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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–22]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005—H.R. 4200






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APRIL 1, 2004




CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Chairman
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
HOWARD ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
WALTER JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
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ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LANE EVANS, Illinois
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOHN LARSON, Connecticut
JIM COOPER, Tennessee

Douglas Roach, Professional Staff Member
Bob Lautrup, Professional Staff Member
JJ Gertler, Professional Staff Member
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John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Robert Simmons, Professional Staff Member
Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member
Jesse Tolleson, Research Assistant




    Thursday, April 1, 2004, Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act—The Army's Future Combat Systems and the FY2005 Land Component Budget Request


    Thursday, April 1, 2004



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    Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

    Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces


    Francis, Paul L., GAO Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office

    Griffin, Lt. Gen. Benjamin S., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 (Programming, Material Integration and Management) United States Army

    Hanlon, Lt. Gen. Edward, Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development, United States Marine Corps

    Yakovac, Lt. Gen. Joseph L., Jr., USA, Military Deputy and Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) Department of the Army


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[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Francis, Paul L.

Griffin, Lt. Gen. Benjamin

Hanlon, Lt. Gen. Edward Jr.

Weldon, Hon. Curt

Yakovac, Lt. Gen. Joseph L., Jr.

[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Mr. Spratt
Mr. Weldon


House of Representatives,
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Committee on Armed Services,
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 1, 2004.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.


    Mr. WELDON. The subcommittee will come to order.

    This afternoon the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the land component and related programs in the fiscal year 2005 budget request. We have two panels of witnesses.

    For the first panel the General Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of the Army will provide the subcommittee with their views on the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.

    During the second panel, representatives of the Departments of the Army and United States Marine Corps will provide us with testimony on force protection, unfunded requirements associated with equipping our forces and sustainment of the current force into the future.
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    I have maintained through the years, first as chairman of the Military Research and Development (R&D) Subcommittee, again as chairman of the Military Procurement Subcommittee and now today that the proposed defense budgets have been, and currently are insufficient to adequately fund the programs included in the budget requests.

    The GAO concluded in 2003 that the current Army heavy force would be required to remain in the inventory through at least 2020. In order to extend our current capability to 2020, this force would need to be maintained and upgraded.

    The funding to support the current force would require significant investment. Our past experience indicates that the current force is constantly shortchanged by ever-escalating cost growth in development programs. Maintaining current equipment is the major challenge.

    It is our responsibility to make sure that we do not sacrifice today the capabilities and equipment provided to our soldiers in order to field a capability two decades from now.

    The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army's flagship program of transformation. As envisioned, FCS would allow the Army to rapidly deploy and operate in all types of military operations, ranging from small-scale contingencies to major theater wars.

    The technological and organizational advances that FCS promises would keep the Army well ahead of near-peer threats for decades. The FCS program has a number of progressive features.
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    The ''system of systems'' architecture within which individual systems will be developed is a dramatic improvement over the past practice of designing separate systems and then making these systems interoperable after the fact.

    Another progressive feature is the collaborative environment in which the Army program management, the contractor, and the warfighter community are developing the FCS requirements.

    And finally, FCS accounts for lethality, survivability and sustainability as equally important key performance characteristics at the inception of the program.

    Unfortunately, however, the Future Combat Systems program also carries very high risks.

    The Army has never managed any program the size and complexity of FCS: 18 systems, 32 critical technology areas, 34 million lines of code, 129 trade studies, 157 programs being developed independent of FCS, and all in 5.5 years.

    FCS will cost at least $22 billion through 2009 and $92 billion through the fielding of the first 15 units of action.

    The software task alone is five times larger than that required for the Joint Strike Fighter and 10 times larger than that for the F–22, which after two decades is finally meeting its software requirements.
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    If FCS experiences the technical difficulties that every major development program seems to experience, the cost overruns will consume the Army's budget.

    If Comanche, Crusader, or F–22 are portents of the magnitude of the problems, then FCS R&D could cost $30 to $40 billion.

    Can DOD or the Army afford such an investment? We do not want to be here in two years rebaselining FCS. Let us consider the long-term and overall DOD budget.

    The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects an approximate 30 percent shortfall in required funding to execute the long-term defense plan.

    Given the overall national fiscal realities, the question is, ''How do we reduce the risk in developing FCS so that we can afford to provide funding for the FCS without sacrificing the current force?''

    We need FCS to be successful.

    I do want to commend the Army for facilitating transparent, proactive congressional oversight on cost, schedule and technical risk from the inception of the program.

    We look forward to hearing from our panels about this program of the future and about meeting the needs of our soldiers and marines today as they fight the global war on terror.
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    Before I turn to my good friend and introduce our two distinguished witnesses, let me just say I chaired the hearing on Tactical Air Forces Acquisition (TACAIR) a week or so ago and the problem is the same: we are in the midst of a massive train wreck.

    We did not modernize the 1990's and we have major programs about to come online that we can't fund. That is why Crusader was canceled, and one of the reasons why the Comanche was canceled.

    We have three TACAIR programs; we can't even pay for two, let alone three. We have increased needs for missile defense.

    It was requested we increase our shipbuilding account; we are currently at 294 ships in the active duty fleet. We are building nine next year as opposed to the past practice of six a year.

    The question we have to ask ourselves as Members of this Congress is, ''Where is the money going to come from?''

    I put the contractors and the services on notice in the TACAIR Subcommittee hearing and I am putting the services and the contractors on notice again today.

    We cannot be forced to make illogical decisions because we don't have adequate resources to allocate. You can't do that to us.

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    You have to help us get these programs under control: costs that are acceptable and realistic so that we can meet the warfighting needs of our soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines in 20 years, while not overstepping the need for our servicemen and women, currently in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

    All of us face the issue of losing our constituents. When I traveled to Iraq one month ago, I met with General Odierno of the 4th Infantry Division outside of Tikrit and we talked about the losses to his troops. And we just had another significant loss yesterday.

    He told me the story of a young 24-year-old soldier who was a great American, would be a fantastic leader if he had lived. He was killed doing what he loved to do: defending the ideals of his country and leading his men into war.

    He came under heavy attack on the road between Tikrit and Kirkuk and he did what a soldier would as an officer: he led the effort, he was wounded, he kept the effort up, he protected his troops, he protected those around him, civilians, and he was shot again and again and he was killed.

    He told about this young American and to me it was an example of why we are all here. And as I listened to his story, I said, ''General, that young man's name wasn't Bernstein was it?'' And he looked at me and he said, ''Well, yes Congressman, it was.''

    I said, ''Well, you see, I am carrying a three-page letter from Lieutenant Bernstein's parents, because I nominated him to West Point.''

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    His parents wrote me a three-page letter telling me what a great man and a great leader he was both in high school and when he went to West Point. And all the stories that came back about him when his funeral was held.

    General Odierno read the letter and this huge officer, who was such a capable leader for our country and a great role model, I could see the emotion in his eyes as he looked up at me and he said, ''My son went to school with him at West Point.''

    Fact is that we must do everything we can for the soldier today. We must make sure that they have the best equipment, the best technology, the best protection. And that is the first priority of our committee, while at the same time, helping to achieve the transformation that is needed for the next 20 years.

    The problem we have is, up until now, we can't do both. The Pentagon and our services are presenting us with unrealistic needs. We can't make those decisions as elected officials in a vacuum, you must help us.

    So, as we begin this hearing today, I urge our friends in the services and especially in the Army, as we discuss the Future Combat Systems to help us through the tough times that we are going to have to take and decisions we are going to have to make this year about how much to fund, about what rate to fund Future Combat Systems, while also providing the modernization and upgraded protection for the troops that are currently serving America around the world.

    We have two panels today. On the first panel, representing the Army is very distinguished Lieutenant General Joseph Yakovac the Military Director, Army Acquisition Corps and representing the Government Accountability Office, Paul Francis, director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management.
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    Our second panel, testifying on force protection and sustaining a current force will be Lieutenant General Benjamin Griffin, deputy chief of staff, G8, United States Army and Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, deputy commandant and commander, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

    I want to thank all of you for joining us today. More importantly, I want to thank you for your service to the country.

    And before I turn to my good friend and colleague, Neil Abercrombie, I would ask that we observe a moment of silent meditation to pray for those soldiers whose lives were snuffed out in this past week and their heroic actions on behalf of this Nation and free people around the world, in their service to America.


    I would now ask my good friend from Hawaii, Mr. Neil Abercrombie, for his opening remarks.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon can be viewed in the hard copy.]


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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to suggest to the panels and to those who are observing and who will be giving advice and taking information back to the Pentagon and to the various services, that it is very, very important that the remarks of the chairman have close attention paid to them.

    I want to make clear for the record that, as the senior Democrat on this subcommittee that I am in full support of the remarks of the chairman and the context and thrust of those remarks.

    It is no secret to the chairman, certainly, and it is probably no secret to Members of the panel that my awareness of the Future Combat System comes from General Shinseki, who first discussed with me and that my relationship with General Shinseki was both professional, in the sense of his representation in the Army to me as a Member of Congress and personal, because of his relationship and his family's relationship to myself, having been born on the island of Kauai and, of course, maintaining his ties there in Hawaii today.

    So, I don't see that so much as a conflict, so much as an opportunity to have perhaps even a closer understanding and relationship to the idea of the Future Combat System than I might otherwise have.

    The difficulty here is, as I indicated to General Shinseki and since to the chairman and other Members of this subcommittee, is that this system to this point is theoretical. And that is important.
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    And a clear academic understanding, if you will, of where we want to go is crucial to being able to formulate a rational and reasonable set of legislative policies.

    This is an authorizing committee and it sets the base, it sets the direction, it sets the policy and that is our job as stated in the United States Constitution. But as a former academician myself, I also understand that the key is the transition from an academic understanding, or theoretical understanding, to a practical implementation where the consequences can be accounted for.

    And in this regard, the chairman has indicated the software question alone, aside from the expense, is an exercise in faith. More than that, it does not necessarily reflect upon the nature of what might be expected in the combat itself.

    I have, over the last 14 years, been particularly struck by the presentations that have been made, both in the open session like this and in closed sessions concerning what have come to be termed asymmetrical warfare. And most particularly what the role of the Army and the Marines will be in the context of asymmetrical warfare.

    The chairman and I do not agree the political policy matches up with the professional capacity to the Armed Services. I think we maybe a little more work in that regard.

    But the plain fact is, is that the Army and the Marines are the ones that are going to and are now facing the consequences of our political actions, whatever their wisdom or lack of it.
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    And they are engaged and are likely to be engaged in the future for our combat systems in asymmetrical warfare. And whether or not the Future Combat System can be married up with those necessities is what the key is.

    I appreciate the chairman giving me a chance to expound on this a little. As he knows and the Members know, I ordinarily don't give much in the way of an opening statement and want to get right to the panels.

    But in this instance, I think the chairman has outlined such a crucial and fundamental decision making process that he was engaged in and has articulated clearly what he intends to do. I hope no one misunderstands that he means every word he says and knowing him as I do, he intends to carry through on every word that he articulated.

    And I want it formally on the record from this side of the aisle that we will be in support of him, in that regard.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank my good friend and colleague, Mr. Abercrombie, for his statement and for his leadership. We do take great pride in this committee and this subcommittee to having a joint response.

    I take great pride in all the years I have chaired a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, I have never had a split vote on any issue. And I don't want to have one this year.

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    But I can tell you the pressures are overwhelming.

    We are being forced to make decisions that our military officers should be making, given the budget requirements and resources we have, given the assignments that we are currently involved with, and in many cases, putting us into, not just difficult, impossible positions to try to rectify: modernization with transformation.

    And that is what this hearing is all about.

    And so with that, I put the pressure on our witnesses to give us the answers. We pay you to be the experts that you are, both in the civilian side, to oversee the programs, from the military side, where we have so much confidence and the most outstanding military ever produced on the face of the earth.

    And all of us agree with that.

    Though we have competing interests and you simply shove off those decisions to us, it makes it impossible. We want to give you everything you want, but we don't have that luxury of an unlimited budget. And so, you have to help us make those decisions.

    With those introductions, I would say that your prepared testimony is accepted without objection for the record. You can say whatever you like verbally and then we will go right to questions.

    So, Mr. Francis, if you would start and give us your assessment. And then General Yakovac, we can have you respond and give us your assessment. And hopefully they will be somewhere close together.
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    I expect they probably won't be, but that is Okay. That is why we have this system.

    Mr. Francis.


    Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you.

    Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee.

    The chairman has set the bar pretty high, I don't know if we can meet expectations here, but I do know we will be talking about the same thing today.

    I am pleased to be here to discuss the Future Combat Systems program, also known as FCS. FCS will be the centerpiece in the Army's plan to transform to a lighter, more agile and more capable force.

    As requested, in summarizing my prepared statement, I will cover three issues. One: the features of the Future Combat Systems. Two: the prospects for delivering a capable FCS within budgeted schedule and cost. And three: whether alternatives to the current strategy are worth considering.
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    First: the concept.

    FCS is a suite of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicle sensors, ammunitions that will be synergized in an information network. They are to be a fraction of the weight of current weapons and yet, are planned to be as lethal and survivable.

    Their light weight and small size are critical to meeting the other goals of the Army's future force, namely better responsiveness and better sustainability.

    At a fundamental level, the FCS will replace mass with superior information; that is, to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to withstand an attack.

    Making this leap depends on the ability of the network to collect, process and deliver vast amounts of information, such as imagery and communications, and on the performance of the individual weapons themselves.

    This concept has a number of progressive features, which the chairman has alluded to. It provides an architecture, within which individual systems will be designed: an improvement over designing systems and putting them together later.

    It includes sustainability as a design characteristic rather than an afterthought. It has galvanized relationships between users and developers and it also shows a willingness on the part of Army leadership not to be bound by tradition.
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    My second issue relates to the prospects for staying within costs and schedule. FCS, as currently structured, is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources.

    In conflict, are the programs' unprecedented technical challenges and time. At a top level, the technical challenges are: development of a first-of-a-kind network; 18 advanced systems; 53 advanced technologies; 157 complimentary systems; and 34 million lines of software code.

    From a time standpoint, the FCS strategy only allows 5.5 years between development start and the production decision. This is faster than it normally takes to develop a single major weapons system and the FCS contains several.

    Mr. Chairman, you may recall I raised a similar issue when I testified before the subcommittee two weeks ago, when we were discussing the problems with developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The FCS program will need to develop two, and possibly, four UAVs in record time.

    To meet this timetable, the FCS is proceeding on a highly concurrent strategy. This strategy calls for conducting technology development and system development at the same time and beginning production without sufficient demonstration.

    I would like to point out a few aspects of the strategy. Although all critical technology should be mature at the start of development, for the FCS, less than 25 percent of the technologies were mature.
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    In November 2008, the initial production decision will be made. This will be a year before all the FCS systems, the network and the software will be brought together and demonstrated as a system of systems.

    Because production representative prototypes are not planned, production process maturity and system reliability will not have been adequately demonstrated at the production decision.

    If all FCS systems are not developed sufficiently, the strategy still calls for going forward with production. Similarly, the strategy calls for accepting existing systems in lieu of actual FCS systems to meet the fielding date.

    In our more than 30 years of analyzing weapons systems, we have not found concurrent strategies to work, particularly when advanced technologies are involved.

