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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–2]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004—H.R. 1588






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MARCH 12, 2003



One Hundred Eighth Congress

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
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ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
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LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
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Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
James M. Lariviere, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant




    Wednesday, March 12, 2003, Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act—Combatant Commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command


    Wednesday, March 12, 2003



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    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services


    Giambastiani, Admiral E.P., USN, Commander, U.S. Joint forces Command

    Hill, General James T., USA, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

    Holland, General Charles R., USAF, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Giambastiani, Admiral E.P.

Hill, General James T.

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Holland, General Charles R.

Hunter, Hon. Duncan

Skelton, Hon. Ike

[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]
MFP–11 Unfinanced Requirements ($ in Millions) chart
MFP–11MILCON Unfinanced Requirements ($ in Millions) chart

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Abercrombie
Mr. Bradley
Ms. Davis
Mr. Forbes
Mr. Hayes
Mr. Miller
Mr. Ortiz
Mr. Skelton


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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2003.

    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.


    The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

    Today the committee begins its review of the state of our combatant commands. Our nine unified combatant commands is where the rubber meets the road, as they are charged with the responsibility for military operations in every region of the world and across the entire spectrum of conflict.

    This morning we will receive testimony on the posture of three of these commands, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This afternoon, we will continue with Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. And tomorrow we will focus on Northern Command and Strategic Command.

    It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses this morning. We have with us General Charles R. Holland, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; General James T. Hill, U.S. Army, Commander for U.S. Southern Command; and Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, United States Navy, Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command.
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    So gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony.

    The combatant commanders who appear before us today face a wide range of changes and challenges. Last April, major changes were made in the Unified Command Plan, altering the missions and geographic responsibilities of many of our combatant commands. At the same time, the volatile political-military situation in the world provides urgent challenges in the areas of responsibility under the purview of each of the combatant commanders before us today.

    As we heard during the testimony of the Secretary of Defense last month, this year's defense authorization request provides U.S. Special Operations Command expanded authority and an expanded budget to fight the Global War on Terrorism. And those very important words were in the Secretary's directive, that you were to support and be supported by the Commanders in Chief (CINC) in whose area you are operating, a very important change.

    General Holland, your forces have been on the forefront of the war on terrorism and will be again should there be a conflict with Iraq. So we look forward to hearing from you on your plans to use these increased resources to further SOCOM's mission.

    In Southern Command, Colombia continues to be a major source of concern. The recent crash of an aircraft carrying Department of Defense (DOD) contractors that resulted in the death of one American, one Colombian, and the capture of three other Americans by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels remains of the utmost concern.

    I look forward to hearing from General Hill on our efforts to rescue those individuals, as well as our ongoing efforts in support of Plan Colombia.
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    General Hill, thank you for being with us.

    And finally, the changes to the Unified Command Plan last year continue the process of refining the mission of Joint Forces Command. With the transfer of its geographical responsibilities to other unified commands, JFCOM is now focused solely on transformation, joint experimentation and joint doctrine.

    So, Admiral Giambastiani, we look forward to your views on how these changes have affected your ability to accomplish your missions.

    So let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he wants to make.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be viewed in the hard copy.]


    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And let me join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming General Holland, General Hill, Admiral Giambastiani. And thank each of you for joining us.

    This year there were major changes made to the Unified Command Plan. Now, these changes realign missions and geographical responsibilities. These changes are entirely appropriate, in my opinion, given new challenges the nation faces. And I hope each of you will give us a sense of how these changes affect your command and what remains to be done.
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    I raise this question, Mr. Chairman, as to a point in history, and maybe each of you could make reference to the Damocles sword that hangs over our country. In my opinion, this is the most potentially dangerous time that America is experiencing since the dark days of 1942. I appreciate any comments you might have on that.

    Now, General Holland, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have played a critical role in the Global War on Terrorism in almost every country we read about. Special Operations Forces are taking on a variety of missions and continue to be in great demand. I worry that your forces are being spread too thin.

    I support the increase in money and personnel reflected in the budget request for the Special Operations Command, but I am concerned, General, that your end-strength increase is coming from the overly strained United States Army. Both sets of missions are critical to our national interest.

    The most responsible solution, in my opinion, is to increase the overall end-strength, not to cannibalize the existing force.

    General Hill, as you know, I remain concerned about American military involvement in Colombia. Last year Congress expanded the military's role from counter-drug to counterterrorism support.

    Now, since that time, as the chairman has pointed out, one United States government employee has been killed and three others kidnapped. And I would appreciate your views as to whether we are sinking deeper into that conflict. I would also like to understand how we will define success in Colombia and how we will keep limits on the level of American involvement.
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    Admiral Giambastiani, last year's changes to the Unified Command Plan had a great impact on the mission that you command, the Joint Forces Command. I hope you will explain to our committee the benefits of these changes in terms of our ability to fight as a joint force. I will underline ''as a joint force.''

    It is important that we understand your plans for joint experimentation. History has taught that joint warfighting is a powerful concept, and the pending war in Iraq will almost certainly be conducted in more joint fashion than the last Persian Gulf war. Joint experimentation holds the key to building on lessons we learn from joint warfare today. And I am confident your efforts in this area will provide future benefits to our military.

    So to each of you gentlemen, we thank you for your attendance, your participation, and for the wonderful work that we have seen you do through the years for our country.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Missouri.

    And I think it would be appropriate at this time to ask the gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh, to comment, before we get into statements, on the tragedy that recently occurred in his district.

    Mr. McHugh.
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    Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

    And I appreciate the indulgence of the chair, the ranking member and the committee, as well our distinguished panelists here this morning.

    As I am sure many, if not most, of you have heard, yesterday, at Fort Drum, New York, home of the 10th Mountain Division, during a troop insertion training exercise a Black Hawk helicopter went down, which, at this point, has resulted in the loss of the lives of 11 brave men and women of that great division.

    And I suppose it is particularly appropriate, as has already been described here this morning, we find ourselves as a nation forward deployed in so many places, complicated and compounded by the potential of an even bigger battle situation in Iraq, that we always remember that while the forward deployed have our hearts and our thoughts with them, that even during training and during their day-to-day activities, back here at home our brave men and women in uniform of all the branches of the services place their lives on the line.

    I would simply ask today, Mr. Chairman, as we go about this very important business discussing these critical issues with our distinguished panelists, that all of us remember that primary challenge that we on this great committee have to do everything in our power to provide for those troops wherever they may be. And to also please keep in your thoughts and your prayers the families, the loved ones and the neighbors of the Fort Drum North Country community who today mourn the passing of 3 of 11 very valiant soldiers and warriors.

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    With that, I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    And I think that is an appropriate preface to this testimony of this panel, which has such an important and critical role in seeing to it that our forces are able to prevail and survive in this, what is becoming an increasingly difficult environment.

    So, General Holland, thank you for being with us and thanks for your service to our country. The floor is yours.


    General HOLLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of Congress. It is an honor and privilege to be here today to report to you on the state of the United States Special Operations Command.

    The CHAIRMAN. And, General Holland, also, before you begin, without objection, all the prepared statements will be incorporated into the record. So you can summarize or give the entire statement, but it will be, at any rate, taken into the record.

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. And with your permission, I will do exactly that. I will submit the longer written statement for the record.

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    Your United States military is on the offensive against terrorism around the globe, and Special Operations forces are at the tip of the spear.

    Last year, over 7,000 special operators were deployed to over 150 countries, providing regional commanders with a force unsurpassed in both agility and lethality.

    The recent success of our men and women during Operation Enduring Freedom have given the world a much clearer insight into the skills and dedication of America's Special Operations Forces. Through your support, we continue to get even better.

    The Special Operations Command will now transform from being primarily a force provider to the geographic commands to adding the additional mission of planning and executing combat operations against terrorist organizations.

    I want to stress, Mr. Chairman, that this new role as a supported command is not meant to replace or otherwise marginalize the Special Operations organizations assigned to the regional commanders. Rather it is designed to dramatically increase the efficiencies of our operations by ensuring that we cover the seams of the existing geographical boundaries in a global war against terrorism where the enemy knows no such limits.

    With this added responsibility comes additional resource requirements. And, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to report that the Department of Defense has worked very hard to ensure Special Operations Forces have what they need to get the job done. The President's budget will increase the command's annual funding by approximately $1.5 billion to $6.7 billion in fiscal year 2004.
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    The additional funding will allow us to increase procurement and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) in programs vital to the success of our force. These include the CV–22, the MH–47Gs, AC–130U gunships and the advanced delivery system and numerous other programs.

    Additionally, we will be able to meet critical force structure requirements that will support the increased effort to defeat terrorism across the globe. The Department's recognition and support of our manpower requirements will result in an end-strength increase of almost 4,000 personnel over the next five years.

    The command is also working with the Department of Defense to find funding for a much needed state-of-the-art war-fighting center to be located at our headquarters in Tampa, a facility that will afford us the highest levels of efficiency and integration when planning the war against terrorism.

    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the special operators who have made the ultimate sacrifice since September 11, 2001. These men and women, the many just like them who have been wounded, and all of the special operators who put their lives on the line around the world, are some of America's truest heroes.

    Yesterday, I talked to Sergeant 1st Class Mike McLaney, a Special Forces soldier who lost part of his right arm in Afghanistan in December 2001. I had visited him in the hospital in Germany that same month, and had been inspired by him and his wife Judy's fervent desire for him to stay in the Army.
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    Well, after recovering from his wounds, in June he reenlisted for an indefinite period of time, which will take him to at least a 20-year retirement. He is serving with the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. And he will take the Army physical readiness test later this year. He already can do more than 50 push-ups using a special attachment on his arm to level himself.

    Sergeant 1st Class McLaney and his wife remain adamant in their desire for him to continue with his military service.

    Mr. Chairman, with people like these I know we will succeed.

    I would like to close by acknowledging the great support that you and the other committee members have given our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians, and thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to addressing your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Holland can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. General Holland, thank you.

    General Hill.

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    General HILL. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to provide my assessment of United States Southern Command and my assigned area of responsibility.

    I appreciate greatly the support of this committee, and that you have provided to the United States Southern Command soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and civilian personnel, whom I am so privileged to command.

    Since taking command seven months ago, I have traveled extensively throughout the region to include nine times to Colombia. These visits have provided me important insights to the region, its leaders and to the challenges and equally important opportunities that lie before us in Latin America and the Caribbean.

    The expectations derived from democratic and free-market reform seemingly so available at the close of the last century are not being realized at the dawn of this one. This, along with economic stagnation and endemic corruption, are significantly challenging many of the hemisphere's fledgling democracies.

    Latin America and the Caribbean is an increasingly important region to the United States. We have strong and growing economic, strategic, security and cultural ties to the region. We conduct more than $360 billion worth of trade with Latin America and the Caribbean; 49 cents out of every dollar spent in the region is on imported goods and services from the United States. The region provides more oil to the United States than all the Persian Gulf countries combined.
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    Currently, Latin Americans are the largest and fastest-growing minority in the United States, and by 2050 one out of every four U.S. residents will be of Latin American descent.

