SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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[H.A.S.C. No. 10823]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005H.R. 4200
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
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TITLE IIIOPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
DIVISION BMILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS
MARCH 18, 2004
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado, Chairman
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
KEN CALVERT, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCJEFF MILLER, Florida
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
ROB BISHOP, Utah
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
Mary Ellen Fraser,Professional Staff Member
B. Ryan Vaart, Professional Staff Member
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCDiane W. Bowman, Staff Assistant
Danleigh S. Halfast, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
Thursday, March 18, 2004, Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization ActTraining Transformation: Examination of the Joint National Training Capability
Thursday, March 18, 2004
THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004
FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACTTRAINING TRANSFORMATION: EXAMINATION OF THE JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CAPABILITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Readiness Subcommittee
Bailey, Michael, Ph.D., Technical Director, Technology Division, Training and Education Command, U.S. Marine Corps
Hart, Rear Adm. David, Director, Fleet Readiness Division, Department of the Navy
Mayberry, Hon. Paul, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness)
Nash, Maj. Gen. Gordon, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Director, Joint Training, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Seip, Brig. Gen. Norman, Deputy Director, Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Department of the Air Force
Weber, Brig. Gen. Louis, Director of Training, Directorate, Department of the Army
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[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Bailey, Dr. Michael P.
Hart, Adm. David T. Jr.
Mayberry, Dr. Paul W.
Nash, Maj. Gen. Gordon C.
Seip, Brig. Gen. Norman R.
Weber, Brig. Gen. Louis W.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Documents can be viewed in the hard copy.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
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FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACTTRAINING TRANSFORMATION: EXAMINATION OF THE JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CAPABILITY
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee joint with Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 18, 2004.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. HEFLEY. If you will find your places. The committee will come to order.
I hope we are going to get a bigger crowd up here than we have at the desk down there. This is not the way it ought to work.
This is a joint hearing, as you know, between the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Readiness. I am looking around to see how joint it is. I think the only joint is I am on both committees. Mr. Saxton had a prior engagement and he should be back here in a few minutes. We hope we get some more folks. In case he is not back in time, I would like, without objection, to put his opening statement in the record.
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A motto often touted by the services is, ''train how you fight.'' As is demonstrated in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, we fight in a joint manner, yet there has been limited joint training. Thus, the concept of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), is significant. If successful, the Joint National Training Capability will enable the military services to train and to conduct exercises as a joint and combined team. Then, when necessary, they will be able to fight as a joint and combined team.
The Joint National Training Capability is not a place or a center, rather, it is a concept in which the military services train and conduct exercises together, using virtual, constructive and life forces. This afternoon, we will hear testimony on policy and guidance changes that are necessary to implement JNTC, as well as testimony from the first JNTC exercise carried out in January.
I hope to have a better understanding after today's hearing of the various roles that the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Forces Command, and the military services play in JNTC. Although it certainly seems intuitive that joint training will improve readiness, I hope to learn how we measure the success of JNTC.
Let me now turn to my good friend from Texas, the Honorable Solomon Ortiz, for any remarks he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
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Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing today. I join you in welcoming our guests and our colleagues from the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. Members of our distinguished panel, we thank you for visiting with us today. What you do is very, very important, and I look forward to learning how we can help you. I am constantly amazed by how proficient our military forces are, and I know all of us are very, very proud.
Our young servicemen and women continually surpass all expectations in whatever situation we put in front of them. In part, this is as a result of great leadership. But it also is due to the emphasis our forces put on tough, realistic training. This training stresses all parts of our forces and provides them with what they need to survive and win in today's demanding operational environments.
But today's operational environments have evolved into highly complex, multi-dimensional affairs. Today, young men and women on the ground struggle to understand all the little details of tribal tensions, how they affect our patrol route. For example, senior officers now must integrate not just the four services, but also multiple government agencies and coalition forces to act in concert with one another. The challenges at every level are enormous, and this complexity will only grow in the future.
This is why our ability to train our forces must evolve as well. We owe those on the front lines the best preparation we can provide them, and we must move to expand our training capability to meet the increasing demands of the future. It is worth noting that joint U.S. military operations in the 21st century have taken place over vast areas. For example, operations in Afghanistan require the Navy and Marine Corps teams to extend their combat power some 700 miles inland from the Arabian sea, coming from a region that is rich with resources, that can support long-range disbursed training events on land, at sea and in the air.
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I am particularly interested to hear our witnesses thoughts on what additional support the JNTC might require as it develops and expands. I believe that the Joint National Training Capability is an exciting step in that direction, and I look forward to listening to your testimony. Again, welcome to this panel today.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
I would now like to introduce the witnesses. Each of you, if you would, make your brief statement, and your entire statement without objection will be made a part of the record.
First, the Hon. Paul Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness; Maj. Gen. Gordon Nash, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center and Director for Joint Training, U.S. Joint Forces Command; Brig. Gen. Louis Weber, Director of Training, Training Directorate, United States Army; Rear Adm. David Hart, Director, Fleet Readiness Division, Department of the Navy; Brig. Gen. Norman Seip, Deputy Director of Operations and Training and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Department of the Air Force; and Dr. Michael Bailey, Technical Director For the Technology Division, Training and Education Command, U.S. Marine Corps.
Mr. HEFLEY. We will start with you, Secretary Mayberry, and move down the line. One of the things I have mentioned to General Nash and you, Secretary Mayberry, in private conversations, but one of the things I would like for you all to share with us, is your vision of is this jointness for real? That is all we are hearing now is jointness, jointness, jointness. It makes so much sense. You would think that is exactly what we would do. But then we have gone through a lot of styles and a lot of cliches over the years, and things come and things go.
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So I would like a feeling when we come out of this hearing of whether this effort toward jointness is something that is going to have enduring qualities that we will continue to use, or if there is still cultural resistance within the various services, to the point that this may be another fad that is here today and gone tomorrow.
With that, Secretary Mayberry, I turn the time over to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL MAYBERRY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (READINESS)
Dr. MAYBERRY. Thank you very much, Chairman. Distinguished Members, it certainly is a pleasure to be here to discuss not only our strategy, but also our progress in transforming training in the Department of Defense.
Today we have brought our joint team to your joint hearing, and we are here to discuss joint training. So I certainly appreciate you designing this most appropriate forum in which we can discuss the future direction for how we are jointly preparing our Armed Forces.
I have one very simple message here, sir, and that is that our forces must train the way that we intend to fight. Let there be no doubt that that is within a joint team. Therefore, we must routinely train in a joint context.
This joint team must be one that can leverage and build upon the respective core competencies, as well as the unique capabilities of each of the individual services. The notion of joint training is not a matter of an either/or proposition here, but it is really about providing an appropriate level of joint context to the service level training so that it is realistic, it is robust, and, most importantly, it replicates the operational environment.
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To accomplish this mandate of jointness, we must effectively transform how we think, how we train, how we educate, and also how we exercise our forces today. I serve as the secretary's point man in this regard, leading his effort to transform training in the Department of Defense to better enable joint operations.
Let me say the military services are first and foremost world class trainers, bar none. The reason for that, sir, is that we train more often, we train to higher standards and under realistic combat conditions.
The first training transformation really occurred in the Department of Defense back in the 1970's when the services established really their crown jewels, that is for the Army, its National Training Center; for the Navy, its Top Gun Program; for the Air Force, the series of Red Flag Exercises, and for the Marine Corps, its Combined Arms Exercise.
What we really seek to do is effect a second training transformation in the Department of Defense, particularly in the joint arena, based upon the successes that the services had. These are the very fundamental principles that we would apply to the Joint National Training Capability: Realistic joint training against an adaptive asymmetric opposing force with sufficient instrumentation to be able to establish ground truth of who did what to whom. And finally, a process really for providing feedback of how we can do things differently.
It is these four basic principles that are really the underlying foundation for creating a live, virtual and constructive environment for the Joint National Training Capability.
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We must be able to distribute this training capability globally. We must able to deploy it wherever our forces may go. But also we must establish it as a persistent capability, so that we can basically turn the key and have this ability not only to train, but to mission rehearse at a moment's notice.
The Joint National Training Capability, sir, is really the engine as we go forward here. It is no longer a dream. As you are aware, we conducted our first event back in the January time frame involving live, virtual and constructive forces distributed at over 16 different locations throughout the United States. Three other events are scheduled for later this fiscal year, and each panel member today will give you their perspective on both the value and the outcome of that event.
Sir, in response to your question of is this a fad, no sir, it is not. The administration has, in fact, put over $220 million in its current budget submission to transform joint training, to really make this a reality. These funds are intended to really leverage the service investments, to really extend and capitalize on their expertise, but really to focus and to provide an incentive to address critical gaps and seams between the services and various joint arenas. I ask for your support in this particular budget request.
We are a Nation at war, and, for the foreseeable future, we will continue to be a Nation at war. Really, the objective end state of the Joint National Training Capability is that no individual unit or staff will ever deploy into combat without first having experienced the rigors and the stresses of their joint responsibilities in a robust and realistic training environment.
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Ladies and gentlemen, if you are looking for one way to significantly impact the Department of Defense and to ensure the readiness of our forces, I ask you invest your time, your energy and your support in the Joint National Training Capability.
On behalf of the men and women of our Armed Forces, both our active and reserve components, civilians and also our contractors, this is truly our team; I thank you for your continued support and ensuring the readiness of our forces through your critical support of this joint training capability.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mayberry can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. General Nash.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GORDON NASH, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDER, JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, DIRECTOR, JOINT TRAINING, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
General NASH. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the honor and privilege of being here today; of representing not just my boss, Admiral Giambastiani, the Commander of the United States Joint Forces Command, but the almost 1.2 million men and women who are under the operational command of the United States Joint Forces Command.
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I am excited to report to you on the significant progress we have made in executing the Secretary's guidance on standing up the Joint National Training Capability. I am proud and excited to be part of this integrated team that is before you today, that is delivering on the principal of training our armed forces in the manner in which they will be deployed, that is, jointly.
As Dr. Mayberry mentioned, we are entering the second training transformation phase. Although our forces are still ready to fight the conventional threat that we still find around the world, we are now fighting a different enemy, an asymmetric foe, that requires full integration of our forces to defeat, and, in fact, full integration of all capabilities of our great Nation. It requires a joint effort.
It is now time to go forward with the second phase of training transformation, at this time joint training, that will ensure our forces are ready to fight jointly against a different threat with little or no notice.
This effort is not cheap; it is also not easy. It requires additional investments in technology and in infrastructure. It requires the development of an environment that allows us to take the superb service training that is conducted today and frame them in a joint context and bring joint assets to service training in all cases to prepare them to be able to deploy and win on the battlefield.
