SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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86–869PS
2003
NASA'S INTEGRATED SPACE
TRANSPORTATION PLAN AND
ORBITAL SPACE PLAN PROGRAM
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 8, 2003
Serial No. 108–18
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
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MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CHRIS BELL, Texas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
ZOE LOFGREN, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM MATHESON, Utah
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DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
VACANCY
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
CHRIS BELL, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado
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DAVID WU, Oregon
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BRAD SHERMAN, California
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
May 8, 2003
Witness List
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
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Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Prepared Statement by Representative Tom Feeney, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Panel:
Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Dr. Jerry Grey, Director of Aerospace and Science Policy, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Oral Statement
Written Statement
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Biography
Mr. Dale D. Myers, President, Dale Myers and Associates
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President and Chief Operating Officer, IN-Q-TEL
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Discussion
Cancellation of ALT Access to Station
NASA Workforce Issues
Cancellation of X–38/CRV
Ending the Shuttle Program
ISS Crew Return Agreements
Restart X–38/CRV
Marginal Cost of EELVs
Unmanned Shuttle
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Dr. Jerry Grey, Director of Aerospace and Science Policy, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Mr. Dale D. Myers, President, Dale Myers and Associates
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President and Chief Operating Officer, IN-Q-TEL
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Ralph M. Hall, dated Jan. 15, 2003, from Charles T. Horner, Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Letter to Sean O'Keefe, dated December 20, 2002, from Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Democratic Member, and Bart Gordon, Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Request For Cost Information On X–38/CRV and SLI Cost Estimates from House Committee on Science, prepared by NASA Headquarters, Jan. 13, 2003
Orbital Space Plane (OSP) Level II System Requirements Document (SRD)
NASA'S INTEGRATED SPACE TRANSPORTATION PLAN AND ORBITAL SPACE PLANE PROGRAM
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2003
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House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:37 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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HEARING CHARTER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA's Integrated Space
Transportation Plan and
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Orbital Space Plane Program
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2003
10:30 A.M.–12:30 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing entitled NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan and Orbital Space Plane Program on Thursday, May 8th at 10:30 a.m. in 2318 Rayburn. The hearing will examine NASA's proposed Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP)(see footnote 1) and plans for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP). Topics will include the proposed ISTP architecture and OSP requirements, including NASA's development strategy for the OSP, plans for risk reduction and technology demonstrations, as well as the proposed schedule and total cost of the OSP program.
BACKGROUND
Since the 1980s, NASA has struggled to develop a new launch system to provide safe, routine, and less expensive access to space. Over the years, numerous concepts have been studied, but few have made it beyond concept definition and none have flown in space. In March 2001, NASA canceled the X–33 single-stage-to-orbit program and the X–34 technology demonstrator after spending $1.4 billion (not including $356 million spent by Lockheed on X–33). NASA concluded that the technical barriers of the X–33 were too great and that the benefits of the X–34 did not justify the cost. Last year, NASA canceled the X–38, a prototype of a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV), because it was believed that a multi-purpose vehicle would be a better use of its resources. NASA headquarters estimated costs for an X–38 vehicle and three production CRVs in the range of $3 billion to $5 billion.(see footnote 2) NASA is continuing to move forward with the X–37 flight demonstration as part of the OSP program, but its value and relevance as a technology demonstrator for the OSP program is questionable because the on-orbit demonstration would not occur until after NASA made its decision for full-scale development.
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Last November, NASA submitted a budget amendment to its FY 2003 request to restructure and refocus the ISTP. The budget amendment proposed to extend the life of the Space Shuttle by creating a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), to establish a program to develop an OSP for crew rescue and crew transportation to Space Station, and to establish a technology program called the Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program. The budget amendment bolstered reserves on the Space Station program, as recommended by the Young Commission.
Because the budget amendment was submitted late in the 107th Congress and because no hearings were held to review the proposal, Congress specifically stated in the Omnibus appropriations report that the ''funding level is not endorsed or denied,'' but wanted to examine the details of the proposal, especially cost. The Omnibus bill did provide funding for the OSP at the requested level of $296 million for FY 2003.(see footnote 3) Other than minor changes, NASA's FY 2004 budget request reflects the program proposed in the budget amendment. This is the first hearing held by any committee on NASA's ISTP and OSP plans.
Current Status of OSP
In January 2003, NASA finalized the OSP top-level requirements, known as the Level 1 requirements. NASA divided these requirements into two parts: (1) the requirements for the crew rescue capability with a delivery date of 2010 (although the need date is 2006 because the Russians complete their obligations for Soyuz crew return capsules); and (2) the requirements for the crew transportation capability to ISS and back with a delivery date of 2012. The complete Level 1 requirements are provided in Appendix 3.
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NASA recently awarded three study contracts totaling $135 million: $45 million each to Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and the Northrop Grumman/Orbital Sciences team. NASA expects the contractors to perform technical engineering studies and further refine the requirements. NASA will hold a System Requirements Review in November 2003 and expects to make a decision on full-scale development by the end of 2004. Key technical tradeoffs include: (1) one vehicle or a family of vehicles; (2) a winged vehicle, lifting body, or capsule and; (3) entirely reusable, partially reusable, or expendable. The results of these tradeoffs will have a significant impact on cost and schedule.
Apollo-style OSP Study
At the urging of several NASA Advisory Council (NAC) members, most notably former Senator John Glenn, NASA enlisted a small group of distinguished aerospace executives and system experts to assess the viability of using Apollo designs as a jump-start toward satisfying the OSP Level 1 requirements. Mr. Dale Myers, a former Deputy NASA Administrator and experienced manager from Apollo and Shuttle, was a member of the Apollo OSP study team and will be a witness at the hearing to present the findings of the team.
In short, the team unanimously concluded that an Apollo-derived crew rescue vehicle, with a four to six person crew, appears to have the potential of meeting most of the OSP level 1 requirements for crew rescue, with the possible exception being the requirement to transport an injured astronaut to definitive medical care within 24 hours. An Apollo derived crew transfer vehicle would also appear able to meet most of the OSP Level 1 requirements for crew transfer with the addition of a service module for propulsion to rendezvous with the Space Station. The study team concluded that the idea had sufficient merit to warrant a serious detailed study of the performance, cost, and schedule for this approach as compared with other OSP options. NASA does not plan to investigate the Apollo concept further, but is providing the study results to the contractors for their consideration.
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OSP Schedule Acceleration Study
In addition to the Apollo study, NASA convened several in-house and contractor teams to assess whether it was possible to accelerate the schedule for the OSP. While the teams found limited potential for accelerating the schedule, up to possibly two years, they agreed on several common themes, specifically to rely heavily on existing technology, narrow the design options early, set requirements and do not change them, allow sufficient budget reserves to manage risk, and consider using a single vehicle design for both the crew rescue and crew transfer functions. NASA plans to incorporate the results of these studies into a revised (post-Columbia) Integrated Space Transportation Plan, due to be completed this summer.
KEY ISSUES
Vision for the Future?
NASA has yet to determine its goals for human spaceflight beyond Space Station. Without long-term goals, it is very difficult to know how best to invest funds in developing a new space transportation system, and the agency runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past by building the system first and then deciding how they want to use it later. While the ISTP is intended to fill a specific need for the Space Station, such a large and long-term investment should be made in the context of the agency's long-term goals. A clear set of goals would provide the proper framework for making policy decisions and setting funding priorities.
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Do We Need and Can We Afford Both Shuttle and OSP?
NASA defines the OSP as a ''supplement'' to the Space Shuttle, and in briefings to staff, NASA has asserted that the Space Shuttle is required for the duration of the International Space Station (ISS) program with or without OSP. However, NASA has not substantially supported this argument. The ISTP plan calls for the Space Shuttle to continue to operate at least until 2015 and possibly beyond 2020. While plans for the Space Shuttle will certainly be examined again after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reports, NASA has not made a compelling argument that it needs both the Shuttle and an OSP, nor that it can afford building and maintaining both systems. In addition, it is unclear to what degree NASA considered capabilities from the International Partners, such as Russian Soyuz capsules and Progress vehicles and the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), in deciding what capabilities the U.S. must develop.
How do Tech Demos Fit into OSP?
NASA proposes to spend approximately $750 million on technology demonstrations between 2003 and 2006. The projected budget for each of the three demonstration projects is provided in the Appendix. Major demonstrations include the X–37 space flight demonstrator, the Pad Abort Demonstration (PAD) to demonstrate crew abort concepts on the launch pad, and the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART). All of these technology demonstrations were started prior to the OSP program and, therefore, were not necessarily driven by the needs of the OSP program. Since the OSP program has not yet progressed beyond establishing the Level 1 requirements, it is not clear that these are the highest priority technologies to demonstrate and warrant the proposed $750 million investment.
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What will OSP Cost?
NASA proposes to spend more than $4 billion on the OSP (including the technology demonstrations) between FY 2003 and FY 2008, but does not plan to field the crew rescue capability until 2010 and the crew transportation capability until 2012. NASA has not provided an estimate for the cost to achieve each of these milestones or an estimate for the total cost of the program. Clearly, this is critical information for making any policy decision. NASA managers unofficially estimate the total cost to be in the range of $9 to $13 billion, however this figure could grow dramatically and will be driven primarily by the complexity of the selected concept and the amount of research and development NASA chooses to take on with the development of the OSP. Without a solid cost estimate the committee must decide whether it has enough confidence in the plan to justify the $550 million requested for FY 2004.
Why did NASA Cancel Alternate Access to Station?
NASA proposes to eliminate the Alternate Access to Station (AAS) program later this year despite the fact that the House Appropriations Committee reported out strong language directing NASA to spend $62.7 million in FY 2003 on AAS to ''demonstrate a near-term commercial ISS re-supply service.'' NASA's decision to cancel AAS appears particularly short-sighted since the Space Station's crew size is now reduced from three to two because of the limited ability to deliver enough water, food, and other supplies to support more than a two person crew while the Shuttle is grounded. NASA's FY 2004 budget request does not include the projected run-out of $85 million for AAS included in the FY 2003 request. Some in industry have highlighted that an architecture consisting of OSP and an Alternate Access capability for cargo delivery would obviate the need for the Space Shuttle entirely.
