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[H.A.S.C. No. 109–23]









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MARCH 9, 2005




TERRY EVERETT, Alabama, Chairman
CATHY McMORRIS, Washington

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
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RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee

Josh Hartman, Professional Staff Member
Bill Ostendorff, Professional Staff Member
Hugh Brady, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Croft, Staff Assistant



    Wednesday, March 9, 2005, Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request for Military Space Activities

    Wednesday, March 9, 2005


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    Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee

    Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee


    Teets, Hon. Peter B., Acting Secretary, Space, United States Air Force; Gen. Lance Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Lt. Gen. Larry Dodgen, Commander, Army space and Missile Defense Command; Vice Adm. Joseph Sestak, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs; and Brig. Gen. Thomas Benes, Director of Strategy and Plans Division of the United States Marine Corps


[The prepared statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Benes, Brig. Gen. Thomas A.
Dodgen, Lt. Gen. Larry J.
Everett, Hon. Terry
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Lord, Gen. Lance W.
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre
Sestak, Vice Adm. Joseph A., Jr.
Teets, Hon. Peter B.

[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Everett
Mr. Larsen


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 9, 2005.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Terry Everett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

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    Mr. EVERETT. The hearing will come to order.

    The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006 budget request for space activities.

    I thank all of you for coming. Mr. Pete Teets, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Lance Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command; Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs; and Brigadier General Thomas Benes, Director of Strategy and Plans Division of the United States Marine Corps.

    Following Secretary Teets's opening statement, we will begin with the questioning. But I do encourage the remaining witnesses to submit their written statements for the record.

    Gentlemen, I would like to highlight a few areas that the subcommittee is interested in hearing today, space-based capabilities and the war-fighters. The lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan indicate technology has revolutionalized the way we conduct military operations. Space rests at the forefront of this revolution.

    The subcommittee would like to hear about our successes in space and for new and better ways to leverage our space assets, like smaller and more responsive satellites, and integration of DOD and intelligence space programs. Given the nature of today's national security threats, past cooperative successes and the reality of a tightening budget, it is imperative that the two organizations leverage each other's resources and partner in the development of common intelligence capabilities.
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    However, the debate still exists on the value of such relationships. Should DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) share common systems? The subcommittee would like to hear your thoughts on that partnership, space acquisition programs and the problems we have solved.

    Over the past decade and a half, virtually all space acquisition programs have experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays. For example, Milstar, Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High, advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF), Evolved Expendeble Launch Vehicle (EELV) have all experienced significant problems. Both the Department and the industry must be held accountable.

    The subcommittee would like to see what measures are being taken to ensure that our future investments in space will not experience a similar fate. That is the space program's systems program. The subcommittee holds a great deal of interest in maintaining space capabilities essential for military operations.

    The subcommittee has specific interests in the development and maintenance of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Additionally, this year, the subcommittee will closely assess a plan for the advanced EHF and the Transformational Satellite (TSAT), as well as consider the investment of space radar systems.

    Please be prepared to discuss the military utility versus the cost of these programs. In my mind, nothing could be more important for the success of succeeding projects and developing a competent and capable force of space professionals.
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    Following up on our hearing of last year on this matter, the subcommittee is greatly interested in your progress. As a part of this year's subcommittee agenda for space, we will address the issue of space control. I understand that some of my colleagues may want to dive into this today. We have scheduled hearings and briefings on space control in the next few weeks. So I would ask my colleagues to hold these questions until then.

    Today, however, the topic at hand is the space budget activity. I encourage you to focus on your questions and comments on these issues.

    Secretary Teets, I now look forward to your testimony.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Everett can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Secretary TEETS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. EVERETT. Secretary Teets.

    Secretary TEETS. No problem.

    Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Reyes—I overlooked my Ranking Member, which I never do. Of course, as you know, we do not get started until he gets here. [Laughter.]

    Mr. REYES. I get here on time, though.

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    Mr. EVERETT. I beg your pardon? [Laughter.]

    Mr. EVERETT. If you would just wait a moment and let——

    Secretary TEETS. Of course.

    Mr. EVERETT [continuing]. Mr. Reyes continue.


    Mr. REYES. I will try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity. And, gentlemen, thank you for joining us here this afternoon.

    The hearing today—we will hear from our witnesses who will present highlights of the 2006 budget request. I hope that they can talk in particular about what efforts are being taken to reduce the cost of operating in space and in improving our space acquisition process.

    As the chairman has mentioned, we have had problems in the space acquisition process for the last 15 years. And current events are evident that the trend continues.

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    Consider the following: First, SBIRS-High, advanced EHF and Navy Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). These programs have all reported significant cost overruns or in some cases scheduled slips within the last year.

    Point two: The cost of EELV, or the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. In this program, we will see the cost double between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2007.

    Point number three: The suspension of Boeing, one of our two EELV providers, for violation of the Procurement Integrity Act—which I know was lifted last Friday. But I am told the civil suit continues and the company has essentially been placed on a three-year probationary status.

    Point number four: The Space-Based Radar program was almost terminated last year due to affordability concerns. The budget request includes funding for a restructured space radar program to launch one of two demonstration satellites. But the future of the program as it stands today is unclear.

    Number five: The Transformational Satellite Program, which was significantly cut by Congress last year, and has rebounded with another large funding increase in the budget request. But concerns are still raised about its aggressive schedule and will it remain on schedule in terms of concerns of Members of Congress.

