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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–2]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004—H.R. 1588






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MARCH 12, 2003



One Hundred Eighth Congress

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
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ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
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LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
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Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
James M. Lariviere, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant




    Wednesday, March 12, 2003, Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act—Combatant Commanders of U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea


    Wednesday, March 12, 2003



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    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services


    Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

    LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea

[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Fargo, Adm. Thomas B.

Hunter, Hon. Duncan

LaPorte, Gen. Leon J.

Skelton, Hon. Ike

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[There were no Documents submitted.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Mrs. Davis
Mr. Hunter
Mr. Miller


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2003.

    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.


    The CHAIRMAN. The full committee will come to order.
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    This afternoon, the committee continues its review of the state of our combatant commands, focusing on the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses this afternoon. We have with us Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, United States Navy, Commander, United States Pacific Command, and General Leon LaPorte, United States Army, commander, U.S. Forces Korea. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony.

    Today, as the world focuses on the Middle East and a possible conflict with Iraq, we cannot forget that the United States faces serious challenges elsewhere in the world. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Far East.

    The admission by North Korea last October that they secretly continued a weapons—a nuclear weapons program in the wake of the 1994 Agreed Framework, has raised tensions on the Peninsula to the highest levels in recent years.

    These increased tensions have reopened the discussion as to whether the United States has a force structure and capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater conflicts.

    While this administration's security strategy has evolved from the two major theater war (MTW) force sizing mechanism, today we find ourselves facing simultaneous challenges in both Iraq and Korea, a possibility that many military planners considered remote only a short time ago.

    While North Korea holds our immediate attention, China looms as a long-term concern for the United States in the Pacific. It is clear that China views the United States as a regional and strategic competitor.
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    China has undertaken a military modernization program in order to diversify its options for the use of force in a variety of situations. The most serious of these situations is, of course, any potential military action China may take against Taiwan.

    Admiral Fargo, I am interested in hearing your views on the China security situation and of a more current concern, I am also interested in hearing about your command's role in the Global War On Terrorism and, in particular, about your ongoing activities and our ongoing activities in the Philippines.

    So, before we get started, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, my partner, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he wants to make.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be viewed in the hard copy.]


    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. And thank you for calling this hearing. I think it is very important that we have testimony from these gentlemen today.

    I join you in welcoming Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte. And Mr. Chairman, having known them through the years, I have added confidence in the military posture in that part of the world. I am very proud of them and proud of the fact that they are here with us today.
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    Our committee has been deeply involved in the question of U.S. policy toward Iraq. And with a quarter of a million American forces arrayed in the Persian Gulf, our nation stands at the precipice of war.

    Looking at the world as a whole, and looking at history as I am bound to do, in my opinion, this is the most dangerous time for our country since the dark and difficult days of 1942. I will ask you about that in a later moment.

    I feel deeply that for some time the situation in the Korean Peninsula could pose greater dangers to our national security. North Korea has long been a leading export of missiles. Its current ability to export nuclear materials and weapons cannot be tolerated. To prevent this, our country must work with our allies and friends in the region. At one level, this is a regional problem that the administration is right to work with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. But the administration must also, in my opinion, engage North Korea in negotiations.

    I greatly fear that once we are involved in hostilities with Iraq, North Korea will seek to take advantage of our distraction. I hope that you both will help us understand your commands' contingency planning in the event that North Korea initiates hostilities towards the United States or other countries, or continues to escalate the current crisis. What efforts are you taking and what capabilities are available? Do we have enough in the right type of forces to provide you with what you need?

    General LaPorte, I hope you will also address the issue of U.S. force protection posture in the Korean Peninsula. The press reports indicate that a long-standing basing consolidation plan will involve moving U.S. troops further away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). So, please explain to us the status of the discussions with South Korea, whether force posture changes will have a destabilizing effect on the current situation with North Korea. I thank both of you, Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, for being with us today.
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    [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank my colleague. Admiral Fargo, thank you for being with us today. The floor is yours.


    Admiral FARGO. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, and members of the committee. It is my great pleasure to be here today. The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command are providing superior service to the nation in the Asian Pacific region and around the world and the high readiness of our forces can be directly attributed to the generous support of this esteemed body and of the American people as a whole.

    The dramatic events of the past year have brought into new focus our national security demands for the 21st century. We have outlined five near term priorities for the Pacific Command to meet those demands. I would like to briefly highlight those priorities if I may.

    At the top of our priority list is very clearly the Global War On Terrorism. We are building momentum on the war on terrorism in the Pacific theater. In addition to providing forces to the Central Command for Operation Enduring Freedom, we are focused on two primary terror threats related to al-Qaeda—the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines and the Jamaah al-Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda surrogate spread throughout southeast Asia.
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    Last year we responded to the request of the Philippines to provide training advice and assistance to the armed forces of the Philippines and southern Mindanao, including Basilan Island, then an Abu Sayyaf stronghold. This six-month effort provided a template to help the Republic of the Philippines develop a lasting counterterrorist capability.

    As a result, we have seen the beginning of stability on Basilan. The terrorists have been separated from the people and normal activity, like children going back to school, has returned.

    There is clearly more to be done. The ASG is reconstituting and have been active in bombing campaigns and are looking for outside support. We have an active exercise and security assistance program in place to continue to build counterterrorist capability in the armed forces in the Philippines.

    The Jamaah al-Islamiyah, or JI, has had cells in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia and has attacked Americans and other interests throughout the region. This group was also responsible for the tragic bombing which killed some 200 people in Bali, many of them Americans and Australians—actually, seven Americans were killed.

    We are focused on the JI and are pleased with the cooperation of our friends in the region, including investigations by the government of Indonesia to apprehend and bring these terrorists to justice. Over 130 JI members have been arrested or detained to date.

    Our service components are enjoying the highest readiness that I can recall in my 32 years of service. For example, in January, all six Pacific Command aircraft carriers were underway simultaneously, five with full air wings embarked and ready to deploy. I can provide similar examples for you for all the services.
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    Our war fighting readiness will benefit from future developments of missile defense; increased stocks of precision guided munitions; improved anti-submarine warfare capabilities; increased intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets; and improved air and sea lift to speed our forces to future conflicts.

    Our quality of service concept includes the traditional quality of life initiatives plus the facilities, the spare parts and the information technology necessary for satisfaction and efficiency on the job. You should know that I am a big fan of this new and present generation. They are smart, engaging and unafraid of hard work. They well represent our nation and its values around the globe.

    Morale and retention are high and we appreciate your support of the defense budget, including the improved readiness funding and the pay raises that demonstrate parts of your continuing commitment to our people.

    Our longstanding bilateral alliances in the Pacific, our solid relationships in the presence of our forward deployed combat forces, are the constancy that insures the region's peace and stability. Northeast Asia is the center of gravity for Asian Pacific security. Our alliance with Japan is fundamental to that security and Japan has been an aggressive and strong partner in the war on terrorism. In my judgment, our relationship with Japan has never been stronger.

    Our alliance with South Korea is also solid. It has been the basis for peace and prosperity in South Korea for 50 years and will continue to serve our mutual security interests even after the lessening of tensions on the Peninsula. North Korea's provocative actions over the last six months have not changed that fundamental truth.
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    Australia is our special partner and friend in the Pacific. The Australians have demonstrated courage and leadership in regional efforts from Afghanistan to Bali to East Timor and we continue to eliminate barriers to interoperability between our forces.

    Our relationship with Thailand and the Philippines, as I have already described, also demonstrate cooperation and partnership in regional and global security initiatives.

    The contributions by good friends in the region are numerous—Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and most recently, India, have all participated in the Global War On Terrorism with contributions that have ranged from intelligence sharing, to overflight access, to combat forces.

    Our final priority is to promote change and to improve our Asian Pacific defense posture for the future. The Pacific Command is synchronizing transformational efforts to produce real improvement in six key areas. These areas include first updating our plans to meet the current and emerging threats within our new force-planning construct.

    Second, strengthening the command and control relationships, which include maturing the standing joint force headquarters concept. Next is improving our force posture and footprint in ways that improve our ability to respond to threats more rapidly while minimizing adverse impact on our allies and our friends.

    We also need increased capabilities for immediate employment. Here I am talking about missile defense, global strike capabilities, the guided missile submarine (SSGN) and improvements in intelligence assets to increase our warning of potential threats.
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    In new operating patterns and concepts, such as the naval expeditionary strike group and the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Team and high-speed vessels, we will be able to harness these capabilities to great advantage.

    And finally, increasing opportunities for diversified access and logistics to reassure allies, build reliable options for contingency planning and improve training alternatives, which will relieve pressure on overstressed locations.

