SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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??–???
2004
[H.A.S.C. No. 108–21]
HEARINGS
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005—H.R. 4200
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FULL COMMITTEE HEARINGS
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ON
AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT
HEARINGS HELD
MARCH 3, 2004
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighth Congress
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
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JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
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LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
TIM RYAN, Ohio
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Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
James M. Lariviere, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2004
HEARING:
Wednesday, March 3, 2004, Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act—Regional Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
APPENDIX:
Wednesday, March 3, 2004
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004
FISCAL YEAR 2005, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
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STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
WITNESSES
Abizaid, Gen. John P., United States Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command
Rodman, Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Abizaid, Gen. John P.
Hunter, Hon. Duncan
Rodman, Peter W.
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Skelton, Hon. Ike
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Bradley
Mrs. Davis (Jo Ann)
Mr. Langevin
Mr. Reyes
Mr. Spratt
FISCAL YEAR 2005, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 3, 2004.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
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The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
This morning the committee will continue its review of the fiscal year 2005 defense budget request by turning our attention to the combatant commanders, those elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) who are actually charged with fighting and winning the Nation's wars around the globe.
Our witnesses this morning are General John Abizaid, United States Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security.
Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning.
For some time now I have taken a moment at virtually every hearing to remind the American public that the United States is a nation at war. I don't say that for members of this committee, many of whom have visited the theater or have been in constant contact with returning troops. I certainly don't need to remind our witnesses, who are at the heart of the war effort. I beat that drum because sometimes we see disturbing signs that our Nation may be forgetting this essential.
As we meet today in the comfortable confines of Washington, D.C., American soldiers are on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world defending our interests, our friends and our allies. But, most importantly, they are defending the lives of our fellow citizens by draining the swamps that allow terrorists to flourish and grow.
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I think that most folks in this country today aren't aware of the fact that we have today one of the biggest troop rotations going on since World War II, with some, as I understand now—and correct me, General, if I'm wrong—but I believe some 157,000 troops now in theater. Because you have the folks coming in and the folks who are side by side with them but who will soon be returning. That is why the political, diplomatic, military, economic and cultural work that goes on in General Abizaid's area is so important.
Even a quick review of the State Department's list of terrorist groups indicates that there are at least 14 organizations operating in the CENTCOM area. Of the State Department's list of seven state sponsors of terrorism, three were in Central Command's area of operations. We are down to two now as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Nevertheless, the region remains a key source of international insecurity. Extremists continue to assault efforts to bring security, stability and democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran's halfhearted attempts at political reform have largely failed, leaving us with a state controlled by extremist supporters of terrorism who the International Atomic Energy Agency caught violating their nuclear safeguards agreements.
In Pakistan, we face a country with nuclear weapons, a longstanding rivalry with its nuclear neighbor, popular support for Osama bin Ladin in key regions, and a governmental system that hasn't succeeded in building a stable democracy. And these are just the highlights.
September 11th forced the United States to jump into this mix with both feet. Osama bin Ladin proved it wasn't enough to contain or deter threats to our security. They had to be eliminated. That—and the Administration is using all the tools at its disposal to improve the security situation in the region, from increased military cooperation with the Asian state—central Asian states, the diplomatic initiatives in Pakistan and military training in the Horn of Africa. We are making progress. General Abizaid leads many of our efforts along these lines and will offer some greater detail during the hearing.
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That said, much of our success to date should be credited to the men and women serving their country and their willingness to go in harm's way. While they are out there defending us, we have a responsibility back home to make sure we are leaving no stone unturned in giving them all the support they need to do the job. Some people forget that and look to cut the defense budget in order to pay for other priorities. I believe that this would be a mistake in the middle of a war while our service personnel are engaged with the enemy.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how the President's budget request will enable us to continue making progress in the Global War on Terror and why it is vital that Congress give them the resources they need to compete the mission.
So, before we listen to our witnesses this morning, let me turn to my partner on the committee, the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might wish to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be viewed in the hard copy.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree with you more about those that would attempt to cut the defense budget. We are at war, Mr. Chairman, and this is serious business in which we are about.
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Mr. Chairman, General Abizaid, Secretary Rodman, thank you for being here.
General, I think this is the first time you have formally testified before this committee. So thank you for being with us today.
I have traveled to Iraq twice in the last six months and recently returned from my first trip to Afghanistan. I don't think it is an overstatement to say that our men and women serving in those theaters are doing an extraordinary job under the most trying of circumstances. They are superbly trained, superbly led, and are just the finest force the world has seen and I think historians would probably say the finest force the world has seen since the day of the Roman legions. We owe them all a debt of gratitude; and as we go into the budget cycle, we owe it to them to provide everything they need to succeed in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
But I was troubled by some of the other conclusions I drew from my trips.
First, I am convinced that the timetable for transfer of sovereignty to Iraq is unrealistic. I think I had mentioned this to Secretary Rodman a few moments ago. I am pleased that we have recognized that there is no way to hold elections by June the 30th and am cognizant that approach may not have been supported by the Shiites, but I am happy to know that the new Iraqi constitution, at least the temporary constitution, has been agreed upon. It is still unclear to me to whom we will be transferring sovereignty on June the 30th. Moreover, I am still concerned that the Iraqis are not on track to make the benchmarks set before it by that date, June 30th.
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For example, recent press reports indicate that we will not complete status of forces negotiations until there is a new government after July, despite the original deadline of March 31. Without such a document, there will be no formal agreement on the rules of engagement on our forces and legal protections for them. I must tell you that I feel very strongly that our troops must be empowered to do what they must do, A, to defeat the insurgency and, B, to have self-protection before Iraq dissolves into a civil war, as I fear it shall.
Simply put, we have to handle the transition right. The stakes are enormously high, and the recent spate of bombings in Karbala and Baghdad remind us that tensions among ethnic groups are getting higher by the day. I hope you gentlemen will address that when you testify.
We need to give the Iraqi people assurances that we are prepared to stay the course for the future. In this regard, I believe encouraging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—NATO's involvement in Iraq would be very helpful. In our view, NATO allies have just as great a stake for Iraq as we do; and we just recently learned that there are 60,000 deployable NATO troops that could be called upon should the request be asked—be made—and the request be accepted.
Let me mention Afghanistan. The simple truth in my opinion is that we are shortchanging our effort to establish a viable Federal Government and rebuild that country. I understand that. On the face of it, Afghanistan is not as strategically important as Iraq, but our efforts there are very critical. Osama bin Ladin and other leaders of the al Qaeda leadership of the former Taliban remain at large. In the near term, the United States must bring renewed attention to our offensive operations to flush out those forces.
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Starting now and over the long-term, we need to ensure that a terrorist-harboring regime cannot gain hold once again. If we pour half as many people and resources into Afghanistan as we have Iraq, I think that country would be well on its way to recovering from the 20-plus years of warfare that have driven that country.
Last, it is simply a matter of properly finishing what we have started. We have a responsibility to see this effort through. With few natural resources and little infrastructure and a long history of tribalism, Afghanistan has a long way to go, and I don't think we are making progress as fast as we need to in order for the Karzai government to survive over the long-term. Simply put, we need to do more now.
General Abizaid, thank you. You have the responsibility and face perhaps the greatest set of challenges that we have seen in over a half century. It is on your shoulders. We thank you for your past and your present leadership. We also understand the challenges that you have ahead of you. We greatly appreciate your service.
And Secretary Rodman, thank you for being with us; and we appreciate your thoughts, too.
Mr. Chairman, thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
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Without objection, the statements of both witnesses will be taken into the record.
The CHAIRMAN. General Abizaid, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, UNITED STATES ARMY, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General ABIZAID. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee. It is an honor to be here.
I would like to, first and foremost, thank the committee for the tremendous support that you have given to young men and women that are in the field. As you said, Mr. Chairman, there are over 200,000 of them in the CENTCOM area of operations. They are performing their missions magnificently, and they can't do it without the help of the American people and the American Congress, and I thank you for that support and help.
Sir, I will make a very brief statement. The CENTCOM area is one of the most active areas in the world in terms of extremism. We are involved in three conflicts; the broader Global War on Terror, a counterinsurgency operation in Iraq, and a counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan, both of which are designed to bring stability to those nations.
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We have three major commands performing this function: Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–7, led by Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez in Iraq; Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, led by Lieutenant General Dave Barno in Kabul, Afghanistan; and CJTF Horn of Africa in Djibouti, led by Marine Corps Brigadier General Maston Robison.
All three of these commanders and the troops under their command are facing a difficult challenge against the extremists in various ways in their areas. Despite that, I am very optimistic that we have the troops, the equipment and the necessary will to fight our way through to a good conclusion as long as we maintain our patience, our tenacity and our courage.
This is a very dangerous battle space, as evidenced yesterday by the attacks by Zarqawi against unprotected Shia Muslims in places like Karbala, Baghdad, and a thwarted attack that fortunately didn't take any lives in Basra. Over 140 people were killed, over 500 were wounded. Undoubtedly, the number of killed will go up by the time some of the wounded pass away.
The CHAIRMAN. How many killed was that, General?