    The chairman also mentioned that we are entering a period of belt-tightening, which I agree that we are. Program Budget Decision 753 will likely be the first of many attempts to reduce costs in the Department of Defense. And as Program Budget Decision 753 indicated, the modernization accounts will likely bear brunt of the full impact. In fact, although the DOD budget request represents real growth of about 2.2 percent overall, the combined procurement in R&D accounts actually shrink in real terms from the fiscal year 2005 level.
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    I do not think space programs can or should be exempt from looming fiscal restraints. Clearly, the department, and Intelligence Community, and the Congress must jointly work together to put out our National Security Space programs on an affordable and sustainable track.

    On this note, I also hope that our witnesses will explain what efforts they are taking to explore whether we can simplify the missions of our satellites and use smaller, less expensive satellites in the future, such as are commonly called Small-Sats, which will in turn be cheaper to launch.

    There is also hope among many space analysts that at least some of the missions that the large multi-mission satellites, what people commonly refer to as Fat-Sats, are doing everything today on a much cheaper scale. Physics and mission requirements may preclude Small-Sats for some missions, but as our future deficits and national debt continue to mount, so we must continue to look for more cost-effective ways of meeting our standards.

    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I know that you plan a future open hearing on what plans the Department may have to put both offensive and defensive weapons capabilities in space and the pros and cons of weaponizing space. I also know that you are scheduling a classified briefing on our space vulnerabilities, the nature and status of the threat, and the offensive and defensive space programs in this year's budget.

    I therefore agree with you that today is not the time to delve into those issues, and I hope and ask all members on my side of the aisle to focus on the unclassified aspects of the budget request. As I indicated previously, there are many unclassified space issues that deserve our attention.
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    With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this important hearing. We have much ground to cover. And I yield back the balance of my time.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. EVERETT. And I thank you, Mr. Reyes. And I apologize for putting the Secretary in front of you.

    Mr. Secretary, would you please now proceed?


    Secretary TEETS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Reyes and distinguished members of the committee.

    I am particularly honored to be before you today in the presence of these four military leaders of our National Security Space community. And I must say I am also pleased to be here as undersecretary of the Air Force, director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Department of Defense executive agent for space.

    I mention those three titles that I have because the consolidation of national security space responsibilities in one person has been a hallmark of my tenure. I feel strongly that these positions should continue to be vested in a single individual.
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    Singular management of national security space programs provides continuity while maximizing the cooperation between military and intelligence community space. For example, I recently decided to relocate the space radar program office to the Washington, D.C., area to ensure both community's needs are met as we move toward fielding this vital capability. This role consolidation is vital to creating the daily executive-level focus needed to tackle the complex National Security Space issues.

    From that perspective, I thank this committee very much, and the entire Congress, for your support to our National Security Space efforts. Thanks to you, we are better able to provide top cover for fielded forces and national decision-makers. With your support, this will continue.

    Our first priority in National Security Space is mission success in both operations and acquisition, to bring space power to bear in war-fighting and intelligence gathering.

    Mission success in space begins with mission space in space-lift. The last two Titan-IV launch vehicles are scheduled to launch this year, marking the end of an era. It will happen in April and in June of this year. Another era ended in February when the last Atlas-III placed an NRO payload in orbit, the 75th consecutive successful Atlas launch.

    Our Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, the Atlas-V, and the Delta-IV carry on our proud space launch tradition and ensure our access to space. As we continue our transition away from legacy launch systems, our strategy is to maximize mission success by maintaining two families of rockets.
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    These launch vehicles are the best ever, but we cannot afford to risk grounding critical national security payloads because we relied on a single rocket fleet with a single design. Once our space systems are on orbit, space professionals use them to provide situational awareness, continuous communication, and other critical services to combatant commanders, senior leaders and frontline troops.

    Our nation's warriors and intelligence professionals make extensive use of space capabilities. We are equally committed to mission success in acquisitions and are improving our acquisition processes. We updated our space acquisition policies for both the DOD and the NRO, aligning them and codifying our best practices.

    We also continue our efforts to provide an adequate management reserve, to give program managers flexibility to address problems in a timely manner. Last year, the Congress directed us to address the technology and affordability challenges of the Space-Based Radar and transformational communications satellite programs. We have restructured both programs to address these concerns.

    As I mentioned, we fundamentally restructured the Space-Based Radar Program, now called the Space Radar Program. We are developing a space demonstration that will address technical and operational risks, validate costs and technology maturity, and exercise the concept of operations.

    We are also moving ahead on modernizing military satellite communications systems through incremental acquisition of our planned transformational communications architecture. Our first step will be fielding the Wideband Gapfiller system, followed by the Mobile User Objective System, advanced extremely high-frequency satellites, and then TSAT.
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    The first TSAT launch was purposely delayed to allow time for laser communications technology to mature. We remain on a path to deliver a transformational communications capability to the war-fighter as soon as technology-readiness levels and our budget permit.

    Another of my top priorities, and the one that will enable success in all others, is to strengthen our team of space professionals—government, civilian, military and industry professionals from across the DOD and intelligence community. Space professionals around the world apply space power for our nation. We are working with the services and national agencies to synchronize their respective space cadre strategies and to implement our space human capital resources strategy.

    The next top priority is to continue to integrate space capabilities for national intelligence, war-fighting, and homeland security. We expanded this priority from the 2004 version to emphasize our homeland security contributions. Space systems assist in tracking illicit material and hazardous cargo, contribute to border security, and have the potential to do even more.

    I believe a single individual holding all three space leadership roles is the right organizational construct to ensure our national and military space systems complement one another to improve our total security. Fully integrated national security space capabilities enhance decision-making and war-fighting capabilities at all levels.