To best describe the Joint National Training Capability, I would like to take us back about one year today. Our forces on the tactical level were deployed from around the world, and in fact, from many of your districts, both active and reserve forces. They were staged, ready to move into Iraq. General Tommy Franks' staff had been together for about a year and a half. In fact, they had already fought one war in Afghanistan. They had established trust and relationships.
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He called his staff and his two and three star functional operational headquarters a team of teams or a band of brothers on the operational level.
Now, let me take you down to the tactical level, where, again, our forces came from around the world. The services were magnificent on their own right, but in few cases had they trained together. They had never trained with the functional headquarters under which they would fight in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. They had never established the special trust. They had never exchanged tactics, techniques and procedures.
This is the real goal of the Joint National Training Capability, to allow our men and women to conduct full rehearsals, to establish these trusts and relationships in training or rehearsals before we have to employ them in harm's way.
In spite of this lack of training ahead of time, our magnificent young men and women did well. In fact, they succeeded on the battlefield. But I will tell you this, it is because they were responsive and they are tough and they represent the best of our great Nation fighting under significant leadership.
Mr. HEFLEY. General, let me interrupt you a moment. I hate to do this. We have this vote on and that is the second bell. I want to take a couple of polls here. We are going to have at least an hour of votes, it appears, five votes. What is your schedule? I hate to have people of your status sitting around here holding your hands for an hour.
Dr. MAYBERRY. We are here to accommodate you.
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General NASH. Our schedule is yours.
Mr. HEFLEY. How many of our committee will be back? We are going to have a BRAC vote, Robin.
Mr. HAYES. I will make it.
Mr. HEFLEY. We would like to hear from you, and we do have a number that are going to come back. If you don't mind, I apologize. I hate to interrupt you right in the middle of your statement, General, but I guess we better go vote.
General NASH. I will pick it up where I let off.
We will be back as quickly as we can. The committee stands in recess.
Mr. HEFLEY. The committee will come back to order.
I again apologize, and thank you for your patience. I know each and every one of you are going to go home tonight and say, man, did I waste today sitting around. It is embarrassing to have you do that, but we have no control over our lives. Thank you for your patience.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC General, we will start wherever you want to start.
General NASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I talked about how our forces actually one year ago were massed around the borders of Iraq, great men and women in uniform from around the Nation. In fact, a lot of your districts. They had never trained together before to fight. They had trained within their own service confines, but not as a joint fighting operational unit.
General Franks' staff had been together for about a year-and-a-half. In fact, they had already fought a war in Afghanistan. I mentioned how he called his two- and three-star staff and his subordinate functional commanders a team of teams, a band of brothers.
That is where we want to take the entire joint force, and the Joint National Training Capability will provide this venue to support training, help us transform from a deconflicted training, where the Marines stay over here, the Army in the middle, maybe coalition forces way out here: Air Force, you are allowed way out here ahead of us. We need to fight as an integrated force, but we need to train that way before we ever deploy.
In closing, I would like to tell you, I take what we are doing very personally. This is the right thing to do, and I am excited about it. But, equally important, I have a second lieutenant son in the United States Marine Corps who, within the next year, will be deployed in harm's way. In a few months, my daughter will marry a Marine second lieutenant, who by then will have his wings as a Marine aviator, and he will be deployed in harm's way within the next year.
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So I ask for your support, because it is the right thing to do for our Nation, and I have a true personal interest in what we are doing.
I thank you very much for your time. It is an honor to be here, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Nash can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. General Weber.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. LOUIS W. WEBER, DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, TRAINING DIRECTORATE, U. S. ARMY
General WEBER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Members as well, it is an honor to be here today to represent the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff General Schoomaker, as well as the soldiers of the United States Army, which, as has been alluded to already, is an Army at war, continuing to serve our Nation.
This war, as we know, with an adaptive enemy using asymmetric means, has demonstrated once again that determined, disciplined, well-trained, equipped, well-led soldiers are the ultimate combat system that we need. Current operations have also demonstrated the absolute requirement to train and fight as a coherent interdependent joint force.
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Training capabilities too often are the forgotten force multiplier that we all need and we all enjoy over other forces of other nations. To assure success during actual operations, units must have the opportunity to train mission essential tasks with the same equipment, operating systems, operational conditions and joint force elements that they will use in actual combat. The Joint National Training Capability, in fact, helps provide these opportunities for the Army and the joint team.
Developing JNTC, or the Joint National Training Capability for operational level units provides a superb training opportunity to commanders and their staffs of all potential joint force headquarters; Army headquarters that must be prepared to function as a joint task force command, or Army headquarters that must be prepared to function as joint force land component commands.
Similarly, developing JNTC, for tactical level units, helps ensure that these units have the opportunity to train jointly in interoperability tasks with a true joint context, that is as close as possible to how they will perform in actual tactical operations. We are making good progress developing and enhancing this tactical level JNTC capability, as demonstrated most recently in January during execution of the first JNTC events.
The results of this exercise will better inform us on how to integrate joint training capabilities at the tactical level without significantly increasing deployment demands on tactical units and without jeopardizing the training rigor we have achieved in service-unique training prior.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC JNTC, at the tactical level, gives the Army greater opportunity to joint train early in our carriers as young leaders or soldiers. Teaching joint considerations and interdependence early enables our young leaders to carry those lessons learned forward throughout his or her professional career, and ultimately improves the Army's ability to meet the current challenges, as well any challenges we may face in the future.
Through our efforts to date, with the other services, the Joint Forces Command and the Joint and Operational Support Command (OSC) staffs, I believe we have achieved considerable agreement about how to build the best possible Joint National Training Capability to enhance our Armed Forces. The Army looks forward to continuing to coordination and cooperation among all concerned.
I would also like to close and echo General Nash's comments. One year ago today, I was moving forward with Third Infantry Division to the Iraqi-Kuwait border. So today has some special meaning to me personally as well.
In retrospect, as I reflect back on the last year in our operation in Iraq, I learned and took away a great many things: One is we never cooperated and trained well enough with the Marines; and going to war and having a Marine division off to our flank, it was a bit late for us to figure out what they do and what the Army needs to provide. So I have some personal experience with this; and over the last year, I believe we have made some great headway.
Thank you for the opportunity for me to be here and speak with you all. On behalf again of General Schoomaker and the secretary, thank you all for you what you do for the Army and your support.
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Thank you, sir.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Weber can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. Admiral Hart.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. DAVID T. HART, JR., DIRECTOR, FLEET READINESS DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral HART. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I appreciate the opportunity to be present here today and update you in the Navy participation in the Joint National Training Capability development effort.
The Navy is fully engaged in this important transformation in training. As noted in our naval transformational road map, inherent in every aspect of this effort is that Naval forces will be, first and foremost, committed to and built upon the principles of jointness.
Our Fleet Response Plan requires the capability to train strike groups in integrated, multi-range, live training environments, supplemented by a robust virtual and constructive training capability. Both our service investments and the JNTC infrastructure can and will support this effort.
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Improving the joint context of Navy training events and Navy participation in other joint events will enhance our effectiveness in achieving the fundamental goal of training, as you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, as we fight.
A collaborative joint effort is essential to build the JNTC in a way that supports both service requirements and joint needs, and that is exactly what is occurring. Our approach for future training is being developed as a Navy Continuous Training Environment. This environment will employ joint standards, protocols and applications to improve fleet training capabilities and allow a seamless integration into the JNTC.
As we work toward overall training transformation goals, we must also preserve our existing high standards of core skills and apply these skills to build joint capabilities across the Department of Defense.
For both our internal transformation program and external capabilities through JNTC, our current spending focused toward return on investment will result in sustained readiness levels that meet our required support to the combatant commanders.
In conclusion, sir,I would like to thank you for this opportunity and your continued support to our sailors for all that you do for them and the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC [The prepared statement of Admiral Hart can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. General Seip.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. NORMAN SEIP, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General SEIP. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak about your Air Force's involvement in the Joint National Training Capability and its benefit to our air and space warriors.
The Air Force has long appreciated the value and the complexity of joint training. Conflicts and contingency operations in the past 15 years, particularly in the Global War on Terrorism, have highlighted the benefits of operating handled in hand with our joint partners. Each service brings a tool box of incredible war fighting capabilities to the fight and the effective interrogation of these capabilities provides the synergy that makes our military power second to none anywhere on the globe.
Capabilities like these give the United States military ability to see first, understand first and act first. However, they have also placed a premium on all-up, full-up joint training where all the services capabilities are represented. When a capability is missing, realism goes down and the risk of learning a wrong lesson goes up. Therefore, the Air Force has fully embraced the challenge to create the JNTC and better enable our forces to train like we fight, jointly.
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This past January, the Air Force, along with Army, Marine, Navy and Special Forces warfighters, participated in the first-ever JNTC event. The event linked existing service training events, including an Army brigade training at the National Training Center, the U.S. Marine Corps' combined arms exercise at Twenty-Nine Palms, a Navy standoff attack missile exercise in the San Diego vicinity, and Air Force's Air Warrior Exercise at Nellis Air Force Base.
Joint close air support was the primary focus of the event. We had Air Force air crews in both life aircraft and virtual simulators operating missions in joint operations with Army forces at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin and Marine forces at Twenty-Nine Palms training in California. Instrumentation of the aircraft provided take-off to landing live monitoring and mission debrief recordings, not only for the air crew and exercise control personnel, but also for command and control personnel at Nellis Air Force Base's Combined Air Operations Center in Las Vegas, the Army leadership at Fort Irwin, and Joint Forces Command at Suffolk, Virginia.
The training event was further enhanced by integrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance inputs from a simulated E8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft at our Distributed Mission Operations Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and simulated Special Forces gunship and helicopters at Hurlburt Air Base, Florida.
This first JNTC event created an expanded dynamic training venue for the services, while reducing the costly requirement to transport our exercise participants, their equipment and maintainers to a distant exercise location. Also, with the integration of sophisticated, virtual and computer-generated elements, the training was more complete and more realistic than experienced in previous exercises.
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Of course, all these beneficial training capabilities do not come without challenges. The Air Force is actively engaged with other services and Joint Force Command to address the creation of forward-thinking technological interoperability standards as well as equitable resource distribution and funding policies.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that the Air Force is fully participating in the development of the Joint National Training Capability, and we certainly look forward to increasingly effective joint training events for our air and space warriors. ''Train like we fight, fight like we train,'' that is and will always be the key to successful joint warfighting.
