SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 1 TOP OF DOC
87–332
2003
[H.A.S.C. No. 108–2]
HEARINGS
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004—H.R. 1588
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FULL COMMITTEE HEARINGS
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
ON
AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT
HEARINGS HELD
MARCH 20, 2003
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighth Congress
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
TIM RYAN, Ohio
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
James M. Lariviere, Professional Staff Member
Harry Cartland, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2003
HEARING:
Thursday, March 20, 2003, Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act—Ballistic Missile Defense
APPENDIX:
Thursday, March 20, 2003
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2003
FISCAL YEAR 2004, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
WITNESSES
Aldridge, Hon. E.C. Pete, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics
Crouch, Hon. J.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Aldridge, Hon. E.C. Pete, Jr.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Christie, Hon. Thomas P.
Crouch, Hon. J.D.
Hunter, Hon. Duncan
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T.
Skelton, Hon. Ike
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Bartlett
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis
Mr. Miller
Mr. Spratt
Ms. Susan Davis
FISCAL YEAR 2004, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 20, 2003.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.
It was almost 20 years ago to the day—March 23, 1983—that President Ronald Reagan questioned the logic and wisdom of our strategic policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, or ''MAD'', and thereby challenged the same scientists and engineers who created our system of nuclear deterrence with the task of developing the means to render these weapons ''impotent and obsolete''.
Over the years, Congress and the nation have engaged in a vigorous debate over the merit of this change in strategic policy. However, in 1999, Congress passed, on a bipartisan basis, H.R. 4—the National Missile Defense Act of 1999—officially committing the United States to the deployment of a national missile defense system ''as soon as is technologically possible''.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
While much has transpired since President Reagan's visionary speech, today we finally stand on the threshold of turning that vision into reality. The administration deserves great credit in recognizing the urgent need to both change the strategic arms control framework and pursue all prudent technological avenues to achieve this goal.
Last year, the United States exercised its legal right to withdraw from the obsolete and counterproductive Anti-Ballistic Missile, or ABM, Treaty. Contrary to the dire predictions of some, the world did not end and strategic stability did not collapse.
In fact, most of the world hardly seemed to notice or care. If anything, the international community has become more attuned to the problem of the proliferation of strategic weapons and the means to deliver them and more focused on developing the means to defeat them. ABM was simply a treaty for another era.
By ridding ourselves from the artificial constraints of this treaty, we can now fully explore all options for basing sensors and weapons to provide the most comprehensive defense possible. Accordingly, the Department of Defense (DOD) has already conducted a number of important test activities that would have likely been prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
Most recently, President Bush announced in December the decision to begin fielding an initial defensive operational capability beginning in the fall of 2004. The budget now before us supports this decision by requesting an additional $1.5 billion over the next couple of years to increase the number of ground-based interceptors (GBI) planned for the Pacific ballistic missile defense test bed from 5 to as many as 20. The request also would equip 3 of our Aegis-capable cruisers with as many as 20 of our developmental Navy upper-tier interceptors, and 5 times that number of Aegis-capable destroyers with upgrades to their tracking radars.
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
While this decision will likely prompt a further round of debate in the Congress, I believe the results of our test program over the past two years are a cause for confidence and optimism and that we must push forward to field an operational capability as quickly and prudently as possible. That said, these are merely initial steps. And much more work remains to be done.
Let me note in closing that if the world's most destructive weapons were launched at the United States—either by accident or with malevolent intent—today there is still nothing we can do to stop them. We cannot stop one. It would be the grimmest day this nation has ever seen.
Were we able to stop only one of those missiles, the result would hardly be less tragic, but the number of lives saved could easily be measured in the hundreds of thousands. Given the stakes, we have no choice but to move forward and eliminate this glaring vulnerability as rapidly as possible.
So, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks that he might wish to make. And I would like to welcome, after Ike's statement, of course, our guests: The Honorable Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Honorable J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy; Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, United States Air Force, Director, Missile Defense Agency; and the Honorable Thomas P. Christie, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense.
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And, gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. But first, I want to turn to my partner and colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, the ranking Democrat, for any remarks he might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be viewed in the hard copy.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to say a personal thank you to you for your leadership and the way you are leading this committee. I appreciate it.
There are no surprises; we work together quite well. And I just cannot thank you enough. And I think everybody on this committee should understand how well we are working together.
So thanks a million.
And Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not say something first about the events that began our time last night, when we received the official call that the hostilities had begun. So the young men and young women wearing the American uniform are certainly in our thoughts and prayers today.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So, gentlemen, let me welcome you. And it is nice of you to provide General Kadish some company today. Hope you do not think of yourselves as human shields, although he probably appreciates the deflections that he is used to getting before this committee. Although, we all have great respect and admiration for you, General.
The people of the United States do need to be defended from missiles. No question about that. And there is no question that the Missile Defense Agency is pursuing that goal zealously. And we thank you for that, the zeal showed in last night's success with the Patriot missiles from the Scuds that were incoming toward our troops.
I will share with you something that does worry me. Some two years ago, the missile defense budget was increased more than 50 percent. And this year, the budget proposal is almost—another 20 percent that is proposed on top of that. This is already the largest hardware program in our Department of Defense.
Now, it would be one thing if that extra money were going to deploy technologies that we already have to protect our troops, such as the Patriot or Advanced Patriots like last night. I think there was strong consensus in this room about that.
But much of it is going to new research programs, including new ideas about putting weapons in space. I am not sure there will be a consensus on that.
But, General, let me point out—I jokingly said to you awhile ago that we have done a great deal of research on you, and you smiled. But in truth and fact, let me remind you of this, in your official biography, General, ''The Missile Defense Agency is presidentially chartered and mandated by Congress to acquire highly effective ballistic missile defense systems to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of the U.S. Armed Forces. Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency will develop options and, if directed, acquire systems for ballistic missile defense of the United States.''
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So there is a primary duty set forth in the charter, which is set forth in your biography, General. And I point that out because we may become involved in that discussion.
And, Secretary Aldridge, two years ago, I was probably less than kind to our friend, General Kadish. And I characterized the missile defense plan as ''throwing everything against the wall and see what sticks.'' And I hope that is not a characterization of what is proposed and what is planned now, when the primary purpose, as set forth in your biography, is to protect the troops.
Let me point out some things that I find encouraging. The agency has made a conscious effort to put more transparency into the budgeting in programs. And that has been done in good faith and cooperative spirit. I believe that Congress is now in a better position to exercise oversight with regard to the program.
And I also see that in testimony earlier this week, every one of you rejected the proposal for legislation that might have exempted this program from operational test requirements. And we thank you for that.
We have waived far too many requirements already on the missile defense program. So I think that is a major step in the right direction. That is a large part of what we do—that is, oversight—and we thank you for your position on that.
So, Secretary Aldridge, Director Christie, my fellow Missourian, Secretary Crouch, we thank you. And, General, thank you.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. I thank my colleague.
And Secretary Aldridge, we are going to turn the floor over to you. I might just mention, before we do that, that you do have a duty to protect troops in theater and to protect folks in this country. And we have discovered that there is no law or Marquis of Queensbury rules that require our adversaries to shoot only slow missiles at our troops in theater and not use the same fast missiles that they might use against cities in the United States.
It is kind of analogous to this problem we now have of detecting chem-bio. We have a Homeland Security Department that is going to have to be in the business of detecting a biological substance in the air in this country.
We will have precisely the same problem of detection and rapid response to precisely the same substances that might be introduced to our troops who are in theaters around the world. And so, while we have two different locations to worry about, it appears that we have much the same problem and challenge in terms of an adversary's capability.
So while I want to acknowledge that there is a comma between those two missions that my colleague just talked about, in reality, we are going to have to protect troops and American citizens against slow, medium and fast-moving missiles.
And with that limited editorial, Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
STATEMENT OF HON. E.C. ''PETE'' ALDRIDGE, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITIONS, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning, everyone.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Fiscal Year 2004 Department of Defense Missile Defense Program and budget submission. I am pleased to provide you this update on the progress of the Missile Defense development program.
In the year that has transpired since I last addressed this committee, we have made some good progress in missile defense. The new management structure established by Secretary Rumsfeld in his memorandum of January 2, 2002 has been stood up. An effective and rigorous oversight structure, aided by the Missile Defense Support Group, is in place and providing valuable advice to me and to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the conduct of the program.
Processes within the Department have been modified to support the accelerated development and fielding of these new revolutionary capabilities. A national team of the best and brightest of the government and industry has been formed and is tackling the complex technical challenges of ballistic missile defense.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We have achieved a number of successes in the missile defense test program, which have added momentum to the development effort and bolstered our confidence that we will be able to meet the challenges that lie ahead. In addition, our overtures to allies and friends have generated an expanded desire for international participation in the missile defense program.
The focus of my testimony in March of last year was the management and oversight of the missile defense program. The committee was rightly concerned that the new management structure should provide for the proper oversight of the program by the Department, and that the Congress should have full insight into program activities.
I informed you of the formation of a Missile Defense Support Group—MDSG—consisting of key officials plus 2 advisors from 13 selected offices within the department, including the military services, for a total of 39 individuals who support decision making by the Senior Executive Council and to advise me and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency on the full range of issues associated with the missile defense program, including policy, operations, acquisition and resources.
In the span of 1 year, we have had 25 meetings of the MDSG, an average of 2 meetings each month, of a group of some of the most knowledgeable and experienced individuals in the Department. No program in the Department receives more scrutiny, either in level of rigor or frequency of study, than the missile defense program.
The MDSG has provided me and General Kadish strong support in numerous key areas of the missile defense program. The MDSG has helped me develop the strategies for the deployment of an initial capability and the follow-on deployment of expanded capabilities in block configurations.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
It has also been valuable for the transition of developed capabilities to the services for fielding and operation. In October of last year, I decided that the time was right to transfer the Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) system to the Army. The advice of the MDSG for making the handover to the Army supported the Defense Acquisition Board process and aided my decision to make the transfer.
The MDSG has also helped the Missile Defense Development Program by speeding a number of routine Department processes, including review of the annual budget and continuing evaluation of each part of the missile defense program against its cost and schedule goals.