    These six areas encompass the primary focus of our transformational efforts in the Pacific. And finally, on behalf of the men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command, let me offer my sincere appreciation for your support and the opportunity to report on the posture of the United States Pacific Command.

    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Fargo can be viewed in the hard copy]

    The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you.



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    General LAPORTE. Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, and distinguished committee members, I am honored to appear before the committee to update you on the current situation in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

    I have prepared a comprehensive statement of the command and I would appreciate it if you would include it in the statement for the record.

    The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, both statements will be taken into the record.

    General LAPORTE. First, I want to extend the thanks of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and the Department of Defense civilians that serve in Korea.

    Your consistent support enables us to maintain the high degree of readiness and accomplish our deterrent mission on the Korean Peninsula.

    The past year was an extraordinary year for those who serve in Korea. The United States Forces Korea, continue to provide deterrence and security to the Peninsula by a maintaining high state of readiness.

    2002 marked the fourth democratic transfer of power in the Republic of Korea, renewed South Korean efforts towards inter-Korean reconciliation and the first World Cup hosted in Asia.

    In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents, as well. The North Korean unprovoked attack, which resulted in the sinking of a Republic of Korea naval boat in the West Sea and increased regional tensions, revelations of the North Korean nuclear weapons development program and a cyclic rise in anti-United States Forces Korea sentient. The Republic of Korea and the United States alliance continues to be the foundation of peace and security in the northeast Asia region.
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    When I assumed command in May of last year, I established five command priorities. The first being to ensure peace and stability on the Peninsula and in the region; second, to focus on ensuring that the service members were trained and ready to execute their mission; third was to strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States military alliance; fourth was to transform the command into a 21st century fighting capability; and finally, to make Korea an assignment of choice for all U.S. service members.

    In 2002, the United Nations command has made significant contributions to inter-Korean initiatives by the South Korean government while maintaining the effectiveness of the armistice agreement, most notably to reduce tensions following the 20 June North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea naval ship and to support the South Korean initiatives to establish transportation corridors through the Demilitarized Zone to establish economic exchanges between North and South Korea.

    Combined Forces Command, which is the backbone of United States and ROK-U.S. alliance continued to modernize capabilities and work together to deter the North Korean threat.

    The United States Forces Korea established a groundwork for its transformation to a capabilities-based force for the 21st century. This transformation, as determined by the ROK-U.S. future in the alliance policy initiative will ultimately result in more capable forces throughout the region.

    Our alliance forged in blood of 415,000 South Koreans and 33,000 Americans who gave their lives in the Korean War remain strong and committed to the principles of the mutual defense treaty.
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    The challenges of 2002 have firmly reinforced three points. First, the events in Korea affect the entire world. The North Korean military remains a serious threat to regional and global stability. The Republic of Korea-United States alliance is essential to continue Peninsula and regional security. The continued United States presence in Northeast Asia is critical to regional stability.

    Two thousand three will be a pivotal year for the Republic of Korea. As the international community works to resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, security and stability will remain the common denominator of the alliance.

    As the first 50 years of our mutual defense and security relationship comes to a close, we will adhere closely to the following principles of the 1953 mutual defense treaty as we prepare for the next 50 years.

    I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee and look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General LaPorte can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General and thank you, Admiral. I will yield at this time to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you again for your appearance and I realize it is a long way from whence you came, but it is important that you be here.
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    I personally believe that we are in the most dangerous period of our nation's history since 1942, those dark and difficult days in the early part of the Second World War.

    The situation in North Korea is a major factor in that assessment as well as other areas in the Pacific, but not limited to that.

    Do you agree with my opinion and, if you do, what additional capabilities do you need to make your region as successful as it can be?


    Admiral FARGO. Mr. Skelton, I think the world has changed dramatically since the Cold War and it is very clear to me that the kind of threats that we face today are much different. We are in an environment where weapons of mass destruction are a very significant concern. We all understand very pointedly the threat from terrorist groups worldwide and certainly there are other issues such as cyberthreats and the ability of people to disrupt our financial institutions and so on.

    My personal belief is that this does require a new strategy.

    Mr. SKELTON. Do you agree or disagree with my statement?

    Admiral FARGO. I do not know if I can put an evaluation that it is more dangerous than 1942. Certainly, it is a very serious point in time. I cannot draw an up arrow or a down arrow on those two, Congressman, but I am very concerned with the threats that we contend with today.
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    Mr. SKELTON. What additional capabilities do you need in your region is my follow on question?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, I think certainly at the top of my list is we have got to develop the kind of counterterrorist capability to match our defensive capabilities and antiterrorist support protection that can protect our homeland and our operating forces.

    My personal belief is that missile defense is helpful. I have forces in the Pacific that cannot defend themselves from a short-range ballistic missile or a medium-range ballistic missile. That is important to me. Improved warning that would be brought by intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are hugely important.

    Systems like Global Hawk and Predator and their ability to move that information directly to the shooter are a huge leverage in our fights against terrorism.

    Last, the ability to be able to deploy forces rapidly with high-speed air and sealift are a key enabling contribution to all that we do.

    Mr. SKELTON. How many aircraft carriers do you have on station in your entire area of responsibility? Today.

    Admiral FARGO. In my responsibility today we have five deployed aircraft carriers. We have three in the Gulf right now, in the Arabian Gulf and we have one, USS Nimitz, that is in Honolulu today, but is heading west to relieve the Abraham Lincoln. We have the Carl Vinson that is in northeast Asia.
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    Mr. SKELTON. You have one in the Pacific Ocean. Is that correct, that will be stationed there?

    Admiral FARGO. I actually have two right now in the Pacific Ocean.

    Mr. SKELTON. I said that will be stationed there.

    Admiral FARGO. That will be stationed there for the near term, yes, sir.

    Mr. SKELTON. Yes. All right.

    General? Should I repeat my question, General?

    General LAPORTE. No, sir, Mr. Skelton. I have it. September 11 changed the world we live in significantly and it is a dangerous world and we face significant threats.

    In the area where I serve our nation, we have a North Korean threat that has a 1.2 million person force and has a very credible, conventional army with significant artillery and missile capabilities. We are concerned that we continue to establish and demonstrate a firm deterrent posture so that North Korea military and the Kim regime do not miscalculate and think that the United States is not paying attention to what is going on while it may be involved someplace else in the world.
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    The capabilities that we continue to——

    Mr. SKELTON. You have not answered my question, General.

    General LAPORTE. I think it is a dangerous place. I do.

    Mr. SKELTON. Go ahead. Tell us about your capabilities.

    General LAPORTE. The capabilities that would reinforce and assist us would be a missile defense. Right now I have limited missile defense on the Peninsula with my Patriot missiles, protecting my critical air nodes, increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and increased precision guided munitions would be capabilities that would enhance my mission accomplishment.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    We are going to go on down the line, but I have—when we get finished, General, I have a few follow-ups from our discussion this morning.

    Mr. Hefley is the chairman of the readiness/military construction subcommittee. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.

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    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. General, I am not suggesting that we pull out of Korea, particularly in light of the recent behavior of the North Koreans, but unless we are at war, I generally have the feeling that we do not belong in places that do not want us.

    I was very disturbed by Germany, for instance, in the recent elections—German politicians using America as a whipping boy in order to get elected, both in the national and the local elections.

    I think we ought to reevaluate how much presence we need to have in Germany. If they do not want us, we should not be there. I am disturbed also by the demonstrations in Korea against our presence there. I guess what I would ask you is, are any of those feelings coming from officialdom in Korea or are these just ad hoc groups that like to take to the streets and wave banners and attack the United States?

    Does the government of South Korea want us there? Are they glad we are there? Are they pleased with us being there? What can you tell us about that?

    General LAPORTE. Congressman Hefley, I have been asked many times, is there a crisis in South Korea and I will tell you adamantly, there is no crisis in South Korea. There would be a crisis in South Korea if they were not able to conduct democratic elections like they did in the December time period. There would be a crisis in Korea if the people did not have the right to gather and speak their minds. There would be a crisis in Korea if they could not worship the way they desire. And it would be a crisis in Korea if the civilian authorities did not have control over the military.
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    None of those are taking place in South Korea. Sir, what we have is a maturing democracy that has challenges like any other democracy. I will assure you, having talked to President Roh several times since he has been elected, that he is a firm supporter of the United States. He is a firm supporter of the Republic of Korea-United States alliance.

    He came to my headquarters for briefings and discussions right after he was elected. It was one of the first places he visited. He wanted to reassure the United States of his commitment to the alliance. I could tell you the ROK government is very supportive of the U.S. alliance in terms of their National Assembly. I see them often, speak with them.

