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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–5]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004—H.R. 1588






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MARCH 27, 2003




JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
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JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee

Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Jean Reed, Professional Staff Member
William Natter, Professional Staff Member
Curtis Flood, Staff Assistant



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    Thursday, March 27, 2003, Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act—Defense Science and Technology Policy and Programs


    Thursday, March 27, 2003




    Meehan, Hon. Martin T., a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee

    Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee


    Andrews, Dr. A. Michael II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology
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    Cohen, Rear Adm. Jay, Chief of Naval Research, Department of the Navy

    Engle, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Science, Technology and Engineering)

    Sega, Hon. Ronald, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

    Tether, Dr. Anthony, Director, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency



[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Andrews, Dr. A. Michael II

Cohen, Rear Adm. Jay

Engle, James

Saxton, Hon. Jim

Sega, Hon. Ronald
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Tether, Dr. Anthony

[The Documents can be viewed in the hard copy.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Mr. Wilson


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 27, 2003.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:10 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

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    Mr. SAXTON. Good afternoon.

    Today, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities will hear testimony on the status of the Department of Defense Science and Technology Program and plans for priority and priorities for the future.

    We will discuss with Director of Defense Research and Engineering Ron Sega, the military departments' science and technology chiefs, and the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), some of the issues faced by the program today, how the program has been reshaped to support the war on terrorism and support to our forces in Iraq and what needs to be done to accelerate the identification, development, and transition of advanced technologies we will need to ensure superiority of our armed forces on the 21st-Century battlefield.

    In 1983, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said, quote, ''We face the danger of losing our edge because we have not adequately replenished the reservoir of scientific concepts and knowledge to nourish future technologies during subsequent years of fiscal neglect in defense research and development.

    ''Given these circumstances, we must systematically replenish the scientific reservoir, using the unique and diverse strength of the United States scientific community. Given the relatively long lead time between fundamental discovery and applying such knowledge to defense systems, the true measure of our success may not be apparent for several decades. When the moment of truth arrives, we cannot afford to be found wanting.''

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    Secretary Weinberger was very wise in his statement.

    Technological superiority over our adversaries is a cornerstone to the U.S. national military strategy. Historically, a robust Defense Science and Technology Program has been key to meeting the known needs for military capabilities, providing a technology bridge to new weapons systems during periods of reduced funding for development and acquisition, and enabling the development of totally new operational concepts and capabilities.

    The combat capabilities that overwhelmed the Iraqi army in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 were the result of technology investments made in the 1950's and 1960's. That matured into development and acquisition programs in the 1970's and 1980's. Advances in semiconductor technology and information technology in the 1970's and 1980's are the heart of the weapons systems and command and control that are the focus of the precision-strike capabilities being used in Iraq this very today.

    Basic and applied research in areas such as nanotechnologies, robotics, wide band-gap semiconductors, and the biological revolution will lead to further radar and weapons systems in the future and to other capabilities for our armed forces that are yet to be—that are as yet unforeseen.

    For the past two decades, both before and after the end of the Cold War, previous administrations and the Congress have faced the issues raised in Secretary Weinberger's 1983 statement regarding the Defense Science and Technology Program. These issues confront the Bush administration and the Congress as of today.

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    And let's just look at a few of them. There are a number of questions that, I think, are extremely important.

    For example, what should the role of the Federal Government and the Department of Defense (DOD) be in supporting science and technology research and development?

    Or, on what technologies should Defense science and technology (S&T) Program focus?

    Next, what is the appropriate level for funding for the program?

    In addition, how do we plan to manage the program more effectively and efficiently?

    Moving along, what is the relevance of Department of Defense laboratories to the program, and what are—what is needed to support the aging laboratory infrastructure?

    In addition, how do we ensure a continuing supply of competent engineers and scientists for defense research and acquisition, and how do we accelerate the transition of technology from the laboratory to the military user in the field?

    And finally, how are we changing the programs to support the war on terrorism and the other threats that confront our nation?

    Our witnesses today are the honorable Ronald M. Sega, director of Defense Research and Engineering; Dr. A. Michael Andrews, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology; Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Chief of Naval Research; Mr. James B. Engle, Deputy Secretary of the Air Force, Science and Technology and Engineering; Dr. Anthony Tether, Director of DARPA.
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    Gentlemen, we welcome you here today. You are familiar faces, and we welcome you back, and we are anxious to hear your testimony.

    And, Dr. Sega, before we begin, I would like to yield to Mr. Jim Turner for any statement that he may have.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be viewed in the hard copy.]


    Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. I am standing in today for our ranking member of this subcommittee, Congressman Meehan, was unable to be with us because of a previously scheduled commitment. But it is an honor to be back in this chair that I occupied with the chairman in the last Congress on the terrorism panel.

    There is certainly no more important issue than the one we are discussing today. That is the effort to effectively modernize and transform our forces to meet the threats that we find on the battlefield of the 21st Century, and I join the chairman in commending each of our witnesses that are here today for the outstanding leadership that you provide to us in achieving that objective.

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    I share some of Chairman Saxton's concerns about the administration's budget request in this particular area, and I have a few of my own concerns.

    First, the totality of the Navy science and technology investments are once again, in my judgment, unsatisfactory and fall well below the Department's stated goal of 3 percent of total Research and Development (R&D) funding.

    I also note the Army's priorities seem overly dependent upon what I perceive to be a risky and perhaps unrealistic investment strategy aimed at fielding the Future Combat System by 2008.

    And finally, I would note that the department's request to migrate programs from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the service is another concern that I have. Many of these programs that were placed with OSD to promote the development of joint capabilities, in my judgment, cannot be achieved by devolving them to the services. These changes, in my judgment, are a step backwards.

    And I hope that the witnesses today will address each of those concerns that I have and share with me your thoughts and views on them.

    Our goal here, of course, is to provide the best military capability possible in the most cost-effective manner that we can.

    In addition to addressing the issues I mentioned, I hope that each of our witnesses will share with us some examples of how your developed capabilities are currently being utilized to degrade the enemy in Iraq. We have heard news reports of some of those capabilities, and those that can be shared in an unclassified setting, I hope you will do so.
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    Mr. Chairman, I join with you in your commitment that you have exhibited throughout the years in ensuring that we are prepared to meet the threat of terrorism. I am pleased that you are the chairman of this committee because your entire career in Congress has been devoted to addressing the threat of terrorism, a threat that you noted way before most of us did.

    Mr. Chairman, with that, I thank you for the opportunity to be a part of this panel review today.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Jim.

    As the chairman of the full committee would say, we are going to fire away now, and we are going to start with the Honorable Ron Sega.


    Dr. SEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about transformation and the Science and Technology program of the Department of Defense.

    I request that my formal statement be submitted for the record.
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    Mr. SAXTON. Without objection.

    Dr. SEGA. As the director of Defense Research and Engineering, functioning in the roll of the department's chief technology officer, I have established five goals: Integrate the DOD's Science and Technology Program and focus on transformation; enhance technology transition; address the national security science and engineering workforce; expand outreach to the combatant commanders and intelligence community; and, number five, accelerate support for the war on terrorism.

    The Department of Defense has requested for science and technology in the fiscal year 2004 budget request approximately $10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent, of the overall DOD request. While this is a sizable investment and an increase over previous years, it falls short of Secretary Rumsfeld's stated goal of having science and technology investment be about three percent of the total DOD budget.

    The first goal is that of integrating DOD's S&T and focus on transformation. It is our goal—and we have done this in a collective way, the sciences—services and agencies—to provide an integrated approach to the Science and Technology (S&T) Program in the department.

    We have established a process of looking at the goals established by the secretary, the Quadrennial Defense Review goals, and assessing how we have done in terms of our investment across department with the services' and agencies' investments.

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    We also have in place processes of looking at the individual investments on a technology level to see if there is unwanted redundancy. Some are desired. Others are not. But we have a formal process that is in place to examine technology across the Department of Defense.

    In addition to the various services' and agencies' focus areas, I would also like to highlight three areas that are cost cutting.

    One of those is National Aerospace Initiative, which includes high-speed hypersonics research, access to space, and space technologies.

    In the fiscal year 2004 budget request, the department focused an increased investment in hypersonic technology, investing over $150-million additional funds in hypersonics. It has an application to various missions and participation by all the services.

    We seek congressional support for the fiscal year 2004 budget request for the increased hypersonics work and the integrated technologies of space access and space technologies of the National Aerospace Initiative.

    The second cost-cutting area is in the area of energy and power technologies, one that is enabling an electric force of the future, includes technologies in the areas of power generation, whether it be from diesels, jet engines, fuel cells, and so forth; energy storage, whether it be in batteries, capacitors, energetic materials; conversion of that energy, which is in switches; and a special emphasis on directed energy.

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    The third cost-cutting area is in the area of surveillance and knowledge systems. Here, we are looking at an emphasis on sensors and robotics, special emphasis on chem-bio-nuclear sensors, high-bandwidth communications, information assurance, information and knowledge management systems, and a special emphasis on cyberterrorism.

    The second major goal is enhancing technology transition. The department is streamlining the acquisition process built around spiral development and evolutionary acquisition. So, to enhance this technology transition, we need means and incentives to programs to also accept the new technology.

    The department is implementing three pilot projects contained in the Quick Reaction Special Projects (QRSP) Program that was funded in fiscal year 2003 at $25 million. The three QRSP projects are complementary in focusing on developing technologies at different maturity levels.

    At the very early stages, the idea stages, the Quick Reaction Fund. Later on, as the technology is kind of demonstrated, the technology transition program and technology transition initiative. And third is the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program for more mature technologies that can be inserted in programs of record.

    In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations bill for the Defense Emergency Relief Fund, Congress identified $15 million for Quick Reaction Munitions Funds. This is the type of work we expect in a Quick Reaction Special Projects Fund as well.

    The two areas that we accelerated were Thermobaric Hellfire Enhanced Capability, and we went from chemistry to the field—and I will speak more about that later—in roughly 12 months at a cost of $13 million.
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    The second project was Low Cost Guided Imaging Rocket, and that is the enhancement of unguided 2.75-inch Hydra Rockets used in close air-to-ground operations. An interesting development there was taking technology from the nightvision laboratory in government, transitioning it actually into the automotive industry where we then picked up the technology once again and applied it in a more low-cost way to this problem of guiding a 2.75-inch rocket.

    We believe the payoffs for the QRSP Program are very high, and we have consequently added $50 million to the fiscal year 2004 budget request compared to fiscal year 2003. So we seek Congress's approval and support for the program at the level of $75 million in fiscal year 2004.

    It will ensure us that we have another tool for the flexibility that we need for execution of your programs. New needs arise from the field, and technologies are revolving at a very rapid rate, and this enables us to react rapidly.

    The third area is addressing the national security science and engineering workforce. This is important to assure innovation in DOD areas into the future. It is a broad national strategic issue involving the availability of scientists and engineers in the United States and particularly in certain areas of interest to the Department of Defense that are American citizens.

    The fourth area is expanding outreach to combatant commanders and the intelligence community for enhancing the connectivity between the combatant commands and the intelligence community so that we would be better aligned with our S&T investment to the needs of the warfighter.
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    The fifth area is to accelerate support for the war on terrorism. We believe this is our most important near-term goal. In September of 2001, we established a Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in the Department of Defense. That was on September 19.

    On the 21st, some 150 technology candidates were brought forward by the services and agencies that could potentially be fielded in a month or so down the road. We accelerated three of those at that time.

    One was a talcum penetrator, a second was a Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance System, and the third was a Thermobaric explosive. In 90 days, we went from chemistry of the Thermobaric mix, which was being done at Indian Head, by the Navy, and a chemistry state during the month of October, selecting a leading candidate, tested it in static conditions in the Nevada site in November, flight-tested it November, and certified it as a fielded system within 90 days of starting. That is one example.

    As we move forward into this year, the fiscal year 2002 Quick Reaction Munitions Funds, as I mentioned, for an extension of that quick technology development in the Thermobaric explosives—we have adapted over the last roughly 12 months to accommodate the system of a Hellfire Missile. So we have taken that knowledge, that S&T investment, and enhanced it and applied it to another system.

