SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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87–546PS
2004
U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION
IN SPACE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 11, 2003
Serial No. 108–25
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
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JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CHRIS BELL, Texas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
ZOE LOFGREN, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM MATHESON, Utah
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
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VACANCY
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
CHRIS BELL, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
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EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BRAD SHERMAN, California
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 11, 2003
Witness List
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
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Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Statement by Representative Sherwood Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Panel:
Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space Authority
Oral Statement
Written Statement
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Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
Written Statement
Discussion
Iran Nonproliferation Act
Partnerships Between U.S. and Russian Companies
Russian Support for the International Space Station
Proliferation Issues
Reliance on Russia While the Shuttle Fleet Is Grounded
European Participation and Contributions to the ISS
Status of Russian Economy
Russian Political Changes
Dependence on Russian Support to ISS
Russian Commitments to Support the ISS
Safety of the Russian Soyuz Vehicle
Technology Transfer
U.S.–Russian Rocket Engine Technology Investment
Russian Budget Commitments for Progress and Soyuz Vehicles
U.S.–Russian Relations
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Clarification on Russia's Commitment to ISS
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space Authority
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN SPACE
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
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Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. I apologize for keeping us a little late here. We have had a little bit of a glitch in terms of who was willing to testify and who is not willing to testify, so—but I hereby call this meeting of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order. And without objection, the Chair will be granted the authority to recess this meeting at any time. Hearing no objection.
Last week, in St. Petersburg, President Bush and Russian President Putin issued a joint statement that is the subject of today's hearing. Both countries promised to continue to cooperate in the arena of human space flight and in the ongoing challenge of assembling and operating the International Space Station in light of the current Space Shuttle situation. They committed themselves to taking ''energetic steps'' toward greater space cooperation.
Today's hearing will explore the benefits and risks of U.S.–Russian cooperation in space, particularly in light, as I say, of the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia. These issues, balancing our nonproliferation concerns against the benefits of space cooperation, remind me a little bit of that Russian, I think they call it, matryoshka doll where you can see it on the outside. It sort of looks like there is—that is what it is all about, but as you go down, you find layer after layer of different concerns and different things within the issue. So foreign—U.S. foreign policy vis-á-vis Russia is almost as complicated as rocket science issues, but of course, our Subcommittee does deal with rocket science issues.
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The U.S.–Russian partnership on the Space Station over the years has been frustrating. And I have followed that very closely over the years, and that has been frustrating. And that especially was frustrating when our Russian partners failed to meet their commitments about a decade ago. But during—but in terms of the chaotic scene in Russia, that now appears to be stabilizing, as we would hope it would be, and a new potential may well be on the horizon.
I am pleased that the United States and Russia are continuing to combat the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And while there is reason for optimism in terms of this relationship, let us always remember the words of my former boss, ''Trust but verify.''
Specifically, this hearing will explore Russia's ability to meet its commitments to the Space Station with Soyuz and Progress flights and our dependence on them. Of particular interest will be to examine calls from the United States industry for Congress and NASA to clarify the interpretations of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Americans and Russians can work together on future space enterprises that will maximize our individual national goals and capabilities. We can do more by working together with the Russians than we can—than each of us could do working separately. We could benefit by working together, not just in terms of financial profit, but by working toward mutual goals.
And when it comes to making the Space Station a success, I believe that the United States companies should work with Russian companies. But it must be with companies that are not involved with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That is clear that there is a—and it is clear that there is a restriction on working with the Russian Government in terms of as long as there is a proliferation question. I, however, would advocate that we can work company to company, American company to Russian company, and still be within the bounds of this nonproliferation legislation.
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Our relationship with Russia has changed in the past three years. Significant progress has been made since the days that our space dollars ended up financing lucky Russian bureaucrats, known as apparatchiks. But let us not dwell on the mistakes of the 1990's nor let us repeat those mistakes. Let us, instead, chart a positive course for the future, and to me, achieving our space goals, by definition, means working with the Russians to make sure we can accomplish what we can accomplish.
So with that said, I will be happy to now turn to Bart Gordon for his opening statement.
Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning everyone. I want to welcome you to today's hearing. I look forward to your testimony. I also want to thank Chairman Rohrabacher for holding this hearing. It is a very timely hearing and a very important hearing.
U.S.–Russian space cooperation has been an important part of our space program since the early 1990's. And today, it is critical to the continued survival of the International Space Station. With the Space Shuttle fleet grounded, it is no exaggeration to say that we are just one Progress or Soyuz failure away from having to pull the crew off of the Space Station. If that happens, the rest of the Space Station will go up significantly.
It is clear that the Iran Nonproliferation Act has complicated the situation. However, a discussion of how fast to achieve the Nation's nonproliferation goals is not the purpose of this hearing. And Members may have different views on whether linking the Space Station program to nonproliferation is a good idea. The fact of the matter is that the Iran Nonproliferation Act had been public law since 2000. In light of that, Congress needs to hear from the Administration in specific terms how it will protect the considerable taxpayer investment in the Space Station.
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And Mr. Schumacher, in your testimony that you submitted, it was rather brief. It didn't really go into these questions. So let me, since you are going to have some extra time, I would like to pose these questions so that you could help us in your testimony, if you don't mind. The United States is responsible for providing Space Station crew return support for non-Russian astronauts starting in the year 2006. How will the Administration meet that commitment and still comply with the Iran Nonproliferation Act? Secondly, the Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for more than 2b years after the Challenger accident. How will the Administration ensure that the Space Station can continue to operate if the Shuttle fleet is grounded that long again? And whether or not the Administration is expecting the Russians or other Space Station international partners to pay for the Soyuz and Progress flights until the Shuttle starts flying again as well as from 2006 onward, and have the partners, in fact, agreed to pay? And if so, is there a signed agreement?
And I will just point out, I understand, Mr. Schumacher, that you are going to be Mr. O'Keefe's new Chief of Staff, and congratulations on that important position. Similar questions were submitted to him on February the 27th, so hopefully you could maybe give us a first installment today and then you can look for those questions there in the office and help us with this. It is something that is important. And again, these are not easy questions. I—you know, and there won't be easy answers. I don't intend to say that. We have to start this process of trying to figure out where we are going.
NASA is dependent upon Russia's spacecraft to keep the Space Station operational until the Shuttle flights resume. Since the Administration canceled the U.S. Space Station Crew Return Vehicle in 2001, NASA is totally dependent on the Russian Soyuz CRV until the end of this decade. And finally, the only alternative to the Space Shuttle for getting crews into the space over the next 10 years is the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. So it is not enough to say that today there hasn't been a need for NASA to seek an exemption or to change the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Given existing commitments and other realities coming over the next 10 years, the Administration needs to tell us or at least start the process of telling us and trying to figure this out, you know, what to do and what we can do with these commitments and realities.
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Again, we have got a lot of ground to cover. Thank you for being here. And I look forward to hearing your suggestions.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Without objection, the opening statement of other Members will be put into the record, but I would like to now, at this point, extend to the Chairman of Full Committee any—the—if he would like to say a few words, we would love to have them.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for having this important oversight hearing. This is the type of thing we do day after day, week after week. It is critically important.
I think the International Space Station and the transportation system now serving it provide a testimony to the benefit derived from a meaningful working partnership between the United States and Russia. And I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that you consider inserting in the record at this juncture the statements of President Bush and Putin arrived at last week. I think they are very important and reassuring, and I thank you for it.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, their statements will be inserted in the record without objection. And anything further, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. BOEHLERT. That is it, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, we are very, very pleased whenever the Chairman of the Full Committee graces our Subcommittee. And we appreciate your involvement and your guidance.
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So without objection, we will include that reference to the statements issued by President Putin and President Bush in the record. (See Charter, Attachment 1, p. 11.)
As I said, other Members here will have to put their opening statements in the written record, and I—hearing no objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent to insert at the appropriate place in the record the background memorandum prepared by the Majority Staff for this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
HEARING CHARTER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
U.S.–Russian Cooperation
in Space
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003
2:00 P.M.–4:00 P.M.
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2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
Purpose of Hearing
On Wednesday, June 11, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee will hold a hearing on U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Space. This hearing will explore the benefits and risks of U.S.–Russian cooperation on space programs. Specifically, the hearing will review Russia's participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program and the Russian Space Agency's (RSA) ability to provide near-term and long-term support for the ISS with Soyuz and Progress space vehicles. Members will examine how NASA has interpreted Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000, how the INA has affected U.S.–Russian space collaboration, and how INA policies have influenced Russian nonproliferation. In addition, the hearing will also review other areas of technical collaboration in space between the U.S. and Russia and how best to organize these collaborations between government and industry.
Major Issues for Congress
Joint Statement on U.S.–Russia Cooperation in Space. On June 1st, President Bush and Russian President Putin issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space that committed the U.S. to safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight and Russia to meeting the Space Station crew transport and logistics resupply requirements until the Shuttle returns to flight. The statement also reaffirmed a U.S.–Russia commitment to take ''energetic steps'' to enhance cooperation in space technologies and techniques. How will Russia fund its commitments for the Space Station?