    The military, the Combined Forces Command, which is a Republic of Korea-United States command, is firmly the centerpiece of the Peninsula security, the ROK military and the leadership affirming in support of the alliance and the United States.

    Mr. Congressman, they have a democracy and they have an opportunity to speak their mind. I would just tell you that last weekend there was a 70,000 person demonstration. It was a pro-U.S. demonstration where they unfurled the American flag, a Korean flag and a United Nation's flag, not to tear it, not to burn it, but to demonstrate their support for this alliance.

    Mr. HEFLEY. That is reassuring. Thank you very much.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

    I thank both of you gentlemen for being here and the troops that you are representing today.

    As you know, since the demise of the Soviet Union, I guess the worst-case scenario that has been trotted out in this room, has been two simultaneous attacks.

    The potential for that, certainly, is a very real possibility within the next month that we would be going to war with Iraq and I would guess around the world, the second most likely place for that to happen would be Korea.

    My question to you is on a scale of one to ten, how high would you rate that threat from the Koreans, the North Koreans?

    General LAPORTE. We have a very significant and capable force as part of the Combined Forces Command alliance. The Republic of Korea has in excess of 600,000 service members on active duty and has the capability of mobilizing a significant number more—nearly 42 divisions' worth of soldiers.

    They have a very competent naval force. I have been on the ships with them. I have been with their Marines in training. I have flown with their air force pilots, so as we look at the threat, I think it is important that we remember that we have a tremendous partner in our alliance, the South Korean military.
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    We watch North Korea very, very closely. I can give you in a closed session or privately detailed information, but I am very comfortable that we have the forces currently in position to be a strong deterrent against a miscalculation.

    Mr. TAYLOR. General, I appreciate that. Again, the reason for this is in my town meetings back home, I have a larger number of constituents who fought in the Korean War than fought in the Gulf War. They remember how rough that was. They are very much concerned of a war with Korea. And the reason I am asking that is the media reports have led those people to believe that this is a real and very high probability.

    My question to you two gentlemen is how high do you right the probability of a war with Korea?

    I heard every word of your answer, but I do not feel like you answered my question.

    General LAPORTE. The training that is going on with the North Korean military now—they are in their winter training cycle. It started in January and it will go through the end of March. It is well within their seasonal norms. In fact, it is less than what we have seen in the past couple of years.

    So, from a conventional force, if they have the capability, my estimate is their intent is not to use that force at this point in time. But there is always an opportunity for miscalculation. So, I am pretty comfortable with the posture we have right now and the support I have received from the Pacific Command during an upcoming major training exercise, we all have additional forces on the Peninsula.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. A follow up—Admiral, if you would like to answer that.

    Admiral FARGO. Congressman, I agree with all that General LaPorte has said. I would probably characterize the threat of going to war on the Korean Peninsula as low right now. I also agree that our deterrent posture is very strong right now. As a matter of fact, the forces that I have arrayed in the Pacific today are more significant than a year ago right now.

    We are very fortunate that we have an exercise ongoing this month in the Korean Peninsula, exercise Full Eagle that is an annual exercise that we conduct with the Republic of Korea. It has been scheduled for a long period of time, so it is not provocative in any nature. That will provide additional troops and additional aircraft on the Peninsula.

    I addition, we have arrayed forces within the Pacific to ensure that we, once again, can deter, but not provoke, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, while I have still got you. A conversation prior to the use of force vote, I quoted General Wesley Clark saying that we would probably, if there was a war in Iraq, be there for ten years. The president countered saying, when the heck do you get ten years from? And as I recall, said something to the effect of well, we have been in Korea for almost 50. We have been in Germany for almost 60.

    I was struck by the President's response. He said, well, we can leave Korea and Germany any time we want. I think maybe a couple of people in this room probably heard that. Again, I do not know. I was just curious if you were getting any indication from the administration that it is their intention to either stay for a long period of time, and this really comes back to a military construction (MILCON) question. Are we going to stay for a period of time or is this something that maybe we ought to be spending our MILCON dollars elsewhere. That is the purpose of the question.
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    General LAPORTE. And that is a very valid question, and it is something that Admiral Fargo and I have talked about a lot. And today, we testified earlier in another committee on that exact matter.

    Mr. Congressman, in December of last year, there was a security consultative meeting held between the Minister of National Defense of Korea and the Secretary of Defense. An outcome of that meeting was to conduct—they gave direction to conduct a future of the alliance study initiative.

    In October of this year, it will be the 50th anniversary of this alliance. We thought it was a good time to review this alliance in terms of roles, missions, force structure and basing. We are in the process of doing that. The decision was to initiate that study once the new President Roh Administration had taken over. And in fact, a day after the administration took over, our Department of Defense personnel were there beginning this review. No decisions were made because it is a bilateral negotiation. I think it is a very healthy thing to do and it gives us an opportunity not only to review, but reaffirm our commitment to the alliance.

    What results of that in terms of force structure is yet to be determined.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And you expect that again this summer?

    Admiral FARGO. The results of that? I think it will be within the next six months. That is our desire, prior to the next security consultative meeting, which would be scheduled some time in the fall in Seoul in concert with the 50th anniversary.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey, the chairman of the unconventional warfare and terrorism subcommittee, Mr. Saxton.

    Mr. SAXTON. First of all, thanks. Let me express my personal thanks for what you and your folks are doing. We all appreciate it very much.

    You both mentioned deterrent posture a couple of times. We understand how important that is and we understand the concept. I became a little bit concerned or confused, maybe is a better—confused, probably, knowing me when I heard Secretary Rumsfeld say a week or so ago that we were considering the possibility of moving some American troops away from the DMZ and possibly out of South Korea. Would you discuss that in terms of deterrent posture?

    General LAPORTE. Well, we have forces throughout the Peninsula, as you are well aware. We are in approximately 100 camps and stations. We have always had a desire to consolidate our forces, in fact, two years ago and it was finally approved this past fall by the Korean National Assembly. We have a plan called the Land Partnership Program.

    Mr. SAXTON. What was this?

    General LAPORTE. Land Partnership Program. And it is a partnership between the United States and Korea, and the goal was to consolidate from 41 major installations to 23 major installations—to scale and improve force protection, increased readiness, and it was a self-financing program where the Republic of Korea would be able to take the land that we gave back to them, sell it, and then buy land that would be more appropriate if it was in the right locations. So, we have always had a desire to restructure the basing that we have in South Korea.
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    This future of the alliance study that I just mentioned will really tell us in greater detail in terms of the future force structure. I think it is more important to talk about capabilities than necessarily force structure.

    We want to provide a significant amount of capabilities to add to the national security of the Peninsula of South Korea. The capabilities of both the South Korean military and the United States military have increased significantly in the past five years, and that is where we need to look to the future is not just a number associated with force structure, but a capability, and it is an enhanced capability, not a lessening of a commitment to a very staunch ally.

    Mr. SAXTON. Does it concern you at all—I am just asking this question. There is no inference that you are wrong or anything like that. You are obviously the expert among other experts dealing with this subject, but is there a concern that it may be perceived by the North as something less than strong deterrence?

    General LAPORTE. Well, I do not think we should ever turn a blind eye to North Korea. I mean, that is one of the main purposes for us being there. I think we will—whatever solutions that we end up with will be a very, very strong deterrent force because of the capabilities it will have.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Admiral Fargo, on another subject, some of our special forces are now in the Philippines. I understand that because of Philippine constitution, their activities are somewhat limited. Would you discuss that with us and tell us how you see it. Is there a solution?
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    Admiral FARGO. I would be happy to. First, I think it is important to recognize that the Philippines is a good friend and has been tremendously supportive in the Global War On Terrorism, and certainly, we would like to help them with their problems as I mentioned in my opening statement with the Abu Sayyaf Group, especially since they have been somewhat effective against them.

    The forces that we have right now in the Philippines—and we are doing a great deal for them right now. We have got 300 people in Zambowanga in southern Mindanao that are there to really do three things. One is to facilitate the security assistance effort and also to advise and assist the armed forces of the Philippines.

    That security assistance effort, which you provided some $25 million for over the last year, is providing a number of things that we think will improve their long-term capability to deal with terrorism. It is providing training for light reaction companies, for their battalions to give them the right skills, a night vision capability to allow them to go in and medivac people out at night, as well as teaching them how to fuse intelligence into an operation with the proper planning.

    So, that is the purpose of the 300 folks we have down there. We had a very successful operation about—that ended on the first of August on Basilan Island. This operation was—once again, this exercise, excuse me, was designed to train and advise and equip the armed forces of the Philippines.