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Why did NASA Cancel the X–38 Crew Return Vehicle Prototype?
Before NASA changed its program and submitted the budget amendment last November, NASA had an objective to provide a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) capability by 2012. NASA was pursuing a CRV prototype known as the X–38 program. The X–38 performed several approach and landing demonstrations and could have provided an interim crew return capability for the ISS by 2006, but was canceled. On June 13, 2002, NASA notified Congress of the project's cancellation citing their desire to pursue a multipurpose vehicle, which could include both crew transport and crew return capabilities as a more optimal use of NASA's resources than pursuit of a single-purpose vehicle, such as the X–38 project. After 2006 the Russians are not required to provide any more Soyuz capsules and the U.S. is prohibited from purchasing Russian hardware because of the restrictions on doing so in the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000. A key issue is whether NASA should re-examine its decision to cancel the X–38.
Are Expendable Launch Vehicles Acceptable for OSP?
The OSP will be launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), such as an Atlas or Delta rocket. ELVs were used for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs in the 1960s, however none of these programs had a winged vehicle on top of the rocket as may be (but not necessarily) proposed on the OSP program. A key issue is whether the use of ELVs poses an unacceptable risk for launching humans into orbit. In addition, today's ELVs cost approximately $150 million each, so the cost of the launch vehicle combined with the cost of an OSP (amortized if it is reusable) could approach the cost per flight of the Shuttle, arguably in the neighborhood of $500 million.
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WITNESSES
The Honorable Frederick D. Gregory is the Deputy Administrator of NASA. He serves as the Chief Operating Officer for the agency and reports directly to NASA's Administrator. Prior to his Senate confirmation in August 2002, Mr. Gregory served as Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and for nine years as the Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. Mr. Gregory has logged over 455 hours in space as an astronaut, and has extensive experience as a test pilot, and manager of flight safety programs and launch support operations.
Dr. Jerry Grey is the Director of Aerospace and Science Policy for AIAA, a member of the Science Counsel of the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, and Visiting Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. Dr. Grey has served as consultant to the U.S. Congress as Chairman of the Office of Technology Assessment's Solar Advisory Panel and several space advisory panels, and as a member of the NASA Advisory Council, and Vice-chairman of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee.
The Honorable Dale D. Myers is the President of Dale Myers and Associates, and has had a distinguished career in high-level management positions in government and industry. Mr. Myers has served as NASA's Deputy Administrator, and Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight; as Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy; as Vice President and Program Manager of the Space Shuttle Program for Rockwell International; and prior to that as Vice President and Program Manager of the Apollo Command and Service Module for North American Rockwell. In March of this year he led a team of experts tasked to assess the viability of using Apollo heritage designs to satisfy the OSP requirements.
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Dr. Michael Griffin is the President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel. He has nearly 30 years of experience managing information and space technology organizations. Dr. Griffin has served as Executive Vice President and CEO of Magellan Systems Division of Orbital Sciences Corporation, and as EVP and General Manager of Orbital's Space Systems Group. Prior to that he served as both the Chief Engineer and Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, and at the Pentagon as the Deputy for Technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.
Appendix 1
The table below summarizes the assumptions NASA has used when making space transportation strategy decisions over the past decade, how they have changed, and how they are now forecast in the revised ISTP.(see footnote 4)
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NASA studied the following options during the summer of 2002 during the development of the current ISTP:
Baseline ISTP—Make the decision in 2006 to build a new RLV two-stage booster and crew transfer vehicle to deliver crew and some cargo.
Orbital Space Plane and delay RLV booster—Develop an Orbital Space Plane by 2010–12 to be flown atop an existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) that must be human rated.
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Develop a Prototype RLV Booster by about 2011—Build a common RLV prototype booster with the Department of Defense. An operational booster would come later.
Breakthrough Technology—Continue to spend money on long-term, high payoff technology like hypersonic propulsion placing RLV on hold indefinitely.
NASA has decided to pursue the second option—Orbital Space Plane and delay RLV booster. In the budget amendment submitted to Congress in November 2002, NASA redirected the SLI program. SLI funds were transferred to the Orbital Space Plane program, as well as the Space Shuttle, space station, and Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program.
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Appendix 3
Orbital Space Plane Program Level 1 Requirements
1. The system, which may include multiple vehicles, shall provide rescue capability for no fewer than four ISS crew as soon a practical but no later than 2010.
2. The system shall provide rescue capability that allows the safe return of deconditioned, ill or injured crew members with ongoing treatment until arrival at definitive medical care within 24 hours. Crew should not require suits in the vehicle, but the vehicle should support crew wearing suits if the situation warrants.
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3. The system for rescue shall provide for rapid separation from the ISS under emergency conditions followed by return to Earth.
4. Safety requirements—system for crew rescue:
a. The availability (defined as ''a full-up vehicle able to perform it's mission'') for the escape mission shall be at least:
i. Objective: 99%
ii. Minimum Threshold: 95%
b. The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Soyuz for the rescue mission.
5. The system shall provide transportation capability for no fewer than four crew, to and from the ISS as soon a practical, but no later than 2012.
6. Safety requirement—system for crew transport: The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Space Shuttle for the transport mission.
7. The system shall be designed for minimum life cycle cost.
8. The system shall meet all applicable ISS requirements for visiting and attached vehicles.
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9. Compared to the Space Shuttle, the system shall require less time to prepare and execute a mission and have increased launch probability.
10. Compared to the Space Shuttle, the system shall have increased on-orbit maneuverability.
Orbital Space Plane Program Concept of Operations
1. The vehicle(s) shall initially launch on an ELV.
2. The system shall be operated through at least 2020. However, the system should be designed so that I could be operated for a longer time.
3. NASA envisions that the systems for crew rescue and crew transport could be different versions of the same vehicle design.
4. The system shall provide contingency capability for cargo delivery to or from the ISS to support a minimal level of science.
5. The system shall support a nominal ISS crew rotation period of 4–6 months.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. I hereby call this meeting of the Space and Aeronautic Subcommittee to order. And without objection, the Chair will be granted authority to recess this committee at any time. All right. Hearing no objection.
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At today's hearing, we will examine NASA's Revised Integrated Space Transportation Plan and the Orbital Space Plane. Given NASA's poor track record on space transportation programs, like NASP, X–33, X–34, and more recently, SLI, and I think I supported every one of those programs, the American people have seen little in return from the investment in these programs, unless—of course, I am always willing to be corrected when I say something like that. And so we see very little in return in terms of improving our nation's launch capabilities. And in light of these failures, or at least non-successes, I welcoming—I am welcoming the restructuring of the Space Launch Initiative as a positive step toward making good on the promise of cheap, reliable, and safe access to space.
As we begin to peel back the layers of the onion, however, and NASA's proposed plan appears to be, perhaps, just another initiative that is long on promises and short on likely results. So let us hear about it. That simply won't cut it any more, and we have seen this in the past, so let us discuss this and make sure that is not going to happen.
In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, NASA continues to view its space transportation requirements through a Space Shuttle prism. For example, for the foreseeable future, NASA has only one U.S.-controlled option for delivering cargo to the International Space Station, and that is the Space Shuttle.
Just last weekend, we reduced the space station's crew from three to two, because NASA can not deliver enough water and food to keep three people alive. Furthermore, we are now completely dependent on our European and Russian partners to deliver enough supplies to maintain even this reduced crew. Unbelievably, NASA is sticking by their plan to kill the Alternative Access to the Station program even when they are in the middle of—in a situation like this. And they are hoping that the Shuttle's return to flight will solve this problem. Now that is, of course, until the next crisis happens.
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Something doesn't make sense here. It just doesn't make sense. And that is what we want to find out today. Let us try to make sense of this strategy. So further, let me note that NASA views the Orbital Space Plane as merely a supplement to Shuttle, at least that is what it appears. And it is unclear how NASA will pay to develop the Orbital Space Plane while operating the Shuttle, which we all know is a costly transportation system, let alone whether NASA can afford to operate both the Orbital Space Plane and the Shuttle at the same time.
Additionally, NASA has yet to provide a clear picture regarding the strategy, schedule, and cost of the Orbital Space Plane. And let me add that over the years, I have been supporting research projects both in NASA and in the Air Force and in the DOD side and NASA side that I would've expected something, at least a schedule, that we could accept at this moment from all of the money that has been put into that research. So we need to discuss these things.
Some of us see the Orbital Space Plane and alternative cargo delivery capability as a potential path for an early phase-out of the Space Shuttle that in order to save lives and money while maximizing the research potential of the Space Station. But—and considering the Challenger's and the Columbia's situation and the disasters we have had there, than maybe this makes sense. But NASA has proposed a plan that offers little hope in this regard. Apparently NASA's space transportation strategy continues to be all things to all people, and we have got to pin that down today.
I have discussed these issues with well-informed individuals. I had a personal discussion with Senator John Glenn, and I believe, as many of these other experts believe, that NASA must give greater consideration to finding a viable near-term solution for our immediate space access challenges. NASA should not be spending huge sums of money on an uncertain Orbital Space Plane design, and we shouldn't be depending exclusively on foreign partners for ISS re-supply. So as Sean O'Keefe would say, ''Hope is not a strategy. We need a clear and realistic plan that sets priorities and delivers results.'' That is what happens when you testify. Sometimes you get quoted back to yourself.
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Post-Columbia realities demand that we reject a business-as-usual approach. Today's distinguished panel will help us focus our attention on the barriers to achieving safe, reliable, and affordable access to space.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANA ROHRABACHER
Today's hearing will examine NASA's revised Integrated Space Transportation Plan and the Orbital Space Plane. Given NASA's poor track record on space transportation programs like NASP, X–33, X–34, and more recently SLI, the American people have seen little return from their investment in improving our nation's launch capabilities. In light of these failures, I welcomed the restructuring of the Space Launch Initiative as a positive step towards making good on the promise of cheap, reliable, and safe access to space. As we begin to peel back the layers, however, NASA's proposed plan appears to be just another initiative that is long on promises and short on likely results. That simply won't cut it any more with this subcommittee.