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Reliance on the Russians to Support the Space Station. U.S. human spaceflight is completely reliant on the Russian Soyuz and Progress space vehicles for all crew transport and rescue as well as cargo delivery to the Space Station while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded. Even when the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight, U.S. human spaceflight will still rely on the Russian Soyuz vehicle for Space Station crew rescue. Several NASA reports call into question the inability of RSA to support the Space Station over the next several years without additional funding.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA). Section 6 of the INA prevents the U.S. Government from providing payments to the Russian Government, including the RSA, in connection with the ISS unless certain conditions are met. U.S. industry has raised questions about whether the INA allows U.S. contractors to enter into relationships with Russian contractors on Space Station work.
Background on Russia's Participation in the International Space Station. The history of the Cold War and human spaceflight are closely intertwined with U.S.–Soviet/Russian foreign relations. In 1993, President Clinton invited Russia into the international partnership (Europe, Canada, and Japan were already partners) to build the Space Station. The primary reasons behind this invitation were to promote Russian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and promote nonproliferation by helping Russia's aerospace industry shift from military to civilian work. Between 1994 and 1998, NASA paid the Russian Space Agency approximately $800 million to build the Zarya space station module, support the Shuttle-Mir program, and other spaceflight activities while the RSA agreed to build and launch the Zvezda Service Module as well as Soyuz and Progress crew and cargo vehicles to support the Space Station.
Throughout the past 10 years, Russia had financial problems and schedule delays in meeting its commitments to the Space Station program. Also, during the 1990s, several reports raised concerns that the RSA and Russian aerospace industry were proliferating weapons technologies to rogue states. In response to these concerns, the House and Senate unanimously (419–0 in the House and 98–0 in the Senate) passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) that became law on March 14, 2000.
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The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) restricts the U.S. Government from making payments to the RSA or any organization under its jurisdiction in connection with the International Space Station unless the President determines that the Russian Government is not proliferating any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic missile technology to Iran. Exceptions to this restriction are allowed in cases of crew safety, and support for the Russian Zvezda Service Module (See Attachment 3 for more detailed background on U.S.–Russia Space Cooperation and Attachment 5 for the relevant portions of the INA). Key issues to consider:
Has Section 6 of the INA helped stem proliferation between Russia and Iran?
How has Section 6 of the INA impacted the Space Station program?
Reliance on Russian Support to the Space Station. The Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and subsequent grounding of the Shuttle fleet has made the U.S. human spaceflight program completely reliant on the Russian Soyuz and Progress space vehicles for all crew transport and rescue as well as cargo delivery to the International Space Station while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded. RSA informed the ISS international partners at the February 26th Multilateral Configuration Board meeting that while RSA agreed to the accelerated production schedule for Progress cargo vehicles (see Attachment 2) additional funds from the international partners were needed to meet that schedule. Since then, the Space Station international partners have agreed to a Progress and Soyuz flight schedule while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded, but have not yet found the necessary funds for those Russian flights. NASA described its concern last April:
''The concern was based on the fact that Russian performance appeared to depend on the receipt of 'off-budget' funds from the sale of flight opportunities [space tourist flights] on the Soyuz missions. The European Space Agency (ESA) had arranged to purchase two of the four available flight opportunities, but prospects for the other two were unclear. The grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet and the subsequent Multilateral Coordination Board-agreed upon interim operations plan have put additional financial strain on Rosaviakosmos [Russian Space Agency]. To assist during this difficult period, ESA has agreed to defer the flights of its astronauts, while continuing payments to Rosaviakosmos for the flights on the original schedule.''(see footnote 1)
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Unless the Administration requests a waiver to the Iran Nonproliferation Act, additional funds for Russia's support to the Space Station will need to come from the international partners other than the U.S.
Long-Term Viability of Russian Support for the Space Station. Even before the Columbia tragedy made issues about reliance on Russian Progress and Soyuz flights more acute, NASA reported ''uncertainties associated with the outlook for Russia's future funding''(see footnote 2) for the Space Station in its bimonthly performance reports to the Committee. The agreement between the international partners called upon Russia to provide Soyuz capsules to serve as crew rescue vehicles through 2006. These NASA reports call into question the ability of the Russian Space Agency to support the Space Station over the next several years without additional funding from the Russian Government, the Space Station international partners, or the sale of more space tourist flights.
How is NASA mitigating the risks to the Space Station and its crew if the Russian Space Agency is not able to support long-term crew transport/rescue as well as cargo delivery?
Due to NASA's problems in developing a Space Station crew rescue vehicle and RSA's financial problems, is continued reliance on the Russian Soyuz a prudent and viable plan?
Safety of the Soyuz Vehicles
The flight of the Russian Soyuz vehicle that returned the Expedition 6 crew last month raised new questions about the safety of our reliance on Russian vehicles. This capsule did not re-enter the Earths atmosphere as planned but re-entered the Earth's atmosphere in an anomalous ballistic entry, and the capsule landed over 275 miles from its intended landing target in Kazakhstan. The astronauts experienced more than 8 G forces versus the normal 4 Gs during this re-entry. Further, search and rescue crews took more than two hours to locate the crew. Rescue teams could not pinpoint the crew until they unfurled a 15-foot auxiliary antenna.
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Key issues include:
What actions have the ISS international partners taken to ensure that the necessary resources are available for Russian Progress cargo flights to the Space Station?
Are the funding shortfalls for Russian Soyuz and Progress missions causing any undue safety risks to the Space Station or its crew while the Shuttle fleet is grounded?
The Iran Nonproliferation Act. The INA prohibits the U.S. Government from making payments to Russia in connection with the ISS and prohibits payments to any other entity if the U.S. Government anticipates that such payments will be passed on to an entity proliferating to Iran. Recently, industry bidders for the Space Station Cargo Mission Request for Proposals (RFP) sought guidance from NASA on the applicability of INA restrictions to U.S.–Russian company subcontracts. NASA asked for information from potential bidders on their proposed Russian subcontractor relationships and impact on the bidder's team if the Russian company could not participate in the work. Key issues include:
What impacts have potential bidders to the ISS Cargo Mission RFP identified to NASA as a result of this guidance?
To what degree does Section 6 of the INA restrict U.S.–Russian companies relationships on launch vehicles or cargo carriers to the Space Station?
Collaboration with Russia on Space Programs. The Iran Nonproliferation Act only covers U.S.–Russian collaboration on the International Space Station, but the U.S. and Russia collaborate in several other space programs. NASA provided a summary of its cooperation with Russia in Attachment 4.
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The joint U.S.–Russia statement says that the two countries ''are prepared to take energetic steps to enhance our cooperation in the application of space technology and techniques.'' Other than the Space Station, space launch is the main area of collaboration between the U.S. and Russia. These joint ventures are formed between U.S. and Russian companies rather than through government-to-government collaboration.
Rocket Engines. Lockheed Martin's Atlas V uses the RD–180 first stage engine built by Energomash, a Russian company, and Sea Launch is a partnership between Boeing, Energia, and Yuzhnoye/Yuzhmash using the Ukrainian Zenit rocket and Russian upper stage engines. Several U.S. commercial satellites are launched from Russia or Kazakhstan.
Space Nuclear Power. NASA, through the Department of Energy, purchases plutonium fuel from Russia for its in-space nuclear power. During the early 1990s, the U.S. purchased the Russian Topaz space nuclear reactor in order to analyze its design for future systems. However, further collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in NASA's new nuclear systems development appears doubtful.
Russian Collaboration with other Nations. The Russian Space Agency also has a number of cooperative ventures with other countries in space—France, Germany, Canada, China, India, Bulgaria, Hungary, Pakistan, Portugal, Israel, and the European Space Agency. Of particular interest, RSA signed agreements to support China's human spaceflight program. Russia also has ties with India and Pakistan's rocket program.
What are some areas of technical collaboration in space between the U.S. and Russia that would provide meaningful benefit to the U.S. space program while also discouraging Russian proliferation of space and missile capabilities to other countries?
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How best should these cooperative space endeavors be organized, either between U.S.–Russian companies or between the governments?
Witnesses
Amb. Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California Space Authority
Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Witness Questions
The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in their testimony.
Questions for Ambassador Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
How has the INA, along with other factors, influenced the activities and behavior of Russian Government, Russian Space Agency, and other organizations under its jurisdiction to exert more control to stem the proliferation of space and missile technology from Russia to states such as Iran?
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Is the State Department actively monitoring Russian collaboration in space and missile technology with the U.S. and other countries and keeping other Federal agencies informed of these Russian collaborations?
What is the State Department's role in working with NASA to ensure that the INA is interpreted and implemented properly?
Questions for Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations
What have been the benefits and difficulties from NASA–Russian Space Agency cooperation on the ISS over the past three years?
What actions have the International Partners taken to ensure that the Russian Space Agency has the necessary resources to accelerate the production for Progress resupply flights and meet the cargo needs for the ISS while the Space Shuttle is grounded?
Given the problems with the Soyuz TMA–1 return flight with the Expedition 6 crew, have NASA and the Russian Space Agency considered any changes to remedy safety concerns with Soyuz flight operations? If so, what are those changes?
Have any potential bidders for NASA procurements identified any adverse impacts due to NASA's interpretation of Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act?
To what degree does NASA believe that Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act restricts U.S. contractor-to-Russian contractor relationships?
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Questions for Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California Space Authority
What are the benefits and risks when U.S. companies collaborate with the Russian Space Agency or Russian companies on space projects?
What areas of technical collaboration with Russian space industry would you recommend that U.S. aerospace companies pursue?
How has the INA affected U.S. aerospace industry collaboration with Russia?