    In this case, the Marine Corps led that with partners of DTRA and the Army. The previous work had been done with the Navy, DTRA, the Air Force, and the Department of Energy. So there are examples of meeting warfighter needs, use of money that was available in the near term, and involving multiple services and agencies to bring a capability to bear for the warfighter.
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    In closing, this S&T Program and the objectives of Secretary Rumsfeld to provide transformational capabilities to DOD are absolutely intertwined. I have mentioned only a few examples within the DOD S&T Program. I believe the Department of Defense successes in technology and transformation are significant, and I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and tell you about them.

    Thank you for your continued support for S&T and DOD.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sega can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Ron, thank you very much.

    We will turn now to Dr. Michael Andrews. As I said, he is Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology.

    Dr. Andrews.


    Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, sir.

    Chairman Saxton and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss how the Army's Science and Technology Program is pursuing solutions that will maintain the momentum of the Army's transformation. I previously submitted by written statement and request that you accept——
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    Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Andrews, could you pull that mike over a little bit closer to you there?

    Mr. ANDREWS. I am sorry. It is one of these three.

    Mr. SAXTON. There you go. Now you have got two.

    Mr. ANDREWS. Sorry about that.

    I have previously submitted a written statement and request that it be accepted for the record.

    Your Army Science and Technology Program is dedicated to providing our soldiers with the technology for decisive victories today and tomorrow. Just six months ago in Afghanistan, a key technology, Interceptor Body Armor, saved soldiers' lives in Operation Anaconda. That came from our Army labs.

    Today in Iraq, fighting in Iraq, we have Abrams and Bradley fighting vehicles, combat vehicles, equipped with second-generation nightvision technology, TV quality, longer range, greater identification capability. We also now have a man-portable anti-tank missile called Javelin that is out there, was not there in Desert Storm.

    So our soldiers, your gallant soldiers, are on point for America, and, as we talk in the Army about the see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively, we are all about the support to that.
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    This is our fourth year of Army transformation. In 2000, we established a memorandum of agreement with DARPA for the Future Combat Systems (FCS). This is the number one Science and Technology Program for the Army. It has become a joint requirement also.

    In 2002, DARPA and the Army awarded FCS Lead Systems Integrator contractor to the Boeing team. This year, in 2003, we are seeking Department of Defense's approval to proceed in the systems development and demonstration. That is transformation in action.

    I would like to show you now a four-minute video, which captures much of the progress that has been made between ourselves and DARPA. When I last testified before this committee two years ago, the technology I showed you then was primarily depicted as ideas, concepts, and artwork.

    If I could play the video—it is about four minutes. I will stop it about three times to show you. This is our technology that has been in progress Future Combat Systems.

    Roll it.

    What you are going to see is the power of FCS immersed in an integrated environment with the force of the network. We have taken a little bit of animation but lots of hardware being demonstrated in the field.

    What you see here is we have been called into action somewhere. We are taken to where we need to go by the Air Force. We count on the Navy to help us where we need to be. And then, at the end of the day, we are on the ground somewhere.
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    And, very importantly, when we are on the ground, we do not have time stop, set up an operations center. We are going to have to be able to get there and communicate for reachback, communicate where the Joint Forces—the other forces may be.

    Importantly, we have now demonstrated we can do satellite communication on the move, up to 40 miles an hour off road. Inside that vehicle—If you play it, please, again—Inside that vehicle is four stations with a collaborative station. What we have brought in place here is an ability to show collaboration on the move. A key part of the Future Combat Systems is a significant fraction will be unmanned, air and ground, and the ground is the most tough—one of the more difficult challenges. You have terrain, and you have issues of getting beyond the trees that may be in there.

    So let me show you in the next piece as we roll how we have attacked this in two parts: autonomy, get through the woods on your own, from Point A to Point B. This is no man in the loop. You are told to go from Point A to Point B.

    Now we are out in the desert. Fort Bliss three weeks ago. You park the vehicle across the road. It knows to go around it, and it knows to stay on the road, very importantly, because that other side of the road might be—have something else there.

    We also attack mobility, build a vehicle that can just about follow you anywhere. This is a six-ton vehicle getting at the ability to transport parts and people.

    The next part is a—what we might call a mule, and this is getting at being able to transport possibly 350 pounds, and, when it comes across a problem, it figures out how to solve that problem rolling its tires around, as you see.
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    Now one of the harder parts to visualize about Future Combat Systems is the network because the network is transparent to this obviously. But, importantly, you talk about the key words of scalable, ad hoc, heeling.

    As the vehicles move through a terrain—and they can only have line of sight—we are going to count on unmanned air vehicles to give us the relays, give us the eyes in the sky, and we are going to have to interact with manned vehicles, such as the Black Hawk you see here.

    Up at Fort Dix, we have been demonstrating for the past three months——

    Mr. SAXTON. That is a good place.

    Dr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]

    Dr. ANDREWS. It is a great National Guard facility.

    Mr. SAXTON. You did not do that on purpose, did you?

    Dr. ANDREWS. What we hope to do is replace some of these surrogate vehicles with unmanned aircraft. What you see demonstrated here is about a 6,000-pound helicopter, totally unmanned, no man in the loop, no one flying it, go out, Point A, Point B. Ultimately, it will carry about 200 pounds 40 hours.
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    Now a key part is demonstrating on the move and can we do it with quality of service. What you see running across Fort Dix there is the ability to manage the network, make sure the high-priority messages get to the right people in the right time.

    Now, as we move to finishing decisively, let's say, and acting first, it is about making sure we put down trip wires wherever the enemy may penetrate and making sure that if we—if the enemy does cross those lines essentially that are connected by the electrons that we send out a signal.

    And here, we have seen a vehicle coming down the road. We sent the signal up to Multi-Sensor Acquisition and Targeting (MSAT), got a picture, put it back inside the cabin, inside the manned vehicle. Now we are flying some small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) out to get it. In a few minutes, you are going to see DARPA's nine-inch version of this that went and flew and were coupled well at the hip.

    Another part is now, as you are in the move, you want to call for fire, and one of the key parts of this program is a precision attack missile. It is in a box being launched. There are four-by-four in there, with one piece of it for command and control. It goes out about 19,000 feet up, about eight clicks out, will ultimately get to 40 kilometers.

    We also test-fired at Fort Dix a Javelin on a tele-operated vehicle.

    We demonstrate we can build 20-ton vehicles fitting inside C–130.

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    Now let me just stop for a moment on this one. We are at 20 tons. There are risks there when you are at 20 tons. Abrams is 70 tons. Thirty-five tons of it is armor. There is a reason for that. If you do not have those extra 35 tons and you are under 20, you need some other kind of protection system. The situation awareness, the network is part of that.

    What you see here on the upper right is the target. Where the target is sitting in the upper left, two missiles are launched nearly simultaneously coming in as—they are both taken down. One by electronic warfare. One by munition.

    Roll it.

    You see the launcher came up there. The missile is going to go and bite the dust in the top one. The next one, the launcher sends out a munition of ball bearings and essentially destroys the incoming round. So the potential of not getting hit is beginning to be there for capability for Future Combat Systems.

    At the end of the day, it is about finishing decisively with soldiers somewhere, and they have got to be able to communicate. They have got to be trained well. So you go in with the best training that you could have before you get there.

    We just had a demonstration as part of the overall effort of something called the situational understand—situational—small-unit operation situational awareness system, DARPA design. We are building this next version that takes it down to soldier size.

    So that is the power of Future Combat Systems. That is the progress that has been made.
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    Let me finish a little bit of my testimony then.

    I want to highlight three other Objective Force S&T pieces for 2004: the Objective Force Warrior Program, the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft collaboration with DARPA, and our efforts to pursue paradigm-shifting technologies through our Basic Research Program.

    The Objective Force Warrior Program applies a system-to-system approach for the individual soldier. This is a $240-million effort over the fight. It takes network, lethality, and survivability developed for the Future Combat Systems directly to the individual soldier.

    We will provide the soldier with the full capabilities of the network, while reducing today's almost 90-plus-pounds of combat load down to 40 pounds and in three years.

    Our single largest aviation Science and Technology Program is the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft partnership with DARPA established in 2002. This is a $500-million cost-shared effort. Here, we are demonstrating the war-fighting payoff of an Unmanned Armed Rotorcraft as a complement to manned systems.

    Finally, let me discuss our broad and diverse Basic Research Program. Here, we draw upon the best and brightest of American academia to focus on Army needs for our soldiers. The foundation of Army basic research rests on our single investigator's program.

    But we have also established university, industry, and Army partnerships to create what I call critical mass and paradigm-shifting technologies. The first two of these are an immersive—what we call immersive environments where you place soldiers in an environment for the best possible training.
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    So next in nanosecond technology. This is about getting soldiers survivability, ballistic protection in a uniform.

    This year, we established a third paradigm-shifting partnership. This is in biotechnology, by—to new sensors for mine detection possibly.

    Now, of course, only with top-caliber scientists and engineers who develop the technologies for our soldiers can we achieve the transformational goals for Future Combat Systems and Objective Force. Recruiting and retaining these important members of the innovation team is a challenge across DOD. Our soldiers depend on these people.

    In closing, the Army S&T community has stepped up to the technical challenges necessary to enable the Army's transformation. We have energized all of our resources and are committed to making the Objective Force a reality. Your contingent support is essential for this Army transformation.

    Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of Dr. Andrews can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mike.

    We are going to move now to the chief of Naval research, Rear Admiral Jay Cohen.
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    Admiral COHEN. Mr. Chairman and members, I must tell you that I am honored and humbled to testify before you today. I am joined behind me by the Officer of Naval Research Vice Chief of Naval Research Brigadier General Frank Panter, a Marine combat engineer.

    Mr. Chairman, I have provided a written statement, and I ask that it be entered into the record. I do not intend to read it.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Without objection.

    Admiral COHEN. This great nation is at war today halfway around the world in a fight to free Iraq, to defeat the despicable agents of terrorism.

    When we are victorious—and we will be victorious—the speed of that campaign and any American and coalition fighter lives saved, as well as the lives of non-combatants, I believe, will be the result of the sustained and generous investment that the Congress has made in science and technology that has given the United States unprecedented asymmetric advantage to win.

    And so, on behalf of the Department of the Navy Sailors and Marines and their families, I thank you for that.
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    With deference to the tasking that we have received during your initial comments, sir, I just wanted to follow-up a little bit on Dr. Sega's comments on the Counterterrorism Technology Task Force, of the three items he mentioned, that two of those were Naval in their basis.

    One was the Thermobarics. That was the 60-day wonder, the cave buster, that was 30 years in development. It started with the USS Forestal fire, which was tragic, and it was an attempt by the Navy to find more stable explosives which resulted in much more powerful explosives. So the 60-day wonder that took 30 years to sustain science and technology.

    The Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance detector efforts at the Naval Research Laboratory to determine how they might detect plastic explosives which are high in nitrogen molecules, understanding how the nitrogen molecule or atom responded in a quadrupole resonance manner gave us the ability to have the equivalent of the screener that you have when you go to the airport for your baggage.

    And probably most impressive, in 1992, the Naval Research Laboratory was awarded the Collier for its efforts in developing the Global Positioning System (GPS). That came out of a $75,000 investment that was hotly contested within Naval Research in the mid 1970's to determine the more precise measurement of time by orders of magnitude that gives us the accuracy that we enjoy today, and, at that time, that researcher had no idea of the multibillion-dollar industry and the capabilities that that small investment would give.

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    Dr. Sega said that we are going electric. I am pleased to tell you that recently we have started the construction of the Electromagnetic Air Launch System. We have parallel risk-reduction efforts, both in General Atomics and Northrup Grumman, at Lakehurst in New Jersey, but it is not just about launching aircraft on the new CBN–21.

    We want to do away with steam, air, and hydraulic auxiliaries. You have to provide the power. And we recently went to contract with American Superconducting up at Fort Devens for a 36–1/2-megawatt. That is 50,000 shaft horsepower, 120 RPM, direct-drive motor that will be available in 37 months that will go on DDX or on the X-Radford for risk reduction on our first all-electric ship, and, together, those will be used to enhance electric weapons, which we see changing naval warfare.