    The next top priority is to produce innovative solutions for the most challenging national security problems. We must sustain a solid foundation of science and technology to create innovative solutions.
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    Our DOD space science and technology strategy focuses on four vectors: Next generation launch capability, operationally responsive low-cost satellites and launch capability, assured freedom of action in space, and integrated persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.

    A promising area of operationally responsive space is to increase the responsiveness, flexibility and affordability of our space capability. The Force Application & Launch from the Continental U.S. (FALCON) Program remains focused on providing low-cost responsive space launch for small payloads with the first demonstration launch scheduled for this year.

    We are using the tactical satellite program to explore small satellite technologies and assess their military operations. The joint war-fighting space concept couples rapid launch in small satellites to provide dedicated responsive space capabilities and effects to the joint force commander.

    My final top priority is to ensure freedom of action in space. America's dependence on space is well-known, and any enemy will try to negate our advantage. We are pursuing improved space situation awareness to accurately characterize the space environment, distinguish malfunctions from attacks, and prevent collisions in space. In addition, we are developing the ability to protect our satellites and the capabilities they provide. This is a military and economic imperative for our nation.

    Because we rely so heavily on space capabilities, we must be prepared when directed to confront adversaries on the high ground of space. Our intent is to use diplomatic or other non-lethal means to preclude hostile use of space. If these measures fail, we reserve the right under international law to take defensive action against an adversary's space capability.
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    I am proud of our national security space accomplishments. We improved our space system capabilities on and off the battlefield, and we are modernizing every major space program while sustaining existing constellations. I am highly optimistic about national security space's future.

    I appreciate your commitment to helping us deliver these vital capabilities. With your on-going support, we will continue to develop, produce, launch and operate critical space systems for this great nation. Thank you again for your support. I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Secretary Teets can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Secretary Teets.

    We can observe the five-minute rule as we normally do, and so have a second or third round or whatever we need to have.

    Mr. Secretary, would you please describe your personal concept and the value of the deployment of small satellite constellations and what it could provide to joint forces?

    Secretary TEETS. Yes, sir. We will, as I mentioned in my statement, we will this year conduct a first experiment with an operationally responsive launch system that will deploy a small satellite. The vision of this is that we can augment theater operations with additional capabilities when theater commanders require it. And we will demonstrate it this year, and we will start to move forward with a continued push with both operationally responsive launch and additional incremental capabilities to our combatant commanders.
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    On the other hand, I would just quickly say that we are not in—we do not have a mindset that will abandon the larger space capabilities that we use today. And I think there is good reason to say that we want both the benefits of large space systems.

    For example, in the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance world, it is important for us to have high-resolution imagery. You cannot do high-resolution imagery with small-sats. It is going to require a large telescope to be able to do high-resolution imagery. And so therefore a capability like that must be provided with a relatively large, heavy kind of a satellite.

    Similarly, significant bandwidth capability with Internet-access kind of protocols from a geostationary satellite using, perhaps, laser communication in the future will clearly require a large satellite. But I do believe that there is a very important niche for small satellites to fill, and we are in the process of doing exactly that.

    Mr. EVERETT. Would you speak briefly concerning the need, as you see it, for space radar?

    And, Admiral, since we had a conversation earlier today concerning that, would you follow Secretary Teets in making the case for the Navy?

    Admiral SESTAK. Yes, sir.

    Secretary TEETS. I would be pleased to do so, sir.
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    I believe that there is a strong need for us to provide persistent intelligence collection. That is, to say intelligence collection that can provide information to combatant commanders and national intelligence users day and night and under all weather conditions. Only space radar can do that. In denied areas, in open areas, space radar will be able to provide us with persistent collection of intelligence.

    And it is for that reason that we have restructure the space radar program in a way that will allow us to move forward in a team sense, military community and intelligence community, to use the same satellites to provide information for war-fighting operations as well as for intelligence analysis. And I think that our restructured space radar program will indeed allow us to achieve those goals.

    To show that to you in a meaningful way, we have structured an operationally responsive small-sat demo which we will launch in 2008, a small radar satellite. It will be jointly tasked by the intelligence community and the war-fighting community. We will work out the concept of operations that allows that kind of joint use.

    That will be the first step in coming along toward an operationally capable space radar satellite that would be launched in about 2015. And this will be a joint intelligence community and military National Security Space initiative.

    Mr. EVERETT. And before you begin, Admiral, let me just say, General Teets, that I am very interested in this. And I want to thank you personally for putting together the target team to take a look at making sure our IC and our DOD folks were on the same page, since we cannot have two of those systems. We cannot afford it.
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    Secretary TEETS. Thank you, sir.

    Mr. EVERETT. Admiral, please.

    Admiral SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

    As you look to the next decade, the community, and I believe for the military as a whole, has probably two principal challenges.

    On one end of the spectrum is the major conflict that we hopefully will not approach, but you hope you have the capability to do when you need to. In that type of conflict, if everybody has watched how we have responded to wars in the past, we have built up over time and we have overtaken and overmatched our adversary.

    But if there is one critical element in the future on a major conflict, I think it is speed. You can look at the scenarios in the future and know that you are going to have to—an area and be able to handle a diverse number of threats against carrier battle groups, for instance, coming down on us, from theater ballistic missiles, then to craft that will come very quickly to reach its objective.