    On the negative side, nearly all of the cocaine and much of the heroin consumed in this country comes from the region, significantly contributing to the deaths of 19,000 people in the United States.

    The threats to security and stability in the region do not come from warring or antagonistic countries or neighbors. Overall, the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean generally have friendly relations. In fact, it is the least militarized region of the world.

    The threats instead come from the destabilizing and corrupting influences of international terrorism, narco-terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking and rampant crime.

    Although nowhere are these transnational threats more graphically and brutally active than in Colombia, they have pervasively and corrosively spread throughout all reaches of Latin America and the Caribbean.

    We therefore cannot focus our efforts exclusively on Colombia, and we in Southern Command are not.

    As I mentioned in my statement, I am proud to say that the men and women of the United States Southern Command do a great deal to further our nation's interest in this hemisphere with very few resources and a modest presence.
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    We are, however, at a critical point where the progress in eliminating conflict, reducing tension and establishing democracy throughout the region could be at risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. The continued progress as a region of democracy and prosperity is of paramount importance to our national security.

    I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and I look forward to your questions, sir.

    [The prepared statement of General Hill can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.

    Admiral Giambastiani.


    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Chairman, before I begin a short summary of my written testimony, I would like to extend also my deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of the brave soldiers from Fort Drum who were injured or paid the ultimate sacrifice last night. This tragic accident serves as a reminder of both the challenge and commitment that all of our service members willingly face every day to keep our nation free. We are all proud of their service and pray for their families and loved ones.

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    Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify for my first time today as Commander of the United States Joint Forces Command. Joining me today and seated just behind me is the senior enlisted member of the United States Joint Forces Command and my trusted adviser, Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka, United States Army.

    My message to the committee today is that Joint Forces Command, following the leadership of President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, is focused every day on executing the top three priorities of the Department of Defense: Successfully pursuing the Global War on Terrorism, strengthening our joint warfighting capabilities and transforming the joint force.

    Joint Forces Command has key roles to play in each of these tasks. It is leaning forward in all of them so that our homeland can be defended, our allies assured, our potential adversaries are dissuaded and deterred, and those who would challenge our peace and freedom swiftly and decisively defeated.

    Exercising combatant command over nearly 1.1 million soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines based in the continental United States, Joint Forces Command is responsible, with our service components, for providing trained and ready forces needed by all of our regional combatant commanders.

    In this era of violent horizons, the call for these forces has been increasing, and Joint Forces Command is working to provide them when and where required.

    As examples, forces assigned to Joint Forces Command comprise almost three-quarters of the forces engaged in operations in Afghanistan, over 50 percent of the forces building in the Persian Gulf region, and 90 percent of the nation's forces deployed worldwide in support of the war on terrorism.
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    Yet it is not enough merely to manage the deployment of our joint force, as large and as complex a task as that proves to be. Those forces need training and they need capabilities to do their job swiftly and effectively. That ties our contribution to the Global War on Terrorism directly to our drive to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities.

    Joint Forces Command is helping to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities now. In our role as the joint trainer, we deploy on average 100 observer trainers and senior mentors—these are retired three-and four-star officers—who assist us every day in support of all of the other regional and combatant commanders' training requirements.

    We have been able to flex significantly in the last six months to support critical mission rehearsals for commanders such as General Tommy Franks, Commander of the Central Command.

    These exercises and rehearsals have been critical to their mission readiness and have proved invaluable to General Franks, for example, as a warfighting commander.

    In the same period, we have helped stand up and train four separate joint task forces for employment in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, off the Horn of Africa, and most recently, in Southwest Asia.

    No other organization can match Joint Forces Command's expertise in joint task force training and command and control. That expertise is fully employed in support of current operations.
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    This training constitutes one of the United States' most potent asymmetric advantages: Highly trained forces with superb command-and-control organizations, equipment and procedures.

    As a final note on strengthening joint warfighting capabilities, we have been aggressive in rapidly exploiting results of our joint experimentation campaign for use by forces in the field.

    As just one example, Combined Joint Task Force (JTF)-180 in Afghanistan used the training and equipment and procedures provided to them in preparation for Millennium Challenge 2002, our major exercise and experimentation event last year, to conduct their highly successful campaign in Afghanistan.

    We continue to look for opportunities to convert experimental results into quick win capabilities for the joint force.

    This robust experimentation and the capabilities it produces is a result of our ongoing and accelerating drive to transform the joint force.

    Having shed the operational burdens, Mr. Chairman, as you have mentioned, of a geographic area of responsibility, as directed by President Bush in Unified Command Plan 2002, Joint Forces Command is liberated to focus its efforts on transforming the joint force.

    In effect, we have lost a geographic area of responsibility, but have gained a more challenging and exciting area of responsibility: The future.
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    To confront the transformation challenges posed by the future, an uncertain future populated by asymmetric threats, weapons of mass destruction, transnational actors, regional powers and potential peer competitors, Joint Forces Command has embarked on a wide-ranging and robust campaign of joint experimentation.

    Building on the insights gained from events such as Millennium Challenge 2002 and working with a wide array of partners, including the services, defense agencies, other federal agencies and departments, academia, industry and close allies, Joint Forces Command is tackling an array of future issues that will define the way our joint force will transform.

    We are proud of the variety, intellectual rigor and concentration capabilities that this campaign exhibits. We are also excited that it is providing a much-needed joint context for the experimentation and concept developments of our Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force partners. It will also form the basis for multinational transformation with both our longstanding NATO allies and other close allies around the world.

    In addition, experimentation and concept development, which produces the intellectual capital our joint force will need for the future, Joint Forces Command is taking a larger role and filling a critical void in identifying joint interoperability requirements, especially in the area of joint battle management command and control.

    Building on our previous integration and interoperability functions and leveraging our expertise in joint task force training, we look forward to working with the services to provide command-and-control solutions both near and long-term so that our combatant commanders will use them.
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    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, since taking command last October, I have worked hard to learn as much as I can about Joint Forces Command. The command has worked even harder to provide critical capabilities to our deploying joint forces.

    I have visited every subordinate command of Joint Forces Command. I have traveled with Command Sergeant Major Ripka to visit troops, just as you have around the world, including trips to Bosnia, Afghanistan and throughout the Persian Gulf.

    I have been impressed, awed even, by the troops' service, devotion and resolve. I have been uplifted by their morale, confidence and good cheer. And I can report to you that your support, as well as that of Congress and the American people, has borne fruit in the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led joint force that I have ever seen in my professional career.

    I consider it a privilege to serve with these young men and women at this critical time in our nation's history.

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience and attention. I will be pleased to answer your questions, sir.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you very much, Admiral, and let me just start with you.
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    General Tommy Franks, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, obviously running the operation in theater. It is an operation that involves all of our forces, and you are the joint operations commander. Give us a little description of how you work with General Franks?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, we have a very, very good working relationship. On a day-to-day basis, in addition to being a joint force provider, as I mentioned, in sending a significant number of forces, we generally run and operate for him, as his support mechanism, two major joint force exercises a year in direct support of him. In other words, he is what we call in the military, ''the supported commander,'' and I am the supporting with my staff.

    In the case of a major demonstration, if you will, also a rehearsal, an exercise called Internal Look last December, we were able to support him. Frankly, we had upwards of 350 people from Joint Forces Command directly deployed or supporting him from Suffolk, Virginia at our Joint Warfighting Center. We did this on fairly short notice and it was quite successful. We have supported him in other exercises.

    In addition, we have provided him with prototyping equipment such as a joint en-route mission planning system that we put on his aircraft so that he could be in constant communications with his commanders while he was transiting from Florida to the theater forward and when he was coming back to the United States. He had both classified e-mail ability—what we call collaboration techniques where he could do collaborative work, his staff could. He also had unclassified, secure voice, video-teleconferencing. All of that was available from his aircraft. That is not normal for most others.

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    The CHAIRMAN. So what you are doing is you are enhancing a CINC's capability to lead and command the supportive elements from the different services.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Correct, sir.

    In fact, I might add, if you talk to the two gentlemen on my right, on your left, I am a supporting combatant commander for these two gentlemen, also. We work very closely together on a routine basis.

    The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you, the best, shortest distance between two points is a straight line, so when the balloon goes up and General Franks is in an operations mode, he needs to be able to have that straight line between himself and his subordinates, whether they are Marines, Army, Navy, Air Force. What is your role at that point?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Our role is to continue to provide him whatever he needs. For example, if he needs additional forces, he will make a request to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman. The chairman and the Secretary, on the Secretary's approval, for example, will approve this request for forces. And generally, if it is for conventional forces, they normally come out of the Joint Forces Command continental based forces, and we send them forward as we are doing right now.

    In addition, he may ask us to help him stand up a joint task force. We have just finished doing that twice in the last three months. The Horn of Africa, as I mentioned; and also, another joint task force that we stood up just recently.

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    Our job is to provide him whatever he needs, when he needs it, as soon as he needs it, and to try to anticipate that. If anybody is in a fight, we do not hesitate.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Obviously, part of your role is to ensure, as the guy who is supposed to enforce and expedite jointness, to make sure we are not reinventing the wheel and duplicating efforts in the services, which has often been a problem.

    It is one I remembered as a freshman, when we had the same contractor sit at that witness table and inform us that at the same time he had a weapon systems program going for the Air Force and one for your Navy with one thin wall in between them, precisely the same program, getting paid by both services. And of course, you have got an array of situations that are somewhat less ridiculous than that, but nonetheless, somewhat duplicative of effort and resources.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman? Would you yield?

    The CHAIRMAN. Be happy to yield to the gentleman.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I understand where you are going. I do not understand. Who is in charge? Is not that the question you are asking?

    The CHAIRMAN. No, it is not. Obviously, Tommy Franks is in charge, but Tommy Franks, the General who is running the operation, the CINC, if we had, for example, a conflict in Iraq, has the various elements, whether they are Marine elements, Army elements, Air Force, Navy, responding directly to him.
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    The Joint Command, at that point, is kind of an enabler, from what I understand with Admiral Giambastiani's testimony, who tries to make sure that you have the best capability for the CINC to communicate, for example, with his components, with his subordinate commands and make sure that they have all of the equipment that they need for good command and control, intelligence and all these other areas.

    The question I was getting at, Mr. Abercrombie, is at one point you have got to make sure you do not get in the way also, and that the Joint Command itself does not become in itself a middleman, if you will, between the guy who is running the show and the people that have to respond to him very quickly.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just to follow that up. What I would tell you is, is that you have explained it well. In the military, we have one term, Congressman Abercrombie; we turn over operational control of those forces to the receiving combatant commander.

    So in every one of these deployments, we physically take all of the units that come out of Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command or anywhere when we turn them over to a combatant commander, and we turn over operational control and they are fully under that combatant commander's day-to-day operational control.