Questions for Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
What areas of collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in space have been beneficial or difficult over the past three years?
How reliant is Russia on funding from other countries to maintain its space and missile capabilities? In what areas is Russia collaborating with other countries on space capabilities? What are the proliferation concerns of these collaborations?
What areas of future collaboration in space would you recommend between the U.S. and Russia governments and companies?
How have the behavior and actions of the Russian government and Russian Space Agency changed over the past three years in order to better stem the proliferation of space and missile technology from Russia?
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Attachments:
1. Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin on U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Space
2. Chart: MCB–Approved Soyuz and Progress Launch Schedule Re-Plan 2003–2004
3. Congressional Research Service Background Paper
4. NASA Summary on U.S.–Russia Space Cooperation
5. Sections 6 and 7 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
Attachment 1
Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin on U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Space. On June 1, 2003 during their meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, the U.S. and Russian presidents issued the following joint statement:
The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored the historic role of the United States and Russia as partners in space exploration, who have persevered despite tragedy and adversity. During this challenging time, our partnership has deepened and the International Space Station (ISS) program remains strong. The extraordinary efforts of our countries continue.
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The United States is committed to safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight, and the Russian Federation is committed to meeting the ISS crew transport and logistics resupply requirements necessary to maintain our joint American astronaut and Russian cosmonaut teams on board the ISS until the Space Shuttle returns to flight.
We confirm our mutual aspiration to ensure the continued assembly and viability of the International Space Station as a world-class research facility, relying on our unprecedented experience of bilateral and multilateral interaction in space. We reaffirm our commitment to the mission of human space flight and are prepared to take energetic steps to enhance our cooperation in the application of space technology and techniques.(see footnote 3)
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Attachment 4
United States–Russia Space Cooperation Summary
Background
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NASA has been engaged in cooperative activities with Russia for nearly 40 years, starting with modest contacts in fields such as space biology and medicine, geodesy and geodynamics. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (Civil Space Agreement), which expanded these contacts into other areas of study including space science, Earth science, satellite-based search and rescue and later, human space flight. Cooperation with the USSR reached a high point with the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975. The Civil Space Agreement was renewed in 1971, but was allowed to lapse in 1982 as a sign of U.S. dissatisfaction with Soviet behaviors, especially in Afghanistan. In 1987 the Agreement was revived and it was subsequently re-established as an agreement with the Russian Federation in 1992. This Agreement was renewed for additional five-year terms in 1997 and 2002.
In October 1992, the United States and Russia signed an Implementing Agreement for the Shuttle-Mir Program, under which 9 missions were flown to the Mir Space Station by the Space Shuttle, including 7 docking missions and 7 long duration visits on orbit by NASA astronauts. Discussions on broadening NASA's cooperation with Russia took place in 1993 in the context of the Space Station redesign effort. A December 1993 Protocol to the Agreement, laid the foundations for U.S.–Russia cooperation in the development of the ISS. NASA's cooperation with the newly formed Russian Space Agency (now known as the Russian Aviation and Agency or Rosaviakosmos) on the ISS program was formalized in June 1994 with the signing of an ''Interim Agreement'' for the Station's design, development and assembly. In the following years, the U.S. State Department and NASA worked with the existing ISS partner countries and Russia to negotiate and conclude an overarching set of agreements on the ISS. This effort culminated with the signature of a multilateral Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) and bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on the ISS program in January 1998.
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Current Human Space Flight Cooperation
International Space Station: In the 1990s, Rosaviakosmos struggled to meet Russia's commitments to the ISS due to a shortage of Russian Government funding. These funding deficiencies had a negative impact on the ISS program's assembly schedule. The first element of the ISS, the U.S.-funded, Russian-built and launched FGB (Zarya) was successfully completed under a contract with Boeing. However, the launch of the first Russian-funded element, the Service Module (Zvezda), was delayed by approximately two years before it was successfully launched in July 2000. Since that time, Russia has been meeting its obligations under the ISS agreements. Permanent human presence on ISS began on November 1, 2000, with the arrival of the Expedition One crew, commanded by U.S. astronaut Bill Shepherd. Russian and U.S. crew members have alternated command of the joint ISS expedition crews for the last two and a half years. Following the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, the ISS partnership has relied on Russian logistics and crew transportation capabilities to sustain operation of the ISS in accordance with the partnership-agreed plan for operations. This circumstance has prompted the Russian Government to adjust its funding plans for 2003 and review plans for 2004. On June 1, 2003, at the U.S.–Russia summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, Presidents Bush and Putin released a joint statement that emphasized our mutual commitments to International Space Station and our aspiration to complete this world-class research facility together with our international partners.
Current Earth Science Cooperation
NASA has cooperated with the USSR and Russia for over 30 years in the fields of Earth science, global change research and environmental monitoring. The overall goal of this cooperation is to advance our understanding of the Earth's systems through the use of space-based sensors, which make quantitative measurements of the state and behavior of the Earth's atmosphere, ocean, land surface, biology and interior.
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NASA's cooperation with Russia is coordinated through the joint U.S.–Russia Earth Sciences Joint Working Group (ESJWG). NASA and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) are the co-chairs of the ESJWG, and other representatives participate from various U.S. and Russian Government agencies, universities and institutes, including Rosaviakosmos. In between formal meetings of the ESJWG, scientists continue cooperative activities and initiate ideas for future collaboration to be brought forward to the next ESJWG meeting. The ESJWG has met twelve times since 1998, with the next session scheduled for fall 2003, in Washington, D.C. Examples of the activities coordinated through the ESJWG include:
Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE III)/Meteor 3M mission: The SAGE III/Meteor 3M mission is NASA's major space flight mission and highest priority cooperation with Russia in the area of Earth science. The mission is providing long-term, global measurements of key components of the Earth's atmosphere and conducts important scientific investigations of the state of the ozone layer. The satellite was launched December 2001 on a Zenit-2 rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Several Russian researchers are full members of the SAGE III Science Team.
High Resolution Picture Transmission (HRPT) Stations and Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data: This cooperative research effort is focused on the study of boreal forests and to provide data to international programs, such as the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP). In this cooperation, three NASA-loaned HRPT stations are installed in Siberia for the collection of 1-km image data from the AVHRR instrument on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) polar orbiting satellites. The raw, processed and analyzed data is available to the international science community on a full and open basis.
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U.S. Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) program: Russia is participating in the SeaWiFS program, which observes the world's oceans from space to measure ocean color (phytoplankton) in efforts to understand the role of the oceans in the global carbon cycle. A representative from the RAS Shirshov Institute of Oceanology (SIO) is a principal investigator on NASA's SeaWiFS mission and a member of the science team.
Space Geodesy: NASA is currently cooperating with RAS and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in a trilateral cooperative effort in Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) geodetic experiments. This cooperation encompasses the use of a NASA-loaned data acquisition system installed in St. Petersburg, and of the radiotelescope of the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory in Simeiz, Ukraine. The experiments focus on improved accuracy in VLBI measurements required for studies of Earth orientation, angular momentum and crustal dynamics. In addition, Russia and the U.S. are cooperating on the laser tracking of satellites of mutual interest, including U.S., Russian and Italian geodetic satellites, Russian GLONASS satellites, U.S. Global Positioning Satellites, and the U.S./French TOPEX/Poseidon oceanography satellite.
Aerosol Robotic NETwork (AERONET): NASA has loaned several sun photometers to various Russian institutions in support of the global AERONET program. The sun photometers measure vital aerosol optical properties and water vapor, which contribute to a more detailed understanding of global atmospheric change phenomena with a particular focus on the assessment of air quality.
Current Space Science Cooperation
Mars Exploration: NASA has cooperated with Russian space scientists on Mars exploration since the 1980s. Recent collaboration has centered on the Russian High Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) instrument, launched on the NASA 2001 Mars Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars, the REND device has returned significant data regarding possible water on Mars.
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Astrophysics: NASA-Russia astrophysics cooperation has centered on two Russian missions: Spectrum-X-Gamma (SXG) and Radioastron. SXG is a Russian high-energy astrophysics observatory under development since the late 1980s and originally conceived with a launch date of 1991. NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU on SXG cooperation in June 1995. Due to continuing Russian Government funding constraints, Russia has terminated development on the baseline mission and is currently redesigning the project.
In March 2002, Rosaviakosmos announced that SXG was no longer its top priority in astrophysics and that Radioastron (a radioastronomy mission) had assumed this role. Like SXG, this mission was conceived in the 1980s, with a planned launch in the mid-1990s, but continual shortfalls in financial resources have also left Russian obligations on this mission incomplete. NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU on Radioastron cooperation in February 1997. NASA was originally slated to provide a series of four ground tracking stations to support this mission, but with Radioastron far from completion, the stations have been decommissioned.
Scientific Balloon Flights: NASA-Russia scientific balloon cooperation began in 1992 with the establishment of a Balloon Implementation Team. Two successful flights were held in the mid-1990s before over-flight clearance was denied by Russia. The two sides have negotiated a long-term Scientific Ballooning Implementing Agreement (IA) for future flights over Russia and possible Russian science participation on NASA missions. It is expected that this new agreement will be finalized later this summer.