    The net result of that was that by helping them, we were able to allow the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to separate the terrorists from the people. That was really the objective.
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    Mr. SAXTON. I thank you both.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    Ms. Sanchez.

    Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Admiral and General for being here before us today. I think some of the questions you are hearing from our side is because we are very concerned. We are not out in the Korean Peninsula right now and you all happen to be out in that part of the world trying to assess what the real crisis is with respect to North Korea and what our potential fighting forces—if something does go the wrong way out there in the near future, what we can really do and what we can really anticipate.

    I believe it was a couple of weeks ago, we had the Secretary of the Army and others before us and we—somebody asked the question about what if we were in Iraq and a front opened up on the Korean Peninsula. And I think the answer we got back was, it just better not because we do not have the troops. We have our operational forces, basically in Iraq right now with respect to the Army. Basically, the answer back, from my understanding was, ''It better not happen''.

    So, you juxtapose that against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld coming before us and saying, you know, we are looking at eliminating some of our troops in the DMZ area and we have become concerned, especially when you tell me that it is really conventional—a conventional army sitting on the other side of that. We are trying to assess, what is the truth here. Do we have enough forces there if something should happen? Do we really have them all operationally somewhere else in the world? Can we really remove troops in a significant way from the DMZ? What is the feeling? What is the feeling going on in South Korea with respect to having our troops there?
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    Either one of you could answer that.

    Admiral FARGO. Let me start out with the first part of that, just to make sure we have got a correct picture of our force posture right now in the Pacific, and then I will turn it over to General LaPorte.

    The Pacific—the Asian-Pacific force structure that I am responsible for, as I mentioned earlier, is actually more significant today, and the posture in place is stronger today than it was a year ago at this time. And we made very significant deployments to southwest Asia as a country, but the Asian-Pacific structure has been largely untouched. All of the forces remain on the Korean Peninsula. Japan is at the normal levels of strength.

    Air forces—our Pacific Air Forces have not had to deploy in any numbers to southwest Asia. The 25th Infantry Division is still in Hawaii. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force is still in Okinawa. So, our force structure in the Pacific has been largely untouched.

    Ms. SANCHEZ. General.

    General LAPORTE. We have 37,000 service members that are stationed there on a permanent basis. We have a tremendous ability to reinforce those 37,000 service members from all our components—from our air, naval and ground components, if required.

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    We spend a tremendous amount of time not only training the forces on the Peninsula to execute their missions, but also the forces that come to the Peninsula.

    Admiral Fargo mentioned the training event that will start when I return next week, reception staging, onward movement and integration. The training is designed to receive forces from off the Peninsula and immediately get them integrated into a role that they would add to either deterrence or in a combat role.

    We train on that all of the time and it is a very important mission. Again, we are part of an alliance. I command a Combined Forces Command, both ROK and U.S. forces. And the ROK military is a very, very capable military. It is well trained. It is highly motivated. It is well led. And they have very good equipment.

    We train together all the time, so interoperability issues have been resolved to a minimum.

    The CHAIRMAN. General, you might mention, in response to that question, the force structure of the ROK forces.

    General LAPORTE. They have——

    Ms. SANCHEZ. Are you going to make sure I get time for my second question, Mr. Chairman, since you kind of asked another question?

    The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, but this is an important part of the response.
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    If you put some numbers to that with respect to the ROK, that would be good.

    General LAPORTE. They have over 500,000 personnel on active duty. They have 24 divisions on active duty and they can mobilize up to 42 divisions. And they can mobilize in less then five days. They also train to that.

    The point I am trying to make is, as being part of the alliance, the Republic of Korea contributes a lot to the alliance. Their capabilities have also increased significantly in the past five years.

    We are always concerned about the threat up north. But today, I am very comfortable with where we sit relative to the forces we have on the Peninsula and the forces that I have currently involved with training on the Peninsula for the next 30 to 45 days.

    Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. So, then, just a quick response from each of you with respect to—I really believe it is almost like two and a half wars or fronts on our hands—the war on terrorism, which indications like the Philippines and other areas is draining our troops, the possibility of North Korea, and also Iraq. Can we handle all of that at the same time? That would just be a very quick question to you.

    The second question would be to the admiral who talked about needing, in response to Mr. Skelton's question, ''What do you need?'' You talked about missile defense. Just as a label, I am supposing you mean theater missile defense versus national missile defense with respect to your ability to handle your responsibilities in that part of the world.
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    And then, third, I would just like an assessment of, because we are spending so much time on North Korea and Iraq right now, what do you think is happening or is there any posturing or anything going on between China and Taiwan with respect to the situation we always find ourselves in right there?

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral FARGO. I guess there were three questions there, so let me see if I can—I will start from the top. First, we have a force sizing construct that allows us to win a war, swiftly defeat the enemy in another effort, and handle lesser contingencies, and that is the range that you covered, and I certainly think we can do that.

    The second piece is missile defense. We have actually taken all of these programs and put them under the term of the rubric of missile defense. Obviously, the piece of it that I am most concerned with is being able to defend our forces both ashore and at sea from short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. And the third piece is China and Taiwan. Right now, that situation and the rhetoric on both sides of the Peninsula is relatively calm.

    Ms. SANCHEZ. General.

    General LAPORTE. I will answer the question that really applies to the Peninsula. I am confident as we sit here today that we could defeat a North Korean attack into South Korea if it was to occur.

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    Ms. SANCHEZ. Even if we have what we anticipate-what we will have in the next few days, a war in Iraq on our hands as well as the terrorist threats that we are vetting out throughout the world.

    General LAPORTE. Yes, ma'am. I am confident that we could do that.

    Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, General.

    Thank you, gentlemen.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

    The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Admiral, thank you very much for your hospitality when I had the opportunity to visit your command headquarters. It is good to have you with us today.

    General, we also, on a prior trip, had the opportunity to visit with a number of your personnel on the Korean Peninsula. We had an opportunity to visit the DMZ. That was a memorable trip.

    Our service chiefs, each one of them now are compiling a list of unfunded priorities. Are you all at the table when this list is drawn up?
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    Admiral FARGO. I think the best way to answer that question, Mr. Bartlett, is that we submit a series of priorities to the Secretary of Defense, an integrated priority list that talks to the programs that we feel contribute in greatest measure to the combat capability that we need in our particular theater.

    We articulate those priorities in some significant depth and provide that to the Secretary and of course, that is provided to all of the service chiefs. And then, there is an exchange of information back and forth and questions where we work with the services, the joint staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to make sure that our priorities are well understood.

    These processes deal with an assessment of how the services have properly funded our programs. It is conducted by the Chairman and submitted to the Secretary of Defense.

    General LAPORTE. I submit my integrated priority list to Admiral Fargo, because I am a subunified commander under his command.

    Mr. BARTLETT. If you are uncomfortable with their list and its organization do you feel comfortable coming to us with your needs or do we have to invite you to do that?

    Unsolicited, do you feel comfortable coming to us or do we have to solicit that response from you.

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    Admiral FARGO. Well, I think we get ample opportunity to talk to the Congress. I mean, this is a good example of those types of sessions. So, I am very comfortable with the process.

    Mr. BARTLETT. If we asked you for your personal—from your command position, unfunded priorities list, you would give us that?

    Admiral FARGO. I, obviously, in my confirmation testimony said that I would provide my personal opinion to any question you asked. Certainly, the way we are structured right now is I provide my unfunded priorities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    Mr. BARTLETT. That was not quite my question. My question was, if we asked you for your list, would you give it to us?

    Admiral FARGO. I would provide it, but I would provide it through my boss, the Secretary of Defense.

    Mr. BARTLETT. And you would know that we had asked for it.

    Admiral FARGO. We will have to figure that out. There is not much he is not cognizant of.

    Mr. BARTLETT. You do not feel comfortable coming directly to us if we asked you.
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    Admiral FARGO. Well, I feel very comfortable testifying in front of this Congress and calling on the Congress and informing the Congress and giving you my personal opinion, but certainly when we are talking about the budgeting process, I ought to submit my recommendations through the chain of command.

    Mr. BARTLETT. We want you to do that. We would also like there to not be an impediment in an exchange between you and us. Is that reasonable?

    Admiral FARGO. Yes, sir. I think that is reasonable and I think there is a very solid and candid exchange between the unified commanders and the Congress.

    The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would yield, I think if the gentleman would ask Admiral Fargo what he needs, I think Admiral Fargo has already told him some of the requirements and I think he would continue to give that list.

    General LAPORTE. I would just add to what Admiral Fargo said, that I feel very comfortable—Admiral Fargo and I and the other combatant commanders have an opportunity to meet with the service component commanders and the members of the Joint Staff, and they are always soliciting our input. They see their main purpose as providing well-trained, equipped units for us.