    Delaying the demonstration of knowledge results in problems being discovered late in development. FCS is susceptible to such problems, as the demonstration of multiple technologies, individual systems, the network and the system of systems will all culminate late in development and early production.

    This brings me to my third issue, which are alternatives. Alternatives to the current FCS strategy are worth considering, particularly because the tools normally employed to accommodate problems in weapons systems, namely, relaxing requirements and adding money, may not be available to the current FCS program.
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    The opportunity for making tradeoffs is limited by the fact that the FCS must be as good as the current force at a fraction of the size. Similarly, providing more money after problems have occurred may not be feasible, as the FCS dominates the Army's future budgets.

    FCS funding will climb quickly over the next few years. The $3.2 billion fiscal year 2005 request represents almost double that of 2004.

    The total cost of the first increment, which will only equip one-third of the active force is $92 billion. There is not much headroom in this estimate because it was based on an immature program and because it assumes full success in development.

    To put the numbers in context, a modest, one-year delay late in development could cost $4 billion. A similarly modest 10 percent cost increase could amount to $9 billion.

    If this kind of additional money will be needed for the program, I don't know where it will come from, considering the other significant demands DOD will be attempting to meet at the same time as the chairman mentioned in his opening statement.

    Several alternatives to a concurrent strategy are possible if acted upon early.

    Alternatives should have several things in common: they should build more knowledge before key commitments are made; they should preserve the advantages of the FCS concept, such as developing an architecture first; and they should have the ability to spin off mature technologies to existing systems.
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    Alternatives might include: getting a better balance between resources and requirements. One way would be to add more time to the FCS program as it is currently scoped. This would reduce concurrency and risk, but would not necessarily make costs and schedule more predictable.

    Another way would be to re-scope the first increment of FCS toward a less-ambitious goal than replacing the current heavy force, if that would be militarily worthwhile.

    In addition, the program could be refocused on demonstrating the more critical FCS technologies or capabilities first and then proceeding with the full program.

    Regardless of what strategy is chosen for the FCS, it should meet the standards that are the business case expected of an acquisition program. The earlier that decisions on the strategy can be made, the better.

    Let me close by saying that General Yakovac, General Shank and their team have worked hard to develop and execute a strategy to meet the program's goals.

    They have developed collaborative relationships with users, innovative modeling and simulation methods, as well as an impressive array of management techniques to define requirements and to fuse design efforts.

    They have been very open about their risks and the challenges they face. I am encouraged by their efforts so far and hope that decisions can be made early, to give the FCS program a scope and a strategy that can be reasonably executed within expected resources.
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    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks and I would be glad to answer any questions.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Francis can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

    General Yakovac, it is your opportunity and whatever you would like to say, you are welcome.


    General YAKOVAC. Mr. Chairman, rather than be a point-counterpoint, I will take a little bit of different tact in my opening remark. But I am prepared to answer questions along the lines that Paul has raised.

    Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for allowing me to update you on the status and progress of the Future Combat System.

    In this role I am here before you on behalf of the soldiers and civilians of the Army Acquisition workforce, entrusted with providing our army's material needs from combat systems to soldier uniforms.
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    Today, our program of focus is FCS: a program with risks, yet full of promise to provide a fully networked system of systems from initial concept through a fully integrated final design.

    As we navigate the complexities and challenges of Army transformation and the needs of responding to the global war on terrorism, I want to continue to partner with Congress to make FCS a reality.

    With the real-time focus on more than 330,000 deployed soldiers around the world in over 120 countries, it is sometimes difficult, even for myself, to think about the future.

    Having said that, we realize that one of our key FCS enablers is open and continuous communications about the need for the program and the challenges it does face.

    From the beginning, Congress and the GAO, from my point of view, have been members of the FCS team. Our emphasis on this teamwork enhances how we work together to support the program of record.

    We have historically created an information pool relationship; therefore, we began this program with a pledge to partner along the way. We see all stakeholders as partners, not organizations providing oversight.

    For example, we have initiated a plan to give your staff unprecedented insight to the FCS program through access to our contractually based earned value management system. We do this to encourage proactive information exchange so you can actively evaluate our progress throughout the program.
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    Additionally, the more everyone understands the FCS management scheme and program of record, the more comfortable they will become with it.

    The complexities and challenges of this program are many, but they are recognized and they are not insurmountable. Through continued open communications and management emphasis on following the key program tenets, we will be successful.

    The tenets driven by the government industry team are an innovative way of guiding program decisions.

    The tenets are, and these form the basis of the management structure of this program: one, we create opportunities for the best of industry to participate; we are leveraging government technology base to the maximum extent; we associate ongoing enabling activities with the LSI-led activity; we have a very advanced collaborative environment that will overcome some of the issues that have been discussed and presented from design through the lifecycle.

    Commonality at the subsystem and component level is the key to how this program has been structured. We design and plan for technology integration and assertion throughout the lifecycle.

    We are very concerned and we look very hard at maintaining and shaping the industrial base for today and the future. We will retain competition throughout this process.

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    We have appropriate government involvement in the entire process. We have consistent and continuous definition of requirements and that is a key to making this within cost and schedule. We maintain, and we will shape the acquisition community that I represent.

    At the end, everything we do is to provide an affordable, balanced, performance-sustainable program. It is that balance that is important.

    An example how these are used, the tenets, one, three, five, six and number 12 really establish the basis for the relationship between the lead systems integrator (LSI) and the Army. We are a true partner in this complex system of systems, engineering task and in the fielding of a unit of action.

    Example number two of how the tenets have guided us maintain and shape the industrial base of the future. It is absolutely critical to the success of this program, perhaps many others, without reshaping our base, we risk losing capability that would be most difficult to replace. Shaping the base is critical and we intend to do so.

    In closing, the FCS program is vital to our future as the nation's land combat force and as the Army's top material development program. FCS is an unprecedented military capability for the future. The real winner or loser, if we do it wrong, is the soldier.

    We serve the soldier and can ill afford mistakes.

    Mr. Chairman and the committee, I look forward to your questions.

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    [The prepared statement of General Yakovac can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, General, for your testimony, and more importantly, thank you for your service to the country. You have done an admirable job in managing a very large and complex program, which I think all of us up here support.

    So the question before us, as I said in the opening, is not whether or not we move into FCS, the question is how we get there at the same time that we have equipment that is being used so aggressively in Iraq and Afghanistan that needs modernizing, needs upgrades.

    And how do we balance the two and not have the Army end up with what we had with the Comanche, where after $6 billion and six realignments of the program, we kill it, when all of us were told that it was the key part of the Army of the future?

    So, we want to be your friends and supporters, but we just have a difficult time getting there from here with the dollar amounts that we know that are going to be available.

    You have done a good job at the GAO in helping us assess this. You have given us what you call your alternatives; I think you gave us three.

    There are some who have said that perhaps, we ought to focus on the system of systems integration of the technology and not necessarily the platform aspect, rather, in some cases, blend it in with what we have in the way of current platforms. I think that might be your second of your three alternatives.
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    Have you done at the GAO any cost analysis of the difference that would be required? And how perhaps, some of the money currently funding for FCS could be used for some modernization needs?

    Have you done that kind of analysis dollar-wise?

    Mr. FRANCIS. No, we haven't Mr. Chairman. We have look at alternatives and we talked about them last year. And I think the first order of magnitude is deciding is that possible?

    That is, right now the FCS is one big effort that is being brought together as a system of systems and I think a question would be is that the solution, whereas perhaps that is the framework within which the solutions lie.

    And I think that is where our first alternative is. Now we haven't gone beyond that to take those apart and see what would the cost differentials be?

    Mr. WELDON. Now General, you are here to tell us about the overall program. And obviously, to make the case that FCS needs to be fully funded so that we can complete this transformation and I understand it and agree with it, but what if you were asked if you could perhaps, look at maybe some focus on the integration of the data systems sets and the software and all that coding work that has to be done.

    Is it possible, in your opinion that you can do that and in the end accomplish the same objectives, while also completing the modernization using that technology as soon as possible with existing platforms?
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    General YAKOVAC. Now let me answer that in two parts.

    First of all, the first part as it pertains to FCS then the integration.

    The concept of FCS, although people refer it to 18, is really a total integration system of systems. Requirements document as written, puts a premium on such things as commonality, logistics support, et cetera, so that the logistical tale that we have to take toward much less than today.

    In order to do that, you have to start from the top; take those requirements and throw them down into those 18.

    So, the cornerstone of those 18, as it pertains to that system, are very critical to keep in-step. If you pull out a piece, than you don't meet one of the higher order requirements that I have, such as the staying ability, reducing the logistical footprint, et cetera.

    With that being said, the second piece is the technology insertion.

    The technologies that we adopted for FCS were already there. We did not put any demand on the system or on the tech base to start something new. We merely looked within the tech base, both government and private, and assessed what we could take and those levels of maturity that would allow us, with acceptable risk, to mature them.

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    A number of the technologies are software, as you stated. Those technologies, as they mature, can in fact, be inserted, but just like with your home computer, if you don't have the right operating environment, the right processing capability, the right memory, just inserting it into a current force system would not give you the capabilities that you would need.

    So then you have to look for those technologies that would be easily insert-able or integrate-able into a current platform.

    Those numbers, if you look at the man-ground vehicle piece of it, are very limited because the current architectures of even our most advanced ground systems, the Abrams SEP tank and the Bradley A3 are not capable of easily adding technologies.

    Those platforms were designed in the early 1980's; we upgraded them three or four times. There is not much room that you can add technology into them.

    Other pieces of FCS, outside of man-ground vehicles, are in fact, being put into the current force and will continue to spiral in. For example, unattended ground sensors; unmanned aerial vehicles; unattended man-ground vehicles.

    Those pieces do not need the over-arching architecture of FCS to be into the force, if in fact, they add value to the current force as we look at the capabilities we need to insert.

    So, on a case-by-case basis we do intend to look at the capability gaps that are emerging from current operations and take steps to take FCS developing technologies and platforms and insert them where they, in fact, do fill that requirements gap.
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    That analysis is being done today by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. We see some beginnings of that with the Rapid Equiping Force Initiative that we have had today in Iraq.

    We have taken some technologies and some capabilities, I hate this talk about technologies more than capabilities; it comes with them, we have put them over there, not in vast numbers, but they are making a difference.

    We are improving the ability of the soldiers on the ground to gather information more rapidly and disseminate it.

    And so, in those areas where we have a capabilities gap, where a technology can then be put into that, to give a capability, we intend to do that.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, General.

    One final, quick question before I let my colleagues question, because we want to get through everyone to ask questions.

    The initial operating capability (IOC) is 2011. Is that correct?

    General YAKOVAC. Correct. Yes.

    Let me explain that, if I may, rather than answering yes or no.
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    A year ago, when the FCS was brought over here, if you all remember, we had a very ambitious 2008. That was an entire unit of action, as it was defined. That was everything.

    Between March and April and May of last year, the Army reassessed, both in terms of when it can afford and the account of their risk that we knew we had as we emerged out of the first phase of FCS. We had documented risk and we knew it.

    So, in that timeframe, we did two things. First of all, we stepped back in the initial phase of the program. We slowed it down by a full two years. And that was to do the system-less systems integration [that the GAO talked about] to focus on it.

    To make sure that we had everything that we needed to have in terms of engineering, sound engineering practices, to include software documented so we can move forward and still meet the schedule.

    The second thing we did was recognizing because of costs, and we have made adjustments from the original program, we looked at 2010 as defined at that time, 31 December, so yes, 2011 calendar year.

    Well, rather than having a full unit of action, that is everything that we thought we could have, we slowed it down and we are going to insert a piece of a unit of action into a current formation.

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    And then over time we will evolve it to a full unit of action, which we will go into an operational test in 2012, and not make a final determination on full rate production until 2013.

    So, that 2 years from 2008, really meant not 2008 to 2010, but really meant 2008 to 2012 and the insertion of those technologies into a current formation, when we begin to look at how we fight together, because as was stated together, we will have the current formation in the force for quite a long time.

    So, we don't intend to overnight to go from a current Army with its capabilities, into the future. We will evolve into it because of obviously, the consideration of technical risk, affordability was a big aspect of it and all of the other pressures that the Army has on it to focus just on modernization.

    Mr. WELDON. Mr. Abercrombie?

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Francis, forgive me, on this, what I am going to start asking you is not meant to embarrass or put you in an awkward position, but what you have put forward here and you are very thorough.

    By the way, I want to compliment you, you think I am coming after you now, your report is extraordinarily well-written, very clear, which enables me to ask the questions, I hope, that I am going to be asking.
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    Do you have a background in the Army, in terms of doctrine, in terms of strategy, in terms of historical understanding of warfare, theoretical and otherwise?

    Mr. FRANCIS. No, Mr. Abercrombie.

    My background has been basically in weapons acquisition for about 25 years.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The nuts and bolts of it?

    Mr. FRANCIS. The nuts and bolts of it. Yes.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The reason I asked that, as I said, believe me, it is not to embarrass you at all. If anything, it is to create a foundation of comments about my questioning and why I am doing it.

    I have not served in combat; I was not in the military. That makes me like a lot of other people in the country. Nonetheless, I have legislative responsibilities in this regard on this committee, and this is my 14th year on it.

    What I have tried to do then, in preparation for this, is I read and try to immerse myself as much as I can in history, doctrine, strategy, try to understand what it was that helped make decisions.

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    Because the overt history, if you will, of combat itself, as far as I have been able to determine, all has as its foundation what people thought was going to happen and what they thought needed to be done.

    Now, in that context, and in the area of critical technology areas and they are, if I am not mistaken, 50-plus individual technologies associated with it.

    Is that fair?

    Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

    Just to zero in on one, I am going to refer you to page six and seven and eight of your testimony because I think the general has already zeroed in on what I was going to try and do, which is focus on a unit of action.

    And this blends into the second panel.

    Forgive me for all my preliminaries, I can't do this any other way and make sense to myself, and hopefully the rest of the subcommittee.

    When Chairman Hunter took us to Iraq, virtually at the end of the initial attack, it is no secret to people in here that I have always viewed this activity, this military action as an attack on Iraq, a lightning attack on Baghdad to be followed by a war. I never considered the initial thrust into Iraq as the war.
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    But I thought it was going to cause a way and then that would happen afterwards. And what I thought at the time, and what I said to the chairman and what I said to Mr. Weldon and others at the time was, ''We drove from the airport in Baghdad. Now they have to have helicopters.''

    And the reason, when we drove in I said, ''Look, from what I understand from all my reading, taking a look here, this is a strip of tar in the desert.''

    And you don't have to go back further than seven pillars of wisdom, or revolt in the desert to see what happens when you have a fixed strip for transportation and no protection on every side. There was no light, there was no anything.

    I said in order to prevent mines being put in the road or explosive devises, on or near the road or in vehicles or so, which we saw burned out on the side. I said, ''You are going to have to have thousands of soldiers just to guard this. Otherwise, you are going to be taking extraordinary chances, unless the vehicles that will be passing down this road have four characteristics: lethality, survivability, responsiveness and sustainability, which you have outlined.''

    I didn't say it as clearly as that, but it was my understanding from all of the reading and all of the work we have done. And we were assigned work by the chairman, I can assure you. If you want to be in his company, you have to do it.

    And I didn't think we were going to be ready for that and I didn't think we were prepared to do that.
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    So, this is asymmetrical warfare. And precisely the kind of thing I thought we were getting into and the traditional decisions, or the traditional ways of saying what a war was all about and how you win or lose was not going to apply.