Even in the wake of the Columbia tragedy, NASA continues to view its space transportation requirements through a Space Shuttle prism. For example, for the foreseeable future, NASA has only one U.S.-controlled option for delivering cargo to the ISS, and that is the Space Shuttle. Just last weekend we reduced the Space Station's crew size from three astronauts to two because NASA cannot deliver enough water and food to keep three people alive. Furthermore, we're now completely dependent on our European and Russian partners to deliver enough supplies to maintain even this reduced crew. Unbelievably, NASA is sticking by their plan to kill the Alternate Access to Station program, and hoping that the Shuttle's return to flight will solve this problem. . .that is until the next crisis.
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Further, NASA views the Orbital Space Plane as merely a supplement to the Shuttle. But it is unclear how NASA will pay to develop the Orbital Space Plane while operating the Shuttle, let alone whether NASA can afford to operate both the Orbital Space Plane and Shuttle at the same time. Additionally, NASA has yet to provide a clear picture regarding the strategy, schedule, and costs for the Orbital Space Plane.
Some of us see the Orbital Space Plane and alternative cargo delivery capability as a potential path for early phase-out of the Space Shuttle in order to save lives and money while maximizing the research potential of the Space Station. But NASA's proposed plan offers little hope in this regard. Apparently, NASA's space transportation strategy continues to be all things to all people.
I've discussed these issues with well-informed individuals like former Senator John Glenn, and I believe, as they do, that NASA must give greater consideration to finding viable, near-term solutions for our immediate space access challenges. NASA should not be spending large sums of money on an uncertain Orbital Space Plane design. We shouldn't be depending exclusively on foreign partners for ISS re-supply. As Sean O'Keefe would say: Hope is not a strategy. We need a clear and realistic plan that sets priorities and delivers results.
Post-Columbia realities demand that we reject a business as usual approach. Today's distinguished panel will help us focus our attention on the barriers to achieving safe, reliable, and affordable access to space.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. And I would now like to see if Mr. Gordon, as our—would like to show us, perhaps—now just a note that Mr. Gordon has been declared, officially now, the fastest member of the United States Congress and—because he has won a marathon, something that—I challenged him to a surf contest. He would not go along with that. So he won the marathon, and now we are going to see just how fast he can be.
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Mr. GORDON. Well, you want me to get my remarks over with quickly, is that it, Mr. Chairman? Probably the quickest thing I could do is say amen to your earlier remarks. I think you were right on line.
Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome the witnesses to today's hearing. I believe this hearing will be one of the most important that the Subcommittee will hold this year. Last November, NASA proposed yet another redirection of its space transportation program. And it proposed to start up a new multi-billion dollar Orbital Space Plane project with price tags still to be determined. Those proposals would merit serious congressional scrutiny, even in ordinary times, but these are not ordinary times.
In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, both Congress and this Administration are going to have to make some tough decisions about NASA's programs and priorities. While I think we can not really make informed decisions about the Space Shuttle and the Orbital Space Plane until we hear from the Gehman Board later this year, we can start reviewing our options. I hope that this hearing will help us to gather some of the information that we need.
When NASA announced last November that it wanted to build an Orbital Space Plane, I was skeptical, but willing to listen. I still am. It seems to me that NASA has given us a solution, the Orbital Space Plane, but it hasn't yet given us a credible story on what the problem is that we are trying to address. For example, the Administration canceled the Space Station Crew Return Vehicle Program in 2001 in order to save money on the Space Station program. At the time, Congress was told that the CRV fleet would have cost about $1.3 billion, a figure supported by the Tom Young Task Force and that the first vehicle could not have been ready—or could not be ready—or could have been ready as early as 2006. That was good, because the Shuttle—or rather the Russian commitment to supply Soyuz CRVs expired also in 2006.
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Now we are told that NASA wants to build the Orbital Space Plane so it can serve as the space station's CRV, but it won't be ready as a CRV until 2010, at best, and even a couple years later for full capabilities, four years after it is needed. And NASA still—and NASA will spend at least $4 billion on it over the next five years, and perhaps two or three times more than that before the OSP project is through.
That doesn't sound like saving money to me. Instead, it looks like NASA is trying to balance the Space Station books over the short-term by shifting the costs of the CRV out into the future and making those costs a lot bigger than they otherwise would be.
NASA has also said they want to build the OSP to supplement but not replace the Space Station—or the Space Shuttle for crew transfer to and from Space Station, but not until another decade has past. Well, that is the answer to a question that we are not asking. Among the questions that we do need to ask—that we do need answered are the following: will we have to phase-out the Space Shuttle in the near future or can, and should we—should it be flown for another 20 years; if a decision is made to phase-out the Shuttle, what space transportation system should be built that will best support the Space Station over the operational lifetime; and what space transportation system will best support NASA's future space exploration goals?
I think that the burden of proof has to be on NASA to convince us that its latest space transportation plan addresses these important questions.
Well, we have a lot to talk about today, so again, I welcome our witnesses and look forward to your testimony.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON
Good morning. I'd like to welcome all of the witnesses to today's hearing. I believe that this hearing will be one of the most important that the Subcommittee will hold this year.
Last November, NASA proposed yet another redirection of its space transportation program. And it proposed to start up a new, multi-billion dollar Orbital Space Plane project—with a price tag that is still ''TBD.'' Those proposals would merit serious Congressional scrutiny even in ordinary times. But these aren't ordinary times.
In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, both Congress and this Administration are going to have to make some tough decisions about NASA's programs and priorities. While I think we can't really make informed decisions about the Space Shuttle and the Orbital Space Plane until we hear from the Gehman Board later this year, we can start reviewing our options.
I hope that this hearing will help us gather some of the information we will need. When NASA announced last November that it wanted to build an Orbital Space Plane, I was skeptical, but willing to listen. I still am.
It seems to me that NASA has given us a solution—the Orbital Space Plane—but it hasn't yet given us a credible story on what the problem is that they are trying to address. For example, the Administration canceled the Space Station's Crew Return Vehicle program in 2001 in order to save money on the Space Station program. At the time, Congress was told that the CRV fleet would have cost about $1.3 billion—a figure supported by the Tom Young Task Force—and that the first vehicle could have been ready as early as 2006. That was good, because the Russian commitment to supply Soyuz CRVs expires in 2006. Now we are told that NASA wants to build the Orbital Space Plane is so it can serve as the Space Station's CRV.. . .But it won't be ready until 2010—four years after it is needed. . .and NASA will spend at least $4 billion on it over the next five years—and perhaps two to three times more than that before the OSP project is through.
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That doesn't sound like saving money to me. Instead it looks as though NASA is trying to balance the Space Station books over the short-term by shifting the costs of the CRV out into the future—and making those costs a lot bigger than they otherwise would have been. That's not my idea of good financial management.
NASA has also said that they want to build the OSP to supplement—but not replace—the Space Shuttle for crew transfer to and from the Space Station, but not until another decade has passed. Well, that's the answer to a question we're not asking.. . . Among the questions that we do need answered are the following:
Will we have to phase out the Space Shuttle in the near future, or can and should it be flown for another 20 years?
If a decision is made to phase out the Shuttle, what space transportation system should we build that will best support the Space Station over its operational lifetime?
And what space transportation system will best support NASA's future space exploration goals?
I think that the burden of proof has to be on NASA to convince us that its latest space transportation plan addresses those important questions.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that very provocative statement and again, you have made some points that are really important. Without objection, the opening statement of all of the Members will be put into the written record so we can get right to the testimony. And hearing no objection, so ordered. I would also ask unanimous consent to insert at the appropriate place in the record the background memorandum prepared by the majority staff at this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeney follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE TOM FEENEY
The loss of Columbia has prompted a worthwhile discussion about how to pursue a rigorous but sustainable strategy for manned space flight and exploration. In particular, NASA must look beyond its reliance on a single, complex vehicle for space access. Accordingly, in its strategic plan issued before February 1, 2003, NASA proposed an Integrated Space Transportation Plan.
So far so good. But the devil is in the details, which remain sketchy at best. Congress can't fund an Integrated Space Transportation Plan unless it receives a measured, detailed, and well-conceived plan. Broad concepts won't suffice.
Furthermore, NASA has a legacy of delivering paper and PowerPoint presentations and not operational vehicles. In the private sector, a business must eventually deliver a tangible good or service. Similar accountability must apply to the public sector. In its quest to place Americans on the moon, NASA consistently delivered and flew Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo vehicles. NASA needs to repeat this legacy of accomplishment that goes beyond keeping paper mills operating at capacity.
This paucity of details and NASA's track record of undelivered promises provides fuel for considerable frustration. So today's hearing will probably feature a free and candid discussion. Although I will politely disagree with some of the expressed sentiments, I also note that this subcommittee is united in our strong desire and support for a vigorous manned space program.
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The Space Shuttle provides the only near-term means to transport the segments and personnel needed to complete construction of the International Space Station and then the supplies, equipment, and personnel needed to fully utilize the completed station. Thus, NASA must promptly yet prudently return the Shuttle to flight.
But simultaneously, NASA must flesh out the details behind its Integrated Space Transportation Plan and then get to the business of delivering an operational vehicle as expeditiously as possible.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for calling this hearing, which is a needed follow-up to our interactions with NASA and Administrator O'Keefe last Congress. I am glad to see some fresh faces before us today. My statement and my questions will likely be almost identical to those I have been making for years. I hope that we will start getting some more insightful answers about the mission and vision of NASA for the 21st Century, and beyond.
I would like to thank our panel of experts for taking the time to come share their ideas with us. I would like to offer a special welcome to Deputy Administrator Frederick Gregory, confirmed in August of last year. Mr. Gregory, I am sure that with your vast experience as an astronaut and in service on Safety and Mission Assurance issues, you will be a great asset to the NASA leadership. I look forward to hearing your personal views on the future of the NASA mission.