    On the other end of the spectrum is the global war of terror. Our unity is charged, with the U.S. Coast Guard, to protect the strategic approaches of the United States. We call it maritime domain awareness. It is now better to make sure that we have the persistence to ensure that that little needle in the haystack, that we need to identify where and wherever it is can be stopped, that the danger a propane tank that we might have some concern about, does not show up in Baltimore Harbor.
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    So, on the one hand, I have seen that the Navy has taken great advantage in war-fighting of a public commons, the seas. We can be anywhere we want anytime we want.

    Five aircraft carriers there on D-Day is interesting but irrelevant. Two aircraft carriers on D–Plus–20–Day, two aircraft carriers on D-Day with the ability to see before war begins and in those critical three or 4 days, which is all we may have during a war in the future, to be able see—Navy on land that can launch a missile to us at sea.

    I cannot shoot down all the arrows. We do not have enough theater ballistic missiles to do it. I have to kill the archer. I need the same capability in space to see it so that I can have a time-critical strike and hit it.

    On the other hand, I also know that this capability has to combine a very critical Navy target indicator on the service over water. I need that capability, not to be able to put a billion-dollar DDG (Guided Missile Destroyer) and follow every vehicle of concern.

    We know, for instance, that certain vehicles—every vehicle over, I think it is 10,000 tons, will have to have an emitter on it. For those that do not have the emitter, to be able to have a space capability to say, ''That one does not. I am concerned about it,'' to begin to do what this Navy will need in the future, which has been take the weak from the chaff in the global war on terror so we can focus our—absolutely critical.

    So analytically the analysis shows over the last year and a half the ability to control the commons from space as well as in the sea is absolutely critical to our war-fighting in the future.
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    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, Admiral.

    Mr. Reyes.

    Mr. REYES. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And on the second round, I would like to follow up on what you just said, Admiral. But for this round I would like Secretary Teets to answer a series of questions.

    The Appropriations Committee, as you know, dramatically cut and ordered the restructuring of the Space-Based Radar Program last year because of affordability concerns. The Department's own estimate for acquiring, maintaining and operating a nine-satellite constellation through 2026, which includes one spare satellite, was $34 billion in constant 2004 dollars. I think you will agree that, even by DOD standards, this estimate produced sticker shock here on Capitol Hill.

    So I have got a couple of questions. The first one is, has the Air Force established a ceiling measured in constant dollars for a space radar constellation in order to meet Congress affordability concerns?

    Secretary TEETS. No, we have not established a ceiling, nor have we made a definitive decision as of yet as to how large a constellation we will attempt to field. What we have done with the fiscal year 2006 budget and this year's Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is put together this restructured program which will launch two operationally responsive demo sats in 2008 that will exemplify the concept of operations that we will have developed with the intelligence community, as well with the military community.
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    And then, in parallel with that, we are working on a full capability space radar satellite that we will launch in 2015. Now, that radar satellite that will launch in 2015 will operate in conjunction with existing constellations of capability as well as air assets and other intelligence-gathering platforms.

    And so what we hope to do then is start to reduce the revisit interval, that is to say increase persistent collection of information. And in future years, out there in the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 timeframe, we will start to define the ultimate constellation that we will want to field. So it will be a time-evolving matter.

    And what we have put into this year's FYDP is exactly what I said, the operationally responsive demos and do the non-recurring development work on and field a first fully operationally capable satellite.

    Mr. REYES. There are three basic ways that you can make this program cheaper: Reduce the size of the constellation, reduce the cost of each satellite, and reduce the mission requirement or capability stated to make this system more affordable. Of course, I do not think these are mutually exclusive options, but I wanted to ask you, is the primary purpose of the technology demonstration that you just described to discover ways to make space radar more affordable?

    Secretary TEETS. Well, it will certainly do that. I would not say that is perhaps the primary driver, but it will certainly do that because it will mature the technology. Transmit/receive modules that we will use in the demo satellites will be used for the full operationally capable satellite, as well.
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    And so we will demonstrate that technology. We will demonstrate the cost of producing roughly a quarter-scale model spacecraft. And we will have a high confidence then in what it will cost us to ultimately field the operationally responsible satellite. As I say, it will operate in conjunction with existing platforms and sensors, both air and space.

    Mr. REYES. Are there any specific quantifiable affordability goals that this demonstration program is designed to achieve or test in the context of, you know, all of the things that you want to accomplish with it? Can——

    Secretary TEETS. We have not tried to, as of yet, set the constellation size or determine even the final orbits that these satellites will go in. Because, as I say, one of the things we are going to learn over time is how this can work in conjunction with other existing assets. And that will determine, in a very meaningful way, how much it is going to cost for us to get revisit intervals down to single digit numbers, how rapidly we can deploy such a thing, and we can then propose an affordable system going forward.

    I think one of the problems that we had last year, very frankly, we got a little bit out in front of ourselves. We talked about a nine satellite low-earth orbit constellation. And that did turn out to be a very expensive constellation operating on its own.

    This time, we will migrate into a constellation that we can afford. And we will do it over an affordable timescale.

    Mr. REYES. My times is up, but in the next round, I want to maybe ask you to explain how you think Congress can evaluate whether we are on an affordable path or not.
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    Thank you.

    Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Franks.

    Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank you, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen. We appreciate you being here. I think sometimes we forget that it is because many of you stay up at night and do your job and say that no one is going to bother America tonight that a lot of us can sleep soundly. And I appreciate you very, very much.

    Having said that, Vice Admiral Sestak, I thought you articulated very well one of the challenges that really is in front of America. You mentioned both the terrorist element and, of course, being able to see an archer from the ground. Of course, what a lot of us ought to be concerned about is a convergence of those two possibilities. But I have not heard a lot of members or a lot of witnesses come before this committee and talk about the archer on the ground. It has always been about the arrows. And that was fascinating to me.