    So, I think it is a very good dialogue that takes place between component commanders, the Department of Defense and the combatant commanders.

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    Mr. BARTLETT. General, I would like to, for a moment, come back to a question that was raised by Ms. Sanchez. If there was an attack from North Korea that was preceded by an advertent or inadvertent launch of a nuclear tipped missile straight up over North Korea, detonated above the atmosphere, producing a rather robust electromagnetic pulse (EMP) lay down, what is now your assessment of your war fighting capability. How much of that would remain after that incident?

    General LAPORTE. Well, definitely it would have an impact on some of our equipment. But we would still be able to function and execute our missions. We train and our equipment is capable of operating at what we call ''degraded modes'', where you do not have all the capabilities resident or present. But I am very comfortable we could continue to execute our mission. We would do it somewhat differently, but still, to the same level of effectiveness.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Are not they now waiving EMP hardening for essentially all the new weapons systems procurements?

    General LAPORTE. I am not certain of that.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Do you know, Admiral, whether they are or not?

    Admiral FARGO. I cannot answer the technical side of the question. I can tell you that in our planning efforts and the guidance we have received from the Secretary of Defense, we consider EMP.

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    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I would encourage you to go back and ask your units how much of their war fighting capability would remain if there was an EMP lay down and all of the computers and their equipment, all the microelectronics and their equipment was now non-functional.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. We will be—let me see, we will be moving on here. Before we do that, let me just exercise my discretion and—just following Mr. Bartlett's question, and I think with the partial answer that you gave earlier, you believe that you need to have a more robust missile defense capability.

    You sure would not turn down more Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) units. Is that right?

    Admiral FARGO. That is correct. Mr. Chairman, I think we do need to be able to deal with, as I said, the short-range, the medium-range ballistic missile systems. PAC–3 is one capability that we feel we need. We also need a capability to deal with a terminal and mid-range efforts from the sea, also.

    The CHAIRMAN. And you mentioned Predators? You need to have a more robust Predator fleet?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, the Predator has certainly shown itself to be tremendously capable in the Global War On Terrorism.
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    The CHAIRMAN. General LaPorte, was that your comment on Predators?

    General LAPORTE. Part of this would be a subset of the entire intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability that we could prove.

    The CHAIRMAN. So, you need more command, central communications, and computers (C4)/ISR assets? You need more airlift, sealift? You would like to see a more robust set of airlift and sealift dedicated to the theater.

    General LAPORTE. That would give us great capabilities in terms of reinforcing the Peninsula and also to do regional contingencies.

    The CHAIRMAN. And a greater store of precision munitions?

    General LAPORTE. Yes, sir.

    The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I think we have got a few of the questions answered here that Mr. Bartlett was highly interested in.

    Thank you. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte. It is good to have you here.
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    I read some really alarming reports about the state of Japan's preparedness. Even today's Wall Street Journal talked about the fact that if North Korea launched a missile toward Japan, that they effectively could do nothing to prevent it.

    Can you chat briefly about the state of Japan's preparedness? I know that there are political overtones and debate inside of Japan about the investments and the posture they want to take, but certainly as an alliance partner, they are key to us. If you could both just briefly talk about it—especially vulnerability.

    Admiral FARGO. Yes, I would be happy to. We have a joint program with Japan right now that is in the research and development phase that deals with missile defense. I think Japan recognizes very clearly that this is a serious concern based on all we know about missiles and proliferation.

    So, this program is moving forward. I think the Japanese are very attentive to this and it is a capability, as I mentioned earlier, I think we recognize as necessary throughout the theater.

    General LAPORTE. Japan is not in my area of responsibility. Admiral Fargo really has that in his.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.
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    The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral Fargo, since we are talking about Japan, if they were to not agree to allow the home porting of one of our nuclear carriers, what effect would this have on our ability to surge in the region should a war break out in the Korean Peninsula.

    Admiral FARGO. Well, obviously, that is a hypothetical question. I think our relationship with Japan is very strong. My view is that the Japanese both value the presence of the carrier battle group in northeast Asia and certainly support its presence.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. General, how necessary is the presence and the ability of the carrier battle groups to surge to Korea in the event of a war.

    General LAPORTE. Ma'am, Admiral Fargo gives me all the carriers that I need. The Navy is not under my responsibility; it is under Admiral Fargo's.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Okay. Then, Admiral Fargo, considering we have about six carriers engaged in operations right now surrounding Iraq, what is our ability to surge more to the region if a war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, we have a lot of options. I will not go into the specifics of those in an open session, but certainly, as I mentioned, we have another carrier on the West Coast of the United States that is—would be available. Certainly, as I mentioned, we have USS Nimitz going in behind Abraham Lincoln. One of those two carriers is going to be in the Pacific the vast majority of the next couple of months.
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    So, we have options to move additional aircraft carriers should a situation develop that would demand it.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, from 1998 to 2001, we gapped our presence for the aircraft carrier battle group to within three steam days of the Taiwan Strait for 336 days. Do you see this situation improving in the near-term, and what are the near-, mid- and far-term risks associated with the gapping of our presence within the three steam days?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, I think the current situation reflects exactly what we believe to be important. We moved the USS Kitty Hawk to the gulf because she was ready and in a position to and it made great sense. At the same time, we also thought that it was important to maintain continuous presence within northeast Asia and that is the reason that Carl Vinson is in the Western Pacific right now.

    So, I think those steps reflect the degree of importance that we place on this issue.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. If I heard the answer correctly earlier, and I do not remember who asked it, you said—I think it was Mr. Skelton—that we only have one carrier battle group in the Western Pacific that is stationed there permanently. Is that correct?

    Admiral FARGO. That is correct. We only have one that is homeported there in the Western Pacific. That does not mean we cannot deploy carriers there and we do not routinely deploy other carriers into that region.
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    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, if I am correct, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for the U.S. to homeport a second aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, and we have not done that. Is that correct?

    Admiral FARGO. I will have to check what the actual word said. It talked to an increased presence of aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific, not homeporting.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Admiral.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

    Mr. Langevin.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.

    Like many of my colleagues, I am very concerned about Kim Jong Il's increasingly volatile rhetoric and aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities. Certainly, he has made a conscious decision to escalate tensions over this situation.

    As the U.S. continues to assess the potential threat of North Korea, how confident are you in our ability to gain accurate intelligence about their capabilities and their intention. What can the Congress do to improve intelligence operations in Korea? Probably more importantly, in your experience and from your vantage point, how do you see the situation in Korea playing itself out? What do you see as the next steps that North Korea would likely take or would likely take given the situation?
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    General LAPORTE. I could give you a very detailed answer to your question, Mr. Congressman, in a closed session, but let me attempt to address it.

    We have good capabilities of monitoring the capability, the conventional capability of the North Korean military. The intent of Kim Jong Il is very difficult to determine because it is such a closed society and they do not allow much access from external forces.

    So, it would be very difficult for us to know the decision making process and the intent. But in terms of its conventional capabilities, we have a good opportunity to observe. Could we enhance that? Yes. I am talking about indications and warnings of a potential attack.

    If we were to get into combat, our ability to find the weapons systems that he has and the troops would be of great concern to us, because he has developed a tremendous underground capability in terms of underground facilities that he has dug over the years. So, being able to identify these with precision and then being able to take direct actions against him is something that we would work on.

    I am sorry. The second part of your question was——

    Mr. LANGEVIN. The second part of the question was, from your vantage point, how do you see this situation playing itself out? What do you—your best estimate? Where do you see this going? Where do you think their next steps could be or would be?

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    General LAPORTE. Well, I think he could continue to increase tensions through many, many ways in terms of testing a missile, having some type of provocation with a reconnaissance aircraft along the Demilitarized Zone, in the transportation corridors that have been developed, possible provocations out in the West Sea.

    There is the possibility that he could do it on underground nuclear tests. I do not think that would be the case, but those are all continued escalatory steps to gain his political end-state, which is to guarantee the survival of the regime and to gain economic assistance for his failed economy.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral.

    Admiral FARGO. I agree with General LaPorte. I would not be surprised to see further provocations of some variety. I think what is important here is that we work with our regional allies, with Japan and the Republic of Korea. China obviously has a vested interest in this, too. It is important for North Korea to understand that this is unacceptable behavior from not only a regional standpoint, but an international standpoint.

    Certainly, the ability to produce nuclear weapons grade material and proliferate it is an international concern. He needs to understand that this kind of behavior is not going to further his objectives.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, gentlemen.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen.
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    The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

    Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a question at this time. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam.

    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome Admiral Fargo. It is nice to see you here again. We see each other quite often coming from Guam and General LaPorte. I thank you both for coming to testify before the committee.