    So, my question, Mr. Francis, is and I guess, generally, you would have to answer it at the same time. You are at a little bit of a disadvantage, Mr. Francis, because we have had classified briefings in this area that you may not have been privileged to, in terms of information.

    But you, nonetheless, signed at the bottom of page seven. For example, the FCS vehicle's small size and lighter weight are factors to improve agility, responsiveness and deployability, however, lighter weight precludes the use traditional means to achieve survivability, heavy armor.

    The FCS program must use cutting edge technology to develop systems such as an Active Protection System to achieve survivability.

    I think we have a case in point. Would you agree, General, with what we are dealing with right now? If not, on the Baghdad road from the airport in Iraq and Afghanistan, too.

    So, my question is, is that given the constrictions that the chairman has outlined, and just using this as an example of the 51. How are we going to do what we said we were going to do? How are we actually going to accomplish that legislatively?
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    If we have to extend this system out, I think we have to know now. I am not going to get mad about it. It is not going to irritate me to 2008 has to be changed or something of that nature.

    Or do we have to draw down on the number of changes we are going to make in this system, in order to address the real question, which to me is a doctrinal one. What is our object and how are we going to accomplish that object with the people and the equipment that we have?

    Should we take what we have and work with what we have and leave some of this software futuristic, technological razzle dazzle to itself. And perfect our training and our utilization of the equipment that we have, rather than try to meet an unrealistic date for exotic technology.

    Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Abercrombie, I think one way you have to look at FCS is it is being offered as a full spectrum system.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand.

    Mr. FRANCIS. So, it will have to take care of everything: just like Iraq and heavy armor. To do that, it needs all of those technologies.

    So, the way I would look at it is the FCS really is it is a revolutionary acquisition. And because it has a very high bar to meet; it has to do everything the heavy force does very well today and everything the light forces are supposed to do.
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    To get that job done, then, if the technologies were there, to put together systems, they had to take immature technologies out of the science and technology base and include them in the design to give them those capabilities.

    So, the way we look at it is, it is a very ambitious acquisition from a mission's standpoint. It has immature technologies, it has a very tight schedule, and it has, I think at this point, an optimistic cost estimate. I don't know where the wiggle room, if you will, for managers to manage inside that box.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If that is the case then, Mr. Francis, and I accept that.

    Shouldn't we go back to principles then and redo our doctrine?

    Mr. FRANCIS. Well, I think the question would be if this is what it takes for that type of solution, then I think you say, ''That could be a very costly solution and we may not get it when we want it anyway, because technologies have a nasty habit of not behaving and not being insistent on a schedule.''

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is right: the psychology of machines.

    Mr. FRANCIS. Yes.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is what Norman Mailer says.
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    Mr. FRANCIS. So, I think then you say, ''If that is the ideal solution''

    And I wouldn't disagree with General Yakovac that that would be an ideal. If we can't get there, then we have to think about what solutions would work, and that is where we get into the discussion——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can you indulge me 30 more seconds?

    General Yakovac, then that brings me to this. Will you agree with me or disagree with me on my approach to this? I am doing the best I could.

    General YAKOVAC. Oh, no, I like the dialog.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not a combat soldier.

    General YAKOVAC. I understand.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But I am not a fool.

    General YAKOVAC. Yes.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I take, as every Member does here, extraordinarily seriously the point that the votes we make affect the life and death situation of you and the troops under your command.
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    So, given that, if this is the case, I understand we have to modernize and all the rest of it, but maybe modernization means that we have to redo the doctrine.

    Maybe we have to modernize our doctrine as well and start matching up what we have and who we have to what they face; what those vehicles and technologies that we do have are facing.

    When you are on the road from the Baghdad Airport into Baghdad, there are a series of things you are going to have to face.

    For example, donkey carts with mortars on them. Speaking of modernization, what the hell difference does that matter to me? That means people are utilizing what they have. I am talking about the opposition here.

    I have to be cold-hearted about it in that regard, is that those in opposition, what do they have? They don't have Stryker Brigade Combat Team. They don't have an Abrams tank.

    They have donkeys and they have carts and they have a mortar system, so they drag it up and they try and blow up a hotel. To me, that is making maximum use of what they have, which is good military doctrine.

    General YAKOVAC. Right.

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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, I would prefer to say to the chairman that I can support maximizing the capacity to utilize our current technology to its fullest extent in terms of lethality, survivability, responsiveness and sustainability, and maximize the training and the indoctrination of the troops with regard to how they can use those vehicles in the circumstances they are most likely to face, rather than deal with the theoretical, and perhaps the impractical, in terms of exotic technological advance.

    General YAKOVAC. I will answer that in two ways.

    First of all: to discuss the doctrinal piece. You are absolutely right. The way we——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Could you repeat that just because it is so good.

    General YAKOVAC. To look at the doctrinal piece, you are absolutely right.

    The material piece is the one that people get enamored with, because it has the dollars.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Exactly.

    General YAKOVAC. But you don't want to go to material if you can do doctrine, and we don't.
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    So part of the evolution from today, and the lessons learned, we have already changed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) to account for what we could do by doctrine.

    We do convoys differently today. The material solution then enables that doctrine to grow.

    So once you determine you have a doctrinal change that you can implement, that turns into a new tactic, technique or procedure to overcome what you discuss, then the next phase of it is to look at the material solution that then allows you to get to the point where you can continue to grow the doctrine and the TTP to be much better.

    I will pick one area, and that is survivability. Survivability has many facets.

    The survivability of the systems that we have today were primarily based upon the Cold War scenario of a frontal, known threat. There is not a vehicle that we have in the inventory that is not susceptible to the type of threats that you have talked about.

    For example: large blasts; 360-degree survivability, because the design parameter was in the frontal 60-degree arc. So, if you take that lesson learned, what can you do in terms of both rapid materiel and also tactics, techniques and procedures?

    We have done that. We have continually fed back from the AOR to a group of officers and enlisted soldiers——
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, general. I am listening.

    I know that the chairman is going to tell us we have to leave in about two minutes because of the vote and we will come back.

    General YAKOVAC. Okay.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But I accept everything that you are saying there, but are you making the case, or can a case be argued to you then, that then we have just done about as much as we can and should and are likely to have to deal with, say, for the next 10 years or whatever it is?

    And so therefore, there is not a necessity to pursue this exotic technology in terms of funding?

    General YAKOVAC. When you come back, I will talk about the other aspect of what you just asked, and that is what you can do with technology in this situation, which we have done some of it, but this expands upon it.

    I will answer that.

    Mr. WELDON. Will the gentleman yield for that?

    We apologize for this break to vote, but if you would hold that thought, when we come back we will recognize you to complete it. And the gentleman from South Carolina has questions.
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    Hopefully, other Members will be back here. So we will stand in recess until this one vote is over.

    Thank you.


    Mr. WELDON. I am waiting for Mr. Abercrombie because he asked the question.

    So, if you bear with us for a minute or two. He must be a little slow today coming back. We are going to have to send a staffer over to get him.


    Mr. WELDON. The subcommittee will come to order.

    Gentlemen, if you don't mind, since Mr. Abercrombie is not here yet and I want to pick up on where he left off, I am going to ask Mr. Schrock to ask his questions, if you don't mind.

    General YAKOVAC. Okay.

    Mr. WELDON. And then we will go back to Mr. Abercrombie to finish, General Yakovac.
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    Mr. SCHROCK. I figured I better get here early, because if Neil beat me, I would never be able to talk.

    Mr. WELDON. The floor is yours, Ed.

    Mr. SCHROCK. First of all, let me thank both of you for coming here today to give us some insight on these matters.

    I believe the goals behind the Army's FCS development plan is very worthy: leveraging the ability to gather and process a superior amount of information for increased lethality and survivability is a practice that should be the hallmark of our modern military.

    And I think the rapid pace and low casualties of the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) in their drive to Iraq can in part be attributed to their effective use of the latest combat command and control systems that allowed General Buford Blount to stay one step ahead of the threat.

    At the same time, that such a large number of systems you are simultaneously developing are immature, and our role as an oversight authority of this committee cannot help but watch anxiously for program delays and cost overruns that have been typical in the similar ambitious programs in the past.

    I strongly urge you to be very careful in not just keeping this program on track, but in properly communicating with this committee in setting expectations, because there is no one who will support you more than the man sitting behind me, I can assure you.
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    I am sure that there will be many critics along the way. That is to be expected. I hope that their insights will prove useful in refining your program and communicating your intentions.

    We owe it to your soldiers to provide the best equipment when we send them into harm's way, and we owe it to the taxpayers to develop that equipment as efficiently as possible.

    That being said, let me ask, and if I am not mistaken, the FCS system I think has been on the drawing board since 2000, I believe, unless I had that wrong.

    But given that the Army has begun, what I think is commonly accepted to be a very fundamental transformation and reorganization in the last year, will the future FCS program goals and objectives have to be adjusted to accommodate the new structure of the Army, which we feel assured is coming down the pike.


    General YAKOVAC. I think, in fact, it is better. I can better answer this question now than I could a year ago.

    As you know, when the Chief came in, he started having Army look at modular units. I am happy to say that the design of the armored modular unit, which the 3rd I.D. will go to this summer, reflects the movement toward an FCS unit of action in structure.
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    And so the Army looked at where it wanted to be, and then looked at modularity, and looked at what we thought the goodness of this design was out here. And in the design, not in functionality, have brought that forward.

    And so, now you have a direct path, in terms of structure, from the modular brigade to an FCS unit of action, to include functionality.

    The difference is in capability, because the technologies are not all here in that structure, but a very similar structure that takes you on the road to an FCS-equipped unit of action in terms of organization.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I think your Chief is right on board with that.

    I wore the Navy uniform for 24 years, but I can tell you, I am incredibly impressed with your new Chief. He talked to us the first time and somebody said, ''What are you going to do with the bad guys in Iraq?''

    And he said, ''We are going to find them and kill the bastards.'' I thought, ''I love this guy already.'' Wonderful guy, so I think some good things are going to happen.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.
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    We will now——

    General YAKOVAC. We back to the other question?

    Mr. WELDON. We will go back to the illustrious Mr. Abercrombie.

    General YAKOVAC. Okay.

    Mr. WELDON. And we will allow you to answer his question.

    General YAKOVAC. Let me think where I left off.

    First of all, if I haven't, I am going to go back and answer the doctrine TTP issue, which——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, I understand that.

    General YAKOVAC. The second piece I would like to take on is this whole idea of asymmetric warfareand the issue of survivability.

    In the asymmetric fight, what you don't want to rely on is what I would refer to as inherent survivability. That is how much armor plate you have, what in testing you know you can defeat, because there is nothing out there that we can defeat entirely at 360 degrees.
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    There is always something that will penetrate.

    The key in the asymmetric is information. You don't want to put yourself in the position where you are reacting and relying on your inherent armored capability. You don't want to go into that fight.

    So, if you look at the construct and some of the rapid-equip things we have done already in Iraq, it is based on information.

    For example, if I fly that route with a UAV with advanced sensors and with software that will detect change, I fly it, I fly it, and I look for changes.

    The key here is fusion of that information so that I don't have to have a man sit there for an hour or two and look for the change. Can I create software that will allow us to look at patterns and pick it up?

    So that convoy, if it is in fact tied information-wise, moving down that road that you talked about, and a change has occurred, rather than being reactive, we can be proactive in how we approach that danger point.

    And so, if you look at what we are doing in FCS, as an architecture, the key is information and networking, so that everybody can have access to it and then proactively take the proper TTP to negate what that asymmetric force has done.

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    You want to be able to do it at standoff, not when you are in the vicinity.

    So, again, it is this integration of sensors and network. That is not peculiar to FCS. What FCS does is take it to the next level in terms of networking.

    That does not mean that along the path to FCS that the integration of sensors and software, and better algorithms, in terms of those sensors, cannot be introduced into the current sensor fleet we have.

    That is probably one of the easier technology insertions that I can think of.

    And so, that asymmetric information, which greatly enhances inherent survivability, because unless I build a pillbox and make the walls X-thick, 360-degrees around, I could never guarantee you the protection that we want soldiers to have.

    So, it is that integration of inherent and information, and in some cases the technologies that if you are wrong, you still don't get into the close fight. You can stand off, you can use that information to negate that.

    And that is part of the path we are on, but it is not peculiar just to FCS. It is just that FCS carries some technology maturation with it that were there before we ever started FCS as a technology.

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    But we are wrapping our arms around and trying to mature it. If it matures, there is no reason why you can't insert it. The only thing that would stop you from inserting is what is the cost of that insertion.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate that and I thank you.

    And just by way of comment back or response, I notice that you are emphasizing the Future Combat System with the emphasis on combat.

    Asymmetrical to me also carries a very heavy doctrinal burden with respect to occupation, or post-combat operations.

    If you are an operational combat, which I think maybe we can address better for purposes of the committee now in the second panel, because I think you have an entirely different necessity to face.

    General YAKOVAC. Let me get one step further though, and part of that is, in fact, embedded in this full-spectrum force, this thought of asymmetric.

    Today, if I am a dismounted soldier away from my vehicle, I really have no connectivity probably other than voice or hand and arm signals, or maybe a radio.

    If I could make every soldier a node on the network throughout that battle space, I now have increased his survivability dramatically, because I have given him more information and the ability for somebody else to help him with his situational awareness.
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    And so, part of FCS and part of Land Warrior, which ends up moving into FCS, which we are going to introduce Land Warrior earlier into Stryker, but as it evolves, it will begin to give that soldier the same situational awareness in combat as he now has in the vehicle, off the vehicle, and a responsive way to react.

    So the same analogy applies. His inherent survivability is what he wears: his interceptor body armor, his vest.

    If I can get him away from having to use that through information, and everybody on the battle space has that, again, I begin to negate some of the strengths of an asymmetric force.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I agree with all of that, and I understand the theory of it, as well as how it would work if it worked.

    My problem is, is that I am a troglodyte, essentially, when it comes to technology. I believe that if it is possible not to work, it works very hard at not working.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished gentlemen.

    And would you explain to us what the symbolism is? People have asked me during the break in the hearing.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. This is an expression of deep love and affection for my constituents.
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    Mr. WELDON. All right. As long as it is not keeping love and affection from me, I am happy.

    Mr. Spratt is recognized.

    Mr. SPRATT. General Yakovac, I commend you for your boldness, but I have to say, I can't recall seeing in the 22 years I have sat here a system fraught with more risk. It is going to be a herculean task to bring it together on the ambitious schedule you have set for yourself.

    Did I understand the gentlemen, Mr. Francis from GAO to say that $92 billion will be needed, I guess current year nominal dollars, will be needed to outfit a third of your brigade combat teams to assist kind of——

    General YAKOVAC. Fifteen brigade equivalents, yes. And then year dollars.

    Mr. SPRATT. Is that the program requirement? Are you doing the whole Army, or just a third of your brigades?

    General YAKOVAC. Right now the program of record is what the GAO discussed.

    What will the Army look like in 2025, and a mix between current force and an FCS unit of action? I can't sit here and tell you that I know the answer to that question.
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    As we go forth and we balance, as was stated before, our resourcing requirements and an uncertain world, things will change that we have committed to 15 units of action, which are modular, so, if you compare that to what the chief would like to get to 48 units of action, however, they are not all of the same construct.