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. I will have more questions. But we need to get down the line and let our members get into this, because you have got some great information for us this morning.
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    The gentleman from Missouri?

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a good number of questions, and I will ask them toward the end of the hearing, if I may.

    But, Admiral Giambastiani used the phrase a while ago: Critical time in our nation's history. And each of you more or less are historians because of your past experience and your service. In my opinion this is the most dangerous time our country has experienced since the very difficult days of the 1942. I will ask each of you if you agree or disagree, and give me your reasons why.

    General Holland.

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. No, I agree wholeheartedly. The amount of uncertainty that is in the world today, when you compare it to previous years when we were able to plan against an adversary, has completely changed the landscape. And as we take a look at our people in Special Operations, we have a phrase that we have coined, and that phrase is that, you know, we train for certainty, but we educate for uncertainty.

    And what is important today is that the men and women we bring in the forces today, especially in this uncertain environment that we are operating in, need to be thinking out of the box on how we can do things more innovative than we have in the past.

    And at the same time we are up against an adversary who does not use the traditional ways of waging war. And so, we need to understand that, and then continue to take that on to stay a step ahead in this particular fight, especially the fight on the war on terrorism.
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    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

    General Hill.

    General HILL. Sir, I agree with your analogy with 1942. For all of the reasons that we face in the Middle East and we face on the Korean peninsula, we also face in other areas of the world. And I think that what has changed is the ability for the terrorists to provide funding for themselves; in my case, narco-terrorism and its support of international terrorism through the drug trade.

    I think that is a pervasive problem throughout Latin America. It is a growing problem. And it will continue to confront us with issues as we go down the road, making our lives more dangerous.

    Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Giambastiani.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Congressman Skelton, I would describe that interim period between 1942 and today as what one of my former chiefs of service, Admiral Frank Kelso, described it as: The good old days. And he did not call it the good old days because he liked them so much, but from a planning perspective they were good old days because they were easy to plan for. We had a known threat. It was much easier to deal with it over a long period of time. We were making marginal adjustments from a year-to-year, day-to-day basis.

    Today, as I mentioned in my formal statement, we have a very, very unusual time in that we are dealing with asymmetric threats, weapons that have significantly more capacity to do destruction than we have ever seen before. The scope, depth and the range of these weapons is truly significant.
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    So there is no question that this is a very dangerous time. And I cannot say more than that. It is one that is most uncertain. Threats come from all directions.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    The gentleman from New Jersey, who is the chairman of the Unconventional and Terrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Saxton?

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

    And thank each of you for what you are doing.

    Earlier this morning we had a briefing over in a little room next door. And we had a gentleman who is the head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Dr. Steve Younger. And Dr. Younger reminded me of something that I have been hearing fairly frequently in the last year or so. And that occurred when I asked him what we could do to help him. What do you need? We oftentimes ask that question, because we, in our desire to be helpful, need the answer to that question.

    ''Well,'' he said, ''you have asked an interesting question, because I believe that we are resourced pretty well. We have the capability of developing customized tools that our forces can use from time to time.'' He said, ''What we really need is more information about where the bad guys are.''
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    And a week or so ago I heard the Secretary of Defense talk about expanding the role of the—the expanded need in intelligence capability and talked about beefing up military defense intelligence.

    And a month or so ago I heard Vice President Cheney talk about that need, and I remember seeing a briefing not long ago where—probably a special ops briefer, because I have been spending a lot of time with Special Forces—had a diagram with a couple of triangles on it. And it demonstrated the intelligence capability that we needed during the Cold War, which is the small point, and the robust military force that we needed to meet the threat back during the Cold War.

    And had another triangle which was just the opposite. It showed the need for a robust intelligence capability today, but perhaps a smaller force to take care of an equally important, but smaller force in terms of the people who are in the bad guys' camp that we want to go find.

    And so, General Holland, from your point of view—and let me ask the other two gentlemen to comment on this as well—explain to us, if you would, the need that Steve Younger was talking about this morning, as he sees it, and tell us how you see that need, as well.

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. In any type of operation intel becomes the very basic piece that you need to develop a course of action that will be effective. When we are talking about taking down a nation it is completely different than having a surgical strike against one particular, very specific target. Obviously, intel at that point needs to be a lot more refined.
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    We make a comment in Special Operations is that when you take a look at intel, you know, do not just give me a town, a city, an area; what we need is an address. And whenever you talk about needing very refined and more detailed intel, then it drives that requirement back into the intel organizations.

    And today that is exactly where the department is coming from—is how do we bring all of our intel forces together; how do we make them more focused and dedicated to what we need to do to be successful on a target?

    General HILL. The use of intelligence and the ability of intelligence to influence an operation I do not think can be overstated. It becomes increasingly even more difficult if you are, in my case, for example, working to share intelligence with a foreign nation; in my case Colombia. And then having their ability to take that intelligence and use that intelligence to affect their operations against the forces that are tearing Colombia apart.

    So whatever we can do to improve that—and I work daily on this in Colombia and in other regions of the area that we share intelligence with, that we have intelligence-sharing operations with—and we will continue to refine that as we go along.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. It is hard for me to add much to what you have heard from General Holland and General Hill, other than to say that it is, in fact, to emphasize, it underpins all our operations, is to have reasonable and good intelligence. But in general, many of our organizations we are today trying to drive them to network information together so that we better utilize all of these different agencies.
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    For example, I have one outfit at Joint Forces Command called the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. It helps in targeting. I have two of my individuals detailed down to Special Operations Command for just this reason, to provide intel. I think you will find that this organization, I believe, will help us better bring together all of these different disparate elements within the Defense Department.

    The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield on that question?

    I thank the gentleman. I thank him for his hard work in this area.

    Do you feel, Admiral, that there is an adequate spread, if you will, of this intelligence and availability across the services and across the warfighting spectrum? You think we have got stovepiping, some of the same problems that we have run into in the homeland security analysis?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, I am heartened to see how much networking is going on between these various organizations that are partnering and asking one agency to work in a certain area and another one to concentrate in this. And this is based on recent visits, for example, to the Army's Intelligence Command.

    The CHAIRMAN. Well, but aside from being heartened, do you think they have done the job? I mean, if you have a piece of relevant intelligence that is developed by any one of the receptors, if you will, is that immediately availed to the relevant warfighters? I mean, unless you can say that mission has accomplished, being heartened is not going to help you.
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    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Right. I cannot answer the question because I am not an ultimate user of the information in that I am a joint force provider at my command, and our job is to help provide that to others. I think the best two to ask at this panel are the two to my right.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. But I would say that if there was one area where you would really make your mark it is the jointness, if you will, of intelligence.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Correct.

    The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't you agree?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes. And that is why I think, frankly, this move to bring these disparate elements together in a more coordinated way is good and it is the right thing to do.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you.

    Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may just conclude, just to make an observation.

    Seems to me that we have several issues with regard to intelligence. One issue is that the intelligence community that existed ten years ago, which was the result of the activities that we needed to take part in during the Cold War, was a capable intelligence community that was geared to meet that threat and find out about that threat.
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    The second part of the problem is that during the decade of the 1990s, for some reason or another our collective mentality told us that we did not need that robust threat, to gather information on the threat of the Cold War, because it did not exist anymore, but we did not identify the new threat. And so, we felt comfortable in permitting our intelligence capability to relax some.

    The third part of the problem is that today we have—we not only relaxed our intelligence capability during the 1990s, but we now recognize that we have a threat that is much different than the old threat—and so this is an issue. No matter how good our fighters are, if they cannot find the target, it is pretty hard to engage in a successful fight. And I think this is an issue which I did not fully—and I am not saying I fully understand it now, but it is an issue that our committee and others really need to focus on because it is the crux of many of the problems that we face today.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Chairman, I might add one last comment on this. In regards to joint warfighting, that is how we organize a joint task force headquarters and how the commander operates with this task force, we are experimenting with and prototyping ways of bringing situational awareness. In other words, operational intel in from all of these myriad of organizations to try to synthesize it for the commander so it makes his job easier. And that is a significant effort within our experimentation program.

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

    The gentleman from South Texas, Mr. Ortiz.
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    Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to welcome the witnesses this morning.

    General Hill, the recent events in Colombia, including the capture of the DOD contractor—also the role that contract personnel are playing in our military efforts. Current information that we have been able to pick up indicates that we might have up to one contractor for every ten military personnel in the war zone. This is information that has been given to me. I am just wondering whether this is correct information.

    Now, with this in mind, what policies are being implemented to protect contract personnel in South America? And do we have a cost estimate for these policies.

    And not only the policies, but what kind of training do they go through before they are going to be sent to a war zone, like the one in Colombia? And maybe, what is the cost?

    Is it more prudent to have all military or is it advantageous to have contractors do, you know, part of the work?

    Maybe you can enlighten me on some of these questions that I have just asked.

    General HILL. Yes, Mr. Ortiz, and nice to see you again.
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    The United States military—and I cannot come close to understanding your number of one in ten—I cannot comment on that—but I would say that the United States military is relying heavily on contractors. I would not say too heavily. I would say that they are providing essential services that simply we do not have enough forces either in the active role or the reserve component role to do. That is why we take the contractors on. Sometimes it is even more appropriate for contractors to do the role than soldiers or other service members.

    In the case of the contractors that you are speaking of, they received training from their employer, Northrop Grumman. They have received training before they come into Colombia and they receive rules of engagement training and force protection training from the embassy in Bogota.

    And I would finally say that in all of those cases, those contractors recognize the risks that they are entering into, and they do so freely.

    Mr. ORTIZ. And we do have contractors, as you stated, General, all over the place now. When we look at some of the civilian workers, you know, they are under the local military commander, whether it is a base, Navy facility or whatever. But when they go there—I mean, are they under the obligation they serve under the contractor or the commander who is at this zone in Colombia, for example?

    General HILL. Sir, they take their instructions from their employer. And the employer sets down specific rules by which they do their service. They also must live by the rules that are put out to military people and to the contractors by my mil group in terms of force protection.
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    Mr. ORTIZ. You mentioned something very important, that maybe you do not have the personnel—this is why, you know, we have to depend on contractors to do some of the work. Don't you think that we might be in a position where we have to raise our end-strength because we do not have adequate personnel? And this is for all of you, maybe you can touch on that.

    General HILL. Sir, I think that, given the new threat and the new wars that we are facing, that we will need to have a mixture of forces, both active component, department of military civilians and contractors. How that appropriate mix is made will be determined over time and to the conflict that we are in.

    Mr. ORTIZ. I have some other questions, but I want to give somebody else a chance to ask.

    And, General, good to see you again.

    General HILL. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    The gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh, the chairman of the Total Forces Subcommittee.

    Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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    Gentlemen, as I said earlier, welcome. We appreciate your being here and your service.