General ABIZAID. Over 140, sir. These attacks are despicable, and they show the clear lie of the idea that Zarqawi, Osama bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and their like are fighting for Islam. They are the enemies of Islam. They have killed more Muslims in the past month than anybody could ever imagine for no reason other than to cause destruction and to cause civil war to take place in Iraq. It is a bleak vision that could only result in the Talibanization of the Middle East should they succeed. The vast, vast majority of the people in the Middle East do not want that to happen, and they join us in this struggle against these extremists.
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Mr. Chairman, I will close by saying, this is an important fight. It is not just a fight about stabilization. It is a fight about extremism versus moderation. It is a fight about the ideas of free men versus those who would enslave people.
I think our young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, DOD civilians that are out there all understand this. They know that if we don't face this menace in the middle of the Middle East, we will have to face it sooner or later at home. They are proud to take the fight to the enemy. They are doing a great job. I have never seen a better Armed Forces, better trained, better motivated, and better led by their subordinate commanders.
So I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that our troops are committed to this battle. They will be successful because of their courage and their tenacity, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Abizaid can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rodman.
STATEMENT OF PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
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Secretary RODMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee, I, too, am honored to be here. I hope to be of assistance to the committee in its deliberations. I am proud to be here in the company of my colleague and friend, General Abizaid.
In my prepared statement, what I attempted to do was put our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a certain perspective, a policy perspective, the perspective of our overall strategy in the war on terrorism.
As General Abizaid just said, really it is a struggle between moderates in the Muslim world, the overwhelming majority of people in that part of the world, against a minority of extremists. It is our friends who are on the frontline; and if you can sum up our overall strategy in a nutshell, it is to bolster our friends, help our friends, help promote the people who share our values or who come close to our values of moderation and peace and help them in their struggle against the extremists.
We all read in the newspapers and we hear about these tragic acts of violence such as happened yesterday. But my view is that the most important thing going on in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the political process, the remarkable project of political construction that is going on and I would say making remarkable progress in both places.
In Afghanistan, we saw at the beginning of January the agreement on a new constitution, a milestone in the construction of a strong central government in Afghanistan, a process which is bringing together, successfully bringing together all of the elements of Afghanistan society as they build new institutions to fill the vacuum left by the Taliban.
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In Iraq, as was mentioned, we have just seen this week a similar milestone, the agreement on the Transitional Administrative Law, which is a kind of interim constitution; and, in fact, again, capping off a remarkable process of political compromise, political co-existence being demonstrated by all of the moderate Iraqis that we have been working with since liberation.
I mean, the real story is not that there are people trying to derail this process. The real story is that this process is moving forward regardless.
There were a lot of concerns at the time of liberation about the centrifugal forces in Iraq, and yet we have seen since the formation of the governing council last July and up until the present point that these groups have learned to work together. They are mastering the art of political compromise. Their cohesion is the remarkable story; and they are coming together in a document which, from what we have seen, is a good document, a moderate blueprint for a decent, moderate, modern Iraq, which will be a partner to its neighbors and no longer a threat to its neighbors.
So that is why we remain confident that we have a strategy, that this political process is moving forward despite the obvious attempts of people to destroy it.
I would mention the Zarqawi document, as General Abizaid did, this document that we came across a few weeks ago, it is clear that the terrorists are worried about this political process. Their fear is that on July 1, when the American, quote, occupation, unquote, is over, and we are there as the partner of a sovereign Iraqi government, that a lot of the political steam comes out, or political legitimacy, if there ever were any, drains out of this terrorist enterprise, because then what are they attacking? They are no longer attacking the Americans. They are attacking Iraqis, which is the case anyway, but suddenly they are worried that their political position is drastically weakened by this transfer of sovereignty.
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My final point, which I have in my prepared statement, is just a plea for staying power. Our friends in the Middle East, especially our moderate friends in Iraq and Afghanistan, are counting on us for a transitional period. They need our help as they get on their feet. They need our help for a period as they build their new institutions; and they need our help, of course, most of all, in the security dimension. I believe we as a nation are committed to help them do that and to stay the course and to be there, to give them the confidence and the support that they need to build those new institutions and to complete this process.
I know this is an exciting year in our domestic debate, but I do say and I take comfort from the extraordinary bipartisanship that the Congress has shown in supporting the $87 billion supplemental last year and supporting the defense budget and the way this committee and others have conducted themselves. I am confident that we are united on the fundamental imperative of staying the course, of making sure that we have a successful outcome in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rodman can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. General, you have—we have one of the biggest deployments—redeployments of any time since World War II going on right now. You have got the 82nd Airborne poised to displace back to the U.S. You have the Fourth Infantry Division (ID) up in the north, to the north of Baghdad. You have got the 101st up in northern Iraq, and you have got the First Armored Division that is in the Baghdad area, displacing out.
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Bringing in, coming in is the First Marine Expeditionary Force, going to the 82nd. You have got the First Infantry Division. You have got at least one brigade from the First Infantry Division in that western area of operation (AO). You have got the First Infantry Division and a Stryker brigade, and you have right now a ton of people moving and, in some cases, working side by side with the outflowing force basically teaching the ropes to the inflowing force.
Just give us an idea of how that is going, how that is working. Is it proceeding as planned?
General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased with the way the rotation has moved thus far. You know that we have already moved the 101st out of the sector and put a Stryker brigade combat team up in the Mosul area. The Stryker brigade is performing very well. The troops there are doing tough work with less forces, yet their Stryker vehicle and brigade combat team systems have allowed them to take over battle space of the division and handle it very well.
We are about, as I said, halfway through the rotation, and I am extremely satisfied with the smooth transfer of responsibility between units, the state of preparedness of the units that are coming in. All of the units have been trained either by the U.S. Marine Corps or by the U.S. Army in some very extensive scenarios. They have had leadership reconnaissance conducted at a fairly high level before any of the units arrived, and now they spend at least two weeks doing what we call right-seat riding with their contemporaries to make sure that they understand all of the nuances of the battle space that they are inheriting.
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In the days ahead, the Fourth Infantry Division will turn over to the First Infantry Division. That is starting to take place now. Many of the units of the First Infantry Division are up there and in place. And down in the Baghdad area, the 1st Cav Division will start to replace very soon the First Armored Division that has done such a great job in that battle space.
So I am very satisfied that the turnover of forces is going smooth, that the troops that are coming in are experienced, that they are ready, that they understand the challenges. There is no doubt that new troops will face challenges of having to learn their areas. That is always true when new troops come into a combat zone. But these are the best prepared new troops ever to show up on the battlefield, and we are looking forward to them taking up the challenge in their areas, and we are grateful for the year's worth of service that our current forces have put in and welcome the opportunity to go home.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you say, General, that defending and protecting the top line of the President's defense budget is an important aspect of this massive deployment?
General ABIZAID. Sir, as a combatant commander, I need to have the resources that I understand are very extensive in order to support 217,000 troops operating in a vast area; and so I support the budget as I understand it to be made.
The CHAIRMAN. Okay.
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The gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, you hit the bottom line in your question. I applaud you for it.
General, if Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur were asked during the Battle of Guadalcanal after the loss of the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, of course, the initial attack on Pearl Harbor—if they were asked, how goes the war, I am sure they would give a very guarded, or would have given a very guarded, and possibly troubled answer.
What you said a while ago, very disturbing. We cannot afford to have a Talibanization of Iraq. The last thing we want is for failure to settle as a cloud on our heads.
A lot of good things are happening but not making the front page. The young troops are doing superbly well. We have seen that. Construction, the ability to get along with people. And, yet, yesterday the last of a series of coordinated attacks this time on so many Iraqis, and I think you testified over 140 deaths as we speak. If we were to ask you that Guadalcanal question of today, we know that your answer would be guarded and difficult. But it needs to be asked. So, General, what is your assessment of the likelihood that Iraq will dissolve into a civil war in the months ahead as we try to transition power?
General ABIZAID. Congressman, I believe there are more people trying to hold Iraq together than tear it apart. I believe that there is always a chance that through the wrong steps of political leaders inside Iraq and through the deliberate steps of people like Zarqawi, groups like on Ansar al-Islam and al Qaeda that are trying to move the country toward civil war, that it is possible. And while I say it is possible, I do not believe that it is probable. I think that there is a much greater chance that Iraq will emerge through this political process as a stable and modern state that is well represented in the community of nations as a responsible state. So I am optimistic that we have a chance.
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But it is not a 100 percent chance. I believe that there is a lot of hard work to do. I believe that as we move toward the period of sovereignty envisioned in the turnover to the transitional government and then move toward elections, which will inevitably happen later, that violence could well increase. It will be the mark of our success as to our willingness to stay the course and our ability to build Iraqi security institutions that are willing to fight for their own freedom and their own survival.
I think there is a high degree of success ahead of us provided that we are patient, we stay the course, we help the Iraqis, we make sure that they understand that this is an operation not of occupation, but of partnership, and that over time we turn over more and more authority and control to them so that they can control their own destiny.
At the end of the day, it will be Iraqis that make Iraq free, not Americans.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, General, for your service and for your straightforward answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentlemen.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.
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Mr. SAXTON. General, not long ago, the Chairman and I were at a briefing at the Fourth ID Headquarters in Iraq. One of the interesting pieces of information—two pieces of information had to do with the trend lines of attacks on American soldiers and the trend line involving people who were coming into newly stood-up police stations with information on people who were trying to make trouble—who were making trouble in Iraq. Can you give us an update on those two trend lines?
