, we need to get more young people interested. And if we can do that, I think we can leverage that talent to make a great deal of progress on these key issues.
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    Ms. WOOLSEY. So, I thank you. And I should go along if young girls can be interested. And I have legislation called Go Girl that starts encouraging girls in fourth grade to stay interested and get their families involved with mentors and models, so they will know that there are people like Elizabeth out there that they could be like when they grow up. I think that is what we need to do.

    So thank you for that answer, and I think you would all say the same thing, so let us not go down the line, because I do have another question. And I am going to have lots of questions. I was in at a hearing in Chicago yesterday with Congresswoman Biggert, and she referred to herself as a ''science geek wannabe.'' It fit so perfectly for most of us on this committee. It is so good. It is perfect. That is who we are and what we are.

First Responders

    But you were talking about the first responders at the local level and their involvement. And we all know that they have to learn the technology, etcetera, etcetera. And there has to be a way to do that. But you know, it has opened up a question for me as how are you getting information from them about what they think they need, because they are the most important piece of this whole thing?

    Mr. GILBERT. Well, the emergency operating centers and the first responders, of course, fall in the cities. And I had the privilege of looking at the cities. It is a real question.

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    I had the privilege of interviewing some emergency operations center management people, some deputy police chiefs who have emergency response responsibilities, and also some fire and emergency medical service people, all of whom have roles in this. And your perception is very well taken. They know they have needs. They have lived in an institution that is pretty well provided to them, their equipment, their process, their expectations of what they are going to do. And they have a very rigorous set of things that they do when they respond to an event.

    Our observations were that these are well taken until you are facing a terrorist situation wherein, perhaps, in addition to a fire or an explosion, there has also been some toxic materials released with the folding tents to do as much harm, and more important, since we are talking about terrorists who spread fear and terror as a part of the act. So what we have noted in our report is a need to develop a means for the first responders to be able to protect themselves upon approaching a site not knowing what that smoke and debris may contain.

    We are talking of a sensor and a sensor system, as Dr. Branscomb talked about earlier. And we are also—we need some different training. And for that we would like to have, as soon as possible, some threat scenarios that would take what is now a training mode that has to do with natural hazards and fires and events that have been predictable from the past and adding to that the unpredictability of the terrorist acts and what it afflicts upon the city, whether it is something in the tunnels beneath the city or in the high-rise building or wherever it may be. Each one of those is a different situation where the scenario would play out, and then training modules to go with that. And what we are trying to suggest in the report is that since there are thousands of these people across the country, we want, as the tide rises, we want all of them to rise so that our citizens would then have a predictable response mechanism in place, wherever they are living, to an event taking place in their midst. So that is where we are headed in terms of the first responders.
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    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you——

    Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Very much. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair recognizes for five minutes the Distinguished Chair on the Subcommittee on Research, Congressman Smith of Michigan.

Public/Private Research Partnerships

    Mr. SMITH. Not exactly that the academies have been sleeping, but it is sort of like the analogy of the sleeping tiger awakened and maybe America awakened to the importance of scientific research as key to not only our national security, but certainly our economic security. My strongest compliments for the quick reaction and what appears to be an excellent product that you and the academies have developed. One area that pleased me is in reference to your agricultural recommendations that calls for centers for plant disease to be established, because that is exactly what my legislation, H.R. 3965, does.

    As the Chairman of the subcommittee that oversees the National Science Foundation, I would like you to expand a little bit on your ideas of how these non-government agencies, such as NSF, working with universities play into what you see as their role mostly in basic research in accomplishing some of the goals.

    Dr. KLAUSNER. The ballot was shared by Barry Gloom and Josh Letterburg, who have a variety of expertise, including agricultural, recognize that our agricultural system lacks many of the protections, which was also thought to be inadequate of our human public health system, that we don't have an adequate surveillance system, that there are a large number of potentially devastating diseases, natural or that certainly could be introduced. We know that the former Soviet Union was experimenting with and had phytopathogens as part of biologic warfare. We also know that the movement to monoculture props makes those props particularly susceptible to particular pathogens that might be introduced.
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    So what we are calling for is: one, an increased research base in understanding plant pathogens; two, a surveillance system that could be built upon and expanded from the state universities, from state agricultural laboratories, but that needed to be integrated as we were going——

    Mr. SMITH. Oh, absolutely. I agree very much. To react to non-defense institutions, such as the effort through NSF in terms of their research fitting into some of the overall goals of the report.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. If the requirements or the technologies in support of Homeland Security are well defined and understood, and if they are made available perhaps through the National Council on Science and Technology—National Science and Technology Council, I guess it is, with the help of the Office of Science and Technology policy, I would expect that the National Science Foundation would make known to the investigators that normally look there for their support what this set of issues is.

    Mr. SMITH. So coordination, how do we——

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Well, if the issue—it is really a combination, a top down architecture that has the vision of where are the disciplinary opportunities, where, if there were advances in science, might it pay off. You don't know for sure, in capabilities that today don't exist and that you might have been counting on. If you had that picture available and you present that to the scientific community and say, ''With that picture in place, we now invite you to propose research ideas that you have that will address that general scene.'' I think we would get the best of both worlds. We will both get an investment that is targeted to defined areas of high potential. And at the same time, we will not micromanage the scientific community by telling them what research they should do, but instead invite them to be the imaginative folks who have the vision that is in those quotations marks on the wall up there to create capabilities we didn't even know we could have.
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    Mr. SMITH. Last month we passed the public Health Security in Bioterrors and Response Act. Have you examined how we should be evaluating that Act to better fit into a new department of Homeland Security?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. The committee has not looked specifically at how that—how this new configuration, this proposal, as it says, Dr. Branscomb, we haven't had a chance to, as a committee, evaluate this proposal for new departments. So the committee did not address that. Again, what the committee addressed were the types of capabilities that needed to be achieved. And we saw some gaps, particularly in agricultural research, as Dr. Branscomb was saying, agricultural surveillance, but also very similar to what Mr. Wyden was getting at. We made a recommendation to create an agricultural health reserve system, and to develop surge capacity to deal with crop disease outbreaks and the ability to evaluate whether those outbreaks are natural or introduced. Again, I think there were about 18 recommendations that relate to health—human health and agricultural health. Again, our sense is that whatever structures are created, we feel that those are the priorities that need to be functionalized in those structures.

    Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, hopefully, we will have time for a second round, but again, thank you and the other scientists that participated so timely in this effort.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Baird for five minutes.

Quick Response Capacity
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    Mr. BAIRD. I thank the Chair for his leadership on this and welcome my good friend and neighbor to the south, Senator Wyden. I thank the Committee and the panelists. You have done an outstanding job in a very difficult and quick response to this challenge. If there is—I want to compliment you on something that I think is particularly important and ask for you to elaborate and then make maybe a suggestion for an area where I think you might expand.