I can confidently assure the Congress that oversight has actually improved under the new management structure with the continual engagement of the Missile Defense Support Group.
As you are aware, on December 19, 2002, President Bush made the decision to deploy a limited missile defense capability beginning in 2004. The nature of the expanding ballistic missile threat and the declared hostile intent of our adversaries compel us to put capabilities in the hands of our fighting men and women as soon as they become available, even if the state of development is less than what we would ultimately hope to deliver.
Putting an effective capability into the hands of our fighting force is a dramatically safer move for our troops, our nation, our allies and our friends than delaying their fielding for five years or more as we strive for a final, objective level of performance. This is the strategy directed by Secretary Rumsfeld in his January 2, 2002 memorandum on the missile defense program and the philosophy by which our efforts are being guided.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Concerns have been raised by some that this might result in the fielding of systems that are unproven and unsuitable for battlefield conditions, or that the Department is seeking a waiver of statutory requirements governing operational testing. The source of this last misapprehension originated in our attempt to fund the Missile Defense Agency entirely out of research, development, testing and evaluation—RDT&E—accounts.
With regard to testing waivers, the unintended consequence of the requested language appeared to be a distinction, but not a difference. Regrettable though this is, no such waiver of testing requirements has been requested. And we still hope to secure our initial goal of funding MDA—the Missile Defense Agency—through RDT&E funding lines.
We have every confidence that the compromise language can be agreed to that honors our original intent, while avoiding the misperception of a waiver of request. We plan to work with the congressional defense committees to pursue this important goal.
The revolutionary nature of missile defense and the threat posed by ballistic missiles have prompted us to take steps to ensure that deployed systems meet effectiveness and suitability goals through rigorous testing throughout development. The Department involves the operational test community well in advance of a deployment decision so that we can gain a better understanding of these issues as capabilities are being developed.
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) is directly involved in the review and assessment of all missile defense testing activities. He will provide his operational assessment report to Congress each year and provide the Department an operational assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the ballistic missile defense system at each block decision point.
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The Director of OT&E also participates as a member of the Missile Defense Support Group, which has examined the developmental test program on several occasions during its first year of work. The Department is committed to ensuring that fielded missile defense capabilities are sufficient for defending against the threat. I am confident that the level of oversight being provided to the test activities will accomplish this goal.
An important element of our missile defense program is the planned ability to extend ballistic missile defenses to include our friends and allies. Recent revelations about North Korea's ability to reach the United States, compounded by that nation's recent behavior, have validated the concerns of Japan and other Western Pacific nations regarding the threat of ballistic missile attack. These concerns are rightly shared by Europe, as well.
The ongoing proliferation of weapons and missile technology to nations such as Iran poses a more immediate threat to the European continent than to North America. This has sparked a growing desire among several of our allies to participate in the missile defense program.
We have recently conducted discussions with the United Kingdom (U.K.), Japan and Denmark toward expanded missile defense participation, with some positive outcomes already agreed to. We are also in continuing dialogue with other allies. The effectiveness of any global ballistic missile defense system will be enhanced by international participation.
Mr. Chairman, since this is my first opportunity to testify before the House Armed Services Committee since the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2003, I would like to take this opportunity to thank its members for their invaluable contributions to such elements of this legislation as ''Buy-to-Budget.'' This provision will help us optimize the use of taxpayer funds as we seek to provide the best possible equipment and weaponry to the warfighter.
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We are also grateful for the removal of certain superfluous and resource-consuming reporting requirements. The continued cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Congress will only grow in importance as we execute our mission to provide for the national security of the United States. I look forward to that continuing cooperation.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee. And I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Aldridge can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service to our country.
Mr. Crouch.
STATEMENT OF HON. J.D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Secretary CROUCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee. It is an honor to be able to come before your committee to provide details about our missile defense policy and the direction of our missile defense program, in light of the President's recent decision to begin initial fielding of missile defense capabilities in the 2004-2005 timeframe. This committee has played a crucial role in bringing our missile defense program to this point. And I want to thank you for the support this committee has shown over the years.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. Chairman, we and our allies face serious and unpredictable threats to our homelands and military forces from the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic missiles have proliferated on a global basis and are in the hands of over two dozen states, many of which have chemical, biological or nuclear programs underway.
North Korea, for example, has had an active ballistic missile program for years, and has developed a wide-range of offensive missiles. It has deployed and exported missiles that can threaten our allies, forces, friends and even the United States.
North Korea has developed the Taepo Dong II long-range missile, which is capable of reaching parts of the United States and could be flight-tested at any time. Iran and other countries are working on space-launch vehicles and intercontinental-range missiles that could be ready for testing in the next few years.
We are moving forward with missile defense to help protect American territory and forces abroad and our allies and friends against the use of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by unpredictable and, in some cases, irresponsible states. In addition, some countries seek missiles and weapons of mass destruction to coerce us simply by threatening their use. Missile defenses will help to reduce our potential vulnerability to such coercive threats.
Finally, missile defense can help to reduce the proliferation of ballistic missiles by reducing their value, thereby reducing the demand for them. In this way, we believe missile defenses will provide a useful complement to our other non-proliferation efforts.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In light of this new security environment and the considerable progress made to date in missile defense technology, the President directed the Department of Defense to proceed with fielding initial missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005. As the President has noted, because ballistic missile threats also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together cooperatively to defend against them.
To do so, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies. And we have structured our missile defense program in a manner that encourages participation by other nations.
The Department has been pursuing a broad-based research, development and testing program to examine the full range of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight. As we field the missile defenses called for by the President, our development and testing program will continue to improve our defensive systems over time.
Under this evolutionary approach, we do not envision a final or fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the composition of missile defenses, including the type, number and location of components, will change over time to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological opportunities. This approach facilitates the timely delivery of an initially modest, but still useful, defensive capability that can be improved as technology advances and provide us with some real operational experience.
As you outlined in your statement, Mr. Chairman, the capabilities called for by the President for 2004-2005 include 20 ground-based interceptors against the intercontinental-range ballistic missile threat; 16 located at Ft. Greely, Alaska and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base. These ground-based interceptors will be available on a continuous basis to intercept long-range missiles during their midcourse phase of flight.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The ballistic missile defense system supporting the ground-based interceptors (GBI) will include an initial set of integrated sensors based on land and at sea and cued by early warning sensors in space.
We have also made requests to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark to upgrade early warning radars on their territory to track ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. The United Kingdom has already granted permission. And we look forward to hearing from Denmark later this year on the subject.
To address the medium-range threat, we plan to equip 3 existing Aegis-class ships with up to 20 Standard Missile–3 interceptors. This will provide a highly mobile missile defense capability to protect U.S. forces and allies and provide some limited protection for the United States homeland against shorter-range missiles that could be launched from ships off our coasts.
Finally, with respect to the short-range threat, we will continue to field additional air-transportable and mobile Patriot PAC–3 units and radars. These initial capabilities may be improved later in the decade through additional measures that will lead, ultimately, to a multi-layered missile defense capability.
Fielding a layered missile defense system poses new operational command and control challenges. A key presidential document used to organize U.S. forces, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002, assigns the United States Strategic Command—STRATCOM—responsibility for planning, integrating, coordinating and developing the desired characteristics for sea, land, air and space-based missile defense operations. UCP 2002 addresses the missile defense command and control issue through the use of centralized planning with decentralized execution.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Therefore, while STRATCOM will be given the responsibility for planning, integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations, Northern Command and other regional combatant commands will retain responsibility for defending their geographic areas of responsibility, including command and control over systems providing defense against ballistic missile attacks.
As the President also stated, it is essential that we work together with allies and friends to defend against ballistic missile threats. Accordingly, the Department is developing and deploying missile defenses that can do that. And we are also cooperating with our allies in this area.
There are a number of examples of U.S. missile defense cooperation with allies and friends around the world. For example, the United States has been working with Israel since the late 1980s to develop the Arrow defense system, which is now standing guard in the Middle East. We are also working cooperatively with the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and Germany, and have an ongoing dialogue with India on missile defense issues.
The United States continues actively to engage the Russian Federation in the area of missile defense cooperation. The Joint Declaration, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin last May, called for missile defense cooperation and reflects the new relationship between our two countries.
To fulfill our commitment, to strengthen confidence, increase transparency and study areas for missile defense cooperation, a U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Working Group has been established under the auspices of the ministers of defense and secretaries of state of both countries.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In this venue, the U.S. has already proposed to begin voluntary and reciprocal information exchanges and visits, has made proposals for potential new cooperation and has also encouraged Russian interaction with U.S. companies working in the missile defense field.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, missile defenses are an essential element of our overall national security policy to transform U.S. defense capabilities to meet the requirements of a dynamic international security environment. As we move forward to field the missile defenses called for by the President, we will do so in cooperation with our allies and friends and, of course, with the Congress.
Our initial missile defense capabilities will be modest; but the evolutionary approach we are pursuing will support continued research, development and testing to improve our capabilities as budgets and technology allow, and as developments in the threat necessitate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Crouch can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Crouch.
And General Kadish, thank you for being with us this morning and for your service to our country. And I might mention at this point in our hearing, or opening statements, that the chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee, Mr. Everett, recommended that we make this a full committee hearing this morning because of the Member interest and because of the importance of this very critical area. And I just want to compliment my friend and thank him for doing that.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General Kadish, we thank you for all the work and service that you do. We have been through lots of hurdles and wickets here over the last couple of years. You have some pretty bright spots in recent testing. And we appreciate you.
And the floor is yours. And incidentally, without objection, all written statements will be taken into the record. So feel free to summarize. Although I think a lot of the detail that we are hearing this morning is important.
General Kadish.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
General KADISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I will just highlight some of the major areas I would like to emphasize this morning about our missile defense program and talk a little bit about the progress you just mentioned that we have made in the past few years.