    I am sure you heard, as I did, the distinguished ranking member make some comments about end-strength, plus-ups, et cetera, et cetera. And I certainly share, along with a number of others on this committee and in this Congress, his concern about the potential inadequacy of troops available to do the incredibly difficult jobs we have assigned to you and to them and the ever expanding jobs we have assigned to you and to them.

    But with respect to, General Holland, with respect to the increase that SOUTHCOM is scheduled to receive under the President's budget proposal, about 1,800, could you tell us a little bit about the adequacy of that number?

    Also, given the recent directive that forces under your command will have their traditional role of supported commander expanded, how do you envision those troops being utilized?

    And again, as I mentioned the first part of my question, is even a plus-up, which I am delighted—like Mr. Skelton, I hope it does not come at the expense of the rest of the Army force; but at least we are plussing up something—how that fits into your vision for your forces.

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. Let me start with your second part of the question because it drives me back to the first part, because that is where the driver is for the additional people.
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    But as the Secretary and the Department looked at Special Operations Command, how we were organized, we kind of reflected back into our past. And when we think about 1987, when Special Operations Command first stood up, there was an intent that it would have that operational role.

    However, there was a commander in the early 1990s that made a comment, because as we continued to see how we were operating, it was really as an organized train and equip providing forces to other geographic commanders to accomplish the mission. And we worked through an organization called a Theater Special Operations Command, which is that particular special operations element which is under that particular regional combatant commander.

    Because of what happened on September 11, then people said that, you know, obviously, we need to change, and part of that change that has come about is to make Special Operations Command the supported command for planning for the Global War on Terrorism. And then, at the same time, have that capability that if the Secretary of Defense chooses to keep Special Operations Command in the lead to execute, to ensure that we have the ability to accomplish that mission.

    So as a result of what the Secretary has laid out for us as our mission, then we came back to him and said, for us to be able to accomplish that mission, then we need to operationalize the headquarters of Special Operations Command; we need to expand the Theater Special Operations Command, who are providing support to the regional combatant commanders; we also need to have more equipment, especially from an aviation perspective, to have our forces forward-deployed, because we saw the importance of forces forward and forces responsive. And with that, then it drives the numbers. So the numbers that you are seeing in the increase gives us the ability to accomplish that.
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    As one good example would be for Central Command, when you look at General Franks' organization. When we went into Desert Storm, and you think about Desert Shield 1990-1991, we did not have forward-stationed forces of a Theater Special Operations Command within Central Command at that time. We never really had the resources available to be able to put people over there in a permanent status.

    Well, with the budget that we are taking forward, it will allow us, for the first time, to put those forces forward and then still have additional resources in the States to draw from to support that initiative.

    So the entire initiative and the increases have been a result of us becoming the supported commander for planning the Global War on Terrorism and then also to have the additional responsibility to be the supported commander if the Secretary of Defense decides in those cases that we should be the supported commander.

    At the same time, if the decision is made to make another regional combatant commander to be the supported commander, then we would continue with our same role of providing the forces to, say, example, General Hill, and down in Southern Command, which is exactly what we are doing today.

    Mr. MCHUGH. So this 1990 figure was the figure that you all worked up and was not some variant of the original estimate?

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. It was—along with this, I mean, we took a look at where we had stress and strain—and I know with Congressman Skelton, he had talked to me about this before—but we looked at where that we were having some concerns even on our total force and where we needed to have more robust active duty forces versus depending upon our reserve forces to carry the load.
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    And so, all the numbers that went forward were numbers that we had when Special Operations Command took forward and we got the support of the Department to go forward with those increases.

    Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I appreciate that response, and congratulations on the success there, and maybe we will try to enlist you on our battles to plus-up the other parts of the military that we think need that help, as well. But appreciate it.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to thank all three of you gentlemen for being with us today.

    General Holland, I want to start with yours.

    I have had an opportunity to visit with a number of the Special Forces folks who have served in Afghanistan and have really become of the strain it has put on the Special Forces community.

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    I guess what really caught my attention was on the day that the plane went down in Colombia; probably the most capable people for responding for that, the 3rd or the 7th, were in Afghanistan, even though they are almost all Spanish speakers and many of them thoroughly familiar with Latin America.

    I also know that probably somewhere in the world on that day there was a Special Forces team at a relatively safe place doing some training.

    The question that I am leading up to is, are they the only people in your mind in the Army who are capable of these training missions because—and I really had hoped to ask that question of the group in Arauca; did not get too good of a chance to do so on my most recent visit.

    When you think of all the units in the military, is that the highest and best use for the Special Forces, are these training missions? I understand we had a period in the early to mid-1990s of relative peace around the world and we had the freedom to do things like that; but is that really the case right now?

    On my limited time, General Hill, I am still—number one, I want to say I am pleased very much to hear in our private conversations that you are going to continue to have the Americans in a training mode in Colombia rather than an active combatant role.

    As you know, I am very much in favor of the troop cap, because I take my duties as responsibly as you take yours. My duty as a congressman is to decide where and when we go to war. And I do not want this nation stumbling into a war without Congress having the vote and the responsibility for that war. If it goes great, wonderful. If it goes bad, shame on us.
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    And in particular, the deployment of 3,000 people to the Philippines in the past couple of days without any congressional vote or determination troubles me. I think that the Constitution says we ought to make that decision, right or wrong.

    Having said all that, can you continue to live with the troop cap that are presently in place in Colombia? Because if we get any bigger than that, I think it ought to come from a vote of Congress and not just one man making that decision, being the President or the Secretary of Defense. I think it ought to be the vote of the elected representatives of this body and the people.

    General HILL. Do you want to do me first, or do you want to do General Holland first, sir?

    Mr. TAYLOR. I have only got five minutes——

    General HILL. I will do your troop cap issue, Mr. Taylor.

    At the present time, we operate well within the troop cap. And at the present time, I see no reason to raise the troop cap. And clearly, by the law and the statute, we would have to come back to Congress in order to do that. And I understand that.

    I am very appreciative, though, of the language in the law that allows us to move people over the Plan Colombia number of 400 in terms of search and rescue, as we are doing with a small number of forces today trying to assist the Colombians in rescuing the three Americans held hostage by the FARC.
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    That is the short end of the answer. I would also like to go back to the one thing you said to General Holland. You said the most responsive folks to rescue the Colombians were the Special Forces—excuse me, the hostages. That would be true if you knew exactly where they were and you had them in country. But the most responsive folks in order to rescue those hostages in Colombia were Colombians and they were incredibly responsive. They were on the scene within 35 minutes. Unfortunately the plane touched down in absolutely the worst place it could have touched down and they were taken captive too soon.

    Mr. TAYLOR. General, as a—well, I will get you later.

    As a follow-up, you had mentioned that there could be some lawsuits from the families of the contract employees who were captured. Are those lawsuits directed towards our nation or towards the contractor?

    General HILL. As I understand it right now, sir, one of the families has engaged a lawyer that I know of for sure. And in my knowledge, it is directed toward Northrop Grumman.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, thank you, sir.

    General Holland, getting back to the Special Forces——

    General HOLLAND. Sir, on the——

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    Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Are they uniquely qualified to perform that training mission? Or are there other units that could do that?

    General HOLLAND. Okay, that is a great question to ask, because it is exactly what we are addressing with the combatant commanders, you know, as we speak.

    We are looking across the world in all of the different types of missions that we have taken on. Obviously we want to have the right to refusal in certain countries, because it is important for our people, with their languages skills and the culture, to develop those relationships which are so important when we get involved with a crisis. Because all of us know we are not there alone.

    I always make a comment about Special Operations: We are joint, we are combined and we are interagency. And that coalition relationship is very important for our success, whether it be a humanitarian, whether it be a crisis. And so, we need to continue to develop that.

    But that does not say that in every circumstance around the globe that we have to do the training.

    Now, it might be that you would want the Special Forces and the capabilities that we bring to bear to be the people to develop the program of instruction, we call it a POI, and get it started and then at some point then transition. And I will tell you a good example. We did exactly that with the Georgia train and equip program. On 15 December we transferred that role to the Marines. And they have now picked up that responsibility.
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    We are also looking at training the Afghan national army, which we have been doing. We have completed at least six battalions, and we have started the seventh battalion in training. We are looking at some point, we need to transition that.

    So your question is a good one. It is one that we are actively pursuing. And we are working very closely with the combatant commanders to come up with a solution.

    The CHAIRMAN. And if the gentleman would yield for just a minute, let me just let members know that we have got three votes, a 15-minute vote and then a couple of suspensions. So we will carry this on down until we are about five minutes from showtime here. And I would ask the staff to let us know when that happens. And we will break when we are about five minutes out.

    General HILL. Could I add one comment to——

    The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Mr. Taylor continues to be recognized.

    General HILL. I am actively exploring throughout my region the ability to train forces and to work with other nations with forces other than Special Operations Forces. We can in fact do many of those missions with other people, and we are looking to do that.

    In the case of Arauca, General Holland and I both concurred that this was a mission that was uniquely needed for Special Operations Forces because of the area that they were in and the mission that they were undergoing.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I want to thank all three of you for your service to our nation and all of the commands that you represent.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    Ms. Davis.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

    General Holland, I have a Marine Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team (FAST) team in my district. And I have heard talk around that there may be an integration of the Marine Corps with SOCOM. Could you tell us if that is being considered?

    And also, could you tell us something about the availability of maneuver and training space available to SOCOM and how the encroachment issues have affected it, if it has?

    General HOLLAND. That is a great question, and it is very appropriate, because as soon as I get back to Special Operations Command, the Marine Commandant, Mike Hagee, is coming to visit with me.

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    As you probably saw in some previous announcements that General Jones and I had come up with a memorandum of agreement between our two Commands, between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commander of Special Operations Command.

    We are continuing the initiatives to build the trust and confidence within our people. And we are also trying to see where are the areas that the Marine Corps, with the great capability that they have, where they can add mutual support to what we are doing in Special Operations Command.

    Probably the best example was exactly what happened on 15 December on the Georgia train and equip program.

    When Congressman Taylor asked that question, I immediately flashed to that, because it is not only important that we see that there were no seams as we transferred that responsibility from Special Operations to Marines, so it shows that, yes, there are other people that can do the training, but it also shows how SOCOM, Special Operations Command can work in conjunction with the services to come up with a success story. And that is a good success story.

    We will continue to explore where we do acquisition, where can we share what each other is doing. What are we doing when their forces deploy at different places around the world to do the link-up so that they understand what is on the Special Operations charter from a regional combatant commander; and then, as they come into the theater, you know, what can we do to add mutual support?

    And then, probably the more recently that you have heard about is that we are going to start a train-up. As a special warfare team goes forward on a six-month deployment, we are going to have Marines. And right now it is about 80 to 85 people that will go along with our sea-air-land (SEAL) teams as they forward for a six-month deployment. And as a result of that, then we will come back and take a look at where are those areas where we continue to add mutual support to each other.
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    So right now, everything is open. We will continue to look at it, but we definitely know that SOF is not entire of itself. The SOF needs services support, we need the support of the interagency, and we need the support of our coalition partners for us to be successful in our endeavors around the world.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. About the question on training?