Thank you for the invitation to be here today, and thank you for your support to JNTC.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Seip can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. Dr. Bailey.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. BAILEY, PH.D., TECHNICAL DIRECTOR, TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Dr. BAILEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Hefley, distinguished committee members. Thank you for inviting the Marine Corps to this important hearing.
I am Dr. Mike Bailey. I am the Technical Director of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TEC), and I am the technical lead for all Marine Corps involvement in JNTC.
The Marine Corps is fully behind the TEC and the JNTC program. The JNTC has stimulated us to develop a much more aggressive plan to modernize Marine training ranges to serve our Marines and to fully participate in the JNTC events. Congress has helped us begin that process this year at the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC) at Twenty-Nine Palms.
The Marine Corps has developed the plan to promulgate JNTC compatible range instrumentation Marine Corps-wide through our new Range Investment Strategy. Our emerging instrumentation capability is consistent with our ethos, and reflects our priority on live fire combined arms deployment in desert and urban terrain. We will also meet the JNTC site certification standards developed by JFCOM. We think it will support better training, increase accountability and enhance the safety of our live fire training ranges.
The Marine Corps supports the JNTC. This joint training opportunity is real.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Dr. Bailey.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bailey can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HEFLEY. When we first began the housing privatization, everybody at the top levels of the Defense Department and the uniformed services thought this was a great idea. But we found that down at the field level, there was a lot of cultural resistance to it. I am wondering, you all did a great job of explaining the policy and the direction and so forth. This clearly is the policy of the Defense Department and each of the services.
But how do the people down at the field level respond to this jointness? Because it seems to me there is still a lot of service pride, I guess I should say. I wear this uniform and you wear that uniform, and we are on different teams, but, yes, we play on the same field.
Is that the case now, or is that being accepted down through the ranks pretty much, this new philosophy?
Dr. MAYBERRY. I will be glad to start here, sir. That is the exact question that Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had. He has been a champion for this concept of a joint National Training Center that has evolved into a capability. So, for the January event, he turned to me and said, ''Paul, I want to go out to each of these locations, at Twenty Nine Palms, Nellis Air Force Base and Fort Irwin, to be able to look individuals in the eye and ask that exact same question.''
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC After his two-day trip there, he turned to me and said, ''They get it.'' it really is important that the types of individuals that he spoke with were combat hardened veterans. This was the third infantry division who had recently returned from their stint in Iraq and were in training for future deployment there as well.
He wanted to make sure that this was not just at headquarters level, with everyone sort of shaking their heads. But, sir, I think the individuals with the real answers are probably the service members themselves who also respond.
General WEBER. Sir, I don't mind at all stepping in.
I would tell you at the lowest soldier level, the soldier carrying the rifle probably can't tell the difference in terms of what he is doing for training day-to-day. What you find, though, is as we become more and more joint, the level of jointness, the education that you deal with in terms of officers and commanders and their staffs, that joint knowledge, experience and training is starting to drop to a lower and lower level. So our younger officers are learning quicker and faster and better the impacts of what the other services bring to the fight and how we, as Army component elements of that fight, can better leverage those capabilities that the other services bring in.
For example, battalion commanders today have situational awareness that division commanders may have had 10 years ago. That is powerful information that that guy can use to fight what he needs to fight in his direct front. He knows where the aircraft are, he knows how to get the aircraft, he knows who can control the aircraft or what other fires may be available. It may not be Air Force-specific, it could come from our flank in the Marine units or it could come from Navy aircraft.
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The soldier doesn't care. The battalion commander doesn't care. All he needs to know and understand is this how I need to get it, and then somebody else figures out what is going to deliver it.
But what you see in the level of experience of today's Army at least, is that information is getting lower and lower and lower. The beauty of the Joint National Training Capability is we can train without having to put large numbers of forces, commanders, and bring those elements together in fairly costly and time-consuming events; and we can tie that together, hopefully through some live pieces of that, but clearly with virtual and constructive elements as well. It just leads to a better-trained force.
Admiral HART. Mr. Chairman, if I may go ahead and join in, in preparation for the hearing today, I got an e-mail from Carrier Air Wing Two out in San Diego, primarily, but also out of Lamore, as a matter of fact, an air wing I know well because they were in my battle group when I was the commander of the Constellation Battle Group just a few short years back.
They participated in the January event. The current deputy CAG, Carrier Airgroup Commander, was my air operations officer, so I know him personally.
I got what we would say to the Navy was some pretty straight ''gouge'' from these guys, and the import of what they told me was the best part of the training was we have got ''warts.'' the best part of that is we now know where some of these warts are.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC My take away is that the warts that were unveiled is exactly the way we want to go and why it is so important to do the joint training piece. There were some disconnects and there were some areas that need some work; but the fact that these guys at that level, and their young pilots in the cockpits and their crews are now sensitized as to what they are, is the only way we are going to fix them.
So, to me, the JNTC represents a significant step forward in getting all that synthesized and finding where all these areas are. And, frankly, it is very consistent with what I saw just about a year ago when I was deputy commander in Europe. As you may recall, we had two fifths of the Navy combat power in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Harry Truman and the Theodore Roosevelt; and there was a level of frustration, almost daily, in the evening Video Teleconferences (VTCs) that we do on wrap up for operations, with pilots coming back having flown the northern routes, trying to provide either close air support or a number of other things in the joint environment, and frustrated to some degree because there was a lack of cohesion in some of the procedures among the services.
It is primarily because, as was stipulated earlier on, we know how to do it, but we have not practiced it adequately together. That is what this offers us, is that opportunity to do that.
General SEIP. Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that probably not every airman gets it, but the vast majority do. Through the JNTC, with this live virtual constructive type of venue that affords us horizontal training and vertical training, as well as the integration piece, that more and more airmen will be exposed to the joint working relationships that are necessary to be successful out there in the battlefield and the battle space there.
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So we see the JNTC as a great way before we walk into harm's way to expose our airmen to the types of scenes, fog of war, that ought to be done in a peacetime type of environment, so we will be more effective when we actually step off.
Dr. BAILEY. Sir, I will just chime in with everybody else. Marine officers get it. Marine officers view joint context as critical to exercises. If we can't get it from the JNTC, we do it ourselves. We do it a lot more poorly, if you will, than we can get it from JNTC; but we always have it.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your patience.
Dr. Mayberry, is it likely that the JNTC will consist of one or more original training constructs or sites in addition to the West Coast and East Coast and areas that are now being developed? If so, does DOD see certain advantages in conducting joint training in the western Gulf of Mexico, in that particular area? Maybe you can elaborate a little bit on that.
Dr. MAYBERRY. Certainly. I think that the notion of a training capability really requires that we pull together many of our regional facilities. And whether those are training ranges, whether those are testing ranges, we as a department really have to capitalize on all of our national assets. The initial event, as you know, is in the western range complex. In the June time frame, we will be functioning basically on and off the eastern seaboard. In the August time frame, we will be in sort of the Gulf region, not as far west as you are speaking.
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But I think as we go forward, that we must be able to have how we go about linking all of our national assets. I think that many of the assets of testing, training ranges, that it you speak of in your area, really do contribute to the notion of power projection from the shore very far inland; those are the types of scenarios that we are going to have to advance forward.
The customer for all of this joint training really is the combatant commander. So how exercises will be designed and the priorities as to what is particular training or exercise in a particular event, must stem from the mission or essential task of that combatant commander. I think the types of facilities in terms of Naval, meaning both Navy and Marine Corps, the Army, as well as the Marine Corps coming in from the western areas, would lend very well to the types of complexes that are available, be it Fort Bliss, White Sands Missile Range, or the Corpus Christi area.
But the overall thrust for these events truly comes from the combatant commanders as the individuals to be trained in terms of joint skills.
Mr. ORTIZ. Great. General Nash, as the secretary just mentioned, from an operational point of view, we do have other bases, Fort Bliss, Fort Hood; and we connect together. In fact, they use our port of Corpus Christi when they have training exercises to move out and do their training. We don't have the encroachment problems that many other communities have. We are free from encroachment problems. At the same time we have free, uncongested skies. So in my opinion, and I am not trying to be parochial, Mr. Chairman
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Mr. HEFLEY. Wait a minute. Did you pay for this commercial message?
Mr. ORTIZ. But I think the area would be ideal. Maybe you can respond to that question, General Nash?
General NASH. Mr. Ortiz
Mr. HEFLEY. He meant to add Fort Carson and Fort Bragg to that, too.
General NASH. Sir, thank you very much for the question. Sir, Fort Bliss will be one of our hubs for the information or, hopefully, when we have the opportunity to establish the persistent or permanent exercise architecture at various locations within the United States, we will be able to run satellite, if you will, locations from that location. So Fort Bliss is there. We have looked at Corpus Christi. We have had visits from a great team from Corpus Christi advertising or describing the advantages and capabilities at the Padre Island area, some of the port facilities, some of the inline airfields. Sir, we have looked at that region.
There are two ways in which a location may be nominated or become a Joint National Training Capability location. The first is the services nominate it. We have about 30 sites within the continental United States which we are looking at during this year. That will expand to cover even the larger expanses of the United States.
The second way a location can be included in the Joint National Training Capability is what comes under my auspices as the Joint Warfighting Center commander and under which I have the joint management office. We will look at locations that will enhance or complement already selected locations.
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Sir, thank you very much.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.
I want to thank the rest of the members, Mr. Chairman, for staying behind. We know that the House has finished their business, but they chose dedication and commitment. We seem to have more on this side, so we can take a vote on base closures right now and win.
Mr. HEFLEY. The ones on this side are tougher, I will tell you that.
Mr. TAYLOR. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a couple of questions.
First of all, for General Nash and Dr. Mayberry, how well is the JNTC initiative linked to the BRAC process? Maybe in the context of your answer, is the Joint Forces Command represented in the process at the appropriate functional committees at OSD? And, obviously, we are concerned your voice is being heard on how important the JNTC is to the changes that you are making.
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Dr. MAYBERRY. Let me begin with this one. The BRAC process is really focused on a variety of what are called Joint Cross Service Groups. One of those is focused in the education and training area, and the principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness chairs that group.
One of the overarching guiding principles for the considerations as these sub-groups go forward is the principle of jointness. So, sir, I know that as they go about assessing and analyzing military value for education and training facilities, which will include training and testing ranges as well as part of their considerations, the notion of encroachment that was spoken of earlier is a valid part of that, the issue of how locations can bring joint to the calculus of military values is extremely important.
But there is really no explicit linkage between, other than the principles that we have talked about here today, the primacy of joint training and the value of no explicit linkage between JNTC and BRAC; BRAC is an independent process as it goes forward.