In early 2001, we started restructuring the missile defense program to develop capabilities to defend the United States, our deployed forces and our allies and friends against all ranges of missiles and all phases of flight. With the support of Congress and, in particular, this committee, we have made considerable progress in demonstrating key missile defense technologies and systems integration. Our testing and analysis give us the confidence that the ''hit-to-kill'' technology works and that we can take the initial steps we are proposing to provide modest initial defensive capability where none exists today.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Altogether, we have made great progress in our missile defense program. Our testing has been aggressive and productive. Over the past two years, we have achieved four for five successful ground-based intercepts of long-range targets and we are three for three in our sea-based intercepts of medium-range targets. We are five for seven with the Patriot Advanced Capability–3, or PAC–3, interceptor. And we are making steady progress with the airborne laser to develop revolutionary speed-of-light technologies to attack in the boost phase.
We have had failures in this process. And in all probability, we will continue to have failures. But this scorecard has increased our confidence in our basic technical approach.
Last December, the President directed the Department of Defense to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities in view of our technical progress and our total lack of missile defenses against intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles. Given our fielding approach using the test bed we have been working on for the past two years and given our testing successes in analysis to date, I believe we are ready for this.
With the President's decision, we now have a basic, near-term architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed long-term architecture yet. We will evolve and improve this capability of the Block 04 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in 2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later.
The number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and basing arrangements may be expected to change and make the system more integrated and capable. This is consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings. We are building and fielding limited military useful capabilities as soon as they can be made available. We have said all along that when we do field, we will not field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We will have constraints and some limitations and gaps, let there be no allusions there. The system we will be fielding initially will have some restraints operationally.
But we went down this road knowing that there would be restraints of some sort on the system and with a process that is specifically designed to make up for those assumed as practicable. With an evolutionary capability-based acquisition approach, we can put capability into the field; we can test it; we can use it; we can get comfortable with it; we can learn what works well and what does not work well and improve it as soon as we can.
Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's budget would have reflected the development of a set of test bed capabilities that could have been made operational. Today, we are asking Congress to authorize funds that will allow us to add to this test bed and make it operational in 2004 and 2005.
In other words, instead of building a test bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability that we will continue to test in a test bed mode. Because of this relationship between initial defense capability and testing, we are asking that all funding associated with both efforts be under the defense-wide appropriation RDT&E.
Now with respect to the issues of operational testing before deployment, I would argue that we are faced today with a timing issue. This is a unique, unprecedented technology in its early stages of maturity. We have to strike a balance between our desire for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy today and our desire to have, as soon as possible, some defensive capability where none exists today. Or can we do both at the same time?
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Can we continue to test the elements and components of the systems we also use to defend ourselves? I believe we can.
Now why do I believe that? Because we have shown the nuts and bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in Block 2004 can work. Over the past two years, we have conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these tests were flight intercept tests.
Each test, whether a success or failure, builds our confidence in the process. And because of that, we know that our ''hit-to-kill'' technology works.
We have had a significant degree of repeatability represented in these tests conducted to date. And we are well along in our goal of demonstrating reliability.
We have formed a relationship with the Operational Test Agency and Mr. Christie's staff in particular. And we are working towards common objectives in operational tests. Regardless of the names we apply to testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to begin to test the system under operationally realistic conditions.
If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded at operationally useful locations, we can not really do a good job of hooking it all up to make sure it works. This program and this budget proposes to do just that. Our intentions are to test the complete system as soon as possible.
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Over the next 2 years, we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests and about the same number of intercept tests as before. We have done the testing to have confidence to proceed. And we want to continue to strike the right balance.
The elements of the test bed will also have some inherent capability. We can do operational testing while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take the next step in missile defense for another reason. Our test bed evolutionary approach to a missile defensive capability is rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have adequate understanding to submit a budget for many tens of billions of dollars for a huge, long-term, fixed architecture. And we do not need to submit such a budget to achieve our goal.
We are able, however, to purchase and field capabilities in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control costs. With an increase of $1.5 billion over two years, we could provide this country with a modest defensive capability where none exists today.
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told the Congress we would do. And your support has been important to the progress we have made. And I very much appreciate that.
We have listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a responsible manner. Our tests and our analysis give us confidence that we can take the first step toward an initial defensive operational capability, while we continue to prove out our technologies and demonstrate missile defense combat utility through realistic testing.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this unprecedented technology into the field in manageable increments to provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it and, more importantly, improve it over time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will stop there and allow more time for questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kadish can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much.
Mr. Christie.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Skelton and other members of this committee. I also appreciate this opportunity to come before you this morning and to discuss operational test issues involved with building a missile defense test bed that will also have some limited, inherent defensive capability.
Let me emphasize up front that I strongly support building this test bed as a means of conducting more realistic ballistic missile defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent capability to test the integrated ballistic missile defense system against more challenging targets and under more realistic flight conditions.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this test bed will also have some limited capability to defend against an actual threat in a real attack, depending, of course, on certain assumptions about intelligence of an imminent attack and the positioning of sensors to acquire, track and target the threat.
Regardless of what we call this initial collection of equipment, communications, and personnel, the fact remains that we must build this test capability and put it in the field before we can test the system. It is also prudent to develop operational concepts and to train personnel in concert with this test bed's development, so that whatever inherent capability exists in the testing infrastructure can be employed to defend the United States in the event of a ballistic missile attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by members of Congress with the precedent of fielding operational systems without adequate operational testing. Let me take a moment here to discuss my assessment of this situation.
The Missile Defense Agency, under General Kadish, is proceeding with a design and development strategy that is extremely proactive when it comes to testing. My staff and I—as he said—are involved on a daily basis with him and his staff and the program managers for the ballistic missile defense system elements. We are reviewing test plans, participating in planning meetings, witnessing tests and providing advice to General Kadish and responding in written reports to Congress on the adequacy of the testing programs.
I have access to all the information I need to fulfill these responsibilities. I have completed my assessment of the PAC–3 initial operational test and evaluation results, which is documented in a classified beyond low rate initial production report that I provided to Congress last November. I have also completed and submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress my annual assessment of the Missile Defense Agency testing programs, as required by House report 107–333.
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In that report, I conclude that the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense system, as of today, has not yet demonstrated operational capability. This conclusion is based on the fact that many essential components of the ground-based midcourse defense have not yet been built. We cannot test the system without these critical components. And we cannot test it realistically without the test bed.
This was illustrated recently, when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle failed to separate from the booster in Integrated Flight Test-10. The Missile Defense Agency subsequently restructured the flight test program, eliminating further testing with the old booster system. This decision took into consideration the poor performance of the legacy booster system and the risks of diverting booster developers from the objective booster design effort, compared with the advantages of gathering additional data from those flight tests.
Beginning later this fiscal year and prior to the 2004 decision, testing will resume with a test flight for each of the candidate boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target launched from Kodiak. Intercept testing will continue in integrated flight tests (IFT)–14 and 15, flown with the new boosters. This is followed by integration ground testing of the test bed and a system test readiness review.
Current plans also call for three more intercept flights for the Aegis ballistic missile defense prior to the end of fiscal year 2004, with the last flight conducted against a separating threat. Additional flight testing beyond this point is still being planned. The purpose of the test bed is to establish a baseline capability, to realistically integrate and test the components of the system and to enhance capability incrementally, through block development.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for using the test bed that integrates the components of the ballistic missile defense system as they become available, in order to evaluate the operational capability of the system and to defend against a ballistic missile attack if so needed. If we do not develop an operational concept and an attack does come, then we have failed in a most serious way.
On the other hand, if an effort to refine an operational concept for an interim system significantly distracts us from building the objective system in an expeditious fashion, then we risk similar failure against more sophisticated threats down the road.
While the test bed is a research and development system, this does not preclude us from addressing operational test and evaluation issues. In fact, it is common for systems in development to combine developmental and operational test objectives.
The test bed, including missiles, will provide us an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground test data on intra-and interoperability between the command and control center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile health and status or built-in testing capability; and on system safety, reliability, maintainability and logistics supportability.
Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from the test bed to be considered in improving the objective ground-based midcourse defense system. Every major ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) ground and flight test, both prior to and after the 2004 test bed is available, formally addresses both DT—development testing—and OT—operational testing—objectives consistent with the maturity level of the system.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The service Operational Test Agency personnel dedicated to planning the details of the operational test portions of the ground and flight tests and for analyzing and reporting relevant operational test data are in place. My staff is working with these operational test agencies to define independent evaluation plans for these test activities.
I will review and approve these operational test and evaluation plans and their associated data requirements. I will use both developmental and operational test data as the basis for my operational assessments, for advising General Kadish and Mr. Aldridge, and as the basis for my annual assessment to the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked diligently with General Kadish and his staff to build what I feel is a very effective relationship. I will continue to work closely with him to ensure that the mission of the test bed, as a test bed, is kept in perspective.
We have discussed taking advantage of the data gathering opportunities that this test bed will provide. And I am working with the service operational test agencies to identify these data requirements for an operational evaluation plan that I will review and approve.
I will continue to monitor planning and testing activities to ensure that we test as realistically and thoroughly as we can, to advise the Director of the Missile Defense Agency of operational testing concerns, and report my assessments of progress to the Secretary and to you.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ready for questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christie can be viewed in the hard copy.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your statement. And let me just ask you: You listened to General Kadish's outline of his proposed action. Is there any part of that proposed program that you would advise against or disagree with?
Mr. CHRISTIE. Absolutely not.
The CHAIRMAN. So you are——
Mr. CHRISTIE. Fully in sync with the plans that are on the table at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. And let me further ask you: As I understand it, part of your reasoning is partly founded on the fact that we have to build this test bed to get the—to be able to proceed with the program in a reliable way. You have to build the test bed.
Mr. CHRISTIE. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. And that test bed, at the same time, will house the missiles which will give us this initial capability. And so the reasoning is that you cannot shoot down something with nothing. Right now we have nothing. We will have something when we have the test bed in place. And as long as it does not prejudice the development of this system, there is nothing to lose by having at least some capability against the prospect of incoming ballistic missiles.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And for the critics of this program, I would simply ask you: If we build nothing, in terms of operational capability, what are the chances of a ballistic missile that enters our airspace striking its target unimpeded?
Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, obviously, as you stated, we have no capability today. And with respect to the test bed——
The CHAIRMAN. So it is 100 percent?