    In chapter nine you talk about the importance of quick response capacity. I am familiar with researchers who desperately wanted to gather critical information on the response of survivors and families of post-September 11, but our very slow and deliberative grant making process, etcetera, just doesn't provide the resources. You need to get there on the ground study. If you want to do any kind of longitudinal or treatment intervention, you have got to get there, gather your data, start the treatment, and such by the time you have got the grant monies available. Any thoughts on how we can expedite that? Mr. Chair, I hope we can discuss this further in our committee as well.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Let me try two really quick ideas. One is to observe that the very agencies you might think could never respond quickly, like the National Science Foundation where typically the peer review takes six months, the fact of the matter is that the Mt. St. Helens explosion, they had a hundred scientists on the site within days. And indeed, in all of the natural disasters, NSF is right on the scene to capture the technical information while it is fast changing. And that is a very important thing to do. And that is really what is being recommended here, but now in terms of people's responses and activities. So I think we should simply insist that our good science agencies be prepared to work fast under exceptional rules to meet the needs of this issue.
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    Secondly, the report in various places says we really need a capability to not only do a piece of research quickly, but to take that research all the way through to the technology that might be ready for a company to manufacture. And so we think of a pattern of organizations like ARPA in the old days or to some degree DARPA today as representing a mode of operation that meets that kind of requirement where again, they have their talented staff. They operate on their own judgment, they are held accountable for that judgment, but they don't have a slow process.

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Let me just add to that. We discussed these issues, the issues you raised, a lot. And as someone who has just finished running a granting agency, I do not believe it is that the granting agencies do not want to be able to act fast for new and creative ways. It is very much often in the hands of the Congress whether the agencies have the authorities, such as other transaction authorities. We think that this overall science and technology to counter terrorism provides, I think in many ways, a challenge to the Congress to enable, to acquit the science agencies to act quickly, to act creatively with new ways of linking the academic sector and the private sector.

    These models exist throughout the Government, but the authorities to use them are not uniformly distributed. This is something that could be looked at by this Committee very quickly and, we hope, acted on.

    Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I hope we can follow up on that, because I think it is absolutely critical that we provide that kind of flexibility, especially for this quick response kind of research. And we don't have time today, but I would love to sit down with you and talk about how we might do that.
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Psychological Aspect of ''Terrorism''

    The other thing I would—possible suggestion I would add to this, is it is intriguing that we use the word ''terror,'' which implies a psychological response to an act of aggression. And yet, much of the documentation and much of our focus, admittedly and properly so, is how do we protect our water resources. And we have done some good work here, but there is relatively little in your report on expanding our knowledge of what psychological treatment interventions are effective in helping the victims and their families in a terrorist attack. And I would hope, perhaps, in your final draft, you would expand on that, because we have some interventions that are very effective, and we have some that are actually considered the bold standard that research suggests may not be effective at all. Any thoughts on that or willingness to review that issue?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. My first response is this is the final draft, thank goodness. It has been reviewed by 46 expert reviewers, and it is going to be printed as a book just like it is with all the works and problems that it may contain.

    But I think you have a very good point. And I think by a logical extinction of what this chapter says, that is indeed the direction that I would expect social sciences to want to go in trying to understand how you design these systems to assist people. And we did have our own problem in trying to define what we mean by catastrophic terrorism, which is allegedly what this report is about. We had to end up with a pretty flexible concept of what constitutes catastrophic terrorism. I would define it as the point at which the public loses confidence and the Government's ability to provide them protection.
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    Mr. BAIRD. I would define it more individually a little bit. And I know my time is up, but I would say the premise is this: we talk about having vaccines for Small Pox available, we have interventions that can help people who have been through traumatic events, but we don't talk about stockpiling psychological equivalents of vaccines. And any of us probably know constituents or families who have survived September 11 and are not functioning well today and urgently need treatment for depression, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and I hope we can address that more. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the Distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research, Dr. Bartlett.

    Mr. BARTLETT. The Subcommittee on Energy. That had changed. I would first like to make an observation and then ask a question. In another life, I had the privilege of, for 24 years, teaching science. And I would like to suggest that our desire and indeed great need to have more of our young people go into science, particularly women and minorities is not going to be realized until we have a very serious change in our culture.

    If young people are going to pursue these areas, they need to be rewarded and esteemed. And I would suggest that so long as they are almost universally in their schools and their communities recognized as ''nerds'' and ''geeks,'' that this is not likely to happen. We need a fundamental cultural change before our young people are going to go into these areas. I think that is maybe why they are going into these areas from other countries, because their cultures are different than ours in this regard.

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Science and Technology in Identifying Priorities

    As I look through your document, I note what I think most people would have assumed and that is that a would-be terrorist has a very large number of potential opportunities for mischief. And your recommendations are many and challenging, and it is clear that we can not pursue them vigorously, all of them simultaneously. And if you make the assumption that our—that the terrorists who are determined to harm us are not stupid, they are going to come at us where the assault could be most asymmetric, where the least which would do the most harm here. And I am wondering about the role that science and technology could play in war gaming so that we can determine what the most likely attacks are. I know you don't want to put that in your book, but isn't there a role for science and technology in determining where the highest priority areas are? And have you pursued that?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. That is exactly what we want the Homeland Security Institute to do. And although we didn't say so, I think it is an obvious inference that they should do so in collaboration with the—of the output from the intelligence community. And in fact, now again departing from my role as co-Chair, because I will make a comment about the President's Bill. He does, in fact, in Title II of the Bill, have the intelligence bringing together activity in the same place with a lot of the information technology. And it would appear that might be a logical place—it is one of the logical places you could plug in the Homeland Security Institute. In any case, it is very clear that the war gaming kind of approach, which is aimed at testing your guesses about where the attacks might come, is a very important thing to do.

    I think another thing that is important to do is recognizing that a lot of action can be taken, and the private industry can be motivated to do a lot of this work. Many agencies of the Government will put in their own proposals to the President, work that is relevant. They may have a whole department doing this with many, many elements. I think we can cover enough of the water shaft of all these issues, with people looking and working and helping prepare both the police authorities and the first responders, that the terrorists would have real trouble figuring out which is the area we didn't cover.
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    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. Chair recognizes for five minutes Ms. Jackson Lee.

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman very much, and I thank the witnesses for their presentation.

    I will use a good deal of my time to make some comments, and particularly since I have just heard that this is a fait accompli and final and end with an end and no options for inclusion. I do hope, however, as we talk about the idea on institutes, that the ideas that members have put forth will become of value, because I think certainly more heads are better than one.

Women and Minorities in Science and Technology

    First, I would like to thank the Academy for this effort. My great appreciation to all of you. But let me share with you that many of us have our particular perspective as we come to the science committee, one of the committees that I think is one of the more important committees in this Congress. My issue had been the idea of exposure building on what some of the members, Congresswoman Woolsey, has been a leader on, and Ms. Morella and many others. And Senator Wyden, I have heard him speak of this issue of diversity from the time I have come.

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    I have spoken about exposure of minorities, particularly African Americans and Hispanics, to the issues of math and science and to likewise to have bodies interested in them being exposed. One of the measures that I passed in the early stages of my tenure was to encourage the laboratories, the particular laboratories around the Nation, to give their secondhand equipment to primary and secondary schools. That is at a base level. So you can imagine my concern. And I certainly probably would not expect that you have polling numbers, but it seems to be the absence of minorities on this particular commission. This now is no more about—no longer about exposure. It is about survival. And for us to survive as a nation, then all of the communities, underserved, inner city, and rural, have to be equally in tune to the issue of survival, if you will, in the security of our homeland.