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I think everyone here knows my passion for NASA and all of the exciting work they do. NASA plays many roles, and means so much to America today. NASA is a source of dreams for our young and old alike. It provides insights into the origins and destiny, and wonder, of our universe. On the way to this noble goal, NASA develops innovations that spur on our economy and keep us on the cutting edge of technology. NASA inspires young engineers and scientists to push their minds to new levels of excellence.
The tragedy aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia has hit this entire nation hard—especially those of us from Houston, the home of Johnson Space Center, and us here in the Science Committee who have made Space exploration such a part of our own lives. I think we all feel that NASA is truly an integral part of the future of the United States. We are being patient, as Admiral Gehman and the C.A.I.B. are doing the painstaking and meticulous work of unraveling the mystery of the Columbia disaster; however, I am also looking forward to seeing NASA moving forward—soon.
That is exactly why I am deeply troubled by the direction this important program in taking. I do not want to see NASA become an exhibit in museums and history books, instead of being the leader in technology and exploration that it should be. At NASA recently, there seems to be a fundamental disconnect between logic and policy. I feel the underlying cause of this disconnect is the lack of a clear vision for the future of NASA. Once that vision is created, once a mission is designed, I believe that the needs to fulfill that mission will become much more obvious. As we decide the needs, I am confident that American policy-makers, American scientists and engineers, and the American people will step up the plate and launch us into the next millennium. The first step though, must be the vision.
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Today we will hear about the Integrated Space and Transportation Plan and the Orbital Space Plane Program. Obviously, we have two primary needs—carrying people into space and carrying cargo. The Space Shuttle has been able to do both, but regardless of the outcome of the CAIB investigation, it seems that using the shuttle until 2020—when its technology will turn about 50 years old—might not be the best we can do. The ISS is now achieving functionality after billions of dollars of investments, and we are talking about staffing it with only two or three crew members. Having such a magnificent facility going unused during sleeping hours for the two-person crew seems absurd. Also we may be putting the astronauts at risk because if one of them becomes sick, it may be impossible for the other to provide help while performing all of the other necessary duties to keep the ISS running.
It seems that we are close to glory in space, but are just not demonstrating the necessary commitment, and boldness. I want to hear what goals the ISS can achieve, and how many people it would take to achieve those goals. Then we can make an informed decision on what kind of vehicle we need to get them there, and how best to bring them back in the case of an emergency.
If the Orbital Space Plane will not be up and running fully until 2012, and the ISS is scheduled to end operations in 2016—is it worth the investment? I would guess that it is, if it is going to be used for other purposes after the ISS is shut down, or if the ISS lifetime is going to be extended. What will those other purposes be, and what is the future of the ISS? I assume that since we are running it at one-third capacity—there will be plenty of work left to do come 2016. Again, we need a statement of purpose and of vision, from the Administrator, or it will be nearly impossible to decide on the credibility of the OSP program.
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I am looking for some thoughtful, creative strategies to get NASA back on track. NASA has a challenging puzzle before it in designing the crew and cargo transport systems of the future. But I am confident that rising to challenges is what NASA does best.
Thank you.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. And let me note before I introduce the witnesses that I will be chairing this hearing today. But as usually happens, here we are, we are complaining about the way other people organize their aspect of the Federal Government. I am a senior Member of the International Relations Committee, and we are marking up the most important bill of the International Relations Committee, of course, our authorization of the State Department as we speak today. So I will be having—I am sure I will be called out once or twice to make sure I get to a rollcall vote over in that Committee. And I apologize to those of you who are here as witnesses. I—and I really am very grateful for you to be here, but I have got that responsibility, too, so that is why I am running back and forth. And when I run out, I believe Mr. Calvert will be—Mr. Calvert won't be taking over for me. It won't be Mr. Gordon. We are not going to give it to him yet. Okay. One of my other colleagues will be taking over during that time.
So we have a distinguished panel with us today to provide their unique perspective to this critical, critical issue in terms of Space Station and how—and our Crew Return Vehicles and how we are going to get up and back. And so we have asked them to summarize their statements and their testimony into five minutes, if possible, and we would appreciate that very much.
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Our first witness, Fred Gregory, is the Deputy Administrator of NASA. He is well known to all of us, and we are very, very appreciative that he is here today. Mr. Gregory, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FREDERICK D. GREGORY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. GREGORY. Thank you very much, sir, Members of the Subcommittee. I always welcome an opportunity to appear and share the plans and progresses that we are making toward our implementation of the NASA Integrated Space Transportation Plan and the development of the Orbital Space Plane Program.
Mr. Chairman, before I start, though, I would like to thank the Science Committee, and, in particular, recognize Chairman Boehlert for his leadership and support in introducing H.R. 1085, the NASA Flexibility Act, which provides many of the human capital provisions that we feel are critical in our ability to reconstitute and reconfigure NASA's work force. We are hopeful that this bill will be enacted expeditiously this year.
Mr. Chairman, you requested that I would address a number of topics related to ISTP and the Orbital Space Plane system, and I have responded to those questions within the written testimony. During my oral testimony, I would like to highlight several important points relative to the ISTP and OSP.
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NASA's updated ISTP plan was driven by NASA's new vision and mission and supported by a comprehensive series of studies and reviews that determined a more beneficial course of action for NASA affecting many of the agency's major programs. These budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among our Space Station, our Space Shuttle, and the SLI programs to support breakthrough research in science and space. They were achieved within our budget, enabling NASA's overall program to be responsible, credible, and compelling.
The ISTP program provides an integrated and systematic approach to our space transportation needs. The plan sustains the Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade, aggressively pursues crews transport and rescue systems, called the OSP system, and continues the development of the technologies that will enable future launch systems. This plan allows NASA in the near future to ensure that the Station can achieve U.S. Core Complete ready to accommodate the international partner modules and better addresses the scientific research priorities.
In addition, we have established the position of the NASA Space Architect, reporting to me to ensure our integrated approach remains consistent within NASA's vision and mission. Under the leadership of the Space Architect, NASA is aggressively studying long-term science and exploration goals to provide further guidance that will better inform these critical decisions.
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn my discussion to the measurable progress we have made on the OSP program since releasing the updated ISTP plan in November of 2002 as part of the fiscal year 2003 budget amendment. Within the OSP program, a program office has been established and management of the program has a direct reporting path to NASA headquarters. Clear, concise Level 1 requirements for the OSP program have been established, which identify the critical, top-level specifications that the OSP system must meet without dictating a design solution.
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The trade space is open for innovative design solutions from industry to best meet NASA's needs. There is no preconceived notion on what the ultimate vehicle design will be, whether it would be a winged vehicle, a lifting body shape, or a capsule. Each of these shapes has competitive advantages and disadvantages that will be explored during the formulation studies. Our requirements do not specify whether the crew rescue and crew transport requirements are met with a single vehicle, by similar vehicles adapted from a common airframe, or by completely different designs.
The final design will be selected based on the ability to meet all of the Level 1 requirements. The Shuttle will likely remain a workhorse for the agency throughout the—at least the middle of the next decade, consistent with the framework of the ISTP program plan. The Shuttle is required to complete the Station assembly and to perform other critical NASA science missions, such as servicing and perhaps returning the Hubble Space telescope.
In addition, its heavy lift capability and ability to return cargo to Earth from the Station will continue to be used until a viable system is developed to perform these functions. We will use the results of mission model studies to better guide our operational strategy on the best use of to space transportation resources available for the Station to guide our investment strategy supporting the ISTP, including consideration of alternate cargo concepts, and to influence the Level 2 performance requirements.
Mr. Chairman, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew is a national tragedy. We are committed to a safe return to flight as quickly as possible, but only after the cause of the accident is fully understood based on findings by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and corrective measures are implemented and independently assessed by a task team led by General Tom Stafford.
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We are conducting an agency study, led by the NASA Space Architect, to be completed by this summer to review each leg of the ISTP road map and each key decision to determine if changes are warranted. We will incorporate our responses to the—Accident Investigation Board recommendations into this ISTP update. Importantly, we are conducting the ISTP update with an eye toward our future needs. We will pursue building blocks that provide the transformational technologies and capabilities that will open new pathways of exploration and discovery and lay the foundation for future human and robotic missions to Earth's neighborhood and beyond.
A series of studies have been conducted to evaluate whether it is feasible to accelerate the OSP program development schedule. The studies identified a possible 6-month to 1-year schedule acceleration for the crew rescue capability and a potential savings of one to two years for the crew transport capability. Cost implementations of accelerated efforts are still being assessed and no final conclusions as to the feasibility have been made.
Mr. Chairman, in summary, significant progress has been made toward implementing the OSP program since its introduction of—in November of last year. NASA is committed to safe return to flight following the Columbia tragedy, and I want to thank you for my opportunity to address the Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregory follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK D. GREGORY
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and share the plans and progress we are making toward implementation of NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) and development of the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) system.
Mr. Chairman, you requested that I address a number of topics related to the ISTP and particularly the OSP Program. I will respond to these questions by first discussing the studies performed for the ISTP that led to the FY 2003 Budget Amendment submitted in November 2002. Then I will discuss the progress made toward implementation of the ISTP, and particularly the OSP Program, and, finally, I will address our approach to the reevaluation of the ISTP as a result of the Columbia tragedy.
Introduction of the New Integrated Space Transportation Plan
NASA's updated ISTP is driven by NASA's vision and mission and supported by a comprehensive series of studies and reviews that determined a more beneficial course of action for NASA, affecting many of the Agency's major programs. These budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among the Station, Shuttle, and SLI programs to support breakthrough research in Space. They were achieved within our budget—enabling NASA's overall program to be responsible, credible, and compelling. The updated ISTP resulted in the restructuring of the SLI, and other adjustments, to accomplish the following:
Extend safe Shuttle operations through at least the middle of the next decade;
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Ensure NASA's ability to achieve Space Station Core Complete, meet international commitments, and provide a robust orbital research program by increasing Station reserves, consistent with independent review recommendations, and by increasing the Shuttle flight rate to adequately support scientific research priorities aboard the Core configuration;
Fund long-lead items for enhanced ISS research that preserve the option of expanding the ISS crew above three;
Begin development of a new Orbital Space Plane system that yields crew rescue and crew transport capabilities; and, to make this possible, the ISTP also
Defers development of a next-generation of launch vehicles until long-term goals are adopted that can justify the expense.