Mr. CHRISTIE. I would say so. The long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat, that is true. But as far as the test bed is concerned, I would like to point out that my office, in previous years, has criticized the test programs of the Missile Defense Agency in the context of needing more realism and has raised issues with respect to doing more realistic testing.
This test bed, in essence, responds to those criticisms. And we will have to have this test bed to do the more realistic testing that I think the system will demand.
The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying that the shot that we have been taking, time and again, where the target missile proceeds over Hawaii and the Kwajalein interceptor comes up and hits that pheasant at the same time, at the same point in its flight every time, is something we have gotten down, but that we need to have different angles, different speeds, more complex problems to solve. And this test bed affords us those problems.
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. CHRISTIE. That is right.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, can I just add on to that, if you do not mind? We have designed the missile defense program against short, medium, long-range to be able to intercept in the terminal, midcourse and boost phase. We need a variety of angles and directions in order to test out that complex system of systems. And this test bed is that mechanism that allows us to do that.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Aldridge.
Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Christie answered my primary question. And in light of that, I will save and reserve the rest of my questions until later. So I will pass at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman who has been a leading proponent of the development of the systems that we are working on today, Mr. Weldon.
Mr. WELDON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank all of you for coming in. And let me say, General Kadish, the confidence that you enjoy on the Hill is one of the reasons why we are where we are today, along with the leadership of the gentlemen sitting to your right and your left. But I appreciate and applaud you for your credible leadership, always being upfront and candid with us.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
For the newer members of the committee, this is an important hearing because for those of you on this committee less than six years, we need to understand where we were back in 1995. Let me refresh the memories of those who were here then and those who were not here.
We had a President of the United States veto our defense bill in 1995 because we put language in—Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate members—that called for the creation of a missile defense system because the threat was real. The veto by the President was based on the National Intelligence Estimate 95–19 that basically said there would be no threat to the U.S. for at least 15 years. Fifteen years.
It was this committee who challenged that assessment. It was this committee who said to the White House, ''The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is wrong.'' In fact, that CIA intelligence estimate was leaked out to two members on the Senate side that were arguing in favor of the President's veto.
We held tight. And that led to the General Accounting Office (GAO) study that said, for the first time ever, the National Intelligence Estimate was politicized. And that led to the Rumsfeld Commission.
The Rumsfeld Commission, in 1996, led to a reversal of the CIA estimate, which led to where we are today—8 years after 1995; not 15 years, 8 years after. In fact, we knew it in 1998 when the North Koreans launched the Taepo-Dong, one variant over Japan's territory, with a three-stage rocket the CIA did not know they have.
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We now know that they have a capability to hit the western part of the U.S. with a light payload. If we would have listened to the President in 1995, if we would have listened to the CIA in 1995, we would not be here today to talk about the fact that we have a test bed to give us—what I am going to ask you to confirm, Secretary Aldridge—a 90 percent probability of hitting a North Korean long-range missile coming over toward our border.
So the importance of this committee is that we do our homework. It does not matter what the White House says. It does not matter what the CIA says. That we maintain the integrity of our work, because our work is the people's work on behalf of our national security.
And today, this committee can celebrate that victory, a victory that allows us now to provide a defense, also a victory that I take great pride in listening to the liberals in this city talk about what happened when the ABM Treaty went away.
And my second question is going to be to General Kadish to verify whether or not the Russians, through the Khrunichev Space Institute, have actually signed a memorandum with Lockheed Martin to do research, which the Russians told me themselves could not have been done under the ABM Treaty.
Do you concur with that, General Kadish?
General KADISH. To the best of my knowledge, they have signed a memorandum, yes.
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. WELDON. So here were the Russians, so we were told, were going to launch a new effort in escalating a Cold War. When the ABM Treaty went away, what did they do? They yawned and they signed agreements with Lockheed Martin to do research they could not do under the ABM Treaty.
Thank goodness this committee took its job seriously in the 1990s. And thank goodness this committee held tough, because today we can celebrate the work of these gentlemen in giving us an initial capability.
And my third question has to do with the Patriot System, which one of the professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has made a career over criticizing because he said Patriot did not work in 1991. Isn't it true, gentlemen, that the Patriot was not designed to shoot down missiles, initially?
Is that correct, Secretary Aldridge?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. WELDON. So when this professor from MIT came out with his illustrious conclusion that Patriot did not do its job in 1991, it is because the Patriot was not designed to shoot down missiles in 1991. It was designed to shoot down airplanes.
Now if you listen to the news reports today—and early reports oftentimes are wrong—but if you listen to the news reports, our PAC–3 systems are alleged to have taken down some missiles. Now PAC–3 is designed to shoot down missiles. Unlike the Patriot original system, PAC–3 is giving us a capability that we did not have when 28 young soldiers came home in body bags in Dahran because we could not protect them when they were attacked by a Scud missile.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
If in fact—either Secretary Crouch or Secretary Aldridge—if in fact those early reports are true and there was a Scud missile that was taken out by a PAC–3 last night or this morning, wasn't a Scud missile the very missile that Saddam Hussein claimed he no longer had?
Secretary CROUCH. It is true that the Iraqi regime has claimed they possess no Scud missiles. At this point, we have not been able to get clear information on what type of missile it was.
Mr. WELDON. But if it was a Scud missile, on the first day, have we not proven that Iraq lied again, with physical evidence, if it was a Scud missile?
Secretary CROUCH. I would say, if it was a Scud missile, that would be further proof that Iraq has been lying.
Mr. WELDON. How about if it was an Al-Samoud missile, which it also might be, according to early indications. Would that also not indicate it was a missile that was beyond what Iraq was allowed to have?
Secretary CROUCH. If the range of that missile was beyond the 150 kilometer range circumscribed by the U.N. Security Council resolution, yes, it would be.
Mr. WELDON. So I would just say to my colleagues that you never underestimate the importance of your work on this committee. Working together with our colleagues on the other side, our job is to make sure that, in our defense decisions, we are checking not just the work of our own actions, but the work of the Administration, irregardless of which party controls the White House, and the work of the central intelligence agencies and those organizations that provide us information. We should never automatically accept the conclusions that they provide to us.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
One further question: Our Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program—I did not hear you describe our success on THEL. Maybe I missed that portion of discussion.
The Theater High Energy Laser program that we did early work with, with the Israelis, I think it is now called Mobile Tactical High energy Laser (MTHEL), the mobile version. How far along are we with that? And how much promise does MTHEL offer us?
General KADISH. Mr. Weldon, that program is not under the MDA umbrella. I can only give you basic knowledge of it, given my association with it from afar. But as far as I know, that program is proceeding and is, in fact, one of the first demonstrations ever of a consistent, reliable use of a laser to shoot down missiles, if you will, but very short-range, Katyusha-type missiles.
So we would have to get that answer to you for the record.
Mr. WELDON. That is fine.
Secretary Aldridge, you have been involved in missile defense activities for how long? How many years?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Forty-two years.
Mr. WELDON. Forty-two years. You have done an excellent job of being a very tough meter in the Pentagon. Sometimes I disagree with you. But in the end, I think you have proven that you were right.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Not often we disagree.
Mr. WELDON. You have proven us right in your toughness of verifying the financial integrity of systems and the operational integrity of systems. You were quoted, in the hearing on the Senate side, in your professional opinion, as to the ability to provide a 90 percent effective rate to take down an incoming missile.
Is that, in fact, your belief based on 42 years of experience? And would you elaborate on that a little further? Because we had some doubters on the Senate and I want you to have a chance to expand upon your statement as a professional in this area.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Thank you, sir. I have been working in missile defense. I started off working the program called Nike Zeus, then Spartan, then Sprint. And then there were the high-technology programs of High-g Boost Experiment (HIBEX) and Upper Stage Acceleration and Guidance Experiment (UPSTAGE). I was involved with the—actually working in the Department of Defense and wrote the paper in which President Johnson made the decision to deploy the Sentinel program, to be changed by President Nixon to the Safeguard.
And also, I was involved with actually writing some of the language in the ABM Treaty, which I live to regret, in some cases. But I was asked to comment on a particular scenario, of which a North Korea would launch a missile—a single missile—into San Francisco. And given the fact that we would have a deployment system in the 2004-2005 timeframe with 20 interceptor missiles, what would I advise the President as to how effective that missile defense would have been against that single attack?
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And based upon my judgment, I would say, given the fact that we could launch one or two or three missiles at that target, the effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range. I would hope it would be in the 100 percent range. But given probabilities, in the 90 percent range.
And under that scenario, I continue to this day to stand by that assessment. Now, if the scenario would have been 20 missiles launched at San Francisco or Los Angeles or the United States and with us having only 20 interceptors, that probability of effectiveness would obviously be substantially reduced.
But in the scenario which I describe, I would stand by to this day that it would be in the 90 percent range because we could, in fact, launch multiple interceptors at a single target.
Mr. WELDON. So there is no doubt in your mind that that capability is now at hand if we follow through on our program, as outlined by you here today, to give America the defense that we have not had against an incoming ICBM, which the CIA now publicly says is in the hands of the North Korean government?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. I will continue to stand by that. I have seen the test results. If you look at some of the movies that General Kadish has shown of some of the intercepts, you would have a very high confidence that the hit-to-kill technology works.
Once we get the test bed and continue to explore and test the system and work with it in its operational mode periodically, I think the confidence level will continue to build. That is why we are building the test bed, is to build that confidence and hopefully, to the point we never have to use the capability at all. Because it will be effective, it will deter actions against this country.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. WELDON. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I just had one follow-on question, that is that the senator who asked you that question received an answer that you had a 90 percent capability if we build this initial operating capability.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. That is correct. If we build it and test it in the period in which we were talking about, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But if we do not build it, we will have a zero percent chance.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Zero percent, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he mention whether he liked 90 better or zero better? [Laughter.]
Was there a response?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. No, sir. It was not.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, welcome and thank you for your service. I have, as representing the home of the Patriot battalions—and I appreciate my colleague and friend, Chairman Weldon, taking note that they apparently have been successful initially over Kuwait.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I have a question that deals with the upgrading of the ten active battalions because today, it is my understanding that every Patriot battalion is forward-deployed and that all our combat commanders have requested the PAC–3 versus the PAC–2 as much more effective, as we have seen this morning.