General ABIZAID. Sir, I have spent a lot of time up in all of the divisional areas looking at a lot of the various statistics. A lot of people talk about how there is a straight-line function about conflict in Iraq, but I think it is better described as being some sort of a sign wave where there are peaks and valleys of violence that move throughout the country.
In general terms, though, I would say that attacks against Americans are down, certainly from their high back in November. But attacks against Iraqi institutions, in particular the police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), are up.
It is clear that the strategy of the Zarqawi network, Ansar al-Islam, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups is to undermine the ability of Iraqi security forces to gain a foothold against them; and they know that ultimately it will be Iraqi security forces that defeat them. So they have embarked upon a strategy of attacking Iraqi security institutions, assassinating Iraqi leaders that are part of these institutions.
I am happy to report to you that despite these attacks, many of which have been devastating, recruitment remains high, motivation in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in particular is high, and people continue to train and move together in an effort to build Iraqi security institutions that are going to be capable.
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So we should not underestimate the ability of the enemy to find our weak spots, and one of the weak spots is the still-building capacity of Iraqi security institutions. I believe that with very close cooperation from the United States and other coalition partners, we can build this capacity so that it is both effective and loyal to the emerging state.
One other point I would like to make, Congressman, is that it is very, very important for us now to build Iraqi chains of command that move all the way from the lowest police private or army private all the way up to the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior; and I think that work needs to be well in progress by the transition of sovereignty on the 1st of July.
In regards to Ministry of the Interior, that work is moving pretty well, but in regards to the Ministry of Defense, we still have to stand up that ministry, get it manned, and have the chains of command start to function.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.
One other thing that I find very interesting—Iran is obviously right in the middle of things both geographically as well as in many other ways. We know that there was some foreign fighters coming into Iraq through Iran. We know that Bahrain has a relationship with Iran that is sometimes tested. We hear that some former Taliban or al Qaeda leaders may be in Iran and under some kind of supervision or whatever. Can you just give us a general notion—your general notion about the role that Iran is playing in the area and how much are you concerned about it?
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General ABIZAID. Iran is clearly the most powerful nation state in the region. They have a tremendous amount of influence throughout the region and for the past several years have certainly been anti-American in their outlook.
It is interesting to me, however, that as we look at our operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that the Iranians have not actively tried to disrupt those operations. There is no doubt that the Iranians, especially in the Shia south, will want to maintain a large degree of influence, but I believe that the Iranians understand that the sooner a stable Iraq and Afghanistan emerge, the sooner their prosperity regionally can return, and the sooner we will reduce our footprint in the region, which they will see as a good thing.
Certainly, the recent Iranian election was one that causes us to have some concerns about the return of hard-liners, about the increase of hard-liners in the government. But, on the other hand, there is an unmistakable movement within Iran of reformers that desire greater political reform that I think will continue to be apparent in the years ahead.
So, certainly the Iranians have probably turned a blind eye on terrorist groups moving through their territory that have infiltrated either into Iraq or Afghanistan. The degree to which the Iranian government has been complicit is not clear to me, but I would say that the Iranians, by allowing groups like Zarqawi, al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam to operate through their territory or to not effectively go after them are putting their own governmental institutions and their own people at risk. After all, Zarqawi's attack on the Shia minority or the Shia Ashura holiday down in Karbala and Baghdad yesterday should indicate to the Iranians that these people do not share common cause with them.
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I imagine Mr. Rodman probably would have some remarks.
Secretary RODMAN. Certainly.
I agree with General Abizaid. Iran is giving itself options for the future in Iraq. As the General said, Iran has not disrupted the political process it is building in Iraq and I think in large part because its friends, Iran's friends in Iraq, some of the Shia groups have been included from the beginning in the political process. So Iran may feel that its legitimate interests are being taken account of in this political process.
On the other hand, it is simultaneously either providing for itself—I think providing for itself some weapons it may choose to wield in the future either as leverage against us to get us out or leverage in support of its allies if politics within Iraq take a more chaotic turn. So I think we are right to keep an eye on Iran. But I would say at the moment Iran is not the main problem we are dealing with inside Iraq.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Rodman, General Abizaid, for what you do for our country and for those folks whom you represent.
Secretary Rodman, we have had now about a year of almost unfettered access to the Iraqi records. A subject that is often brought up without great clarification that I would like your opinion on is have we been able to find any substantial links between the government of Saddam Hussein and the attacks of September the 11th?
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Secretary RODMAN. Let me say a couple of specific points. One is, there is still a mountain of documents that we have not yet translated and gone through. Second, the administration has never attempted to demonstrate a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11.
What we did feel we had good documentation of was a long record of links between the Iraqi Intelligence Service and al Qaeda. We have put out information—as I said, it does not demonstrate a connection with 9/11, but there is already, I think, significant evidence that there is a record of exchanges and contacts and some degree of cooperation between the Iraqis and al Qaeda, and a lot of that information has been put forward, including in Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations (U.N.) A year ago. I think some of the new information that we are gathering may be relevant to that, but there is nothing dramatic that I am aware of.
Mr. TAYLOR. If something like that should come to your attention, would you please make me aware of that?
General Abizaid, I continue to be concerned—and you please correct me if I am wrong. But from what I can see, the majority of our casualties in Iraq continue to be the result of improvised explosive devices (IED). I would certainly hope that you would make that a priority of yours. I know that our Nation—I want to make this very clear, because we were all in on a bad decision, that said that not every soldier going to the Iraq theater would have the best body armor. We have finally corrected that bad decision. I would sure hope we are not making a similar shortsighted decision when it comes to trying to protect vehicles from improvised explosives, and I would hope you would be a part of that.
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My second question would be, a friend of mine in the Special Forces community raised an interesting point, and I would like to hear your thoughts on it. His observation was, in the hearts and minds department, he felt like that we had made some short-term decisions to move into the Hussein palaces because they had running water, because they had heat, because they had air conditioning, because they had walls around them, all logical things to do in the short-term for the quality of lives of our troops. He felt like, long-term, we may be making the mistake of becoming associated with those palaces that I would think that to the average Iraqi were obviously symbols of evil. I mean, Saddam Hussein was an evil person. They did bad things in those palaces.
I was just curious if we have a long-term strategy to build the kind of barracks that we have done like the SEA-huts that we did in Bosnia so that quite possibly we are not associated with those palaces in the future, or if there is any policy along that line. We are obviously replacing 130,000 great troops with 110,000 great troops. We want them to have as many of the comforts of home as possible, realizing they are gone for a year. But I would like to hear your thoughts on the possible association, the possible links that when we move into that palace we pick up some of the baggage of the Hussein regime.
General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, on the IEDs, I agree with you that the IED continues to be the greatest casualty producer among our troops in the field; and, like you, I believe we must do everything possible to protect our troops in the field. We honor the sacrifice of any of our soldiers, any of our service people that have either been wounded or killed in action. What more can we say about that?
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I had an interesting conversation before the hearing today with the chairman of the committee about IEDs; and his question to me was, are we doing everything we can to protect the troops? The answer to the question is, we have to continue to work this issue every single day; and it is a priority of mine. There are technological fixes to the problem that can be partially successful; there are tactics, techniques, and procedure fixes to the problem that can be partially successful; and, of course, there are offensive actions that can be taken against the bomb makers when we know where they are and how they are operating that can be partially successful. But, Congressman, I cannot give you a 100 percent assurance that we have got the solution to the problem, because the enemy knows that we are vulnerable in this regard.
As you know, we went into the war with a requirement for about 200 up-armored Humvees. Now we are up to 4,000 Humvees, and yet the force is actually smaller now than the force that went into Iraq. So you can see that we are every day evaluating how we can protect our troops in a better way; and in a commander's conference that is upcoming here in the days ahead in the Middle East, I will be going over this in great detail with not only our technological experts, but also our commanders. Believe me, this is very, very serious business and we pay great attention to it.
As far as the palaces are concerned, my view about Iraq is that there is nothing in Iraq that belongs to the United States of America. The palaces don't belong to us, the airports don't belong to us, nothing there belongs to us; not the oil, not the natural resources, nothing. It is their country, and we are there to create an environment that allows them to move down the road of moderation and prosperity if they are only willing to seize the moment. So I think that it was the right thing to do to initially move into the palace areas for all the reasons that you described. I also think it is the right thing to do in the next year to move out of these areas in a very, very clear and connected operational movement that returns these public lands to the Iraqi people; and certainly we will be doing that. We have done it in some areas at a small rate, but, as you know, where most of the American troops are these are areas where the regime had a lot of palaces, and we are looking for places to move out of these public lands and move into areas that will be less obtrusive for our troop presence. That doesn't mean that we won't patrol or we won't conduct our operations.
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But there is some resistance to units that get comfortable, and I have told them that I expect them to move out of the Baghdad airport area, for example, and they are doing that now.
You have noticed that we are making Balad Airfield our primary hub in the region. The idea of doing that is because we need to have the Baghdad International Airport revert to civilian control, we need to have the Basra International Airport revert to civilian control at the earliest opportunity, because turning over these important symbols of sovereignty will demonstrate to the Iraqi people that this is a partnership and not domination.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General. Thank you, Secretary.
Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome—Mr. Secretary, General.