    So, where the Chief is taking us today is a bit different from a year ago. And I can't sit here and tell you that every unit of action, FCS-equipped, will replace every unit of action brigade as he now envisions modularity. But the program of record is 15.

    Mr. SPRATT. Each unit of action is about $9 billion procurement cost, plus some allocation of R&D?

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir. But that takes into account systems that people have referred to as complementary, that would be there even if we didn't have FCS.

    For example, precision munitions such as Excalibur, a precision munition for mortars. Those were there on the drawing board long before FCS and had fielding dates about when FCS was coming in. So, all we did was marry those up.

    And so, if you look at an FCS-equipped unit of action, that is where that number comes from. It is not just the 18 things we are developing under the FCS program of record, it is the other complementary pieces that were there.

    I can't think of one complementary system that we brought along as a result of FCS. They were there, and then we moved them in to fully integrate those capabilities into the FCS architecture.
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    Mr. SPRATT. Well, given the effectiveness to this system, its efficiency and effectiveness, efficacy on the battlefield, will there be savings? Will we be saving systems that you want? Will this give you greater lethality and greater maneuverability at less cost, eventually?

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SPRATT. Will it obviate the need for some——

    General YAKOVAC. Especially, and, again, I will put this in the context of less cost.

    My basic branch is infantry. When I came in as an infantryman, I was a chief instrument of war. I had recoilless rifles, 90-millimeter, 106s and I carried them on Humvees, 1–1–3s, et cetera.

    I look at the same lieutenant that I was, today, in a mechanized unit, and I have replaced recoilless rifles with Javelins, I have replaced 1–1–3s with Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

    And so, that desire to continue to improve the capability of our young men and women to fight and return home has driven us to now a tip of a spear that is what we are asking them to do, and what we want to provide them, is more expensive than the tip of the spear used to be.
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    Now, that being said, where you get the savings: as we continue to move down that spectrum of that tip in increased costs, we were designing individual programs with individual logistical tails, with individual components that were in a Bradley A3, a processor that is different in a tank, so, the supply chain that you have to have behind you is large.

    Through commonality across the design; through sharing of even sensor technologies in the future, you are getting at the biggest cost driver, and that is operational and support costs.

    The problem is that how do you garner that if out here? And I can't bring it forward, I wish I could, but we can't. And so, that is what we are after.

    Does it cost more? Is the unit production capability absolutely because of the technologies? Will it cost more over time? The contention is no, because we are taking advantage of technology and commonality, prognostics, diagnostics and information.

    So the same thing that you enjoy in your car today is have a very reliable system that is responsive and easy to maintain. So it is out here. It is not upfront, unfortunately.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Francis says if you have a one-year slip in schedule, which is not at all untypical for a DOD system, it could cost easily $4 to $5 billion more. Would you agree with that?

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    General YAKOVAC. No, sir.

    Right now, if you would look at the way this program is structured between now and 2008, we have taken into account the decisions that will allow us what we call off-ramps.

    So, if we have a capability that we want and we assess it, and either because of cost or schedule; we have a very close relationship with TRADOC, who is part of this team, to say, ''Look, we can give you this or we can give you this. Is this acceptable right now, because from the overall Army standpoint it is going to cost a lot more money?

    In fact, in the last year, we have already made some of those trades. We have made trades to look at not only performance, but affordability and integration, cost and meeting the timelines.

    And we are in the process of continuing to make those trades.

    For example, if you would look into the FCS unit of action, we have four unmanned aerial vehicles. In our acquisition strategy, we went out and requested from industry to be honest about what they could do in the timeline we laid out.

    We had quite a few bids on the high end of the class-four UAV, the largest UAV. The one that we chose, because we balanced cost, schedule and performance, is one that is already in production and we have now teamed with the Navy to bring that in together. I am now leveraging another service's costs, which I like to do.

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    But we are going to have a bird at the end that is common. And that was a conscious decision that we did as we went out and we looked for things to bring into this.

    So, if we could make and continue the discipline of making the right decision at the right time, we could negate that large requirement for increased resources.

    Now, will I argue with you that history has proven me wrong? Absolutely.

    But if we know that is what we have to do in this constrained environment, and my leadership is in concert with that, we have definite decisions to make in the next year that will influence the cost and schedule of this program and performance.

    And I believe the Army is willing to make the tough choice, because we understand the resource constraints we have.

    Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you this: is the lead system integrator reliable to the Army, to the Department of Defense for timely performance for scheduled specs, with respect to all of the subcontractors or all of the component manufacturers?

    General YAKOVAC. Absolutely. We brought in a lead systems integrator because of the complexity of this program.

    And the contract for the development phase is through them, working with us, a much different construct than anything that we have ever put together before. It is not a cookie cutter lead systems integrator approach.
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    But to answer your question specifically, ''Yes.'' It flows down that requirement to deliver us, not a piece part but an effective unit FCS-equipped unit of action. That piece, which is FCS——

    Mr. SPRATT. The question I am asking is, if there is a slippage of, say, a year or two years, and if there is an identifiable cost of $1 billion or $2 billion, is the lead system integrator responsible for that additional cost?

    General YAKOVAC. No. And let me tell you why.

    Historically, most of the times, we have a program of record that says we share the risk in determining those requirements that we want to meet. We also share the risk of laying out the timeline. We do that. Then we go to industry and we partner with them. It says ''Based on these constraints, work with us.'' If they had the ability and they have influenced our design time-for example, last year, when we collectively looked at the schedule, we stretched it.

    Because with our partners, we sat down and we said, ''We can't do it.'' And they said, ''You are right; we can.''

    Now, if they weren't part of this, they could have said, ''Yes, we could do it.'' Because they know they don't have to pay. But I believe in this case, they are very, very conscious off what the army has at stake.

    They are very conscious of what we are doing today as we fight the war, but we can't afford to do something that would allow that to happen.
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    So, to answer your question, ''No. I don't know how to do that, because so many factors they don't control'' as we go into this. But in those areas where they do, and they are committed to us, as a team, to help us make the right decision.

    Because they know that if this goes away, we don't have any other major modernization program. And as a representative of all of the industries that were brought together, I think we have now the timing and the commitment to try to do things right.

    Now, tall order, a lot of things have to happen, but knowing that, I think that is how you get around that, to answer your question.

    Mr. SPRATT. One final request; my time is way past out.

    Could you submit for the record the Army plan for program management metrics that you referred to in your testimony?

    General YAKOVAC. Absolutely.

    Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank the gentlemen.

    Dr. Gingrey is recognized.

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    Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Gentlemen, Mr. Francis, General Yakovac, thank you.

    Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to come and speak about this important issue, and, of course, thank you for your service.

    General Yakovac, I am particularly interested in how the implementation of the Future Combat System over time will change the way that the Army trains and equips its soldiers, and I am thinking particularly of the infantry.

    And I represent Fort Benning down in Columbus, Georgia, and if you could just elaborate on how the Army will generally have to adapt their training to implement this program, I would appreciate it.

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir. One of the things that we have done over the years, a good analogy when I was a lieutenant: I would go out to a range and everything I did was live. I mean, I fired a weapon. I had to do it.

    The one big change is, over the years, we have begun to adapt to other ways to train, using simulations, using the integration of modeling and simulation with real.

    The FCS is the next logical extension of that training philosophy. To get back to the issue of the cost to the Army: live training is expensive. If you have to shoot a lot of live bullets to maintain your proficiency, if you have to go out and do large maneuvers, it is expensive.
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    Part of the FCS construct is a focus on training differently and growing leaders with a more of a blend of live and this idea of simulation and virtual.

    For example, embedded in each combat system, which is not today's way of doing business, are all the tools you need to become a proficient gunner.

    Today, we have an off-board device called the conduct-of-trainer (COFT) for Abrams and Bradley. You have to go somewhere; it costs about $1 million apiece, maintained under contract, for you to maintain your proficiency while you are not in the vehicle or out training with it.

    And this is followed up by an extensive period of live gunnery.

    You can never get away from live gunnery, because you need to do that, to feel the jolt that you get in the recoil and all the other things that happens inside the combat system. But you can maintain proficiency in the concept of FCS by just going and taking your own crew.

    If you are a sergeant, take your crew with you, go down to the motor pool, turn on the vehicle, and go into the training mode.

    The training mode will put you in a virtual environment, as if you were out there somewhere, with a panoramic view coming in. You can actually learn how to fight your system and never leave the motor pool.
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    And so if you can shrink that training time and that proficiency, that allows more time for soldiers and their families. It allows them for more schooling. It really changes the way you do business.

    And so embedded in this is that concept of being able to train individually through collective tasks by the construct of that. The next level up would be: I am a platoon leader, I am a company commander. I want my folks to come together and learn how to command and control.

    I will go down to the motor pool, go to the training mode, turn on the network. The network will be robust enough for them to train as if they were really at the NTC. But they will be in their own motor pool.

    So, that is the next logical extension of what we have started today. We have some of that today, but it is normally in a fixed facility. It is not in the system of record.

    And that will greatly enhance the training. Also, the interface between the dismounted infantryman and the vehicle: the same thing. If I want to tether that person via Land Warrior and information, I can do the same thing with that.

    For example, rather than going out to a range with software, I can give a soldier a sight and the software can bring up a picture that makes it appear as if it is really on the ground. And I can begin to see targets and train them on things before I ever go out and fire a real bullet, which costs money.
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    So, it is that revolution in training that is inherent in this networking and in this basic design of all the systems that we are after. But it is just the next evolution, it is not revolution. We had that today in stand-alone trainers, and what it allows us today is the processing power we could put inside of a vehicle, which we couldn't do before.

    So I hope that answers your question.

    Dr. GINGREY. General, that is an excellent explanation. It does answer my question.

    I thought I heard maybe, Mr. Francis, you may have said earlier, or someone, that this wasn't an evolutionary change, it was a revolutionary change. Did I hear one of the witnesses say that?

    Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, I said that. Yes, and I was referring to the totality.

    That is, to meet the combat requirement, that is, to have the Future Combat System perform the full spectrum of activities, say, from peacekeeping to all the way up to duking it out with armed vehicles. That takes in total a revolutionary advance in capabilities.

    Dr. GINGREY. So there is no disagreement between the two of you on that. Thank you.

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    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentlemen.

    The gentlemen, Mr. Akin, is recognized.

    Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Start with a couple of questions here.

    First of all, given the advances in technology which lead to designing and acquiring increasingly complex weapons systems, program managements become very challenging.

    Is that the reason the decision was made to go with an innovative means of meeting the management challenge for your Future Combat Systems program that you chose to select a lead systems integrator for the program instead of remaining with the traditional Defense Department method or management process?

    General YAKOVAC. The answer to your question, simply, is yes. I have been in this business now, when the Army chose me to go to it from infantry, for about 13 years. I have managed the Abrams, Bradley, and I was the manager of record of Stryker.

    Dealing with Abrams and Bradley in retrospect as I went to Stryker was relatively easy. I had a set platform, I had a set piece of requirements that was focused on, A, capability.

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    Going to Stryker, excuse me, increased the complexity of integration across the entire battle space.

    And so in order to do that effectively, in Stryker, because of the fact that those were already components that we had, by and large, then I can go out to sister PMs and PEOs and say, ''I need you to be part of my team to integrate this item onto this new vehicle.''

    The integration was relatively simple. We merely took the network of record and put it into the vehicle: relatively simple integration.

    What FCS requires is a different level of complexity.

    And since the acquisition community on the government side has always been focused on the piece parts, in order to handle that complexity effectively and help us do a better job at the system of systems level, and to control that was the reason why we brought in as a partner in this development the lead systems integrator.

    And so it is that blend of the technical expertise that we still have in the piece parts and the integration of complex weapons, of complex systems that we desire to get from industry where we went out and competed for a lead systems integrator.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I assume what you are saying, if I were to say could you offer an opinion on the decision or are you satisfied with the lead systems integrator process, you would say not only are you satisfied, but you are saying it is probably the only way to go with the level of complexity we are talking about.
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    General YAKOVAC. To be honest with you, when I was told I would be the manager of this program if I took this job, the first thing I asked, because I would never been involved, what is a lead systems integrator.

    So I immediately went to Houston, Texas, talked to the Space Shuttle people. I went to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and talked to them and tried to get some understanding of what a lead systems integrator really would do.

    And now as I look back on that decision, I believe we would not be where we are today nor do I believe we could get to where we need to go without that proper relationship. And that is what it has to be. They cannot be lead in the sense of taking this program where they want to take it. We have to control the reins, and they have to help us get there.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right. Would you recommend any changes to the way—is that balance working properly now? Would you recommend any changes to where we are or do you think we have things balanced out pretty well?

    General YAKOVAC. Right now, after a year, and I make a quarterly visit to the review with the government and industry, I am satisfied that we are still on track of us being in charge and holding the reins and them helping us get to where we need to go.

    But you have got to continue to make sure that that is the balance that you have. And today, yes, I am satisfied. I would not recommend to my leadership any changes at this time, as we continue to evolve how an LSI does things.
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    Now, that being said, at the beginning in my prepared remarks, we got together as a team and we laid out tenets that we said in our relationship we wouldn't violate. And so we continually go back to those when we meet and say, ''Are we still okay with those?'' And those really guide that relationship, because we felt that we had to have a baseline to start to and to compare to as we went along.

    If we begin to violate where we have to answer, ''What is the right tenet under number 2,'' are we going in a direction we don't want to go?

    So those are the things that hold us together right now is those tenets.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you put a structure together to help define that relationship and how that all is going to work.

    General YAKOVAC. Absolutely. Job one at the beginning was not the relationship, it was to find some basis for it.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, it would seem to me that, at least—I used to sell for IBM a long time ago, and sometimes when you are dealing with a lot of science and you are trying to explain it to sort of average kinds of people that make decisions, you have got to kind of make that jump.

    Would, in this case—is there a potential tension or problem with the fact that you are looking in a very visionary sense at what something is going to look like. And it seems, I would imagine to you, fairly tangible how it is going to work. But to somebody else it may be—boy, it is hard to get the concept, even.
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    Does that make it then a threat that people are going to come and try and take money away from it and undermine it just because they don't understand it? Is that a kind of a constant thing that you have to pay attention to?

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because, I mean, if you de-fund it, then that is going to hurt the schedule, isn't it?

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir. My contention is that the best way we could keep this program of record going is for information exchange.

    Any time and anywhere, I am more than willing to come over and dialogue with anybody. And I think the members of your staffs know me well enough that I have don't that. Because this is so different and it is challenging that you can get, like you said, enamored with the technologies and then not understanding the management process by which we are trying to manage the risk. And I admit—and I did in my statement—there is risk. But I think we have identified it. We have identified off-ramps.

    The key here is to be true to what your plan is. We historically have not kept to the plan. We have got to a decision point and said, ''Well, look, a little bit more money and we will get there.

    We can't afford to do that in this program. If we get there, we have got to make the choice. We take the off-ramp or we stick with it. And then we stick with the consequences, because in most case, the issue will be cost. And as was stated in the chairman's opening remarks, this program cannot afford to pull any more resources away from other missions that the Army has to perform.
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    And so it is that discipline in the process, and information sharing that people have access to in the way that we have presented even the program. This is the first program I know of record, and when we offered it, I was told by a lot of people, ''Don't do it.'' Where people on the staffs, on your staffs, have full access to our earned value management.