But it is my understanding also that you are only planning to upgrade eight of the ten battalions. And my question is: Are we unnecessarily placing our soldiers at risk by not upgrading all ten Patriot battalions?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Sir, I am not familiar exactly the precise number we plan to upgrade. The problem we have with PAC–3 is building the production rate at this near term. We got congressional approval just recently in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Bill to add $104 million to begin building the production rate for the Patriot because we really do not have that many at this point in time.
But I just cannot answer about the number eight out of ten. I do not recall the exact number.
Mr. REYES. Can you take that for the record?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Yes, I will. I will take it for the record. Yes, sir. Delighted to.
Mr. REYES. Because in the past, when I have expressed concerns, the answers that I have gotten is that ultimately they will be replaced by the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). But the concern I have is today, MEADS has slipped so far to the future. I think currently, it is fiscal year 2012 that MEADS has slipped to.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I know that we can upgrade, if in fact our information is correct, I know that we can upgrade the two remaining Patriot battalions a heck of a lot faster than fiscal year 2012.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Reyes, we will take that for the record. I am strongly supporting the continued development of MEADS. As you know, that is another international program that provides both missile and cruise missile defense. We have partners with Germany and Italy. And I have been talking with my counterparts in both of those countries to ensure that that continues to have their strong support.
Because it is a good replacement eventually for the Patriot because of its mobility and capability against the wider variety of threats, that we ultimately see that as a good replacement. Using the PAC–3 missile, of course, is part of that plan.
Mr. REYES. And in keeping with the strategy to have as many systems out there as we can to protect our warfighters, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is also a system. In fact, THAAD would take the place of several Patriot battalions and provide the same—if not more—effective coverage for our forward-deployed warfighters.
But that is also a program that has slipped. And I guess my question about THAAD is: If you had more money, would you be able to accelerate the deployment of THAAD? Because currently, in looking at the budget, it looks like there is only one THAAD test scheduled per year.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And given today's environment, especially again at the doorstep of yet another war where it jeopardizes our forward-deployed warfighters, it seems to me that additional money for THAAD makes sense to provide the kind of coverage that everybody is talking about, in terms of incoming missiles against our warfighters.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Ron, you go on.
General KADISH. Congressman Reyes, in regard to THAAD, as you know, we have redesigned the missile and a large part of those components. And the first test is scheduled for late 2004 timeframe. We have a balanced program now, in terms of the money we have allocated in the out years. And we are looking for ways of making sure we do more testing than already planned.
But I think right now, our plan is to have up to three to four tests per year in the program. So I would have to get back with you about the details of that, in terms of the specifics of the test program. But we are looking at many ways of increasing the testing of that system.
In regard to accelerating the deployment of that type of system, I think it should be consistent with what we have done with the other elements of the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) and have the first test before we decide what it is we want to do with that system in terms of its capability. So we are going to need to wait for that 2004 timeframe. But we have contingency plans that we could put forth for the Department to make decisions on as soon as we get confidence in that system.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. REYES. Will you be changing the strategy? Because I am being told that through 2004 through 2009, there is no money requested in either the Army or MDA budget for procuring any THAAD.
General KADISH. That is correct. In our budget, we deal only with the research and development dollars. And just as we have proposed increasing the quantity of missiles in the test bed that we described earlier and added $1.5 billion over two years to do that, that will be a decision for the Department to make in regard to THAAD once we have more data on its capabilities. That is why it is not in the budget as a procured-funded program, because it is not proven yet.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Reyes, the way we manage the Missile Defense Agency is, as General Kadish has said, they focus on the research and development. When there is a decision to deploy something, as we did with PAC–3, we move the money out of the R&D budget and their activities and we put it into the military department that will actually deploy and operate the system. As we have transferred PAC–3 to the Army, as we have also done for MEADS, it is an Army—basically, they will be an Army program.
The same thing will be true for THAAD. If the decision is made, once it is tested and we have confidence in it, we want to deploy. It will be given probably to the Army to actually deploy and operate. And it will be in their budget. And the acquisition process will revert to like a normal process that we have for all other weapons systems.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. With that, I will turn to the distinguished Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, who has agreed to allow the full committee to have this hearing. We appreciate his leadership and his commitment to missile defense, the gentleman from Alabama, Chairman Everett.
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, one and all, thank you very much for your service to this country, long-term service to this country.
And General Kadish, I want to thank you for the visit over to your agency. I was most impressed with the presentation. And I equally was impressed to hear you say—and let me quote—''We can do operational testing while having the system on alert. We need to take advantage of that.''
Would you briefly say again why we need to take advantage of that? Are we not feeling a gap?
General KADISH. I think the clearest reason is that since we do not have missile defense capability against these types of threats today, the fact that we have inherent capability in the test assets is a benefit that we ought to exploit. And something better than zero is always more useful.
Mr. EVERETT. Ninety is better than zero.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Secretary Aldridge, just for the record, this system is not legally or any other way exempt from realistic or operational testing?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. It is not. I repeat, it is not. I have only said this about 20 times now. It was an interpretation of some language that was included in our budget that came over that was interpreted as asking for a waiver for operational testing. It was no attempt to ask for a waiver.
We are building the test bed exactly for the purpose of doing operational, realistic testing. So it was illogical that we would be asking for a waiver and asking for something that would actually test operationally. And so we are prepared to work the language and make sure we get rid of the ambiguity and that we can do so very easily.
Mr. EVERETT. Please describe the Kinetic Energy Boost-Phase Intercept program. And will that require—the testing or development of space-based weapons—will that require changes in any international agreements?
Secretary CROUCH. We have a broad-based boost phase program that is going to be looking at ground-based, sea-based, potentially air-based and space-based boost-phase intercept capabilities. None of those programs would require us to make adjustments in international treaties. There is no aspect of the program that would be either prohibited or constricted in some way by those agreements.
General Kadish might want to amplify a little bit on the balance between the various elements of that program.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General KADISH. Mr. Everett, we have what we call parallel paths in development of boost-phase. Once we were free of the ABM Treaty constraints to explore this aggressively, we established—and it is funded in our budget—multiple ways of solving the boost-phase problem. We think we can solve it technically. But we have some work to do to get that done.
So as a result, we are looking at terrestrial-based interceptors, as well as working on the airborne laser program, to solve the boost phase intercept program. Terrestrial means land and sea. And in fact, we are in the midst of a source selection today to select a set of competitors to proceed on that development.
At the same time, in a little bit later in time, we have tried to establish what we call a space test bed for interceptors of that nature. Because the fundamental problem we have in solving the boost-phase intercept issue is geography. You have to be close to the boosting missile, relatively speaking, in order to be successful to intercept it.
And if you look at land basing and sea basing, it covers some geography close to potential offending nations or threatening nations. But if you are in space, you can see the obvious benefit of being closer to the boosting rocket at any given point in time.
We have a lot of technical challenges to solve as a result of trying to do that. That is why we are looking at progressing with terrestrial first and then having a space-based test bed involved in this later on in the decade. And we think all of those are necessary and prudent to reduce the risk of developing a boost phase capability.
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. EVERETT. One final question: On the Pacific test bed, the early warning radar out at Fylingdales, who do they pass that off to?
General KADISH. I am sorry, congressman, I could not hear.
Mr. EVERETT. Early warning out at Fylingdales, in the U.K.?
General KADISH. Yes?
Mr. EVERETT. Who do they pass that off to?
General KADISH. I am sorry.
Secretary CROUCH. You are speaking about the Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom.
Mr. EVERETT. Yeah, right.
Secretary CROUCH. And the end of the question, I think, is what we missed with the buzzer. Was it who is it——
Mr. WELDON. Who do you pass the data on to, right? Yeah, who do you pass the data on to once Fylingdales picks it up?
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General KADISH. It will be passed—it will be an integral part of our battle management command and control system. So the data from Fylingdales will be integrated into our command and control system and what we call battle management, that actually cues the missiles where to go and operates the system. So it will be a direct feed into that effort.
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. We are going to be under a time constraint here with votes. And we have another hearing here that commences at 11:30. But I would turn to Mr. Schrock now. No questions?
Next? Mr. Wilson is recognized.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for the vision all of you have had in your work to promote the missile defense system. And I certainly want to say ''Amen'' to Chairman Weldon and also Chairman Hunter for their comments. And I appreciate their leadership.
And in particular, I am really grateful that my predecessor, the late Floyd Spence, indeed considered this a primary concern of his. And you are fulfilling what he wanted accomplished.
And I want to restate, for whoever would be applicable, in regard to the AMB Treaty withdrawal, what has been indeed the implications of the withdrawal? And it has already been stated very well by Chairman Weldon that Russia, in fact, has now signed a contract with Boeing that could not have been possible.
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And so it appears very positive, the withdrawal.
Secretary CROUCH. There are a number of advantages, we think, for the withdrawal. The first is that we are now able to test in an unconstrained environment. We can take advantage of all of the sensors that we have deployed around the world. Some of them are sensors that were not actually designed initially to perform missile defense capabilities.
We can do tests against various kinds of threats that we would not have been able to test against. For example, I think we recently did a test where we were looking at a boosting missile that will help to provide data for our boost phase program.
From an international perspective, we are now able to think of missile defense as a global problem. And it really is a global problem. There is no more artificial distinction between theater missile defense, short-range type missiles and long-range missiles.
Our allies face threats against short-range missiles. They may also face threats against long-range missiles.
Similarly, short-range missiles could be launched off of our coasts. So we are able to integrate the entire capability and not keep them separate, which is what would have been required by the treaty.
Finally, we are able to cooperate with allies in ways—and friends. And I think the point is that we are making some progress with the Russian Federation in this area. We hope to make more progress.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
But I would also point to the fact that there are a lot of friends that we have, including Japan and others, who are very much under the gun, as we might say, from shorter and medium-range missiles. And we can work together to help provide defenses and support our alliances and our alliance commitments.
Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate your reference to Japan, the U.K., Denmark, our traditional allies. I am very fortunate to be the co-chairman of the India Caucus. Has there been any activity in working with India?
Secretary CROUCH. Yes, we have begun to explore—and we are at a fairly early stage—but we have begun to explore and have had a couple of meetings with the Indians, which we are beginning to look at the issue of requirements. Obviously, they are going to be doing some analytical work on their side to sort of see what kinds of missile defense systems and capabilities would be interesting to them.
And we have done this with a number of other very close allies over the last decade. And I think it is a very promising thing that we are now doing this with India, as we are trying to build a broader and more strategic relationship with India.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And again, I want to thank you for your—all four of you for your credibility, your competence. Today, as never before, it is indicated how important what you are doing. And so, thank you and God bless you.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. We have good news and bad news. The bad news is we have to go vote 3 consecutive votes, which will take us at least 25 minutes. So we will not be able to be back until approximately five of eleven.
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The good news is there is a hearing in here at 11:30, so you will not be held longer than 15 minutes beyond that.
So sorry for this interruption. But that is life in the Beltway. So the hearing stands in recess until the votes are over. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. WELDON. Okay. The hearing will now come to order. I am sorry for that delay. And back to our questioning. And Mr. Taylor was next on the list.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would remind this committee that I think we have two functions. Number one is to support the troops to the greatest extent possible. And part of that is to emotionally pump them up.
The other is to be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. I vividly recall when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch approached this committee informally and said he had quite frankly had enough of the C–17 program. They had come to the committee for five years in a row with almost identical testimony.
They had turned another corner. They had a new management team. The planes were not flying.
Secretary Deutch got a number of us to sign on with him that we would threaten to kill the program if the planes did not start flying. Something like 60 days later, miraculously, the planes started flying.
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Now that led me to believe that maybe the contractor was milking us for every dime they could get. Or maybe it is a hell of a coincidence. But I think the committee did the right thing in reading the contractor on the C-17 the riot act.
To date, we have spent, by my estimation, about $77 billion on national missile defense. And I would welcome you gentlemen to correct me if I am wrong.
The question I have asked General Kadish, I think, two or three times running—and I am going to ask it again—is: General, if the North Koreans gave us a week's warning, told us exactly where they were going to launch a missile, told us exactly where it was targeted, agreed to use no decoys or chaff, what are the percentages after—that is what are the chances that after that $77 billion, this day, we could shoot that missile down?
General KADISH. Mr. Taylor, I will give you the same answer I said last time is that if it is going to South Korea, we have Patriot–3. If it is going somewhere else, in 2004, we will have, as we have testified to, the test bed operational.
Mr. TAYLOR. Today, General Kadish.
General KADISH. And if we got that kind of notice, I would hope we would not get the chance to launch it by using other means. But the situation has not changed, you are absolutely right, against long-range missiles.
Mr. TAYLOR. And that percentage is, just for clarification?
Page 60 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General KADISH. Pardon me?
Mr. TAYLOR. So the percentage today would be—the chance today?
General KADISH. Zero.
Mr. TAYLOR. Zero. Okay, because I thought you had amended your testimony at one point to bump it up to 10 percent. So we are back to zero. I thought— my memory is certainly not perfect.
General KADISH. I do not believe so, Congressman.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, general, I will remind you that the Navy is down to about 305 surface ships. For that same $77 billion, we could have built a dozen carriers, 77 destroyers. We could have done a whole lot of other things that need to be done.
I got a disheartening letter here from the Disabled American Veterans talking about an $844 million cut this year to their budget. You have an important job. I would strongly encourage you to light a fire under your contractors.
The American people demand accountability and results on every dime we spend. And I do think missile defense is something we ought to do. But that is really not anything for any of us, be it on this side of the table or on your side of the table, to be proud of. Because after $77 billion, we cannot shoot down one.
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And I would welcome you gentlemen's comments. This is a hearing. You tell me where I am wrong on that.
Secretary CROUCH. Sir, I think one of the things that we have accomplished in the last year is that we have moved some of the policy and political impediments that would keep us from being able to do that out of the way. Now the number you used is obviously derived from the missile defense, ballistic missile defense agencies and Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) budgets over the last 10, 15, 20 years.
A lot of that money has gone into technology that is being fielded in the Patriot system. It is being fielded—and hopefully will be fielded over the next couple of years—in this Standard Missile (SM–3) capability and in the GBI capability.
But we had a lot of, as I think you know, political controversy over the ABM Treaty, over the impact that this would have, in terms of our relations with Russia, whether this might start an arms race of some kind. There were a lot of debates over the last 20 years.
I think what we have accomplished in the last year is we have demonstrated that we could move beyond the ABM Treaty in a cooperative way with Russia, that we could reduce our offensive nuclear capabilities while doing that. And we have signed the Moscow Treaty. And the Senate has provided its advice and consent to that treaty.
So I think that some of the important impediments that are really not technical that have had an impact on our ability to develop, deploy, test—all these aspects of missile defense, we are now going to be able to take advantage of the fact that we have moved beyond these things.
Page 62 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So I think——
Mr. TAYLOR. While I have got you, how many PAC–3s are in the inventory today?
Secretary CROUCH. I do not know the exact number.
Mr. TAYLOR. I am seeing conflicting numbers between two of the testimonies. One has it programmed of trying to get to 346. I think the other one was a bit higher than that. Is that today? Is that in the near future?
Secretary CROUCH. Neither one of those numbers are today.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Taylor, we will get you the exact number that is in the inventory. But it is in the 50s, something in the 50s today. We would like to get it up to the 300 and so, several years from today.
We just asked and the Congress agreed to accelerate the production of the PAC–3 in the Omnibus fiscal year 2003 bill. We asked for an additional $104 million to be reprogrammed. And it was approved.
So we are upping the production rate, getting to close to the 350 several years downstream.
Page 63 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. TAYLOR. Your delivery right now is about what per month?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. I do not recall the exact delivery rate today. But we are going to 20 per month is the number that we asked for.
Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank you for what you are doing. But do not spare the matches in lighting a fire under your contractors, general. We pay them a lot of money. We want to see a product for it.
General KADISH. I could not agree with you more, Mr. Taylor. And we already have and we will continue to do so.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I guess I may share some of the concerns that Mr. Taylor has. But I look at this as my glass being half full, not half empty. I believe in the spiral development program that is underway.
And each time I see a success, it makes me feel good that this committee has been an important part of encouraging the progress that you and your folks have been able to make. And so I thank you for the great effort that you are making in this regard.
As late as this morning, as Mr. Weldon pointed out earlier, according to news reports, the Iraqi vehicle that was taken down—whether it be Scud or whatever—you know, there are some folks who are pretty lucky that that PAC–3 missile was capable of doing its job this morning. They will never know who they are, thanks to the PAC–3.
Page 64 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And each time I see you hit a bullet with a bullet and drive by the Lockheed Martin plant in Morristown up in New Jersey, I hear a cheer go up. And that always makes me feel good.
And when I hear about the possibility of having something that I guess I call, and others may call, ''picket ships'' off our coast, and contemplating the capability of being able to do that in the not-too-distant future with Aegis ships or with some other platform. That makes me feel good. That is part of the spiral development program that we are all involved in.
And I wish, too, that we could jump to a full-blown system and have it in place in a few short months. It is not going to happen. It is too complicated a process for us to have those kinds of expectations.
So, like Mr. Taylor, I wish we were able to make faster progress, too. But I am sure pleased and grateful for the progress that we have made to date.
And let me just ask you a couple of questions.
General Kadish or whoever wants to respond, what is the situation currently in trying to integrate the capability of X-band and S-band radar for the purposes of tracking and engagement?
General KADISH. Right now, I would have to make a couple of assumptions. We are not trying to integrate them at this point in time on the same vessel where the S-band is with Aegis right now. What we have done is take a little bit different tact. And we are looking very seriously at using X-bands that may not be located—co-located—with Aegis, as an input to either aid Aegis and/or have Aegis aid it, the X-band radar.
Page 65 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So it is a cooperative arrangement with off-board X-band efforts. And we will be pursuing that aggressively in the overall program in the weeks and months ahead.
Mr. SAXTON. I am not sure I understand. They are obviously two separate functions. But you are going to plan on using them separately?
General KADISH. If we had an X-band radar somewhere in the locations and we have an Aegis ship in the same vicinity—and I would have to describe the regions to you—we could use the X-band radar to cue the Aegis weapons systems and, to some degree, the other way around. That is a command and control communications issue, as opposed to having X-band radars on the same ship, for instance.
So this is one of the things that was prevented by the treaty in previous opportunities. So now we are exploiting the idea that we could have different sensors located in different places, all focused on the same problem and make this a much more robust system than it would ordinarily be. So that is what we are exploring rather aggressively.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Could you just comment on the other issue that I mentioned a few minutes ago—that is, the possibility of using existing technology to protect our shores, existing or modified technology?
General KADISH. Are you talking about short-range missiles potentially being launched off our coast? Is that what it is?
Page 66 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SAXTON. Yeah.
General KADISH. When we have the Standard Missile–3 on an Aegis as a part of this test bed activity, we will have for the first time the ability to handle those types of threats under certain conditions off our coasts. So Aegis and the sea-based portion of this test bed become very important at that point in time.
Obviously, there are limited inventories of missiles. And we have to work on that in future years in the evolutionary way that you described. But initially, for the first time, should it be necessary, we could place those ships to defend portions of the United States.
Mr. SAXTON. Do you see technology—do you see that as being an important step or an interim step in the evolution of national missile defense? And should we be thinking about what type of a platform to provide for these types of capabilities? Or will we move through that stage of evolution too fast to have to worry about platforms?
General KADISH. It is an important step, I believe, because the fundamental task we are trying to accomplish is to defend the U.S., our allies and friends and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. So that is why potentially shorter-range missiles threatening either Alaska, Hawaii or the continental United States is important. So this is an important first step.
And in regard to looking at other platforms eventually, I think the answer to that question is: We should. We will have a capability inherent in Aegis.