As the Chairman noted in his opening remarks, many of us have visited the CENTCOM region extensively. I have had the opportunity to travel twice to Iraq and just returned from Afghanistan last week, and I wanted to compliment you on your leadership and the great job your troops are doing.
It is frustrating to many of us who have been there that the adage in the news media often appears to be: Good news is no news. We don't as a people often get the opportunity on the nightly news broadcast to see the great work that is being done, the progress that is being made. I was particularly pleased in your testimony to see your reference in Afghanistan of the PRTs, provincial reconstruction teams. I visited one of those in Kandahar last week, and it is a true success story. The one I visited was in the heartland of the so-called spiritual base of the Taliban, and yet there are American forces along with others providing real help to people. You could see the appreciation in the people's eyes, and it was a truly enlightening experience.
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I would like to just ask a question about the events that occurred yesterday, the tragic events, the series of bombings on the Shia. One of the reactions or a number of the reactions focused on the so-called moderate Shia leader particularly, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, that pointed a finger of blame at the American troops as somehow they didn't step up to the job of providing security. It was my understanding that indeed there were limits placed on the kind of security we could provide to these particular venues and to Shia activities in general and that we are really not allowed to get in close and personal. Could you expand on any operational limitations that are placed on our security efforts vis-a-vis the events of yesterday, for example?
General ABIZAID. Sir, if I may talk a bit about what happened yesterday to put it in context. Within 4 minutes of each other, at about 1,000 hours local time in Baghdad, suicide attacks took place in Karbala and in Baghdad and in the Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad near the holy mosques that are located in both locations. There also obviously was an attempt to attack a holy site in the Basra area that was fortunately foiled.
We saw in this attack at least six suicide bombers, which is the most we have seen on any single day. It is possible that there may have been even more associated with the attack. So the level of organization and the desire to cause casualties among innocent worshippers is a clear hallmark of the Zarqawi network, and we have intelligence that ties Zarqawi to this attack. We also have intelligence that shows that there is some linkage between Zarqawi and the former regime elements, specifically the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and we are concerned to see a terrorist group come into close coordination with former Iraqi Intelligence Service people because that creates an opportunity for the enemy of cooperation that can have a lot of danger for the force.
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As you can recall, back during the early stages of the war when our forces first entered into Najaf and Karbala and you recall the pictures of our troops moving toward the mosque and people clearly not wanting them to get near these holy areas and you recall the picture of a lieutenant putting this one weapon upside down and backing away, ever since those early days of the war, we have had a relationship with the Iraqi police and with local guard forces led by many of the Shia notables to guard those sites themselves.
That doesn't mean that there is not close cooperation. There is an outer-ring in Karbala that is manned by the Polish multi-national division, an outer-ring in Baghdad manned by American troops. We had some intelligence that indicated that attacks would take place. We passed that intelligence to the Iraqi police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units and to the local authorities. We also know that they were trying to go after several prominent Shia personalities. In the night before, American special operation units raided some of the Zarqawi network operatives and probably prevented even greater carnage by being successful in one of those raids.
So there is a level of cooperation that exists all the way from General Sanchez to the lowest Shia police private on the streets of Karbala to try to ensure security. But, as you know, sir, in a city like Karbala of over a million and a city of Baghdad of over five million, you can literally find your way through any type of security cordon, especially when there is about a million pilgrims that are celebrating Ashura holiday.
It was clear, also, that the people that planned this outrage also planned to blame it on the United States, and there is some indication that they planted leaflets very shortly after the explosions in Baghdad that claimed that the United States had mortared the worshippers.
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So this is clearly along the lines of the letter that we intercepted from Zarqawi that talks about the need to plunge Iraq into civil war and do it quickly; and it is probably not surprising that, because we have the perception of being an occupying power there, that there are many people willing to point their fingers at us when there is a security incident, especially one as horrific as occurred yesterday.
Now, that having been said, I believe the plan was for even greater carnage. I think that joint actions between Americans and Iraqis prevented that from happening, and I think that we have better cooperation among various groups throughout Iraq in terms of security than is widely reported, although politicians are—inside Iraq are, of course, quick to point the blame at us. I think we will face many more of these challenges ahead, and I believe we will continue to stay after the Zarqawi network, we will continue to train the Iraqis to get after the Zarqawi network, and over time we will become more and more successful.
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, as you have noted both in your testimony here and prior to this hearing, the Pentagon's long-term strategy to reduce U.S. troops in Iraq depends upon the ability to hand over the responsibility for security to the Iraqi forces. According to the New York Times, though, many of the Iraqi police officers and militia now operating independently or in cooperation with the American forces still lack basic equipment like radios and patrol cars. Just two weeks ago, simultaneous attacks against Iraqi Civil Defense Corps headquarters and a police station in Fallujah left more than a dozen Iraqi police officers dead because they lacked adequate weapons and ammunition.
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I can't say that I am surprised that the new Iraqi security forces don't have the equipment they need because in many instances our own troops haven't had enough body armor and armored Humvees to protect themselves. But if the hand-over of powers is going to succeed, Iraqi troops and law enforcement officials have to be trained and equipped to deal with insurgence, or I think it is clear we risk chaos.
General, if we have had problems with our own troops getting necessary protection like armored Humvees, what makes you think that the Iraqi forces will be ready to assume control of security operations by June 30th?
General ABIZAID. Sir, I do not assume that they will be prepared to assume control of security operations by the 30th of June. I believe that the security situation in Iraq will require a partnership between a U.S.-led multinational force and the Iraqi security institutions, and I believe that as you look at the transitional administrative law that provisions are made in there for that to take place. And I agree with you, Congressman, that Iraqi forces, be they army, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units, police, border police, et cetera, still are not fully equipped, trained or memory-ready for the assumption of full sovereignty and being able to battle the very difficult threats that they face.
They are certainly prepared to face the obstacles, and they are courageous people. And I have great admiration for what they are doing, but the most important thing we have to do now between now and the 30th of June is increase the quality of the forces by getting them the right equipment, getting them the right training and ensuring that we start to build a chain of command that goes through the Iraqi private all the way up to the minister of interior or defense, as the case may be.
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I think, actually, sir, that it has been a remarkable thing that we have taken security institutions that were effectively at zero in May and brought them up to a strength of about 200,000 today, but I also have no illusions that it will take time to build them, train them and work with them. And as we move into the next phase of a multinational force headquarters, we will have Iraqi officers embedded with us there. We will have Iraqi joint forces, a staff that will be built that will help command and control the effort. And it will take some time before they are able to handle the very difficult tasks that are ahead of them, but I am very confident that given time and patience, we will be able to do that.
Mr. MEEHAN. General, on a follow-up note, I understand that the Iraqi Governing Council has decided to delay negotiations over a status of force agreement until a new provisional government takes over. This delay leaves the relationship between the United States troops and Iraqi security forces, it seems to me, completely undefined when we handle the sovereignty to the Iraqis. Without this agreement, the regulations governing where the U.S. troops will be based and what the conditions under which they will operate will be, it seems to me, will be up in the air, to say the least about the protection of our soldiers being guaranteed.
If our troops are going to be in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we owe it to our troops, it seems to me and to the Iraqis, to define our role in Iraq now.
What are you doing or can you do to revive negotiations for a status of force agreement with the Iraqi governing council? And I am wondering what legal rules will govern the conduct of our troops after the handover? In other words, how can we be sure that our troops will be able to defend themselves and establish sound security agreements if we don't have a status of force agreement that is in place?
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General ABIZAID. Sir, with your permission I am going to let Mr. Rodman answer some of the points contained in this.
Secretary RODMAN. I am happy to do that. I think that report is a mischaracterization of the situation. I would say that both the Iraqis and the Americans are coming to the conclusion that there is a different way to handle this problem than was spelled out in the November 15th agreement. As you were suggesting, the November 15th agreement said that by the end of March we would negotiate all this. I think we are coming to the conclusion—well, we have had some preliminary discussions with the Iraqi leaders who, first of all, assure us that they absolutely understand that they need us, they want us to stay, they need our help. The November 15th agreement also has a clause in it that says we know that the coalition will require wide latitude for its operations.
We are in the administration looking at a variety of legal ways of assuring our position through the transition that may well—depending on what we conclude, may well permit us to allow a detailed negotiation to take to wait until the transitional government is in place after July 1.
I mean, I can assure you that we are not going to have a period of time when our forces are without protection, but let me just say that there are a variety of ways of doing this and a variety of legal provisions that we can resort to, and we are at the beginning of—I think we are about to come to some conclusions ourselves. We are about to begin consultations with the Iraqis again and with coalition partners on exactly how to do this. But as I say, it may not be, you know, what was expected in November.
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Mr. MEEHAN. But would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that it should be laid out in written form and clearly understandable?
Secretary RODMAN. We will want to have clear, legal assurance of our position, both political and legal assurance.
Mr. MEEHAN. Any timetable when you might have such an agreement?
Secretary RODMAN. I think this is going to unfold during the course of this month. I think we are close to coming to some conclusions about ways to do it, and we will very quickly start discussing this.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General, thanks very much.
General ABIZAID. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank you both for being here today.
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General, as you know, one of the greatest challenges of the war in Iraq was logistical planning and implementation, specifically that of the movement of fuel, water and supplies, and we hear a great deal of testimony about weapon systems and body armor and intelligence, but very little about the phenomenal task that was done logistically in this whole conflict, and I would just ask you if you could, today, please comment on any distinctive challenges of this mission, and particularly your evaluation of the performance of the quartermaster corps during the war in Iraq.