International Living With A Star: Russia is participating in the ongoing Office of Space Science (OSS) Living With a Star Program, including participation in the International Living With a Star Executive Steering Committee that held its first meeting in January 2003. The goal of this endeavor is to stimulate, strengthen and coordinate space research in order to understand the physical processes that govern variability in the connected Sun-Earth system.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. We have a distinguished panel with us today to provide their unique perspectives on this issue. Unfortunately, we don't have all of the members of the distinguished panel who could provide us a perspective. One was unable to join us, and we will talk about that later, but we have asked our witnesses to, if possible, to summarize their testimony to five minutes. And we will have a robust discussion thereafter.
One of the reasons we have a hearing panel is so that we can have an interchange of ideas that will benefit the Members of Congress as well as add to the national debate. Unfortunately today, the Administration, or at least the State Department, has determined that if it has a witness to present to Congress, or at least to this subcommittee, that it—that that witness must testify independently, not sitting next to or part of a panel of other witnesses. This was a demand made upon this Chairman by the State Department. And let me note, having worked in the Executive Branch, and now having been elected to a position in the Legislative Branch, it is not my reading of the Constitution that the Executive Branch will dictate to the Legislative Branch the format of our hearings.
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And I think that this is an issue that concerns all of us on both sides of the aisle. I think that the Administration should think very thoroughly this issue out before they decide to try to force this policy upon the Congress. It does not speak well of any Administration that is committed to openness and transparency and an honest discussion of the issues to try to put restrictions on the type of exchange that witnesses—their witnesses before Congress can participate in.
So I would hope that we can work this little issue out, but it must be worked out with due respect to both the rights of the Executive Branch and the rights of the Legislative Branch. And I find this format to be the most informative. I have never had objection from the other side of the aisle on this. I don't know of any party who has ever objected to this format. I happen to share the same party as the person now who heads the Executive Branch. There—I don't see why this is an issue, but it will be if we continue to have this type of——
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Just let me say that I wish to associate myself with your remarks. It is not clear to me. I think it is somewhat hazy whether this is an Administration policy or one department responding in this manner. And I hope we can get some clarification on that.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. I will—it will be up to all of us to work together to get that clarification and to try to work something out where we respect the rights of both parties and both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch.
So our first witness was to be Ambassador Steve Pifer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs. That meant that he oversees our relationship with Russia.
As you see before us today, Ambassador Pifer is not here to answer questions, not here to participate in the discussion and I regret that. And that is unfortunate.
Our second witness is John Schumacher, who is in charge of NASA's external relations and NASA's lead negotiator with the Russian Space Agency. I am glad to welcome him here today, and you may proceed with your testimony.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would observe that Mr. Schumacher is a very valuable member of this Administration. So that would indicate that this is not an Administration policy, at least at this juncture, as far as we are aware of, not to let Members testify in the manner in which you have indicated is most helpful to the Congress.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. And make sure that the record is straight on that. There was a serious negotiation as to whether he would be here and be on the panel. And Administrator O'Keefe wisely decided to send him and to be part of the regular format that we have here in the Subcommittee. And I would applaud Administrator O'Keefe for demonstrating that he wants to take the extra step in order to work in cooperation with this subcommittee.
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Mr. Schumacher, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. SCHUMACHER, NASA ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Mr. SCHUMACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Boehlert. I will make sure that your very clear remarks are conveyed.
Thank you again for having this hearing. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee on U.S.–Russia cooperation in space. It is an important topic.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will submit a copy of my full testimony for the record and make a brief oral statement to summarize the testimony.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Without objection.
Mr. SCHUMACHER. First of all, and not exactly a topic of this hearing, it is great to report to you that Mars Exploration Rover named ''Spirit'' just this Sunday launched successfully yesterday afternoon from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on its way to a January 4 arrival date at Mars. The second Mars exploration Rover named ''Opportunity'' is scheduled for launch on the 24th. They join an Express mission and a Japanese mission all on the way to Mars for dates later this year and early next year.
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And exactly in line with the subject of this hearing, a Russian Progress successfully docked with the International Space Station this morning. I talked to the program office a little while ago. The hatch is open and they are getting ready to unload cargo, so another good news piece. I will speak to that Progress launch and what it involved in the relationship to the partnership later in my remarks.
I think everyone is pretty much aware that during the last decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities with Russia in the fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science, and human space flight. The accomplishments have included historic steps forward in human space flight by our astronauts and cosmonauts as well as important projects such as our joint work on the study of the Earth's ozone layer, coordination of research on the Sun-Earth system, and cooperation on the study of Mars.
Building a strong human space flight partnership with our colleagues in Russia has yielded many benefits. This has been particularly evidenced since the loss of Columbia on February 1 of this year. The redundancy and unique capabilities provided by Russian spacecraft have made it possible for the International Space Station partnership to maintain a crew aboard the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet. This has also allowed the ISS partnership to continue ISS operations and scientific research and to prepare for a resumption of construction of the Space Station once the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.
The concrete results of this unprecedented cooperation with Russia were clearly evident on April 26 when NASA astronaut, Ed Lu, and Russian cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko launched aboard a Russian Soyuz spacecraft to begin their ongoing six-month mission. This success was followed on May 4 with the landing of the ISS Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin, ending their 5b-month mission.
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I am also pleased to be able to report to this committee that the Progress launch was successful and is proceeding. The vehicle was launched on June 8 and carried 5,300 pounds of food, fuel, water, and other supplies to support the Expedition 7 crew and continued ISS ops. This Progress mission is the eleventh Progress flight to the International Space Station.
The challenges of the last four months since the tragic loss of Columbia have drawn the ISS partnership, which also includes participation from Japan, 11 European nations, and Canada into an effective and very integrated team. At the start of 2003, the partnership was well on its way to achieving ISS Core Complete on schedule in early 2004. In 2003, we had talked about a lot that it was to be a very demanding year technically and managerially, as the partnership planned to execute five Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS and closeout multilateral work on selecting an ISS configuration. Within hours of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the ISS partners offered their full support and began work to address our new challenges. By the end of February, the partnership had a new plan for interim operations while the Space Shuttle remain grounded.
The partnership has continued to implement this plan and update it as necessary. In particular, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, Rosaviakosmos, has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming increased responsibility for operational support of ISS. The Progress that just docked is a great example of that and how fast people move when—with the use—the switch from crew rotation, which was supposed to be on Space Station to two, the Soyuz, that was done in a couple of months. The crews were retrained. The vehicle was made safe, and launched on time, and brought another crew home. At the same time, work was made across the partnership. And Mr. Gordon, in response to your comments, I will get into that in more detail later, if that is acceptable, a lot of work, very hard work and a lot of hours between U.S., Russia, and other partners on these very detailed technical looks at what was needed to sustain human presence on Station, conduct research, and keep Station safe and operational until a shuttle returns to flight.
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On this Progress, the Russians, again, in this short time period, installed an internal water tank, so water could be carried up. This was not the configuration of Progress that was to carry water. They also actually literally strapped in, literally, five gallon cans of water into there. We had a cooling pump fail on one of the U.S. cooling systems. The Russians went in and installed the hard components that allowed that cooling pump to be hard-wired, if you will, you know, locked into the Progress and carried up. The food, they—the Russians—looked and worked a way where they could double the amount of food that was brought up on this Progress. All things at a fast turnaround, we are going to make this work is the type of great cooperative effort between the two of us. So I highlight those types of things, because that is not easy to do. That is a lot of engineering, a lot of work on center of gravity, all types of things that—to get that Progress and get some—as much backup on the Station as we can for our two astronauts that are up there.
In summary, our relationship with the Russian space program is strong and effective. President Bush and President Putin highlighted the importance of this cooperation, the Joint Statement both Chairmen have referred to. And it is really significant that both Presidents—I mean, they picked several key issues they wanted to highlight, and one of them was space cooperation and, in particular, the importance of sustaining and moving ahead with the completion of assembly and the operation and use of the Space Station.
We greatly appreciate the willingness of Russia, as with all of our ISS partners, to act decisively to address the challenges faced in the wake of the Columbia tragedy.
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Mr. Chairman, this completes my oral statement. Mr. Gordon, I ask for indulgence, and I will get into those in more detail after the other gentlemen get to do their opening comments. I would very much be glad to, and I look forward to any other questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schumacher follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. SCHUMACHER
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today on the subject of NASA's cooperation with the Russian Federation in civil space. As highlighted by President Bush and Russian President Putin during their discussions on the first of this month in Saint Petersburg, ''The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored the historic role of the United States and Russia as partners in space exploration, who have persevered despite tragedy and adversity. During this challenging time, our partnership has deepened and the International Space Station (ISS) Program remains strong.''
During the last decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities with Russia in the fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science, and human space flight. The accomplishments have included the historic steps forward in human space flight by our astronauts and cosmonauts, as well as important projects such as our joint work on the study of the Earth's ozone layer, coordination of research on the Sun-Earth system, and cooperation on the study of Mars. For example, the Russian High Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) is an instrument on the NASA 2001 Mars Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars in October 2001, the HEND device has returned significant data regarding possible water on Mars.
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Building a strong human space flight partnership with our colleagues in Russia has yielded many benefits. This has been particularly evident since the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003. The redundancy and unique capabilities provided by Russian spacecraft have made it possible for the ISS partnership to maintain a crew aboard the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet. This has also allowed the ISS partnership to continue ISS operations and scientific research, and to prepare for a resumption of construction of the ISS, once the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.
