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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–8]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004—H.R. 1588






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(H.R. 1588)

APRIL 3, 2003




ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
KEN CALVERT, California
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
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GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

Jean D. Reed, Professional Staff Member
Kate Gordon, Staff Assistant





    Thursday, April 3, 2003, Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act—Navy Transformation and Future Navy Capabilities


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    Thursday, April 3, 2003




    Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe, a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Projection Forces Subcommittee

    Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking Member, Projection Forces Subcommittee


    Cohen, Rear Admiral Jay M., Chief of Naval Research

    Nathman, Vice Adm. John B., U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs

    Young, Hon. John J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)

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[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Nathman, Vice Adm. John B.
Young, Hon. John J.

[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Bartlett
Mr. Kline


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Projection Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 3, 2003.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in room 2112, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

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    Mr. BARTLETT. The subcommittee will come to order.

    This afternoon we will again receive testimony from Department of the Navy witnesses on the president's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Navy's projection forces.

    Last week the subcommittee focused on Navy procurement and force structure issues. Today's hearing will examine the Navy's research and development programs that support naval transformation and future naval capabilities. We will hear from our witnesses on the Navy's transformation process, the role of the Navy's science and technology program and how it provides advanced technologies for insertion in naval systems and for future capabilities for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

    We will discuss the critical role played by force experimentation in the development and integration of new concepts and technologies that will lead to improvements in war fighting capabilities for our naval forces. We will discuss the Navy's program for development of a new family of surface combatants, including the DDX advanced mission destroyer and the LCS, Littoral Combat Ship.

    And we will hear from our witnesses about the Navy's critical core competencies that are necessary for successful operations in the littoral regions of the world, anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and ship self-defense.

    Our purpose today, as it was last week, is to ensure that, for fiscal year 2004 and beyond, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to be provided the proper resources to achieve the right balance of force structure and capabilities to meet new challenges that surely lie ahead.
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    We owe it to our sailors and marines who defend freedom around the world and are fighting in Iraq today to ensure that they have the ships, planes, combat vehicles, weapons, equipment, training systems and technologies that will ensure success on any battlefield on which they may fight, at sea, in the air, or on the land.

    Secretary Young and Admiral Nathman, I am very pleased that you have again agreed to be with us today to continue this dialogue.

    Thank you.

    Admiral Cohen, we welcome you and look forward to any comments that you may wish to make during the course of the hearing.

    Before we begin, let me call in my friend, the gentleman from Mississippi, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Gene Taylor, for any remarks he would care to make.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be viewed in the hard copy.]


    Mr. TAYLOR. I just want to thank our witnesses for being here, Mr. Chairman. I want to hear what they have to say.
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    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Secretary Young, yours and the other witnesses' testimony, will, without objection, be entered into the hearing record in its entirety. So please proceed with your testimony with the assurance that there will be ample opportunity during the question and answer period to expand on any issue that you would like to expand on.

    Thank you very much.


    Secretary YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I will try to be brief. I do appreciate the chance to testify again before the committee. As I noted in a recent trip to the Persian Gulf, we have seen exactly how the Marines and sailors and the other forces in the joint operation are prepared to perform the will of the nation and doing an excellent job. There are over 70 ships, 400 aircraft, 55,000 sailors and 60,000 Marines in theater and our prayers are with them.

    The fiscal year 2004, as we discussed before, has done a great job in providing the readiness necessary for those forces to be equipped to carry out the mission. In building the new budget, we focused on providing the balance with adequate procurement to see the future ahead for these forces. We have worked to develop technological capabilities at a reasonable cost, in a reasonable time frame and transition those into products for the forces.
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    The future naval capabilities process focuses these efforts to identify, develop, demonstrate and transition maturing technology from the lab to acquisition managers for timely incorporation in the platforms. Two-thirds of our 6.3 Advanced Technology Program and 40 percent of our 6.2 Exploratory Development Program are in these future naval capabilities.

    We work to ensure constant validation of the technologies. We try to achieve buy-in into these plans by PEOs and program managers, working in a team effort with ONR, the PEOs, the Navy and Marine Corps requirements community and the fleet-force user.

    We have recently strengthened the process by aligning the 12 future naval capabilities with the development processes and the Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing and FORCEnet priorities that the CNO—recently with the Air Force, OSD and DARPA to forge a joint unmanned combat air vehicle program, or UCAV effort.

    Unmanned air vehicles, as we all agree, will play a significant role in future operations. We have developed a strategy with our partner services and agencies to try to meet common requirements, but also maintain the flexibility to support service unique functions.

    Within that structure, the goal is to have competition between the UCAV competitors so that we get the best product and have a JSF-like acquisition strategy that results in the selection of a common platform with service unique variants.