And one second question if you have time. You mentioned the possible Talibanization of Iraq. If that were to occur, what, in your opinion, would be the consequences to the security of the continental United States, if that were to take place?
General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congressman. First of all, in terms of logistics, it is really remarkable the great strength of the United States Armed Forces not only in the fighting caliber of its men and women, but in this unmatched logistical capability to move from the United States of America at any point on earth, get mountains of equipment to the right place at the right time and move against a fairly sophisticated enemy in a very quick amount of time and achieve great results and then have no one really talk about it.
It is to the point where operational commanders just absolutely expect that the system will work flawlessly, and most of the time it does. Clearly, in the early days of the movement into Iraq, there were challenges with parts for helicopters and some of our armored vehicles that required a great deal of innovative thinking by young logistics troops on the ground.
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As I look at the theater now and I see how our supply systems are working, I am very satisfied that we are getting the right equipment and the right parts to the right place at the right time and that the troops are living a quality of life that is pretty unprecedented for a theater as tough as this theater is. And I attribute all of that to great logistics work.
However, we also need to understand that part of logistics is getting the force structure right in the first place, and one of the things we really have to understand as we evaluate the lessons of the war is whether or not the force structure in terms of logistics support, in terms of certain types of vehicle densities, for example, up-armored Humvees and et cetera, is correct. And if it is not correct, we need to correct it. And I know that General Schoomaker is thinking about that and working hard on that. But the work of the logistics troops is absolutely magnificent, and if you also look, Congressman, at the casualties among the logistics troops, you will notice that they are percentage-wise much higher than I think we have seen in any of our conflicts, because they are the young men and women that run those roads all the way from Kuwait up to Mosul, for example, that bear an awful lot of the risk in the combat operations that take place there, and they have done very well. We thank them for their great work.
With regard to the consequences of Talibanization, I really don't mean only of Iraq. I mean, if a country emerges in the Middle East that was like Afghanistan, that allows terrorists to operate from their soil as a base of operation, that allows this hateful ideology to be spread from its soil, that is a huge problem for not only the United States of America but for the entire region.
We cannot allow this ideology to take root, because it could be the source of much, much greater instability and difficulty for us in the region in the years ahead.
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I don't believe that it is likely for extremists to take charge of Iraq. I believe that the process is more likely to produce a moderate, although not necessarily recognizable western democracy, but a moderate government emerging that will protect the rights of its people.
The fact that a government like Iraq would emerge as a moderate state in the middle of territory not noted for its moderation will have a huge impact on the entire region, and if we fail there and the extremists were to succeed there, the opposite effect would affect the region in a way that would be very bad for all of us.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Secretary Rodman, in your opening comments you had the phrase, we are united on the fundamental imperative to be successful in Iraq. I think that is a very good way of putting the whole issue that regardless of how the American people felt or how the Congress felt. We had differing views on the decision to enter Iraq, but we are there now and we need to make this successful. And I think that was a good phrase. You ought to help somebody write a book sometime like Dr. Kissinger.
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General Abizaid, I want to thank you for all your service, too. You mentioned the 1st Cav. And I was down in Fort Polk a week ago yesterday and visiting the 39th Brigade, the National Brigade from Arkansas, the several thousand young men and women that are going to be part of the 1st Cav.
I actually carry the little coin around with me. All my Texas friends think that the Boyd 9th is, you know, Jim Boyd in Texas, but we know it was developed in Arkansas. So it is on their coin. And my apologies to all the many other Arkansas units that I don't carry their coin, but we have had so many go over, I couldn't do it all. But they are doing very well and they are getting very, very good training.
Last night on NBC news, I happened to hear a report that I found very disturbing, and I am going to read it in its entirety and ask for your response to it, Secretary Rodman, if I might.
This was a report by Jim Miklaszewski, and this is the report. Quote, quoting from NBC news now, ''with Tuesday's attacks, Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant with ties to Al Qaeda, is now blamed for more than 700 terrorist killings in Iraq, but NBC News has learned that long before the war the Bush Administration had several chances to wipe out his terrorist operation and perhaps kill Zarqawi himself but never pulled the trigger.
''In June 2002, U.S. officials say intelligence had revealed that Zarqawi and members of Al Qaeda had set up a weapons lab at Kirma in northern Iraq, producing deadly ricin and cyanide. The Pentagon quickly drafted plans to attack the camp with cruise missiles and air strikes and sent it to the White House where, according to U.S. Government sources, the plan was debated to death in the National Security Council.''
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Quote, ''Here we had targets. We had opportunities. We had a country willing to support casualties or risk casualties after 9/11, and we still didn't do it, said Michael O'Hanlan, military analyst with the Brookings Institution.
''Four months later intelligence showed Zarqawi was planning to use ricin in terrorist attacks in Europe. The Pentagon drew up a second strike plan, and the White House again killed it. By then the Administration had set its course for war in Iraq.
''People were more obsessed with developing the coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the President's policy of preemption against terrorists, according to terrorism expert and former National Security Council member Robert Cressy.
''In January 2003 the threat turned real. Police in London arrested six terrorist suspects and discovered a ricin lab connected to the camp in Iraq. The Pentagon drew up still another attack plan, and for the third time, the National Security Council killed it. Military officials insist their case for attacking Zarqawi's operation was airtight, but the Administration feared destroying the terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam. The United States did attack the camp at Kirma at the beginning of the war, but it was too late.
''Zarqawi and many of his followers were gone.'' Quote, ''Here is a case where they waited, they waited too long, and now we are suffering as a result inside Iraq, Cressy added. And despite the Bush Administration's tough talk about hitting at the terrorists before they strike, Zarqawi's killing streak continues today.''
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I was reading verbatim from the NBC News report, last night's news. I find that a very disturbing report. I mean, the allegation is that three times there were plans drawn up to take out a terrorist camp in northeastern Iraq in an area of Iraq that Saddam Hussein did not control that was a Kurdish controlled area who we had very close relationships with, and according to an NBC News report and their sources, we did not attack that camp because it would interfere with support for the war. Do you know if that story is true or not, Secretary Rodman?
Secretary RODMAN. I do know something about the planning. We had our eye on that location, Kirma, but I am not sure I agree with the characterization of, you know—of the decisions that were made. Any kind of operation is complicated, and I do know that we had our eye on that location. There were discussions in the Administration and obviously nothing—no attack was made, but I don't recall anyone discussing-on either side of the discussion anyone saying, well, no, we don't want to do this because it will interfere with a plan to go after Saddam. I mean, you could have made the opposite argument that it would—if we had found something interesting there, it would have—could have strengthened our case.
No. Any operation that one thinks about is complex, and there are always arguments, pro and con, and I am certainly not going to prejudge or pass judgment on ultimate decisions. But I think—
Dr. SNYDER. If I might interfere, because my time is running down. You say we are not going to pass judgment. The purpose, in my view, of the Congress when we look at past events is not to pass judgment, but to figure out what went wrong and how not to have it happen again. We have a situation here where the Congress and the American people acknowledge in a bipartisan manner we have had some real problems with intelligence gathering and processing and have had it for years under both Democratic and Republican administrations.
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But I think the issue here is you said we have kept an eye on it. I have got—you may recall in Secretary Powell's—Secretary of State Powell's discussions before the U.N. February 2003, he had a picture of this camp, but keeping an eye on it, we kept on eye on it. We had our man in Jordan, we believe, assassinated by this group after one of these plans was put forward, and according to NBC News—and I don't know if the report is true or not. So I would hope that the Administration will provide information to the American people that points out this report is not true, because if it is, it is a very damning indictment of how we use the good intelligence that we have.
Secretary RODMAN. Let me just say one thing. Whatever the—I am not aware of any evidence that the reasoning behind not hitting that target had anything to do with the reason that you have given. I think we—the decision to go to war with Iraq was being made at a high level and for reasons that we have all discussed and we all know about.
My understanding is that the decision on that particular target was made, you know, for other reasons. I don't think—I never heard any discussion that that would be the reason not to go after it, because somehow it would interfere with some pre—you know, predisposition.
Dr. SNYDER. Are you a member of the National Security Council, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary RODMAN. I am not a member of the National Security Council, certainly not.
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Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hefley.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We keep talking about transferring sovereignty July 1st. I am not sure exactly what that means, and I wonder if you could help us understand that better.
First of all, do you think we will hit that target? Because that seems like a tough target to hit. And then when we say transferring sovereignty, does that mean we will have fewer troops in there? Does it mean that the Iraqis will be making their own decisions or we will still be making the decisions behind the scenes from our embassy? What does transferring sovereignty mean?
Secretary RODMAN. Let me start. It doesn't mean that our troops come home on July 2nd. It changes the legal status of our presence there. It obviously changes the legal situation in the country. As you suggested, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will turn into an embassy, but our expectation is that the—I mean, the most important thing from the Department of Defense's point of view is that the Iraqis understand they still need us, and nothing changes dramatically on July 2nd as opposed to June 30th in terms of their desire to have us there to continue the job of training, supporting them until they are able to take that responsibility on, but we would be there on a different basis as a partner of an Iraqi government on the model, perhaps, of Afghanistan, where a sovereign government was restored in Afghanistan at the end of 2001; and we have been there, you know, with the consent of the Afghan government, as a partner of the Afghan government.