General NASH. Sir, thank you for the question. As for your question, how integrated are we across the Office of the Secretary of Defense and within the services, I would first say look at this team. I know everybody's first name, we meet closely together here. We have three levels. We have the Joint Integrated Process Team, which is really the Colonel-Navy-Captain06 level and significant staff officials within the Office of Secretary of Defense and the various service departments.
The next level up is the Executive Steering Group, Senior Advisory Group. We all sit on that group. But also our three star, if you are the services, your operations deputies sit on that. So in the hierarchy, this ensures that this Joint National Training Capability is integrated throughout the Department of Defense. The representation also comes from the various agencies, organizations, and offices within the Office of Secretary of Defense.
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The final level, the Executive Steering Group, which is chaired by Dr. Chu and my boss, Admiral Giambastiani, the membership also includes some of the principles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but also the service vices, the assistant commandant, the vice chief of staff of the Army. So it gets significant oversight and review.
Now, civilian agencies, for example, today, at Joint Forces Command, we are holding an ''Industry Day,'' in which senior representatives from industry are invited to participate. The topic this year is combat identification and how to prevent fratricide. The venue in which we are discussing that down at Joint Forces Command today is within the context of the Joint National Training Capability.
We invite participation from local governments, from industry and anywhere within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department, sir.
Mr. REYES. And in that vein, I shared my thoughts with several of you on the integration of the air defense component with the National Training Center; and you were telling me, General Nash, in June, I believe, there will be another exercise where they will be actually incorporated into the training.
The concern that I have, which I am trying to get money for, is to integrate the National Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss, White Sands, and get it to be able to tie in with the National Training Center.
I wonder if anyone had any comments to make on that?
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General WEBER. Sir, I will take that. The unique aspect of the JNTC, what we are trying to build to is a capability where we can have units, headquarters, formations, and commanders tie in from anywhere in the world to participate in a training event, either preparation for a real world event and execution prior to a real world event, or just for normal training in order to empower ourselves at the joint level.
In your particular case, with your question, sir, on the Fort Bliss piece in January, that is a capability that we will be able to do, I think, fairly easily. We are talking communications architecture here in the most fundamental sense, I guess, with some simulation capability, but also some life folks who are going to participate. That organization could just as easily be in Korea to tie into this event. So that is what is really empowering about the JNTC construct, we are not limited to fixed sites or fixed formations or people. We can do whatever we need to do.
So, I would tell you, sir, that the June event will be pretty exciting, because we are going to take it down the air defense path. The Army is participating in that with several key components, but it is just a piece of the larger exercise play.
So, to answer your question, I would tell you we are excited about that. We are using the Fort Bliss piece of this now and tying into this new event in June.
I hope that answers your question well enough.
Mr. REYES. That is helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask a few questions about the network and the systems architecture; and perhaps Dr. Mayberry and General Nash probably can start out with answers, because these, I think, are perhaps questions most appropriate for you.
One of you today said you still need to address the creation of forward-thinking technology standards as well as equitable funding responsibilities. My antenna went up a bit. That tells me in terms of creating a network or systems architecture for JNTC, it doesn't seem to be at one set of standards yet perhaps developed.
On top of that, some of the work we have here, which was given to us through the staff work, talked about the January event where you leased commercial communications nodes and later then broke those down and were having to build that up again perhaps for the June event, after which we may have to break down again.
So there is a question in my mind just about what we are funding, how it is being funded, and who, sort of, is in control of being sure we are actually on our way to building a standardized JNTC network. And who is in charge of designing that architecture and what standards and protocols are being used; is it in compliance with the GIG network, which we have been exploring on the Terrorism Subcommittee, and what is your plan in the future to ensure you are integrating both legacy systems and networks with the new systems that you are developing?
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We need to get a handle on some of the costs. We cut $2 billion out of the authorization of a $28 billion IT budget last year in the committee because of some of the concerns about where the money is going in IT within the department.
So, if you can help me understand where you are headed with the systems architecture development of the network and standards, that would be helpful to us on the committee.
Dr. Mayberry and General Nash, I will let you start; and if the individual services have comments, we will go from there.
Dr. MAYBERRY. The issue of networks for JNTC is intended to build upon the existing service networks, whether to build upon existing engineering networks and the testing community, to really be able to leverage much of the ongoing work.
You raised a very good question about the January event and that some things were leased and then basically pulled at that moment. We had to do that because of some lack of funding that was actually pulled back. That was the intent. What was in place
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. The intent was to pull it back?
Dr. MAYBERRY. The intent was to fund this so it would be permanent, so we could build upon this having a persistent network in place.
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Sir, that is the focus; and as we sort of pull all of the architecture issues, the issue of the Global Information Grid (GIG), training is going to have to work hand in hand as a community with the operators here, because initially the training communities were not included as a part of those networks to the extent that they did not overlap with operational sites.
Now, sir, that is something that we as a department are going to have to address going forward here, to be able to capitalize on that, because that is the way that we fight, that is the way we are going to have to also be able to plug in through those training opportunities.
General NASH. Mr. Larsen, we work hand in hand with the Defense Information Systems Agency. As the Global Information Grid, especially the Bandwidth Enhancement Program develops, we will use that program to establish persistent or permanent architecture between the Joint National Training Capability installations.
Today, we have targeted about 50 percent of our Joint National Training Capability locations to be part of this persistent architecture. Remember, we will not reach initial operational capability until October of 2004, this year. With full operational capability, where we have built this persistent architecture, not only across the continental United States, but made it exportable, or mobile, where we can that take this wherever U.S. forces and even multinational forces may need to train, or, more importantly, conduct a rehearsal anywhere around the world, this is very important. Again, this is not a separate effort on the part of the Joint National Training Capability program.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC We also did leave some architecture in place and some of the apparatus in place at various locations that participated in the January event. As more events are conducted, we will establish a more permanent architecture that does not need to be built up and broken down after every event. That is not a wise use of the taxpayers' money.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Any of the other services?
General WEBER. Sir, I can pile on with General Nash. That is truly what the Army tries to do; when we bring in a new exercise or scenario and we have to build infrastructure, our intent is to always keep as much as we can so we don't have to rebuild it later. Sometimes we do a good job at that. Other times it is not possible. But we do give it every effort we can.
Admiral HART. Mr. Larsen, from the Navy perspective, with the high level of architecture that has been defined, we all know that if we ensure that we develop and use systems that are in keeping with those requirements, we should be right on the money. It will allow us to use legacy systems as we build toward that. Of course, for us in the Navy with our vision on ForceNet 21, that is exactly the way we want to go. That alone itself, then, would be consistent with the overall GIG piece that you had referred to earlier on.
General SEIP. Mr. Larsen, I will tell you the Air Force shares the same vision that was conveyed to you by General Nash. We certainly don't want to have a duplicate effort out there, nor do we want to build an architecture that possibly brings the wrong lessons learned to the training environment out there.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC So, we don't want to necessarily have the capability where we think we are going to have a dial tone every time, to put it in layman's terms. We want to make sure we have the architecture out there that is one that is going to replicate what we think we will see in the battlefield.
Dr. BAILEY. Sir, the Marine Corps is strongly supportive of the standards-based approach that JFCOM is taking to develop not burdensome, but useful standards to support joint training.
As to the build up-tear down issue, we should all remember that this January event was a fairly high adventure activity and that we very well could have blown it; and if we had blown it and bought it, that would have been a lot worse than leasing it and blowing it, and then being stuck with something.
So, we were one of the sites that got pulled back on, and we fully expected to be permanently in place in the next year or two, and we find that acceptable. Frankly, the Marine Corps is not necessarily supercharged up about being a guinea pig when it comes to training, so we are okay with the prototype approach.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC First of all, thank you for your patience here this afternoon. We appreciate it. We are used to it. Mr. Hefley and I were talking on the floor during the debate, and, frankly, it is a tad embarrassing when we have guests come here and try to help us out, and have to leave you for an hour to go off and do something else. That is not the way things should work. But anyway, having said that, that is the system, and that is what we work in.
It is fairly obvious that there have been some rather dramatic changes in warfare. I recently read where someone's analysis of the evolution of warfare from World War I, to World War II, to Korea, to Vietnam, to other smaller wars we have had through the period of time, and then into Afghanistan and Iraq; and it is true that warfare has certainly changed. There are no longer front lines in the traditional sense. The rules of morality have changed in warfare. The treatment of non-combatants has changed.
The goals of enemies have changed. That is, where we used to have wars of attrition, now we have actions in wars that are intended to have a psychological effect on the enemy, in this case the enemy being us. Weapons have changed, technology has changed. There have been so many changes, if you don't look back at it, sometimes you don't realize it.
Keeping in mind all of those changes and the enemy we now face, particularly in Iraq but also in Afghanistan and many other parts of the world, could you describe how JFCOM and each of the services plan to train future opposing red forces to think, adapt and act as credible adversaries in this new evolving and evolved environment?
General NASH. Mr. Saxton, I would like to take that first from Joint Forces Command.
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Having an incredible opposing force is one the four pillars of the Joint National Training Capability. As I mentioned in my statement, we are no longer fighting a conventional force, as you said, we are fighting an asymmetric threat that has no rules, has no ethics, and really only wants to influence national opinion.
In the January event, for example, the opposing force out in the field, in the desert at National Training Center, had cell phones to see if our forces could monitor them and pick them up. They had their own unmanned aerial vehicles to spy, if you will, on the friendly forces in the exercise.
We had aggressive air contracted. Although they had once been U.S. A4s, they were now aggressor air, to see if our surface-to-air capability could detect them and then kill them before they got to the friendly forces.
We had leased now under civilian hire a ''Hips and Hinds,'' former Soviet aircraft, to insert aggressor special forces to see if they could get through our defenses.
This is a key part of the national training capability. That is live forcing.
Under the constructive portion, which is the computer enhancement or wrap-around that integrates all of the common operating picture, we had aggressor forces coming in at the friendly forces to see if they were detected, and the friendly force commanders executed the right combating operations to detect them first and then to kill them. So we have included this as one of the key pillars of the Joint National Training Capability. Really, it is thanks to the support of these committees to provide the resources to make that happen.
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General WEBER. Sir, again, I have got some experience with the National Training Center, particularly Fort Irwin, but we want independent thinking and aggressive op forces, opposing forces.
So we encourage, for example, the National Training Center, the ground opposing force commander is a full colonel. He gets paid to be innovative. He brings those ideas to the commanding General out there, and we work through the scenarios to try to keep him in a box to some extent. I mean, sometimes they come in asking for capabilities that you couldn't find anywhere else in the world. But we pay him to be aggressive and to be independent thinking, and apply the lessons learned, for example, that he and his organization see occurring in Iraq every day. So he will take those lessons, bring them back, try to incorporate them into the scenario as an opposing force commander.