The challenges of the last four months have drawn the ISS partnership, which also includes participation from Japan, Europe and Canada, into an even more effective integrated team. At the start of 2003, the ISS partnership was well on its way to achieving ISS Core Complete on schedule in early 2004. 2003 promised to be a demanding year technically and managerially, as the partnership planned to execute five Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS, and close out multilateral work on selecting an ISS configuration. Within hours of the tragic loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, the ISS partners offered their full support and began work to address our new challenges. By the end of February, the partnership had a new plan for interim operations while the Space Shuttle remained grounded. The partnership has continued to implement this plan and update it as necessary. In particular, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming increased responsibility for operational support of the ISS.
In early May, the partnership executed the first ISS expedition crew exchange using Soyuz vehicles. Despite the necessity to re-train the crew for launch on Soyuz instead of on the Space Shuttle, the launch of Soyuz TMA–2 (ISS Flight 6S) was successfully accomplished on schedule. A week later the Expedition 6 crew executed the first return of U.S. astronauts on a Soyuz vehicle. During reentry the Soyuz TMA–1 executed a back-up reentry profile. Rosaviakosmos appointed a Commission to investigate this anomaly. The Commission reported on May 26, 2003, that the guidance system on the vehicle erroneously detected a malfunction and, in accordance with safety protocols, the system ''failed safe'' to the back-up re-entry profile. As another indication of our close partnership with Rosaviakosmos, NASA has been regularly briefed on the progress of the Soyuz investigation. Later this summer, a joint Russian-American team, led by Thomas Stafford, Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.) and his Russian counterpart Nikolai Anfimov, will review the findings of the Russian Commission and report to the NASA Administrator and the General Director of Rosaviakosmos on the implications for ISS operational readiness. We are continuing to work closely with Russia in preparation for the next Soyuz crew exchange planned for October 2003.
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The unwavering support of the ISS partners has reaffirmed the strength and depth of our partnership. NASA has conducted frequent consultations with its Partners as the Columbia accident investigation proceeds. These consultations are being held at all levels, including at the programmatic and technical level, through the Space Station Control Board; at the program management level, through the Multilateral Coordination Board; and at the Heads of Agency level. The ISS partners have scheduled a Multilateral Coordination Board and Heads of Agency meeting for the end of July.
To date, near-term ISS operational plans and decisions taken by the partnership have not resulted in a need for NASA to seek an exception to, or request an amendment of, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
Mr. Chairman, NASA has conducted a broad range of cooperative civil space programs with Russia over the last decade. At present, our relationship with the Russian space program is strong and effective. We greatly appreciate the willingness of Russia, as with all of our ISS partners, to act decisively to address the challenges faced in the wake of the Columbia tragedy. Moreover, we look forward to resuming Space Shuttle operations so that we can continue the construction of the ISS and make full use of its remarkable capabilities.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, we appreciate you being here to present that to us. Thank you very much.
Mr. SCHUMACHER. My pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman ROHRABACHER. Our next witness is Bob Davis, who will represent the United States industry perspective on cooperative ventures with the Russians in space. And while Mr. Davis is the President and CEO of the California Space Authority, his testimony before the Committee today is based on his own experience in working U.S. industry deals with the Russians. And the opinions he expresses are his own today, but he is a man whose opinions have been shaped by his own experience.
So with those caveats, Mr. Davis, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT M. DAVIS, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE CALIFORNIA SPACE AUTHORITY
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for addressing this matter of considerable importance to the future of our U.S. space enterprise community.
As you have heard, my name is Robert M. Davis. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of the California Space Authority, a member-supported, California-based, non-profit corporation that exists to retain, grow, and create U.S. space enterprise in an intensively competitive global market that is highly coveted by all space-faring nations, current and future. Our constituents have little choice but to compete sometimes on unequal footing in these tough markets.
As you have heard, the comments and viewpoints expressed today are my own. They do reflect extensive experience gained throughout the 1990's for the number of U.S.–Russian company-to-company and company-to-Russian government dealings and ongoing monitoring of these projects, most of which continue today.
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With several provisos, I support U.S.–Russian cooperative space enterprise initiatives and strongly encourage U.S. Government support of company-to-company projects, particularly when they contribute to a strong U.S. industrial base. Overall, aerospace projects performed with Russian entities have been a positive experience for U.S. companies.
Many companies view the Russians as good, positive partners. Strong and positive relationships have developed in a number of instances, and a number of these business ventures have become very successful over time. Tangible, specific benefits occur to those companies who enter these arrangements, from which the United States Government also benefits significantly, including ostensibly from reductions of Russian missile technology proliferation elsewhere. Cooperative aerospace projects gainfully employ Russian companies and individuals, thereby creating positive behavioral incentives.
U.S. companies have gained highly productive access to Russian technology and know-how. The opportunity to leverage technology, particularly in propulsion, metallurgy, ceramics, optics, and other select areas has significantly advanced U.S. interests.
Aerospace endeavors have helped bring about Russia's transition toward a true market economy. A number of early U.S.–Russian company-to-company dealings broke new ground in adoption of western business approaches, financial thinking, and judicial practices. Projects with Russian aerospace entities expose and teach market-oriented Western economic philosophy, practices, and operations to Russian entities and citizens. In kind, we have gained far better understanding of Russian interests, viewpoints, and objectives.
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On the subject of undesirable technology proliferation, it is difficult to know what else a Russian partner company may be doing. The Russians are very proud, by their nature, can be very suspicious, even of one another, and secretive. Their cultural behaviors and motives can create uncertainty as to what they are doing, as to whether what they are doing is or not in the interest of the U.S., particularly as interpreted by U.S. citizens doing project work.
That said, Russians can be quite trustworthy. After a failed first deal, my second undertaking built first on gaining each other's trust and thereafter enacting a relatively simple contract that became a true, enduring partnership, even when subjected to extreme Russian Government pressures to abandon it. That partnership endures and every tenet of the agreement has been upheld to date. That said, the Russians are tough, able competitors who have their own needs to satisfy and will invariably do so.
There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides that result from U.S.–Russian space cooperative endeavors. Given the weak, worldwide commercial launch demand, U.S. companies, particularly in propulsion, are working at 50 percent of capacity and far worse. A real tangible downside is the loss of work done in Russia that could be done here. Comparatively meager and unsustained United States Government space propulsion investment, as one case in point, is what stimulated, originally, strategic alliances with Russian propulsion entities at the probable cost of some U.S. jobs. While not their preference, perhaps, U.S. company employment and investment losses are somewhat offset by access to and selective use of Russian technology, know-how, and U.S. development projects. Projects such as Sea Launch, Orbital Space Plane potentially launched on an EELV, or other known ISS access concepts, do or could make highly productive use of said Russian capabilities, albeit at some U.S. employment cost.
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Absent U.S.–Russian cooperative aerospace endeavors, Russia will fill the vacuum. If projects are stopped or slowed, Russia will likely turn to China or increase its dealing with Russian—excuse me, with European interests. The U.S. would also lose access and insight into Russian aerospace plans and technological capabilities, which we may later come to regret. The U.S. Government should clearly articulate and steadfastly support policy that enables U.S. Government—excuse me, U.S.–Russian company to company transactions. I urge the policies, laws, and regulations be implemented in a fashion that minimize business disruption.
Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. DAVIS
Mr. Chairman, and Honorable Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for taking time from your busy schedules to look into a matter that is of considerable importance to and impact on the future of our U.S. space enterprise community.
My name is Robert M. Davis. I currently serve as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the California Space Authority, a member-supported California-based non-profit corporation, whose purpose is to Retain, Grow and Create California Space Enterprise. Our membership is comprised of individuals and entities from industry, academia, labor and workforce developers, and local government. Our membership includes a number of companies, large and small, from whom you hear frequently in behalf of their and our nations' aerospace interests. The name of my corporation implies that we are interested only in the well being of California Space Enterprise. However, Space Enterprise is an intensely competitive, internationally coveted industry, and many of our constituents compete in tough global markets. The California Space Authority is therefore keenly attentive to policy positions taken by the U.S. Government that bear on the future competitiveness of our industry and nation and therefore do not limit our interests and voice solely to the confines of the borders of the State of California.
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While I appear before you today as an employee of the California Space Authority, the comments and viewpoints today are my own. They are drawn from and reflect extensive earlier experience that I gained throughout the 1990s with a number of U.S.–Russian company to company and company to Russian government dealings and to which I continue to pay ongoing attention. I am flattered to have been invited to appear before you today, and thank you for the opportunity to offer and share my views as a U.S. space enterprise industrialist.
With several provisos that I will define in my subsequent remarks, I support U.S.–Russian Space Cooperation and initiatives, and strongly encourage that our policy-makers and policies support company to company cooperative pursuits, in particular where they contribute to a strong U.S. industrial space enterprise base, and compliment our National Security interests.
In support of the aforementioned statement, I offer the following points for the Committee's consideration:
Overall, U.S. industry dealings with Russian space entities have been a positive experience for U.S. companies. Many U.S. entities have found their Russian partners to be good partners. It is fair to say that strong and positive relationships have developed over the years in a variety of areas. A number of these business ventures have grown to be very successful and they have gained use of technologies that are beneficial to U.S. space enterprise companies' interests. Later in my remarks, I will underscore what my own experiences have taught me as to how Russians become good partners, which is quite different than how such relationships occur and grow in a U.S. to U.S. business framework.