    Many of us will have been to one and two and three Homeland Security meetings in a day or over the next couple of weeks. And so I believe the concept of an institute is extremely important because as we run around trying to deal with the practical aspects of security, we need thinkers. We need to have individuals who are ahead of us in thinking how to solve problems. Rather than practicing security and reacting to security, we need to be thinking about our vulnerability and how we can alleviate that.

Local Responses

    I note that you have, in page 1–5, spoken very eloquently about science and engineering, that they hold the potential for future interventions and discoveries that could reduce these vulnerabilities and further, they can address yet-to-be-discovered vulnerabilities. And I believe that is a key to where we need to go with respect to Homeland Security. For example, in your concluding summary, you have states and cities. I believe that is going to be sort of the first level of getting people protected. What, then, will the thinkers say about inner cities, NGOs, if you will, nonprofits? What role do they have to play? How will you inform people who are not online? We talked about that a lot in the new millennium. We don't talk about it as much, but I can tell you in my community, there are a lot of people that are not online. There are a lot of schools that are not online.
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    One of the first things that I did on September 11 is call my home community to find out how they were reacting, what notice was going out. What did I find out? Mass confusion. And I am from a far away place, Houston, Texas. When I say that, parents running to schools, notice not being as well informed, not their fault, as to whether you should pick up your child, whether the child should stay in school. These are thinking issues, because they deal with what we do in practice. So I think these are important issues.

    Let me also comment on the fact that I do appreciate you brought to our attention that out of a $38 million budget, only 10 percent was for R and D. I will leave you with this and ask you to comment on some of the thoughts that I have offered this morning. And I know that many will see this repeatedly. There was a number, 1–888–888–6009. I sort of altered it. ''Call up and order on your master charge the new 'radiotech' device,'' as they showed a family. ''This will protect you against radioactivity. You will have this device, and this will allow you to run out ahead of all of the others that will be massively killed by radioactivity, because you will have the device that we have got on 1–888–888–6009.'' I believe that this is going to be like a circus. The barkers are going to be out selling our citizens, our vulnerable citizens, everything under the sun.

    I would offer to say that we have a great responsibility and this is an important hearing. I conclude, and I said I was going to conclude on the cyber security hearing that we had with Chairman Boehlert, which I thought was very interesting. And I would only say to you that a very valuable point that was made was that there is dormant research that we have here in the Government that is not being utilized; why not utilize it? And I hope if we have an institute, we will be able to utilize these various points that I have made, thinking ahead of the game, but also possibly using dormant research that has not been acted on by the Government to put it into the private sector to be utilized effectively for security of this nation.
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    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Would you let me apologize for a flippant answer to the question of in the next edition of the report? It is indeed a finished report, however, we recognize there are lots of issues that we were only able to open and not to address.

    The National Research Council and the academies have a deep commitment to diversity in public education and lots of work being done there. When we first started this project, we thought that all we were going to do was to address the technology roadmap and that all the issues of implementation, of relationships with other institutions, things like the human resource issues, would be dealt with in a subsequent project. We found we couldn't leave those alone, but in truth, all we were able to do is open the questions. And we didn't give very good answers, and that really is work that remains to be done. And your issues you raised are very important issues in my view.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Dr. Branscomb. The Chair now recognizes distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology and Standards, Dr. Ehlers.

    Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a delight to see all my good friends there in the panel and in the audience, and it is good to have you back again. And thank you, especially, Dr. Branscomb. Although I do have to reprimand you for waking me up this morning on my clock radio, and in a moment of stupor after I awoke, I wondered what you were doing in my bedroom. But you were obviously being interviewed about this report.
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    I also want to just make a comment about Dr. Bartlett's statement about the nerds and the problem. That is indeed a problem. Excuse me, but I am attacking it from a different angle speaking for students across the Nation, trying to instill some pride in them for the work, and in being a nerd, and to turn it around from being a derogatory term. I always remind them of two things. First of all, if a nerd can be a congressman, there may be some hope for them, and I would probably point to the fact that I still wear a plastic pocket protector, as convincing proof that I still am a nerd. But secondly, I always conclude with the comment, do not worry about it, folks, they are all going to end up working for the nerds, which is another fact of life that has to be pointed out.

    Your comments about the Transportation Security Agency, which you just threw in gratuitously are absolutely right. It is a huge disappointment maybe because I was on that Subcommittee, Aviation Subcommittee, and the Conference Committee. We expected much more, and we are rapidly going through a situation where our plans are going to be too expensive and troublesome to use transportation, while ignoring what I regard as the greatest transportation threats: shipping and pipelines. We have much more to do there and I think we have probably done more than enough in aviation.

    On to the subject of your report, the Homeland Security Institute, I think, is absolutely essential, and I am delighted to see you recommend that. I hope we can institute it. It may well be more important to this nation's security than the so called Homeland Security Department, which is likely to be formed, because all I see that doing under present proposals is just pulling bits and pieces of the present administrative structure and putting them all in one place. That does not necessarily yield you any better performance or result. What you are proposing will, indeed. That will be a great improvement in our efforts. I do have a question. Well, let me make one other comment on that. The difficulty is the follow-through. We have all been talking loud about science and technology, and I probably more than any other Member of the Congress, and yet I do not see the increases in the budget other than NIH, and this year again, we are through that situation. We are fighting very hard in this Committee. Chairman Boehlert has been leading the charge with Chairman Smith on doubling NSF, and yet when you look at the budget, the money is not there. We will try to get it there and continue to work on that, but you cannot talk in the abstract about what science and technology can do for defense and Homeland Security without funding the work that they have to do to provide that. That is a lesson that Congress and the Administration have to learn.
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Eliminating the Source of the Threat

    My question, however, is all of this is wonderful when you talk about Homeland Security. My concern is, in an open and free society, it is extremely difficult to provide security, to provide defense. I think we are far better off concentrating your efforts on eliminating the threat. And I have been saying this not just September 11th, but for the past several years, because I have perceived a threat coming some time ago. I have racked my brain about things we can do to improve the security of our nation internally. There is a lot we can do, but for every answer I come up with, I can also generate 10 new ideas about dangers that exist. It seems to me our effort really has to be to concentrate on how can we eliminate the threat. I would appreciate your comments on that.

    Dr. KLAUSNER. In many ways we felt the same way. It varied depending upon the threat we were talking about. Perhaps Dr. Happer would like to describe his Committee's deliberations, but what you are saying is most clear with potential nuclear threats and the almost unthinkable idea of nuclear terrorism, where we wanted to make it very clear that we needed to engage in actions that were aimed at prevention because that is probably largely what we can do. Before we turn to Dr. Happer, let me just say that it may not be true with biologic threats. Biologic threats, either terrorists or emerging infections, are going to be extremely difficult to absolutely prevent. On the other hand, that is an area where the concerted search for new antibiotics, new approaches to anti-toxins, new approaches to the development of vaccines, do provide opportunities to protect ourselves when it is probably going to be difficult to get to complete prevention because of the fundamental difference in the nature of the technology, the simplicity of some of the technology, etcetera. Let me turn to Dr. Happer about that.
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    Mr. EHLERS. Let me just on that point first say you are correct in that score, but partly because the threat is so much smaller than the public believes in terms of biologicals. It is great, but compared to the nuclear or some of the other things they can do, it is—just compare what they did in New York to what happened with anthrax; a few thousand dead versus a handful dead.