    And I guess I am wondering if you might expand on that to some degree and tell me, or tell us all, what you think the state process is, as far as us being able to see that archer on the ground and being able to interdict it in an earlier level. And, second, what can we do in Congress to make sure that that is on track?

    Admiral SESTAK. Yes, sir. Up until recently, this area that we are talking about today, space networks sensors, we have not been able to model very well. It has been relatively easy to take kinetic kill vehicles, how many Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAMs), how many bombs can I drop to destroy that target. But we have never really been able until recently to measure the value of an extra inch of bandwidth. So what I am getting at is this. We have taken certain areas, and certain regions, and certain countries. And we have actually taken the actual places where we know and our intelligence agencies they will have transportable erector launchers, the ability to shoot suddenly, scoot out from a cave, shoot an X amount of minutes, a ballistic missile, theater ballistic missile, not just as it targets a fixed base.
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    But why I am concerned in my battle space, also, is against moving targets at sea from a ballistic missile next decade. So when they scoot out, we know from our analysis that adversaries are in major conflicts looking at what I call saturation tactics, a lot of stuff against us, a lot of mines, a lot of swarming boats some of them, a lot of little things coming against us, or a lot of missiles being shot at suddenly.

    There are several ways to handle that. Some is information operations, which I do not need to get into here. Some is time where time-critical strike, the ability to see someone scoot out, the ability to sense that, see that, and relay that information to a missile with the speed to go in and hit it. And then the third way is to be able to hit it with a hard-kill missile back here.

    There are three pieces to trying to defend a site. And those are the three. Informational operations from various means, networks, things we could do. The ability to shoot it down, last-ditch. But we are pretty good at that. You have seen the test of the SM–3. Not bad, five of six. But, finally, the ability to hit the archer before he launches.

    The Navy operates in the commons. But increasingly in a quick war, we have to be able to protect ourselves from the archer ashore. That is why I need the ability to see. Because the only way before a war begins I can get over countries legally is from space. But I cannot not have the ability of that craft.

    And I understand affordability, but I understand capability also. And the analysis shows I need a communications capability for that and for the global war of terror to track who and what I need out there at sea. It is a vast ocean. In that case, it is not saturation tactics. It is picking that one individual up and by means of other means scoping it down, that is why I need the other end of this capability.
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    Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Vice Admiral. I think that you articulated very, very well. And I am just hoping that, you know, as far as that, involving the joint war-fighting space concept, for the different forces can come together and see systems available to us.

    Because I think it is—you know, we speak in terms of what might happen. But yet one missile with a nuclear capability that lands in America changes our lens and our forces changing to a concept for freedom forever. So I wish you the best——

    Mr. EVERETT. General Lord, would you explain the concept of joint war-fighting space and the value it has to our integration of this information? I know we are going to run over, but since you——

    General LORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be delighted to.

    Joint war-fighting space was an idea that our chief, General Jumper, brought to us about a year ago and said take a look at. There are faster ways we could be more responsive to theater commanders with specific space capabilities, responsive launch, perhaps smaller satellite capability, because we wanted to make sure we could deliver space-based capabilities to a war-fighter.

    We went out, as a result of this idea, to put the concept together and then visit with all the combatant commanders, all of the theater commanders, and ask them what their needs were, most in terms of communication, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, things that would be immediately on their mind that they need in a particular fight that they might get into or some need that they would have.
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    And we would put together a package of payload, plus the capabilities that were directly linked to a theater commander with a human being, perhaps supplement with some other work that is being done in a particular theater and provide the capabilities directly to them.

    We took advantage, as Secretary Teets had mentioned, with the Tactical Satellite Program (TACSAT). Those are small-sats. The first TACSAT, by the way, we hope will be launched in July of 2005, and it will be directed toward the Pacific theater. The payload is aimed to help the Pacific Command (PACOM) and their operations. Later on, we will move through the other theaters and support them with that kind of operation.

    I might follow onto something that Admiral Sestak mentioned, and sort of in response to your question, about—we experimented with rudimentary kind of capabilities, as we mentioned, and questioned about in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, with early indications of theater-class ballistic missiles lost and detected by our missile warning capabilities.

    We got better at that when it came to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. And we think we can do a lot better, as we replace our warning systems and then cross-correlate with Space-Based Radar or Space Radar in a way that we can do what Admiral Sestak and the Secretary have spoken about, and that is get ahead of these people on the ground, and identify them before, and do the intelligence preparation of the battlefield so a combatant commander can use all his assets or her assets in space to have a good picture of what the threat might be and be able to take or pick different courses of action in advance, as opposed to waiting until some action has occurred.
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    I think the confluence of these capabilities really pays off for America. And certainly as we work with other service colleagues, we have got a good way ahead then.

    Mr. EVERETT. That July launch will be when the FALCON—Mr. Schwarz, I apologize for delaying your questioning. But it is your time at bat.

    Dr. SCHWARZ. If I can turn the microphone—I guess it is on.

    Gentlemen, in the real world, I am a surgeon. This is the first hearing of this subcommittee that I have attended. I do surgery through a microscope, middle-ear. Even doing something like that and having done it for many years, the stuff that you are talking about is still pretty much ''Gee whiz'' to me. So any question that I ask will be probably elementary, to say the least.