    I would first like to thank you, Admiral, for the comments you made this morning at the military construction hearing regarding securing MILCON funds for the Navy and Air Force's typhoon recovery efforts on Guam.

    I want to work with you to keep up the pressure to deliver the emergency recovery funds for our troops. Their housing and base facilities must be repaired. We know that. I appreciate your presence and the general today to draw our focus to the issues you face as commanders of the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Forces Korea.

    It is because Guam is so intimately involved in these issues that I strongly support the work that you both do. And I have a couple of questions.

    The first has to do with South Korea. Secretary Rumsfeld has recently stated his desire to move U.S. troops from South Korea. He suggested that U.S. forces be arranged at an air hub and sea hub where they would have more flexibility to respond to this crisis.
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    As our Chairman Hunter noted in his recent Wall Street Journal opinion piece, Guam has seen an increase of temporarily stationed forces. We would certainly—and we certainly support the idea of more permanently stationed forces, fully utilizing both our air and sea facilities.

    What role do you see, Admiral, for Guam as a permanent hub for the U.S. forces, ready to respond to events not only on the Korean Peninsula, but, say, any other areas in the Pacific or Asia that might be facing a crisis.

    Admiral FARGO. I think that is something I think about very frequently and it is a big part of our planning at the Pacific Command. First off, let me tell the whole committee what I have told you a number of times before.

    We think Guam is not only hugely important, but strategic in terms of our planning. It has a wealth of ability to support our forces logistically with maintenance capability and, certainly, the capabilities of a place like Anderson Air Force Base and a secure harbor like we have at Apra, are hugely important to us.

    With a number of initiatives that are already underway, as you know, we have moved three fast attack submarines to Guam, which is a very logical move based on the submarine tender that we already have there. We currently have a bomber deployment that is at Anderson as we speak.

    Certainly, our view is that there are other efforts that might make equal sense in the future. Certainly, Guam's capability at Anderson would be a very logical place to put intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets because of its location; and as General LaPorte and I have both identified, that is a key priority for us in the future.
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    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. General, do you have any comments on that?

    General LAPORTE. No, ma'am.

    Ms. BORDALLO. All right. My second question then is, at the February 13, 2002 budget hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Vernon Clark, who the Chief of Naval Operations said to my predecessor that the Quadrennial Defense Review guidance about homeporting additional surface combatants, a cruise missile submarine, and an aircraft carrier battle group in the Western Pacific would be reflected in the fiscal year 2004 budget. Where are we, Admiral, in this review process, and what else needs to occur before the QDR decisions, such as stationing these assets in Guam?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, we are conducting a very thorough review in the Pacific Command. As I mentioned in my opening statement, what I am doing is taking the strategic guidance, which is provided to me by the Secretary of Defense and the President, and I am operationalizing that in six particular areas that we expect will make great sense and will answer precisely the kinds of questions that you have posed here today.

    We are not there yet. We are still working through this and talking to the Secretary about it, but in terms of updating our plans, looking at our command and control constructs, looking at new operating advantages and deciding what our future force posture and footprint ought to look like, it is a high priority and one that we are working very closely with the Secretary on right now.
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    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral. On my next trip to Guam, I will be stopping by your headquarters in Hawaii.

    Admiral FARGO. I look forward to it.

    Ms. BORDALLO. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady from Guam.

    The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, Admiral for coming. I apologize again, as we discussed before this hearing began, today is a day of competing committee hearings.

    I do not think that you have had the opportunity to discuss much Indonesia in these hearings. It is a huge country, the largest Muslim country in the world, I believe—the site of an attack, a terrorist attack earlier. Many of our friends in Australia, families suffered losses. Can you bring us up to speed on what is happening there, and is that turning into a tinderbox or is it something that you think we have got a pretty good handle on?

    Admiral FARGO. Yes, sir. I am a glass that is half-full person on Indonesia. I think—as you point out, this is a tremendously important place; a moderate, secular Muslim government that, certainly, we would like to see succeed. They have been very cooperative on the Bali investigation, and much of what we have learned about the Jamaah al-Islamiyah, (JI) and many of the arrests that have been made, have certainly been facilitated by the Indonesian government.
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    We have arrested the number three person in the JI as a result of this, so we are making strides here. Part of that effort is a result of the cooperation we have had from Indonesia. They also have a peace accord that is in place with respect to Ache. That is good. We would hope that that would hold up. And they are trying to create the kind of reform that a fragile and new democracy finds important, legislation such that they can separate the military out of the political process.

    There is one area that we are not comfortable with: The Papua investigation. We are certainly dissatisfied with that at this point. But fundamentally, we believe that the kind of reform that breeds accountability for the military, a clear understanding of the responsiveness of the military to civilian leadership and a solid respect for the rule of law, are the kinds of things that we ought to encourage, and we are. And programs such as IMET, which was restored this year, we think are tremendously important toward that objective.

    IMET is the International Military and Education Training program.

    Mr. KLINE. Could you give us some kind of idea as to the extent of that and what, if any, other joint or sort of training operations you might be conducting there?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, let me talk about IMET first and also the regional defense counterterrorist fellowships, which are the two programs we are using in the Pacific Command, or will use in the Pacific Command to engage in. Right now, we have a number of officers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School. And we believe that kind of activity is exactly what will reinforce those values that we believe to be particularly important.
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    We also believe that we need to start programs like English language training; and the best of this military, the folks that will be in key leadership positions for the future, and get them the basic English language training so that they can benefit from our schools in the future.

    We still participate in an exercise Navy to Navy called CARAT, which is Cooperation and Readiness and Training Afloat, which provides them a chance to interact with us in non-lethal skills and we continue to invite them to places like the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies to give them, once again, that kind of grounding that is particularly important as they develop their democracy.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Ryan.

    Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also apologize. I have a couple other committees and I do not know if you answered this question, but understanding what North Korea is doing and the missile tests, et cetera, is South Korea the biggest threat from any kind of maneuvering from North Korea, or would you expect some sort of random act.

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    General LAPORTE. In terms of what North Korea might do, is that your question?

    Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir.

    General LAPORTE. North Korea is preparing to conduct any type of conventional attack at South Korea. In terms of escalation relative to the nuclear development issue, it is highly likely that he will continue to politically escalate the situation. Potential provocations could be the reprocessing of the spent fuel rods in the Pyongyang. It could be some type of provocation along the Demilitarized Zone, in either the transportation corridors or the joint security area. It could be some type of provocation in the West Sea or it could be some type of provocation with reconnaissance aircraft that fly in international air space.

    It is more likely that you would see one of those types of provocations as he continues to politically escalate.

    Mr. RYAN. Do you have any comments, Admiral?

    Admiral FARGO. No, I think General LaPorte has outlined that pretty clearly.

    Mr. RYAN. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    I call on the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Bishop.

    Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General, Admiral, I also apologize for coming late, so I will make up for it by leaving early. So, if you have answered this question, I apologize and I will read it in the minutes, but I have a special interest in the Philippines. And I was wondering if you have not so, if you would comment simply on the political realities. Has that hampered our efforts to assist them? Is the area basically still confined to the south or is it spreading northward. And specifically, do you have recommendations where we can be of assistance in helping you in that particular area.

    I also-my kid speaks Tagalog, but I realize that does not help very far past south of Manila down there. And specifically, are we providing you with enough information. Is our language program that we are providing in need of more revenue and enabled to expand into areas like this where we have specific languages? Is the training adequate to get you the information that you need in that particular place.

    Once again, if you have already covered those, I will wait and read it later. I apologize.

    Admiral FARGO. I covered some if it, but let me add a little bit to my original comments. First of all, in regard to your specific question on language training, I think we are in pretty good shape there, really, in terms of the Philippines. I go through and look at where I am short on linguists and cryptolinguists and the Philippines is not one of those areas, so I am pretty comfortable with that.
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    Once again, I think we are continuing to look for ways to help the government of the Philippines for all the right reasons. They are a mutual defense treaty partner of many, many years. They have been a staunch supporter in the Global War On Terrorism. You have done a lot already. The money that you have provided for security assistance, the security assistance program that allows us to meet our long-term objective, which is to ensure the AFP has a sustained capability to deal with counterterrorism, that is really key.

    We want to—you know, this will not be a one-year program. It will be something that will have to continue over a number of years to ensure that they can do—that they can be effective in dealing with these different terrorist groups.

    Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Admiral.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from San Diego, my distinguished colleague, Ms. Davis.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome to you, Admiral Fargo and also to General LaPorte. A belated congratulations to you.

    We have touched on a number of issues already and I apologize, as well. We are trying to do several things at one time here.