    Dr. HAPPER. You are absolutely right that the best way to protect ourselves is from the source if we possibly can, and that is particularly true with the threat from nuclear weapons. And so in our report, you will see we make a very strong recommendation to eliminate as quickly as we can the huge stocks of fissionable material in the Soviet Union. Anything that we can do in this country to hasten that is in our interest. It is in the world's interest. So we have a clear recommendation, for example, to blend down their highly enriched uranium to 20 percent. It would not cost a great deal. There would be almost no loss to them in terms of the Russian economic interest, and the great gain in our own security. So we fully agree with you about the need to go at the source.

    Mr. EHLERS. Is this true in other areas as well?

    Dr. HAPPER. I think so. I think that this is perhaps a little beyond my report, and I suppose I should speak for myself, but you have some large numbers of schools teaching in an organized way hatred of the other, you know, of Jews, of Christians, of Americans, Hindus. You know that is not good for the world.

    Mr. EHLERS. And just one comment on nuclear, I am just really, really afraid of that issue and of the weaponry. I really do not believe the American public and most-likely the American military realize the extent, the danger and the damage from nuclear weapons. It is absolutely incomprehensible. To believe that we can simply destroy incoming missiles and solve the problem, I think, is being perhaps even foolish. That is probably the one case in warfare where a pre-emptive strike is justified, non-nuclear pre-empted strike just to stop it from ever happening.
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    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. We can all say amen to that. The Chair recognizes for five minutes, Mr. Wu.

    Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, but I am just here to listen and learn, and I do that better with my mouth closed, but before I yield back the balance of my time to you, our Senior Senator from Oregon is here, and I would like to yield him as much time as he would like to consume from mine if he would like to make any comments or ask questions.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The distinguished Senator from Oregon is recognized.

    Senator WYDEN. Well, I thank my colleague and we are so glad that he is on the Subcommittee. Congressman Wu has one of the most science-sensitive congressional districts in the country with the Oregon Health Sciences Center and others, and I thank him very much for his thoughtfulness.

Openness of Information and Security Concerns

    I only wanted to ask one question, and impose on my colleague's time. As you know, gentlemen, there is a considerable debate with respect to the openness of counter-terrorism scientific data, and this goes right to the heart of essentially how you strike a balance with respect to how this data is used. The Department of Defense, for example, has been discussing new classification and secrecy restrictions now on sharing, reviewing or publishing the work of scientists who are, in part, funded by the Department. So on one hand, we have got to protect our national security with respect to making sure that vital information does not get out, and at the same time you do not want to impede the advancement of science and cutting-edge technologies. How do you recommend, and in your deliberations, how did you look at the question of how you strike a balance in our society between openness and protecting national security with respect to access to data?
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    Dr. KLAUSNER. Mr. Wyden, we recognize this as a problem, and because of the speed of the study, we realize that all we can do is point to this problem as really a very serious one. Our recommendation, in essence, is an admonition that while this needed to be addressed that we really believed that before any restrictions on basic research be put in place; that a discussion take place, that there be consultation between the scientific communities represented by the universities, the private sector, professional societies and the government. There is, in fact, it is going on as we speak, another committee of the National Academies that is attempting to look at the question of security and secrecy in biologic research as it may relate to terrorism, chaired by Dr. Jerry Fink, from MIT. They are deliberating now. So our Committee made a cautionary recommendation. We did not have the time to come to a resolution of this difficult problem. Perhaps Dr. Hennessey might want to comment about this from the viewpoint of the university.

    Dr. HENNESSEY. I think Dr. Klausner has done an interesting—given a very good answer, and I think you are right, Senator. It is a very complex problem. I think it is a problem that the universities have to—they are certainly sensitive to this problem, and they need to simply sit down with the government agencies and define the boundaries. I think the one thing we would ask of the universities is that the boundaries be clear so that when we engage in certain areas of research we know how to deal with it. I think we do understand the sensitivity and I think a recent report from MIT also suggested some ways in which they would cope with parts of the research that were secret while still preserving some parts that could be open.

    Senator WYDEN. I thank my colleague, and I want to give him back his time. I do think we have to get some boundaries here because if there are not clearly defined boundaries, instead of the win-win, which is to advance science, while protecting national security, we will have a lose-lose here. What we will do is we will end up not promoting the advancement of sciences, as we all wanted. Information will still get out. Dr. Branscomb, did you want to add?
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. I would just like to urge that we be very careful that if we do need to classify or otherwise constrain research information, that we do so on the basis of what the research itself is and not on the basis of who financed it, which in other words, what the justification was for appropriating the money. If NSF continues to do basic research in areas that are important to our society and important to counter-terrorism, the fact that they justified this piece of money because it is known to be potentially helpful to bio-terrorism should not result in any additional constraint if exactly the same work were to be funded for entirely different purposes.

    Senator WYDEN. Chairman, I intruded on my friend's time. Can he perhaps be given another opportunity?

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The other half of the dynamic duo from Oregon is recognized.

    Senator WYDEN. Thank you. Thank you.

    Mr. Wu. Thank you, very much Senator. And it was with the intent of yielding my time that—and my instincts were right, I did learn more by listening. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Long Island, the Empire State, the representative for Brookhaven Laboratory and Stony Brook and the district that produced the science advisor to the President of the United States, Mr. Grucci.
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    Mr. GRUCCI. Well, thank you Chairman, for that generous introduction. You took away half of my opening statement. I, too, want to congratulate you and the Senator for convening this joint hearing today, and for the information that is being presented. As the Chairman did point out, I do represent the Brookhaven National Laboratory. I also represent the District that houses Plum Island in it, and they are two very fine and distinguished laboratories and doing such great work for our country, so much so that on a recent visit by Secretary of Energy, Spence Abraham, he left a little satchel behind of about $80 million to create a Nano Center at the Brookhaven National Laboratory as a result of the fine work that is being done out there.

Roadblocks to Sensor Research, Development, and Deployment

    What he had the opportunity to see and what I have seen that you talked about in your report is the technology and the research being done in sensors, research and development work, and the demonstrations that need to be done and the procurement that needs to be done. I share that with you. I have seen a lot of work being done out at the lab that requires additional funding and additional commitment by the government, and has the potential to really go a long way in helping to protect our homeland, and to ward off such evil from coming to us and creating such damage and destruction. But I also noticed that—or maybe I should just ask you if you would elaborate on the roadblocks that your study committee has identified in the current sensor research and development and the deployment efforts. And could you also elaborate on your recommendations particularly as they relate to the new Homeland Security Department?