    We will train them, we will give them access to it, and they can come and report to you on a day-by-day basis, if that is what they want to do, how this program is doing in terms of cost, schedule and performance.

    Now, the downside of that is, for somebody who may not know exactly what that means, I can be answering, or the folks who with me, a lot of e-mails about, wait a minute, this just went south. Well, no, it didn't. We are okay. Let me tell you about it.

    But the idea of information exchange was much more important than keeping something back. And I think that is the key to this.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. My time is getting a little short, but very interesting what you are saying.

    It seems like one of the things is going to really help produce a level of comfort with the program is if there is some fairly clearly defined, fairly tangible kinds of objectives, and you see those things starting to be met and people actually can see it and hold it and feel it, it seems like that is going to make a big difference to us.

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    Is your schedule set up to do some of those things so people can actually start to see pieces coming together?

    General YAKOVAC. Yes, sir. About a year ago when we went in, we said the big thing that has to happen this year for this program to keep on schedule is for us to do trade analysis and come up with what would be acceptable to the user as the appropriate material solution to a requirement.

    For example, when you look at the infantry carrier, which is part of this system, when we went into it there was debate based on how this was going to fight what size weapon mounted on that vehicle would be acceptable. We had various options. We had options of what is available today. We had options of putting more money into it, both the weapons system and the munition.

    We are now going through that trade. We are necking down now to a solution that is probably the best in terms of not technical, but meeting the requirements of performance by going to a cannon that the Marines already have and developed.

    And so if we continue to make informed choices and we continue to balance cost, schedule and performance, then we can continue to be successful.

    Is it easy to do? No. But that is the key to this. And that is the example, what you just asked.

    We are making those decisions. We have a review coming up where we are going to bundle some of those and make some of those big decisions that will no doubt make, ''Meet the Press.'' And people want to know, why did you pick this caliber of cannon, or why did you do that? What is going to be the balance of cost, schedule and performance? And we are doing that today.
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    And I think as we make those decisions, and people see that we are not going for the far-out technical solution, they might say, ''Hey, maybe they are going to make some good decisions about reducing risk.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And just one last quick question. When you started overall looking at future combat systems, did you have still some basic parameters of what sort of war fighting environment that you had to be able to deal with?

    In other words, did you have some very broad parameters a modern army is going to have to deal with this, this and this? And so are you working toward a set of very specific kinds of things in that way?

    General YAKOVAC. Absolutely. Before we ever had a program, the work, then it was tradeoffs, was to find those parameters. What would we need to do in the future? What type of army would we need? And what capabilities would allow that army to win and fight on that future battlefield?

    So before you ever see a program, that work is already done. And it is vetted and it is discussed. We get the INTEL folks to come in and try to project out, and that is always kind of fun, because everybody has a different vision of the future. And then you agree on what it is.

    And then you bring the war fighters, the guys who get paid to do that, not the acquisition developer, to sit down and say, based on that scenario and what we know today, here is the capability, the capabilities we think we need, not defined as specific technologies——
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right.

    General YAKOVAC [continuing]. But in terms of capabilities. And then that is when we come in.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right.

    General YAKOVAC. We come in—say, based on what you want. Now, let us come back and give you the technical solutions to those capabilities that you have now outlaid, also based on how you intend to fight.

    It doesn't do you any good to have the capability if you don't fight it that way. And so it is that entire process of doctrine that evolves out of TRADOC. It gets us then the materiel guy to come in and say, ''Now that we know what that is and how you want to do it, let's partner with you to bring that to reality.''

    And that is how this program started. It didn't start with the materiel, it started with what you are talking about, as a vision of how we want to fight and where we want to be.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is really encouraging. Thank you very much, General.

    General YAKOVAC. Okay.
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentlemen. I thank you both. We have a number of other questions that I would want to ask of you, but because of time and our second panel, we want to get to the other witnesses.

    But before I do just let me commend you both. Your passion, your sincerity, your intelligence is obvious, and your approach to this problem we have in terms of funding adequate resources to meet the needs that you have identified.

    Again I will repeat: All of us want to help the Army move to this new posture. And, General, you have done a more than commendable job in laying out the case and showing the vision. But the problem exists above you. And I am going to tweak some people above you right now, both within the Army and within DOD.

    If you look at all the services and their increased funding for next year, the Army is lagging way behind the caboose. The Air Force is getting a 12 percent increase in funding. The Navy is getting an increase. Even the Marine Corps is getting a slight increase.

    The Army's total modernization is a six percent decrease. That is outrageous. It is outrageous when the OP TEMPO rate and all the grunt work being done over in Iraq and Afghanistan, probably 80 or 90 percent of it is being done by Army personnel.

    And we are using up all this equipment and causing equipment to be destroyed and having to modernize it. And here is the Army trying to meet that need and then being asked to modernize for this transformation into the future, and you can't do it. And so because the bosses up that push the pencils in the Pentagon don't want to make tough decisions, they push it on us.
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    We have got a net decrease of six percent for the Army's modernization for next year. And it is going to be extremely difficult to meet the needs that you have to allow you to do what you are doing and still meets the needs of the next panel, which are going to be the immediate needs that the Army has today.

    And that is unfair. In fact, I would say it is almost immoral that our soldiers on the battlefield and their overseers are being faced with this kind of a situation.

    And I would send a signal to the brass and the Joint Chiefs, and I would send a signal to the secretaries and Secretary Rumsfeld himself: Get your act together. I mean, the Army is being decreased by six percent, and yet it is being asked to carry the bulk of the work. That is just not fair, it is not logical, and it doesn't work.

    So I will say what you can't say, and I will keep saying it over and over again, because that causes us to be in the problem that we are in right now.

    Thank you both for your excellent testimony and your work.

    We will now ask our second panel to come forward.

    Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, sir.

    Mr. WELDON. Welcome.

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    General HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General GRIFFIN. Good morning, sir.

    Mr. WELDON. General Griffin and General Hanlon, we are pleased to have you both here. And I am glad you brought along some visuals. Being an old teacher, I think the best way to tell a story is to show some visuals.

    So we have some great examples, and I hope you blend them into your statements today. Your statements are accepted as a part of the record.

    You have heard from our first panel, and you know the challenge we have. Now you are going to give us a greater challenge, and that is the needs that we have to modernize the existing force structure. And we want you to be as candid as possible, because we have got to marry these two together with an unacceptable level of dollars that are being pulled at the request of the Secretary's office.

    So, General Griffin, please proceed with your opening remarks. Both of your statements have been entered in the record.


    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, along with my friend, Lieutenant General Ed Hanlon.
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    We take pride in our close relationship with the Marine Corps, both peace time and war time, and it is appropriate that we appear together to address your questions and share with you what we have accomplished and where we are going. We are an army at war, a military at war, serving a Nation at war. Our number one priority is to the war fight, and this emphasis is reflected in everything we do.

    Requirements from the theater are resourced first, particularly force protection needs. At the same time, we are continuing to carefully balance current readiness with a need to invest in the future to ensure that your Army will remain relevant and ready for future requirements.

    In the last six months, I have had the opportunity to visit our units in both Iraq and Afghanistan, most recently in February, to look specifically at where we need to increase and sustain support to Army soldiers and units.

    In addition to these periodic visits, we have established a number of forward liaison elements in theater to facilitate information exchange and to help solve problems. We have dedicated officers stationed in theater at the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait, and the Combined Joint Task Force–7 headquarters in Baghdad.

    And we have a liaison officer en route to Afghanistan this month. We also have liaisons with eight of the Army's ten divisions and all of the Stryker Brigades—all there to identify problem areas and help us expedite fixes.

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    With respect to the reserve components, we have people with the CONUS, who also provide us continuous feedback as we work with the enhanced brigades, National Guard divisions and Army reserve units.

    Let me express the Army's appreciation for the outstanding support that your committee and staff have provided in supporting programs to protect our soldiers, including the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), the Army's Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) to better equip our soldiers—and so we do have our handout, which lists exactly what is included in the Rapid Fielding Initiative, and I can address those if you like—and also armor protection for our vehicles.

    These enhancements are saving soldiers' lives, and your support has helped greatly.

    There are some items I would like to mention quickly that I know are of particular interest to this committee. First, Army modernization and transformation. We have heard concerns expressed that the Army is delaying substantial modernization of the force until the introduction of the Future Combat System. This is not the case.

    For example, during the program period, the Army intends to invest $2 billion in unmanned aerial vehicles in both current and future UAV programs. I can address that in more detail in the question-and-answer, sir, if you would like.

    We have fully funded six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). The first, as you know, is doing a great job in Iraq today. Two hundred eighty-four Block 3 Apache 864 helicopters, the UH–60M helicopter upgrade, the development and procurement of the aerial common sensor, which will occur in 2008, and Blue Force Tracking, a capability to Army forces.
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    Termination of the Comanche program has allowed us to fix our identified shortfalls in Army aviation. We have a $5.4 billion strategy to modernize our truck fleet, and we have a group looking currently with respect to the 611 POM, how better to transform our truck fleet across the board.

    That 5.4 is what we have currently in the program. The Comanche termination generates $14.6 billion that we can reallocate to aviation.

    And we also have a plan to field the Army Battle Command System to select units in both the active and reserve components over the next two years.

    General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, has established 17 immediate focus areas to channel on the efforts to win the Global War on Terrorism and increase the relevance and readiness of the Army. One of these focused areas is modularity.

    I cannot stress enough the importance of the Army's modularity initiative. If we are to remain a relevant and ready force, the Army must modulize. This brigade-based plan will allow us to be more responsive and better enables us to be joint and expeditionary in nature. It also allows the Army to meet the needs of the strategic environment now and into the future.

    We are making great strides to meet this crucial requirement through shifting existing equipment assets to the fullest extent possible, but we anticipate that the procurement of equipment and vehicles will be critical to meet our desired end state for both the active, the National Guard and the Army reserve.
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    Sir, I know you are also concerned about the Army's ability to maintain its readiness in key areas like ground combat vehicles, aviation and trucks. We continue to experience battle losses of equipment, and the pace in the environment of Iraq and Afghanistan are taking a heavy toll on Army equipment.

    Whenever possible, we are making repairs in theater, and have established multiple maintenance sites in the region for this purpose. We are making great use of depots, and in fiscal year 2004 the Army received $1.2 billion toward our needs for depot maintenance.

    We are making smart decisions on the timing and extent of maintenance to be performed that takes into consideration the rotation of deploying forces, modernization in plans and modularity initiatives.

    We have an aggressive recapitalization program that takes systems to zero hours and zero miles. This recap program includes 16 funded systems, and is currently programmed for $11.6 billion over the program, and when complete will have recapitalized the equipment of 2–1/3 divisions worth of equipment.

    In the May time frame, the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense will conduct mid-year reviews to analyze fiscal year 2004 expenditures. These mid-year reviews are ongoing at this time. We expect the results of these mid-year reviews to be complete probably in the May time frame. After this review is complete, the Department of the Army will have a better idea what it will be able to accomplish in the areas of modularity, reset and other programs this year.
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    I have spoken about what we are doing for the current force, but I do not want to diminish the need to balance risk between the current and the future force. We must ensure that today's soldiers have everything they need, but we must also remember that the Future Combat System is the centerpiece of the Army's future. The FCS program budget for fiscal year 2005 is $3.2 billion, and over the period of 2005 through 2009 is programmed for $22 billion.

    Our great Army in the field today was the future force a decade ago. We must maintain this careful balance between the current force and the future force, and we must continue ways to spiral future force technologies into the current force whenever possible.

    Two examples—UAV and the network. Much work has been done here and in theater to provide support to our soldiers, but much work remains.

    When asked what my number one focus and concern is, it is getting protection to our soldiers serving in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    I am extremely honored to be here, and await your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Griffin can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, General. I appreciate your comments. Are you finished? Okay. Thank you.

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    General Hanlon.


    General HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today with General Griffin.

    And, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to mention to you that I have brought with me a couple of the general officers that I work with. One of them is Brigadier General Tom Waldhauser, who commands our war fighting lab, who was also one of our combat commanders in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom last year. And also our Marine Corps Systems Command Commander, Brigadier General Bill Catto, who had the laboratory before this assignment.

    And these two gentlemen, I would say, work with me daily—that wouldn't be fair, it is probably hourly—on the issues that we face in making sure that our Marine Corps is ready to fight.

    Let me start my comments today, Mr. Chairman, with force protection. For many years now the Marine Corps has recognized force protection as one of the six battle space functions that we address in the development of any war fighting capability. This function covers a wide range of both active and passive measures undertaken to improve the security of our forces.

    A year ago, during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we saw the success of many of our force protection measures, such as improved body armor, which is credited with saving Marine lives and with reducing the severity of injuries to others.
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    Another success story is the capability which Ben referred to a few minutes ago called Blue Force Tracker. Marine and Army forces in Iraq last year demonstrated this joint capability which enabled them to maintain increased situational awareness regarding the position of U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground units.

    This was, sir, a superb tool, not only for its value as a force protection asset that aided in preventing fratricide, but also is a means of simply coordinating complex ground operations.

    The Marine forces that recently deployed to Iraq to participate in coalition security and stability operations have not only retained these capabilities, but will also benefit from some additional force protection measures that we have undertaken. One of the primary thrust to coalition forces in Iraq is that posed by the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices in roadside bombing attacks and convoy ambushes, which we see every day in the newspaper.

    Recognizing that Marines would confront this threat, we initiated a vehicle hardening program like the Army did that has provided a degree of armored protection for approximately 3,000 of our thin-skinned vehicles, such as our Humvees and our heavy trucks.

    We accomplished this through the addition of armor plating to our vehicle doors, the installation of armor kits and the use of ballistic blankets to provide an additional layer of protection from fragmentation.

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    We also recognize the need to address vehicle hardening considerations for the long term. This is a broader issue for the Marine Corps. At present, we are evaluating alternatives for a permanent solution to this challenge with regard to our current fleet of vehicles.

    Mr. Chairman, you will also notice that I have included in my prepared statement a review of certain force protection measures that are underway at our bases and our stations around the nation. We recognize that our supporting establishment provides the critical infrastructure that supports and sustains the forces as we deploy overseas to the global war on terrorism.

    And we have a number of initiatives in progress to enhance the protection of our infrastructure. These include bottom-up vulnerability assessments, as well as the implementation of specific measures to provide protection against unconventional threats such as chemical, biological and radiological attacks. Many of these are, indeed, joint programs. And you have my assurance that the Marine Corps is an eager and enthusiastic participant.

    Mr. Chairman, I would now like to address the Marine Corps' equipment initiatives that grew out of the Army's lessons learned of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Naturally, your Marine Corps and Army have been working closely at all levels to exchange information regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    We have several forums in place to share these lessons. There is an Army-Marine Corps board which both Ben and I sit on, which meets frequently at the senior flag officer level for the sharing of information with regard to Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as for the coordination of efforts to better prepare both the Army and Marine forces scheduled to deploy into Iraq.
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    We also hold a series of Army and Marine Corps war fighting conferences, which are conducted at the one-and two-star level, followed by sessions involved in the senior leadership of both services. In fact, Mr. Chairman, last week I hosted a one-and two-star Army-Marine Corps war fighting conference at my headquarters at Quantico.

    At these conferences, we address both near-term issues such as lessons learned in ongoing operations, as well as future plans for transformation of both services.