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Those with whom I speak from across industry for the most part endorse company-to-company engagements with Russian aerospace industries. There are tangible and specific benefits that accrue to the companies who enter into these engagements, from which the USG also benefits significantly. It appears that these dealings have reduced the likelihood of missile technology proliferation. Whether they have wholly stopped proliferation is not known. Company to company aerospace projects do keep Russians (companies and individuals) gainfully employed, thereby creating incentives to behave in ways that comply with U.S. ITAR and export/import requirements, which is beneficial to the interests of the U.S. and USG's objectives.
Dealing with Russian entities on development and production of aerospace products achieves other outcomes that are beneficial to the interests of the U.S. Government. These dealings expose and demonstrate market-oriented/western economic operations and philosophies to Russian entities and citizens. Presuming the USG finds it desirable for the Russian Republic to continue in the direction of becoming a true market versus command economy, these relationships and ongoing business dealings do help in achieving the transition of Russia toward that end.
Aerospace endeavors appear to have been helpful in bringing about Russia's transition in the direction of a true market economy. A number of early U.S.–Russian company to company dealings broke new ground in Russian adoption of western business approaches, financial thinking and juridical practices that did not broadly exist during the Cold War. Last year the USG recognized Russia as a Market Economy, which can only be helpful to U.S. global economic interests in the future.
Another real plus is the access U.S. companies have gained to Russian technology and know how through conduct of company to company projects. The opportunity we thereby have to leverage technology, particularly in propulsion, which is selectively more highly performing and a high quality product, has been of specific benefit to U.S. propulsion interests, and thereby the USG and other U.S. companies that buy products that incorporate these technologies.
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I do not have a specific answer to the question ''How do U.S. companies ensure that Russian partner companies not proliferate?'' In my experience, which admittedly is somewhat dated, I think it very difficult to detect what a Russian partner may or not also be doing that is not in the interests of the U.S. As professional relationships grow, particularly when U.S. people are operating in situ, it is reasonable to expect that if one has his or her eyes open and ears attuned, one might coincidentally witness circumstances that would give rise to suspicions about undesirable dealings the Russian partner may be conducting. In my own case and those of my past and current colleagues who have ongoing dealings with Russians, none with whom I have worked would allow business interests to cloud their view of U.S. interests and let some concern, if it were to arise, go ignored.
Cultural behaviors and motives can create an air of uncertainty about whether a Russian entity is conducting ancillary activities that are not in the interests of the U.S. national security and diplomatic interests elsewhere in the world. The Russians are very proud, by their nature very suspicious even of one another, and secretive. They are deservedly proud of their aerospace accomplishments, highly protective of their technology, and behave diligently to ensure that their intellectual property remains theirs, and is not exploited, at least without specific offsetting gain. These behaviors can create concern over their underlying motives, which may not be warranted.
Russians can become very Trustworthy. My personal experiences speak volumes about dealing with Russians. My and my earlier company's first ''deal'' with a Russian design bureau came apart in August 1991, after some months of joint activity, probably the result of a collision of expectations, and more importantly due to fundamental failures in communications borne out of vast initially indiscernible cultural differences. My second undertaking, which became a true, enduring partnership, even when the leaders of the Russian partner were subjected to extreme Russian government pressures to abandon it, have stayed the course. The fundamental difference between the two was the presence or absence of one-to-one trust on the part of the two leaders of the two entities. In the first case, we went at it as a standard business to business transaction, wrapped in typical Letters of Agreement, Contracts, payments, etc., which in the outcome didn't endure at the first moment of any pressure. The second was a partnership that was built first on gaining each other's trust, then jointly resolving how to meet our mutual business interests and objectives, and finally entering into a relatively simple ''contract''. That partnership endures yet today, and in the case of the Russian partner, has upheld every tenet of the agreements, even when it has been very financially painful for both partners to do so. I can also report that this has been the experience with many of my industrial colleagues who have entered into and continue to conduct business to business dealings with Russians and Russian entities today. That said, neither I, nor my many colleagues who have worked closely with Russian counterparts hold a Pollyanna view of the Russians—they are tough, able competitors, who have their own national and international needs to satisfy, and they will invariably seek to do so.
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There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides that result from U.S.–Russian Space Cooperative Endeavors. U.S.–Russian company to company (and government to government) dealings has and does displace U.S. company workers. Propulsion and other aerospace work that could be done by employees and U.S. companies is being done by Russian companies and workers. Given the recent and dramatic decline in demand worldwide for commercial launches, U.S. propulsion companies, in particular, are suffering, probably all working at something less than 50 percent of capacity, and worse. From first hand experience, our nation has not had an enduring space launch propulsion investment program, which is what compelled me, one of my former employers and other propulsion companies to look toward Russia as a means of expediently gaining a better domestic competitive position. Essentially, our nation's only enduring space propulsion investment has been in the Shuttle's main engine, which generally powers but a fraction of our national launch program needs and capabilities. The expense of large engine development, as a general rule, exceeds the financial capacity of essentially any of the U.S. propulsion companies or corporations. While not necessarily the choice or preference of U.S. propulsion companies, the comparatively meager USG investment in space propulsion is what has helped create the gradient or incentives that stimulated strategic alliances with Russian propulsion developers and producers. In order to achieve the access and workable alliances, a number of those U.S. companies have heavily invested private capital in order to achieve productive agreements; in some cases those agreements have not been particularly lucrative, especially in light of the downturn in the worldwide commercial launch market. To somewhat offset their losses (and domestic technology investments) in propulsion base, those same alliances have gained access to and use of technology and know how developed by the Russians in the course of their space program. The Russians took different technology and production routes than those of the U.S., and produced, selectively, more highly performing, very durable rocket engines; several of those different approaches are being incorporated into future U.S. engine technology development. In fact, in the era of a future Orbital Space Plane, potentially launched on a US EELV, powered by an engine of Russian technology origin, U.S. ISS access interests are likely to be served. Other such projects such as Sea Launch, arrangements and possibilities exist that could enable routine ISS access in yet different beneficial ways, again selectively using Russian aerospace technologies and capabilities.
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On the subject of U.S.–Russian cooperative interests, nature abhors a vacuum, which absent U.S.–Russian cooperative aerospace endeavors, Russia will seek to fill. If the U.S. were to take the route that future dealing with Russian aerospace developers and producers is undesirable, and cause their discontinuation, several things will or could occur. First, a part of our current expendable launch stable will be disrupted for a period of time. That will result in a loss of competition and in the long run, quite possibly a loss of technological innovation and progress. Absent competition, the flow of innovative juices is eventually stunted. Absent government to government, company to company dealings, Russia will be forced to seek new markets for its capabilities and products. China appears headed in a direction that some U.S. aerospace leaders feel could seriously threaten U.S. space enterprise leadership. Russia may well be induced to turn to dealing with China in order to keep its aerospace community productively employed and earning, something that the U.S. may not find in its longer-term best interests. The same outcome may occur between European and Russian interests. The U.S. would also lose access to and insight into the ongoing evolution of Russian aerospace interests and capabilities, which we might later come to regret.
In closing, it is therefore my viewpoint that the U.S. should clearly articulate and steadfastly support policy that enables U.S.–Russian company to company (and government to government) undertakings. I urge that these and our Administration's deliberations produce policies and accompanying laws and regulations that are implemented in a fashion that minimizes the potential for business disruption. Many U.S. companies have invested considerable sums of private capital in joint U.S.–Russian aerospace endeavors. From time to time they find their partnership and financial expectations disrupted, or relations with their investors imperiled because of a temporary diplomatic position taken by the USG in order to produce a behavioral modification on the part of Russia. Most companies enter into these business partnerships with a prudent appreciation of the potential for instability and possibility of disruption. However, whatever actions the USG can take to insulate these U.S. companies, particularly those that are entrepreneurial, and often thinly capitalized, from contemporary diplomatic issues, should be further explored and implemented.
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Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be delighted to answer any questions that you may in regards to my remarks.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Our final witness is Henry, and it looks like Skoloski.
Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Now say that again. Let me hear it.
Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski. Sokolski.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. There it is.
Mr. SOKOLSKI. There it is.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. I mean, with a name like Rohrabacher, I——
Mr. SOKOLSKI. Yeah.
Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Shouldn't ever complain.
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Mr. SOKOLSKI. I know. We are afflicted with this.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. But he is the Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has testified before our committee when we were considering the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And just last week, you testified before the International Relations Committee. And I welcome you. I understand that you are a witness who is a little bit more cautious about this, and we are very interested in these relations with the Russians, and we are very interested in your opinion. So you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you for letting me testify here today, Mr. Chairman.
Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies cooperate with Russia on civil space projects and show them that we can profit from peaceful trade—show them that they could profit from peaceful trade, the less they will be inclined or need to sell this sensitive technology to nations that would use it for military purposes. According to this view, the more U.S.–Russian civil space cooperation and commerce one has, the more the cause of nonproliferation will be served. Unfortunately, I don't think things are quite that simple.
In fact, two of Russia's most important incentives to proliferate have nothing at all to do with profit. The first of these is the foreign political access and influence Russia gains when it sells militarily useful space technology to others. It isn't just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous technologies that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China, to name two, it is also the leverage it affords Russia with these nations on a host of other diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for cultural and political reasons, Russia is still anxious to maintain its outmoded military-related industries, including its oversized space and missile sectors. Because this infrastructure is still—despite downsizing—too large to be either profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to maintain it continue to drive Russia toward risky exports in the mistaken belief that cornering this illegitimate market might keep it from having to further downsize its space and missile sectors.