Information Sharing and Foreign Scientists
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    Lastly I will end by asking you to consider this as well. The synergy that is created between our national laboratories and universities has always proved to be a pretty good working relationship. Certainly Stony Brook University and Brookhaven Lab can demonstrate that. But now with the heightened alert that we are on and the attention that we are paying to foreign nationalists as they come and share with us some of their knowledge or come here to take back to their country some of their knowledge, could you, just for the benefit of this committee give us your thoughts on that? Do you see that being impaired? Do you see that continuing as in the past or what do you see the future for that being?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. As I said in my opening, I think we have to be very careful in terms of tinkering with a very successful system, as you talk about the synergies between the universities and the national labs that they are associated with have been very productive and essential to making sure that the highest quality work and people are attracted to the national laboratories. I think the universities, as Dr. Hennessey said, are sensitive to the question of sensitive information. The national laboratories provide one type of solution to that, that could allow those interactions in a way that can satisfy national security. Once again, I think that many of us are concerned that if we move, we move very carefully on restricting foreign nationals working in science in our universities. They are and have been a very important part of the productivity of our scientific enterprise. Going back to the sensor issue, if I can, sensors come up in almost every aspect of looking at the approach of technology to making the Nation safer in counter-terrorism, and there is a lot of work going on in sensors. Much of that work, not all of it, but much of it is about the primary sensing technology itself. How do you actually recognize the something you are trying to recognize? One of the things that our report emphasizes is that sensors ultimately, in order to work, have to be thought of as one thinks about a systems approach: that they have to be able to work in a way that they can be linked together; that there are multiple approaches to sensing; that they are linked to output and how they are interpreted, and that they work where they are intended to be deployed. That is a whole different thing. That is why we recommend that we actually think about national sensors research program as programs that go beyond just the specific technology of how a molecule sees another molecule, for example, but actually new ways of that process of sensing, but that it has to be linked to understanding how the systems themselves work, or else we are going to have sensors going off all over the place that we will not know what to do with, either not going off when they are supposed to go off or going off all the time, and we will eventually just turn them off and ignore them.
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    Mr. GRUCCI. What are the roadblocks that you see in the way, and how can we, here, help you break through those roadblocks?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Well, again, we think that one aspect of the Homeland Security Institute, again, is to analyze how solutions to problems need to work; take this sort of systems analysis approach. We think this would be particularly useful for the sensors research. In addition, we think what is critical is to make sure that for these cross-cutting areas of research we provide mechanism and means, perhaps through this new Department, perhaps through OSTP to be sure that research that is going to be successful not within stovepipes, but by cutting across traditional disciplines of material science, biology, chemistry, physics, information science, human factors research. Find, perhaps, new homes in the government or across the government where this transdisciplinary research actually can produce the technologies we want. Those are the types of things that we attempt to address.

    Mr. GRUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes for five minutes Ms. Zoe Lofgren.

    Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me apologize for my absence. I had another Committee that I could not escape.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Let the record note that you were here at the beginning.
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    Ms. LOFGREN. And I am here at the end.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. And you are here at the end.

Openness of Information and Security Concerns

    Ms. LOFGREN. First, let me thank you. I think this is a significant contribution to the safety and well-being of the Nation, but as I think you have noted, it is just the beginning. Much remains to be done. As we move forward, there are many issues. I mean, there are funding issues, and there are organizational issues, but there are also information-sharing issues that I would like to explore a little bit with you. If I am reading this correctly, you hold up the DARPA as kind of a good example of a mission-oriented technology development scheme. And if I am wrong, you will tell me, but what I am hearing is that what you are proposing now is kind of a DARPA for Homeland Security. Maybe that is an over-broad statement, but DARPA had some constraint on information sharing. You mentioned the issue of foreign students in labs and the issue of deemed exports, which I think is a big one. Clearly, university-based research is shared the whole—I mean, you cannot make advances unless you have a free flow of information. How do you reconcile, what recommendations do you have for us in the need and the mutually exclusive impossibility of both sharing and conserving information for security reasons?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Well, if Dr. Hennessey was here, but he had to catch an airplane to get back to Stanford, he would point out that DARPA, in that example, did very successfully fund information technology research to universities that created new capabilities and new technologies many of which then were used independent of the university open research for military applications. So in that way, one can get that research done in the open context of the university, but then still apply it for situations that may, in fact, be classified where you do not want to share information. So we think that in some ways those can be reconciled, all those aspects of what you raise are very difficult. Let me emphasize, however, that while we talk about DARPA as an example, I do not want to over-emphasize that, we recognize that there are positives about DARPA. There are some limitations. More what we are saying is that we need to open up our multiple research funding and agencies to a wide and full range of models of funding and managing research. DARPA, especially the old DARPA, being just one of those examples, and not overly constrained because of procurement limitations or other sorts of managerial limitations, the possibilities of how to get best research done.
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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. And I amplify that by noting that in the President's proposal for our new Department, he has the border control agencies. I would imagine that the actual instrumentation that those agencies deploy in our seaports and airports and elsewhere might well be controlled information not available to the public at some level, because presumably a terrorist, if they knew exactly what was being deployed, could try to figure out a way to work around it. But the science that you do to figure out how to make that system would not help the terrorist at all, at least, marginally in most cases. So that since that science is likely to be embedded in the mainstream of American science for all the other reasons we do science, it would be a great pity to throttle back the entire enterprise without doing much benefit in terms of frustrating the terrorists. But where we have information that if the terrorists knew it, they could work around our defenses, then that should certainly be protected.

    Ms. LOFGREN. Could I follow-up on the deemed export issue because it is something that I really do have a fear that we will become insular and do damage to ourselves. I know some of the founders of Silicon Valley, my District, and companies and patent holders are all new to our country and want to come and be Americans here with us. But it takes a while to become an American, and if we cut off that flow of intelligence, I think we could do damage to ourselves. And yet, there are security concerns. Do you have a recommendation for Congress on that subject?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. The Committee does not have a specific recommendation, but what I can tell you in discussion is that we shared your concern. We just did not feel that it was in our purview to fully and deeply analyze what it took to make an actual policy recommendation about that.
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    Ms. LOFGREN. Finally, I notice that you have a section on the immediate applications of existing technology. I would like to add one. You know, recently the Attorney General suggested that the FBI should be freed up to go surf the web and look at what is in chat rooms to find out what the terrorists are doing. You can agree or disagree with that, but the fact is most of the FBI agents have computers so old they cannot load a browser. So it is an academic discussion. I would really hope that we can add, you know, the need to really upgrade from not cutting-edge, I mean go down to, you know, Fry's and you can buy it today, just to get into the last century. I mean, not even just this century. And I yield back. Thank you.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. And you are absolutely correct.

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Could I just add that that is not only a problem at the FBI, but the number of public health laboratories that have no computers, the number of schools that have no computers. The issue of, you know, are we up to the standards for the most basic equipment for these sorts of issues throughout our society is something that I think really does need immediate attention.

DOE Labs and the Department of Homeland Security

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Let me ask about the interaction with a new Department and DOE labs, because the report is sort of ambiguous about that. What are your thoughts on that? Not the report, the Administrations proposal is ambiguous.

    Dr. HAPPER. Well, certainly, there was tremendous confusion at Livermore for a few days after the Administration's proposals came out. I think the understanding now is that there will be a facility at Livermore. Livermore will continue to be a DOE lab for the most part, but they will have a significant effort working for Homeland Defense outside the normal weapon stance.
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    Chairman BOEHLERT. How would you envision the interaction between a DOE lab and this new Department of Homeland Security?