    I notice Jefferson Laboratories are represented here where we are working with them on free-electron lasers which, we believe, within three years, will demonstrate weapons-grade lethality.

    Finally, I just want to talk about a million dollars that as chief of Naval Research—I am in my third year—I think was the best spent of any monies that I have spent so far, to revitalize our precious S&T workforce. And it is graying. The median age now is in the 50's, which does not sound too old to me, but it is something that takes attention.

    A year and a half ago, through our Naval Reserve Hoster training units around the country, we offered summer stipends on the order of $3,000 to $4,000 for rising juniors and seniors in college and post-graduate students to select the Naval Research Laboratory or warfare centers all around the country to be summer interns for a period of eight to 10 weeks and work side by side with our government scientists and engineers.
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    We had on short notice 830 applicants, 163 participated. I got to talk with almost all of them because we set a very broad net across our Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units all around the country. I can tell you when you look at the pictures, you see the face of America everywhere.

    This year, we have increased the number. We already have 1,800 applicants, and we anticipated a modest increase in the program, that over 260 will go to our laboratories and warfare centers.

    And the most exciting thing——

    And they were mentored, taken home, provided food and shelter.

    The most exciting thing is the majority of them want to come back, and those that are graduating are starting to apply to be government scientists and engineers.

    So we thank you for your support, and I look forward to answering your questions, sir.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Admiral.

    We are now going to move and hear from the Air Force.
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    Mr. James Engle.


    Mr. ENGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Members of the subcommittee and staff, I very much appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony——

    Thanks, Mike.

    To provide—on our program—fiscal year 2004 Science and Technology Program.

    The United States Air Force is transforming to the capability-focused Expeditionary Air and Space Force, as I am sure you are aware.

    We have taken the effects and capabilities required by our Air Force concepts of operations and mapped them to our long-term challenges and short-term objectives identified in the congressionally mandated S&T planning review completed in February 2002.

    Our goal is to make the warfighting effects and capabilities we need—and the capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for everything we do. This is especially true on our S&T program.
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    The United States Air Force is committed to a robust S&T Program that enables us to achieve our vision of becoming an integrated air and space force capable of rapid and decisive global engagement.

    Transforming our warfighting capabilities toward this end will involve continuous innovation in how we think about employing our forces to defend our nation, as well as quantum leaps in our technology.

    We must be prepared to counter regional instabilities, the worldwide availability of advanced weapons, and other emerging and less predictable asymmetrical threats.

    We are developing transformational technologies that permit flexible forces to operate far from home, on short notice, for extended time periods.

    However, we must also be able to afford these innovations, once we develop them, in order to recapitalize the Air Force to our full vision. To meet these objectives, we search out the most promising and affordable technologies in order to win decisively, protect our forces, and minimize collateral damage.

    We have been faced with the reality of a fiscally-constrained but operationally-demanding environment. The high operations tempo in the Air Force has sustained—in support of our peacekeeping operations and conflicts, such as Afghanistan, has placed a great burden on our people and our systems. In spite of these requirements, the Air Force has maintained a balanced S&T portfolio.
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    The Air Force fiscal year 2004 president's budget request for S&T is $2.2 billion, an increase of more than $535 million from the fiscal year 2003. The most significant change in this budget request results from the development of $350 million for several Office of the Secretary of Defense efforts to the Air Force S&T Program. These include the High Performance Computing Modernization Program, a portion of the University Research Initiative, and High Energy Laser Joint Technology Program.

    As the Air Force understands the concerns of Congress regarding the level of support for these developed programs, we are working hard to ensure execution of the programs transferred to the Air Force continues to support the diverse multiple military objectives inherent in each of these programs.

    Further, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to provide policy guidance and oversight for these efforts.

    In conjunction with the increase in S&T funding, there has also been a significant increase in the involvement of the warfighting commands and the senior Air Force leadership in planning, programming, and prioritizing Air Force S&T.

    The Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief of staff, the Air Force four-stars, and other senior leaders review the S&T portfolio on a routine basis. The latest senior leadership review focused on transformational technologies that can be developed to assist in combating terrorism and other asymmetrical threats.

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    The Air Force scientist and engineer workforce is another area where our senior leadership is involved and plays a vital, pivotal role. Both Secretary Roche and General Jumper are deeply involved in shaping our future scientist and engineering workforce. Air Force civilian and military scientists and engineers (S&Es) are highly motivated and productive.

    The Air Force is unique in that 20 percent of its laboratory S&T government workforce is active duty military. This gives us a direct link to the warfighter. Some of these military scientists and engineers come directly from operational commands, while others serve in operational commands and then later in their careers serve in S&T.

    The Air Force is committed to shaping its S&E workforce with the vision to enhance excellence and relevance of science and technology into the 21st Century and appreciates the support Congress has already provided. We, as others do, find it difficult to recruit and retain S&Es. However, the Air Force has several initiatives, both military and civilian, that address recruitment and retention issues.

    We are employing the Airman's Education and Commissioning Program and the Technical Degree Sponsorship Program to recruit additional scientists and engineers into the military workforce and bonus programs to shrink the current shortfall in our military scientists and engineers.

    On the civilian side, the Air Force Laboratory Demonstration Project has provided the Air Force Research Laboratory with some key flexibilities needed to compete with private industry for critical science and engineering talent. These flexibilities will need to be considered as a national security personnel system is developed.
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    Initiatives such as the special hiring legislation authorized by Congress in Public Law 106398 which provides DARPA-like hiring authority to the military departments should also produce positive results in shaping our S&E workforce. This authority has only recently been delegated to the Air Force, but we are optimistic about its potential, and, again, we express our thanks to Congress for your continued support.

    As technical superiority is increasingly a perishable commodity, we work hard to optimize our S&T funding, not only by inventing the future ourselves, but also speeding the introduction of new technologies to our warfighters. One way of rapidly transitioning technology to the warfighter is through our Applied Technology Councils and Advanced Technology Demonstrations.

    The Applied Technology Councils were initiated in fiscal year 1999 to foster top-level user involvement in the transition of technology from laboratories to the system developer to the operational user.

    The Councils are composed of two-and three-star generals from the Air Force Research Laboratory, our logistics centers, our acquisition product centers, and our major unit user commanders to formally prioritize the Advanced Technology Demonstrations.

    We hold Applied Technology Council meetings with each major command twice every year and have commissioned 34 Advanced Technology Demonstrations that have transitioned funding. This process facilitates technology transition to operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do systems design and development and fielding of technology.
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    While traditional focus on S&T has been on developing long-term capabilities, the Air Force S&T program also contributes to current needs for the Nation and our troops deployed in hostile areas.

    One example of the Air Force—of an Air Force project receiving a great deal of attention since September 11 is the Elastomeric Coating polymer, which was developed by the Air Force to protect key buildings and installations from close proximity explosion, such as air-dropped weapons or truck bombs.

    This easy-to-apply spray coating provides greater structural integrity of external walls and prevents dispersion of debris as well as separation of wall elements. In addition to protecting lightweight shelters, this polymeric coating is currently being applied to the interior of the outer walls of the Pentagon.

    Another transformational effort is the Vehicular Mounted Active Denial System, or VMADS. VMADS is a currently developed—jointly developed program with the U.S. Marine Corps and is a defensive millimeter-wave system used for perimeter defense application. It is a directed-energy weapon that emits a non-lethal, non-damaging beam, which heats up the skin of the potential enemy causing extreme pain and forcing the person to flee.

    They have a demonstration of this technology at full weapons parameters on volunteers at a range beyond that of small arms. I have brought along a small demonstration model, which we call a finger zapper, if any of you would like to test it, and I think we have it over here.
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    And it is quite impressive. If you have some time after the hearing, I would certainly urge you to give it a try. I guarantee you that it will not hurt you, but it will certainly demonstrate what the sensitivity of a human being would be if involved in the full beam of this weapon.

    In the war on terror, Special Tactics Controllers—and I would be happy to test it first for you just to let you know that, or I am sure Mike would. [Laughter.]

    In the war on terror, the Air Force Special Tactics Controllers are changing the very nature of warfare. By performing operations deep in enemy territory, they help determine who the terrorists are, where their weapons are located, and who the innocent civilians are.

    Then they precisely control the elements of air power to defeat the terrorist threat, while taking care to spare the innocent civilians and minimize collateral damage. Then these Special Tactics Combat Controllers are there to provide instant battle-damage assessment.

    We call these deep engagements Battlefield Air Operations (BAO).

    To give you an idea of what these Special Tactics Warriors carry with them, I have brought a sample of the pack with me, and I think we have that somewhere around here, and—I would go and pick that up for you, but I think it is probably beyond my capacity. It weighs about 150 pounds.
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    These are extremely awkward and heavy, and about half of this weight is coming from what we call the Battlefield Air Operations Kit itself. This is a collection of about 12 different individual items that aid the Combat Controller in actually calling in fires at the appropriate time and place.

    Working collaboratively with the Special Tactics Warriors, the Air Force BAO TIGER TEAM is partnered with a national team of industry participants to field significant enhancements of increasing capability while reducing the weight and size of the individual BAO Kit equipment.

    These kit improvements are being realized very rapidly in spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and fielding. As a result, our Special Tactics Warriors will soon have a digital machine-to-machine capability that helps quickly connect the right aircraft with the right munition, guided precisely to the right target at the right time to achieve the desired effect.

    This new automated process helps to reduce the time it takes to target the terrorist threat or other threats, while at the same time reducing human error in the targeting process. These new BAO capabilities will help save American lives and the lives of innocent civilians. The BAO provides a revolutionary and highly effective way to combat terrorist—the terrorist threat.

    Another terrorist threat that is not limited to the battlefield and is growing every day is that posed by man-portable infrared air-guided systems. These ubiquitous missiles threaten not only our combat aircraft but our large transport aircraft, both military and civilian.
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    To counter this menace, the Air Force is developing and testing the technology for generation on-board directed-laser infrared countermeasures, an effort focused on providing self-protection for high signature platforms like the C–17 and other valuable assets.

    Advanced Laser-Protected Closed-Loop Infrared Countermeasures, or CLIRCM, as we call it, multispectral missile-warning systems will enhance our capability to engage both current and future infrared surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.

    Another Air Force technology that deserves special mention is a small munition currently being flight-tested at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System, or LOCAAS, Technology Program.

    This is a 100 pound flash-powered munition of which the primary target is set—set is moving and relocatable.

    And I think we have one of these sitting up here. Thanks, Dan, for your inspection. This is one of the Advanced Technology Demonstration Programs I referred to earlier, and I brought along this model, as I said, that you can examine.

    LOCAAS will integrate a laser-radar precision terminal seeker with an Autonomous Target Recognition algorithm, a Multi-Modal Warhead, Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System Mid-Course Guidance and a miniature turbine engine with a fly-out range of about a hundred miles.
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    This program is scheduled to complete five flight tests by the end of the fiscal year 2003, and we just completed last week its third flight test. Flying under its own power, LOCAAS acquired and identified the designated surface-to-air missile launcher target and detonated over the target at the appropriate time.

    Mr. SAXTON. Is the—is the target location programmed in before takeoff? Is that what happens?

    Mr. ENGLE. There is a recognition algorithm, and we can load a series of targets into the system. It uses a Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR) sensor that identifies the target. It then correlates that with the priority set that we have loaded, and it attacks in priority order those targets.

    In this particular test we did last week, we had the primary target, which was an erector launcher plus two confusing—confuser targets that were prioritized lower on the list. It actually identified a T–72 tank, bypassed that, found the erector launcher, recognized that was a higher priority, engaged that system using its LADAR identification and algorithms.

    Mr. SAXTON. Pretty smart.

    Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

    In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this nation with advanced air and space technologies required to meet America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we remain on the cutting edge of systems performance, flexibility, and affordability.
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    The technology advantage we employ today is a legacy of decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our future warfighting capability will be substantially determined by the investments that we make today in S&T.

    As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance technologies for an Aerospace Expeditionary Force as we continue to move aggressively into the realm of space activities.

    The Air Force S&T Program provides for the discovery, development, demonstration, and timely transition of affordable, transformational technologies that keep our Air Force the best in the world.