In simulations as well, when we do command and staff exercises, whether they are contracted guys or green suiters that come in and we bring in, those folks are paid to be independent minded. We try not to limit the constraints that we put on to those folks.
So we need that kind of rigor and vigor, if you will, from the opposing forces, to really challenge us as well, to make us think, and to get better at what we do.
What we have seen in the Joint National Training Capability is that that Op4 environment is something we want as well, something that is independent, free thinking, makes you think about what is going on. So we are happy with what goes on at the National Training Capabilities level in this case.
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Admiral HART. Mr. Chairman, thinking about your question, I could not help but harken back to about 20 years ago as a lieutenant commander skipper of a frigate assigned to Op4 for a major exercise, and it was going to be a one-on-one defense as opposed to zone, if you will, in basketball parlance. When I asked with whom I had to deal, the answer was the Battleship New Jersey. It was not exactly a fair fight, as you can well picture.
Yet the point that I am trying to make is that it really was not an Op4 worth putting against that particular asset, and yet there were a lot of steaming hours and days spent around the ocean trying to create that atmosphere.
One of the things that I take away, especially for us in the Navy, where the mobility of the sea space is a particularly difficult challenge, is the ability to bring in the virtual and constructive piece and get inside the head of a commanding officer of a ship or a leader of a squadron of airplanes, to really challenge him and his folks in a multilayered, surprised, very often difficult and asymmetric fashion to think through the whole problem and see if we can react.
That is what I think is one of the great outcomes of JNTC, because you can merge that into the live piece. Thank you.
General SEIP. Mr. Chairman, I see the Air Force taking a two-prong approach to this. One is we stood up a directorate there that is focused on lessons learned, and what we are trying to do is get away from lessons observed and turn those into lessons learned. You take those lessons learned, turn those into tactics, techniques and procedures, and be able to apply those to our exercises where there are opposition forces, and then share those through Joint Forces Command so that they can tie into that pillar of a professional opposition force out there that can bring that live virtual constructive type of play into these horizontal and vertical types of exercises.
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Dr. BAILEY. Sir, Combined Arms Exercise, which is our exercise that was linked to the JNTC for the horizontal event, is a live-fire exercise. It is our best and only combined arms live-fire opportunity for Marines. So it is portrayed that the Marine Corps does not do live Op4. That certainly is not true. It is just not in this one exercise.
It just so happened that about a mile away from where the JNTC visit site was at Twenty Nine Palms, we were tearing down a housing complex. We were talking earlier about privatizing housing. Well, this is going on at Twenty Nine Palms.
So as they were tearing the housing down and closing the housing up and condemning it, the Marines were using the fenced-in area as a security support operations site. So we were actually pushing patrols of platoon and squad size through a dilapidated housing area, using what are called simunitions as their ammunition. In that housing area, we placed a company-sized live Op4 in the form of women, children and men, all who had been trained by Lt. Colonel Woodie Woodward, who was the commander of First Battalion, 7th Marines in OIF 1. So Woodie basically created an Iraqi town full of everything you can find in it, and then we had patrol operations going through that area.
So we definitely take lessons learned directly from combat Marines and turn that into as much of an asymmetric threat portrayal as we possibly can.
Mr. SAXTON. Let me ask one follow-up question. The nature of our enemy is different in many respects, in some respects, than the nature of any enemy we have ever faced, and that is because they would rather die than live if they can kill us in doing so. That is different. Can we simulate that kind of an opposition force?
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General NASH. Mr. Saxton, I had a chance to visit the National Training Center during this event. What were once pristine corridors, if you will, or open areas in the desert at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, where units fought much as the way Pershing rehearsed several years ago, the Army has put villages in these pristine desert patches, being very creative, making them out of sealand containers that can be reconfigured. They have built tunnels down into the rocks.
So when a friendly force shows up, one guy walks out with a white flag, or 100 role players come out with a white flag, both men, women and children role players, often families of service members themselves. Then they all break out weapons. Or in this tunnel complex, it may be a hospital or it may look like a hospital in which role playing weapons of mass destruction are being built or stored in.
So, sir, there was a company commander who, it was a very cold day as the wind can blow across the desert out there in January, and he was in his shirt sleeves sweating. He said I have not been scared like this since I was in Iraq last year.
Sir, I hope that answers your question. We are presenting them with a significant challenge that will hopefully make it harder in training than they face when they go in harm's way.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up on Mr. Saxton's question. Without the introduction, he is quite right, this is a different world. But it is similar to the world I was in in Vietnam. One of the things that struck me was that in many instances and in many ways, the most effective person that I had around me was a recon platoon sergeant whose job was to go out and find, kill, capture the enemy; he was my Kit Carson scout. He spoke the language, knew the territory, had great instincts, was a more effective soldier than most of the folks around me, by far, and in some respects irreplaceable.
It seems to me for where we are in Iraq, you do the conventional part of it, a lot of the exercises that you would typically go through and are going through prepare you well for that. Then you get to the unconventional part of it, where we are right now, and our success is very dependent upon whether or not the Iraqis step forward and start policing their own country. It is our relationship with them that determines whether or not we are going to be successful in tracking down these guerrillas.
So we are trying to stand up units of Iraqis, train units of Iraqis, integrate with them in different ways, as we did in Vietnam; and our ultimate success is dependent upon that. An alien Army has a comparative disadvantage that simply cannot be overcome in a situation like this unless we are willing to kill a God awful number of people, which we are not going to do.
So I guess my question is a very broad one. It is how do you, in your training exercises, integrate the kind of experience that we are going to find ourselves in once we get past the conventional part of conflict? This is going to happen pretty quickly, in just about every instance, it was pretty predictable that it would in this instance, and it did, and we are in this environment in which really we are dependent upon this new group of people.
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The School of the Americas is an example. One of the reasons why we formed that, I suspect, is because we realized how important it is for us to have relationships with military types in different parts of the world.
So, I guess I wonder, to what extent you do that in your training and can you do that in your training and should we be doing more with those sorts of things?
General WEBER. Sir, I don't disagree at all with your comments. I think they are absolutely correct.
What I can tell you is the lessons we learn in Iraq, we have methods to bring those lessons very quickly back to the National Training Center, in our case, and incorporate those lessons learned and to build those stressors, if you will, into the scenarios and into the situations and conditions that we present to ground forces that go train out there.
In this coming month, we have a brigade of the Third Infantry Division; the Second Brigade is headed back out to the National Training Center. The Third Infantry Division is being deployed once again to Iraq toward the end of the year, as most of us know. The scenario will input those kind of stresses into those conditions for that brigade training.
We do as well as we can. We make unit commanders have to deal with things as simple as working with an interpreter, for example. If you never have had the opportunity to do that, that is very stressful work. It is very frustrating. It is hard to do. But we input those conditions into the scenarios to force it to happen.
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We take all the lessons we learned and we take the frustrations and try to build a scenario that sets out the conditions as realistic as possible.
Can we exactly replicate it? No. As Congressman Saxton pointed out, there are some things you just cannot do in a training environment. You can't induce the stresses really of people shooting at you. You can't induce the stresses of blood and things running all over the place, kids screaming down the street, who is a target, who is a foe. We do that as best we can. We introduce those kinds of things into our scenarios to prepare soldiers to be able to face it.
Now, what you will find when you talk to soldiers is that the conditions that we train them on reflect fairly accurately what is in the theater that they are going to, be it Iraq or Afghanistan, Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia. We put a lot of energy and money and effort into setting up the conditions right. So when they get into theater, the stress may go up a little bit, but it is not really the first time they have seen that kind of scenario, so they are better prepared to deal with it. But there are some things we just can't overcome.
Mr. MARSHALL. Do you have, for example, where Iraq is concerned, hypothetical police forces and those sort of things?
General WEBER. Yes, sir. Absolutely. As General Nash mentioned, if you go out, even in January, we set conditions out, and we will put out a town of several hundred people, we can even go up to several thousand, if that becomes the principal event for that scenario, and induce friction in there. Five or six guys are the antagonists, the others we don't know about; they hide the weapons, shoot at us. We can do that very easily. It takes some planning and preparation.
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Dr. MAYBERRY. Sir, I was able to have the opportunity to visit the training of the 30th Enhanced Heavy Separate Brigade, the ''Old Hickory'' out of North Carolina, as they are about ready to rotate into Iraq now, and the contemporary operating environment that General Weber spoke about was really tremendous.
The training support brigade there had gone out and hired, via contractors, many Iraqi Americans, I am talking about hundreds, to come in and participate as part of this reserve component training, much less active component training. It really got into some very complex scenarios of search. How do you go into a house? How do you identify the dominant senior male. How do you treat the Iraqi women? All of these are very complex issues.
Then you roll in a crowd scenario, where here you have a young soldier having to deal with rules of engagement, and does he fire and use of force. I was amazed at the complexity of the situation here at an urban operations training facility at Fort Bragg that really did test these individuals to the max.
What we seek as a part of the Joint National Training Capability is also that it be capabilities-based. We can't do it all. We don't have the resources nor the time. But how do we become a dynamic training organization? Yes, we may be in an urban facility at this particular juncture of our Nation. How do we become able to have a capability to go further than that?
Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Could I just follow up?
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I guess my question is, in that kind of scenario that you just described, do you have hypothetical allies among the Iraqis that are working with you, that you are coordinating with? You mentioned the translator. But do you have a Kit Carson scout? Some of you know that reference, the Vietnamese that worked with us. They are included in the training exercise?
General WEBER. Yes, sir. I would be remiss without mentioning, we do the same thing at all of our training centers, at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Europe.
But, yes, sir, the populations that we build into these scenarios, we will have some bad actors, we will have some pro-U.S. actors, they will have some neutral actors, and the neutral folks is where you really get concerned, because if you do something as a commander or someone on the ground, a soldier, that will lead to some effect, if you do something good, then the neutral parties have some positive reaction to that. If you do something wrong, then the neutral parties will become antagonistic and you will have a negative reaction to that. So what you do on the ground has an impact on how that population group, good, bad or indifferent, reacts.
But we do build in those kinds of scenarios. You will be told here is your translator; he is trustworthy to the 95 percentile level. Perhaps one of our soldiers will end up killing his sister in the scenario somehow. Now you have got to deal with that problem.
So we induce those kinds of things. I think any one of the training centers you would see, or whatever training at the local areas, you would see those kinds of efforts being made.