Resulting budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among the Station, Shuttle, and SLI Programs to enable humans to conduct breakthrough research in space. Achieving success in the assembly and operation of the ISS drives launch demands for the Space Shuttle, our international partners' vehicles and the OSP system. Similarly, the expected lifetime of the ISS, coupled with the potential for enhanced research and expanded crew post Core Complete, as well as our plans for future exploration goals, will drive potential future launch requirements.
The ISTP provides an integrated and systematic approach to our space transportation needs. The plan sustains the Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade; aggressively pursues crew transport and rescue systems, called the Orbital Space Plane system; and continues the development of the technologies that will enable future launch systems. This plan allows NASA, in the near-term, to ensure that the ISS can achieve U.S. Core Complete, be ready to accommodate the International Partner modules, and better address scientific research priorities. In addition, we have established the position of the NASA Space Architect, reporting to me, to ensure our integrated approach remains consistent with NASA's vision and mission. Under the leadership of the Space Architect, NASA is aggressively studying longer-term science and exploration goals to provide further guidance that will better inform these critical decisions.
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Background: Original Aim of the Space Launch Initiative
To aid in addressing our thought process in the formulation of our new ISTP, I would now like to reflect on the original aim of the Space Launch Initiative. In the late 1990's, NASA sponsored the Space Transportation Architecture Studies to examine candidate architectures for a new reusable launch vehicle and to assess the launch market outlook. Both NASA and its contractors concluded that the market was too small for industry alone to finance a new launch vehicle and thus, development would place a significant cost burden on the U.S. government. In addition, it was concluded that a two-stage-to-orbit RLV could have many desirable performance characteristics and would be within reach of existing technologies. As a result of these studies, NASA proposed the SLI, initiated in the President's FY 2001 budget. The SLI Program's stretch goals included reducing the cost of space access to $1,000 per pound to Low Earth Orbit and reducing the probability of loss of crew to 1 in 10,000 for a second generation RLV. The SLI Program planned to spend $5 billion over five years to develop critical technologies and architecture concepts that would reduce the risk of this approach, prove that these goals were attainable, and support a decision by 2005 whether or not to build an operational RLV.
This SLI Program was part of a larger investment strategy that tied together NASA's various space transportation efforts. The strategy, the original ISTP, included milestones, decision gates and off-ramps for SLI, Space Shuttle, and third-generation air-breathing hypersonic technologies. This is the ISTP that served as the basis for the original FY 2003 Budget request.
The projected government investment in SLI was based on the assumption that the development cost of a new RLV would be amortized across both the commercial and NASA launch markets. The NASA market is currently dominated by the needs of the Space Station program that requires nearly full use of the Space Shuttle. Consequently, the RLV design was driven by unique Space Station requirements that included cargo and crew transported into orbit, rendezvous and docking with the Station, and return of cargo and crew to a landing site. To ensure the safety of the crew, the new design of the RLV would be certified as human-rated.
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Unfortunately, the key assumptions proved too optimistic. The commercial market continued to decline. It was premature to base new RLV requirements on other potential markets, such as DOD or future NASA exploration missions. Revised estimates of the development cost of a new RLV were well above the original estimate. Given the uncertainty of the market and the higher cost of RLV development, NASA concluded that the economic case for a new RLV was in doubt for the foreseeable future.
Options Considered for the New Integrated Space Transportation Plan
As a result, NASA decided to examine alternatives prior to making the large commitment required for full-scale development of the vehicles under study. NASA undertook an evaluation during the summer of 2002 to examine possible options for the ISTP and SLI. The options studied included:
Option 1—Maintain the baseline ISTP program that assumed a decision in 2006, to concurrently build a new RLV two-stage booster and a crew transport vehicle to deliver crew to and from orbit. The new RLV could replace the Space Shuttle as early as 2012.
Option 2—Develop an Orbital Space Plane system and delay the RLV Booster. This option built an OSP system by 2010–2012 to be flown on an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) that would be human-rated. In this option, the RLV booster development was delayed.
Option 3—Develop a prototype RLV booster by around 2011. This option built a common RLV prototype booster with DOD. In this option, an operational booster and Orbital Space Plane would occur later.
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Option 4—Breakthrough Technology. This option focused on long-term, high-payoff technologies, like hypersonic propulsion, and indefinitely delayed a new RLV.
The ISTP options were evaluated based on the following factors and criteria:
Safety—the potential for improved crew survivability through development of an ISS crew return vehicle and a crew escape system on a crew transport vehicle.
Assured Access—the provision of alternate independent means of meeting launch requirements despite potential launch mishaps, Space Shuttle groundings, or shortfalls in partner contributions to Station needs.
Economics—the affordability within the budget outlook and the potential for future cost savings.
Flexibility—the ability to evolve capabilities and adapt to changes in future launch requirements that remain uncertain.
These option studies were complemented by a number of other studies, including:
SLI Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Crew Transport Vehicle Development Studies, conducted by the SLI Program Office in 2002, evaluated hundreds of alternative space transportation system designs and performed in-depth evaluation of the 15 best candidates. A conclusion from these studies was that separating crew transport and cargo delivery functions would provide the optimum approach to improving crew safety and decreasing costs.
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A Crew Transfer Vehicle/Crew Rescue Vehicle Study, conducted by the SLI Program in 2002, concluded that a multi-purpose Orbital Space Plane that can perform both the crew transfer and crew return functions for Station is viable and could provide the most long-term benefit for NASA's investment.
An ISTP Study by the NASA Independent Program Assessment Office in 2002 concluded that it was premature to commit to an RLV development, except that an Orbital Space Plane launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle promised a number of benefits, including crew return from Station, assured crew access to space, potential enhanced safety for crew transfer and crew return, and a potential long-term Space Shuttle replacement strategy.
The SLI Level One Requirements effort conducted by NASA Headquarters and the SLI Program Office in 2002 indicated it was premature to commit to Level One requirements for a next-generation RLV.
The 120-Day Joint NASA/DOD Study conducted by the SLI Program Office and various Air Force organizations in 2001–2002 concluded there was common interest and benefit in development of the first stage of a two-stage RLV using a kerosene-fueled engine.
The National Aerospace Initiative and the National Hypersonics Plan developed by NASA and DOD in 2001–2003 chartered a joint NASA/DOD roadmap for technology development of an advanced space transportation system.
The Space Shuttle 2020 Study completed in 2002 concluded that the Shuttle lifetime could be extended to 2020. However, additional investments would be needed to preserve and improve Shuttle safety and maintenance beyond 2012.
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Based on the criteria and information from the complementary studies, NASA chose Option 2—Develop an Orbital Space Plane system and delay the RLV Booster. The OSP Program concept promises a number of benefits that rank well against the criteria for safety, economics, assured access and flexibility.
It is aimed at providing assured crew access to the ISS, improving crew safety, meeting the U.S. ISS crew return requirements from the ISS, and providing a bridge to the future by demonstrating technologies on a new crewed vehicle and supporting enhanced science on the Space Station. In summary, key changes to the ISTP roadmap which resulted from this decision were to extend the Shuttle lifetime from 2012 to at least the middle of the next decade and to delay the decision to develop an RLV booster from 2006 to no earlier than 2009.
The new ISTP consists of three major programs: the Shuttle, OSP, and Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Programs. The OSP and NGLT Programs are both managed within the restructured Space Launch Initiative. No strategy is without risk. Some of the key risk items within the ISTP that we must address include:
The ability to sustain the Space Shuttle fleet to safely meet its service life requirements;
The design and integration of the Orbital Space Plane flight vehicle(s) onto an Expendable Launch Vehicle including the associated human rating of the system and ground launch processing needs;
The ability to meet our objectives in the event of another Shuttle loss or extended down time; and
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The ability to meet each of these objectives within a responsible and credible budget.
Our approach to mitigating these risks is to consistently address the issues using an integrated approach within the framework of the ISTP. By pursuing multiple paths with interim decision points, we are less susceptible to technical issues and more flexible in dealing with changing requirements. We are striving to implement robustness in our design solutions and ensure that our investment strategy provides the greatest overall benefit to the Agency. The OSP program is a prime example, providing multiple benefits including assured crew access to space, meeting the U.S. commitments for crew return from the ISS, improving crew safety, and providing a bridge to the future. We believe the OSP system will, in combination with other launch systems, provide the vital human transport capability necessary to retire the Shuttle. Finally, the NASA Space Architect will ensure an integrated approach is taken to resolve any issues and remain consistent with NASA's vision and mission.
An important feature of the new ISTP is the linking of key decisions across the three space launch programs and NASA's long-term strategy. The next two years are critical for a series of decisions that will occur in the 2004 to 2005 timeframe. These decisions include: whether to compete for long-term contracts for Shuttle operations; whether to proceed into the full-scale development phase of the OSP; and whether to aggressively pursue a new launch vehicle or instead pursue a long-term technology program in pursuit of breakthrough technologies. These decisions will also be linked to the expected lifetime of the ISS, as well as any new space transportation requirements for exploration beyond low earth orbit. Currently, the ISS Program assumes Station mission life through at least the middle of next decade, and likely extending into the following decade. NASA plans to aggressively study longer-term exploration goals to provide further guidance that will better inform these critical decisions.
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Progress Made on the Orbital Space Plane Program
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn my discussion to the measurable progress we have made on the OSP Program since releasing the updated ISTP in November 2002 as part of the FY 2003 Budget Amendment.