    As an integral part of the Department of Defense S&T team, we look forward to working with Congress to ensure a strong Air Force S&T Program tailored to achieve our vision of a superior air and space force.

    Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for the opportunity to present testimony, and thank you for your continuing support for the Air Force S&T Program.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Engle can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Engle.

    We are now going to—we are now going to go to our cleanup batter, Tony Tether, from the great agency of DARPA.
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    Dr. TETHER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for having me here today. I would like to enter my written testimony into the record.

    Mr. SAXTON. Without objection.

    Dr. TETHER. My written testimony and our strategic plan, which was delivered earlier this year, lays out eight major thrusts that we are working on in response to the—to potential future threats we face or new technological opportunities. These range from counterterrorism, assured use of space, robust self-forming networks, down to biology.

    In addition to that, we are also continuing our work in technologies that have historically shown themselves to be powerful enablers of new defense capabilities, such as materiels, microsystems, and information technology.

    I am not going to talk about these in any detail because I believe the written testimony does a good job in laying out what they are along with the strategic plan.

    However, I am—I am asked many questions, as you might imagine, on DARPA, what it is, how we do what we do, and, you know, why should you—we give you more money, I guess, is—I am asked, not only here but also elsewhere. [Laughter.]

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    Dr. TETHER. One question I am asked is—so what I would like to do is go through some of those questions.

    Mr. SAXTON. You ought to do some of those experiments up at Fort Dix. Then you would get some money.

    Dr. TETHER. Well, in fact, we do. [Laughter.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Well, we are getting to that.

    Dr. TETHER. One question I am asked is whether DARPA's efforts are aligned with DOD's priorities.

    DARPA's well aligned with DOD's efforts to transform itself. Ninety percent of our budget is—over the five-year defense plan maps into the six Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) operational goals for transformation directly.

    In fact, of the ten percent that does not map, five percent of that is Basic Research and 2.5 percent is Small Business Innovative Research, which we could have actually put on there, but we did not. So this is a very specific mapping.

    Another question that I am asked is what is DARPA's methods for transitioning technology and is it successful.

    Let me mention how we get our technology to the warfighter. There are basically three basic ways.
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    One, DARPA is a very low-overhead operation. Over 97 percent of our money gets into the hands of the performers—industry, universities, so forth and so on.

    And what we do is we develop capability in industry. We develop capability in industry until industry is brave enough to bid that technology to somebody other than DARPA.

    Now that occurs—in order for that to occur, industry both has to have the capability, but they also have to believe there is a customer who is going to receive it other than DARPA.

    So our second method is basically all of our money—almost all of our money is contracted through the other—the Army, Navy, Air Force service and technology organizations.

    This is where the COTRs are, the Contracting Technical Representatives, who basically are—by doing this, we are building up a constituency in the services, and, as time goes on, the industry has the capability the constituency has built in the service, and the transition occurs.

    And usually, at that moment, DARPA is totally forgotten about, as well it should be, actually, in order to have that transition be successful.

    A third way when we actually go and try to build a prototype system—go all the way, not just build the capability, but actually build a prototype system—is we develop memorandums of agreements with the services.
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    And what we try to do with the memorandums of agreement is to come to an agreement which says something like, if I build this capability in 2007, you promise to put into your budget money in 2007 and the out-years to take it over at that point.

    Basically, we have learned that if you cannot put money in 2007 in 2004, you are never going to put it in 2007 in 2007, and so this is one way to avoid that gap that sometimes occurs when we build a prototype system.

    Now, to help all of this work, we have liaison officers from each of the services, from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, that live at DARPA, and their job is to go around to DARPA—the program managers, understand what the program managers are doing, and to basically be—spread that word to the services, also bring back from the services—the respective services the needs, you know, what is it that they really need, not requirements but what they really need. You know, what is it that is not written down that really is needed.

    In addition to that, we have memorandums of agreement with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) where JFCOM is going to actually put a liaison officer up at DARPA, and we are going to—on a—this is a new thing—on a—in order for DARPA and JFCOM to be able to transition technology that way.

    We also have a liaison down at Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Here, we did not ask SOCOM. We just went and did it. We just went and put—and this is very unusual for DARPA to do. This has been done in the past.

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    But this is very unusual to—for—we just put a person down there, a DARPA person at SOCOM, and the job of that person is to really make sure that DARPA technology and the SOCOM needs are well known.

    And, in doing so, over the last six months that we have been doing this, we really have a great list of technology that is being transitioned into SOCOM.

    Now we like SOCOM. We like SOCOM because it gives my program managers almost instant gratification. The toys that develop—the capabilities that we develop, SOCOM will go out and experiment with and give us some feedback, and if we develop 10, 20, 30 of these things or—it is almost all they need, so we get an instant feedback from that organization.

    Now, when we met a few weeks ago, I showed you a history chart detailing some of the major DARPA transitions over the last 44 years. That chart, however, did not directly include the massive information technology efforts transitioned by us because it is very difficult to get a picture of that.

    A review by the Department of Defense IG, Inspector General, of the transition of our information technologies found that we did a good job. I gave a copy of the IG report to the committee staff. Jean has a copy of it.

    Basically, the IG stated that DARPA is successfully pursuing new information technology programs and the technology is being transitioned to military and commercial users because the program managers were effectively planning, managing, and coordinating with potential users.
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    IG, however, in their way, they could not just say something nice like that and leave it alone. They had to close with saying, well, we needed to continue to focus on the warfighter. So, when you read the report, there is that part in there, too.

    Soldiers in the field—today, Mike showed you a—this organic aerial vehicle (OAV). I had shown you a model of it. This is the actual OAV. This is—they would not let me have one that had a motor in it, but this is the actual OAV. That one flies.

    And, if you look at, there is a camera on the front, and there is—if you look at the bottom of it, you will see a camera and two other ports which have a wire over it.

    The reason—the camera on the bottom—the purpose of the camera on the bottom is to be able to—so the soldier can see where the edge of a building is and then basically put a land command that lands—the other two sensors are acoustic sensors which basically tell that how far off the edge of the building is so it automatically lands and then perches.

    And with that, we can populate a city—an urban city and basically see what is going on, which—and is really one of the greater difficulties.

    We also have a water pen. This is in use today. This is in use in Afghanistan and also in Iraq.

    Basically, its obvious use to people who need water—water is one of the biggest logistics burdens that we have, but, by having that pen basically allows soldiers to use water wherever they find it and be assured of its—that it is safe.
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    And, again, the Marines are now setting up a program to purchase that pen in large quantities.

    Finally, we have a Phrasilator—Ron has it over here—which allows a warfighter to speak into the hand-held device and have the phrase converted to any of several languages.

    Last night, ABC ''World News'' had an interview with a Marine in Iraq using that Phrasilator when he had captured some prisoners, and he used the Phrasilator to communicate with the prisoners to ask them if they had any—whether the prisoner was wounded.

    Obviously, that Marine did not know anything about the DOD's Science and Technology Program, probably never heard of DARPA and Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), whoever, but it does not matter. I mean it is in use and—today.

    Finally, I am often asked what is the most difficult part of my job.

    Finding new people to come to DARPA is one difficult part. We rotate program managers at the—by design at the rate of 25 percent a year. That is our turn rate. The program managers at DARPA are really there only four years.

    However, Congress, you all have really helped me to be able to bring new, good people into DARPA by providing what is—we call the Section 1101 hiring authority, which was established in the 1998 authorization bill, where we can literally hire as if we are an industry.
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    I can make an offer to somebody and have them working that afternoon. Now that is exceptional in the Federal Government, and that is really what was referred to earlier as a capability that the labs now have.

    We have 40 slots, and we basically have filled up 38 of them.

    But the important thing is that when you have real good people—as I told you once before, we do not have jobs. We hire people for their ideas, and when, you are hiring people for their ideas, to be able to say, well, listen, I would like for you to come, but it will take me six months for me to get you in here is inconsistent with DARPA.

    So this really is a capability that you all gave us, which is—without it, I do not think I could do this job.

    Second of all, the last—another difficulty is making sure that I—it always bothers me—I am trying to always make sure that we are reaching out for those people on the far side and not just going to the same old people, not that the same old people are bad. I mean, they are good people, but I really worry about am I really getting to the new people who do not know anything about DARPA, never heard anything about DARPA.

    The prize authority that you all granted last year or renewed actually last year, is helping tremendously. We are using it to hold a contest in the desert next year of autonomous ground vehicles, which, obviously, play—extraordinarily important to the Army. They—the challenge is to go from outside L.A. to Las Vegas, and the one who gets there first is going to win $1 million, winner take all.
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    This is an exciting way to get new people. I mean we have had people become interested in this who ordinarily would not even think of being involved with the Department of Defense.

    Other ways we do this—we hold a conference every 18 months or so. We held one last year in Anaheim, Disneyland. Where else could you hold a DARPA conference but Disneyland? Or Disney World would probably be okay. And we are going to do this again in another year. We had nearly 2,000 attendees at that conference.

    And then, finally, I spend an awful lot of time giving briefings at conferences and universities all around the country to make sure that people know about us.

    But there are many other questions that I am asked, but I think, at this point, I will just thank you very much for your support in the past and your future support, and I will close and look forward to answering your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Dr. Tether can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Well, Tony, thank you very much. We—we appreciate what you do, and we know you have got a tough job, and we are very grateful for the—for the great effort you make.

    We are going to let Jim Turner ask the first round of questions here.

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    Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And I certainly am encouraged by what I hear from each of you. It makes us proud of our military. It makes us very much aware of why we do have a decisive advantage in battle.

    Dr. Tether, we have talked at a previous meeting about a subject that I would like to address once again because it is certainly an issue that is on the minds of all of us right now, as we engage in the conflict of Iraq and know that there is a heightened threat of terrorism here at home.

    One of the most serious threats, in my view, that we face, the one that—in addition to possible nuclear device detonation, the most serious threat that could result in the greatest loss of life is the threat from bioterrorism.

    And I know that you have told us before that you have done significant work at DARPA in that regard, and I would like to approach this by asking you to address a question from me, and you can share in your answer what you are doing, but I—perhaps my question to you is even a broader challenge than what we are currently doing.

    But I would ask you if we were to make a list that could be agreed upon as being the 10 most serious biological threats that could be used both against our own troops in battle as well as used against the people of our country here at home, I assume we would start with things like smallpox and anthrax and botulism toxin and on down.

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    But if our goal was to develop the vaccines and to develop the antibodies, to develop the drug treatments that might be necessary to deal with those threats—if that was our national goal, how would you suggest we best organize ourselves to find the answers to those threats and to find them in a way that we could not only do the necessary research to find the proper vaccines, proper treatments, but we also could have assurance that once we find them that they could be rapidly manufactured and deployed and put in place and stockpiled so that they would be available either to be utilized in advance or to be utilized at the time an attack occurred. But what would your view be on how that would best be accomplished?

    And I know, in your work, you have worked with universities. You have worked with the private sector. You are very familiar with the capability of our government agencies, in particular the department. But give us your view on how that best could be accomplished in the most rapid fashion possible?

    Dr. TETHER. Well, thank you again for the question.

    The problem that I see in being able to do what you said is really not in the early stages of finding the drugs. We have a good program going on with the Department of Defense where we are working hard on finding vaccines for all of the diseases that you have talked about or therapeutics, if somebody has the disease.

    And the techniques that we have been using are—we have deliberately made them quite different than the way the big pharma does it today, and what we have done, as I mentioned in the last hearing, is our approach has been to try to find one drug for many bugs by really looking at the bug itself to get down to what makes this bug different.
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    And it turns out that the bugs you are talking about, if you look at their DNA, all have a content of AT, which is part of the DNA, which is well over 80 percent where humans are like 10 or 15 percent.

    So, by going at that and attacking them that way, we believe that we can come up with drugs—and we have—that basically will go after those bugs but also will not allow those bugs to be genetically changed because we are going after a part of the bug that you would not be able to change.

    This—I mean one way to think about it is if I find a way to rip out your stomach, you are going to die, you know, and you can genetically change your brain all you want, but as long—if I go for your ability to put energy into your body, you will not survive.