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So operational things will not change, and I quoted from the November 15th agreement in which the Iraqis understand perfectly well that our coalition forces will need wide latitude to do their mission. And as General Abizaid was saying, the numbers of forces, other operational things will depend on circumstances, and, you know, the magic day of July 1 doesn't predetermine those decisions.
General ABIZAID. Sir, with regard to military forces, there will be a number of things we will do differently as a result of sovereignty being transitioned, many of which we are working on right now. For example, trying to assist the Coalition Provisional Authority in building administrative defense, that still has yet to emerge, and it very much needs to emerge quickly.
So we will build a new headquarters. We will have a new headquarters, Iraqi officers that we are looking at very hard now in terms of ensuring that they have not committed any crimes against the Iraqi people and that they are supportive of a new representative government forming in Iraq. We are building Iraqi chains of command, as I have mentioned before. Throughout the country, we are building what we call joint core Nation centers where Iraqi military, coalition military, coalition civil police advisers and Iraqi police units come together and discuss security activity that has to take place.
Iraqi intelligence capability will be built by other agencies of the U.S. Government to give them a capability to conduct the intelligence activities necessary to protect the state. And counterterrorist capability is being built, as well.
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And as we transition from the period of what I would call perceived occupation to a period of partnership, it is very, very important that we give Iraqi military and civilian personalities that are responsible to the government an opportunity to take authority and take actions to be more involved in the security of the country. There are areas where we have already repositioned forces out of the urban areas, for example, because we think that the police forces and the ICDC units are capable enough to maintain control there, and we certainly look for the period ahead as one in which most operations that are conducted inside Iraq are joint operations with American forces, with Iraqi police, with Iraqi ICDC units.
And another thing we are doing, as we move to this main effort of building Iraqi security capacity as opposed to counterinsurgency, you will see a large number of American special forces and regular force people assigned to Iraqi units to mentor, train and provide linkages with the air system and other combat multipliers to make these forces more effective.
So from our point of view, after 1 July, we will do everything in our power to change the effort to building this Iraqi security capacity as our main effort, as I said.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his question. It is an excellent question, and I just—to follow up briefly, general, making this handoff is critical, and the question is always a balance of how much responsibility you vest in this new stood-up military and how early you vest that responsibility and how much you, on the other hand, withdraw the American area of responsibility (AOR) as this new force fills that area.
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What is your take on the present state of the leadership in this new Iraqi military and their ability to undertake this responsibility under what we now understand will be some pretty difficult circumstances? We know there is going to be explosions in Iraq for a long time to come, long after the Americans are gone and even after they have a stable country with an enduring government.
General ABIZAID. Sir, right now, I would say at the low unit level, especially in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, we would call that battalion level, and below the leadership is solid and it is capable; but above battalion level, both for the army and the Civil Defense Corps, there essentially is no strong Iraqi leadership, but we will endeavor between now and June to move it along as quickly as we can. It will not be ready to assume the responsibilities of defending the state against outside aggressors or against the terrorist forces that are operating within the country by the 1st of July. And when I say it is not ready, I mean that the leadership will need time to organize, time to get their equipment in place, and they will also need time to think about how they function in a representative state as opposed to a dictatorship.
As you know before, the mentality in the Iraqi army was one of summary executions, was one of moving into villages and essentially doing whatever you wanted there to include people and include killing people. And so this attitude of the army being served by the people is one that has to be changed, and it won't happen overnight. It is one that will have to continue to engage with them for a long time ahead.
So I am confident that there is a professional cadre of soldiers even from the former Republican—or even from the former Iraqi Armed Forces that can lead the Armed Forces in a cooperative way that is beneficial to the state.
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But the education process, the training process, the equipment process will take some time. There are areas of the country now where the Iraqis have very good control of security. Up in the north, down in the south, in some key cities inside what used to be former regime-controlled areas. And we do not intend, in any way, shape or form to abandon these immature security formations to their fate. We will have good levels of coordination, and when they want their help, they want help from us, we will come to their aid. And if they get in trouble and they don't ask for our help, we will still come to their aid. But ultimately, the idea is for them to become strong so we can leave.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, General.
Mrs. Tauscher.
Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Secretary, General Abizaid, first let me say, general, how thankful I am for your service and your dedication and for all of our fighting men and women in your AOR that have done such a masterful job, both Active and Guard and Reserve. I think we are all so proud of them.
I read in today's Washington Post a story by Walter Pincus and Tom Ricks, which is significantly disturbing in the fact that it pretty much lays out the dangers coming forward for us on this transfer of power.
Let me just quote very quickly. Signs have been growing that there will be more violence as different religious, ethnic, political forces seek power at a time for transferring sovereignty grows nearer, said one senior analyst. Several defense experts predicted intensified unrest as the transfer of sovereignty approaches. Quote, ''We should be expecting a pretty violent period ahead on featuring both spectacular suicide attacks and intensified resistance operations.''
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It is clear that—and by the way, I think that General Mark Kimmitt is doing a phenomenal job, and I think his physical presence and the way he is handling a lot of these interviews is very, very comforting to many people in my district, but at the same time it appears that it is very difficult for us to get really good intelligence about these suicide bombers. We know that they are able to be successful specifically in Israel and Palestine and that they are a tough nut to crack.
But there is also some talk out there that to hand over control of the country, unless we have some basic predictable level of security, and that is going to continue and the confidence that we can build in that, that it is going to be very hard going for us.
As you move—as you discussed in the last couple of questions, as you move to integrate and expand the Iraqi security forces, you are going to be layering on top of them much more of an American presence. My concern is, is that really puts our fighting men and women who are in a dangerous path all the time in a much more significantly dangerous place as they move toward a more transitional policing kind of effort.
Can you just discuss with us your sense of all of that, what the next five months are going to bode for us in those transitions, and if there are things that we can do to help you create a much more safe environment and force protection.
General ABIZAID. Thanks very much, Congresswoman. I certainly appreciate your support, and I agree with you about Kimmitt, as well. He is a great guy.
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This is going to be a dangerous period that we move towards. There is no doubt about it, and I believe that the extremists on either end of the spectrum will move very hard to derail this effort. They will continue to target Iraqi security institutions. They will continue to target people that are cooperating to make Iraq a better place, and they will certainly come to target Americans.
But if we are to be successful in Iraq, I think it is absolutely essential that we move toward a spirit of partnership with the new Iraqi government that allows them the authority necessary to build their own nation, and in giving them that authority, it also means giving up some of the control that we have on security, and it means exposing some of our special operation soldiers to the dangerous tasks of living, eating and fighting with Iraqi units that will be on the front lines. But the truth of the matter is we are all going to be on the front lines out there. There is no rear area that is safe.
I believe that, unfortunately, there will be more casualties ahead for us and for the Iraqis, but I also believe that with strength and perseverance and partnership, we will defeat the extremists. And as long as the political process moves forward in a coherent fashion, that we move toward a transitional government that is regarded as being legitimate by Iraqis and as long as the process has, as its end game, an independent Iraq that will not have any foreign forces there other than those that are invited, then I think there is a very high chance of success.
And while it is absolutely true, as you said, that it remains a dangerous place, and it is probably going to become more dangerous in some respects, the amount of progress that has been made in Iraq is absolutely incredible. When I think of how things were the first time I went back there over a year ago or back in April of 2003 to what it is now, I am absolutely astounded by how far we have come. But the terrorists have gotten themselves established. They must be defeated. Our intelligence systems must continue to work very, very hard to identify them, precisely target them and kill them, and we will do that in conjunction with the Iraqis. And ultimately, ultimately it will be Iraqi intelligence and Iraqi counterterrorist groups that eliminate this threat completely from Iraq, and I am comfortable and confident that they have both the will and the desire to do this.
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Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General. Good luck.
General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and sharing your time. And first, General, thank you for the terrific job that you are doing and all of those soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines under your command in a very large theater.
I have a very short period of time, and I have two or three issues I would like to cover, so I will try to move on quickly. We talked about rotation in Iraq, but you pointed out that you have troops in the heart of Africa. Can you share with us very briefly what the plans are there? Are you doing a troop rotation in the Horn of Africa? And if so, how is that going?
General ABIZAID. Sir, thanks very much for bringing up our effort in the Horn of Africa, because it is really my view of the way we ought to be doing things throughout my area of operations, and I look forward to the day when the size of our force in both Iraq and Afghanistan gets down to the point of what it happens to be in the Horn of Africa. And we are at 1,400 troops that are serving there, and it is primarily a headquarters and quick reaction and training establishment that does a very, very good job in helping the regional nations help themselves.
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And, ultimately, I think this is the way that we need to operate throughout the broader Middle East in the CENTCOM area of operations. And the commanding general there, Brigadier General Master Robinson, has done a fantastic job in developing relationships with local militaries, developing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, working with their counterterrorist forces to make them more effective. And of course, we are doing it in an area that is very volatile, very poor and includes one failed state, which is Somalia.
That having been said, I think the visibility that this headquarters provides for us in the region, the linkages it provides to allow us to cooperate against the terrorist enemy that hasn't yet gained a full foothold there is impressive; and while there is a lot of work to be done out there, we have got probably more bang for our buck from those 1,400 people out there than a lot of people imagine. It is a great job done by great people in a tough part of the world.