Within the OSP Program, a program office has been established and the management team has been put in place, with a direct reporting path to NASA Headquarters. NASA expertise is being provided from across the Agency to ensure program success, embodying the One NASA philosophy of an integrated NASA working together. Clear, concise Level 1 Requirements for the OSP Program have been established and approved by the Agency. These requirements identify the critical top-level specifications that the OSP system must meet without dictating a design solution within the requirement. Key requirements include providing rescue capability for no fewer than four Space Station crew members as soon as practical, but no later than 2010; and providing transportation capability for no fewer than four crew members to and from the Space Station as soon as practical, but no later than 2012. The OSP system must improve crew safety relative to either the Space Shuttle or the Soyuz; offer increased on-orbit maneuverability and increase the launch probability relative to the Space Shuttle; and require less time to prepare and execute a mission as compared to the Space Shuttle. The OSP system for crew rescue must also provide for rapid separation from the Space Station under emergency conditions and allow the safe return of deconditioned, ill or injured crew members with ongoing treatment until arrival at definitive medical care within 24 hours; a capability not currently available to the astronauts on the Space Station. The OSP system must meet these requirements and all applicable Space Station requirements while minimizing life cycle costs.
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The trade space is open for innovative design solutions from industry to best meet NASA's needs. There is no preconceived notion on what the ultimate vehicle design will be—whether it is a winged vehicle similar to the Space Shuttle, a lifting body shape like that of the X–38, or a capsule similar to the Apollo command module. Each of these shapes has competitive advantages and disadvantages that will be explored during the formulation studies. Our requirements do not specify whether the crew rescue and crew transport requirements are met with a single vehicle, by similar vehicles adapted from a common airframe, or by completely different designs. The final design will be selected based on the ability to meet all of the Level 1 requirements.
A Systems Requirements Review will be conducted this fall to establish an integrated set of NASA Level 2 Requirements to provide further definition in support of the conceptual design activities. Three competing industry teams are under contract to perform trade studies, develop conceptual designs, and develop detailed Level 3 Requirements in support of a Systems Design Review to be held during the summer of 2004. This information will be used along with independent assessments performed by NASA and other external review committees to support a decision on whether to proceed with the full-scale development of the OSP flight system in September 2004. A full-and-open competitive procurement for the design, development and production of the OSP system will be held next year leading to contract awards in late 2004 if a positive decision is made to proceed with full-scale development.
The Space Shuttle will likely remain a workhorse for the Agency through at least 2015, consistent with the framework of the ISTP. The Shuttle is required to complete the ISS assembly and to perform other critical NASA science missions such as the servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. If the OSP proves sufficiently safe and reliable, it could ultimately replace the Shuttle as the primary crew transport and, thus, free up Shuttle to focus on cargo functions, or, possibly, a heavy lifter for ambitious science-driven research missions. We will use the results of mission model studies to better guide our operational strategy on the best use of the space transportation resources available for the ISS; to guide our investment strategy supporting the ISTP including consideration of alternative cargo concepts; and to influence the Level 2 performance requirements to be placed on the OSP Program. Our intention is to focus the Shuttle on the most critical functions that it alone can provide while meeting the ISS logistics needs, providing assured access to Station to ensure science objectives are met, and improving crew safety. The OSP system will be an integral part of that strategy.
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NASA is committed to providing responsible, credible cost and budget estimates prior to committing to new development programs. We will be following NASA policy guidelines of using the formulation phase of the OSP Program to establish cost and schedule commitments for the implementation phase. At that point, the requirements and conceptual design will be sufficiently understood to ensure a responsible and credible development cost commitment is made. As part of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs along with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost Credibility External Review Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document, as used by the Department of Defense and on the ISS Program. These various cost estimates will be studied and understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all ongoing OSP Program activities by using a proven Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance as compared to plans
Mr. Chairman, the estimates included in the President's FY 2004 budget request for the implementation phase of the OSP Program following the full-scale development decision are placeholder estimates only, until these life cycle analyses and independent cost validation exercises are performed. We are actively examining the near-term budget requirements for the OSP Program in support of the ongoing budget submittal cycle to ensure adequate funding is maintained.
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Flight Demonstrations
In addition to the OSP Program requirements definition and conceptual design activities, several flight demonstrator projects are in place to test critical technologies in relevant flight environments and reduce the risk of developing a full-scale space vehicle. Validating ground-based testing and analysis is a necessary part of fielding a new space transportation system. Each of the OSP Program flight demonstration projects will produce data that can be directly applied to the entire range of potential system designs and was selected based on previous SLI studies identifying the most critical flight demonstration needs. Each was selected under a full-and-open competition to produce data that will reduce the technical risk of a particular aspect of the OSP system regardless of the design finally chosen for full-scale development.
The Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) flight demonstration will demonstrate automated rendezvous technology and proximity operations between a chase vehicle and an on-orbit satellite, validating an advanced video guidance system that is needed to perform similar operations for the OSP system. In addition, NASA is working with the Department of Defense on related projects such as the Orbital Express to further demonstrate the technology, which has utility for both agencies. The DART vehicle is nearing the end of the manufacturing and integration phase and is being prepared for system integration testing.
The Pad Abort Demonstrator (PAD) is a full-scale platform for testing and assessment of crew escape technologies. Adding to the experience base from the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo Programs, the PAD Project will demonstrate crew escape and survivability systems utilizing current technologies by performing an end-to-end launch pad abort demonstration. Fully instrumented mannequins will generate data on crew environments during testing of propulsion and parachute systems, orientation and landing techniques, and external structural configurations.
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The X–37 technology demonstrator is an integrated platform to validate approximately 30 high-priority technologies in the orbital and re-entry environments. The X–37 project consists of two distinct flight demonstration vehicles. An Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) continued from an earlier full-and-open competitive procurement award, will validate pilot-less operations during approach and landing from an altitude of 40,000 feet and below after being dropped from a B–52 aircraft. The vehicle is currently in the manufacturing and integration phase.
The X–37 Orbital Vehicle (OV) will provide a versatile technology platform to validate important technologies and obtain environmental data during critical stages of the mission. It will be launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle, operate autonomously on-orbit, and return to Earth.
The X–37 modularity allows for multiple advanced development demonstrations. Flight experiments can still be defined and incorporated into the Orbital Vehicle into the fall of this year without adversely impacting the overall project schedule. Key X–37 technologies to be demonstrated include: pilot-less guidance, navigation and control (including high crosswind landing and all-weather windward adaptive guidance); aero-thermal and flight profile data collection; multiple high temperature, wing leading edge, and durable acreage thermal protection system technologies; lightweight landing gear and phase change brake technologies; avionics and power technologies including high-energy/high-density batteries and electrical actuators for aero-surfaces; advanced high-temperature structures; and ground operations including rapid thermal protection system waterproofing. As a particular example where the X–37 will be used to demonstrate advanced technologies, the Space Shuttle uses a Thermal Protection System (TPS) primarily composed of carbon-carbon for the nose and leading edges, low-temperature thermal blankets in the low-temperature areas, and silicate blocks. This complex system is difficult to process and maintain. The X–37 will demonstrate the effectiveness of multiple advanced TPS technologies, including high-temperature ceramic leading-edge material, durable high-temperature blankets, and metallic TPS.
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Two competing interests arise when integrating the flight demonstration projects into the Orbital Space Plane Program. The first desire is to perform the flight and technology demonstrations early in the design cycle (and ideally prior to the full-scale development decision) in order to assist in that decision. The counter desire is to defer flight demonstrations until the OSP system design is better defined in order to maximize the utility of the flight demonstration. Because of the long lead time required for flight demonstrator projects coupled with the time-critical urgency of the OSP Program, it is not practical to meet both desires. We believe that the present program achieves a balance between these competing interests. The DART automated rendezvous and X–37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle flight demonstrations are scheduled to be completed prior to the Full-Scale Development decision. The PAD launch abort design will be completed and the X–37 Orbital Vehicle design will be nearly complete prior to the Full-Scale Development decision. The PAD and X–37 Orbital Vehicle flight demonstrations will be completed during the OSP program design period, allowing their results to be directly incorporated into the vehicle design.
It should be noted that all of the flight demonstrator contracts have built-in option periods to minimize the government's risk, in the event that the contractor fails to perform or the OSP Program concept definition studies determine that an alternative flight demonstration approach is required. This approach allows the government to end the contract without incurring termination penalties at the end of any option period should the need for redirection arise. For example, the X–37 base contract expires in September 2003 followed by an option period and a decision on a second option in August 2004. An independent cost estimate of the X–37 will be performed in support of the decision to implement the first option period of the contract. The second option decision point is consistent with the schedule for the OSP Program full-scale development decision. Using this approach, we believe we have adequately ensured that the demonstrations take place early enough to influence the OSP system design without exposing the government to excessive risk.
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We believe these flight demonstrations represent a high value investment when considering the potential total development cost of the OSP system, and they will provide valuable quantitative data in support of the full-scale development decision, and that they will greatly mitigate risks during the development period. All of these flight demonstrations are crosscutting in their nature, and will provide technology data applicable to other potential future space transportation systems in addition to supporting the Orbital Space Plane system.
ISTP Reevaluation as a Result of the Columbia Tragedy
The loss of Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew is indeed a National tragedy. We are committed to a safe return to flight, as soon as the cause of the accident is fully understood, based on findings by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), and corrective measures are implemented and independently assessed by a task team led by Tom Stafford. We will finish the ISS assembly and optimize our ISS utilization, support our national space transportation goals, and build a foundation for possible future science and exploration goals.
We are conducting an Agency study, led by the NASA Space Architect, to be completed by this summer, to review each leg of the ISTP roadmap, and each key decision point, in order to determine if a change is warranted. We will incorporate our responses to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations into this ISTP update. Importantly, we are conducting this ISTP update with an eye toward our future needs. We will pursue building blocks that provide the transformational technologies and capabilities that will open new pathways of exploration and discovery, and lay the foundation for future human and robotic missions to Earth's neighborhood and beyond.