    The reason we did that that way is that what we are hoping to find is a commercial bug—the common cold would be perfect—where if we could find that to be one of the bugs, then we could get the pharmaceutical companies to basically take on the real hard task of how do you get these drugs, as you said, so that they are allowed to be used on humans.

    The manufacturing costs to put them into manufacturing is very large, and that is where—I do not—honestly, I do not have an answer, but that is where I see the difficulty is. I do not see the difficulty—I do not think I would change a thing on the front end, on finding the innovation of the new drugs.

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    But what we have problems with, what the department has problems with, is how do we go to the next phase in the FDA, you know, phase two, phase three trials, and then getting somebody to spend a lot of money. And it is a lot of money to create a drug line.

    If we—if this—you really wanted to take this problem seriously, then I think what has to be done is that the Federal Government would have to put down the money to basically have somebody decide—and I do not know who that somebody is—homeland security—but somebody needs to decide here is something that really has the potential, and now we are going to just pay the money to get it through the rest of the trials.

    None of us have that kind of money. The S&T people I am talking about. None of us have that kind of money in our budgets to take those inventions any further.

    I do not know how to organize that. I do not know who should do that, but that is what really needs to be done to do what you want to do.

    Mr. TURNER. Could the private sector, could the private drug companies be incentivized in some way to take on that responsibility?

    Dr. TETHER. Well, I think so, and I think that is what has to happen. Now one way to incentivize them is just to pay for it. You know, I mean literally just pay for the cost of doing so.

    You all know far better than I do, you know, how—I mean tax breaks is another way to incenti—but—yes, I think they can be incentivized, but they have to incentivized and I do not mean, literally at the monetary level.
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    Mr. TURNER. So you are saying that, within government, within DARPA, within in the—I guess the other capabilities, National Institute of Health, we have the capability to determine the kind of vaccines, to make those—to do that research and come up with the right answers in terms of what the treatments are and what the vaccines should be.

    Dr. TETHER. I believe we do, but we do not have—we do not have the money or the wherewithal for the next step. You still lose a lot of these drugs when you go to—you kill—it kills the bug, but does it kill humans?

    You know, I mean it is sort of like the operation was a success, but the patient died, and that is sort of what these trials are about. I mean they are there for a very good reason. I mean there was a lot of things that we have developed that literally kill the pathogen but also do bad things—side effects to humans.

    So the trials are really trying to find the answers to all—and they are very expensive because they do end up having to become human trials.

    Mr. TURNER. If you reach that stage you just described and you tried to entice a private company into taking it from there and moving it forward, and to try to entice them to do so, you offered them in advance a guarantee that you will contract with them to buy several million vaccines or doses or whatever so that they knew at the end of the day they are going to be able to sell whatever they end up producing——

    Dr. TETHER. That is one way of doing it, although then they still have the risk of what if it did not work. You know, you can be $300 million, $400 million into these trials and then find out that it was—you know, it was something that did not work.
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    I really think that we need to almost—as we do with ships, airplanes, missiles—you know, when it comes down to something which is really something that we need for our national security, we have yet to ask, although every now and then we do try, a company to go build an airplane on their own hook, and then we will buy it from them. You know, we literally end up having to pay the freight for having that airplane developed all the way, and I think we need to look at this problem the same way.

    Mr. TURNER. So you think it would be better if we as a government went ahead and committed the funds to try to move this forward to the point where there—we were capable of moving into production and then pay for the production, and then it is available——

    Dr. TETHER. Absolutely.

    Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Stockpiled for use.

    Dr. TETHER. Absolutely. And that is exactly what we do with every other weapon or defense system in the Department of Defense.

    Mr. TURNER. If you took the other approach I suggested and simply provided a private company with a contract in advance guaranteeing them a certain amount of money if they were to bring this vaccine through the clinical trial stage and on into production, let's say for botulism toxin, then would it be a reasonable concern that we might have placed all our eggs in one basket if we just made that one contract with that one company that——
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    Dr. TETHER. No, I think the contract that you are talking about—they first have to come up with it, and then we will buy it. But a company then has to assess the odds of them coming up with something, and then—you know, so that you will buy it, and that could be done.

    But then that, again, is like us going out and saying, look, I have a—I want you to—Northrop tried this one time. I want you to build the F–22, I think, is what the airplane was.

    I do not know, Jean. Do you remember?

    And if you build it, we will buy it. Well, they went and built it, and we did not buy it. I mean they put down a lot of money, and it—the DOD chose to not buy it after they had it.

    So you have got to—if you really want to solve the problem, I think you just have to go and do it the way we do it. There is a good reason for why—you know, for things that are not—for things for which there is no large commercial market, and we really are the customer. We—I think we have to pay the freight.

    Mr. TURNER. We have to pay the freight——

    Dr. TETHER. All the way.

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    Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Paying for the cost of development right on through paying for the cost of production.

    Dr. TETHER. All the way. All the way.

    Mr. TURNER. And if you guarantee a private drug company that, at the end of the day, if they took it through the clinical trial stage and on into production, if you guaranteed them in advance that you were going to buy what they produced, I guess you could be buying a pig in a poke.

    Dr. TETHER. Well, no. I mean, obviously, you would only buy it if it worked. But what you are asking them to do is to put the bet down, to spend $600 million to see if this particular technique really worked.

    Mr. TURNER. So you are saying then it would be really foolish to contract in advance to buy something when you do not for sure whether what is going to be produced is going to work.

    Dr. TETHER. If you were a company, a pharmaceutical company, you would be foolish to take that contract, unless you knew——

    Mr. SAXTON. If you will yield to me for just a moment

    Mr. TURNER. All right.

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    Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned $600 million. Is that a number you used or is that——

    Dr. TETHER. It is a number I have been told of what it takes to get a drug from, you know, like discovery all way to—through the FDA process to manufacturing in large quantities. I have not verified—I am just giving you a number I have——

    Mr. SAXTON. For less than a billion dollars, you think we can solve the biological——

    Dr. TETHER. Well, let's put it at a billion dollars per attempt. I mean it is less than a billion dollars per drug, and that is where the rub is, you know.

    Mr. SAXTON. Well, you would not mass produce drugs—a drug if it did not work.

    Dr. TETHER. Well, we—you do not know it does not work until you spend a lot of money, is the problem.

    Mr. SAXTON. I understand all that. But when you answered my question on the $600 million, I thought you said that it included production of the drug.

    Dr. TETHER. Right, right. So that is—you are right. If you—if we got to the point where it did not work, you would save some of that $600 million, and probably it is a third of it anyways or a half.
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    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. I——

    Dr. TETHER. Do not take my numbers—you know, I——

    Mr. SAXTON. No, I understand. We are just—we are ballparking here.

    Dr. TETHER. Yes.

    Mr. SAXTON. Yes.

    Mr. TURNER. I know I have taken too much time. I want to—just one other question to clarify something in my mind. It is my understanding that, in the State of Arkansas, we have a Department of Defense facility that actually manufactures—is a manufacturing facility. It may be a facility that is where we contract with the private sector to produce, but tell me what kind of facility that is and what its capabilities are if you are familiar with it.

    Dr. TETHER. I am really not. Where is BioPort? BioPort is the—Excuse me. Chicago. BioPort—BioPort is a company that is making anthrax vaccines for us, and, basically, you know, they are making it, and we are buying it, and we have a—we buy it by the shot, I guess.

    Is that the way it goes?
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    But I do not know—I do not know about the company in Arkansas.

    Mr. TURNER. Thank you very much. You have been very informative.

    Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And, Dr. Andrews, I was very interested to hear of the effort to reduce the soldier's physical load from 90 pounds to 40 pounds, and I just think that is excellent, and—can you get any more specific on how that would be done?

    And in particular, last week, the chairman arranged for an extraordinary presentation about the new protective gear and gas mask, which now we have seen so often on television, and the progress there was so encouraging, and what you said is—it sounds astounding.

    Dr. ANDREWS. You have to attack the problem. Right now, it is 92 pounds of carrying a fighting load in, which carries your ballistic protect, your water, your other part—your ammunition, your overall equipment, your computer, your communications system, and part of the challenge we face here is how to redistribute some of that fighting capability across the squad, let's say. As a system of systems, you do not count on just one piece then. You distribute—people carry different items along the way.

    Part of it is the power and energy, as Dr. Sega talked about a moment ago. Very—very importantly, right now, we carry—I do not have the numbers in front of me. A very significant piece of our weight is the batteries to power all of our electrical devices, and part of the thrust to get at this now is using hyperelectric in terms of fuel cells.
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    Essentially, how do we propose to—if we can burn methane on the battlefield inside one of these fuel cells, you save the power—you essentially save the weight associated with the power density of the battery.

    We are also pursuing efforts in what we call microturbine engines. If you burn diesel, you essentially replace the—a battery—a standard battery with something that is the size of a dime. That is a bit further downstream.

    So it is essentially replacing the armor with lighter-weight materials, distributing the communications systems across the field, counting—using the networked fires like you saw displayed up here so that soldiers can call in fire from the precision attack missiles so they do not carry as much fire power with them, if necessary. They are going to get sent with only the right kinds of solutions in place and a lighter-weight rifle, let's say, for the future piece.

    Mr. WILSON. And in particular, in communications, I am still hopeful that each troop could have the equivalent of a cellphone rather than other systems that I have seen. Is that where we are going?

    Dr. ANDREWS. Yes. In fact, if the last shot is a technology that came from DARPA, and it is called a small unit operation situational awareness system, and it was a—it was that big thing carried on the soldier's back at the moment because that was a prototype.

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    Mr. WILSON. Right.

    Dr. ANDREWS. We now have a three-year effort, which is part of the soldier program. It is to reduce that down to a—essentially a very small size, hand-held size, and that is the—ultimately going to be what is called the Tactical—the Joint Tactical Radio System, and it is the—essentially the surrogate for it until that comes on line, what they call cluster exident. So what you saw in terms of ability to communicate on the battlefield, both across the squads and up the echelon level, is that kind of capability.

    Mr. WILSON. I think that would be very helpful.

    And for Dr. Sega and Dr. Tether, there has been so much coverage today about the capability of Iraq with their radio and television transmission, and I had thought that there was a capability of some type of electronic pulse or some type of jamming device that could have effectively knocked out a country's propaganda machine without having to resort to an actual attack. Do—does such exist?

    Dr. SEGA. There are a variety of options that one has of going against communications systems, and I think this is probably not the right forum to go into the other options.

    Mr. WILSON. Well, I—because I did not—it did not surprise me that Iraq has—or Saddam Hussein has a child-care center next to the television station.

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    Another question for either one who may apply or be able to respond. All of us are concerned about friendly fire, fratricide, accidents, and the accident that occurred this week with the Royal aircraft and the Patriot—has there been any determination, even at this early stage, as to how that occurred or how that could be avoided?

    Dr. SEGA. I am personally not aware of the results of an investigation into that friendly fire accident.

    Mr. REED OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF. If we can get that for the record——

    Mr. WILSON. That would be fine, but I just—something that is elementary as a returning jet to be fired at by our own Patriots, it was certainly tough for all of us this past weekend.

    I have no further questions.

    Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Kline.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. I know it is late in the afternoon, and the questions grow long. A couple of quick ones.

    Dr. Sega, a few—couple of weeks ago, Dr. Tether was testifying, and we were talking about the level of effort spent in chem-bio, and put into the context—the larger context, if you will, of your—your fifth piece here called accelerating the support to the war on terrorism, looking from your position across DOD, where would you say we are at level of effort of the—of S&T on that war on terrorism, particularly chem-bio but a broader range, if you choose. Where are we?
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    Dr. SEGA. The war on terrorism has many, many parts, and some of the systems that I mentioned—in fact, if we would be able to load that—I have a CD with one image of a short—very short clip of this Thermobaric Hellfire missile as an example of how we are approaching certain targets in a very surgical way, and, if we bring that up, it is designed to be very effective in enclosed spaces, whether it be a multi-room structure or a cave or other enclosure.

    If we can bring that up—this is from a Cobra. It is a multi-room structure, and the goal was to attack one floor of the building but not harm the upper floor, and so, in that case, whether applicable to kind of an urban-type environment or others—so there are systems that were—would be surgical in terms of urban warfare.