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    The issue of cryptolinguists and linguists just came up and perhaps you addressed it earlier and you just mentioned where we are really short in this. And I am wondering whether we are putting the proper emphasis, whether we are putting it in the right place when it comes to the training, the deployment, use of reserves. What could and should we be doing more, because one of the issues that we continually hear about is the fact that we may have all the equipment in the world, but if we do not know where the bad guys are, it is not going to help.

    If you have addressed this fully earlier, I——

    Admiral FARGO. I have not addressed it fully and I would be happy to provide a few thoughts on this. You know, cryptolinguists are really a difficult discipline, because you not only have to have the language skills that allow you to be a cryptolinguist, but you also have to have the cryptological training that allows you to employ that language skill effectively.

    So, it takes time to develop these folks. I think the things that you talked about are all parts of the solution. Certainly, we need to recruit people that can make a contribution in this area very specifically that have those right language skills. We need to make sure we have got good databases of our people in the reserves that have these language skills and then provide them the appropriate training so we can target those reserve capabilities in the right direction. And we also need to look at native speakers, too.

    So, all three of those are probably parts of the solution to ensuring we have got the right capacity in terms of linguists and cryptolinguists.

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    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. As you look at the priorities that we set and whether or not we are really giving it the attention and some of that may be, you know, basic education as well in terms of changing the way our schools really approach the whole issue of being multilingual.

    Is that an area that gets really short shrift, and what should we be doing then?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, this is a personal opinion and it is not based on a lot of data, but certainly, I think, language skills in our secondary schools or high schools, even starting earlier than that is very important.

    When I travel in Asia, I find that most of those countries have multiple language skills. We need, obviously, a broader base of Americans with these skills that can make a contribution, not just on the military level, but on the economic level, on the diplomatic level and so on.

    So, I would certainly encourage any effort to broaden that within our educational system.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess what I am looking for is having that rise to the issue of national security and whether there is really a role to play there, and perhaps when you are sitting and working through the priorities that we set, perhaps that could get better attention. If we need to be pushing harder, I would appreciate knowing that. I think you are suggesting that.
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    But we may need to be doing something quite dramatic in the way that we address that issue, because I do not think it is going to get better if we do not.

    Admiral FARGO. Well, I think it is important to America and in the environment we are going to see ahead. It is a very globalized world.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. On just a few other quick questions. I think you raised the specter and the need, really, to gain, of course, more intelligence and to work in a way that we locate underground facilities in Korea and I know there are certain things that you cannot go beyond that, perhaps, in this testimony.

    But that would be a great concern in terms of what we would need to do to further our interests in understanding that better and whether we are getting—is that getting the attention it deserves. Are we focusing enough attention on how we determine the extent to that—the extent to which that exists and would be used against South Korea or other countries in the region?

    Admiral FARGO. My sense is that we are very focused on this in the Department of Defense. It is part of all of the discussions that I have with the senior leadership. I think we recognize this very clearly today, and people are pressing hard to find ways to improve our intelligence capability across the full-spectrum of its contribution.

    General LAPORTE. I agree with Admiral Fargo. I think we are focused. This is an adaptive behavior that North Korea adopted to protect itself from our intelligence capabilities and our tremendous air capabilities. So, they have gone underground.
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    We focus on this because that is where the threat is that we are going to have to address if the time comes.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And just finally, night vision equipment—does everybody have proper equipment and night vision. Do they have it fully in Iraq? Perhaps not in Korea or is it—is it all over? I know when we visited Afghanistan back in July, it was a concern that they did not have enough equipment for night vision.

    General LAPORTE. I am comfortable with the—our service members have been equipped, both our aviators and our ground component forces with the night vision equipment that gives them a distinctive advantage at night.

    Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

    The very distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo?

    Okay. And the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Wilson.

    Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also apologize for being in two places at once today. I thank you both for coming here. As a young lieutenant, my first assignment was at intel center Pacific. And, of course, that meant I was really the officer in charge of beach volleyball and little else of use, but I appreciate you being here and the challenges and the responsibilities that both of you have.
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    I did want to ask you about China. This is more of a long-term question than a short-term one. We know that they have purchased or are in the process of purchasing eight submarines, at least, from the Russians that may pose a threat to Taiwan, but also may challenge our power in the region. They are increasing the accuracy of their short-range ballistic missiles using U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) data, as I understand it.

    And we are seeing defense budget growth there, which if compounded over time, may change some things in the region that you have responsibility for. And I wonder if you would reflect with us a little bit on the mid- and long-term threats you see from China, and what your perspective is on that.

    Admiral FARGO. Well, I think that China is—certainly their economic growth right now, which is pretty substantial; there are lots of numbers thrown around in the neighborhood of ten percent a year—has fueled a military modernization, if you will.

    And it has included precisely the pieces that you have identified—the number of kilo submarines that they are purchasing, have purchased and are purchasing additional ones from Russia. They have bought a Sovremenny-class ship and the associated missiles, and as you have pointed out very clearly, they have also invested significantly in expanding their short-range and medium-range ballistic missile capability.

    This is something that we pay very close attention to. It has not reached a point that I feel that the balance across the strait is out of balance at this point. But fundamentally, the larger issue is what is the intent. And certainly, we would be much more comfortable, and would encourage China to discontinue the statements that they might use force to resolve this particular situation.
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    Mrs. WILSON. I know there are limitations in this setting, but are there anything—is there anything you see with respect to North Korea and its relationship to the Chinese military that causes you any additional concern on the Korean Peninsula.

    Admiral FARGO. My view is that China, first of all, has stated that they believe it is important to have a non-nuclear, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. And I believe that is their honest view; that they see it in their best interest to have a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

    Mrs. WILSON. General, do you have anything to add to that?

    General LAPORTE. No. I think it is very difficult for us to make assessments of China's military interaction with North Korea. I believe it is limited, but I really could not give you a good answer on that.

    Mrs. WILSON. One final question that has to do with seaborne ballistic missile defense and its potential initial operating capability. How important is that capability to you in the Pacific?

    Admiral FARGO. Well, I would say I think it is pretty important. The ability to be able to move a ship, to provide a missile defense capability is hugely valuable to me. One of the problems is nobody's crystal ball is completely clear here as to what threats will emerge and where they will emerge based on the kind of proliferation that is potential and in the world today.
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    And so, the ability to move a ship and to provide a missile defense for forces both ashore and in the sea, I think would be a huge advantage.

    Mrs. WILSON. Thank you. I know it is a long hike to get here and I appreciate your willingness to spend some time with us today. Thanks.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady, and I want to recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Missouri, for another question.

    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Admiral, headlines in the Washington Post a good number of days ago talked about additional American troops to the Philippines. And there seemed to be a problem that somebody on their side, it appeared, did not see that there was a constitutional impediment. Has that been cleared up?

    Admiral FARGO. Mr. Skelton, I think we are working very closely with the Philippines at my level of the armed forces of the Philippines and certainly with the government of the Philippines.

    I think the Philippines very much would like to continue this partnership that we have had in terms of the United States providing them help for their fight. I mean, this is very clearly——

    Mr. SKELTON. No. I understand that. But there is a constitutional—Philippine constitutional problem. Has that been overcome?
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    Admiral FARGO. The Philippine constitution talks to the foreign forces being present in combat operations on their soil. We have no intention in the past or in the future of putting together any plan whatsoever that violates the Philippine constitution. I mean, I am not going to do that. That is not our way.

    Mr. SKELTON. But we can still be of help to them, I hope.

    Admiral FARGO. I think we can still be of help to them. We certainly were a huge help to them in the Basilan exercise that we conducted that was called Balakatan.

    Mr. SKELTON. Is our help on track?

    Admiral FARGO. I think our help is on track. I have made pretty clear proposals and I think that they will be along the lines of training and advising and assisting the armed forces of the Philippines.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, sir.

    General, the International Herald Tribune quoted the South Korean defense minister as saying that South Korea had not been informed of the possibility of troop movements to the south. He was of the opinion that his government would not discuss such movements until after the present crisis is passed.

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    Would you comment on that, please, sir?

    General LAPORTE. The minister of defense Cho has been the minister of defense for about 10 days now. I have met with him twice since he has taken office—once in my headquarters and then the evening before I came to Washington, I met with him.

    His staff, his Minister of National Defense policy staff is involved with the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy staff in discussing the future of the alliance in terms of the roles, missions, structure and basing that I talked about earlier.

    I have not had a chance to talk to Minister Cho. I saw the same comment, so when I go back to Korea, I will be meeting with the minister and talking to him.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. I have got—Mr. Saxton has got another question, and so does Mr. Taylor. So, Mr. Saxton, go ahead.