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We are evaluating options to prioritize the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to ensure a safe return to flight. A two-day summit was held in March to explore, discuss, and determine the best strategy to safely and effectively fly the Space Shuttle fleet to support key missions until at least the middle of the next decade. Recommendations from seven SLEP panels (Safety, Sustainability, Infrastructure, Aerospace Industry, Performance, Operations and Resources) provided recommendations to NASA's Space Flight Leadership Council. From this, 60 candidate projects were targeted for further consideration. A ''Tiger Team'' was established to prepare an internal submittal to support Agency decisions this summer as part of this ISTP review.
We are also re-evaluating whether we should more aggressively pursue a risk reduction program leading to a new launch vehicle to replace the Space Shuttle and support our future space exploration needs. We are working with the Department of Defense to ensure that any space transportation vehicle development or risk reduction activity is coordinated and that the investment will service both our agencies' needs to the maximum extent practical. In addition, we are re-examining whether we should place higher priority on providing assured U.S. cargo access to and from the Station and whether a development activity should be implemented in parallel to the assured crew access to be provided by the OSP system. Finally, we are examining the possibility of accelerating the OSP Program to provide an earlier alternative for crew access to space.
A series of studies have been conducted to evaluate whether it is feasible to accelerate the OSP development schedule. In order to determine the most rapid development schedule possible, the OSP established an independent review team of aerospace experts (Aaron Cohen, Vance Brand, Dale Myers, John Young, and Ken Szalai) to evaluate whether the proven Apollo Capsule could provide a relatively quick solution to crew rescue and crew transport requirements. The review team brought vast space transportation expertise and intimate knowledge of the Apollo Program to this study. The Apollo capsule is a potentially attractive solution since it was a robust design, its performance was well understood, and the full-envelope abort-and-recovery system was simple and safe. This study team concluded that, for a crew rescue vehicle, an Apollo derived vehicle that has the potential for meeting most of the Level 1 requirements could be available four to six years after contract award given adequate resources; hence, one to three years sooner than the OSP plans.
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Additional findings of the Apollo Capsule study team were that while the Apollo system is well understood, virtually every system would have to be redesigned. In particular, the structure would need to be redesigned for compatibility with the internal pressure of the International Space Station. In addition, Apollo hardware could not be used due to obsolescence, changes in manufacturing techniques, and lack of traceability; the drawings could not be directly used due to incompatibility with modern systems; and life cycle costs would be strongly dependent on ground support systems and recovery site infrastructure.
In addition to this best-case schedule improvement, the OSP Program organized two other groups to provide an assessment of the schedule acceleration potential. The first group was a NASA-wide Focus Group consisting of representatives from several NASA Centers containing experienced Program and Project managers as well as ''out-of-the-box'' thinkers. The second group established was a multi-disciplined team from within the program. Both groups were to address alternative approaches to the OSP system design and development that could, given no funding or personnel constraints, result in schedule improvements by evaluating the current plans for each phase of the program. In addition to these internal teams, the OSP Program architecture contractors were solicited for their input on the acceleration possibilities. The studies identified a possible 6-month to 1-year schedule acceleration for the crew rescue capability and a potential savings of one to two years for the crew transport capability.
However, to accomplish an accelerated schedule, the following would be required:
Conduct an early downselect of the shape and design concept. Select a single design to serve both the crew rescue and crew transport functions;
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Limit the requirements and keep them simple, focusing on the primary role of transporting crew;
Develop the minimum flight vehicle test plan early in the program, including qualification test flights, and adhere to that plan; and,
Provide additional reserves to allow recovery from issues and problems as they arise.
Cost implications of an accelerated effort are still being assessed, and no final conclusions as to the feasibility have been made. While the direct use of the Apollo heritage design does not appear to provide significant benefits, an advanced capsule remains a candidate that could be considered for the OSP system design. The results of these studies are being incorporated into the ISTP update study to determine an integrated NASA position once the data from all studies is available.
Summary
In summary, significant progress has been made toward implementing the OSP Program since its introduction in November of last year. The OSP Program Level 1 Requirements have been established, and the program schedule and acquisition strategy has been developed. The NASA/industry teams are in place to perform the conceptual design studies and flight demonstrations that will support a full-scale development decision by the end of FY 2004 and future detailed design decisions. The OSP Program provides a number of near-term and long-range benefits for the Agency. The new system offers operational flexibility for U.S. missions by providing assured crew access to the ISS and meeting the U.S. obligations for crew rescue. Safety will be improved beyond that of the Space Shuttle and Soyuz. In addition, the OSP Program builds a bridge to the future by the experience gained from designing and developing the system and by enabling increased Space Station crew size and resultant science benefits.
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The new ISTP represents a flexible roadmap to guide our space transportation investment strategies. NASA is committed to safe return to flight following the Columbia tragedy and to create new capabilities for continued exploration and development of space. As we look forward, we will continue to use an integrated approach to guide our investment strategy and to ensure a responsible, credible plan.
Thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Mr. Gregory, I just—this is an unpleasant part of my responsibilities, but your testimony was very provocative, but we needed to look at it. We didn't get it until yesterday. And I don't—my guess is that you have got a pretty good staff. It does not reflect well on you or your staff when this committee does not have the time to examine your testimony to make sure that this hearing is as meaningful as it should be. And I would advise you that you should make sure that that testimony is in on time in the future.
Mr. GREGORY. Understood, sir.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you. Next, we have Dr. Jerry Grey, who is Director of Science and Technology Policy at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. And he is, again, like most of our other panelists today, very well acquainted with this committee, and we are very appreciative that he has joined us today to loan us his expertise. You may proceed.
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STATEMENT OF DR. JERRY GREY, DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE AND SCIENCE POLICY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS
Dr. GREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As with Mr. Gregory, my written statement has answered the 18 questions you posed. Since there is no way I can address them in five minutes, I am just going to hit the high points.
First, the ISTP. It has three elements. The Next-Generation Launch Technology Effort should be strongly supported. For years, the AIAA has decried the lack of an ongoing program to advance and upgrade space transportation systems, that is to have each successive generation of launchers in the pipeline to succeed the current generation. It is the lack of such a program in the past that has led to the current crisis in space transportation.
The Shuttle Service Life Extension Program should also be supported, because for the foreseeable future, as everyone has noted already, the Shuttle will be essential to Space Station operations. We now have only three Orbiters, and the likelihood of another Shuttle failure in the next 10 to 15 years can not be ignored.
Finally, the Orbital Space Plane. Now if we assume successful, on-time development of the OSP, the OSP EELV architecture suggested by NASA does, indeed, meet their critical needs. But that is a big if. The OSP isn't even a paper vehicle yet. And Mr. Chairman, as you have pointed out, NASA's record for on-budget, on-schedule development of new space launchers leaves some doubt as to whether it will really be available on the proposed dates. One troubling factor, again, is the current OSP development cost estimate, which ranges from 9 billion to 13 billion, although admittedly premature. NASA might be better off to pursue an evolutionary OSP development, which I will discuss later.
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In summary, the revised ISTP is neither overly optimistic nor overly conservative. The new OSP EELV architecture does make sense, but it is too early to assess the risk involved in OSP development or the soundness of its cost estimates.
On continuing Shuttle operations, there is one overriding reason for NASA to maintain the Shuttle: space transportation will remain a high-risk activity for the foreseeable future, so reliance on a single system could once again precipitate a crisis much like the present one should the OSP system fail or be grounded. Neither the Russian nor the European access capabilities can be counted upon.
In my written statement, I have cited several other strong reasons for maintaining the Shuttle. The only real negative is a big one, of course, the additional cost of maintaining the Shuttle fleet. With the OSP, the Shuttle could be kept on a standby basis, flying only when needed, but that raises safety concerns and doesn't reduce the Shuttle infrastructure, which absorbs the bulk of Shuttle costs. The safety issue could be addressed by having the SLEP reduce the Shuttle crew and provide a flight deck escape capsule, which doubles the chances for crew survival. However, the best way to address both cost and safety issues of the Shuttle would be to equip the Orbiters for fully autonomous operation.
If we look at design alternatives, as Mr. Gregory has stated, NASA has suggested that the design trade space for the OSP is essentially open, but it would make sense to develop the required functions, crew return and transport, serially rather than in parallel. The urgent need is for station crew rescue. Why not seek the lowest cost design approach to meet that requirement and then use the experience gained to develop the transport capability? There are at least two viable, low-cost design options for crew rescue: the original X–38 CRV concept, which Mr. Gordon mentioned, and an Apollo-derived capsule, which Mr. Myers, I think, is going to address at length in a few minutes. I have mentioned several other possibilities in my written statement.
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An evolutionary OSP development program would provide crew return at the earliest possible time with low risk. With the Shuttle fleet operational, OSP transport capability is not urgently needed and hence could be stretched out to reduce both risk and budget impact. Some urgent cargo needs could be met by resurrecting the Alternate Access to Station Program, as you have recommended, Mr. Chairman.
Now there are some challenges in using ELVs with the OSP. The primary challenge is safety, but that is true for any launch system, not just ELVs. The current failure rate, that is loss of mission, of the partly reusable Shuttle is now 2 in 114, or about 1.75 percent. The current failure rate of the Delta 2 ELV is 3 in 125, or about 2.4 percent, and of the Atlas 2 to 5 family is 0 in 64. Any residual safety risks can and should be reduced by an effective OSP crew escape system.
Hence safety is a challenge, but the risk of flying people on an ELV is certainly not unacceptable. The Soyuz launcher on which we now rely for all Space Station crew operations is expendable, as were the Atlas, Titan, and Saturn rockets used for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo without a single launch failure. I have talked about other challenges in using EELVs in my written statement. None of them pose insurmountable problems.
There are trade studies that need to be done. Besides examining serial versus parallel OSP development, a temporary cost-saving option that should be explored is to extend the on-orbit lifetime of the Shuttle fleet so as to allow an Orbiter to remain at the station for extended periods, thereby serving both the functions for the OSP. This approach has obvious disadvantages, which I have cited in my written statement, but it would remove the time pressure on OSP development and would also, and this is important, provide a crew of seven to ten people for both Station maintenance and science research. I have discussed other trade studies in my statement.