    There are systems for looking in terms of developing technologies, which we have accelerated, in agent defeat, whether it be in terms of chemical or biological stores, and we have developed capability in those areas working toward a systems for detection of chemical, biological, and radiological kinds of agents, and we have accelerated the development of those as well for the global war on terrorism.

    Improvement of communications systems is also very important. Tony Tether mentioned the Phrasilator developed by DARPA, but now incorporating it in an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD). Some of the technologies incorporated a program called LASER, and the technologies to Language and Speech Exploitation Resources is the title of the ACTD. Software package of reading and hearing foreign text and translating into English.

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    It—I saw the demonstration of that actually today and an Al Jazerra article that was translated automatically into English, and the Phrasilator allows, as was demonstrated, English, then into a variety of languages to be brought to bear on the global war on terrorism.

    So your question was in terms of level of effort, but it spans information technology, it spans weapons systems, command and control, communications, computers, intelligence and so forth, in addition to the chem-bio-nuclear pieces.

    Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. I take your point. I guess my point is that, in different decades, at different times—you could say that there was a large level of effort, for example, on Stealth, or, at another time, there was a large level of effort on communications and simulators. It seems to me that we are in this war on terrorism, and, as the president said, it is going to be a long war.

    So, granting that there are multiple applications in conventional warfare and the war on terrorism, I am just wondering if you feel that the level of effort across the span, the services, DARPA, DTRA, all the things that you are looking at—are we putting the right level of effort into the war on terrorism? Is it enough? More—do we need more money? Do we need more focus? What is your sense?

    Dr. SEGA. I believe we are putting the effort on the global war on terrorism. We have—in the near-term, monies and flexibilities that we have is—almost exclusively from my office has been pointed to the near-term needs of Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
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    Now the broader question in the global war on terrorism also includes the defensive piece in homeland security, and other partnering agencies are very important. So in the—in the bio piece, DARPA has a significant program in biology. But so does the National Institute of Health, Health and Human Services, and so forth.

    And so the partnering arrangements are very important, and we are engaging agencies and organizations outside the Department of Defense to make sure that we have integrated our research and development with that in other parts of the department—of the Federal Government.

    Dr. TETHER. Okay. If I could take a moment. I—I am sorry Congressman Turner left right—I do not think I really—I can use this as an example of—last week, I told you we spent about—that—if you add both the biology, and the detectors about $300 million, or 10 percent of our budget, and I think I said that, if this was a space program, it would be equivalent to something three times bigger.

    Well, I went back, and I thought about that a little bit more, and I think I was off. It really would be equivalent to about a billion-and-a-half-dollar space program, and the reason is—and this is what I did not make clear—the reason is that, in the space program, this $300 million is sort of equivalent to the front-end design and research, and then we take it the rest of the way.

    In other words, in the space program, I would then take that technology and actually build a spacecraft and launch it and test it and do all of those things, and that is why it is a billion and a half, but, in the biology, counterterrorism, we stop. We stop and we do not have any way to go and get the $600 million to bring it through the FDA process.
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    In other words, the—in the S&T part, we are doing our thing, but there is not an equivalent acquisition system that takes what we have and brings it the rest of the way. I mean we are hoping on the big pharmas to do it for us, but we do not do that on the rest of the stuff that we build. I do not know if that helps, but——

    Mr. KLINE. Oh, I—it does help, and it seems to me that Mr. Turner was working—needling, if you will, on a problem that we need to address. We need to—we need to protect the homeland, we need to protect American citizens, and we cannot let a process, if you will, or lack of a process maybe, prevent that from happening, and I appreciate your stepping in then to expand on the answer from the question before, and it does bear directly on what I am getting at.

    And the reason that I asked Dr. Sega is I was asking for the look across DOD, not that DARPA does not look across, but, in your role, are we—are we addressing that? Are we going to get to where we need to go? And chem-bio is at the top of my concerns, but there are other—other things in this—in the war on terrorism—we just looked at a pretty neat little Hovercraft here, for example—that the emphasis is there and not on a radar cross section or something like that.

    Dr. SEGA. Well, the—to bring a, I think, cohesive look at the ability of the research and engineering community to bring to bear our—what we have available to the war on terrorism was the motivation for forming the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in the first place.

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    And so it—it is at the leadership level in the services and agencies, as well as our partners outside the Federal Government, to look at that and also bring in the folks that are actually fighting the war on the battlefield—and it is a varied battlefield, obviously, in the global war on terrorism—to see if we are getting this right.

    Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much.

    I have a burning question for Admiral Cohen, but I see my time has long since expired, but I would like to talk to you about my mine countermeasures at another time.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. Before we go to Mr. Langevin, I just would like to follow-up on John's question because I am not—I am not sure that we collectively are devoting the resources that are necessary to the war on terrorism.

    We are good at doing what we do. We are good at fighting conventional wars. We have been fighting conventional wars since the beginning of time, and we are—for example, over the next several weeks, we are going to show our capability of fighting a conventional war, and I would make the point that there is nobody in the world today that can fight a conventional war like we can fight a conventional war.

    And yet the major program that we have discussed so far today is the Future Combat System, which is a conventional—scientific, highly technical, conventional combat system, and we have got this war on terrorism to fight for.
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    Let me ask you this question. How much money are we—how much of your budgets are we spending on information collection? We have been briefed by so many people who are fighting the war on terrorism that we no longer need the conventional capability that we needed during the Cold War. We all know that. We have got a different enemy. We need a small force to meet this enemy, but we need a huge collection system to know where he is so we can go get him.

    How much of our budget are we using on information—are we using trying to develop new ways to collect information on our enemies?

    Dr. TETHER. Well, you know, we are—we have a program called Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA), which we have talked——

    Mr. SAXTON. We know that. [Laughter.]

    Dr. TETHER. But it is—it is addressing, you know, that problem. It is——

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. How much——

    Dr. TETHER. It is not——

    Mr. SAXTON. How much of your budget is TIA?

    Dr. TETHER. It is another five percent.
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    Mr. SAXTON. Five percent. Okay.

    Dr. TETHER. But, again, it is—it is a non——

    Mr. SAXTON [continuing]. Information—is that—okay.

    Dr. TETHER. It is a non-hardware program.

    Mr. SAXTON. It is really information coordination, and I will accept that as part of information collection.

    Dr. TETHER. Yes.

    Mr. SAXTON. Anybody else have any information on intelligence gathering?

    Dr. SEGA. The third cost-cutting initiative that I had mentioned was in the area of surveillance and knowledge, and that is the one that we are in the process of pulling together, but the—I would like to take the specific number for the record to try to——

    Mr. SAXTON. Yes, I am——

    Dr. SEGA [continuing]. Get our arms around that, but—
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    Mr. SAXTON. I am just trying to make the point. Look, I have been doing this since 1987.

    Dr. SEGA. Sure.

    Mr. SAXTON. It took me 17–1/2 years to get Congress' attention, and we still would not have—so I am not picking on you. I——

    Dr. SEGA. Sure.

    Mr. SAXTON. I am picking on Congress, too, because it took us 17–1/2 years after I started doing it, and there were undoubtedly people before me trying to tell Congress that we needed to address the subject of terrorism. We are good at doing what we like to do. We like—That is the wrong way to put it. We are good at doing what we are successful in doing, and we like to be successful in fighting conventional wars. This is no longer a conventional war, and yet—and I am not saying this to you as individuals—I do not think we are addressing the issues that we need to address to fight the war on terrorism.

    How much money are we spending—how much of your budgets are we spending on developing—solving the problem of biological warfare? It is blank. And they are—whatever other aspects of terrorism we need to address. And maybe the question is how can we help you with those issues. Do we need to restructure? Do we need to have an agency that does research on these issues that are peculiar to this—to these subjects?

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    Admiral COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate——

    Mr. SAXTON. I am not really this mean, you know.

    Admiral COHEN. I appreciate that Dr. Sega's asked to take the question for the record, but we are doing an awful lot. I am sorry that Congressman Turner is not here.

    You know, our surgeon general and our Navy doctors have been working diligently on what we used to call DNA and we now call vaccines. It is a variation of what Dr. Tether talked about. I will tell you that those Navy captains, those Navy doctors—and we will get this right.

    We are close to going into human trials—is you take the DNA of whatever the antigen is. We then tailor in weeks the vaccine. We can test it, get it out there, and then, when the bad people modify genetically that, we modify the agile vaccine to go back toward that. It is scalable. It is expandable.

    Those doctors, I believe, will be competing within 10 years for Nobel Prizes in medicine. There are lanes. There are lanes. And I spent a lot of time with these other gentlemen.

    And we have a lot of cost-cutting areas, but it is the Congress that has established in the Department of Defense chem and bio now under Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar with a significantly enhanced budget that you all provided. We also have National Science Foundation (NSF). We have the National Institutes of Health.
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    It would be my hope that, as the Homeland Security Department becomes organized, and I believe that will happen, having worked for Secretary England when he was secretary of the Navy, that he will leverage all of these various investments, which are very significant and are focused to address the very things that you need. We have a strategic level.

    We have a tactical level. We have an offensive and a defensive mentality. It is a difficult question. You are—I salute you for bringing it up. I do not think we are going to resolve it right here.

    Mr. SAXTON. Yes, I agree with you. Jim. Oh, I am sorry.

    Dr. Sega.

    Dr. SEGA. Perhaps another part of your question is that in terms of the intelligence. Just recently, we have a new undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Dr. Cambone, and we have met with his developing organization to make sure that we are going to align technology investments in that very important area in the department as well.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Jim. Jim Langevin.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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    Gentlemen, I want to congratulate you on your testimony today. It is been very informative here.

    First, I want to just go to Admiral Cohen and just comment on your mentoring program, and I am very pleased to hear that you are doing that. I mean, for a while, I have been concerned that we are not investing enough in science and technology, most importantly in terms of bringing people into those fields.

    And that was certainly confirmed by the findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission, which, as you know, was an historic commitment between President Clinton and Speaker Gingrich to evaluate U.S. national security in the 21st Century, and that report concluded that we are putting our own national security in danger by not investing officially in those deals and bringing people into the fields of science and technology.

    So it sounds like a great program. I encourage you to continue that.

    If I could—I have addressed you, Admiral. I know that, because of this global war on terror as well as the Iraqi conflict right now, much of the American public has been introduced to the capability of unmanned aerial vehicles, and it certainly has enabled our troops to carry out their mission more effectively, as well as making great strides to protect our troops.

    And I understand that we are also—DOD is also developing unmanned underwater vehicles, and particularly since I have Newark in my home state of Rhode Island, I would just like to ask if you would give us some progress on these programs and talk about some of the advantages that those programs have over manned vehicles.
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    Admiral COHEN. I—yes, sir. And thank you so much for your comments on our initiatives with S&T. We are not as fancy in the Navy and the Marine Corps as some of our brethren services. We still use pasteboards. But unmanned vehicles in all of our services, in all agencies, are absolute critical, and you have seen some examples of that today.

    Tim, if you would get out of the half torp, I think I would prefer that.

    We have gone ahead and provided the Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit System (REMUS), which is a small unmanned underwater vehicle currently in use in the Persian Gulf. As you know, although we have captured the port several days ago, there is a significant mine-clearing effort that is going on before the full amount of relief supplies can get in.

    What I am showing you here, Congressman, is what we call half torp. As you know, Newark—at Newport, it was key in developing the old torpedo station, the Mark 48 torpedo. When I took over three years ago, it was clear to me that mines would be a very significant threat to our submarine operations.

    Out of 688 submarine carriers, 26 Mark 48 torpedoes. We had not significantly improved the head, meaning the hydrofoam on the torpedo, in some period of time. We have had incremental improvements, as you can imagine.

    What we did was we came up—worked them into it with the half torp. The half torp is half the length of a Mark 48 torpedo, using the conventional propulsion, less one inch. So, instead of 26 rounds in the 688, we could carry 52 rounds.
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    As you can see on the left-hand side or your right-hand side, we changed the head to be scores of small hydrofoams instead of the classic four-quad hydrofoams, and you can see the difference in definition from the top yellow to the bottom pink showing in a countermeasure environment how it can discriminate a target.