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General NASH. Mr. Marshall, we have four services sitting at this table. We actually have what I like to call our fifth service, the United States Special Operations Command. More emphasis has been placed on our civil affairs and our psychological operations groups, and they have been really probably stressed to the max to support our worldwide deployments right now, and they play an integral part in this.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate you all being here. This is very helpful, opening up our eyes to some the things you all do. I was at Fort Polk about three weeks ago. General Weber spent about a day there with a lot of Arkansans that are heading to Iraq.
After two or three hours, I started feeling like I was in a foreign country seeing all the things; it felt like being overseas at a military operation.
My favorite training story is one that involves myself. Years ago before I went to medical school I was an orderly, and we had a hospital I worked in. One morning, we had a disaster drill, I think it was a simulated plane crash, and my job was to go outside and block the street and only let ambulances by.
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Dr. SNYDER. And when the hospital administrator came by that morning to park her car, she was not very excited about the fact that I would not let her in. It would have been much better for my career if it had been a virtual hospital administrator.
I want to ask General Weber in response to Chairman Hefley's question about jointness and at what levels does everyone appreciate jointness. You said that at the lower levels it is not noticed very much. I think this is just a sign I do not understand your business very well in this area. I would have thought that at the lower level, if your Army guys are out some place and they need help and, for example, perhaps there is a Marine unit nearby, they want to be sure that their radios, that they can communicate with the Marine unit or they need close air support. It might be an Air Force plane, it might be a Marine plane, it might be Naval fire. I would have thought that maybe your guys on the ground might be the ones who would notice it most in terms of who is circling overhead, where is the fire coming from. Straighten me out.
General WEBER. Sir, what I will tell you, is that the soldier on the ground will see the effect from those platforms.
Dr. SNYDER. And they do not care much where it comes from?
General WEBER. They do not care where it comes from. The soldier on the ground just does not know and he does not care.
When I was at the National Training Center, I had a poster up for our staff training piece. It had a photo of a tired, fatigued, unshaven soldier. And the comment was, this soldier doesn't even know who you are.
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Now, this is directed toward the battalion level staff, his own leadership and staff. He does not know who you are. He does not care. All he needs to know is what do you want him to do, where and when.
Dr. SNYDER. They would care if jointness did not work, would they not? If they have an Air Force plane circling overhead?
General WEBER. Yes, sir. If you cannot get the effects, yes, sir. It has an impact, but he does not know if those effects are artillery delivered, air delivered, Tomahawk delivered or delivered some other way.
The question that we wrestle with is at what level really does everyone need to be fully jointed and everything else. Do we expect our young soldier to have some compensation and understanding of what close air support might be in this case?
I would argue maybe at the platoon sergeant and platoon leader level, yes. So we are looking at inducing joint level terminology training, et cetera, down to the lowest officer level training and the mid grade NCO level training, to start inducing more and more of that terminology and concepts to them.
Dr. SNYDER. That is what I thought you meant.
My last question, and if each of you would respond, I think it was General Seip mentioned the words, I think it was you who used the term ''warts,'' General.
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Admiral HART. That is a Navy technical term.
Dr. SNYDER. Which I assume is what the training is all about, the finer things and to correct it. But what I would like you to discuss, and I think you have done that in some of your witness statements; and I was at another hearing and missed the first part of this, but what were the warts that you discovered as far as the training itself, the things that the training did not work, that it was not real, that it needs to be improved, that it did not do what you wanted it to do. Go down the line or however you want to do it, and that is my last question.
General NASH. People ask me how do you ensure interoperability. And through a Joint National Training Capability event that brings services together for the first time in many cases, maybe we find out that we have not distributed the same call signs on a very basic level to everybody. Maybe everybody does not have the same frequencies. We even have the same kind of radios but they cannot talk to each other. We may have a different, we call it a cryptofill, so they can talk in code to each other. In fact there is a story, not a story but a real world example. That is the Marines moved up one side of the Tigris and the Army moved up the other; they had to hold in place and use a small boat across to exchange call signs, frequencies and crypto materials.
Dr. SNYDER. If I might interrupt, General. That would be a sign to me that on the ground they knew that jointness was not working at the platoon level if they had to do that, to miscommunicate Marine to Army.
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC General NASH. Mr. Snyder, this is why we need to train together at all levels before we ever deploy our men and women in uniform. One small example; I could probably go on all afternoon but I will defer and I will be welcome to entertain any questions.
General WEBER. Sir, it has been mentioned we train to identify weaknesses and to correct those weaknesses clearly. I will give you another anecdotal story. I was the Assistant Division Commander for Support for the 3rd Infantry Division, as we flowed in; the 1st Marine Division eventually followed in behind us. But in and amongst all of that, we kept getting more and more truck companies coming in and resources to help support. And unbeknownst to me, and I am a general officer now by this time, the Army, by our doctrine, is obligated and designed to support Marines with logistic support.
As I see all these trucks flown into theater, I think a good part of them are coming to me when, in fact, I have to share them with our Marine friends off to our flank. That is all well and good, but it probably would have been useful for me to learn that some years if not decades earlier.
So that is the kind of thing I take away is we can do better. We have identified those faults. The Joint National Training Capability will allow us to learn those kinds of lessons in a virtual, constructive, sometimes live environment, and make it smarter at a younger age to not run into those problems in the future.
Admiral HART. Dr. Snyder, I think your question was probably specific, for instance, to the January exercise we just experienced and some of the concerns we had. Obviously for the Navy one of the key ones, which, of course, is a problem of our physical environment since we cannot take that coaxialcable with us as we steam out of harbor, is a function of bandwidth and its limitations and how much we can actually bring down and incorporate into the ship if it is under way in a live environment, while it still has all of its other circuits that are required up for other things that are going on at the same time. So bandwidth is something that is a challenge and will be one that we have to continue to address.
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Specific to the exercise also, one of the areas that I got a little bit of frustration in feedback to me again from the air wing, was not so much on the fast moving shooting airplanes, because they typically are a fairly easy part of the flight in terms of the way we do business, the Hornets in this case. But it was the E2C Hawkeye and its integration into the exercise, and I think it was a function of tactics and procedures that really has not been very well articulated in its role in a joint environment. It is an airplane that typically is much more in a strictly service role and yet can have a great capability when brought to bear in a joint environment.
So those are the kinds of warts that I was talking about earlier on.
General SEIP. From a larger context, I would propose to you that the JNTC will allow us take the lessons observed from all of the services, turn them into lessons learned, be able to apply those to some joint tactics techniques and procedures, and then lay those into the various exercises so we can minimize the seams, minimize the ''fog of war'' that will occur when we step off into the conflict.
Dr. BAILEY. I will give you one operational and one technical, sir. Operationally, we had combat veteran aviators on the Navy and Marine Corps aviation team; and during the conflict, they actually developed on the fly a TTP, that is, a tactic, technique, and procedure, that was a technique actually called keyhole casts. It is not really important that you understand exactly how it works, but suffice it to say that there was a new way of communicating between forward air controller and aircraft that was developed during the war.
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC The aviators came home and expected the air controllers at the National Training Center to know this particular technique, but they did not because they were not combat veterans. This is an instance where a technique was promulgated to a large audience straight from combat, a lesson learned, that did not go through a joint lessons learned data base, and did not get talked about at the Navy War College. It went straight from combat veteran to potential combat veteran as part of the exercise. It was something that was forced by the JNTC, and you can call it a wart but it was a really great thing. A lot more people know about keyhole casts as forward air controllers now than they did two months ago.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being here and thank you for your service.
You have each spoken about the needs of the individual services. Is there a point sometimes at which your responsibility for the service, where your Title X responsibilities and the requirements of JNTC cross the line at some point? How has that worked out? And I guess maybe to Dr. Mayberry and General Nash particularly, but everybody can join in.
Dr. MAYBERRY. This is truly the essence of the situationwe need to train the way that we intend to fight, as everyone has said. If we were going to and we do always, there is no question of it, fight as a joint team, the issue then is how you back up from that and have forces that are prepared, trained, exercise educated in their joint responsibilities, building upon the unique capabilities of each individual service. And it sort of says, hey, you have got your core competencies down pat as well. The Joint National Training Capability is one where we tried to bring that sense of balance together and to make the core competency training and exercising truly taken to the next level by putting an appropriate level of joint context to that.
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If each of the services were to just focus on their core competencies, it really would not be a robust training scenario. We all know that is not the way we fight. If that is not how we fight, how can we bring the jointness to this complex situation and allow that really to take each of the services to the next level. I think I will allow the services to sort of address this themselves. That is really the challenge. There is not but 24 hours in a day and 7 days in a week; and we already do a tremendous amount of training, both at a joint and service level. How do we go about seeking this sense of balance to be able to fight the way that we have trained, and that would be jointly.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there a particular place where that really does create the greatest challenge?
General NASH. If you look at U.S. Code, Title X, it very specifically gives the service chiefs or the Commandant, as you will, they have the requirements by law to organize, train and equip their specific service forces. When I was on the Marine staff, I used Title X a lot and I would always throw that around to the OSD guys, to the Joint guys, ''But that is a Title X responsibility, get out of my business.''
I am a Joint guy now so I read the rest of Title X. And there is equally or more responsibilities to the regional combatant commander. He has the serious responsibility of employing joint forces. He is the real warfighter. So getting right to your question, we must bring jointness down to the lowest appropriate level and sometimes maybe down to the lieutenant or captain. It can come to him, if you will, through a soda straw. He does not really care where the close air support comes from. He just wants close air support. But he has got to have the knowledge, the tactics, techniques and procedures to utilize close air support from another service.
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Information is a good area or you could even call that intelligence. As a company commander, I did not care what national asset or where this information came from, but I needed to know what was over the next ridge line. And if we maintain strict service-centric training, we will never get that. And on the low level, our young men and women will not know how to use the great assets that the joint team brings to the fight.
General WEBER. Just a quick comment, ma'am. What excites me, particularly with the Army, about the Joint National Training Capability Exercise, or event here, is the definition of standards that we can all plug into as services so that we do not have to build different architecture every time we need to exercise with other services or in a joint environment. We have our own simulation requirements, perhaps within the Army. That is okay. What we are trying to do is make sure that the systems we buy and we need to operate within the joint context are capable of plugging into a JFCOM or an OSD-defined standard for communications requirements and simulations requirements. That is what I particularly like about the JNTC aspects.
Do we have issues or difficulties in terms of funding and what the priorities might be? Well, I have not been in the job long enough to honestly say. But there is a form, as you heard General Nash elaborate on earlier, where we can bring those things to the table, we can work out the issues, and that is all good as well. We all have our own perspectives that we need to bring to the table. But in a joint context, in a joint environment, it is a collaborative process and there are systems in place for us to work through those issues.