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These proliferation motivations are really quite important. As long as they are in play, U.S.–Russian space cooperation and even commerce and our efforts to curb dangerous missile proliferation, will be at odds on at least three counts.
First there is an immediate tension, which I am sure this committee is seized with, between the U.S. funding work on the International Space Station and our desire not to have U.S. taxpayers support Russian entities that are proliferating missile technology to Iran and others. The original idea behind the U.S.–Russian cooperation on Space Station, an idea, I might add, that I first remember raising with our delegation in 1992 when we visited Russia, was to get Moscow to fully comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime. This deal was subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became clear that Russia was not living up to this understanding, the nonproliferation requirements, however, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was finally enacted. Its aim was to assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers would not pay to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation.
Now one of the issues is whether or not President Bush should invoke the Act's safety waiver. Invoking the waiver would require stretching the law quite a bit. The Act reads that one can only invoke the waiver to prevent the imminent loss of life or grievous injury to those aboard the Station. So long as the Station's current crew can be returned to Earth, and it can, this condition is not present. Then, there are the politics of making such a waiver, which again are awkward. Making the waiver certainly would set quite a precedent. What parts of the Space Station aren't important to safety? There aren't many. Yet if you waive for one without meeting the law's clear language, why or where would you ever stop? More important, nobody really thinks our intelligence agencies can give Russia a clean bill of health on Iranian missile proliferation.
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This, in turn, raises a host of difficult questions. Is keeping the Space Station's schedule on track, even though we have already let it slip year after year after year, and on budget, even though we have already paid billions and billions and billions over the project's original cost estimate, a priority that should now trump our security and that of millions of people who will live downrange from Iran's missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can get a clean bill of health from our intelligence agencies, or until we can develop an alternative to the Soyuz, more than we can afford? The President certainly spoke up in support of the Space Station, but he and Putin also warned the world about Tehran's worrisome development of strategic weapons, and it was this announcement, not Bush's statement on the Station, that got the world's attention.
Second, there is a tension between U.S. civilian Russian space commerce and cooperation and peaceful Russian space-related transfers that Moscow knows are being diverted for military purposes in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China—nations either primed to proliferate or that already have a track record of doing so. President Bush only increased this tension with his announced desire recently to work with friendly states, including Russia, to interdict the export of weapons of mass destruction, including illicit missiles and the means to make them. If Russia fails to cooperate fully in this effort, including Russian space and nuclear help to Iran's suspect nuclear weapons program, this failure will only work to expose U.S.–Russian space cooperation and commerce to increased political scrutiny and skepticism.
Let me conclude, I would ask that the entire statement be placed in the record, by stating that until Russia's space industry is downsized to accord with legitimate private and domestic military demand, continued space cooperation and commerce with Moscow at current or higher levels, I am afraid, is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and space proliferation as it might prevent.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI
Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies cooperate with Russia on civilian space projects and show them that they can profit from peaceful trade, the less they will be inclined or need to sell this sensitive technology to nations that would use it for military purposes. According to this view, the more U.S.–Russian civilian space cooperation and commerce one has, the more the cause of nonproliferation will be served. Unfortunately, things are not so simple.
In fact, two of Russia's most important incentives to proliferate have nothing at all to do with earning a profit. The first of these is the foreign political access and influence Russia gains when it sells militarily useful space technology to others. It isn't just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous technologies that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China; it's also the leverage it affords Russia with them on a host of other diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for cultural and political reasons, Russia is anxious to maintain its outmoded military-related industries—including its oversized space and missile sector. Because this infrastructure is still too large ever to be either profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to maintain it continue to drive Russia toward risky exports in the mistaken belief that cornering this illegitimate market might keep it from having to further downsize its space and missile sector.
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These proliferation motivations are important: As long as they are in play, U.S.–Russian space cooperation and our efforts to curb dangerous missile proliferation will be at odds on at least three counts.
First, there is an immediate tension between U.S. funding work on the International Space Station (ISS) and our desire not to have U.S. taxpayers support Russian entities that are proliferating missile technology to Iran and others. The original idea behind U.S.–Russian cooperation on the Space Station—an idea I remember first raising as an option in talks with the Russians in l992—was to get Moscow fully to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This deal was subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became clear that Russia was not living up to this deal's nonproliferation requirements, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was finally enacted. Its aim was assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers would not pay to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation. Now, one of the issues is whether or not President Bush should invoke the act's safety waiver. Invoking the waiver would require stretching the law quite a bit. The act reads that one can only invoke the waiver ''to prevent the imminent loss of life or grievous injury'' to those aboard the Station. So long as the Station's current crew can be returned to Earth—and it can—this condition is simply not present. Then, there are the politics of making such a waiver, which, at best, are awkward. Making the waiver certainly would set quite a precedent. What parts of the Space Station aren't important to safety? There aren't many. Yet, if you waive for one without meeting the law's clear language, why or where would you ever stop? More important, nobody really thinks our intelligence agencies can give Russia a clean bill of health on Iranian missile proliferation. This, in turn, raises a host of difficult questions. Is keeping the Space Station's schedule on track (even though we've already let it slip year after year) and on budget (even though we've already paid billions and billions over the project's original cost estimate) a priority that should now trump our security and that of millions of people who live down range from Iran's missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can get a clean bill of health from our intelligence agencies or until we can develop an alternative to the Soyuz more than we can afford? The President certainly spoke up in support of the Space Station in Moscow. But he and Putin also warned the world about Tehran's worrisome development of strategic weapons and it was this announcement, not Bush's statement on the station, that got the world's attention.
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Second, there is a tension between civilian U.S.–Russian space commerce and cooperation and ''peaceful'' Russian space-related transfers that Moscow knows are being diverted for military uses in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China—nations either primed to proliferate or that already have a track record of doing so. President Bush only increased this tension with his announced desire to work with friendly states, including Russia, to interdict the export of weapons of mass destruction including illicit missiles and the means to make them. If Russia fails to cooperate fully in this effort, this failure will only work to expose U.S.–Russian space cooperation and commerce to increased political scrutiny and skepticism. Russia is helping to build missiles for India; India has just signed a military cooperation agreement with Iran and is talking about exporting its own missile technology. Iran, meanwhile, is not just getting covert missile assistance from Moscow. It is also overtly buying Russian satellites and earth tracking stations that could help it and others target their missiles against our friends and forces abroad. Moscow knows this but continues to claim that all of its space commerce is peaceful.
Finally, there is a tension between the lack of domestic military and civilian call for Russian space related goods and services and U.S.–Russian space transfers, which tend to keep Russia's space infrastructure larger than legitimate demand can support. U.S. and European cooperative space efforts and commerce with Russia are too modest to keep all of Russia's oversized space and missile industry fully employed. But they are not small enough to force Russia to make the painful political decisions to further downsize their industry so it will not be so prone to proliferate. In the U.S., whatever surplus of space-related capabilities we have is maintained with the federal funding of space related projects. Russian government funding of its space industry, however, is much smaller. As such, there is constant pressure on many of its space enterprises to sell militarily useful technology to foreign customers who might use or sell this technology to proliferate. Until Russia's space industry is downsized to accord with legitimate private and domestic military demand, continued U.S. space cooperation and commerce with Moscow at current or higher levels is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and space proliferation as it might prevent.
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BIOGRAPHY FOR HENRY D. SOKOLSKI
Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics, policy-makers, and the media.
He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Paul Wolfowitz and received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to his appointment to this post, Mr. Sokolski worked in the Secretary's Office of Net Assessment on proliferation issues.
In addition to his Executive Branch service, Mr. Sokolski served from 1984 through 1988 as Senior Military Legislative Aide to Senator Dan Quayle and as Special Assistant on Nuclear Energy Matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey from 1982 through 1983. Mr. Sokolski also served as a consultant on proliferation issues to the intelligence community's National Intelligence Council. After his work in the Pentagon, Mr. Sokolski received a Congressional appointment to the Deutch Proliferation Commission, which completed its report in July of 1999. He also served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Panel from 1995 to 1996.
Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of works on proliferation related issues including, Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); 21st Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready? (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001); Prevailing in A Well Armed World (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000) and Fighting Proliferation (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996).
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Mr. Sokolski has been a resident fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington and has taught courses at the University of Chicago, Rosary College, and Loyola University. Mr. Sokolski attended the U. of Southern California and Pomona College and received his graduate education at the University of Chicago.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT
While not appearing before the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary Steven Pifer provided the following written testimony and agreed to answer questions for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pifer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN PIFER
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee. It is an honor to appear before you with my colleague from NASA. We at the State Department consider it a privilege to work together with John Schumacher and his colleagues at NASA to further one of America's loftiest goals—the mission of human space flight. At State, our contribution to this mission is to facilitate relations with our international partners in space exploration while safeguarding our broader national security interests. Although we cooperate closely with many space agencies around the world, any conversation about the U.S. space program would be incomplete if it did not note the unique and historic partnership we share with Russia in the field of human space flight. Space cooperation between the United States and Russia remains one of the most visibly successful elements of the U.S.–Russian bilateral relationship.