    We designed this to find a one-meter tethered mine in the littoral, which has great reverberation, in a countermeasure environment, and what you see on the bottom on the left is what the Mark 48 torpedo sees today. You cannot discrimination a target.

    On the right with the new warhead, you can see not only the countermeasures, which are those red vertical lines, but the target farther to the right. Newark turned this around in 18 months. This month, we are shooting the first of these at Ortech, having validated at Lake Seneca. Those are side-by-side in-water validations. So this is just one example of how unmanned underwater vehicles—this was a weapon that we have refined.

    The REMUS is a sensor to find the mines. This can find the mine and destroy it at the same time.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I guess my time has run out, so I will—thank you again.

    Mr. SAXTON. Jim, you—you have been patient. Do you want to take another minute? It is okay.

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    Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, if I could since, Chairman, you raised the total information awareness (TIA) program, you made mention of that, I was wondering if you could briefly talk about it—I suppose we know what it aims to accomplish, but do you want to talk about that as well as its current operational status and possible practical applications.

    Dr. TETHER. Well, TIA right—it is in a very—it is a research stage, and it does not—regardless of what you may have read in the papers, it really is not a collection program. We are not collecting any data. We are not spying on U.S. citizens.

    Basically, what TIA is doing is providing tools to allow agencies to better collaborate with each other. I have been involved in the business for a long time, and, every time I have seen an intelligence failure, it was never because we did not have the data.

    We always ended up being able in the forensics to show that we had the data. It is just that the data was distributed. CIA had some. NSA had some. DIA had some.

    But the problem was that there was no technology which allowed them to collaborate with each other so that they could bring their data forward to solve a problem, and that is all that TIA—the research in TIA is about, is really to do that, to allow agencies to communicate with each other and collaborate, and yet maintain the privacy of their sources and methods.

    It is an experimental phase. We have—we have—we are doing a spiral development.

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    United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is a major node. Now INSCOM is not just a single place. INSCOM is worldwide, and, basically, we are learning how to use these tools, and it will be many years before it—you know, it really is to the point where it needs to be.

    I do not know if that answers your question or not, but——

    Mr. LANGEVIN. That is helpful. Thank you.

    Thank you, Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. Is—on that—on that same question, is—is the research project active and aggressive in regard to TIA?

    Dr. TETHER. Yes, it is. Very active and aggressive. In all fronts, in language translation, in being able to create models.

    Another misunderstanding of TIA is that it is thought—some people thought it was a data mining thing, that we went out and went into databases to look for patterns. Actually, it is the reverse.

    The—there are two technologies—major technologies. One is the collaboration technology, but the other is to make things from a hypothesis-based or a model-based—where you create a hypothesis and you say, if this hypothesis is true, what are all of the observables that have to be true.
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    And then you take that pattern to the database to see if they exist.

    Mr. SAXTON. Have we gotten past the public relations problem?

    Dr. TETHER. I am getting less letters. [Laughter.]

    Mr. SAXTON. That is a good thing.

    Admiral COHEN. But they are catalogued. [Laughter.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Todd Akin.

    Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I had a couple different things, but some of the other questions, so I figure maybe—the first one on the Mark torpedo—do you use one Mark torpedo per mine? That is kind of an expensive way to work at things, isn't it?

    Admiral COHEN. You know, it is a lot cheaper than using one submarine per mine.

    Mr. AKIN. Yes, that is—yes, the—relatively speaking, I suppose. [Laughter.]

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    Mr. AKIN. And that is what you are talking about with that technology.

    Admiral COHEN. That is correct. But the real effort here was, if we can find a one-meter mine tethered in a littoral, which is a very difficult sonar environment, we can find a seven-meter-diameter submarine. If I scaled this to find a seven-meter submarine, it was no guarantee I could find the one-meter mine.

    So I set the goals high for the smaller object with the real intent not being the minefield because we have many ways to find and destroy single mines, especially in the littoral. This was to be able to have the load to defeat the submarines that we might encounter.

    Mr. AKIN. Okay. That explains—that makes the American taxpayer—at least this one feel a little better anyway.

    I was going to ask—I think, Dr. Sega, it might be in your area, but some other—some of the other gentlemen as well, and that is the hypersonics area. We have been interested in that, and I am from the St. Louis area where we have got Boeing working on some of that.

    Could you give us a quick update because I understand that from a—you know, a shuttle vehicle as well as defense against cruise missiles that are moving at more than speed of sound and then, of course, just from a flight point of view, where are we on that in the hypersonics area?

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    Dr. SEGA. Last year was a big year for ground testing propulsion systems in the hypersonics area, and I will probably let others expand on this a bit.

    But high-five programs from the Navy and DARPA co-sponsored probably around 80 tests in wind tunnels.

    For the Army, about 50 some tests at Mach 10 in a shock tunnel with a hydrogen-based scramjet and 20 at Mach 12.

    On the Air Force, roughly 90 tests have been run on—at around the Mach 4–1/2 range going to Mach 6–1/2.

    And so this is a point where we have advanced technology and also high-speed turbine technology through to the program have been advanced for a number of years, probably decades, and I believe we are ready to begin the fight demonstration phase of these technologies.

    Mr. AKIN. I did not think it was—I did not think the regular—the simple scram and ram jets were turbines. Is there turbines on them?

    Dr. SEGA. Yes. In terms of the National Aerospace Initiative, one piece is high speed and hypersonics, hypersonics generally defined at Mach 5 and above, and so the engines themselves generally need about Mach 3–1/2, the scramjets and ram jets do, scramjets in particular, to ignite.

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    So the question is how do you do that. In the case of high-five, like in a rocket, to bring it up to that velocity, other reusable concepts would have a turbine engine so you would take off as an airplane and accelerate to the right velocity, and then the scramjet can take over, similar to an afterburner.

    So I think——

    Mr. AKIN. Is that a totally separate engine then, the scramjet, as opposed to the turbine, or is——

    Dr. SEGA. Yes, yes. And most concepts are a combined cycle and—concepts are out there, and most that I have seen are separate pro pads for the turbine and the scramjet. But I think it is an important area for us as we advance into the next century.

    Speed's important for missile defense, whether a cruise missile or boost to action phase, important for time-critical targets, important for strategic strike options, and it could give us another way of access to space with the first stage being air breathing, the second stage rocket.

    And so we have laid out a program that is a stepping-stone approach of—and our target is a Mach number per year, reaching Mach 12 by 2012, but participation from—the services and agencies are all engaged in one place or another in the program. So we are——

    Mr. AKIN. Is that a good thing, to have everybody—each agency—or like the Navy's working their program, the Army working something else, is that a good thing, or would it be better to combine it, or is there some logic to have some parallel development when you are kind of in the early development stages?
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    Dr. SEGA. Well, when I came on board in August, 2001, I saw that there were separate, you know, efforts going on, and the question is are we well integrated, are we well coordinated, and I think, through the last year with the technical community coming together, a series of workshops, and then, after that, building a plan that was vetted with industry to see if we understand where we are technically and what the opportunities are, that we have an integrated plan, and so I think coming at things in a little different ways, as long as it is coordinated and integrated, makes sense.

    Mr. AKIN. So each one's learning from the other is—maybe one experiment in one place can help the other.

    Dr. SEGA. That is the plan.

    Mr. AKIN. Good. Good. Thank you very much. Thank you.

    Do I get one extra too?

    Mr. SAXTON. Sure.

    Mr. AKIN. Okay. Just back on the vaccine area in bio, was this to deal with either bacterial or viral or anything like that, the technology? I came in sort of on the end of that discussion.

    Dr. TETHER. Oh, it is really at the DNA level itself. It is——
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    Mr. AKIN. So it does not really make any difference what the——

    Dr. TETHER. No.

    Mr. AKIN [continuing]. What the organism is.

    Dr. TETHER. Correct.

    Mr. AKIN. It could be as small as a virus or some—some big creepy crawly or whatever it is. You can—you can tailor it to any of these things.

    Now does that have tremendous implications in terms of just things like fighting other kinds of viruses, as you said, like colds or AIDS or any of the other——

    Dr. TETHER. Well, that is—that is what we are hoping in this program that we have. We do think we—the potential is there for AIDS. The common—if we could get the common cold, we would have—we would not have to worry about these drugs being—I mean the big—the pharmaceutical companies would run with it because it would be a very commercial opportunity, but that is—right now, we have vaccines that will handle—will vaccinate four or five of the major bugs that we are worried about.

    Now, when I say that, I mean this is in mice. You know, that is the problem, Okay. We—you know, we have got—there are thousands of drugs that work in mice, that when you go to the next step, you find that they are lethal in humans, you know.
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    Mr. AKIN. These—are these passive or active vaccines?

    Dr. TETHER. Well, they are active. They are——

    Mr. AKIN. Active vaccines?

    Dr. TETHER. Yes.

    Mr. AKIN. Okay. Because I think the—I forgot his name, but the doctor from the Soviet Union that did their bio stuff said that we have to get used to the idea of using an active vaccine——

    Dr. TETHER. That is correct.

    Mr. AKIN [continuing]. In his opinion.

    Dr. TETHER. And—that is correct, and in his techniques——

    Mr. AKIN. That is your thought, is the same thing?

    Dr. TETHER. Yes.

    Mr. AKIN. Well, in that the chairman was—had his attention missing, I will go for one other. [Laughter.]
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    Mr. SAXTON. Fire away.

    Mr. AKIN. The importance of electricity on board our ships. What—is there—how much can you say about where we are with particle as well as laser, and what sort of technologies you are looking—can you use it to defend against incoming kinds of things at this point or——

    Admiral COHEN. This is really an exciting area, and you have already heard from the Air Force on the active denial, high-power microwave.

    Earlier, I talked about free-electron laser. The Air Force has been working, as you know, on chemical lasers, on the Airborne laser, and that would also be needed in space-based laser.

    It turns out that the Navy and the Air Force really have different requirements in this area because the Navy operates at sea level, which is a high atmospheric pressure and, frequently, a hundred percent humidity. We must have a tunable laser frequency. To date, for us, that is the free-electron laser.

    Now, when I got involved with this three years ago, we thought the efficiency was 1 percent, but, if you have all electric ship with a hundred megawatts, even if only one megawatt goes out the pointy end, one megawatt per second is one mega jewel. That is one stick of dynamite. So I named that DASL, Dynamite At Speed of Light.

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    We now find out what the Jefferson Lab is doing with their free-electron laser is 10-percent efficient, and it is about the size of a Tomahawk armored box launcher.

    So, on a ship, which is several thousand tons, where we are going to be all electric anyway, and that power can go into the propellers or it can go into radars or it can go into lasers. We see great efficacy for this for close-in defense, anti-air, and downstream potentially ballistic-missile defense in a theater role.

    The Air Force has other requirements, and they are pursuing those, and I do not want to speak for the Army or the Air Force, but we do work together under Dr. Sega's leadership here, and, in fact, they are looking at an alternate technology, the solid state high-energy laser which is a similar approach to the free-electron laser, and, just because we are investing, we are finding more lasers are becoming available that are getting smaller, more efficient. DARPA is invested as well.

    This is the Wild Wild West, but it is moving very fast, and I believe that we could have this on our ships—DDX is the first all-electric ship—by the end of this decade.

    Mr. AKIN. Wow. Thank you.

    Admiral COHEN. It changes warfare, in my opinion, as much as Monitor and Merrimac made wooden-hole warships obsolete, but I would like to remind you we continued to build wooden-hole warships for about 40 years—40 years afterwards.

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    Mr. AKIN. Yes, sir. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. Can you—Tony or Admiral, can you define active vaccine for us?

    Dr. TETHER. There is one—one vaccine would create antibodies, and that I would call a passive vaccine. The active vaccine goes right after the DNA of the bug that is in there. At least that is my definition of it. That is—I think that is right. I think—that and alive, I guess. Yes. Whatever works.

    Mr. SAXTON. Let me back up to the subject that we were discussing for how much of our resources we are spending on the war on terrorism. Tom Hawley and I were with some military folks not long ago, and—it is actually a classified thing, and so I would just be a little bit circumspect—and they were using some information technology to do some pretty amazing things, and we have watched other people use science and technology who are good military folks.