    But I would like to ask General Dodgen and General Benes—I was battalion surgeon for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, General, 35 years ago—how does the development of our space systems as we go into the 21st century, how does it aid and abet a Marine battalion going over to the littoral or an Army battalion or brigade strength organization somewhere out in the middle of nowhere—I am thinking of the Middle East. I could be thinking of Central Asia.

    How do the space systems help you? Just help me understand what we are talking about here.
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    General DODGEN. If you want, I will go first. Thank you for the question. Well, I didn't want to get into the middle of your preference for Marines. [Laughter.]

    The Army is transforming. And we are, in fact, giving up some of the protection we have had in the past to do the missions with the speed that we will need in the future and to get the flexibility in the execution of those missions.

    And to do that we will be reliant, in line with what Admiral Sestak has said. We will want to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. And so our reaction to the vulnerabilities that we may have faced with armor and protection around our soldiers, we will face with understanding of the battlefield, absolute understanding of the battlefield.

    That will cause us to need complete situational awareness. We will have to see the battlefield. We will have to understand what is there. And we will have to be able to share that communication across all the mobile formations so that it is not part of that formation that is not.

    So literally every combat vehicle will have a common understanding of where the enemy is and where the objective is. And the only way to do that, and to free yourself from the geography of terrestrial systems, is through space platforms and space platforms that let you know exactly what is out there, even passing imagery through high-bandwidth capabilities to soldiers so they know exactly what is over the horizon and they can react properly with their systems to kill before they are at risk.
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    General BENES. Thank you for the question. Also, and I guess I will dovetail too on the Army's and Admiral Sestak's comments.

    Sir, there are probably two big pieces to this. One is the portion afloat where we are partnered with the Navy. And we are going to use their platforms as a sea base. That is what we are doing now. That is what we are going to do in the future. And, as you know, anti-access issues throughout the world and force protection are going to require us to operate from a sea base.

    And so while we are afloat, we rely on the sea shield portion, which I believe is what Admiral Sestak described here in detail, but we go on a sea shield. In other words, some force has to protect as we approach a littoral, or a campaign, or whatever we are going to do. So that is one piece.

    So we really benefit as a user of space from the other services in that respect and from all the services acquisition programs, because we do not really have any acquisition programs on our own.

    We see us having to do more of what we are doing today, the regular-type warfare, but we also have to balance that with a requirement and a capability, or a capability, I should say, to do the traditional stuff and service our op plans in a large scale. So we have to be able to do both.

    Our lessons learned in Iraqi Freedom and what is going today, and to some extent the Afghanistan campaign, shows us that space is an absolute critical enabler for us. And it is going to be more so in the future.
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    And there are about, I guess, three general categories I could probably comment on. Number one is, we need to have beyond line of sight communications. We need to be able to communicate on the move. And technology, and all the studies, and everything I have seen, it seems that space is going to afford us that capability.

    And we are limited in bandwidth. Maybe we are limited in the way we manage bandwidth, but anyways, we are limited in that. And there is a limitation because then we cannot communicate to the degree we want, and space is probably the only solution for that capability.

    The other is the Intelligence, Surveillence, and Reconaissance (ISR) that was mentioned. We need, like the Army, we need to be able to have situation awareness, understand where key terrain is, who is there, what they are doing. And space systems offer that. We also need to be able to get that stuff down to the lower level.

    Sir, you mentioned the battalion level. We would like to get it down to a squad level. Because, in the future, we are looking at a concept called distributive ops, which means that we feel that we are going to have to operate in a distributed fashion over greater distances than we have traditionally done.

    And we are going to have to be able to communicate. I have mentioned that. But we are also going to have to have situational awareness on where the enemy is, what the terrain is like ahead of us. We may not just be in the desert. We need to be able to know who is on our flank and who is not, so there is some situational awareness piece there. And we need the revisit capability that was mentioned here so that we know what the enemy has done in time.
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    That has to be networked, as was mentioned. And we need to get it down to the lower levels. We are working on that. Distributive ops, the concept does that. It decentralizes our command and control and our operations down to the battalion and below level.

    We also need the ability to amass quickly, in case we need to put the force back together in a larger fashion, battalion and above, and address an enemy that is doing the same thing to us or there is a significant threat there.

    So those are two pieces. The Blue Force Tracker—or Blue Force situation awareness is probably a better term—we also need, because we need to know not only where we are but where our friends are, our allies are, and that needs to be part of a common operational picture.

    So I guess those are the three big technical areas, trying to bring it down to the Marine level, as to what we see space as an enabler for us in the future, sir.

    Dr. SCHWARZ. General Dodgen, General Benes, thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Dr. Schwarz. And you are correct. These gentlemen are in charge of some of the most fascinating things in our lifetime. As General Lord pointed out today, space is only—most of us were born before space began, as far as—and see what we have accomplished in the last 50 years, what is going to happen in the next 50 years.
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    Mr. Larsen.

    Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I am living proof that hanging around this place long enough, you move up pretty quickly. [Laughter.]

    Secretary Teets, General Benes's comment about there is not enough bandwidth, we need more bandwidth, and space is probably the way we are going to go to try to get that. I think most of us agree with that general concept. But, you know, I guess, last year, all four defense committees have also indicated about the concern that the schedules of other systems that might link up with, say, TSAT, are moving faster than TSAT. But the TSAT technology timeline seems to be trying to shoehorn into the pace of the development of these other systems, like the future combat system.

    In short, I guess, Congress supports the concept and goal of TSAT and using lasers to enhance communication, but perhaps not the pace. And last year we cut $300 million, about 3.5 percent, of the 2005 budget request, yet the timeline for selecting a contractor to begin building the first TSAT only slipped from the second quarter of 2006 to the last quarter of 2006.