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Admiral HART. There is no doubt, ma'am, that there are core competencies that you have to be able to build first. The cook has got to be able to cook and an engineer has got to make the screws turn on a ship or we are not going any place and the rest is relatively immaterial. That is a very rudimentary level of training. In this day and age, I think everyone has been around long enough to watch it grow and mature, that the graduate level is at the joint level.
Oh, by the way, once you get there, all of the sudden it does not turn off building the core competencies within the service. Many of the things that we do that are in joint exercises are still capitalizing not only in the rudimentary core training but is reinforcing the core training at a much higher level; and, frankly, it is a level at which we are going to use it. We are not going to use it as a solo, single, parochial level that we may have thought as we had done in the past.
General SEIP. I have had the great opportunity to be with this group for almost two years now. I think there is consensus among all of us, to include OSD, Joint Forces Command into the services. The services do blocking and tackling real well, and those are our core competencies. And then when we are going to pick up the West Coast offense, so to speak, that is where it is important that now we can plug in the joint interoperability type of exercise and training. If you will accept the premise that we organize training to equip the services in order to support our combatant commanders who are supporting the regional combatant commanders out there, then I think you can minimize those types of lunch pail swinging type of discussions when it comes to Title X.
Page 65 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Dr. BAILEY. I concur with my general officer colleagues to the greatest extent possible. We have not graduated anybody for combat until they have had joint context.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. As of when?
Dr. BAILEY. What I am saying is we have not succeeded in providing a combatant commander with combat ready units until they fully understand their joint context.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, I appreciate that. You mentioned the SOF earlier and the extent to which even in the exercises that have already been held, the extent to which they have been integrated into that. Has that been possible to do that, to provide that? I guess the situation in which they are really needed, that you would have to call upon them in one of our simulation exercises?
General NASH. Yes, ma'am. In the first event we had live Special Operations Forces operating actually at the southern California logistics area, former March Air Force Base, live forces. These are live service personnel conducting operations in a simulator. We had AC130 gunships flown in a simulator from Herbert Field, Florida, but on the common operating picture it was 100 percent seamless. At our table normally we have a Special Operations rep on the general officer level, so they are a full participant in the Joint National Training Capability process; yes, ma'am.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Just really quickly, we have existing training areas, obviously Camp Pendleton, San Clemente Island, in the San Diego area. Are they integrated into this in all cases or are we generally sending people out of those basic training facilities and into other areas?
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General NASH. The short answer is yes, ma'am, they are integrated and Camp Pendleton will be one of the terminals, or hubs if you will, for our communications architecture and persistent infrastructure. This first event, they were forces from Camp Pendleton participating; but in the future, it will be one of their locations around the country that will be a full participating location; yes, ma'am.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. One other thing that I am aware of in the community, there are a number of businesses that are actually working very hard in being supportive of the needs for simulation and I would hope that they would be considered, certainly when there are opportunities to really utilize their services.
General NASH. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned, I guess it was Mr. Bailey that mentioned SOF first; SOF personnel in this day and age I suppose, are generally trained over a long period of time to be able to survive in strange kinds of places and do strange kinds of things and deal with strange kinds of people. Has SOF been useful in providing personnel assets on the opposing force side, on the red force side?
General WEBER. Sir, I can speak for the Army, I guess, in this sense. Typically, those forces are so difficult to come by in the first place that we do not dedicate them to opposing force capability. We can introduce some other things. We have brought in some Marine force recon to work with at the National Training Center. We do it at JRTC as well. Typically, in all honesty, where the Army SOF is concerned, those guys are hard to come by. They are committed across the world, as we know, and they are hard to come by.
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Mr. SAXTON. But they do train with you on the blue side?
General WEBER. Habitually in the past it has not always been the case. We are better at it in the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk than at the the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, but more and more we are building those things into the scenario because in Iraq and in every other operation they are part of the joint team. So we have to figure out from the conventional Army side how to work with these guys. It brings a different culture. But again, at what level do we introduce this joint operation concept working with special operations? I will tell you again during the last war the first time I stumbled across this, SOF guys were outside of Najaf, and we were using them to give us some updates on some intel inside of Najaf as the 2nd Brigade at the time had Najaf surrounded. So they were very useful. We knew they were there. And we knew what information we needed from the elements. But again, because of their commitments worldwide, it is difficult to really introduce the numbers of Special Operations ODA teams that you might need to do as well as you would like, but we do as best we can with it.
General NASH. Mr. Saxton, if I could add to that, please, sir.
A successful lessons noted that is actually being turned into a lesson learned was an integration of Special Operations Forces with conventional forces; and there a lot of vignettes, especially now that our lessons learned team has spoken with some of the Iraqi leadership of what they thought were conventional forces or were SOF forces and is a significant success story.
Page 68 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC As I mentioned, the leadership from the U.S. Special Operations Command at McDill Air Force base in Tampa is a full participant in our Joint National Training Capability development and support process.
Mr. SAXTON. You are not saying something different. You are still saying there are not enough SOF units to incorporate into the Joint National Training process?
General NASH. We will use them to the best of our ability. Most are deployed somewhere in the world today, so to accommodate that they have helped us build the constructive part of this, the computer enhanced portion, to add SOF participation where it shows up on a common operating picture as if there are Special Operations Forces totally deployed. And the commander on the field has to deal with them. Are they live, air breathing soldiers, sailors, airmen in the field? No, sir. But it is transparent to that commander who has to make that decision.
Dr. MAYBERRY. The SOF community also is one of the major leaders in the advancement in the simulation fields. I think that their mission rehearsal capability is probably something that in the future we aspire, the Joint National Training Capability, to evolve towards; and that is that you actually would have an adaptive training capability, again pulling people together from literally around the world, to be able to prepare, train, own the flight as you are going in. So simulation, simulators are really one of the strengths of the Special Operations community.
Mr. SAXTON. Anybody else want to talk about SOF? What kind of bandwidth constraints, radio frequency and spectrum management issues did you encounter during the January exercise and how did your service handle these issues? Do you foresee these issues arising in the next NJTC exercises, and how will your service be better equipped to handle them? I read that just like my staff wrote it. How about that?
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General NASH. If the services want to answer that first. If not, I will.
Admiral HART. Let me go ahead and at least address that a little bit, sir. From the January exercise from the Naval perspective, and as I mentioned earlier one of our toughest challenges obviously when we go to sea, we have no fiber-optic cable that we can depend on. It has all got to come through the ether. In the case of the January exercise, is was a ship pierside and so, in fact, he was plugged into the network.
Hopefully that is better. In our January exercise the one ship that participated was, in fact, pierside in San Diego. So he was able to plug into the network, so to speak, and simulate his own combat systems onboard the ship. So in that particular environment, which would be either constructive or in this case simulated, that was not an issue. At sea it is going to be a little bit different, but what we do then for the training piece is we augment the actual antenna configuration on the ships to allow them the extra bandwidth in order to accommodate the necessary downfeed and interchange that is required for the JNTC.
General SEIP. Mr. Saxton, probably at this time of day the last thing you want to hear from a fighter pilot with a degree in Latin American history is someone trying to talk about pipes and com. What I can do is take that for the record for the Air Force and we will get back to you with a detailed answer.
[The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Page 70 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Dr. BAILEY. Sir, from the Marines' perspective, we were prepared for dealing with frequency management. We were prepared to deal with some bandwidth that is used; and we took the JNTC exercises, an opportunity to greatly expand our ability to communicate from one side of our base to the other, basically using instrumentation as an excuse to roll out a more robust capability. That was a very good positive effect of the JNTC. What comes along with your question is the question of secure bandwidth. The Marine Corps traditionally runs an unclassified exercise at Twenty-Nine Palms, and the requirement to go secure to participate with our joint friends drove us to some fairly extreme measures and some expeditious use of fencing and guards. We got through it, but it is definitely a culture change for the Marine Corps.
General NASH. Unfortunately, sir, they did not answer the question. The Joint National Training Capability will really depend on a persistent high bandwidth network. There are two challenges as we establish this persistent architecture. One, as Dr. Bailey mentioned, was network security and the second is development of a common architecture. We are working hand in hand with the Defense Information Systems Agency as the Global Information Greater Bandwidth Enhancement Program is developed. And what it will really depend on is building a program that is built on the GIGBE, the Global Information Greater Bandwidth Enhancement, to establish persistent architecture, permanent architecture, through a significant number of training locations within the continental United States and then be able to build a web from those particular locations. That takes care of the issue within the continental United States. But again, remember when we want to train overseas with NATO, with coalitions that are coalitions of opportunity, we have got to be able to export this worldwide and; therefore, we are working hand in hand with the Defense Information Systems Agency to make that a reality.
But I did not answer your question on January. I apologize. Through lease networks and one time usage, we accomplished the task. But that is not the desired answer.
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Mr. SAXTON. So it sounds like we have a long way to go?
General NASH. We have a way to go and with the committee's continued support, we are confident that we can make that happen.
Mr. SAXTON. I am aware of a book that has been written called Transformation Under Fire. It is written by an Army Colonel, Doug MacGregor, and he makes the point one of you talked about; it was Mr. Bailey who talked about the new technique of
Dr. BAILEY. Closed air support, sir.
Mr. SAXTON. Closed air support. And that is the kind of thing that you develop because you need something real bad and you figure out a new way to do it, and that is transformation under fire. Do you see the same kind of initiative in the JNTC process? Does it bring about that kind of change in this training process that we are involved in?
Dr. MAYBERRY. Let me say that training is mnemonic of JNTC may be somewhat misleading. We need to really capitalize on the benefit and the value of a Joint National Training Capability much further beyond just the training. We must get into areas of experimentation, concept development. JNTC in that sense really must be a sandbox. We have got a tremendous amount of very complex joint problems that we face as a department in the area of information operations, joint urban operations, coalitional partners, interagency, intergovernmental homeland security problems. How do we go about real concept development for this? It is one thing to get a lot of smart people in the room and come up with the TTP, the tactics, techniques and procedures here, but then you need a device really to go out, test and understand and put them in a stressful environment. The same types of pillars that have been discussed here in terms of realistic training, opposing forces, instrumentation, and feedback really are the same concepts that we need to apply to the experimentation world. I think that under Joint Forces Command and their charter, not only for transformation, training and experimentation, this is really where this will have to come together.