    In addition to these established venues, you will find the Army and Marine Corps cooperate regularly on an informal basis. For example, the officer-in-charge of the Army's Rapid Equipment Force (REF) briefed me personally on the Army's program for quickly identifying needs and developing solutions. We have learned a lot from the Army.

    We have a similar process, the Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, which we have used to rapidly respond to Army and Marine Corps lessons learned, and urgent priorities of our deployed forces.

    As a result, we have initiated a number of equipment-related actions to improve the readiness of our forces, one example being the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, before deploying to Afghanistan last fall. They received specialized equipment designed specifically to improve its ability to fight in mountain and cold weather environments.

    Further, much of what the Marine Corps learned about protecting the force from the hazards of IEDs, we learned from our brothers in the Army. In fact, we have established a special counter-IED working group that coordinates very closely with the Army and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to mitigate this threat.
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    We are also providing our Marines with new tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as the training to make them work to full advantage. Again, the Army has been a great resource for us in this area.

    Let me conclude by reiterating my thanks to the subcommittee for the opportunity to share with you the Marine Corps story.

    Mr. Chairman, earlier today in your opening comments, you told the story of Lieutenant Bernstein, who I think was one of your constituents, and it was a very compelling story, albeit a sad one.

    I have over in Iraq right now the Marine Corps Lessons Learned team which reports directly to me—60 officers led by a colonel. Their job is to report daily back to me on things they are learning, not only from the Marine Corps experience—we have been there now basically in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) for about 2 weeks—but from the Army as well.

    As you know, we have a number of Marines who have already been wounded, who have now already started to come back to Bethesda. I have had my lessons learned team go up and talk to each and every one of those Marines. I did it myself yesterday.

    And when you were telling your story earlier today, I will tell you, there were four of those Marines in ICU yesterday. Three of them could talk to me, one of them could not.

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    And so I want you to understand, we are taking this very, very seriously, sir, in terms of how we take care of those Marines, so that we have fewer and fewer of those casualties coming through Bethesda.

    One of the things I did—and you saw this earlier—is I have asked one of our young officers here, Captain Pat Dienhart. Patricia is a combat engineer of 1302. She works at our Marine Corps Systems Command.

    She is also a combat veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, she worked for then Colonel Waldhauser. I have asked her just for a second to stand up to show you some of the latest gear that we are looking at in terms to protect and equip our Marines over in Iraq.

    Would you, please, Captain?

    [The prepared statement of General Hanlon can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Captain DIENHART. What I have here is an M16 A4, which is the new and improved version of the M16, and also it has the new advanced combat optical guide, also known as the ACOG.

    It has a LED-laser that when you look through the lens, which magnifies at 4.5 times what you normally see, you can actually put a red dot on a target, and then you can essentially shoot the target.

    Also, right here, I have this button right here, which is for this, which is the personal road radio, also known as the intra-squad radio. This has a range of 500 meters on open terrain or also 3 to 4 stories in a building for urban terrain. It's per squad so that we can talk amongst each other. I also have a tactical handheld radio right here in my pocket, which is for speaking to helicopters or higher headquarters, such as the company or battalion level.
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    I also have right here, sir, is a phrasealator, which is a new piece of equipment that they use in Iraq, and you basically can talk into this phrasealator. You take a certain language—Iraqi, Farsi, whatever has been loaded into this, and it says the phrase in that language, so you can see, if you want to say, ''drop your weapon,'' and it will say in Iraqi, ''drop your weapon.''

    You can also enter phrases into this via a translator if there are certain phrases that are not loaded onto this.

    Yes, sir. I can pass this around later on, sir, but there is a speaker in it.

    If I dropped my weapon, sir?

    Mr. WELDON. We want you to do the ultimate challenge. Take——

    Captain DIENHART. Drop your weapon. That is not even at maximum volume.

    Mr. WELDON. We want you to do the ultimate. Take that device back to OSD and speak into it, ''Give the Army more money.'' [Laughter.]

    Mr. WELDON. And see if you can translate that into language that the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs can understand. Can you do that?
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    Captain DIENHART. I will try, sir.

    This back here is the new lightweight goggles which has a double-point strap, which is much better than the old goggles, which tended to shake around on your head quite a bit.

    I also have ballistic goggles, which are for fragmentation up to 650 feet per second, so it's great for any kind of fragment.

    What I am also wearing here is a new auto-tactical vest. It also has nine-millimeter protection on the sides, over the shoulder and also here on the side. And inside this vest I have new small arms protection insert, also known as a SAPI plate. And the one I have here was actually used on the range. It is good against 7.62-millimeter rounds, which is actually is much more. This is 5.56. So 7.62 is what this was shot with at point-blank range, and as you can see it put three holes into the plate first, and there is only welts on the back. So it is a very effective piece of gear.

    And then I am also wearing the new digital camouflage, sir. Captain Taliotta has the unmanned aerial vehicle, sir. This is used for aerial reconnaissance at the battalion level. There is one camera right here on the head and also a camera at the bottom. There are two different ones. One is for daytime use, and one is for nighttime use with infrared. It lasts about an hour. They can send it out and you can see the small—I don't know if you can see that, sort of small right here. And there is basically a rubber band that attaches to it and you sling up in the air.
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    Once this reaches 25 miles an hour, it senses it, it takes it in and then it—the battery life is good for an hour, and it is a rechargeable battery. It has automatic report detection so that if it loses the radio waves from the ground control station, it automatically comes right back to its—it has a homing device there.

    And it breaks apart into five pieces. This nose comes right off. The wings come off, the tail, and it fits into this small bag.

    Each system comes with three of these little air tracks and one track, in case they break you have a backup.

    Mr. WELDON. It is a great UAV. We had a hearing on it a while ago, and I have seen the technology. I don't think you have the capability there for that UAV to track your unit if you are going down the road. You don't have the software to do that, do you? That won't follow you, if you are——

    Captain DIENHART. You can set grid coordinates into the UAV, sir——

    Mr. WELDON. Right.

    Captain DIENHART [continuing]. And it goes to where you want that grid coordinate. So you actually—you need to monitor the screen and tell it what to do.

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    Mr. WELDON. Right.

    Captain DIENHART. You can override the grid coordinates capability as long as you say, ''Turn left, turn right——

    Mr. WELDON. There are systems now in UAVs about that size that is being fielded, actually, by the Marine Corps, I believe.

    General HANLON. Silver Fox, sir.

    Mr. WELDON. Silver Fox—that actually has the AIM software——

    General HANLON. Yes, sir.

    Mr. WELDON [continuing]. Developed out West, that actually stays around the unit as they are going down the road, or whatever it is. So it is a constant—so you are doing great work.

    How much weight are you carrying in that outfit?

    Captain DIENHART. Each of these plates are four pounds, and the actual vest is seven pounds. When you have both plates in, it is 15 pounds.

    And what I have right here is a cutout from—and I can bring this back there, as well, sir—it is from a SAPI plate that has a 7.62 rounds in it. And as you can see, it blocked about two-thirds of the way in. So it was effective.
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    Mr. WELDON. What don't you have on there that you need?

    Captain DIENHART. Right now——

    Mr. WELDON. I mean, you have been out in the field. What don't you have that we should be getting for you? If you had no question on dollars, what else would you want? Do you feel like you are——

    Captain DIENHART. Yes, sir. I didn't have any of this newer gear in Afghanistan. And in Iraq we had these with the SAPI plates, and it gives you tremendous amount of confidence, and the Marines a tremendous amount of confidence to have to go out there in the crowds and——

    Mr. WELDON. The only thing I would want, beyond what you have is an undergarment that you would wear that would give you not just GPS locational information, vertically and horizontally where you are, but also would transmit your vital signs back, so your commanding officer at any given time would know how well you are doing, how you are breathing, your pulse, as well as where you are located. We have that technology——

    General HANLON. Yes.

    Mr. WELDON [continuing]. But we have not yet put in the system. But it sounds to me like you seem like you have got pretty much everything you need.

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    And you have—go ahead, do you have a question or a comment?

    Mr. SCHROCK. How much protection is there on the shoulders and the arms? It doesn't look——

    Captain DIENHART. It's nine-millimeter, so——

    Mr. SCHROCK. All right.

    Captain DIENHART. It's nine millimeter point-blank range, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. All right.

    Captain DIENHART. So——

    Mr. SCHROCK. Point-blank range, Okay.

    Captain DIENHART. Yes, sir. But I mean, I know a story from a Marine, for example, that had a very, very thick notebook in the front here that he was shot at a longer distance, and that notebook stopped it. That is point-blank range protection.

    Mr. SCHROCK. But that is critical for protecting——

    Mr. WELDON. So it won't go into your chest cavity or anything. Yes.
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    Mr. SCHROCK. So that's a good idea.

    Captain DIENHART. Stopped it right here. And then also the shoulders.

    Mr. WELDON. When we took our trip over to Iraq and Afghanistan, we stopped on the way back at Ramstein and went to Landstuhl and talked to the soldiers there. And one of the soldiers had had significant shrapnel wounds, but they were only on the outer extremities. Totally protected in the chest area and the upper arms because of the capability we have.

    So we are doing a good job, and we applaud you for that. And we appreciate you coming in.

    General HANLON. Thank you, Patricia.

    Mr. Chairman, you know, she was mentioning the ballistic goggles. And I was telling you in my travels up to Bethesda, in talking to each of the young Marines up there, most of the ones who were there—in fact, all of them had been hit by IED shrapnel of one sort or another. Most of the injuries were either in the legs, below the armor, or in and around the face.

    And so one of the things I have asked my guys to look at is what can we do—almost like, if you think about what race car drivers wear, you know, the complete 360 degree helmet kind of thing. Of course, that gets very hot in Iraq in the summertime. But, I mean, looking at these kinds of things that we might be able to use to be able to give better protection to the neck, the throat and particularly to the eyes. And so these are some of the things that our team is going to be looking at.
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    And, Mr. Chairman, that ends my statement. Thank you.

    Mr. WELDON. Oh, that was fantastic. I think you ought to get the Captain and go around to all the offices. She is your best—she did a fantastic job—your best salesperson, I think.

    So thank you, Captain. Great job.

    General HANLON. And she is indicative, sir, of the fine soldiers and marines we have over there.

    Mr. WELDON. Where are you from, Captain?

    Captain DIENHART. I am from upstate New York, sir.

    Mr. WELDON. Upstate New York, great.

    Well, it is good to have you here. Thank you for your great work.

    And we thank our commanding officers for being here for the great work in developing this breakthrough technology.

    I will go to Mr. Cooper first, and then I will save my questions for the end.
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    Mr. Cooper.

    Mr. COOPER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I was very impressed with the presentation. I am still worried, though, about actually getting all this fine equipment out in the field where it is needed the most.

    I was in Iraq in December, and it wasn't out there yet. And all we have heard is a rolling delay and when the SAPI plates would be available to all our troops and how many years it is going to take to make sure we have armored Humvees.

    I am worried that we still have too much of a bureaucratic attitude, and we are not using all national means to get this equipment manufactured and deployed.

    General HANLON. Well, Mr. Congressman, I can speak for the Marine Corps.

    Mr. WELDON. Before you answer, would the gentleman yield on that? Because I was going to bring this up and didn't, but it is a good segue.

    Would you answer for the record the media's claim that we don't have enough of the plating for the soldiers, which was reported to us last week, that we are actually forcing families to buy plating for their soldiers. Would you include that in the answer to Mr. Cooper?
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    General HANLON. I will let Ben talk about the Army, the soldiers, because I did not see that media report. But I will tell you—and Bill Catto's right behind me, he will correct me if I am wrong—but every one of our Marines that are over there, Congressman, have the SAPI plates and the protective vests and the equipment that they need.

    All of our vehicles right now, over 100 percent of them, have at least the minimum protection that they needed on the vehicles that we sent over with the Marine Corps now, sir.

    Mr. COOPER. I would ask you to have a purple suit attitude here, because whether they are active duty, Marine, Army, Guard or Reserve, everybody in harm's way needs the best equipment. And, at least the best we can tell, it is——

    General HANLON. Sir, you are absolutely right. But my responsibility is with the Marines, and I will ask Ben to talk about the Army.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we have today in theater enough of the outer tactical vest (OTV) and the SAPI plates to equip all of our soldiers and DOD civilians. If reduction——

    Mr. COOPER. If you have enough to equip, are they being equipped? Does every living soldier there have the SAPI plates?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we have in theater being distributed—in fact, this month, as of today, we are now fielding outside of theater both the OTV and the SAPI. I have gotten from the senior commander there, Army commander, that he has adequate OTV vests and SAPI for all of our soldiers.
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    Mr. COOPER. So that mission is complete as of today.

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir, it is.

    Mr. COOPER. And no CODEL will find a soldier over there who is without this gear.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, they should not find a soldier. Now, we intentionally continue to ship both OTVs and SAPI into theater until we got a thumbs-up from the commanders that they had enough for all of their personnel. And when they did, then the decision was made then we would equip other units in CONUS and OCONUS with OTV and SAPI.

    Up to just recently when a unit redeployed back to CONUS, they were in fact turning in, in country, both OTV and SAPI. We have ceased that now so that the units that now redeploy back from service there will in fact redeploy back with their OTVs and SAPI.

    Mr. COOPER. That is OTV and SAPI. How about up-armored Humvees? How long is that going to take?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, up-armored Humvees we are ramping to 330 per month—I am sorry, 300 per month production. Today, we are at about 185 per month.

    By the July-August time frame, we will have enough in production and in theater, probably with normal ship time, as fast as we can get it there is up to about 60 days, so it should be about October. And we will meet the requirement, the current requirement, sir, for 4,388 by the end of September, first of October.
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    Now, sir, the requirement could very well change, based upon the operational mission. And, for example, I know for a fact that there is a requirement back in the billing for 12 additional up-armored Humvees. So add that to the 4,388. But to meet that current requirement what I just gave is the time frame.

    Now, if the requirement changes, sir, then we will continue to ship up-armored Humvees. We, across the Army, have shipped available up-armored Humvees into theater. We have gone through a ramp process, if you would, to get us to the 300. We are awaiting the $331 million to finish with respect to production.

    On body armor, there is another $292 million, which we expect that are either coming from reprogram, reprogramming or IFF funds.

    Mr. COOPER. I hear a lot of words——

    General GRIFFIN. So there is one other aspect: There are the kits that we are putting on. We will ramp up to a production of about 800 kits per month. And requirement for Humvee kits is 8,400, and the requirements for FMTV is 1,150; HEMTTS, 1,080; PLS, 800; HETS, 500; M915s, the tractors are 250. Now, that requirement, sir, again, as it changes, then we will send more kits.

    We have also established six sites in Iraq to apply the up-armored kits, protective kits to the vehicle. But as you know, the kit does not provide the same level of protection that the up-armored vehicle does.
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    Mr. COOPER. I have heard a lot of nice-sounding words, but I am still worried that, number one, we underestimated the demand for these vehicles.

    Number two, while we are ramping our capability, it doesn't exactly sound as robust as it could be for the greatest nation in the history of the world, and a nation that is spending more on our defense than every other nation on earth combined—and we just heard testimony of the Future Combat System, and there are a lot of good folks who are focusing on, you know, those nice items.