    General HOLLAND. The encroachment?

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Right. And the availability of areas to train.

    General HOLLAND. The concern—and we have put together a large report that came forward. And if you have not seen that, I will provide that to you from our command.

    But obviously encroachment on our training areas is a concern that not just we from Special Operations Command, but it is a concern that we have throughout the services. Because our ability to be ready when we are asked to go to a fight is all based upon how realistic the training we were able to accomplish, and if that training was able to be conducted as a full mission profile versus doing segments at one place and going to another range and doing something else.

    So the importance of us is having ranges where we can do full mission profiles, take our wide range of capabilities and be able to exercise our people.
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    And ranges are always going to be something that will be a point of contention. We will continue to do everything we can from our perspective to ensure that we go by the laws and the environmental impact of all those; but at the same time we need to also have places where we can truly train our people to a level that they need to be trained.

    And I will provide the copy of our report to you. And if you want that included in the record, I can include that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, General, and thank you, gentlemen. It sounds to me like all of our services are doing well to work together. And I appreciate the job that all of you are doing. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Why don't we break at this point, and we will be back after this little roll of votes here.


    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes?

    Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I, too, would like to associate myself with the comments of my colleagues in thanking you three gentlemen for the great work that you are doing.

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    And in particularly, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to, at the risk of ruining General Hill's professional career and maybe his reputation, he and I went to grammar school together in El Paso a few years back. So it is good to have a good friend come back.

    And back then, I like to tell people, Mr. Chairman, that we used to be in the playground talking about what we wanted to do. He always said that he wanted to be a great general in the United States military. I always told him I wanted to run away and work in a circus. I think we have both fulfilled——


    We took a long time in getting here, but we got here.

    I wanted to follow up with all three of you gentlemen on a question that our ranking member asked about this being the most dangerous period in our history. And I guess the obvious question for me is, what are the things that we need to be doing to support the challenges that you face?

    And I say that with the thought in mind that throughout the history of this we faced many challenges in many different parts of the world. But I have got to think that today's challenge is particularly important because it is an unconventional threat that we are facing. And, you know, it requires an unconventional response, which means we have to really be thoughtful in how we prepare, not so much for the challenges that have occurred such as occurred in 9/11, but what those that are trying to attack us want to do in subsequent attacks on this country.
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    And then the last part of that is the kinds of forces, or the kinds of training, kinds of equipment, and those kinds of things that have to enter into the equation.

    And I was just curious to comment from all three of you in how we can be helpful to help with your preparation and understanding the kind of threat that we face as a country today.

    General HILL. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. I think that is a great question. And let me put it from a SOUTHCOM perspective.

    I think that the mere fact that you are asking the question is a great statement, because what happens is there is an understanding between the military and the Congress that supports the military, because that is in fact your job, you have got it right here in front of your podium, a recognition that there are threats to the United States that were out there today that were not out there 20 years ago. Probably were out there 20 years ago and we did not notice them because there were other, bigger threats. That is first and foremost.

    The second is to continue to support the American military in the way that this committee has and the Congress has over the years. Even as you differ in opinions, policy opinions, in fact the committee has always been the staunch supporters of the American military and the personnel that support this great country and serve this great country.

    The threats to the United States from SOUTHCOM do come at us from a different direction. And the first and foremost in my opinion is drugs and the money that the drugs supply to the narco-terrorists, who in fact then move that money in varying degrees through various apparatuses into other international terrorist organizations, and we are fueling, through the drug trade, international terrorism.
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    Finally, I would say to you on this committee in a specific instance for how can you help Southern Command. We have asked to come back to the Congress, the Department of Defense has, for continued expanded authorities to continue to break the nexus between drugs and counterterrorism. In point of fact they are one in the same—you cannot continue to draw the line between what is counter-drugs and what is counterterrorism, and we must be allowed to fight them with both our hands.

    Thank you very much.

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. I will just jump on the bandwagon; exactly what General Hill had mentioned. I think the fact that we have recognized that times are changed, there is uncertainty, even the American people's awareness is even far more aware than what they have been in the past, will definitely help us in the right direction.

    I am reminded that during my trip in Afghanistan each time that I have traveled, I have talked to our soldiers, sailors and airmen from Special Operations Command and it always comes back to the question, ''We understand, sir, we have the military might and there is the political will, but what about the American people?''

    Our people understand the importance of their job. They will serve 24-7 around the world. They realize when a deployment order comes in that their reason for being is the reason that they raised their right hand, that they would support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic. I think that domestic piece has a little different flavor today than what it did in past years.
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    But it seems like the question always comes back, ''What about the American people?''

    So continues to stand behind our people as they are forward, and the other part is that you see with our budget that is coming forward the Department also has recognized this term about uncertainty, and we have had the additional resources that we gave been plussed up to handle this particular threat.

    So we appreciate your support on that endeavor.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Just a footnote, Congressman Reyes. I would add that how you can help us is support us as we look at the different force mixes that occur within the services and in the joint force overall.

    And what I mean by that is, in the homeland defense area, we have created a number of different units; for example, quick reaction forces, rapid reaction forces. There is a number of other joint task forces that support now the Northern Command. And we are trying to relieve forces like Charlie, Holland's Special Forces and Special Operations Forces, so that they can focus on the external war on terror, and we will use conventional forces to, for example, do training.

    One of the things you did not hear earlier is that the free Iraqi force training that is being done in Tazar, Hungary is actually being done by all conventional forces. That, normally, as he explained to you in the Georgia case, would have been done with special forces, and, of course, in the Georgia case it was turned over to Marines, which are conventional forces. But in the case of Tazar, Hungary, to relieve any pressure that we had in the take-up of additional responsibilities, we use conventional forces to do this.
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    So if you would help support us in this drive to equalize the amount of work that we have got across the force, that would be useful to us.

    Thank you, sir.

    Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    And the gentleman, Mr. Reyes, was perhaps the most successful Border Patrol chief in our history, and his district is where JTF–6 is located. And because of that, General, I thought that your comments about the integration, if you will, of the terrorist operations and narcotics operations is kind of an important fact, because that, to me, would seem to compel us to want to keep a robust JTF–6; that is, military coordinated operations to secure the border in a fairly robust state. Do you agree with that? You up-to-speed on JTF–6 and their operations there at El Paso?

    General HILL. I am, sir.

    The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about that?

    General HILL. And I think that the integrated system between the Joint Task Force-6 and my JIATF, Joint Interagency Task Force East in Key West, is a key role.

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    If you go to JIATF East, it is one of the national treasures, in my view. It is one of the few places in the country, maybe the only place in the country, where all the intelligence assets come to bear, both in terms of being able to task intelligence, receive intelligence, fuse intelligence, analyze intelligence, and then they have the operational ability to execute on that intelligence in a timely manner, and they are, in fact, the first line of defense against the drugs entering this country.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you.

    And, Silve, you may want to work, engage with SOUTHCOM on this issue at a later time here.

    Mr. REYES. I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate the support.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes?

    Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And, Admiral, I know that you know this, but some of my colleagues may not be aware that the Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center is located in Suffolk, Virginia, in the 4th District; and Suffolk is very proud to be the home of the Joint Warfighting Center. I know the chairman has visited there before and we enjoyed visiting there last summer when you had the Millennium Challenge 2002, and certainly look forward to 2004.
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    Unfortunately, a lot of people in the public really do not realize, I think, fully, the opportunities we have there to find our mistakes and weaknesses and correct them without paying the price tag of lives, but we certainly appreciate your efforts there.

    I know that JFCOM is not only the lead agent for service transformation, but that JFCOM itself has undergone quite a transformation from the days when it was U.S. Atlantic Command.

    As commander, can you tell us how JFCOM is pulling together transformation for the Department of Defense? And do you feel that you have adequate resources to fulfill that mission in light of all the recent changes under your purview?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Congressman Forbes. It is always a pleasure to be able to talk with you, and thanks for your support of Joint Forces Command and, in particular, our Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Futures Laboratory.

    I might just add, before I go into the transformation pieces, as an overall answer, out in Suffolk, Virginia, we have, as part of the overall complex—we have a second group out there which is actually my J–9 directorate, and they actually run the Joint Futures Laboratory, which does our concept, development and experimentation.

    And I have a large portion of military, civilian, and contractors who actually work there. I will talk about that in just a second.

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    First of all, I would reemphasize again that the fact that we no longer have a geographic area of responsibility is important and that we are focusing more on concept development and experimentation. In fact, in the Unified Command Plan there were two key things that were pointed out by the Secretary and the President in that Unified Command Plan that was executed on the first of October of last year: One of them was to create a new Northern Command for homeland defense; and, the second part that was brought out was to allow Joint Forces Command relieved of some of these other responsibilities, to be able to focus on transformation.

    What I would tell you along those lines is—is that since I have been at the Command over the last five months now, we have made our budget submissions. The budget is now, of course, up here on the Hill. And there are substantial resource increases to support efforts within Joint Forces Command to support my fellow combatant commanders as we try to become more joint, multi-national, and also increase our work interagency-wise.

    Let me point out in the joint training area, besides those things I have talked about already, one that is very big is the Joint National Training Capability. Right now, there are 37 sites, frankly, 15 states, that have very, very competent, very professional training facilities and simulation facilities across the United States that support our services. And that what I would call is the first training transformation that occurred within the United States is the advent of all these very fine ranges and simulation facilities.

    The next wave of transformation that I think is very important, that has just been directed, and there are substantial resources now coming to, not only Joint Forces Command, but the services, to stand this capability up, is to net all of these together, if you will, into a live virtual and what we call constructive network, to allow us to take every opportunity to get joint training and drive it even down to the lowest level within the services and provide us with an ability to get good feedback, as you already pointed out, to provide that feedback to the services, and also provide us with a venue to do concept development and then experiment with those in our exercises.
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    So this is a fairly big initiative. We are talking numerous hundred million dollars across the entire fiscal year defense plan, but also sizable amounts of money, frankly, in this fiscal year 04 budget.

    In addition to that, how we have come a long way is that as of the first of October of last year, my predecessor was actually dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. We had two NATO Supreme Allied Commanders. I did not relieve in that role, and there was a reason for that, because the United States felt from the Administration's perspective that we would stand up hopefully some type of transformation command within NATO.

    And at the November ministerials that the president, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld attended, it was decided throughout the entire NATO alliance that we would stand up, probably in June of this year, Allied Command Transformation.

    As a matter of fact, tomorrow, General Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and the interim commander of NATO right now for the Atlantic, Admiral Ian Forbes of the Royal Navy, and myself are meeting with our staffs so that we, in fact, can bring NATO forward. We are looking at standing this up starting in June and bringing the command forward.