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Mr. SAXTON. Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And perhaps just to follow up with what you were saying, I think part of our question and our issue obviously comes to the bottom line, to the resources, what you have and what you can do with it. There has been some concern about the R&D budget and whether or not that would impact what you do or not. I do not know. Some of this is in basic research, but I am wondering whether is there an issue around that in terms of the availability of resources to do additional experimentation?
And the other question would be I think to Admiral Hart, and tell me, sir, perhaps I read too much into this, but you had mentioned the representation of the intelligence community as another area where JNTC and all of their simulation services may need further investment. Where I am questioning is, is that an area that you all struggle with a little bit more in terms of getting their involvement or support or trying to help where people are fearful of crossing certain lines and what is available to you?
Dr. MAYBERRY. In terms of resource issues, I think that we have dollars in three flavors here and the preponderance of them will be in operations and maintenance side where we really are executing much of the training requirements of the combatant commanders. There will be some procurement requirements that we have budgeted for to get at the instrumentation and communication aspects. We have got some challenges there to make sure that those are interoperable as we go forward, that standards have been set to which these procurements would allow the services to really press forward on.
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In the R&D realm, I think that we are conducting a training capabilities analysis of alternatives right now and it is really focused on how we bring modelling and simulation in a joint frame work, as we said earlier. Each of the services have their respective Title X service models to move forward. I think that we as a department are conducting this analysis of alternatives now for future training capabilities and that we are going to have to continue to research that as we go forward. That report is due in the April time frame to be able to be included in the Department's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development programming cycle to be able to address these specific needs.
Admiral HART. Mrs. Davis, I apologize, I do not think it was I that raised the intelligence issue. That is a word they do not let me speak very often, by the way. It may have been one of my conferees at the table, but I do not think it was one that I raised. I am sorry.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Mr. Chairman, in my last set of questions I think it was either Mr. Berry or General Nash used the term with regards to the January training event that it was pulled back, that is something was pulled back, you were putting down communication, putting down wire, but we had to lease it and it was pulled back. Could you please explain that, what that means?
Dr. MAYBERRY. The original plans that we had for the January event were, in fact, based upon resources that we did not completely have at the time of the January event. The original requirement for that was the full amount would have put some degree of permanence to the types of communications and connectivity across the sites.
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Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Let me ask an obvious question. Why was it pulled back? Why were the resources not there for a training exercise that seems to be the foundation of the military's future?
Dr. MAYBERRY. We took a mark from the appropriators in terms of whether the question of could these funds be executed in this fiscal year. We went over and made our case, and I must not have been persuasive enough at that time.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Okay. All right. The budget that is proposed this year is $227 million and then 140 of that is for JFCOM. Is that right? There is $227 million for training transformation with 140 million for JFCOM? Do I have that right?
Dr. MAYBERRY. That sounds in the ballpark.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. How is that money going to be used? And I want to ask that question more specifically. You said that you were looking at developing the permanent architecture, the permanent network. Is that money going to be going into building the network and the architecture this year?
Dr. MAYBERRY. Before General Nash jumps in on this one, let me say that about $225 million have been focused on training transformation. The Joint National Training Capability portion of that is about $190 million.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. How much?
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Dr. MAYBERRY. About $190 million. Those dollars then sort of come in three flavors: Funds that go directly to JFCOM and its joint management responsibilities, funds that go directly to the services to be able to have their requirements of a Joint National Training Capability event supported, and then there are funds that also go to JFCOM that are pushed through to the services to address many of the gaps and seams that would not be a service responsibility. But I will let General Nash talk about how those funds are then divided into permanent architectures and communications.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. That would be great. Thank you.
General NASH. The services were funded no monies to participate in a Joint National Training Capability.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. No money directly to the services?
General NASH. Correct, sir, other than what originally Dr. Mayberry mentioned. So first, these funds are being spent to build a foundation, the persistent architecture. Second, it is to incentivize, if you will, the service participation, to pay for joint capabilities that they would not normally have in an exercise off San Diego. It might be Navy only, a brigade rotation at the National Training Center, an air warrior, which, although that supports the brigade rotation at the National Training Center, at the Joint Readiness Training Center, it does not bring the full joint involvement. It brings jointness to Twenty-Nine Palms at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Training Center.
Page 76 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC In fact, the real expenditure is first to establish the architecture that will be able to be used in the outyears. But it is an expense to bring jointness into an exercise, and that is one of the real values for, I would say, where I work at the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Management Office, sir.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Next year at this time do you expect to come back to us and say that we are 50 percent done with the network and architecture itself or 75 percent or so on? What kind of time line is involved there?
General NASH. Sir, we will meet the initial operational capability in October 2004, this year. That really just meant to conduct four exercises on the various levels that we had described. The goal is to establish the beginnings of the persistent or permanent architecture. Every day we grow more, every day we build our team; and I hope we get invited back next year to tell you about the continued success. First of all, this will mean this is not a one-time event, a fad if you will, and then show you the road ahead to reach full operational capability in 2009.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. If I may, why is there money proposed in the budget to incentivize, I guess, to pull the services into the involvement as opposed to just being directed to do it? This is the way that we are going to run the military and the way it is going to be run in the future, joint operations; you should be doing this. Why is some of the JFCOM money being used to pull the service in rather than being encouraged strongly to participate?
Dr. MAYBERRY. We could certainly encourage them strongly, and we have in the past in other areas. I think that the issue here is it goes back to Title X responsibilities and service responsibilities. And if, in fact, we are going to bring everybody to this neutral distributed field, what is the benefit of threat emitters at a ground location, and who would pay for them? We get into some very interesting discussions over that, sir; and it is because of the criticality of the joint context that needs to be provided that, in fact, we have had these types of funds to address those gaps and seams between the services.
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Dr. BAILEY. I was going to say, sir, we are pulled in. POM06 is our first flexibility to accommodate a JNTC capability, and the Marine Corps being notoriously uninstrumented, saw a crisis and we were responding directly by building what we call a range investment strategy that will accommodate JNTC capability at Twenty-Nine Palms and all of our major bases, including Camp Pendleton, as early as POM06, which means we wish for it in 2004. We see it starting to happen in 2006; and we feel it is sometime soon after that, sir. But we as a service are committed.
Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. General Nash.
General NASH. Sir, I was just going to build on the other statements. The services still need their core competency training time and then when they reach the 100 level or 200 level, to put it in in academic terms, we bring them into the joint environment where they fully participate. They are currently not funded to go beyond their core competencies.
General WEBER. Let me elaborate. Every NDC-JRTC rotation we are jointed with the Air Force. Habitually we train with them. We are hit or miss on Special Operations at the NTC, CMTC perhaps. Typically, that is always a JRTC event. So when we bring in a Joint National Training Capability event, that is sort of an add-on to what we would normally be doing. So typically that is where the JNTC money will come to the service to help pay for that add-on cost that was not forecasted for, was not planned for, and certainly not programmed for.
Admiral HART. You mention a good point, and it came up a moment earlier on. In fact, Title X is, of course, our predominant description in the catalog of responsibilities; but nevertheless when we go into a major exercise, it is primarily a service exercise. Witness the June event coming up, which is primarily NAVAL as it is a combined joint task force exercise; but it plays directly into and it will be the backbone of a key JNTC event. I think it will be a little bit misleading to imply that there is a firewall between the funding between Title X responsibility training and something that is joint. Many, many times there is a lot of bleed-over there; and I think that is a good example of where that occurs.
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Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. I have just one final question, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to frame it this way so you know why I am asking.
The week before last we had a budget proposal which would have taken the top line of our military defense budget of $401.7 billion, taken a slice off the top; and 33 members of this committee wrote a letter to the Republican leadership and said if you do that, we are not going to vote for the budget. And after lots and lots of words exchanged, an arrangement was made where they restored what they were going to take off the top; but in exchange, we agreed that we would find $2 billion worth of waste, whatever that is. So we have to reach into something and find some waste and then we are going to plug that money back in some place into the defense budget. So we need your help to know what is important to you. When I asked Admiral Giambastiani last week, he said just don't cut us. I said, well, I understand that. And likely because you are a new and important program or a relatively new and important program, we probably will not.
The other question is, what is it you need that you do not have that gets you to the capability level you want to be at in 2009?
Dr. MAYBERRY. Well, what do you need that you do not have? Sir, I think that what is required to really be at this graduate level of Joint National Training Capability is that the services have to bring a range infrastructure to the party. And that is, as you have seen, the Marine Corps really has made some tremendous advancements and commitments to how they are going to go about not only their range infrastructure but the instrumentation to that as well.
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That is probably one of the greatest challenges as we go forward, as we try to really push the envelope in terms of training capabilities with joint national focus, is to make sure that the range and training infrastructure is able to come along with that. That is a great challenge as we go forward to make sure that everyone can bring the respective not only blocking and tacklings, but contributions to this joint event.
Mr. SAXTON. You are talking about physical things that you need to build infrastructure, is that right?
Dr. MAYBERRY. I am talking about threat emitters. I am talking about instrumentation that allows scoring for force-on-force types of exercises. Many of these capabilities are getting somewhat very dated and to the end of their lives within the services.
Mr. SAXTON. Would it be possible for you to have somebody work with our staff to identify the line items that need to be enhanced in order for us to help you with that?
Dr. MAYBERRY. Yes, sir. I will do that.
Mr. SAXTON. Okay. Anybody else? That is what I thought. I was not sure.
General NASH. Sir, my boss said do not cut it. My boss, Admiral Giambastiani, said do not cut it, and I guess that is our story and I guess I better stick with this.
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Mr. SAXTON. We think what you are doing, I think what you are doing, and I am sure I speak for the remaining Members here, think what you are doing is extremely important. We saw joint warfighting exercises in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and prior to that too. We now understand from a Congressional perspective how important that is and how much more capable our forces are after being trained to fight in this joint manner. And we have been convinced as well by the military leadership, particularly the Secretary of Defense and others, General Shoomaker and others, about how important this is and, therefore, how important your job is. So we want to do whatever we can to be helpful to you.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much. The hearing turned out to be a whole lot better than it started out. We have taken more of your day than normally we would. We really appreciate it and appreciate you being here.
Have any of you read the book Pentagon by, I think, Allen Drury? Well, since Jim gave a book review, I will too. I think you would find it fun because of the area you are working in because it is an inspiration for the need for jointness because it talks about an operation in the South Pacific where we are going to invade this little island, and so forth, where the Russians are doing something, and trying to put together all the services to do that in the Pentagon and how very difficult that is to do back in the day when he wrote the book. I suspect he was not too far off the mark. It sounds to me like you have come a long way from those days. But for history, you might enjoy reading that.
Page 81 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC If there are no further questions, then the committee stands adjourned, with our thanks.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the joint subcommittee was adjourned.]