    It does not strike me as a significant slowdown of the program, perhaps not addressing the concerns that Congress has about the pace. So how have you addressed Congress's fundamental concern that you may be—we are moving too fast on TSAT, given your comments you said earlier about the technology not necessarily being ready for us?

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    Secretary TEETS. Yes, sir.

    We have restructured some of the technology maturation efforts associated with the TSAT program to make certain that the long-lead technology developments can be shown to be coming along on time. And if for some reason we run into unanticipated programs, we will be able to adjust and take certain off-ramps.

    And so we kind of, in the President's 2006 budget and this FYDP, we have tried to build in some safety factors that would allow us to adjust if we—as I say—encounter some unforeseen adversity.

    But I just want to say quickly that there has been a demonstration of space-based laser communications. We flew a satellite called the GeoLITE Satellite in a demonstration a couple of years ago, which closed the laser link from space to ground in New Mexico. And significantly it also closed the link from space to airplane with a laser communication link closure.

    And so I think the tallest technology pole we have right now in TSAT is to be able to do the Internet protocol router from space. And that is a vitally important element in being able to truly network.

    And if I could just expand on that for a second. I would tell you that the bandwidth that we talk about is enormously important. But it is important because we are going to want to be able to serve this com-on-the-move equation that General Benes talked about and General Dodgen talks about so much, that we are going to have to service thousands of users simultaneously and located on different parts of the globe. And in order to do that, you not only need the bandwidth but you need the access. You have to be able to know who wants what when, right now. And so that is why we are going to this Internet-in-the-sky sort of concept.
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    And we are rapidly moving—or we are trying to move rapidly—into laser com so that when somebody wants a map of the area in front of them, that can be requested in a way that will have enough bandwidth capability to get that map to him in seconds and use an Internet protocol to be able to do so.

    And you could think of yourself as just being on the Web with an ability to request information and get it while you are on the move. And that means you have to get it with a small antenna. So that is what we are all about now.

    And we see that as the ultimate vision. We have developed a developing communications technology that includes things like the Navy's MUOS, which will be for certain Internet protocol, also. We are going to use Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites. We are going to have a Wideband Gapfiller launched yet this year.

    So we are incrementally building bandwidth and access capability. And I think we are on a nice progression that can show you that TSAT's time will come in about that 2013 timeframe. If not, we have off-ramps that allow us to simply not expand it as fast but go with additional AEHFs.

    Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, two things for the record, if I could just ask——

    Mr. EVERETT. We are going to have votes at 4:05 we are told. We have Mr. Davis, and then we are coming back for a second round.
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    Mr. LARSEN. We are going to come back for a second round after votes? Oh, yes.

    Mr. EVERETT. If you do not mind.

    Mr. LARSEN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Davis.

    Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first thing I would like to do is just praise the efforts of you and your predecessors in transforming the ability. And the military will communicate jointly on a more and more network-centric manner.

    I remember one of my former bunkmates made the one joint call for fire during the Grenada operation, the 82nd Airborne Division. And they had to use his phone card to contact Fort Bragg. And their satellite communication was transferred to Navy Norfolk. And he did not even know that his call for fire went through until he saw the smoke come out of the guns on a cruiser off-shore. And to see where we are now is really an awesome thing. To me, the ultimate end of maneuver warfare is putting this cornerstone in the sky in place to truly control the battlefield from an information standpoint.

    But as a former manufacturing guy, it raises questions to me about the pipeline to get all of this information out, and specifically on the bandwidth. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, I think about 80 percent of the bandwidth that was used was commercially obtained. And you are constantly dealing with that challenge, from a budgetary standpoint.
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    I was wondering if you could comment for a moment, Secretary Teets, or any other general officers at the table as well, if you feel there is a need to establish a commercial satellite communication policy similar to the national remote sensing policy to assure we have that ability while we are in this time of transition?

    Secretary TEETS. I think the National Security Council actually considered such a policy and deemed it not necessary on a national basis. But I will tell you that, within our own infrastructure in the Pentagon, we have met jointly. And all the services feel a need to join together here, in a sense, to establish a Department of Defense policy as it relates to use of commercial telecommunications.

    And as a result of that, the acting Secretary of Networks & Information Integration (NII), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) NII, kind of has the lead role in formulating that policy that we would go forth with for use of commercial space. I think it is an important element because, as you mentioned, we are using a lot of commercial communications, and we need to have some policy framework for that.

    Mr. DAVIS. How would you handle right now, for example, if we had a surge requirement, say, in another theater simultaneously with maybe increased demands in Southwest Asia, what would your approach be, just simply to buy it commercially? I am thinking of capacity in the commercial market, as well, and the needs.

    I guess where I am going in this is something, you know, almost along the lines of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, which can be grasped from time to time in a national emergency. But if you could comment on that, either any of you, that would be fine.
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    General LORD. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great question.

    Something we need to remember is, first of all, bandwidth handles a lot of the unclassified traffic. We still have protected traffic over Milstar and our protected mechanism.

    We have come a long way with our Milstar constellation since it was first put together. And we were able, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, to transmit the air tasking order and some of the protected communications in very few seconds versus hours and minutes before in some cases.

    So we have got protected communications. Advanced EHF will come on and help us with protected communications. But we are still going to need a mixture of broadband as well as the narrow-band and protected communications in our overall kind of policy.