    And I am wondering is there—are people who are involved in the war on terrorism accessing your groups and saying we really need to develop the capability to meet this need? Is this a conversation that goes on on a continuing basis, on a daily basis, and do you have the resources available to meet those needs?

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    Dr. SEGA. I will start. I think a few of us have examples to present. The—users—the combatant commanders and the technical community, I think, have come together closer over this last year than I am aware of in any previous time because the situation's so fluid, and the rate of change in technology is so high that—and much of the technology that has been developed in the world is outside of Department of Defense and also accessible to potential adversaries.

    And so the need to connect in to the technology community from the war fighter's perspective is high, and I would submit probably going to grow in the future, and so, when we prioritize to the candidate list of technology that I mentioned in the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force, we would filter it from the—where it was in terms of being able to deliver.

    But then we asked for the combatant commands and the Joint Staff working together to prioritize that for us before we made the investment to accelerate it. We used the monies that we—the funds that we had to react to this and, when possible, did some reprogramming of funds to meet those needs, but that is also one of the motivations of increasing the Quick Reaction Special Project Fund from the $25 million requested in 2003 to the president's budget request in 2004 to $75 million to allow additional current-year flexibility to meet those needs.

    Dr. ANDREWS. Maybe I would like to come back to respond to that in two ways. You mentioned earlier that Future Combat Systems is a conventional-like approach. It is not actually. It is a—in the conventional approach, the Army took mass to go solve this problem. We are seeing that today. And how long did it take to get that mass in place? It is still moving to get in place.
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    What we have done with Future Combat Systems is cut its weight so significantly it can get—that the combatant commanders have asked for—we want—they want the Army forces on the ground somewhere in 96 hours. No force in the world today can do that. If we had it available to us today, you could provide precision attack on those terrorists that were in place in specific parts of the world, Afghanistan, wherever it may be.

    So Future Combat Systems is one of their priorities for the war on terrorism, and it is a different way. It is really unprecedented in knowledge, speed, and precision across the full spectrum of conflict. Our main—heavy forces today cannot go after that kind of terrorist.

    Mr. SAXTON. Could I—go ahead. I will come back to that.

    Mr. ENGLE. I guess just, Mr. Chairman, to address your question of exchange of information between presumably, in my case, warfighter and me the producer of science and technology, I would take you back to our Battlefield Air Operations Kit.

    That was actually communicated directly to Secretary Roche as he was pinning the Purple Heart on Staff Sergeant Yoshida, and the secretary turned to him and said, young man, what else can we do to make your job easier, and he says, well, sir, my job is to use the information I provide to combat terrorism to close the kill chain between, you know, the platform and the bullet and the terrorist, and I have got this basic problem, 150 pounds on my back.

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    So, in very short order, almost in real time, the attention to the lab returned on that particular problem, as I mentioned in my testimony. That is happening almost routinely right now as we speak in many areas in the Air Force and I am sure in the other services between those that are in the field finding new problems that they are having difficulty solving and bringing them forward to the laboratory and to the product centers to try to get something, you know, in the field as rapidly as possible.

    And I think we are doing a pretty good job in responding to that as the ideas come in and time and technology can accelerate within the realm of reason.

    Mr. SAXTON. With regard to the subject that I was discussing with you before, the—are there technologies—I continually see things that amaze me, and the use of technology in different ways is absolutely astounding to me.

    And I am wondering are there—are there programs that you are involved in and—in any of your agencies that are—that are going—that have the potential to help us in the—in significant ways in intelligence information gathering?

    Admiral COHEN. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, in the Navy, we went away from the Advance Technology Demonstrators three years ago because we would provide wonderful, workable devices, but, because of the limited resources in acquisition, the—although they were highly desired, they were ahead of their time, and there were not the resources to invest to transition them and go into acquisition.

    So, in the future Naval capabilities, I now invest precious 63 only when somebody dealing like Dr.—with Dr. Tether—they have a written memorandum of understanding and hard money put down in the acquisition side. It is programmed over the FYDP.
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    I am investing more than $70 million a year in what we call knowledge superiority and insurance. It is one of our FNCs. It goes directly at what you are addressing, Mr. Chairman.

    Now we focus primarily on netcentric warfare, which brings together all of the space, air, surface, and subsurface sensors so that we can then complete the kill chain, but when you are able to do that and you have the bandwidth and you have the protocols and you have the manned machine interface, its application across anti-terrorism is a small step to take.

    So it may have something quiet in this area because the war on terrorism is just one component of the war that we are required to be prepared for and conduct as we are now.

    Mr. SAXTON. You bet, but let me just—let me just make a comment on that. And I think this is really important.

    Ten years—12 years ago, we showed the world that Saddam Hussein could not compete with us. We are showing him again now. Twelve years ago or 11 years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed, and I do not think it—that—except for maybe the nuclear threat, I do not think anybody would claim that, with their capability and readiness today, they can complete with us.

    So there is—we have essentially shown the world that, if you want to get at the West or the United States, you cannot do it with conventional forces. And, therefore, we have seen over the last 12 years, an emergence of a significant threat that did not exist at least to the point that it does today.
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    And so when we—we have seen—it is—my opinion is that we continue to emphasize the development of conventional capability, which is fine, because we have to think about tomorrow as well as today. But we have some threats that exist today that we cannot manage, and that is why I get excited about—about these things.

    Dr. TETHER. We have—we have some programs that probably are more—closer to what you would like to hear about, but I—this is not the place to hear about it.

    Mr. SAXTON. This is not the place to do it. That is right.

    Dr. TETHER. And Jean will be over, and we will get—we will dunk his head in the pocket, but there are programs. Amazingly enough, the programs are not necessarily large dollars, but——

    Mr. SAXTON. Jean and I were just talking earlier, Secretary Andrews, about having a—a future weapon—a Future Combat Systems hearing later after we get past our busy season here marking up and what have you. But I just have—when you were talking about FCS before, you mentioned 20 tons. Is that per vehicle?

    Dr. ANDREWS. Future Combat Systems is comprised of about 18 systems right now, about half of them manned, half of them unmanned. The largest vehicles are about 20 tons, and what we are looking for is a family of systems that you can get commonality in the structure. The unmanned system is going to be somewhat less than that weight typically. The six-ton vehicle you saw up here probably is max high.
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    So what Future Combat Systems does for us is allow us to—when we are getting—when we are sent somewhere, you are now taking a larger effective force in a lot less space and weight, and yet more of the power of the network comes with you, as well as lethality and survivability.

    Mr. SAXTON. Understand. And Boeing came in the other day with some nice charts and showed me how much of the—we had a great briefing. Here is what I want to say to you.

    Dr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SAXTON. Because of—somehow in the processes developed in the Striker, which is also 20 tons, somebody decided that we were going to deploy these systems in 96 hours, just like you said, and, with the deployment equipment, i.e. airplanes, that we have available today, you have to use C–130's.

    Dr. ANDREWS. Yes.

    Mr. SAXTON. Well, guess what. The Striker's too heavy. It weighs 40,000 pounds, maybe more than that with the crew and ammo and crew equipment, and—I will tell you this story because I do not want to see this happen to the Future Combat System because it—it is a—it is not very nice.

    I heard that it would not fit in the C–130. Well, people told me, it will fit in the C–130. Do not worry about it, Congressman. As a matter of fact, we are going to fly three up to McGuire Air Force Base on a C–17, and we will show you that it fits in a C–130.
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    So the Army did that. They brought three up on a—flew them in on a C–17, which I should have—I should have figured something out when I saw the C—when I heard about the C–17, but I did not get it right away, and, sure enough, they put one up, and they put a ramp of a C–130 down. They drove it up in there. They chained it down. It was neat. It had four inches on each side and 18 inches over the top. Needed a waiver to fly it that way, but that is Okay. And I said, hey, you guys are right, it fits.

    So, while I was there, General Williams, who is commander of AMC, said would you like to talk to the crew. I said sure. So we went up to the cockpit, and we are talking to the crew. I said do you always fly with 40,000 pounds. Oh, almost never, sir. I said, well, how far can you fly. He said, well, depending on climate, depending on altitude, sometimes to a location a couple hundred miles away. But, on a bad day, maybe as little as 60. I said you are kidding.

    Now, when we were in conference marking up and—I think the Senate had included funding for the Striker and the House did not, and so Chairman Hunter got a call from the Army leadership saying we have got to have this system because we have got to have a system we can deploy on C–130's and be in the fight in 96 hours. Well, the Striker ain't going to do that. It is too heavy.

    So, in planning this family of vehicles, please go see the Air Mobility Command and say how many C–17s can we use for this mission and how many—and how heavy can we be to deploy in C–130's from reasonable locations for reasonable distances to get to the fight in 96 hours.
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    Dr. ANDREWS. We are pushing very hard to keep it down around 16 tons, in this case——

    Mr. SAXTON. Well——

    Dr. ANDREWS [continuing]. Which is closer to when you go off and fly and the range you need because, once we get there in C–17s, then we will be deployed by C–130's which may be a few hundred miles at the most.

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. Right. If we were—if we were deploying into Iraq today, it would be marginal with a 40,000-pound load. I am not sure you could do that. You would have to fly—well, you would fly it in the C–17 to a point——

    Dr. ANDREWS. Like the air base we just took over possibly.

    Mr. SAXTON. Yes, right. And that is fine. But to have a capability of flying to a location 60 miles away is not fine. Wouldn't you agree?

    Dr. ANDREWS. I am not a war fighter, but it would not seem necessarily logical, but——

    Mr. SAXTON. You may—that is where you may need the forces right then. So AMC made me some charts based on deployment into Afghanistan, and, at 38,000 pounds, from six airports in the Afghan theater, because of altitude, at six of the airports, the C–130 could not take off with 40,000 pounds on the board.
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    Well, I guess it was 38,000 pounds. I have forgotten exactly. I have forgotten the charts, but it was very discouraging to see the number of airports in the Afghan theater that the C–130 could not take off with 38,000 and 40,000 pounds on two charts, two different examples. So—

    Dr. ANDREWS. And the challenge is we are—essentially, that becomes an asymmetric threat against us, and so, until we take on that problem of reducing our weight, we are going to be helped to certain places we cannot go.

    Mr. SAXTON. I agree.

    Dr. ANDREWS. So I—you know, it is at 16 tons or better kind—around that kind of number.

    Mr. SAXTON. Now let me bring up one other subject. And I am sorry for—I—this is not the—really the place to talk about this, but we are engaged in these things, so—and I am just——

    Dr. ANDREWS. And I am just a technology guy. I am not——

    Mr. SAXTON. We are—we—the Army's Special Metals Division—that is not the right title.

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    Dr. ANDREWS. The Nay Labs.

    Mr. SAXTON. It is up at Aberdeen. Called Special Metals; has developed a theory to refine titanium domestically and cut the cost of it by at least half, and we need to pay special attention to this. I have heard about—they are taking it from the—$20 a pound or so down to probably about $3 or $4, and I have got a briefing on its way.

    Dr. TETHER. Down around $5.

    Mr. SAXTON. Five then. Now that would mean a lot to you.

    Dr. TETHER. Oh, yes. Yes, we buy a lot of it.

    Mr. SAXTON. You bet. You bet. And this 38,000-, 48,000—–40,000-pound weapons system would be a different animal, wouldn't it?

    Dr. TETHER. You are right.

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. We will work together.

    Dr. TETHER. Yes, sir. And we have a major DARPA program in getting titanium down. Not—it is not just titanium. It is in the alloys. I mean you really want to end up with titanium alloy, and we will be happy to share that with you.

    Mr. SAXTON. Hey, thank you. You are all doing great work. I do not know if either of my other colleagues want to ask another question, but we have been here for a couple of hours, and it is 6:30, and it is probably time to go home, but——
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    Dr. TETHER. Well, thank you.

    Mr. SAXTON. Yes. Thanks—thanks a lot for the great work you do. We really appreciate it, and, as I said in my opening statement, we are where we are today with national security because of advances in technology. That is where you are, and we appreciate it, and we want to do what we can to help you. Thank you.

    [Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]