Page 67 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
But as the future combat ships come down the line, we have been discussing with the Navy senior leadership in very broad terms over what the kinds of configurations those ought to be. And missile defense is certainly on the table for those issues.
Mr. SAXTON. It would seem to me that a ship with, for example, the capabilities of a guided missile destroyer (DDG), it seems to me you do not need all those capabilities if your mission is to protect some shoreline from a short-range missile. Is that——
General KADISH. Well, I think while that might be true, specifically from an overall cost-effective point of view, I think that people who know most about building these ships and the missions they ought to have on them need to determine what the best balance is. We can certainly always have a ship that is tailored exclusively to missile defense. Whether or not that is a smart idea, I think, really needs to be debated and analyzed a little bit further.
Mr. SAXTON. What about—let me have one more question, Mr. Chairman, then I will get out of the way. The concept of lateral ships is a hot topic nowadays. Would it be something we might want to contemplate to use that kind of a platform for a short-range missile defense?
General KADISH. Sir, I would like to take that for the record because there are many facets to that that need to be explained. So rather than doing it here in the hearing, I would appreciate it if we could take it for the record.
Page 68 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from Virginia is recognized, Ms. Davis—California, I am sorry. I did not mean to offend California.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. No offense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you all for being here. Thank you very much for your service. I wondered if I could—perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you already talked about this. But I wanted to ask Mr. Christie particularly about some of the comments that you had made in your report. And I also wanted to thank you for your frankness for saying that we have to tell it like it is.
In the report—have you all talked about this? The issue of continuing pressure to reduce operational testing and evaluation? I do not know if you have had a question about that.
But you go on to state that you are concerned within the acquisition community that the pressure really to control cost and schedule is leading to a practice in which learning about performance is avoided. And we all I think would recognize that we have to test complex systems and risk performance shortfalls in the program. And when we try to skimp on that testing, I think we sometimes create a need for further development to correct the deficiencies. And, additionally, those shortfalls really lead to schedule delays and to increased costs, as well.
Page 69 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I wonder if you can talk about that more—again, I am sorry if it has already been discussed at length—but reviewing for us the advantages and disadvantages of deploying without completing the testing because of pressure.
Mr. CHRISTIE. I think, madame, you are probably quoting from my annual report, not my missile defense report. What you are quoting for has nothing to do—or from—the statement that you have quoted has nothing to do with the missile defense issue that we are talking about here because I have testified here or stated here earlier today that I am fully in favor of the test program that they have laid out, the Missile Defense Agency has laid out, fully support it. It is a robust test program.
What I was commenting on was the situation that I had expressed some concern with that we were—in a totally different context—in our rush to get things into the field, that we were skipping some steps along the way. And that is what I was commenting on, that there is a tendency—and we have seen it in many programs over the years—when you get yourself into trouble dollar-wise or schedule-wise, one of the things that gets cut quite often is testing.
And that is not necessarily operational testing that I am responsible for. It is testing in general. And I was expressing that concern in that context, not in the context of this program.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Can I just—there was some speculation in the press and in hearings on the Senate Armed Services Committee a couple of days ago regarding the speculation that we were trying to get a waiver of operational testing in the missile defense program.
Page 70 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
That is wrong. We are not requesting a waiver. There was some misunderstanding of a particular statement in the budget request that could be interpreted as we were requesting a waiver. That was not the intent.
We have agreed to work the language with the Congress to make sure that it is completely unambiguous. We are not requesting such a waiver. We are going to continue to conduct the full operational tests in missile defense.
And in fact, the reason we are developing the test bed for missile defense is to do exactly that. The test bed would give us more realistic operational testing. And that is part of our plan that we plan to conduct.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Sir, thank you. I am glad to hear that. I think there was a lot of concern about that. And sometimes, these things make it into the press. And there is some basis for it but I guess I would suggest that I think everybody would like to see those statements enlarged so we can fully understand as we are asked in our district about that kind of issue.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. We will certainly plan to make sure that the language is unambiguous, that that is not our intent. I have been pretty forceful several times now to say we are not requesting a waiver for operational testing. And in fact, the purpose of the test bed is to do exactly that.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. May I ask, though? Are there any areas in which perhaps there are some pros and, as well, cons in doing some shortcuts? Do you see anywhere that you will do that?
Page 71 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Secretary ALDRIDGE. I do not think there is an advantage to doing shortcuts anywhere. I know most of the problems that I see in looking across the acquisition programs of the Department of Defense, is we get ourselves in trouble when we do not do adequate systems engineering, looking across all the aspects of the program, and we try to take shortcuts in various ways.
I think what we are trying to do with the acquisition philosophy now that I am pursuing is that we will do spiral development as we are applying to missile defense so that when the initial block of capability gets ready to be deployed, we can do it in a short period of time; but we do it with mature technology, technology that we feel confident that we can, in fact, get in the field on that period of time and then plan to upgrade it with time.
And therefore, we are not taking shortcuts. We are trying to do—to deliver that piece of equipment to the military warfighter on the fastest possible schedule with the lowest possible risk, with more confidence that I can deliver it at that cost, at that schedule, with that performance. And then we understand that we can upgrade that with time, as we develop and test and understand the systems as they operate.
So shortcuts are always more expensive in my view. And therefore, we have an acquisition philosophy that avoids us taking shortcuts. And we will do it right. And we will upgrade it with time.
Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you.
Page 72 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank the gentlelady from California.
The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, I think it is very appropriate and timely that we are having this discussion today, given the fact that on Sunday, March 23, 2003, we will commemorate the 20th anniversary of a speech given by President Ronald Reagan that challenged the concept of mutually assured destruction as the reality of the United States' nuclear deterrent posture with the Soviet Union.
He asked the people of the United States, in a televised speech on that date, shortly before I would graduate from college, this very simple question: ''What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a nuclear attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they have reached our own soil or that of our allies?''
It is that simple, yet profound, vision and with great technical and technological challenges, as these gentlemen will attest to, that you gentlemen are going to see to fruition. I think that is very profound and something that actually did not become the policy of the United States government until the gentleman sitting in the chair today, Mr. Weldon, introduced H.R. 4 in the 106th Congress, which became the National Missile Defense Act of 1999; was subsequently signed into law by then-President Clinton.
Page 73 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So while the vision has been 20 years in coming, the actual deployment discussion and activity has actually been very new. So there has been a lot of money spent on the vision, but very little action spent in deploying it.
And that deployment situation—I would like to ask you gentlemen, this idea of deploying or fielding an initial operating capability before the operational tests and evaluation of the objective system itself is not unprecedented. And I think we see a precedent in the Arrow system, whereby the nation of Israel, after a few number of tests, decided to deploy a system, given the threat that they faced.
So I guess my question is: It is not unprecedented to say that we have a capability that may be able to foil a ballistic missile attack. It is not the objective system. But it is important that we have the ability and the right to deploy that system as soon as possible. And that has been done before, has it not?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Yes, sir. It has been done before. We did it on Predator. We did it on Global Hawk. The Israeli Arrow program had four tests and was then deployed. And we have done it on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). We have done it on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It is not unprecedented.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. So the idea that putting this system in place before the testing of the final system is, in many cases, has been done. And it would be in our best interest to deploy a system as soon as possible that may not be the objective system, but may have, in fact, the capability to do what we need to have done.
Page 74 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Correct. Especially when you have a void of capability. In this case, we have zero. Getting something out is better than zero. Many cases—the ICBM program—of saying we had nothing, so we had to go with something. We did not have unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), so we did Global Hawk and Predator. We have something, some capability we ought to deploy as quickly as we can against a realistic need.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. And there will be robust OT&E of the objective system?
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Absolutely. That is the purpose of the test bed, is to prove it in the most stressing way we can.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. I have one more line of questions. In 2001, the Secretary of Defense was named in a suit regarding environmental concerns that a group had—a federal lawsuit—environmental concerns by a group on the location in Ft. Greeley that was, I think, later dismissed.
Now there is the discussion of putting part of Vandenberg Air Force Base into the national park system. Are these two anomalies with regard to this missile defense, national missile defense system that we see, where environmental concerns may, in fact, stall the deployment of an initial operating capability or, ultimately, an objective system? Or could this become a pattern?
General KADISH. We work very hard to follow the environmental laws and regulations and intent.
Page 75 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Which, I believe, is why the suit was ultimately thrown out.
General KADISH. Right. We came to an agreement with those folks that filed that suit. And I think a lot of the problems we have with people challenging us is that they do not understand exactly what we are trying to do. So we are trying to make a big effort in explaining it.
We will have issues with environmental. But our intent is to work our way through it and to follow the rules and disseminate the information as rapidly as we can. But it is something we work very hard and is part of our schedule. So right now, we seem to be doing pretty good. I do not know of any what I would call ''showstoppers.'' But we are working that problem real hard.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman for his questions and yield to the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crouch, in your testimony, you discuss the question of—not so much discussed the question, but in addressing the various ballistic missile defense systems, aspects of it, of the ballistic missile defense system, you make mention of medium-range threats, short-range threats, et cetera. In my testimony here, it is pages, like, nine and ten. I do not know if you have it separated out.
Page 76 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
My questions have to do with the emphasis on the ballistic missile defense, the long-range ballistic missile defense. This is not news to you or the General or others, that I have this concern about the short-range or medium-range, the THAAD and the area and missile defense and the medium-range and that it might be de-emphasized.
What bothers me is while there is—well, not so much bothers me—what I am concerned about is that is there a de-emphasis in this budget with respect to pursuing the testing and continued research in the medium-range or the short-range missile defense, which in my estimation is more crucial at the present time?
Secretary CROUCH. Absolutely.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Obviously, I have a parochial reason in that, too, because of the emphasis that we have placed on the pacific missile testing range. And the Kwajalein is still out there, of course.
But in terms of—and this answers also, Mr. Chairman, some of the points raised about the environment or the area in which you can do testing today. My own view is, or at least the view I have adopted as a result of what has been said to me, is that what we are doing at Barking Sands there on the Island of Kauai provides a pretty ideal testing laboratory, in terms of the distance that you can utilize without coming into environmental problems, so on and so forth.