    But meanwhile, our soldiers are dying every day in Iraq, partly due to the fact that we don't even have basic, primitive armor for our vehicles. So it is nice to hear that you are up to 330 a month, or whatever. But, you know, this is a Nation that fielded incredible armament during World War II, and every other conflict we have been in. And considering our automotive capacity and our ability to do almost anything when we set our mind to it, it is still sounding to me like a little bit of a late and feeble response.

    So you are a professional military man; I am not. Are doing a good enough job for our soldiers today?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, there is a combination of things that we are doing.

    Mr. COOPER. How about a yes or a no?

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    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we never——

    Mr. COOPER. Are we doing a good enough job supplying up-armored Humvees to our soldiers?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, I think the answer is we are doing the best we can right now. Do we ever do-are we ever doing enough? If you asked me what keeps me up at night, it is body armor and up-armored Humvees. It is trying to get as many there as we can, as quickly as we can.

    If you go and visit the soldiers there, you will see first hand that there are innovative things that they are doing to put extra protection on vehicles.

    Mr. COOPER. The greatest nation on earth shouldn't have to force its soldiers to put sandbags in the bottom of these vehicles in order to have a slightly better chance of surviving.

    And if you are unable as a professional military man to answer a question like that ''yes,'' then I would suggest we are not doing all that we can to really help our troops survive under very difficult circumstances.

    I wish we had more testimony in this and other committees from real troops in the field. And I respect our generals. You are great. I am sure you served well in the past.

    But there are men and women living and dying today in a foreign land who do not have adequate protection. And we hear long lists of numbers presented to this committee.
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    I first became aware of this problem last August, as many members did. And we were told with SAPI plates, oh, by December it will all be fine. Then it was January. Then it was February, and then it was March. And now it is April, and you say that requirement has been met.

    Well, we are maybe out of Iraq by the time we get enough up-armored Humvees. You know, and we are the—we should be able to do it faster, shouldn't we?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, again, there are a number of things you do to protect a vehicle.

    We lost a 113 yesterday in Iraq. We lose up-armored Humvees to explosives, whether it is a mine or a number of charges. There are other things that we do for convoys to protect our vehicles as they move along a convoy.

    Anything short of providing the best protection we can, whether it is on the body or the vehicle or our soldiers, or any other military or civilian personnel serving, is—have we done everything we can, if we put them out there in a vehicle that is not totally protected? No. Because something else could have been done.

    Are we maximizing the production to get—as the production capability ramps to the 300 per month to meet that production level, based upon the requirements today? Yes, sir.

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    Are we putting the dollars against it? Yes, sir.

    One of the questions asked yesterday, if they had more money to put against it, could you give it to me any quicker based upon where we are as to steel, the glass, the workforce, the production capability?

    Now, soldiers in the field are doing some innovative things with steel, putting it on sandbags in the floorboards of vehicles, other things to protect. We learn every day. You saw body armor that the Marine captain had on. The shoulder protection is something new. It is a lesson learned.

    The kits are a short-term, interim fix, if you would, because we can produce more kits and get the kits over on the vehicles.

    Mr. COOPER. Well, I thank the chairman's indulgence, but I am still worried that our nation, the greatest nation in the history of the world is not doing all it could and should be doing to protect these troops.

    General HANLON. Congressman, if I may take a crack at this for a second. I want for the record, I want to say, lest we forget, the Marines we have in Haiti also have the SAPI plates and are protected. I want you to know that, sir. They do not have armored Humvees, because there is not a threat in Haiti for that.

    Which brings me to a point. And that is, last night as I was preparing for this testimony, I asked my guys to tell me how many Humvees that we have in the Marine Corps, how many trucks do we have in the Marine Corps? We have about 19,000 Humvees in the Marine Corps total, sir.
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    If we had had the vision 5 years ago, 10 years ago, when we let the contract on these vehicles, thinking that we would be in the environment that you are talking about in, sir, in Iraq, every single one of those vehicles would be hardened. I guarantee it.

    And this has brought up an interesting discussion in our own service. And that is—because we are hardening vehicles now as quickly as we can.

    To answer your question, sir, we are. And I will only say one thing. It has brought up an interesting discussion in our own Marine Corps now. And that is, as we look into the future, every vehicle that we build from this day forward, should we automatically assume that every one that we build should be built——

    General GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask your indulgence——

    General HANLON. Oh, I am sorry.

    General GRIFFIN [continuing]. Just for one second?

    General HANLON [continuing]. Should be built at a hardened standard?

    And so, I mean, sir, I understand exactly what you are saying, and we are trying to get there as quickly as we can, sir.
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    General GRIFFIN. Could I go back and follow up one? General Schoomaker made a decision early on after coming on board as the chief, that every soldier, active guard and reserve, would be equipped with body armor and SAPI. That is 840,000 soldiers. We are on the path to do that.

    Every Humvee that we produce today, whether it is up-armored or not up-armored, will have the same engine, chassis, springs and shocks, so we can very rapidly put additional armor protection on those vehicles.

    Mr. COOPER. Gentlemen, if the chairman would just indulge me one more question.

    We chose the day to start this war. And this was a country very familiar with us, as a result of the prior Iraqi war.

    Many professional military people seem to have assumed we were going to be greeted with roses, like we were liberating the French in World War II or something. This looks to be very hostile territory. And somebody, or some group of people, seems to have seriously underestimated the threat that our men and women in uniform are facing.

    And, you know, hindsight is 20–20, but this wasn't a sudden engagement that was forced upon us. And it looks like to me we were terribly unprepared.

    Now you are saying we need this is in the future going forward. Well, where were we a year ago? Or 2 years ago? Iraq has been a threat for a long time. And is it a sudden surprise that we, you know, their nature is so hostile?
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    Who is responsible for that miscalculation? Why is this a surprise? Why is the greatest nation in the history of the world so surprised this late in the day?

    You guys are the professionals. This is a country we know pretty well.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, I want to answer that. That both the Marine Corps and the Army, and I am sure the Navy and the Air Force, aggressively capturing lessons learned and applying those as fast as we can.

    I believe everything that can be done today to get protected vehicles and body armor to our soldiers is being done.

    We are testing at Aberdeen 24–7.

    Mr. COOPER. When did the ramp-up in vehicles occur?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, the real-the first request, basically as an addition to the existing up-armored Humvees, came as we started into the—at the tail end of the—as we went into Baghdad. And that initial request, I believe, was for 235 up-armored Humvees.

    Mr. COOPER. Why didn't it start earlier, and why wasn't it a larger request?

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    General GRIFFIN. Sir, I think the key is that we are doing everything we can today to meet the requirement of today. And we do everything we can in the future to prepare ourselves for this type of situation.

    Mr. COOPER. This is the fifth Muslim nation we are essentially trying to rebuild in the last 10 years. I hope we do learn the lesson.

    I thank the chair for being so indulgent.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, gentlemen.

    Mr. Schrock is recognized.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just real quick follow up. And I don't want to plant words in your minds, General Griffin and General Hanlon, but could some of this be because we had never encountered some of the hostilities or some of the intensity of the hostilities we had before that we didn't have some of this stuff? Could that be part of that or not?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we had tanks, we had Bradleys, we had some up-armored Humvees. So there was a combination of—and Strikers. Strikers provides—we designed and built the Striker. We put 14.5 protection on the Striker. It is very good. It has done very well in Iraq.

    We adapt as fast as we can to a changing enemy threat. As you go around and visit the units in Iraq, some units are removing the doors from a Humvee, protected and non-protected, so the infantrymen can go down the street and point the weapon out the side of the vehicle.
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    They are doing other things, though, to protect that vehicle. As the enemy adapts, whether that is with IEDs or other tactics or techniques, then we adjust to that. We apply the slide armor to the Striker vehicle, as an example, based upon a threat. We have done some other things to our tanks and Bradleys.

    We are continuing to try to design as light a weight material as we can that provides as much protection as we can. But in some cases, like the vehicle we lost yesterday, with the 113 traveling down the road with some of the best sensor type equipment we have. You are still very vulnerable and at risk.

    While I was in Iraq this last time, I went to a site where there was an up-armored Humvee that 3 155-rounds had been detonated, an IED, in the vicinity of that vehicle. Three of the soldiers were killed, and the driver was thrown free but severely injured.

    The challenge we have is to adapt to an enemy as the enemy changes. And how we adapt, whether it is with a UAV that is flying along, whether it is tactics, techniques and procedures, and it is a combination. And it is also equipment.

    And we talk about the equipment here, whether it is an individual equipment or whether it is the vehicle. So it is a continuous process.

    Now, with me today is Colonel Promotable Joe Votel, who heads the Army's IED task force, and very aggressive at applying lessons learned, capturing lessons learned.

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    Before units go over to theater, they are briefed on the latest threat—how the enemy is adapting, how the enemy is changing. This also occurs in theater, and is a continuous process. We share the lessons learned. We try to make the adaptations as quickly as we can.

    Mr. SCHROCK. We have heard the colonel. The colonel has briefed us before. He did a magnificent briefing here a while back.

    My general line of questions was going to be along the questioning of IEDs that General Hanlon spoke of, but I look at this, look at the Captain, she looks like something out of ''Star Wars,'' and you look at this wonderful equipment.

    But I just wonder, isn't there—and I wrote a couple of things here—isn't there some sort of a radar beam or a laser-type device or a scanner or a high-pitched sound system that could be underneath these hills and looking forward, so that they could detonate any IEDs that might be out there? I know that sounds kind of ultra high tech, but it just frustrates me that we can do all these wonderful——

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, what I would ask you is if we could go into—if we could provide that to you in a closed session.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Okay. Yes, all right.

    General GRIFFIN. Because there are some classified things that we are doing——
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    Mr. SCHROCK. Great.

    General GRIFFIN [continuing]. That are very effective, that—very aggressively doing, as well, that we could share with you.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Yes. I should have——

    General GRIFFIN. Both in aviation survivability, as well as ground survivability.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I should have said within the confines of the classification of this forum. I apologize. But I would be interested in knowing——

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. I would be very happy to.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I just dread getting up in the morning and turning on the news. I really do, because I just fear another one of our kids has been hit.

    And I think there is something—now, I certainly understand Mr. Cooper's frustration. I don't think he was picking on you just to pick on you. He is frustrated. You know, we are both frustrated, because we want to make sure these kids are safe, and you do, too. Believe me, there is no question. But if we could get some information on that, or I could, I would be most grateful.

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    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. And believe me, we are so grateful and so appreciative of what you are doing. I know this seems kind of harsh, but we just don't want any more kids to die. I don't.

    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Schrock. And we are going to put in the record the exact numbers on the current add-on armor that we have. We had the numbers updated—how many are being worked on right now, how many have been installed, how many are—we are going to put that in the Congressional Record.

    And we would ask you to check that number——

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. WELDON. Ask our Staff Director for that.

    What we get down to, Generals, and this is really, I guess, the core of this hearing, our number one priority is to equip our soldiers with whatever they need now. You will never have a question from the Congress in either party to give you what you need now and to give you the money. That is not an issue. Versus that need, compared to the request for funding for Future Combat System, which is a transformation, which is a big ticket item.

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    Now, we have heard the testimony today. And you have had to toe the party line, I guess, so to speak, that we are doing both okay.

    But here is the problem. We have $1.3 billion of Marine Corps unfunded requirements. We have $5.987 billion of Army unfunded requirements. And that includes $1.3 billion for vehicle bolt-on ballistic armor. It includes $1.175 billion for the Rapid Fielding Initiative. It includes up-armored Humvees, $704.7 million.

    So here we have additional requests, which the services have given us, in the form of unfunded and funded requests, and shortfalls. And we have the robust funding necessary for the transformation, which we would like to give the $3.2 billion.

    So we have got to then balance the two and say, how do we—we want to do more. We want to do this yesterday.

    And we want to give this—now, there is an issue, we can't do all this, because there is not an industrial capacity to do all this work that quickly, and maybe we are at that capacity. But that is the mix that we are trying to find.

    And the bottom line is what I have said all along. And if I have offended some people in the Office of the Secretary, so be it. This whole budget for the Army to me is ridiculous this year—Army and Marine Corps.

    The two services that have more soldiers on the ground, in theater, risking their lives and being killed and injured every day should, in my opinion, be the two services getting the biggest increase in dollars to meet these unfunded requirement needs, as well as the transformation for the next 20 years. That is not the choice we are being given.
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    Now, the Air Force is getting a huge plus up, and they probably deserve that. But, you know, we are losing soldiers every day. And this committee, as much as any other one, air or land, has got to take the money that is been requested by the Pentagon, and try to make sure in our minds we are satisfying the current needs of our soldiers, to the maximum extent possible.

    And if that means we have to cut into the transformation for the future, I will guarantee that is what the numbers are going to do. And we don't want to be in that position. We want to give you the transformation, although we want to help control the costs of it, but at the same time, give you the immediate needs you have for today's soldier.

    So the balancing act that we have is between these items. And I don't know whether you want to comment or not, but I think these are your figures—not yours, but the services': $6 billion for the Army, $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps unfunded requirements. That is our dilemma.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir.

    Mr. WELDON. Let me ask a question. General Griffin, on our first panel, we discussed the need to sustain our fighting tactical vehicles through 2020.

    There is a basic sustainment program for the Abrams tank, known as the Abrams Integrated Management—AIM. How do we get the current force sustained to 2020, is there a funded equivalent program plan for the Bradleys, Humvees and trucks?
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    General GRIFFIN. Sir, currently, for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, when it returns from Iraq, we will field the M–1 A2 SEP tanks to the that force, which is the most modern tank we have.

    The 4th Infantry Division is leading 90 some tanks in theater, which will be—and when they come back into CONUS, they will draw the M–1 A2 SEP tanks. So at the end of that, the two and one-third counterattack corps will have the most modern tanks and Bradleys that we have.

    We are going through a recap program and a reset program. The recap program is funded for a little over $11 billion. The reset program we continue to work. I mentioned that earlier in the testimony, with respect to the $1.2 billion that we got this year, and with respect to depot-level maintenance. And then, we continue to define, as best we can, what our requirements will be for 2005, with respect to depot-level maintenance and those things.

    There are other things that we are exploring with both a combination of civilian contract and government depot, looking at refurbishment of tanks to bring them back to 1020 standards, as well as Bradleys, both in the same lash-up with respect to Bradleys and keeping them out in the 5050 depot level versus commercial. So we are very actively doing that and looking specifically at the costs and the best way to do that.

    Mr. WELDON. I understand that you are making a valiant effort here. But I guess—and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I guess the answer is, to 2020, we don't have an identified program funded. Is that correct?
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    General GRIFFIN. Well, sir, if you look at—for 2020 time frame, specifically, we know what the force—we know which tanks and Bradleys we will have around the force. We have looked at SEPs and M–1 A1's. We have looked at the AIM program. We know what we want to do for the Bradley upgrades. We know where we are putting the ODS plus Bradleys.

    So I would say, do we have a plan with respect to that force? The answer is, yes, sir, we do.

    Are we putting that into the POM? Yes, sir, we are.

    And that ties again, back into the previous discussion on the 43 brigades and the modularity. And as we go through that 43 brigade active component force, the combination of Strikers, heavy and light airborne type forces.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, general.

    General, did you want to add anything to this, General Hanlon, or no?