    Dr. HAPPER. Well, you know, there will be arguments over money, as usual, but I think fundamentally it will be a good one because there are a lot of people at the DOE labs who have thought about these issues for a very long time. And so they will be off to a running start as opposed to trying to start some Greenfeel site with recruiting of new people.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. And attitude is so critically important. I think we are all sort of now getting in the right frame of mind for this whole exercise, Dr. Branscomb.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. It is obviously going to depend, importantly, on the quality of the people that are—the government people who are, in fact, recruited into the Department, because Livermore, of course, is not a government agency. It is a piece of the University of California. Therefore, somebody has to buy that work from them without micromanaging it. My personal opinion is the DOE does not have a great record of doing that well. So the talent is there in the Livermore Laboratory, but the new Department will have to think very hard about how it establishes the right headquarters/field relationship with the laboratory.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Senator Wyden.

Information Sharing

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    Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to this question of information sharing, and particularly information fusion, because you talk about it some in the report. I think to put it in something resembling English, Chairman Boehlert and I are both on the Intelligence Committee, as well, and certainly conceptually this is something you can talk about in open session, is we got this tremendous amount of data, and it is just strewn all over the countryside. And the question is sort of how to bring it together, and to bring it together in a way that people can use and make sense. I have really come to the conclusion that essentially we get to this process after all the horses are out of the barn. You basically have a situation where you have all these systems, you know, out there, and after they are all out there, everyone says, oh, my goodness, what we have got is a situation where we have a lot of incompatible systems, and we have to figure out what to do. That is essentially where we are today. Now, we are looking, of course, at the idea of creating a Department of Homeland Security, and it seems to me with some good counsel from people with expertise in this area, we could turn that around, and we could basically say if we can put in place a system of protocols, for example, ground rules with respect to technology, we could, in effect, use those IT protocols and the IT infrastructure of the new Department of Homeland Security could, in fact, be built around those protocols so that you would be getting at it up front rather than after-the-fact trying to reconcile all these incompatible systems. I would be interested in what you think about that, and whether you have any recommendations as to whether or not protocols even exist for how you would allow effective information sharing over a broad range assistance. Dr. Klausner?

    Dr. KLAUSNER. Since I had nothing to do with the IT panel, I could be extremely complimentary of it, and I am. I think that panel gave us an extremely rich set of recommendations addressing the questions you are asking, and pointing out how many problems there are. It is easy to talk about data fusion and data mining, but there is much that we can imagine doing that the experts in IT on this panel really felt we just simply cannot do now. Now setting of standards, one can move toward doing, but one is going to have to, again, be very, very careful about how to set standards across many agencies that might be brought together in this Department versus the fact that the majority of issues relevant to information technology are in the private sector. So there is going to have to be some way to bring that together. The issue of research into interoperability, machine independent language, how one goes about—I mean, the reason why, as you say, we seem to end up connecting the dots after the horse has left the barn is because once the horse has left the barn, it gives us a whole new set of information that could help guide analysis that we sort of wish we can do without that added information. What is made clear in the report is that despite the promise of data fusion and data mining of interoperability, interoperability standards of machine-based learning, etcetera, that this is an area in which we have under-invested and under-emphasized in terms of research support, and it is going to take research in order to do that. I do like the idea of this new Department, however it is configured, being a model Department. You are building a new Department. It would be nice to have it as a model in terms of—there was a very interesting op-ed today in The Washington Post about this, a model not only for management, for personnel systems, and for how one shares and integrates information. Again, speaking not for the Committee but just for myself, for this type of department creation that is going to attempt to bring so many pieces, district pieces together, if it does not attempt to be a model of flexibility, of innovation in management, in information sharing, I suspect the Department will not work.
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    Senator WYDEN. That is my sense, and I just think some more thought has got to be given with respect to particularly how you are going to develop these specific protocols for information sharing. I mean, what we have done up to this point, and Chairman Boehlert and I sit in other settings and spend a lot of time talking about it, and cannot get into it here, is we all say it is difficult and we all say it is hard, and people have to look into it. But I think it is going to be critical that someone be tasked with coming up with specific protocols for information sharing. Otherwise, what will happen is, in this new effort, we will create a variety of systems. Some will be good. Some will not be as impressive, and we will still have the same problem of incompatibility.

    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I know we are going to wrap up in a second. I want to express my appreciation to you for taking the lead in terms of putting this joint hearing together. I think that we all understand that these are unique times. You know, historically, what happens in this town is that Committees make these good gentlemen trapse all over town testifying before the Subcommittee on Acoustics and Ventilation or whatever it is that has an idea that they have got to get out the technology of acoustics, and we waste a lot of time and a lot of effort that could be better addressed with ideas like you have suggested today. So I thank you very much for doing this. We have got a lot of work to do in the days ahead. You have my commitment to work with you to get that package that we have underway involving cyber security effort, the netguard legislation, working with you and the Bush Administration to get that on the President's desk over the next few months. It is priority business, and working with you has been a real pleasure.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me say the times, now more than ever, call for a bipartisan, bicameral approach to some of these very real problems that are facing us. It is right here, right before our eyes, and I just welcome your partnership, and I welcome and admire your leadership. So thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee.
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    Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will join in on that, and I will, before the Senator leaves, hope to ask him to, as well, consider the viable role that NASA can play with existing technology in international space station, and hope that I will be able to collaborate with the Chairman in a bicameral way, legislation that can help compliment the efforts that we are now making on Homeland Security.

    Senator WYDEN. If my colleague would just yield.

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would be happy to yield.

    Senator WYDEN. I just want you to know that I appreciate your expertise in this area and would be glad to work with you on it.

The Marketplace and Homeland Security

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excellent. I thank you very much. I gave, more or less, a testimony and some of my concerns in my last opportunity to speak to you. I did acknowledge my applause and appreciation. What I would like to do now is just give you the opportunity to comment on three or four points that I made. I will refresh your memory, the whole issue of the marketplace dominating Homeland Security for the less informed with gadgets and you being the institute or proposed institute to really talk about real science and technology. The other point I made is existing dormant research, Dr. Klausner, if you can start out on answering these that we know exist in the Federal Government. It was brought to our attention that there was some technology dealing with laptop computers that might be useful for law enforcement, sort of a mobile command station scenario that might be worthwhile utilizing. That issue, do we have dormant research, to your knowledge, or is that a place in your research or the Commission's report to have that issue pursued? And then the idea of protecting low-tech communities, and how we make sure that they are included in the loop as we do our research and development. And my last point, if you have any knowledge, is the satellite system that NASA has, how effective that can be utilized for civilian protection and security or being utilized by the researchers who are doing research that would help us improve the vulnerabilities that we now have? Thank you very much.
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    Dr. KLAUSNER. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. I think those are all very good points. In many ways, the goal of trying to ask for a central place of evaluation, a place that independently is searching to frame the questions and then look for and evaluate the proposed answers, which is what we hope this think tank and the multiple functions that we ascribe to this independent institute will, in part, address the question of vendors that are hucksters and the very difficult problem that faces locales with very limited budgets of having to make decisions and being told that this is a good counter for radioactivity or this is a good sensor or this is a good protection device. We need to protect our protectors by what we hope the type of independent evaluation entity that we are proposing, which will not necessarily do all the testing and standard setting, but will be looking over the whole landscape to make sure that someone is; that there is someone looking at what is being made available to as information to the emergency responders and the communities for all the different communities that may have very different capabilities, very different resources, and therefore, different needs.