Secretary CROUCH. There is no de-emphasis on medium-range or short-range systems. We are deploying right now short-range systems, the PAC–3. The test bed actually gives us the ability not just to test against long-range systems, but also to test against medium-range and short-range systems.
Page 77 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So we are in a position to use that test bed. And as it matures and gets more capable, we are going to have assets that we can move around in that Pacific environment. We will have the facilities in Hawaii, the facilities at Kwajalein and the like, that can be used in various geometries against missiles of various ranges.
So we consider the short-range and the medium-range threat also a threat we have to deal with, not just because we want to defend deployed forces and have the ability to work with allies, but also because in the long run, we think there may be some short-range threats against the United States. It is possible that a short-range missile could be launched off the coasts of the United States.
And so, longer-range systems, like the GBI that is going to be up in Ft. Greeley, will not be able to deal with that threat. So that is one of the reasons why, in the President's announcement, for example, we made the commitment to fielding initially up to 20 of these SM–3 systems.
General KADISH. I might add that the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) is pretty key to the test bed that we are building. Because, for instance, the THAAD operation, we are planning very vigorously to do out of PMRF as soon as we can. So it is a key part of the overall structure.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.
Page 78 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The gentleman from Florida is recognized, Mr. Meek.
Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. According to your statement, over the last two years, you have achieved four of the five successful long-range, round-based intercepts, three for three, which were successful; ship-based exoatmospheric—I am sorry, I cannot even pronounce that—intercepts, five for seven successful; short-range, ground-based intercepts, what you call PAC–3s and for the first flight of the airborne laser aircraft.
I guess, when I was reading the statement, one of the questions I wanted to really get out here this morning and hopefully get a response: Were any of these tests against targets accompanied by countermeasures or radar-jamming equipment?
General KADISH. We had countermeasures in those tests, but not radar-jamming equipment, no. But we do have countermeasure test data as a result. And they are going to get increasingly more difficult as we build this test bed to deal with that.
Mr. CHRISTIE. I think on some of those statistics there, we did have countermeasures with the PAC–3.
General KADISH. Oh, I am sorry. I think you are right.
Mr. CHRISTIE. Radar countermeasures in the PAC–3 testing; quite a bit, as a matter of fact.
Page 79 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. MEEK. Were these like, any of these tests multi-target tests?
Mr. CHRISTIE. In the PAC–3 tests, certainly they were. We had several tests that were multi-targets, simultaneously.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. In fact, one or two of the tests had a missile and an aircraft——
Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes.
Secretary ALDRIDGE [continuing]. Cruise missile-type target simultaneously.
Mr. MEEK. Well, I guess, how diverse has the testing protocols been, launching targets from ships or planes or different altitudes, as it relates to coordinations, things of that nature? I know that you said that they were diverse.
But I was very interested in this because I could not help but reflect, as it relates to the Welch Report that came out in 1998, making sure that the diversity of the program was not—how would you say?—compromised in any way.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Well, I think—and maybe General Kadish can follow up—but the purpose of the test bed, again, is to do exactly that which you described, is to be able to test the system in a variety of angles, ranges, configurations, that will really stress the system in a more operational-like environment. And I think the testing program we certainly have laid out is going to do that.
Page 80 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And you do not do the most stressful test first. You try to build your way up to see, fundamentally does the technology work? Which I think we have proven, that hit-to-kill now works. Now, as you—and you can build up more confidence that it works against more stressful conditions. And that is basically what we are doing and why we have the test bed to do that.
General KADISH. And I would add that, along with the recommendations from Operational Test Office, the Welch Report and other folks who looked at this, we have taken almost every one. I cannot think of a recommendation we have not put in this test bed.
Mr. MEEK. That is comforting. Thank you so very much for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
The distinguished ranking member, Mr. Skelton, is recognized.
Mr. SKELTON. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. You know, if you stick around long enough, all your questions are going to be asked by someone else. And Mr. Christie asked one—or answered one. And Secretary Crouch answered the second one.
But I do have one, General, for you. I was in the heart of the writing and the passing of the four-year effort that we now call Goldwater-Nichols. As I understand and remember, only the services can procure and operate deployed systems. I will underline the word ''deployed systems''.
Page 81 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And you have asked us to pay for the initial deployment in Alaska from your budget. And how do you get around the Army or whoever, one of the services, not being the one who runs the procurement and deployment of this particular system.
Are you going to have civilians do it? Are you going to have contractors do it? Or were you aware of the law?
General KADISH. Well, sir, the intent that we have—and we are proceeding with this—is that we will have uniformed members of—right now—the Army is actually operating the system when it is on alert. Now, behind that will be a whole host of contractors supporting the system because it is a test bed at the same time.
So our intent and the overall approach we are taking is that the Army or the combatant commander structure that we have today will be the operating authority of the system. The difficulty comes in, from a funding standpoint and other management problems, is trying to slice the test bed up such that you have to use different colors of money and management structures.
Mr. SKELTON. You have answered my question. And I feel a lot better. Thank you a lot.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman. I have one final question. And to me, this is putting on another hat besides the role I play on this committee, and that is a new member of the Homeland Security Committee.
Page 82 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I am extremely concerned about the possibility domestically of a shoulder fired Stinger missile getting in the hands of the wrong person and using it against one of our airliners. And I know that was the subject of a classified hearing yesterday in the House.
I know that perhaps—and I will not ask the question—but I think it probably does not come under the direct jurisdiction of the Missile Defense Agency. But in fact, it is a major problem.
Now I am not so naive as to think we can put a system, a defensive system, in every airport to basically stop a shoulder fired Stinger missile. But there are other devices and technologies we can use that I am sure the scientists at MDA could assist us in understanding and then dealing with.
So my question, I guess, starting with the Secretary and then moving down, is: Do you share the concern? Do we have a process in place right now? Is there a need for us to perhaps put together a high-level technical commission to look at the vulnerability of commercial airlines to—heaven forbid—that kind of a threat of the use of a shoulder fired missile, which we saw happen, or an attempt to happen, with an Israeli airplane not too long ago?
And I would pledge to you my full support. And I am sure my colleague would join with me in whatever we need to do, if there is not a process in place right now, to use defense assets and perhaps MDA assets to help us understand that threat and deal with it.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, let me just say what I know about this. I know that there is an interagency group under the leadership of the National Security Council dealing with a lot of agencies—Homeland Security, as well as the intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense—looking at this problem.
Page 83 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We are heavily involved through both the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, looking at their technologies, what might become available, as well as other counterterrorism task forces that we have underway that we have asked for inputs from industry on this. They are working as part of this interagency team.
I do not know the exact status of that team. But I know it is a very large and very high priority activity.
Mr. WELDON. I do not know whether, General, or any of the rest of you have or want to make any comments. But the Congress is now looking—there have been several bills introduced, looking at this issue. And I would rather have the advice and input of you all, especially your agency, General, because that is your purpose—missile defense, even though perhaps not defense against commercial airlines.
But that is the—and certainly, the scientists you have and the consultants you have are the experts on this, whether it is through decoys or through flares or other mechanisms like we use in our fighter aircraft. Our colleagues are going to be asking us, who are not on this committee, well what do we think? In fact, they are already asking: What should we do?
And I appreciate your answer, Secretary. And what I am looking for is not so much from the standpoint of terrorism, but the actual technology to divert a missile away. Do you have basic research going on in the area of this kind of avoidance measures that could be employed on not just a fighter plane, as we do on all of our aircraft, but perhaps other basic research in this arena?
Page 84 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General.
General KADISH. Congressman Weldon, I would reply in two facets. We do have a pretty good understanding and some technology on how to shoot airplanes down because we worked on Patriot–3 and those types of issues, as well. So there is a technical base that we have that we could contribute it and then have as needed, as mentioned by Secretary Aldridge.
The second point is, in my previous life, there is a whole host of technology, over the years, that have been responsive to protect airplanes—military airplanes—from these types of threats. And there are some very effective systems already installed on our aircraft.
So the technology is out there to a substantial degree. It could always be improved.
But some fundamental decisions will have to be made about affordability and those types of practicality and that type of a thing. But there is a very wide community in DOD and beyond that know how to solve that problem.
Mr. WELDON. I guess just in closing, Mr. Secretary, I would ask you—if you could, for the record—to give us your ideas as to this interagency group that has working and any recommendations you have for us, as the Armed Services Committee, to perhaps enhance the use of our scientist base. Because it is an issue that is becoming more and more visible to our colleagues, greater concern to the traveling public. And since the question that our colleague, Gene Taylor, put before, we have a lot of money invested in missile defense. And we have done some good things.
Page 85 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Israel is being protected today because of U.S. dollars that funded the Arrow program. If we had not invested, there would be no Arrow program today for Israel. We are protecting our troops with PAC–3 today.
In fact, I have letters also from constituents, the families of 14 dead Americans from my state who were wiped out by a low-complexity Scud missile in 1991 that we could not defend against. I cannot satisfy those families. I cannot tell them that more money will bring their sons and daughters back. And so there is a concern that this investment has paid off.
But in the area here, which from a terrorist standpoint is a real concern for us, I would ask you if you could just make any recommendations. If there are suggestions, if there are ways that we can help legislatively, I know there is a lot of interest on the part of a lot of members on both sides of the aisle that we are aggressively addressing this issue through whatever form is most appropriate, whether it is through the Homeland Security Agency.
I happen to think that with the capability we have in this agency, that there ought to be a leadership role within DOD on this, even though it is more of a domestic terrorism issue.
Secretary ALDRIDGE. Mr. Weldon, I would be delighted to give you a rundown. It may become classified, but that is okay. We are delighted to do that.
I am aware of some technologies we were working on to try to do this in commercial airlines because cost is very much a driver for them. Maybe somewhat different than the military aircraft that are carrying quite valuable cargo. But I will respond and be delighted to do so.
Page 86 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. WELDON. Thank you. We are backed up with a second hearing, which will start at 12:05. We will give the staff 15 minutes to clear the room.
We want to thank you all for your outstanding—not just your statements, but your service to the country. And we appreciate the great work you are doing.
Any other Member that wishes to submit a statement or questions for the record, without objection, that is in fact approved. And with that, we will adjourn this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]