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You asked about technology demonstrations. A flight demonstration is, by far, the most effective mission-assurance tool; hence the planned X–37 program as well as the proposed DART and Pad Abort demonstrations are of high value to OSP development and should certainly be retained.
In closing, I would like to suggest a possible scenario for optimum servicing of the station. First, the Shuttle SLEP effort should be initiated immediately and should include the following elements: one, convert the four-person flight deck to an escape capsule for all flight modes; second, provide the Orbiters with the option for fully autonomous operation; and third, equip two Orbiters for orbital stays of at least four months. As soon as one Orbiter is equipped for long-term stays on orbit, it should be flown to the Station and based there for four more months. Until the OSP crew return version has been demonstrated, the two Orbiters suitably equipped should alternate with each other.
Meanwhile, the NGLT program should be pursued and evolutionary development of the OSP should be conducted. OSP flights to the station should begin as soon as the crew return function has been demonstrated, relieving the on-orbit Shuttles. When the OSP transport function has been demonstrated, the Shuttle should be placed on a standby basis for autonomous operation to fly when needed for lifting large payloads to the station, for crew and cargo transport up and down during any OSP stand down, and also for ambitious NASA science and exploration missions in the solar system. Smaller Station cargo needs could be met by one of the Alternate Access to Station designs should NASA choose to resurrect them.
Thank you for this opportunity to address you, Mr. Chairman, and that completes my statement.
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[The prepared statement of Dr. Grey follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY GREY
Introduction
My name is Jerry Grey. I am Director of Science and Technology Policy for the American Institute of Aeronautics (AIAA) and Visiting Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. Although the views I express here on the orbital space plane program and related subjects are consistent with those appearing in the AIAA's publications, they are my own and do not necessarily reflect the formal position of the AIAA. Thank you for this opportunity to offer my comments on this important subject.
As you requested, I focus my testimony on the questions you posed.
(1) What key factors should be considered when evaluating human space transportation architectures?
There are two principal factors: safety and cost. Included in ''safety'' are avoidance of failures, tolerance of failures (i.e., no injury to the crew) should a failure occur, and adequate life-support systems and provisions. Note that ''tolerance of failures'' implies consideration of crew escape systems. Included in ''cost'' are development and operational costs, broken down into annual budget requirements and life cycle cost.
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(2) Is the proposed ISTP an overly optimistic or overly conservative approach to meeting NASA's needs? What areas of the proposed approach pose the greatest risk? What recommendations do you have to reduce these risks?
NASA's needs
It is first necessary to define NASA's needs. By far the most critical current need is to meet the International Space Station's transportation requirements. Prior to the loss of Columbia, the Shuttle fleet provided the large-payload capability needed to transport major elements of the International Space Station (ISS) and carried ISS crew members to and from the station, along with sizable amounts of both technological cargo (e.g., experiment apparatus) and expendables (e.g., water). Once the remaining Shuttle fleet returns to flight status, those functions can resume. When that will be, however, is still uncertain.
Additional provisions and emergency crew return capability for up to three ISS crew members have been provided by Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles. The Russians are committed to provide Soyuz crew-return capability until 2006, and although funding for the number of Progress vehicles needed to continue ISS supply flights without Shuttle support has yet to be identified, there are ''workarounds'' that are likely to allow the station to function at least minimally until the three Shuttles return to flight status. These include measures already implemented; i.e., using Soyuz lifeboat-replacement flights to transport ISS crew members up and down and reducing the ISS crew to two; finding ways to finance an increase in Russian Progress operations; and using the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), whose initial launch aboard an Ariane-5 is planned for late next year (assuming the Ariane-5 will have successfully returned to routine service by then). The main near-term concern is that if no source of funding for additional Progress flights can be found, it may become necessary to mothball the ISS late in 2003 or early in 2004 until the Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.
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NASA's other needs for space transportation, other than one more servicing mission to the Hubble telescope, do not require the Shuttle's unique capabilities and can be met by the existing Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) fleet. Hence the principal requirements for the ISTP, as far as NASA's specific needs are concerned, are (1) to provide an alternative to the Shuttle fleet for servicing the ISS, especially after the next Shuttle failure occurs (at least one such failure is highly likely if the Shuttle is required to operated until 2015 or perhaps even 2020), (2) to provide ISS crew rescue capability after the Russian Soyuz commitment expires in 2006, and (3) perhaps most important, to provide rescue capability for an ISS crew larger than the present 3-person complement. This latter requirement is critical in order for the ISS to fulfill its purpose as a viable research facility. Cancellation by NASA of the original Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) program in February 2001 created this new requirement, which is of major concern to our foreign ISS partners as well as to the U.S. science community.
There is another important function for the ISTP, however: to provide the technology advancement and demonstration necessary to support major improvements in future U.S. access to space. Although not a specific NASA ''need,'' this is clearly part of NASA's overall mission as defined by the 1958 NASA act. Without such improvements all elements of the U.S. space program—commercial, civil, and military—cannot proceed very far beyond what we are able to do today.
The ISTP
The amended ISTP proposal has essentially three primary elements: a Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), and development of Next-Generation Launch Technology (NGLT), the latter two of which constitute a revised Space Launch Initiative (SLI).
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Next-Generation Launch Technology
The expansion of the former Generation 3 technology program into the NGLT, as well as the increased emphasis placed on this type of effort in the amended proposal, should be strongly supported. For many years the AIAA has decried the lack of an ongoing program to advance and upgrade space transportation systems; i.e., to have each successive generation of launch systems ''in the pipeline'' to succeed the current generation. This is relatively standard practice in both the automotive and the aviation industries. It is the lack of such a program in the past that has led to the current crisis in space transportation. The NGLT also incorporates technology advances being pioneered by the DOD, including those of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering's (DDRE) National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) and the Air Force Space Command's Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS) program, thereby strengthening not only the NGLT's technical base but also the potential user base for future launch systems.
One area for concern, however, is the NGLT's focus on hydrocarbon-fueled first-stage designs for the future Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). Although some offices of the Air Force (mainly the laboratory community) also favor hydrocarbon fuels, a definitive summer hypersonics study conducted by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board in 2000 concluded that a hydrogen-fueled first stage would be optimum for both rocket-powered and airbreathing-propelled designs.
The planned NGLT also reduces the emphasis on rocket-powered launch systems in favor of airbreathing combined-cycle propulsion. Hence an excellent propulsion prospect, the robust high-thrust, high-pressure, high-performance expansion-cycle engine, a derivative of the ultra-reliable RL–10 (which has employed an expansion cycle with great success for four decades), will receive little or no attention in the NGLT.
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Shuttle Service Life Extension Program
The Shuttle SLEP should also be supported, because for the foreseeable future the Shuttle will be essential to ISS operations. With the loss of Columbia, we now have only three remaining orbiters to conduct these operations through at least 2012 [and possibly much later, because (a) the OSP is likely to encounter development problems that will delay its initial operational date and (b), as I will discuss later, Shuttle capability will be needed even after a successful OSP system is deployed]. Moreover, with this extended operational period, as I mentioned earlier, the likelihood of another Shuttle failure cannot be ignored. One key capability that ought to be explored in the SLEP (I don't know if NASA is planning this) is conversion of at least some missions to fully automated flight operations. More on this later.
Orbital Space Plane
Now, the OSP. In effect, the OSP and its expendable launch vehicle have been moved chronologically ahead of the Generation-2 program in NASA's original SLI; that is, development of technologies for, and selection of, a reusable system that was to have replaced the Shuttle's function of carrying crew and cargo to and from the ISS at lower cost and with higher reliability. Elements of the old Gen-2 program now appear in the NGLT array of system applications, but the new plan postpones a decision on developing an RLV to 2009—well into the development phase of the OSP. The OSP also replaces the function of the original CRV that was canceled in 2001, as I've noted earlier.
So, does the proposed OSP/Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) architecture meet these needs of NASA's?
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If we assume successful, on-time development of the OSP, that architecture does indeed meet those needs (except that the proposed initiation date for crew return capability [no later than 2010] is four years beyond the Russian commitment to provide that capability).
But that's a big ''if.'' Let's look at the background.
X–33. NASA's termination of the X–33 single-stage-to-orbit technology demonstrator was certainly a correct decision (although as I told this subcommittee on April 10, 2000, I really regret the expenditure of over $1 billion and several years on a program that, like the National Aerospace Plane, was doomed to failure by its overambitious goals right from the beginning).
Space Launch Initiative (SLI). NASA's subsequent decision to focus on a much more realistic two-stage-to-orbit architecture for the original SLI was also a wise one. As mentioned earlier, NASA has proposed to continue the evaluation of a reusable hydrocarbon-fueled first stage in the NGLT program, with significant cooperation from DOD. This evaluation could have some effect on the OSP development, in that the new ISTP proposal identifies the possibility of ''OSP bridge to a new launcher'' in 2016, but its major influence will be on the future (2009) NASA decision regarding a reusable booster. Contrary to NASA's and the DOD National Aerospace Initiative's focus on a hydrocarbon-fueled first stage, however, as I mentioned earlier, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board's Summer Hypersonics Study in 2000 concluded that a hydrogen-fueled first stage, whether rocket-powered or airbreathing, is better than a hydrocarbon-fueled one. Hence consideration of hydrogen-fueled boosters should not be dropped from the NGLT.
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Reusability. NASA should not, however, be blamed for postponing to 2009 a decision on development of a reusable launch system. The basis for that decision was sound: neither the commercial launch market nor the government launch market, even in combination, can support the estimated price tag of a new reusable launcher. Fortunately, while NASA was obeying the August 1994 Presidential directive to spend its time and money pursuing a too-ambitious reusable launch concept, the Air Force and its EELV contractors were able to develop two new expendable launcher families that now open up real possibilities to help solve NASA's near-term needs.
OSP/EELV Suitability. Back to the big ''if.'' First, although the EELV program has demonstrated highly successful initial launches, it is still too early to tell if the EELVs can reliably support a major ongoing NASA