    We have also demonstrated a willingness, I believe, to challenge existing programs when S&T efforts prove promising. For example, the S&T investment in the tactical control network, or TCN technology, has offered a different approach to meeting the requirements of the cooperative engagement capability that allows off-board shooting from one platform based on the sensor information for another platform.
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    Adaptation of this TCN technology to CCEC can provide a more bandwidth efficient solution at lower cost and allow more warfighters to access the high quality situation awareness that CEC provides.

    Timely fielding of these efforts reflects our commitment to the products from S&T. And with this in mind, I have made transition a point of emphasis over my time in office. We have recently reorganized in establishing a deputy assistant secretary for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation with the mandate to aggressively drive innovative R&D ideas and bridge these concepts and technologies to our platforms and systems to facilitate the transition.

    We have also used a tool call the Commercial Technology Transition Office and successfully arranged the transition of over 20 technologies bridging the commercial sector to the defense sector to try to lower our operating costs and get these technologies into our fleet.

    All of these initiatives are paying big dividends, as you will hear in Admiral Cohen's statement and Admiral Nathman's, with our warfighter today. We have had FNCs that have fielded capabilities from autonomous operations and led to the Marine Corps having available to them a Gladiator tactical unmanned ground vehicle.

    The knowledge web superiority and assurance FNC produced a tool that is giving situation awareness, web-based tools, so that the sailors can pull information from the intelligence sources and other database sources and make decisions based on that information. Advanced submarine technology efforts have provided resources to support the recent Giant Shadow exercise, which demonstrated the use of UUVs, UAVs and the potential for the SSGN concept.
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    I believe we have crafted a balanced and properly focused budget. The Navy and Marine Corps team, as you well, know, is a professional and capable force, the most capable in the world. With your assistance, we will continue to work to provide the maximum capability for the sailors and Marines and the maximum security for America.

    And I thank you again for the chance to testify.

    [The prepared statement of Secretary Young can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Admiral Nathman.


    Admiral NATHMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, for our distinguished members.

    If I could take just a few minutes in my statement to talk to you a little bit about what I think is the importance of the analytic rigor and the leadership we have around our S&T investment and how we arrive at the right prioritization for that science and technology, which is critical to us in terms of delivery and transition to future war fighting programs.
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    As you are aware, when CNO rolled out Sea Power 21, we aligned our naval capabilities around Sea Basing, Sea Shield, Sea Strike and FORCEnet. We also aligned the core of our analytic work and leadership around delivering those naval capabilities.

    In my particular job, I have flag officers assigned and future warfare requirements and programs that are assigned to each naval capability to lead that particular effort. And that includes the understanding of the total analytic work that is done there, the amount and understanding of the program investment. And what we have discovered, of course, in the analysis, as you would expect is when we look at the future threat, what are the capability gaps that we have.

    Now, these capability gaps take the form of sometimes you do not have enough. We do not have enough airplanes, or we do not have enough this or that. And so that is, in many ways, is an affordability challenge.

    But the other side of this capability gap is that there are potential future threats out there and challenges that you need to understand. How are you going to develop a program that will answer that capability gap based on where we are going to go?

    As you know from my previous testimony before this committee, we talked about the fact that we are a near land Navy with the Marine Corps. We are going to operate in the littorals and we need to understand those challenges and what capabilities we need to have to deliver in the far term to make sure that we have a very robust and capable force when we close the littorals and deliver force over land.
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    So, what we have done here is in the analysis, what we see with those gaps is how do we take those capability gaps and how do we react? What are the alignment? What is the institutional response to make sure that we are going after those gaps the right way?

    What we have done is we have aligned our future naval capabilities; they look at those particular gaps. Those gaps then go through a process, as you would expect, a process which involves both a analytical effort to identify the gap, but also a warfare leadership effort so that you have individuals in uniform that get to look and make core judgments about the future capabilities that we need.

    Then we use that particular process, the future naval capability process, which is funded at a rate of about 80 percent to transition, then 20 percent to discover. So the intent there is that we do not want to hold scientists' hands and pin them down so strictly that they cannot have some discovery in their work. But there needs to be a clear transition. And that transition effort is typically leveled at around 8 percent of the total investment we expect that to deliver.

    So that particular process then goes toward an S&T investment around those gaps. Those gaps also form the basis for experimentation because those are delivered to the Navy Warfare and Development Command, which organizes sea trial. Sea trial is then meant to look at those particular gaps. And then the sea trial part is what particular technology could we look at? What are our change in our concept of operations?

    What is the integration of those kinds of efforts so that you see a synergy of the fleet, through Navy Warfare Development Command and the OPNAV staff in the Pentagon aligning around the same analysis and then aligning those gaps to specific future naval capabilities?
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    And thank you for your time, sir. Look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Nathman can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Admiral Cohen, do you have a statement? Or will your contribution be made during answers to the questions?


    Admiral COHEN. Mr. Chairman, any contribution I might make would be made during the answers to the questions. But I did want to let you and the members know how pleased I am to be part of the Secretary Young, Vice Admiral Nathman team as we work to transform the Navy. The underpinnings of that, as Admiral Nathman and Secretary Young have indicated are science and technology.