    That, in itself is important, because transformation is not only inside the joint role, but it is multi-national and it is also interagency. And I think we are out of time, sir.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
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    The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.

    Mr. MARSHALL. I will just thank all of you for your service to our country. And I am very interested in learning more about your operations and supporting you in any way I can.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Meek.

    Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And I am glad that you are all here to testify today. I have a—my question leads into the Southern Command and I believe it is called Operation Noble Eagle. Of what has happened—I am from the south Florida area and, as you know, we have Cuba that is just 90 miles off of Key West. And some of the deliberations that are going on in the U.N. right now, as it relates to who is in a line with Iraq, Cuba is.

    Cuba is one of the countries that have agreed with Iraq, as it relates to their position in the U.N., and is a communist country. We have had incidents in the past as it relates to civilian aircraft being shot down by Cuban MiGs. We know that we have had a few incidents as it relates to Cuban MiGs flying into the Air Force base in Key West.

    I just met recently with the mayor of Monroe County. And just the last high alert we had, when we had a terrorist information saying that we could possibly have a terrorist attack, non-state sponsored, a Cuban gunboat came right up into the—what you may say the cruise ship harbor there, docked—four armed Cuban military officers walking down Duval Street. Obviously, they surrendered.
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    But I am just trying—in another, October of last year—but this does not fall into that category—the U.S. Coast Guard escorted some 200-odd Haitians into—close to downtown Miami and everyone got upset about it. But the Coast Guard was on top of it; out even further out from the bay and was able to make sure that it was a harmless vessel.

    I am wondering, how can we—and especially the members on this committee, including our chairman—I am a part of the Homeland Security Select Committee—this a discussion that we are going to be having, as it relates to the safety of our borders.

    What has been corrected, as it relates to these aircraft being able to land in south Florida, or coming in by board undetected? I know the Coast Guard, many other folks, and so that I know that SOUTHCOM, you have that kind of relationship.

    Has there been any corrections? Are we paying attention to what they are doing? Because I just do not—I want to make sure that we are covering this area well.

    And there has been some great discussion at SOUTHCOM or either with Operation Noble Eagle.

    I know that we have aircraft at Homestead that could scramble and deal with those issues. If any of you could elaborate on that, I would appreciate it.

    General HILL. Well, I would defer the question of aircraft interdiction to the NORTHCOM commander——
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    Mr. MEEK. Okay.

    General HILL [continuing]. Because that, in fact, is his purview.

    I will speak to, tangentially, the issue of the small craft that came in from Cuba, which essentially was a go-fast boat, very similar to what drug-runners use.

    We catch some drug-runners; we do not catch all drug-runners. That is an ongoing problem that will face the United States for years to come. And we have to continue our efforts in order to interdict those efforts—those illicit activities—but it is going to be very difficult. And it requires a coordinated effort by a lot of different people, as we just talked about with the chairman between JIATF East and other organizations—Homeland Defense, Northern Command and all of that.

    Mr. MEEK. Let me just elaborate a little further. I know that—we know we have immigration issues in South Florida. And we know that dealing with the Caribbean and some of the islands that are there and some of the issues as it relates to shaky governments, I know that that is going to be more and more of issue.

    And a lot of the folks in Monroe County, including the mayor—the mayor of Key West—has great concern with it. I mean, it was at a time of high alert.

    And, hopefully, I could talk with the U.S. Coast Guard, some of the other folks that are trying to do the best that they can do. But I think that, not only this committee, but the Northern Command or the Southern Command as it relates to dealing with the Caribbean nations, and also South America, that we need to pay very, very close attention.
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    This go-fast boat was marked as a military Cuban vehicle or vessel and could have been used to—could have done harm to a cruise ship or even individuals there in Key West.

    So I understand that the task is big, but it is something that we are going to have to focus on. And I did not know if you all had great deliberations or even a plan to try to deter that from happening in the future.

    And, as you know, we had a crop duster land in South Florida recently, and was sold in Marathon. All of this seems to be normal practice, but I can see the danger in all of that.

    So I look forward, General, working with you and others in the Northern Command so that we can hopefully come to some sort of peace of mind for folks in South Florida and ultimately for the country.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    Mr. Abercrombie.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral—and this is maybe a little bit of follow-up—I was just trying to determine the difference between Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) now—now, I find, in terms of responsibility.
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    I keep asking, trying to find out who is in charge of what. I am all for transformation, but I am having great difficulty, Admiral, in figuring out exactly who the hell is in charge.

    Now, in your testimony, we start on page 3, you talk about the Millennium Challenge and units deploying from the continental U.S. And on page 2, 90 percent of the nation's forces deployed worldwide in support of the war on terrorism, including here at home.

    And taking for granted that we know what knowledge—centric, network-centric and effects-based operations are, and you have defined them later in your testimony.

    And that we understand what joint community, joint requirements, future joint environments, coherently joint capabilities are all in conjunction with borne joints.

    And taking into account then that around page 10, you get to the Northern Command—excuse me, on page seven you say the Joint Forces Command is the ''nation's agent for transformation.''

    And along about page 10, we get to ''additional efforts that support the commanders of Northern, Central, Pacific and Special Operations Command.'' That is the first time northern makes its appearance there.

    Then we get on to page 19, and where you talk about being the executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation.
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    Northern Command makes its appearance, then, on page 23, as you get near the end of the testimony: ''Additionally we have delivered four interim capabilities that directly support the Global War on Terrorism and ongoing military operations for Central Command. Six other initiatives that support U.S. Pacific Command and Northern Command for homeland security.''

    Now, in testimony that General Eberhardt is going to be giving, he talks about a conceptual framework having been established. And in that conceptual framework, as best I am able to understand, the Joint Forces headquarters has moved your homeland security component, and your civil support component, and the aforementioned JTF-6 component into Northern Command.

    Is that correct?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. That is correct, sir.


    What is the Northern Command doing that you were not doing before and could do better given all of the testimony that you have in here about your joint operability, your joint training, your integrating, all the things that you say you are doing here.

    What on Earth is the Northern Command doing that, at best, is not a duplicate or simply trying to extrapolate out of it for some reason some opportunity to do something?

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    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. First of all, I would tell you that I do not think what Northern Command is doing and what Joint Forces Command is duplication.

    What we have done is turn over—first of all, in the Unified Command Plan that became effective on the 1st of October, for the first time ever we have a combatant commander who has the area of responsibility of the United States for homeland defense.

    That did not exist before.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is right.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. That is number one. Number two——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Probably because we have a posse comitatus law, among other things, because we do not want to have a military command having the possibility of taking over police functions in this country.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Let me continue on, and I think I can explain why this is important. Joint Forces Command expended a significant amount of energy standing up and forming a joint task force homeland security, a joint task force civil support. JTF–6, for example, has been in existence for a long time.


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    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. All of those reported operationally to Joint Forces Command; so, therefore, the amount of time that the commander spent on a daily basis worrying about transformation or worrying about operations—he spent a lot of time worrying about operations, if you will, to support those civil support and homeland security JTFs, in addition to JTF–6.

    I no longer have that responsibility. That has been turned over to General Eberhardt so he can combine that with his North American Aerospace Defense Command responsibilities; he can worry about what is happening off-shore from a homeland defense perspective in a maritime sense. He shares that with the U.S. Pacific Command, as you know——


    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI [continuing]. For Hawaii and also for Alaska. That allows me to spend more time worrying about transformation. That was one of the purposes of this, so I am a force provider to NORTHCOM, just like I am a force provider to General Hill, General Franks, Admiral Fargo. I do this for the other combatant commanders.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, is that—am I correct, then, have we set up an entire command to essentially be a reporter to the rest of you as to how all the coordination is going?

    Because when the Colombia went down, I have the release here from the Northern Command. Everything that you were doing before—in some respects it is a compliment to you. Everything that you were doing before apparently kicked in into being—with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the connection with the National Guard, with the 5th Army down in Texas—everything went in, and the Northern Command observed it all, from what I am able to gather.
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    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I do not think——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year; we took people out of the existing commands and put them in the Northern Command. All, apparently, to have a big public relations (PR) operation with a web site about who we are and what we do, and it looks like just an enormous reporting operation.

    What kind of authority exists there that did not exist with you? And what kind of operation is now underway that would not have gone into place anyway had this Northern Command not existed?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think you will find that in the long-run, Northern Command, in my opinion, will bring homeland defense to a level that Joint Forces Command could not do because of all of the responsibilities that we had.

    We are——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will accept that. A very quick follow-up on Mr. Taylor's questions, and the observation made about the JTF–6—and to both Generals. I accept what you say about the drug situation, believe me, I do.

    What bothers me, then, especially where special ops is concerned in Afghanistan—are we or are we not acquiescing by default or by design to the reestablishment of drug enterprises in Afghanistan?
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    Is the United States actively pursuing the suppression of drug cultivation and distribution in Afghanistan today?

    General HOLLAND. Sir, from a Special Operations standpoint, that right now is not the mission that we have on the table. I think what we need to do is to, we will get back to you and just take that for record.

    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I yield to Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. General, with all due respect, as someone who is in charge of the soldiers involved in those missions, I would ask that you would speak out of the insanity of this policy.

    We have got 500 brave young Americans down in Colombia right now with the nexus being a counter-drug mission. We are paying contractors to fly modified observation planes to spray the coca fields.

    They get shot at—they get shot down occasionally. How on Earth does it make sense to turn a blind eye to the opium trade in Afghanistan?

    And I have seen the CIA briefings and I have seen the sacks of opium stacked up like oyster sacks on the pier at Gulfport—I mean, as far as the eye can see.
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    And yet we turn around and say, we, as a nation—you know, we are combating drugs. Well, heck, if it is wrong in Colombia, it is wrong in Afghanistan.

    And somebody at some point has got to say that. And I think it is wrong in both places.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Reclaiming my time. This is not an accusation against you folks, you understand that—that Mr. Taylor and I are engaged in. We think, as a matter of fact, you are being, if anything, victimized in this kind of thing of the policy.

    My point in asking the question and in following up on this is I think it is important. I do not, however, Mr. Chairman, want to see United States military personnel committed into something in which they cannot actually exercise the kind of capabilities that they have in regard to a mission which we, at least on the surface, say we support.

    Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay, I thank the gentlemen, and the—Mr. Kline, a gentlemen with great military expertise, is recognized. And let me apologize to our witnesses in that I have to leave shortly, but the chairman of the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Mr. Saxton, will take over the hearing.

    So, I thank you for your testimony today, Mr. Kline.

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    Mr. KLINE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank you very much for your service, hard work and for being here today, and for your very detailed answers to our many and diverse questions.

    I would like to follow up on the question of intelligence and how it is getting to the warfighter, but frankly I am going to defer that to another venue, where we are in a classified session and we can talk about that.

    So I want to talk instead about manpower issues. I was speaking to a group in Minnesota the day before yesterday, and in the audience there was a young man who identified himself as a member of the Army Reserve, and only half-jokingly said he was the last reservist left in Minnesota.