Protecting Communities

    Another issue, in terms of communicating with all communities actually, in some sense, has been raised to one of our top seven immediate actions. And that is for the government to work proactively to think about scenarios. You cannot think about all of them, but to identify trusted spokespeople within the government or connected to the government that can speak to communities in ways that communities understand when situations arise like 9/11 or like anthrax or like many things that one might imagine that we might hope never happen. But that we are prepared up front recognizing what it takes to communicate in a reliable and responsible believed and believable way to the diversity of communities that are in the country. That actually rose to one of our top seven, of all these recommendations, things that the government should move to do immediately.
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    Ms. JACKSON LEE. You do not know how important that is. In a survey done in my local community, the most watched 10 o'clock news was not ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, FOX. It was Univision for ages 18 to 49. That is a very important point.

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. Could I just add, the thought that the best protection we have that the technology deployed will be appropriate for all the people in the community and not just those who are more sophisticated or more wealthy, is if, in fact, the requirements for those technologies are generated in collaboration with the local city officials who have to face the music, because they know who lives in their community. They know what those people can and cannot do, and how they need to be helped.

The Role of NASA in Combating Terrorism

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. Any of you gentlemen have any insight on the value of the space station or NASA in some of the issues that you may be involved in?

    Dr. BRANSCOMB. No, I do not. If you have a good idea, I would love to know about it.

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. As I said, I do have good ideas, but in any event, I hope the Institute will, and I like the idea, will be a think tank. They will look at all the resources that we have that can help us with Homeland Security. Those of us in Texas know how effective and valuable NASA's research has been, and I know the Nation does as well.

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    Dr. BRANSCOMB. It is obvious that NASA has a lot of research capability that is relevant. I am not sure about the space station's activity.

    Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much.

    Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, and Dr. Branscomb and Dr. Klausner, including all of your associates, including the captain of Congresswoman Lofgren's all star team, Dr. Grossman. Thank you very much for, once again, demonstrating your commitment and your public service. We really appreciate it. This hearing is adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Appendix 1:

Biographies, Financial Disclosures, and Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

BIOGRAPHY FOR LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB

Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

    Lewis M. Branscomb is the emeritus Aetna Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management and emeritus director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program in the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Branscomb, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, has a background in physics and public policy. He was a research physicist at the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and also served as its director. He was the founder and first director of the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics at the University of Colorado and an at-large director of the Associated Universities for Research in Astronomy. He served on the President's Science Advisory Committee, where he chaired the PSAC committee on Space Science and Technology during Project Apollo. Dr. Branscomb served as vice president and chief scientist of IBM Corporation until his retirement 1986, and is a former president of both the American Physical Society and of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society.
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BIOGRAPHY FOR RICHARD D. KLAUSNER

Executive Director, Global Health Programs, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

    Richard D. Klausner is Executive Director of the Global Health Programs at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Dr. Klausner, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine, is well known for his contributions to multiple aspects of cell and molecular biology and is highly cited for work in biology and biomedical research. His work has been recognized with numerous honors and awards including the Outstanding Investigator Award from the American Federation of Clinical Research and the William Damashek Prize for Major Discoveries in Hematology. Dr. Klausner was chief of the Cell Biology and Metabolism branch of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development from 1984 until 1997, and director of the National Cancer Institute from 1995 until 2001. He has served on numerous advisory committees, including chair of an NRC project charged with writing standards for science education for the United States from kindergarten through 12th grade. Dr. Klausner is the past President of the American Society for Clinical Investigation and is the author of over 280 scientific articles and several books.

80340b.eps

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Questions for the Record to Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb and Dr. Richard D. Klausner by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph Hall

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Q1. You discuss at length the need for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to play a stronger, more visible, and more active role. Specifically, the report recommends making the Director of OSTP the leader in the process of developing the S&T research priorities for counter-terrorism.

A1. The Academies Report recommends that the Director of OSTP should lead an interagency process to develop the research priorities for counter-terrorism, but these priorities would be responsive to and aligned with the overall counter-terrorism agenda developed by OHS. We believe this is the correct role for OSTP both before the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and after, since the R&D programs that need to be coordinated will arise from agencies both within and without those to be incorporated in the new department.

    The R&D priorities would, of course, be informed by the threat analysis and examination of technical alternatives by the Homeland Security Institute that the report recommends the Director of OHS establish. But the Director of OSTP is in a good position to work with all the technical agencies to assist the OMB and OHS with setting those priorities.

Q1a. Is the current level of coordination in setting research priorities adequate?

A1a. It is difficult to determine whether the present level of coordination of research priorities for homeland security is adequate because so little research has emerged in the budget for counter terrorism research. The requirements must be established and priorities set before it is possible to assess the need for coordination, much less its adequacy.

Q1b. What level of resources, financial and human, would be needed for OSTP to do the job that you envision?
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A1b. Once those requirements emerge, we suspect that the resources in OSTP will be found inadequate. The number of Assistant Directors has been reduced from prior periods, and a substantial number of the staff are on loan from the agencies OSTP has to oversee and coordinate. The homeland security mission, in which OSTP serves as the technical arm of OHS today, adds substantially to the work of OSTP, which still must oversee the highly diverse federal R&D enterprise outside the area of security.

Q1c. What should OSTP be doing that it is not currently doing?

A1c. We are not in a position to comment on OSTP's total scope of function and responsibility, since we have not reviewed it. In the area of homeland security we believe OSTP is using its current resources to the best advantage in support of the OHS and in seeking to engage the scientific and engineering community in the national counter-terrorism effort.

Q1d. Has the President invested enough authority in the Director to allow him to perform this duty?

A1d. The report also concludes that if the Director of OSTP were appointed assistant to the President and reported to him, his effectiveness would be substantially increased. However we recognize that this decision is a personal one for the President to make.

Q1e. Should the OSTP organic act be amended in specific ways to accomplish your objectives?

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A1e. We believe the Organic Act establishing OSTP as a statutory agency within the Executive Office of the President is quite adequate, although we have not made a detailed study of the matter to see if there any improvements needed. We note that, unlike the current structure of OHS, the OSTP not only has the authority to receive support from a nonprofit, dedicated contractor support organization, but also has a very modest one in place.

Q2. Discuss the procurement and regulatory changes that you believe are necessary for the Department of Homeland Security to conduct its business rapidly and efficiently. Specifically, would you recommend that the Department be granted the ''other transactions authority'' that the Department of Defense has?

A2. [Answer to be provided later.]

Q3. In the President's legislative proposal, the Department of Homeland Security would set priorities for health-related R&D. This has caused concern among health researchers.

    Do you think these priorities should be set by DHS or by existing agencies like NIH?