    What we will do is, in this case, we would adjudicate a lot with the Army, and the Navy, and the Marine Corps through the joint staff who would help us partition bandwidth and saw what combatant commanders needed for particular solutions for that, as well as we use DISA, the Defense Information Services Agency, to help us secure bandwidth on the open market for unclassified traffic needed.

    I think General Harry Raduege and his team did a marvelous job during Operation Iraqi Freedom, going out and getting on-the-spot prices in a very good leverage ahead of time to make it so that we could communicate and cover all our bases with not only commercial capabilities but also with military-essential traffic over protected——
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    Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

    Mr. Secretary and General Lord, a lot of our programs, SBIRS-High, the Advanced Extreme-High Frequency, give a case in satellite Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, we have experienced recent breaches. What have we in place to try to make sure that we can stop experiencing this?

    Secretary TEETS. Sir, it is an excellent question. And I will start, and perhaps General Lord would like to add onto this.

    But I will just say that one of the major initiatives that we started some three years ago was a change in the way we fundamentally acquire our space systems. And we have, in the course of this last three years, put into place a new policy for acquisition of space systems, which gives full recognition to the fact that developing a space satellite system is different from buying airplanes, tanks, guns or bombs.

    And as a result it requires a different process for acquisition. Now, this new acquisition policy called 03–01 is really an amalgamation of the best practices that we have learned over the years. And it changes in a very fundamental way the way programs like SBIRS, and AEHF, and others, Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), for example, other programs have been acquired. It changes that basic approach.

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    These satellite systems are years in the development. And so it is going to take some time to see the effect of this new acquisition policy. But I have a genuine belief that you will see positive effect over time from the new policy that we have established.

    And I would simply say that it involves things like doing the system's engineering that is necessary way up front in the program. It involves establishing meaningful reserves, in terms of schedules and budget, so that when problems arise in a development, the program manager has a resource to apply to the problem in a very rapid so that the problem does not get worse, it gets fixed.

    And a whole series of different ways to apply an acquisition process are currently in place. It will take some time. And we can expect to see continuing problems on both FIA and SBIRS-High. Those programs were not structured properly at the outset, and we cannot expect anyone to snap their fingers and have them fixed instantly.

    General LORD. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, I have been in the company of Mr. Teets and several of our senior level programmers use with the contractors and with the assistant from our case from Los Angeles, the space missile system.

    The fact that the Under Secretary personally takes its time to look at programs in depth with what is called a deep-dive kind of look at each on of our programs pays off, in terms of making sure that our contractor understands how important is it to making sure we have the right professionals on the job.

    We made changes at Los Angeles with keeping our program managers around for a longer time. It is a minimum of four years as a leader of a program at systems engineering school we have started in Los Angeles. Putting our best team forward and competing for the best engineers to be part of our acquisition element is going to pay off for us.
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    Mr. EVERETT. We are going to have votes in about five or six minutes. And I will, Mr. Larsen, I am going to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Larsen to ask his questions. And then, with the agreement of the rest of the members, we will wrap this up. And the questions that you might have for the panel, any member of the panel, you will submit them in writing. We will ask you to respond within 60 days.

    Mr. LARSEN. Well, I have a twelve-part question I would like to ask. [Laughter.]

    Mr. EVERETT. I reclaim my time. [Laughter.]

    Mr. LARSEN. I thought I would just follow up, Mr. Secretary.

    Do we have a viable back-up, with respect to TSAT? Do we have a viable back-up technology, alternative to a router, or to either the router or the laser technology itself? And what happens if there is a development delay in either of these variants?

    Secretary TEETS. The off-ramps that we have established, or not to abandon Internet technology, but the fact is that using lower frequencies at AEHF rates or at MUOS rates, as I mentioned. MUOS will have a router on board. And we will have Internet capability.

    We will also, if necessary, put that kind of capability onboard AEHF. And so there are ways, if we run into trouble on TSAT, to take off-ramps and still have some capability.
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    Now, it is only when you go to TSAT and laser communications that you are going to get this enormous jump in another order of magnitude and with capability. Today, our satellites are operating with higher bandwidth by about a factor of ten than they were just a few years ago. We will get another factor of ten when AEHF launches along with Wideband Gapfiller. And then there will be a third order of magnitude of bandwidth capability when we go to laser com.

    Mr. LARSEN. Okay. If we could get something in—can we get the timeline in the off-ramps in writing?

    Secretary TEETS. Yes, sir.

    Mr. LARSEN. Do you have something like that you can provide for me——

    Secretary TEETS. Absolutely.

    Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. To help us? And maybe when we get that, we can get back to you and explore that a little further.

    Secretary TEETS. That would be fine, sir.

    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.
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    And I thank the members.

    Mr. Schwarz, as you so directly pointed out, this is fascinating stuff. And we really could spend an awful lot of time here going over it. However, I know from experience we have three votes. Those 25 minutes normally translate into about an hour or 45 minutes to an hour. And I would prefer not to keep the panel here, just sitting around for that length of time.

    So I thank you all for the work you do and dedication to this country.

    And in particular, last I would like to take what could be the last opportunity to publicly commend and thank Secretary Teets for his dedicated service to our nation. Over the last three years, you have greatly enhanced our nation's security by developing a comprehensive space strategy, executed by a unified team of quality professionals. Your actions have had a tremendous effect and will continue to pay off for years to come to this country. Americans will and can sleep well because of your effort. You have been of great service to this country. And we appreciate it very much.

    Secretary TEETS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank all the members of this committee. It has been a real pleasure to work with you for these three and ahalf years. Thank you very much.

    Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

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    The meeting is adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]