    We suggested that he be escorted out of the room.

    My point is that—General Holland—and I think hearing your testimony, the notes I have, that one third of your military manpower is from reserve components. And my guess is that the people in my district and most Americans would be surprised to hear that number. And I have not looked closely at the force structure, but I assume quite a bit of that is in psychological operations (PSYOPS) and so forth.

    My question to you and to anybody who would like to weigh in on this is, do you think the mix is right of active forces and reserve component forces for special operations command?

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    And I am really driving to the question of overall end-strength in the total force and, specifically, active end-strength—are we where we need to be?

    General HOLLAND. Senator, it is a great question, because within the budget request that has come over, we have taken this on as an issue because we need to work because we do have an imbalance.

    I will use the example of civil affairs. Ninety percent of our people in civil affairs reside within the reserves. On the psychological operations side of the house, two-thirds of our forces are on the reserve side. Today, in Afghanistan, a member of the Army National Guard is the combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander. And so, you can see how much we depend upon the guard and reserve.

    And so, from a total force element, I have great examples of how they are—what they are doing for us. So what we have done in the budget, we need to bring on more active duty people into civil affairs. We are requesting two additional companies. We are also requesting two additional companies for psychological operations on the active side. And also with that, four additional companies for—on the reserve side. So we have recognized that piece of it and we are going to take that on. And those two areas are the ones that have our largest concerns.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

    In those cases, then, you are really calling for an increase in end-strength to the Army in this particular case. I would assume that you are looking for greater end-strength in the Army or a realignment of their force structure that will give you active components that would be part of Special Operations Command?
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    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, we are working very closely with General Shinseki. And what he did is he cross-walked those positions with dollars from the Army to Special Operations Command.

    Mr. KLINE. Okay, thank you very much. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Mr. Wilson.

    Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And, gentlemen, we certainly appreciate you being here this morning. And I want to tell you how proud I am of your service. I am very grateful. The family that I represent, my family, has some military service. My dad was with the 14th Air Force in the Flying Tigers, so he covers Air Force and Army during World War II. I am very grateful to be a member of the Army National Guard myself.

    And then I have a son who is in the U.S. Navy, at ensign in the U.S. Navy, and two sons in the Army National Guard. And the tradition shall continue. My son in the Navy—his wife is in labor right now in Bethesda, getting ready to provide you a new recruit. And so, we are real excited about that. That is our first grandchild.

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    Mr. SAXTON. Will the gentleman yield?

    I understand through the grapevine that when your kids are grown up, your only question is which service will you join?

    Mr. WILSON. It is. It is which service? And I am really proud of their service—and because it means so much to the country. And thank you for what you do.

    Now, Congressman Kline is always ahead of the curve. He has already asked the question I wanted to ask about civil affairs and PSYOPS.

    I do want to point out that in South Carolina we are very pleased that the civil affairs unit there in the Midlands was established by then-Governor Strom Thurmond. And it has had many of the leading citizens of South Carolina as participants. And we are very grateful for the opportunity that we have had to provide that service. And in the future we hope to continue. And I am very pleased with the guard and reserve role.

    But Congressman Kline did save me one question. And that is in regard to the Osprey program. I am very interested in that, General Holland, and that I am very supportive of it. I think the unique capabilities of it are so important. And I am very happy to see that in the budget that there is a provision for two, to be used by the Air Force Special Operations Command. And I would like your view of how you feel that program is developing?

    General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. In fact, in this room I made a comment—previous testimony that as we bring on the CV–22, we need a safer, reliable and maintainable aircraft to be able to put our people in on the target.
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    I am cautiously optimistic. We are continuing to look at the testing that is ongoing as far as the basic MV–22. Everything is proceeding well. Within the next month or so, we will start on the CV–22 equipment specific, such as terrain-following radars, electronic warfare. And that will go into a test program over the next year. And I would say that probably in one year from now, or a little over that, we will have a very good test data on the viability of that platform.

    In conjunction with this, we have also gone back through the department to bring on additional test aircraft. Because what we want to do is we want to reduce the risk over the next year. And we would like to do some parallel testing on TFTA, the Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance radar and also the electronic warfare.

    As I have talked to the crews, they are all excited about it.

    They continue to talk about the awesome capability that this brings. From our standpoint, it is a transformational weapon system and will give the chance with the speed and the ability to get inside the decision cycle a very good capability to special operations in the future.

    Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate your comments initially about on target. That, to me, is so crucial; and I yield the balance of my time.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you Mr. Wilson. Mr. Israel.

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    Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would direct my question to Admiral Giambastiani. Admiral, I am new to this committee; although I am not new to Congress. And I have been trying to read a lot about, study, and learn about issues of military transformation and modernization. And I just read an excellent book by Robert Kagan called ''On Paradise and Power,'' that is being discussed hotly throughout Europe and here in the United States.

    And one of the things that Kagan says is that European defense budgets will continue to diminish rapidly as European governments pursue non-military trajectories in light of the absence of power that those governments have.

    So it seems to me that the allocation of resources that our NATO allies can apply to transformation and modernization will decline, or be nonexistent, over the foreseeable future. And I am wondering what you think we ought to be doing to promote and coordinate and encourage our NATO allies to do with respect to modernization and their own transformation. That is one question. I will ask you the second question after you answer the first.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Okay.

    Thank you for the question, Congressman Israel. I think it is a very appropriate one. By the way, I have not read the book, but I did see the article in the New York Times Magazine on Robert Kagan here about two weeks ago.

    What I would tell you is this: Secretary General Lord Robertson has spent a significant amount of his time as the Secretary General, frankly, lecturing, trying to gain support from the various governments within NATO to, in fact, increase their spending. And there are few who have done that and are very supportive. And there are others, unfortunately, where the budgets have been declining. But that is not for me to—I can just be an observer in this.
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    What I would tell you from my perspective is—is that we believe very strongly that bringing allied command transformation within the NATO organization to fruition here this year, and standing this organization up, will give us an ability to train with, learn from, in fact, export things that we know in the transformation area that are very important for us to be able to war fight in a coalition manner with our allies in the future.

    We think that there are capabilities that we have clearly that the Europeans do not have; yet, by the same token, there are very important capabilities that our coalition partners in the Global War on Terror have been bringing. Our ability to work with them is important.

    But let me point out one particular part of the NATO structure that I think we can make a success. And General Jones and I are very much committed to working on this, and that is the NATO response force. This is a vehicle in my view, where, from a command and control perspective, using techniques and procedures, doctrine that we have learned and built on in an experimentation and a history of operating with them with our joint task forces that we can export and bring to this organization to make it more responsive, able to be able to do operations that are directed by NATO.

    So what I would tell is that there are organizational constructs that we can help bring to this coalition that are important. And I think from that perspective we can bring great capability to us and our allies.

    Mr. ISRAEL. I appreciate that, and I look forward to continuing to hear more about it.
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    My second question is and again I, up to now, have some limited exposure on this issue, and learn more everyday. But in my own reading and research on transformation issues, it seems to me that each service is undergoing their own individual disparate transformation—separate forestructure, separate RDT&E, our next generation weapons system, separate procurement decisions.

    My question is, to what degree do you seek to harmonize and coordinate those transformational issues, and should we be doing more?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Let me answer the second half of that question. First of all, should we be doing more? The answer is ''yes''.

    And, are we trying to do more? The answer is ''yes''.

    One of the things that the service secretaries and the service chiefs themselves have told Secretary Rumsfeld—and I have heard them tell him when I worked for him as the senior military assistance—that they looked for concepts of operation that were joint in nature such that they would provide a context for how the services would build their budgets.

    And I think over the time that I worked for Secretary Rumsfeld—we have moved a significant distance here to be able to do this. And, in fact, now, the chairman, his staff, Joint Forces Command—other combatant commanders are taking part in this, but we are trying to build and then experiment on these overarching concepts of operation by which the services can feed in, if you will, and have a better idea for the secretaries and the chiefs of the service how, in fact, they should organize, train, and equip their forces.
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    Mr. ISRAEL. I see. Well, thank you for your work, and I look forward to working closely with you, and I yield back my time.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, sir.

    Mr. WILSON. If I may just step out of—Admiral—out of order here for a minute—something happened that we observed that raised some questions, and it was involving the C–130 transportability, the Stryker.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir.

    Mr. WILSON. And I assume that the Joint Forces Command would be a coordinator between the services so that those kinds of things do not happen again. Is that—do you play that role?

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, we play a role with regard to interoperability, if you will, and integration. We do not—I do not think Joint Forces Command, because we were not created when the stryker originally came about.

    Mr. WILSON. I understand that.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I do not think—what I was going to say is, we review a lot of operational requirements documents from all of the services to try to make sure that there are interoperable. I do not know, but I will find out for the record whether we had looked at it. I do not think we did. And I am not sure that in the context of a vehicle fitting inside an aircraft, frankly, we would have looked at that, but that is a very good point. I had not quite thought about it in that perspective.
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    Mr. WILSON. There are details. Somehow these details slipped through somehow. The stryker does fit in the C–130.

    Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. It does.

    Mr. WILSON. And from many locations, it is so heavy, the C–130 cannot take off.

    And it seems as though when the Army was looking for funding for Stryker, they came to the committee during the period of time when we were having conference with the Senate, and said: ''Please yield to the Senate position. We really need to fund this, because it will be C–130 deployable.''

    Well, it turned out that it is—you can make a case that it is. I mean, you can deploy it 60 or 100 miles or something with a C–130, but that is not what they meant, I believe.

    So anyway, I bring this up only for future reference. And I hope that you are joint command will get down into those issues, as well.

    Thank you.

    Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Ryan.

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    Mr. RYAN. Thank you.

    My question is for General Hill. You talked a—little bit about the drug trade and the drug money and how that leads directly to international terrorism. Can you just kind of explain—I am also new to the committee and new to Congress—that is why I am sitting way over here.

    Can you explain to me a little bit about how your efforts are coordinated with some of the national stuff within the country is handled and how the two kind of work together?

    General HILL. We do interagency support of the President's and the National Drug Policy, work closely with the Office of Drug Control, Mr. Walters' office. We are—we have—working out our MOUs, memorandums of understanding, with NORTHCOM on how we will coordinate our efforts—the interdiction efforts coming out of the Caribbean toward the American homeland. And on other, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)—we work with all those different agencies in our area.

    Does that get at your question, Mr. Ryan?

    Mr. RYAN. Yes. Thank you.

    And then one final one. How do you think—and I do not know if anyone asked this or not—how do you think things are going as far as our war on drugs?

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    And how effective has it been in kind of drying up money for these international terrorist organizations?

    General HILL. In the last year, the reports will come in and they will show you that there has been a 15 percent drop in coca production in Colombia. There was a slight rise in coca production in Peru and Bolivia. But I think you will find the numbers will show at about an eight percent drop in coca production.