A3. This specific question was not explicitly addressed in the Academies Report. We can offer the committee our personal judgment based on our experience in managing government and industrial R&D in the past. We believe there is a principle that should govern the way a new Department should purchase and finance the R&D it believes is necessary for its counter terrorism mission. The Department should have its own R&D organization and the authority to support R&D in laboratories inside and outside government like all the other ''mission-oriented'' technical agencies of government. Applied research and development in support of operations in DHS should be funded by DHS, either in its own laboratories or by a transfer of DHS funds to another agency more able to do the work quickly and well.
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    However, where DHS needs research leading to new capabilities, and there are science and engineering research skills already in place and already contributing to the homeland security mission, as in the case of the NIAID in NIH and the computer security division of NIST, those capabilities should remain in place and should be funded by a line item in their agency budgets. Once the OHS has made its strategy for this longer-term research, and OHS and OSTP have found agreement on the resources available, the funds would be added to those agency budgets by OMB. The recipient agencies would remain accountable for the quality and value of the research.

    Thus in the NIH case, we feel strongly that the OHS strategy should inform the NIH on its research needs, and NIH should undertake to respond to them with line item funding that would be included in the NIH budget by OMB. The alternative of removing the funds from the NIH budget, and then transferring them back under the control of OHS officials creates an unnecessary and inappropriate relationship between the agencies and we fear it will lead to a pattern of micromanagement such as is often seen in DOE in its relationship with its national laboratories. Of course if there are operations support activities needed by DHS, it would be appropriate for these to be funded by DHS as required, or for some of the capability to be built up in DHS.

Q4. Who should set the Information Technology research priorities contemplated in your report?

A4. We believe the principle put forth in our response to Question 3 should be applied throughout the R&D needs of the new Department.

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    The information technology research priorities for homeland security will be of two kinds—(a) those that serve the operational needs of the department (which has a cyber security mission as well as responsibility for integrating and acting on intelligence information), and (b) the urgent need to expand the state of the art and understanding for computer and network security, which calls for highly creative research by the community with the highest basic research skills in this field. The (a) program priorities will be proposed by OHS, and OSTP would work with OHS to identify agencies outside the department with special skills in computer security (such as NIST) that could make valuable contributions. Program priorities for the (b) programs—funded to serve homeland security but best performed in an open, basic research environment—would be set by the agencies in the best position to fund and manage such programs: NSF, DOE and other agencies.

Q5. There is currently a group in the Federal Government—the Technical Support Working Group—that screens and funds promising new anti-terrorism technologies. TSWG is co-chaired by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

Q5a. Is TSWG effective?

A5a. The TSWG is regarded by both the participating agencies and those who worked on our report as quite successful in identifying existing technologies, or technologies that could easily be adapted to meet counter-terrorism needs of the client agencies. But we are under the impression that TSWG did not feel that it was well positioned to help user agencies get access to research resources to advance technologies not yet fully developed. For this reason, TSWG welcomed the collaboration of technical experts brought in by the NRC.

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Q5b. Should it be absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security?

A5b. The new Department will definitely need access to the capability described in 5a, i.e., the capability to identify relevant existing (or easily adaptable) counter-terrorism technologies. However, we are not in a position to comment on whether TSWG itself should be absorbed into the new Department or how else the Department might access the needed capability. TSWG has clearly served a very useful role and should be complimented for taking the initiative when it did.

Q6. You recommend that the new Department of Homeland Security should have an Under Secretary for Technology. This mirrors a provision in Sen. Lieberman's bill on Homeland Security, S. 2452.

A6. Our reading of the description of S. 2452 calls for an Office of Science and Technology to advise the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rank of the head of this office is not given in the Bill description provided to us by Committee staff on June 26. For the positions within DHS, Title V specifies the rank for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary only. The Academies report calls for an under secretary for technology (or science and technology) to have this function. The President's Bill has no provision for such an S&T manager at all.

Q6a. Please elaborate on how the R&D office should be organized and staffed.

A6a. While the Academies Report does not spell out what the duties and authorities of this under secretary should be in detail, in our personal judgment, based on many years experience in government S&T management, we believe the under secretary must have budget control over all of the Department's R&D, although those R&D activities in support of specific operating units should be managed by the heads of those units. A position of Director of S&T who only advises will be empty of authority and weak in effectiveness. In other words the conventional role of ''science advisor to the secretary'' will not be able to fulfill the needs.
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Q6b. Which of your suggestions in (a) should be incorporated into organic legislation?

A6b. The legislation should specifically call for a Presidentially-appointed, senate-confirmed under secretary for technology with responsibility delegated from the Secretary to propose to the Secretary the R&D component of the Department's budget, to supervise the performance of this R&D by the line managers in the divisions who have justified the requirements, and to represent the Department in its interactions with the OSTP and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), and any other interagency technical bodies that may be defined in the statute (such as the bodies defined in S. 2452).
    The legislation should also authorize the Department to contract for the analytical and technical services of the Homeland Security Institute proposed in the Academies' Report. We would expect that the HSI would also report to the under secretary for technology, although it might be wise to leave this to the discretion of the Secretary. Under certain circumstances the Secretary might want this institute to report to the Deputy Secretary or to the Secretary himself.

Q7. Your report highlights the disconnect between research agencies and operational mission agencies. This is not a new problem. The inability of the United States government to take research from the workbench, develop it and make it useful either to government or, more often, in the marketplace, is well documented.

A7. The question notes the managerial significance of the distinction to be made between operational and support functions. This distinction is critical to the logic of our views in the previous questions. But your subsidiary questions address a different issue: the importance of the rapid and economically successful conversion of inventions into innovations that are in the market and available to those who need them. Given the time pressures that we expect to prevail in homeland security, this is a more important issue than is usually the case for government R&D programs.
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Q7a. What kind of mechanisms need to be in place to ensure the researcher knows what the first responder needs (i.e., how should users be involved in setting research priorities)?

A7a. The Academies Report stresses the importance of designing technologies that reflect the needs of and training available to the emergency officials and first responders. Few federal R&D programs have experience at doing this, since many grew up designing systems for use by military personnel or commercial pilots or other highly trained people with well-defined roles for which they are specifically trained. The users of counter-terrorism technologies will still have to be able to adapt to unforeseen situations, no matter how well they may be supported by technology.

    Our report recommends that the federal agencies work with the many professional associations that today already serve the function of bringing together the requirements of police, fire or other emergency professionals and making these requirements available for standards processes, to state and local governments, and to federal officials. We believe these institutions can be important means not only for hearing the voice of the users but also for finding the common requirements that satisfy the largest part of their needs, which would help allow a national market to be integrated. (See page 13–2, and several places in Chapter 8 on Cities.)

Q7b. Should the Director of either the Office of Homeland Security or OSTP assume this responsibility or would it seem more appropriate for an Under Secretary of Technology at the Department of Homeland Security?

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A7b. The responsibility for ensuring that user needs are reflected in the R&D should be assigned to every operating unit of the Department that is setting requirements and contributing to the homeland security strategy. Indeed this should be very high on every manager's list of things to pay attention to. It would probably be wise for the under secretary for technology to have a small but very strong-minded staff office headed by a forceful person with many years of experience either as a first responder or in the business of serving first responders' needs unusually well. This person would deliver the message and call quick attention to failures.

    This message will also have to get to those people doing longer-range research outside the Department, through conferences, documentation, and all other available means. Failure to address the reality of the users' needs is high on the list of ways the national effort can fail.

Appendix 2:

Additional Material for the Record