But the local forces in the region, just like throughout my entire area of operation, no more want Osama bin Laden to be the winner of this great struggle of ideas than you can imagine. They are committed to having the opportunity to live a better life, and that means, number one, that you can't allow the extremists to win. And the levels of cooperation are good; an awful lot of good work has been done there.
So I am very satisfied with what has been done there. I hope to continue the operation with the support of the Department over the next six, seven months or so and continually reevaluate its effectiveness, but my evaluation of how it is going there is that it has been very, very effective for very low cost.
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Mr. KLINE. Thank you. And you are not concerned when General Robinson and the 1,400 troops there are replaced that you will lose some effectiveness?
General ABIZAID. Well, I am concerned about General Robinson leaving, because he is just one of those unique kind of people that know how to do that better than anybody I have seen before. So his successor better be good, but I am sure he or she will be.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you, General. Sort of following the theme that I am working here is this transition in lessons learned, if you will. I guess that is the phrase I am looking for here, that whoever replaces him and those 1,400 troops are going to have to have learned some lessons from those soldiers and Marines that are in the Horn of Africa now. And the same thing is true in Iraq, and I have spent a fair amount of time talking to majors in the Army and in the Marine Corps here of late, those who served in Iraq and some of whom are going back in the case of the Marines, and we have seen stories of lieutenants and captains and sergeants using the Internet and scraps of paper and so forth to tell their successors, those following them, tidbits of lessons learned, tactics, how to drive, which side of the road, when to turn, that sort of thing.
So my question to you, and it is my last question, is are you comfortable with the way those lessons are being learned back here through this service effort and with your own efforts in theater? Do you feel like we are passing on what we need to pass on to those coming behind?
General ABIZAID. Sir, I believe that the system of lessons learned that I see implemented through the Joint Forces Command, for example, is better than I have ever seen it before. We have people from the Joint Forces Command that work lessons learned that are embedded in our headquarters nearly full-time, both in Qatar and up in Baghdad and out in Afghanistan. They have done a lot to pass the information from in-country experience to the troops that are training back in the States to the—especially in the case of the United States Army, to the training centers.
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So although I haven't visited the training centers since I have been in command, because I spend most of my time in the Middle East, I understand from General Schoomaker, who was talking to me about it the other day, that they have significantly refined the training in the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana, and also the training center in Helmstedt, Germany so that it replicates some of the threats that the troop will face throughout the region.
So the lessons learned process is alive, and it is well, but the most important way to learn the lessons of the theater is to be in it. Sometimes those are very hard lessons that young leaders learn. There is clearly no doubt that this is a sergeant lieutenant and captain battle, and these young people have gone into harm's way in a way that we really haven't seen since Vietnam, Korea and World War II, immediately after being commissioned or arriving at the rank of sergeant, and their remarkable way of living in this most difficult of all military environment of counterinsurgency is absolutely remarkable.
I marvel at their ability to understand the enemy, to understand the people, to apply effects against the enemy and at the same time, be compassionate enough to keep the people on their side as much as possible, and I think that we are building an armed force that has tactical savvy and operational capability unequaled in the history of our Nation.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you. Thank you very much, general. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
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The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, my first question is for you, and it follows up on what Mr. Kline just made mention of. I was going to ask the Chairman and not General Abizaid about these reports that we have been seeing, communications over the Internet, company commanders, lieutenants, et cetera, who have been there and have tips to pass on. I thought it would be very helpful to the committee if the Chairman could ask the committee staff to filter through all of that. And I am sure it is very voluminous, and put together a packet for all of us to review. The information that the committee staffs thinks would be helpful for us to have a better feel for what is going on on the ground as reported by these ground commanders. I think that would be very interesting.
The CHAIRMAN. I think the gentleman makes a good recommendation. I think some of the things we probably want to put together, make available to all members, but maybe in a classified session so we don't tell the world what is working and what doesn't work. But I think it is a great suggestion. We will work on that.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for being here. I can't tell you how helpful this sort of thing is to all of us. I know it is not necessarily the most pleasant part of your duties, but thank you for that, and thank you also for your service.
Mention has been made of the Zarqawi letter to Osama, I understand from what I read in news reports, and I have also seen excerpts from that letter in news reports, and I was wondering if it would be possible for members of the committee to get a translated version of that letter as well as a copy of the original letter itself so we could see what it looks like and then see the translated version of the letter. So that is a request that I have, and I am sure that all members of the committee would be interested in seeing that.
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Secretary RODMAN. I will look into that.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. And there may be sections that you have to excerpt, you know, but to the extent that—and if we have to receive it in a classified fashion, then that is fine. I am sure we would be willing to do that, but it would be very helpful for me to see that.
I have been in Iraq twice. The last trip was with General Schoomaker, and one of the places we visited was pararescue team (PRT) Gardez in Afghanistan. Their mission, it seems to me, involves an awful lot of things that civilians would typically be doing, the interagency folks. And yet, if I recall correctly, there was only one civilian present, roughly 100 soldiers, maybe 40 or 50 assigned to security and the balance assigned to—some to soldier missions and some to missions that civilians would typically be doing, it seems to me.
And in both trips I have heard—and then I have heard from colleagues as well—that it has been difficult for us, for Mr. Bremer, for the CPA, to get the kind of civilian expertise over to Iraq that we would like to have there in order to further the mission.
General Abizaid, one of the process of transforming the military—I very much support what General Schoomaker's vision is. When General Schoomaker was testifying before the Armed Services Committee, I asked him to think a little bit outside the box, outside his particular lane, and think about what—if you could do it, if you could add people, add capacity right now to this effort in Iraq, in Afghanistan, what would you be adding? I frankly think the transformation process that we should be as a country thinking about is much broader than just DOD and approaching these kinds of efforts, the initial conventional conflict, that is a straight military deal. Once the initial conventional conflict is over with—and I expect these are going to be fairly brief conventional conflicts. Hopefully we won't have any, but if we do, they will be brief.
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Then we are going to be in this drawn-out period that we find ourselves in now where different capacities are called for, and it seems to me that the capacities that you would like to see is the theater commander go well beyond simply military capacities, the sort of things that we can put into the theater given the sorts of abilities that we have, personnel-wise, technically, et cetera.
So what would you like to have that you don't feel like you have, and broader than just the military?
General ABIZAID. Congressman, thanks. That is a great question, and also thanks for visiting over there. We appreciate you going. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, we would like as many of your members that can get over there to come by and see what our troops are doing.
The CHAIRMAN. I might say on that point that Mr. Marshall's trips to the theatre are greatly appreciated, as are all of our members, and practically every member of the committee has been over at least once. So they have taken this very seriously.
General ABIZAID. We support you as much as we can. Sometimes timings don't work out for us because of various other commitments, but you certainly have my commitment to help you continue to see the battlefield.
Sir, the situation with regard to fighting this type of war, I mean, this type of a war is—it would probably be a surprise to hear a military guy say, one, that is not going to be won by the military alone. It requires a synchronization and coordination of national power, of information, of economics, of politics, of diplomacy and of military power. And unless that all comes together in a way that is coherent and it not only includes national power, but also international power, then it becomes very, very difficult to stop this ideological movement that has some attraction for the extremists in the region.
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And as I look at the things that are very effective to us throughout the area, we have a lot of military capacity doing things that could be done by other civilians from other international or national organizations.
For example, you mentioned the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. It is a huge—hugely efficient way for us to cause the writ of the central government to be seen out in the provinces, and we have been very, very satisfied with the results that we have had, but it can't only be a military face on that provincial reconstruction team, because one of the things that we are trying to teach people in this part of the world is that the military doesn't solve all the problems. Indeed, the military needs to be led by civilian authority.
And as I look out to the future of the Global War on Terror, had this requirement to ensure that we have got good intelligence capabilities and excellent civil construction capabilities at the right time and the right place, it is clear that we need to open our thinking about how to organize ourselves on the civil side to allow that to happen more efficiently, without the long lag time for recruitment, without specific timelines about 90 days in the theater or so, because 90 days is just enough time to get there, learn it and then leave, and often there is a gap between important people that isn't efficiently covered. And we lose capability and efficiency there.
But as I look at capabilities that I know we have got to have, whether they be military or civilian, the first and foremost happens to be intelligence professionals. We must have people that are willing to go into this area, develop intelligence, understand the intelligence and work with comfort in the region, and it requires an awful lot of human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. And that is something that we desperately need more of.
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We also need translators, interrogators, people that are culturally adept at operating in the area, dealing with people and causing actions to be taken on the civil side that allow for more efficient reconstruction.
Civil affairs, troops, civil affairs people, people that can organize nongovernmental organizations, they are all essential to this sort of thing. Police trainers, I mean, we know we need a lot of police trainers to help mentor the Iraqi police, and they shouldn't all be military policemen. They need to mostly be civil policemen. And as I have been associated with these efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and elsewhere, getting police capacity rebuilt quickly is often the key to success, but it is the effort at which we are the least agile.
So those are some thoughts that I think we need to take very seriously, and we need to have a discussion, because this war is ahead of us for a long time, about how we organize ourselves to deal with the broader problems.
I am sure Mr. Rodman has got some better thoughts on it than I.
Secretary RODMAN. I will start with the broader—a broader answer.