    There is an increase in heroin poppy production in Colombia. We are, in many ways, I believe, in Colombia, especially, attacking the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the other illicit groups—attacking the source of their money, which is drugs. And the Colombians are being a very effective force at it, and getting better everyday.

    Mr. RYAN. How about the use in this country of—I have noticed the ads on TV and how they are trying to illustrate the link between use in this country and the international terrorism—how effective have those commercials been, if you know?

    General HILL. I cannot answer that, Mr. Ryan. I do not know the answer to that.

    Mr. RYAN. Okay.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And gentlemen, thank you for being with us today and for your patience.

    General Holland, as you well know, I had the privilege to be with you and some of the other folks in different locations here recently. And I cannot tell you how proud and impressed I am with the young men and women that are serving our country in all the capacities that we saw. Also, I want to thank you for an excellent briefing we got on SOF aviation last week. A couple of folks behind you were largely responsible for that.

    Got a question for you. Over and over again, people are asking, what is the cost of the war on terrorism?

    Let me ask in a different way. Given our less than stellar record, and this goes back at least 12 years, of not prosecuting the war on terrorism, what is the cost to America, in your opinion, if you want to express one, of not fighting—winning the war on terrorism, which very clearly includes Iraq?

    General HILL. Well, Congressman Hayes, I would like to be able to put a number on that. But, I mean, there are so many variables, because you look at lost opportunities as a result of what happened.
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    I think if you put it into the number, as far as loss of life and as we flash back on what happened on 9/11, and you think about the people we lost not only in New York City, but in Pennsylvania and at the Pentagon. And then you kind of flash to the future and you can ask the question: What if weapons of mass destruction were involved in one of those attacks? And I would submit that 9/11 would pale in comparison.

    And so it is hard to really put a dollar figure, but, I think, we as Americans and we as a free society need to continue to do everything we can to ensure that this does not happen again, because the tragedy not only to the loss of life, but to our way of life is definitely in peril.

    Mr. HAYES. Thank you, sir, I appreciate that.

    And I just think it is important publicly to state that maybe people cannot tell you the cost of fighting the war on terrorism, but the cost of not fighting and winning that war is far higher. We need to keep that out there.

    Colonel Wilson asked about V–22. I know we had a little glitch. Just want to plug in; you do not need to answer. And hopefully, if we stay with the Barry Amendment, buy American—and I got staff checking to see if that was somebody else's titanium causing the hydraulic line fault—and we will keep our folks moving ahead, because we want your folks and all our men and women in uniform to have every assets and resource that they need.

    Again, thank you for being here, for your patience, for your service. And anything we can do to encourage and thank the folks under your command, please make sure we are on the ball doing that.
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    General HILL. Yes, sir. I will pass that on to them. And we appreciate your leadership at the SOF Caucus, as well.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. Gingrey.

    Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General Holland and Hill and Admiral Giambastiani, I just want to echo what my colleagues, the gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from South Carolina, had to say just a few minutes ago before he had to leave; how much the people of Georgia appreciate the work you do and how grateful we are for a strong national defense. The citizens of the 11th district that I represent, the eight and a half million people in Georgia, are very grateful for your command. And I appreciate your testimony today.

    My question will be directed to General Hill, and it is kind of a follow-up to the question in a way that my friend, the gentleman from Ohio, asked a few minutes ago about the drug situation, and particularly in regard, General Hill, to Colombia.

    The capture of the three DOD contractors in Colombia would appear to be a mark of a major escalation by the FARC against the United States. And I wanted to ask you two questions in regard to that.

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    First of all, do you view this incident as a major turning point in the way that the FARC operates with regards to the United States?

    And the other question is, what is your command's participation in the ongoing search and rescue operations in Colombia?

    General HILL. The FARC have been becoming more aggressive against the Uribe government and the Colombian people since President Uribe took over in August. The reason they have become that way is because President Uribe and the Colombian military, I believe, are making a difference against the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, and they are fighting them in ways that they have not been fought forever probably.

    The hostages that the FARC have today were essentially dropped in their lap. The aircraft on its mission experienced engine trouble. The pilot, talking to us on the ground, talked and said he was going to try to glide to Florencia, which was the nearest airport. He did not quite make that. He made a wonderful landing in some incredible terrain, high mountain terrain. And, unfortunately, he landed at exactly—probably the worst spot he could have landed in, which was in directly where two FARC columns had come together to do an operation.

    Colombian military responded very rapidly. They were in the air above the site within about 35 minutes. But the capture had already taken place. And two of our people—one Colombian, one United States citizen—were killed.

    The escalation will be, in my opinion, if they continue to hold them for an extended period of time, or if they execute them and then the demands that they make on that will cause us to look at the situation in a different light. But until they do that—and we are not sure at this point what their motives will be in terms of kind of how long they will hold the hostages. I would defer that question.
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    What are we doing about it in terms of Southern Command and support of it? The Colombians immediately—very quickly put a large number of forces into the field to try to rescue the three American citizens. In order to help coordinate that effort, I sent my special operations Brigadier General Remo Butler into the area with—and he brought a small planning staff. And they are engaged with the Colombian units trying to affect the rescues and assisting them in terms of how to coordinate and do better training.

    In that regard, the Colombians—about 2,000 of them in active search mode, five—and another 3,000 in support—have done a very good job, in my opinion, militarily, in trying to affect this rescue operation. I cannot go much more into it than that in open session. But I have been very pleased with their efforts in the support of this.

    Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, General.

    Mr. SAXTON. I believe Mr. Taylor has one final question.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Well, thank you General, for sticking around. And General Hill, I guess our 12 o'clock meeting kind of went by the waysides——

    General HILL. I think we are having it, Congressman.

    Mr. TAYLOR. I think we are having it. [Laughter.]

    In a book about the Russian experience in Afghanistan—I believe it was ''Unholy Wars,'' was the name of it—one of the many things that the Afghans successfully did was the supplying of drugs to the Russian troops to—in fact, at some point they mentioned that Russian troops were actually trading their weapons for drugs, knowing that those weapons would be used against either themselves or other Russians.
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    I would ask this about a year ago as to what steps we are taking to prevent a similar scenario from happening in a place where opium is quite readily available, as far as drug testing of our troops at an increased rate?

    And the second thing is, going back to our use—frequent use of contractors, and those contractors, in my estimation, often having the accessibility of pretty sensitive information.

    How would you gentlemen feel about the extension of the drug testing requirements that now applies to all American military personnel, also extending to DOD contractors and their employees in situations like this?

    Because I truly think, going back to that intelligence mission, you are counting on those guys to give you—to send your planes in the right place—what if they have been compromised?

    Does that not just throw everything for a loop, and what if they have been compromised because of their drug use. And I will very sadly point to the horrible situation where I think our mil group commander, three of four ago, I believe has actually been convicted for smuggling drugs out of Colombia.

    And I do not mean that as any dispersion to Colonel Higgins or Colonel Keane, but I think Colonel Higgins' predecessor was one, so it is not that far back in history.

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    General HILL. I think all of us in uniform have been concerned about drug use among our forces since the Vietnam era. That prompted your analysis and, in my opinion, your analysis is one of the saving graces of the military—one of the saving aspects of the military as we emerged out of Vietnam and began to rebuild the United States military.

    It has been absolutely critical to the way that we have managed discipline within the force. I do not—I think the rules and regulations of all the services in terms of drug testing are very adequate to the mission that we have today, either in Colombia or Afghanistan or anywhere else.

    My personal opinion on the contractor issue is that would be a good idea. I would not be opposed to that idea.

    Mr. TAYLOR. How about DOD civilian employees?

    General HILL. I would leave that up to DOD to determine that.

    Mr. TAYLOR. General Holland, would you——

    General HOLLAND. No, I would just take a, you know, Congressman Taylor, I think, you know, what you are getting at here is really a policy decision.

    Mr. TAYLOR. It is a policy decision, hopefully with your input, going back to, one of—you quoted Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. We would like to have a policy that we think helps you.
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    I, personally, would think that policy would help you. It makes it a heck of a lot easier to make that policy if someone of your stature would endorse it.

    General HOLLAND. And I think the words that General Hill used are exactly—would be my sentiments, as well.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Which is, sir?

    General HOLLAND. Which is that, obviously for DOD civilians, the DOD needs to come up with a policy, you know, for that, for contractors—especially if I, you know, Congressman Hayes and I have had some discussions on some people that providing contract air, and for those people providing contract air—for our people in Special Operations to either be inserted or dropped, or jump out of their airplanes on a training mission, then I want—it would be good that we could ensure that these people are not under the influence.

    So I think in those particular areas I think it very much applies.

    General HILL. I think General Holland's point is, the distinction is well taken. In particular, sensitive positions—I think that that would be an appropriate aspect.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

    Mr. SAXTON. You three gentlemen are a very popular trio. Mr. Hayes and Mr. Wilson would both like to ask a final question, if you have time.
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    Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. HAYES. Just a comment that I failed to mention before. My wife Barbara and I were at Fort Bragg—the epicenter of the universe, home of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—last week, and we had a—she started out with General McNeill's wife, met with spouses of deployed folks. And let me tell you, that group of ladies is on the ball, doing the job.

    They are really—I mean, I cannot tell you how positive that meeting was. And we came away from there with some ideas of things we could do—force protection, as it relates to husbands and wives of deployed spouses.

    And I want to criticize the press because of some of those folks will go after deployed people to find out where they are and find out whose spouses are home, and it creates a problem.

    And I wanted to make sure that everybody was aware of that, and I know you are doing what you can to deal with it, and I want to make sure that our offices do, as well.

    The other thing—and, again, I want to emphasize how great these ladies were, and we are going to do everything we can to help them. The other issue that truly bothered me—they had children in schools, young children, who were being heckled, badgered and harassed because their parents were in the military and wearing a uniform.

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    That is unacceptable, and that is just really disgraceful and disgusting, and we are going to move to see that we can do something about that. But, again, that is something that I wanted to report to you all in public, because these wives are making a tremendous contribution to our effort.

    Thanks again.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Mr. Wilson.

    Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Hill, I just want to thank you for your efforts in Colombia. I have been on the board of the Partners With The Americas Program in South Carolina.

    We are associated with Southwest Colombia, and we have worked to bring exchange students to our community and we send exchange students. It has been a wonderful program, except it is now one way.

    We have a student staying with us now from Cali, but it is not safe to send our students there. And so I want to thank you for your efforts and I know that one of my sons did have the opportunity several years ago to go to high school in Cali, and at that time it was a first world country.

    And so what you are doing is so important, and I want to wish you well on everything that you are doing to stabilize the country and return it to a democratic system. Thank you.
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    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

    And gentlemen, thank you very much for your participation today. We appreciate your indulgence and we will see you all soon. Thank you.

    General HILL. Thank you, sir.

    General HOLLAND. Thank you, sir.

    [Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]