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U.S.–Russian Space Cooperation
In recent months, this partnership has had to face tragic and unforeseen challenges. In the wake of the loss of the Shuttle Columbia, we have turned to our Russian colleagues for their assistance in sustaining the operations of the International Space Station (ISS). Considering our mutual experience in space exploration, Russia has undertaken important additional efforts to maintain the viability of the ISS. With the Shuttle fleet grounded, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) readily accepted its role as provider of the world's only physical link to the Station.
When the International Partners became concerned about the supply of water and other critical provisions to the Station, Russia made every effort to ensure that its Progress resupply vehicle would be available to provide support for the Station. The unmanned Progress vehicles are critical workhorses for delivering supplies to the Station. When the International Partners were faced with the possibility of mothballing the Station, Russia utilized a previously planned Soyuz launch to ferry a fresh crew to the Station, a mission that had been slated to be carried out by the Shuttle. This kind of cooperation, in the aftermath of the loss of the Columbia, has strengthened further our space partnership.
Underscoring the depth of this partnership, President Bush and President Putin reaffirmed U.S.–Russian cooperation in space at their June 1 meeting in St. Petersburg. In their joint statement, the Presidents extolled the role our two countries have played in the field of human space flight and confirmed their mutual aspiration to ensure the continued assembly and viability of the International Space Station as a world-class research facility. Looking to the future, the Presidents agreed to explore ways to enhance our cooperation in the field of space technology and techniques.
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The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
As our space partnership proceeds and explores new areas of cooperation, both the State Department and NASA have been rigorous in enforcing the legislative requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000. With the International Partners and separately with Russian officials, the Administration has consistently made clear that all activity with Russia must be conducted within the bounds of U.S. law and our nonproliferation policy.
Bolstering nonproliferation remains a core issue on the U.S.–Russia security agenda. The State Department and other U.S. officials in the Administration have engaged the Russian government at the most senior levels to seek an end to sensitive cooperation between Russian entities and state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran.
In the context of our diplomatic engagement, Russia has taken steps, though not yet sufficient, to implement stronger export controls and improve oversight at Russian facilities. In the case of Iran, we have made clear our very strong concern that Russian cooperation with Iran not facilitate Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles. While we cannot go into great detail in an unclassified forum, we can affirm that Russia has taken actions in response to specific cases related to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology in the course of our dialogue on nonproliferation. We continue to monitor the issue of ballistic missile technology assistance, and continue to be committed to Russia's cessation of any assistance that could help Iran with the delivery of WMD.
Iran's nuclear program was a key issue addressed by Secretary Powell with President Putin in their May meeting in Moscow and by President Bush with President Putin in St. Petersburg on June 1. We have stressed our concerns about the recent revelations of hidden Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear fuel cycle capable of supporting a nuclear weapons program, such as the centrifuge facility at Natanz. Given what this new information says about Iran's nuclear ambitions, we have again urged the Russians to reconsider their nuclear cooperation with Iran and believe they are actively doing so.
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President Putin made clear at the G–8 Summit in Evian that all Iranian nuclear programs must be under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Director General is conducting an investigation of the Iranian nuclear program, and his report will soon be taken up by the IAEA Board of Governors. Until Iran has fully satisfied the IAEA's examination and fully addressed the international community's concerns and questions, including full implementation of the Additional Protocol, no country should be engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Administration will continue to press the Russian government not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran signs an Additional Protocol and verifiably abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Although it would be difficult to quantify the INA's impact on the Russian government's export control policy, I assure you that the pressure applied by the INA is palpable in any dialogue with Russia on space. Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General Director of Rosaviakosmos, has been particularly active in promoting reform throughout the Russian government, and frequently notes the constraints imposed by the INA on U.S.–Russian space cooperation. Other Russian officials also regularly express their concern about the INA constraints. While the Administration acknowledges Rosaviakosmos' sincere efforts to reform and to maintain a good record on nonproliferation, we remain concerned about Russia's broader nonproliferation record. We will continue our high-level diplomatic dialogue with Rosaviakosmos and other relevant Russian agencies to address this issue.
The U.S. Export Control Process
Domestically, State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs ensures that our own export control policy is sound and is implemented effectively, including in our space cooperation with Russia. The Directorate is charged with controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML). The Directorate's mission is to advance national strategic objectives and U.S. foreign policy goals through timely enforcement of defense trade controls and the formulation of defense trade policy. It carries out its mission by enforcing the law and reviewing export license applications for defense articles and services, ensuring that exports approved are consistent with this mission and that companies comply with defense trade laws and regulations. Through the licensing process, relevant U.S. Government agencies have the opportunity to review individual export license applications and advise whether proposed exports would be consistent with our national security and foreign policy. The State Department makes licensing decisions accordingly. This extensive procedure applies not only to exports to Russia, but to all U.S. exports, and helps ensure that federal agencies such as NASA and U.S. aerospace firms do not, even inadvertently, contribute to the proliferation of sensitive technology around the globe.
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U.S.–Russia Relations
A word about our overall bilateral relationship with Russia. Our two countries are working hard to move past our recent disagreement over Iraq. In St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin made clear their determination to reinvigorate the partnership. Expanding cooperation in the security dimension remains at the top of the agenda, and this includes pressing the Russians to improve their performance on key nonproliferation issues. Likewise, the Administration will persist in its efforts to enhance U.S.–Russian cooperation in counterterrorism, strategic stability, and missile defense. We also hope to broaden our cooperation in space and expand the economic component of our relations, particularly in the energy field. We intend to continue working closely with our colleagues at NASA to implement the Presidents' commitment to enhance our cooperation in space, while remaining fully consistent with our security and nonproliferation goals for the bilateral relationship.
Discussion
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you for your words of caution. And before we get into the question and answers, I would ask a Member of my Staff, we happened to find a little matryoshka doll here. We were talking about not knowing what is inside and not being able to ask any questions, so we just have this little matryoshka doll to remind us that Ambassador Pifer is not here to answer any questions and to let us get any deeper insight into this issue. So he will just sit there like a little wooden dummy instead of being here to answer questions and to express—explain to us the policies of the Administration.
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Thank you.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, apparently the State Department—the Administration is represented by Mr. Schumacher.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well said, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. With that said, I would like to start the questions and answers off with just—I think we need to go to Mr. Schumacher first. Right.
Iran Nonproliferation Act
To what degree does NASA believe that the—and of course, this is the crux—one of the major issues here today is whether the Iran Nonproliferation Act restricts U.S. contractor to Russian contractor relationship. And is a congressional clarification needed on that account?
Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. I can tell you for the Iran Nonproliferation Act, and specifically Section 6 with—which is titled International Space Station, but in the definitions talks about all human space flight-related goods or purchases in kind transfers. We have worked closely with State on that. I can tell you the view from State to us is that they express serious concern about any contemplation of a contract—what—in short version, contractor to contractor meaning U.S. funds to a U.S. contractor. U.S. contractor goes out and buys from a Russian contractor.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Um-hum.
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Mr. SCHUMACHER. Any entity under the Russian Aviation and Space Agency that that might well be violative of the Act, and if it is not violative of the black letter law of the Act, it is, at a minimum frustrates and deemed violative of the intent and the spirit of the Act. So the short version would be——
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. I have the law in front of me here, and it doesn't seem to mention private companies. It talks about the Russian Government.
Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, in the definition, it defines any entity under the jurisdiction or control of Rosaviakosmos. And then it even says even an entity where the Russian Rosaviakosmos had a joint stock ownership and then got rid of that.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, it says here neither the Russian Aviation and Space Industry nor any other organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation Space Agency. Now that seems to be pretty definitive in terms of if you have an American company, would you say that—and that same restriction was placed on NASA, would you say that that applied and that that then related to all American companies?
Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, sir; I sure wouldn't.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. I am sorry that the—as you are relaying the position of the State Department, I am just sorry the State Department couldn't come here and express that to us themselves. And Mr. Woodenhead here isn't going to tell us, so we will just have to have this discussion based on what we have here today. So but you believe that then if we are going to be in compliance with nonproliferation, you—it is your reading, and for what you know, the Administration's position that that also relates to private companies?
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Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. And if I could take you in the—in Section 7 of the definitions of the Act, it is a sub—let me see. It is number 5, organization or entities under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation Space Agency. And then in there, it goes through a whole bunch of subsets, but it—any entity—basically, it is any entity that was under the jurisdiction or control of Rosaviakosmos, which covers, the way the Russians are structured, some 450 aerospace enterprises. And then a little later on, it even says that—let us see, any entity that the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency had a holding or controlling interest and then divested it, it would still be subject to the Act.
Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now I—it seems to me, now I was around when this happened, in fact, I was one of the supporters. And I still support the concept of this. We should make sure that we keep the pressure on. And I know that Mr. Sokolski, no, whatever it is, anyway, sorry about that, what—I understand the concerns that you have, and we cannot just ignore the fact that the Russians are building a nuclear power plant for the Iranians and Iran happens to be a—you know, an oil and gas rich country. So, is this a threat to our national security along with missile development? The answer is yes, it is. How we can, perhaps, instead of using a punitive attempt, and maybe I should open this up to the panel, would not a more carrot rather than a stick be more appropriate in getting the Russians to have their—to judge their decisions in something—in a more positive way?
Mr. SCHUMACHER. Mr. Rohrabacher, I can tell you we, as we have talked with you and with the Committee over these years about this, certain