When CPA turns into an embassy, that will be an opportunity—in fact, the necessity for us to look at how we want to staff our presence there, and we went through a similar exercise just recently in Afghanistan when a new ambassador went out there, we took that as an opportunity to look at how we staff him, are we doing it right, all of the different—and all the different agencies have missions there. And in both of these countries. So you are right to talk about that interagency effort, and we need to constantly reevaluate and look at what the needs are and fill the gaps there are there.
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PRTs were mentioned in Afghanistan, and as General Abizaid said, the PRTs were conceived from beginning as interagency. The military component would be whatever is required. But there is a State Department person. There are United States Agency for International Development (USAID) people. I mean, three of them have Department of Agriculture people. So it was meant to be a creative device and a way to provide this kind of broad support. And it is very definitely something that all of the U.S. Government needs to be involved, and we spend a lot of—Secretary Rumsfeld spends a lot of time exhorting his cabinet colleagues to help out, and we need to do that.
General ABIZAID. Sir, if I may, I just want to say that I think it is very important for people to understand that our civilians who go over there and volunteer their time to work in these very dangerous circumstances have my greatest admiration and respect, and when I look at the job Ambassador Bremer, in particular, personally does, I can't think of a more courageous person in the country.
So I don't want to denigrate what they are doing, because what they are doing is essential, but I do think that as a Nation, we could do better in organizing how we approach bringing to bear the full capability of this great country.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you both.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole.
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Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, thank you both for your service. I am in awe of the job you have done and the people that you lead, General. It is quite remarkable, and the country is very grateful.
You may have covered some of this in your earlier remarks, but just a couple things. I am going to jump on the map a little bit, but we have such a remarkable disparity in forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, obviously different theater, different missions. Are you comfortable in Afghanistan with what you have given the population, the terrain, number one?
And number two, I would be very interested in any observations that you have on either the similarities or the differences in training security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and particularly getting armies up and operational in those areas that can assist you.
General ABIZAID. I am comfortable with the force levels that we have in Afghanistan, and I am also very mindful of the fact that we are fortunate to have NATO in command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISA) operation in the Kabul area and also now beginning to consider NATO expanding into the northern tier of the country to build and take charge of provincial reconstruction teams.
A little bit of military force in Afghanistan goes a long way. We have been very effective in getting our forces up along the Afghanistan, Pakistan border area primarily and primarily in the southeastern part and south central part of the country, and we have had very good effect against organized Taliban and Al Qaeda opponents. We see a certain amount of change in tactics in Afghanistan. As they have gone through a loya jirga process which has given President Karzai a tremendous amount of legitimacy and a move toward elections, the extremists become more and more desperate to undermine the legitimacy of the government, and so you see them reverting to more suicide attacks in Kabul and more attacks against nongovernmental organizations.
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But I am comfortable that our military forces have the ability to find and destroy large groups of Taliban and al Qaeda operating inside of Afghanistan as they have demonstrated.
The real key for Afghanistan, just like Iraq, is the expansion of Afghan indigenous security capacity. Afghanistan will ultimately take charge of its own fate only through the efforts of Afghanis, and we are doing a lot to build an Afghan national army, Afghan police forces, and we are looking very hard at the direction of the secretary with the way to replicate an analog to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps inside Afghanistan.
Clearly in Afghanistan, you also have a different set of dynamics, the way the campaign was fought, the way the warlords control various areas, the way that the Presidential power has evolved, but there are good signs.
For example, in the Pashtun areas, we have seen a desire for reconciliation that we haven't seen in a while. We have seen governors down in Kandahar and other key provincial areas expand the rule of law into areas that had been pretty much the purview of the Taliban or other antigovernment coalitions.
General ABIZAID. So I am not underestimating the challenges ahead in Afghanistan, but after the Loya Jirga, I am more confident about the way ahead and more optimistic about the way ahead than I would have been, say, six or seven months ago.
In terms of the difference between training Afghanis and training Iraqis, there is quite a degree of difference. A lot of it has to do in Afghanistan, especially with regard to training the National Army that people that live in Herat are not necessarily interested in going to Kabul to train to be part of the National Army and be stationed in Kabul as part of the central corps which we are building.
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And I think you know, Congressman, that the idea is to build the corps around Kabul first and then move our way out. We are reevaluating that, and we know that we are going to have to train more regionally in Afghanistan than in Iraq. And that is primarily a function of being able to move easily around the country. It is easy to move around Iraq; it is not easy to move around Afghanistan, as you know.
Levels of education are different. Professionalism of the officer corps is different. The type of organizations that have been fighting in Afghanistan for the past 30 years happen to be irregular and not regular. And so there is actually less of a challenge in Iraq in terms of regularizing, if that is a word, the armed forces than happens to be the case in Afghanistan.
But the bottom line for both countries is that we continue to have people volunteer to come forward to be part of the future, that are willing to fight for their own country, and they want to do it without us being around. And that is our plan, to build their capacity to the point where we don't have to be standing there with large forces looking over their shoulder. And I think that, given patience and perseverance, we can do that in both places, but it won't be without cost.
Mr. COLE. So, is it fair to say you are comfortable that we have not lost—that our effort in Iraq has not caused us to lose our focus in Afghanistan? I know there have been legitimate concerns expressed that we bite off more than we could chew or go further than we should have here.
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General ABIZAID. As a theater commander, I have authority to move forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. So if I thought that there was a huge discrepancy where one was unduly favored over the other, I would talk to the Secretary and I think we would pretty easily make those adjustments. We have made those adjustments on special operating forces consistently. But it is not a matter of a large land campaign in Afghanistan at this point. The situation is much more tribal, much more agrarian, much less what I would call urban area to deal with in a way that is necessary in Iraq. So, it is—I think it is about right.
Mr. COLE. Well, thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for your presentation today. I want to follow up actually in that line of questioning, and specific to bin Laden's location. There has been a fair amount of opinion that he is in northwest Pakistan, the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. And there were, interestingly, reports—I guess it was about a month ago now we started seeing in the news media that a major offensive was going to be launched in the spring. I found that interesting that we would give advance notice of that, and it later turned out to be not completely accurate.
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But I get a lot of questions from people that if we know where this guy is within a—I don't know; I don't know what the mileage is there—within a fixed point on the map, anyway, why not just drop 50,000 troops over there and go get him? I am sure there is an answer to that in terms of where, you know, the logistics of it or whatever. But there is that feeling, because—you know, my opinion and I think the opinion of many people; I mean, the threat of bin Laden and Zawahiri in particular continue to pose to us is extreme. And al Qaeda's capabilities would be significantly reduced if those two people were out of commission.
So, what is the thinking in terms of do we really have some certainty as to where he is? Even if we know he is in that area, still does it work militarily? What is the approach to that?
General ABIZAID. Congressman, we do not have any certainty of where bin Laden or Zawahiri happen to be. And I have seen the reports, I have seen all this talk about the spring offensive, I have seen reports by some of our younger enthusiastic officers in the theater about how we are closing in on them. And I have had people say, I understand we have got him surrounded and he is under observation.
If he was surrounded and under observation, we would have him exactly where we want him. But the truth of the matter is, that individual manhunts in this part of the world in particular, and in addition to the fact that it is complicated by the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, make it very difficult to say, with any degree of certainty, where one human being happens to be.
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On any given day, I could probably roll out four or five different reports from four or five different agencies that widely report him as being in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and other places.
Mr. SMITH. Is there confidence, though, within that region? I mean, there aren't any reports saying that he is in Central Africa all of a sudden. I mean, is there a fair amount of confidence that he and Zawahiri have stayed in that region at least?
General ABIZAID. My belief is that the two of them happen to be located somewhere in Pakistan or somewhere in Afghanistan. But that is a lot of territory.
And so, the other thing that I think we need to give the Pakistanis important credit for is the fact that they are stepping up their operations in an area where they haven't had a lot of military capacity, and they are putting pressure on their side of the border on the al Qaeda organization as we are on our side of the border.
The notion of a spring, winter, fall offensive and counterinsurgency is really kind of an outdated World War II sort of notion. We are conducting offensive operations now in areas that we think are high payoff.
Mr. SMITH. Any idea where that story came from? Because it seemed to be fairly persistent. It should have come from somewhere. I mean, the media doesn't usually just totally make things up. They frequently get it very wrong. But is there any idea where that came from?
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General ABIZAID. Well, I think there is always this idea that spring is the campaigning season in Afghanistan. And there is clearly a desire on our part to continue to step up operations; and when there is areas that have ten foot of snow in them right now, we don't operate in them, and we will be able to operate in them better in the springtime.
So to the degree that we will pick up operations in certain areas that are now inaccessible to us, as the weather improves, then I would say that is where it might have come from.
Mr. SMITH. Could I ask about one other area? And that is the Shia and Iraq and our relations with them. Certainly it has been a tense but not always negative relationship. And certainly there is developing an ''enemy of my enemy is my friend'' potential there. I mean, it is the Sunnis and the other—not all Sunnis, but certainly the Islamists are targeting Shia far more than they are targeting us. Has there been an improvement in the relations? Obviously we saw from the attacks yesterday, as you mentioned, they are trying to blame it on us and there was a hostile reaction even when the forces showed up to help. Is there any way to exploit this sort of new reality that is developing there that we an