    General HANLON. Well, sir, our M–1 A–1 main battle tanks are to carry us out to about the year 2015–2020 time frame. I know you know this, Mr. Chairman, but our main amphibious assault vehicle, the AAV, we are taking a number of them—in fact, we are close to 700 of our 1,000 inventory right now—and we are modernizing them in the interim by putting in Bradley engines, suspension systems and transmissions.
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    We are calling them the rammers version. And really what it does, it brings that vehicle up to its 1972 basic requirement, because we had to weigh them down with armor to protect them. And so we are bringing them up to those standards.

    Our light armored vehicles (LAVs), which of course, are one of our main combat vehicles, we have got a service life extension program (SLEP) program underway for all 750 of those vehicles. Ultimately, we will convert, hopefully, to the expeditionary fighting vehicle, the EFV, which is in advanced testing right now in the ocean out at Camp Pendleton, somewhere around the 2008–2010 time frame.

    And we are looking very closely at the—I was listening, sir, to the FCS discussion earlier today, because we have been watching with the Army where the they are going with Future Combat System, to see where along the way the Marine Corps might be able to leverage in on that.

    We know we will have a requirement, sir, to replace our M–1 A1 and our LAVs in the future. We have a program that we are calling the MEFV right now, but we are looking to see what happens with the Future Combat System to see where we might be able to marry up and leverage with the Army. And, in fact, it will be a joint program that will be set up here in the future to do just that. And I think that is where we are with it right now, sir. It seems to be working well.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank you both for your outstanding testimony and again for your service.
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    I apologize, I have to run. I am going to ask Mr. Schrock to assume the chair and close out the hearing with Mr. Abercrombie. But to both of you, I say thank you for a job well done, and thank you for everyone that came in with you.

    Mr. Schrock, would you take the chair?

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I apologize to you. I missed your testimony, but I have been through it. You know the drill that we go through.

    The fact that we are not here does not mean that we are not paying attention and are in any way disrespectful to the process underway here. So if I do go into a little bit of something that has been—you have already addressed, if you indulge me in that. And if the chair would, I would be grateful.

    Have you both had the opportunity to read Mr. Francis' GAO report?

    General GRIFFIN. No, sir. I have not.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, Okay.

    General HANLON. No, I have not, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. Then, if you will grant me for conversation's sake, I am trying to quote to you sufficient for this little dialogue.
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    One of the points that he makes on possible alternatives. They analyze the whole thing about the future combat system and the knowledge system, whether we are going to be able to get up to speed, and so on and so forth.

    When he comes to the end of his presentation on defense acquisition, he said, ''perhaps we could focus on maturing the most critical technologies first''—and this is in the context of the conversation you just had with the chairman—''focus on the maturing of the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in demonstrations of capabilities such as the Advanced Concept Technology demonstrations.''

    He uses that as the example, and defines that as follows: ''Advanced technology demonstrations are used to demonstrate the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military operational capability, or cost effectiveness, and reduced technical risks and uncertainties at the relatively low costs of informal processes.''

    Now, I know that is a long sentence, but it makes sense, and you can—as you follow it along. And in a sense, I take it from the demonstration you were using that I missed, but I take it that what you did was try to show, pretty much along those lines.

    How do you show a more mature technology that addresses at relatively low cost, a highly—an increased capability of being able to carry out missions. And you were able to do it without—to an informal process, if you will, of flexibility and utilization of that technology. Is that a fair——

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    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Summary of that kind of thing?

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, if that is the case, then, here is where I find a difficulty. And I don't think you can answer it.

    Obviously, you have to have some politics behind this that are worthy of the mission. And that is where the argument comes in.

    In your testimony, general, about the Blue Force Tracker, and trying to deal with the unexploded—explosive devices—and the random attacks kind of thing, this has to do with the context of the political—in other words, that military situation is likely to take place in the asymmetrical warfare kind of idea that I expressed before. You said you sat through all of that conversation before with the previous panels.

    My point here is, does it make more sense for you to engage in this kind of activity, which I think, from a cost point of view, a dollar point of view, is manageable by us, from a technological, innovation and flexibility point of view as manageable by you, and allows you to address the kind of circumstance that we meet?

    These aren't grand armies meeting in big, huge venues. This isn't Spartacus meeting on the plain somewhere with the Roman legions.
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    Your Blue Force Tracker example that you are using is small group dynamics. It involves situation which, by definition, require almost instantaneous decision making in contexts that can't be anticipated very well by the people who run into them, expect in the most generalized kind of idea.

    So is this where we need to go, rather than this grand scheme, this grand, exotic, technological leap, which I am more and more thinking is not necessarily taking where either of you have to go. And I see you as front-line, literally, exponents of whatever political policies have put you into that situation.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, the FCS is the future. And we talk about spiral development.


    General GRIFFIN. As a division commander at the 4th Division, we feel that FBCB2 to the division. And what FBCB2 allows you to do is that the individual platform, and then, in the future, at the individual themselves, allows you to know where you are and where your buddy is, and then, whereas, to the extent that you can put the red feed in, where the enemy is.

    So whether you are on a block, on the street in Baghdad, or whether you are in the middle of the desert at the National Training Center, it can be zero light, 2 o'clock in the morning, and you know where you are, because you have an icon. Not only that, you know where the other folks are.
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    Now, that allows you to operate much more decentralized. This asymmetric threat that you talk about that can be from any direction. So as you do your decentralize, and the front is in the rear and vice versa, you are just as likely to get attacked from your flanks or your rear, or in the center.

    So especially in a—whether it is an unconventional way, you are in a peacekeeping operation, whether you are in Baghdad or wherever you are, conventional, that Blue Force Tracking, we call it, the FBCB2, that gives you situational awareness, situational understanding. It allows you very rapidly to transmit that information.

    Now, that is technology that, when we start talking about Future Combat System, we very quickly talk about the network.

    So if we talk about the question that was asked earlier, how do you, what are you doing for the tanks and the Bradleys and the trucks as you go on to modernization, the network is one of those key things.

    So as we develop the technology for the Future Combat System, and we spiral development, spiral it back into the current force, that means in 2015 or 2012 or 2020, when I have got the latest tank or whatever version of the tank and the Bradley and the Stryker, and whatever the FCS looks like, and in the air systems, we can all communicate through that network.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But excuse me, General, because the hour is late and the chairman is kindly letting me work this through, I understand all that. And I don't dispute that.
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    I think where the chairman's difficulty is and probably mine, in trying to make the proper recommendation, is that—but do we really need to concentrate on that kind of leap? And is it really necessary, as opposed to what you are probably going to have to deal with right now?

    Let me give you a concrete example, no pun intended. I am working right now to figure out just exactly what do we need to do by way of funding. And what can I tell the chairman, and subsequently, the appropriators?

    What do we need to do to provide the proper training ground for the Stryker Brigade in Hawaii——

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. At Scofield, to meet all the environmental standards to keep us from going into court, to understand what it precisely is needed, considering that the Stryker has already gone through a couple of these phases, is already spiraling?

    I mean, I have seen it with my own eyes. I know exactly what is taking place. And I approve of it, and I see what is going on.

    General GRIFFIN. Good example. Yes, sir.

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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We have got to do training at Pohakuloa on the Big Island. But there is money involved. I have got to have specific figures. I have got to be able to tell them. And I am trying to think 10 and 15 and 20 years down the line. I can draw you a parallel to the Navy at Barking Sands, at the Pacific missile testing range over there, of trying to think clearly 20 years ahead, if possible, to provide an infrastructure to allow for that kind of spiral flexibility, to be able to meet the needs.

    But I don't want to confuse myself with then undermining the capacity of today's Army or Marine Corps or Navy to be able to carry out its missions in those elements and areas that it is likely to find itself in the next five years or ten years.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, the way I view the Future Combat System, and it really gets back to some of the things Mr. Cooper mentioned, we provide a vehicle that is lighter, that has the protection, that has a better source of energy use, whether it is hybrid electric or whatever it is. It reduces the weight, it provides a better armor protection, it has a different weapons system on it.

    It allows me to do those, to fight that asymmetric fight that you talked about, decentralized type operations. It allows me to project that force much more rapidly. Or it allows, wherever it is in the world, it allows me to get it there faster.

    It really gets at, how do we do the things that we just talked about? And what does the future look like? And in my mind, that is the FCS. So whether it is a network——

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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, I know, in general. But we have got to know in this budget the next steps you are going to take to make sure that that individual soldier knows where the person is next to him, the things that you outlined. That we can concentrate on.

    General GRIFFIN. So that FCS piece is, how do we—and we are using that research development, RDT&E. And that really——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

    General GRIFFIN [continuing]. That is where we are—that is what we are all about in the early years with respect to the FCS.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I appreciate it. Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful.

    Mr. SCHROCK [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie. Let me just follow up with one more question.

    I share a lot of the frustrations of Mr. Abercrombie, and I think you all do, too, but the bottom line is, is the Army procurement process the best vehicle to meet these urgent requirements? Or would a specialized process or a specialized office somewhere to meet these urgent industrial capacity requirements be a better mix for this?

    Has it gotten so involved in the political process that nothing can get done quickly? Or what would be your take on that?
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    General GRIFFIN. Sir, I go back to your comment on General Schoomaker——

    Mr. SCHROCK. All right.

    General GRIFFIN [continuing]. And his focused areas, his 17 focused areas, and zero backing on many of the questions that this panel has asked.

    Now, I am not a procurement person, but I think we have a good system in place today to ask the tough questions, and whether that be a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) that is coming up in November, or through that process.

    And I think we have got the right leadership to challenge both inside the headquarters as well as in the field, to challenge that development process, if you will, that technology. And you know we are wrestling with the current as well as the future, and as we move along the axis that the chief talks about, going from the current force to the future force.

    So I would say, based upon my experience and from where I sit, we have a good system in place, and we have got a leadership that is committed to trying to balance that. And what I am most encouraged is, we talk about spiraling into that current force, that technology, whether it is the Bradley, the tank, the Stryker, the light infantry, the airborne, as we move to that FCS.

    And back to what Joe Yakovac said earlier, you know, the first unit of action we are looking at is in 2012. That is really a brigade-sized element.
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    So the key is for the Army is the rest of that force, and as we go along this process, how we modernize and keep that force trained and ready, and try to meet as best we can those current requirements as we go down this road to FCS.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I understand that as we go from 2010 and beyond, but I am looking at the current situation.

    General GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Is the procurement process adequate to get the gear the men and women need to wear or the hardening of the vehicles? Is that procurement process messed up?

    General GRIFFIN. Okay, sir, I understand the question.

    I think one of the most impressive things that I have watched is the Rapid Fielding Initiative, and that is the sheet, that is the helmet to the boots, clothing. That is a very aggressive process, and it is working very well. We are ramping to this production of the 25,000. The Chief has given us the task of within 2 years the entire 840,000 force will have the body armor.

    There are innovative ideas that FCS is driving with respect to a lighter protective material that is being worked today. I saw some of it last week, and we are doing as much of that as we can.
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    I would say, from a procurement standpoint, sir, we are very aggressive with respect to trying to get that equipment there. But we are wrestling with the resources, as you mentioned.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Sure. You want to comment?

    General HANLON. Yes, sir. In fact, I was just talking to General Catto, my systems commander here, who deals with this literally every day.

    The system we have in the Marine Corps, sir, we call it the Urgent UNS process. It is a very fast-moving system for identifying current urgent needs that the force needs. We used it extensively last year for the main operations in Iraq, and we are using it again.

    It is working very well for us. I mean, like anything else, every now and then, if there is something we are trying to buy a lot of and the Army is trying to buy a lot of, and there is one guy making it, or one or two companies making it, then you always have to deal with production capability. I have to sit down with Ben and work out a fair share on that.

    But for the system itself, sir, I think it works very well. In fact, Bill, you were mentioning we are at 25,000 of these, is that right, of the side pads? And we got 5,000, how quickly?

    General CATTO. In six weeks.
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    General HANLON. Six weeks, and the other 20,000?

    General CATTO. Mid-day.

    General HANLON. By mid-May. So that is pretty quick, sir. I mean, that is actually pretty fast.

    Mr. SCHROCK. What the captain was wearing, was that an innovation that was created after we went into Iraq? Or was it——

    General HANLON. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. After.

    General HANLON. Yes, sir. It was a lesson learned. It was a pull-down lesson learned. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. That was the follow-up, I guess, of what Mr. Cooper was asking. We knew we were going to go into the situation. Why didn't our troops have it at the same time? But if some of it was developed in the process of, I can understand that.

    I think that is what we are all concerned with, that these young men and women don't have what they need when they go in there. And frankly, I think we are as guilty, if that is happening, as anybody.
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    We want to be here to help with that process. And I believe that is what Mr. Cooper was saying. And I am guessing if he goes to Iraq again and finds someone that doesn't have one, we will be hearing about it again.

    General HANLON. I guarantee you, sir, there will always be some Marine out there that won't be wearing his helmet the day you walk up. I just guarantee it.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Sure.

    General HANLON. He should have it in his kit somewhere, I will tell you.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I am sure.

    Mr. Cooper.

    Mr. COOPER. If the chairman yields, for just one quick question.

    I think you said, General Hanlon, in response to the question, the Marines are pretty well outfitted now with SAPI plates and up-armored Humvees. Do you have any extras you could share with the Army, if they are short, and you have already met your requirements?

    General CATTO. Congressman, the question is, if we are asked for it and we have it, we are going to supply it.
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    Mr. COOPER. If you are asked for it.

    General CATTO. If we are asked for an item and we have it, we are going to supply it. This is a joint fight.

    Mr. COOPER. Has the Army asked for any surplus that may be available?

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we will take surplus from anyone. We have actually, we have just gotten, I think, 150 from the Air Force.

    Mr. COOPER. Would you ask General Hanlon right now if he has any surplus?

    General GRIFFIN. Oh, yes, sir. You got any extras, I will take them right now, for sure.

    Mr. COOPER. We need to make sure there is sharing here. People shouldn't wait to be asked. They should volunteer this.

    General HANLON. Yes, sir. And, sir, I assure you that there is a lot of that that goes on day to day. I mean, when we got into——

    Mr. COOPER. It is called ''come show,'' all right?
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    General HANLON. When we got into the issue of up-armored Humvees, getting Army RL kit, we would not have gotten into that buy had the Army not made it possible for us, sir.

    General GRIFFIN. Sir, we have a weekly VTC with the theater. And at that VTC is someone from this ops group. As the Marines prepared to go into Iraq, we discussed requirements that the Marine Corps had where the Army could help and vice versa, whether that was in body armor or protected vehicles.

    Much of his testing for his material, I think is done in Aberdeen, right alongside with the Army. So there is lots of sharing here between the Army and the Marine Corps. To include, in his testimony he mentioned, say, an Army-Marine Corps board that we host about once every three weeks, and across the board how we can share information.

    Just recently, he had a capability in Afghanistan, which we found out about and we immediately got on the classified net and talked to our folks in Afghanistan and were able to take advantage of that. So there is sharing between the Army and the Marine Corps here, as well as the Air Force, sir, and the Navy.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Well, General Griffin, General Hanlon, thank you very much for being here. You can see how interested this subcommittee, and I assure you, the full committee is, because this is a topic of great debate here on the Hill. And I am sure we will be, and I am sure there will be other times we are going to want to visit with you all.

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    We appreciate your time today and——

    General GRIFFIN. Sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK [continuing]. Look forward to seeing you again. Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.

    General GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

    General HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    [Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]