    Mr. SAXTON. I would like to discuss the issue of smallpox as it relates to the region—your area of responsibility. There was a newspaper article that ran in the New York Times in June of 1999, which raised suspicion that both Iraq and North Korea had acquired weaponized smallpox.
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    A Russian defector to this country, who most of us on this committee know at this point, Dr. Ken Alibek, said in secret briefings that Russia had grown vast quantities of smallpox virus for war and that Russian scientists sought new ways to support themselves when the Soviet system collapsed. Samples of the virus might have been sold or hidden. In May 1994, a report by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) citing an unidentified source, whose credibility had been questioned by some experts, echoes Dr. Alibek's worry.

    It said that some of the Russian smallpox had been sent to Iraq and North Korea, naming no other nations. Another discovery prompted even a stronger suspicion that Iraq was working on smallpox, which is not in your area of responsibility (AOR), but still part of this story. In the mid-1990s, inspectors found a special apparatus for freeze-drier labeled ''smallpox'' at a maintenance shop of the state established for medical appliances marketing.

    I guess, in short, my question is, can you comment on what your expectations of the capabilities of North Korea, and if you want to venture over to Iraq, that is fine, too.

    If it is information you cannot discuss, you can say that, too.

    General LAPORTE. I think I could give you a better response in another setting than this setting.

    Mr. SAXTON. That is fine. We will do that. Thank you.

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    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. General LaPorte, I read with some dismay on page 26 of your testimony about the pay disparities between a soldier in Bosnia and a soldier in Korea and particularly given the level of threat as articulated by the President and people in the press, I was curious if in this year's defense budget request the President had addressed that, or is this an unfunded priority of yours?

    General LAPORTE. I appreciate the fact that you read my testimony and pulled that out. To be honest with you, Mr. Congressman——

    Mr. TAYLOR. I wish you had mentioned it in your testimony.

    General LAPORTE. It is a concern of mine. It was a concern of my predecessor that there is a paid disparity for service members who serve in Korea compared to service members who were serving overseas and other areas. Service members in other areas get tax relief. They get to keep their separate rations. They get hazardous duty pay.

    The service members in Korea are not allowed to keep their separate rations. They have no tax relief. They have no cost of living allowance given to them that other service members get. They do receive a hardship duty pay. The service members in the Second Infantry Division receive $150 a month and all the other service members in Korea receive $50 a month.

    This is a challenge to us as people consider having an assignment to Korea. Financially, they can look around and say it is a much better deal to go to Kuwait or go to Bosnia than it is to go to Korea. So, it is a concern to us. It is an unfunded requirement.
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    The services have, perhaps, the opportunity to pay a distribution incentive pay. That is being discussed, but basically, it is an unfunded requirement. But I keep raising it because I think it is the right thing to do for the service members.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And to that point, are you prohibited from writing to members of the committee that have responsibility for personnel and pay matters, a letter making them aware of this?

    Again, it was buried in a fairly large packet of information. I think that is something that the members of that subcommittee very much need to be aware of. I think a letter from you would go a large way towards addressing that if you are in a position where you can do that.

    The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would yield.

    Mr. TAYLOR. The general could consider that we have elicited further information. A letter, if he could send it to us, but I think the key here is to have him give us the disparity between what folks in other theaters receive and what you receive in Korea. You said that they get $150, separate rations in the Second Division. But if you got all of the treatment, all the tax treatment and the pay treatment you get in other theaters, what would that mean to the E–6 and maybe an O–1, O–2.

    General LAPORTE. Mr. Chairman, I can provide that to the committee. I have given it to other members as they have toured Korea, but I would be more than happy to provide that. I provided that to the service chiefs and to the Department of Defense.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, General, that would be more like a rifle shot at the target than a scatter shot over a sprinkling of Congressmen.

    General LAPORTE. I will be glad to do that.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman have a question on this point here? Mr. Kline?

    Mr. KLINE. I do, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, your soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that are stationed in Okinawa and other posts, do they receive the same pay as the generals do in Korea or are they compensated like those in Bosnia and Kosovo and so forth?

    Admiral FARGO. Congressman, it is a little different in each location. In Japan, there is a cost of living allowance that is pretty substantial. And of course, it floats based on how the yen moves with respect to the dollar.

    The other difference in a place like Japan is that 90 percent of our people are housed in facilities that are pretty modern and have been built for the Japanese facilities improvement program.

    Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. I do not want to take up the time. My point is that when we are getting this comparison that we ought to include not just comparisons with Bosnia and Kosovo, but also other duty stations like Okinawa, for example.
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    Admiral FARGO. We can certainly do that.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. Sounds good. You know, Mr. Wilson, I am—please accept my apologies. I forgot to call on you when you came in here 20, 30 minutes ago. Do you have any questions?

    Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I want to apologize. I missed the presentation, but I think the chairman will even accept this. I was invited to a meeting at the White House with the President, so I apologize. But I look forward to reading the materials. I have been reading from the moment I got here, and I want to thank you for your service.

    The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

    And gentlemen, let me follow up on a question that was asked of you earlier. Ms. Davis has left, but I think she asked a question to the effect, are you concerned about intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or theater ballistic missiles.

    We now have a missile defense agency that has taken what I would call a seamless approach to missile defense; that is, we want to be able to defend against slow, medium-speed and fast missiles. And the longer-range missiles happen to be the fastest, and the medium-range missiles happen to be about medium-speed, and the old and the very short-range ones, the ones I call the ''Model-Ts'' of ballistic missiles, but nonetheless very deadly, Scud-type missiles are the shorter-range and move at a slower speed.
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    But I have asked this question before. The North Koreans are building the Taepo Dong–2 (TD–2) that has—according to some published reports can get pretty close to the West Coast of the United States.

    That missile, a faster missile, a longer-range missile could be shot at American troops in theater, could it not, simply by giving it a higher trajectory, instead of a flatter trajectory, taking it up high and bringing it down fast?

    Admiral FARGO. Mr. Chairman, there is a range of missiles out there, and in some cases, because of the speed and trajectory of the missile, there is a minimum range, too. But either way, even if the Taepo Dong–2 missile—if our troops were inside its range, the No Dong missile, and of course, the Scuds, which provide a range of capability on down, are certainly within range of our troops and need to be dealt with.

    The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that and I understand that we have systems that can handle the slower missiles, the medium-range missiles, and the PAC–3 system, for example, and PAC–2. But my question is, does not it make sense to have a defensive system-if you would have your druthers, to have a defensive system that can handle slow, medium and fast, because there is no law against the adversary shooting you in theater with a fast missile. There is no requirement that they only use slow missiles to take on our troops in theater.

    Admiral FARGO. Yes, sir. It absolutely does.

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    The CHAIRMAN. Have you folks had any folks look at the—or analyze out the potential for just shooting a high trajectory, high capability missile at troops in theater.

    Admiral FARGO. I will have to take that for the record. I cannot provide you the kind of answer that you deserve.

    The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think we know the answer. I want you to take a look at it.

    Admiral FARGO. Sir, will do.

    The CHAIRMAN. The reason I say that is I think you hit the nail on the head in response to Ms. Wilson's questions about the importance of being able to utilize seaborne missile defense. Makes sense to be able to picket an area of difficulty, whether it Ps Peninsular or someplace else and protect your troops in that theater.

    You want to have, I think, as much capability as possible in that seaborne defense, because you may have to handle fast-moving stuff. And, of course, if you have some fairly fast-moving stuff that is coming at American targets that are a long way off, if you can get them early, in the ascent phase, but you can get them with a high-performance missile defense system. That is obviously a capability you want to have.

    So, we are looking at the results of the most recent sea-based test that we have undertaken, which have been pretty good, been pretty encouraging. And I would like to get—as we move down the line, Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte—get your take on what you would like to have in terms of requirements.
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    But I think the bad guys are looking at the potential of using some fairly high-performance stuff. I think they are going to concede at some point the ability of our Patriot systems to take down the Scuds. I think they are going to move to higher-performance capability and we are going to have to move accordingly or we are going to have a problem.

    Does that make sense?

    The WITNESSES. Yes, sir.

    The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody else want to ask any follow up questions? In that case, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. Thanks for your service to our country. You have made a little sojourn here to testify. We appreciate that. We look forward to being with you soon on the Peninsula to—General, I know there are a number of members in the committee who would like to get out there and see our troops, so let's keep working this problem in our meetings. I think some of the things we briefed on this morning, I think were very valuable. Let's follow up on that. Hopefully we can do some good things in this coming budget to give you some of the what I would call the leverage items, that I think are important for your area of the world.

    So, Admiral and General, thank you.

    [Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]