    Today we find ourselves at war. We will be victorious. Any loss, any casualty is a tragedy. But as you look at the difficulty of this war and the few number of casualties in relative proportion that we have suffered, I can tell you as the Chief of Naval Research and as a citizen of this great country, I am convinced that it is the sustained commitment that the Congress has made to science and technology over decades that has given us the technological dominance that you see being demonstrated on the battlefield today. And we thank you so much for that.
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    Mr. BARTLETT. Well, thank you.

    Of course, during the years, the investments that we have made with money and technology, we are now trading off for lives. And that is a trade Americans understand.

    Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Young, I am going to hit you with something you probably did not expect, but I did not expect to be doing it either. I went to Bethesda this morning and met a kid from an adjacent state, lost a leg, who was a Marine on a tank retriever.

    And he mentioned to me that one of the frustrations was that the vehicle was green sitting in a desert, particularly when they were sitting still. And I think the analogy he used was he really felt like a sitting duck.

    You know, I spoke with the president in September as he was lining up votes for the use of force. And I was pretty well convinced when I left the White House that day that he had made up his mind that there was going to be a war in Iraq.

    So we count from September through March, that gives us six months. I was here for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. And I do remember in the September through January time frame of that war, we did manage to get almost everything painted desert camouflage.

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    You know, for the sake of that kid and for the sake of the ones who are still out there, I would sure like to go on record as saying that that was not a very good place to cut corners. And I would sure hope this never happens again.

    And I know you happen to be the secretary at the moment, but you know, that just should not have been. And I will leave it at that. I was told in a previous hearing that the paint, the chem.-bio paint that they put on them is expensive. Still, that is a hell of a place to cut corners.

    So let's get to some Navy points. I wish you would very strongly look at converting those first five cruisers to a more modern configuration. I have done a little research. I think the oldest of those is still only 20 years old. We are down to a fleet of approximately, last I checked, 310 ships. We are at war. How would you rate the Iraqi navy? And straight-faced answer, how would you rate them?

    Admiral NATHMAN. On a scale of one to 10?

    Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

    Admiral NATHMAN. About a one.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, so what percentage of our ships are deployed right now?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Deployed right now is right around 50 percent of our ships are deployed, probably 55 percent are deployed.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. So if we are deploying 55 percent of our ships to take on a Navy that is rated one out of 10, how in the heck are we going to get by with a smaller fleet if we ever had a real challenge?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And I just do not think it makes any sense to take platforms that are only 20 years old that have perfectly good hulls, perfectly good engine machinery that we could convert for a heck of a lot less money for building new ones. I would sure hope you would look at that.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. TAYLOR. The other thing I would hope that you gentlemen could provide some guidance on is I am very much concerned about our defense industrial base. I think some of my colleagues led the effort a few years back to have multi-year procurements of DDGs and I think that has served this nation well.

    We both know that procurement is coming to an end. We are not quite there yet with the DDXs. What steps are we taking to maintain a hot industrial base as we make the transition from DDGs to DDXs so that those people in the shipyards do not choose to go to work for Holiday Inn or something else, not come back to us after they get laid off?

    Secretary YOUNG. On your first comment, sir, can I offer to go back and understand this issue? It is not totally in the acquisition lane, but I think Admiral Nathman and I would both like to go back and understand the paint issue and get an answer back to you because I agree with you, that is troubling. And I hope it was not a resource-based decision, but we will figure it out.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. All right.

    Secretary YOUNG. To the industrial base question, as you know, the good news is this year the budget has seven instead of—seven ships under new construction as opposed to the five that was in the previous proposed plan.

    We have exactly, as you have highlighted, a new DDG multi-year that puts great—and then that in conjunction with the LPD swap, puts very good stability in those surface ship construction yards. Low rate, but it is a base from which we can build upon.

    I think going forward, we have to look again and we have at least a couple of budget-build opportunities to look at that six, seven, eight time frame, make sure DDX is on schedule.

    Also look at something Admiral Nathman can address better, but what are the requirements going to be? And whether we have both the industrial base transition and then the requirements base transition we need in the destroyer community.

    Mr. TAYLOR. When do you anticipate making that decision?

    Secretary YOUNG. I think we will make—it will be the subject of the 2005 budget build discussions as to—from my point of view, an industrial base point of view, whether we have an adequate transition for that industrial base.

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    And we will have a chance to look at it again in 2006. And then from our requirements point of view, and I will let Admiral Nathman speak, but as you know, we have recently provided the Lake Erie to MDA as their test ship.

    And have a very exciting initiative there where we expect to have missile defense capability on ships in 2004 and more by 2006. Those are requirements that are additional to the fleet. And this is a continual process, as you highlighted. We have seen what the needs of Operation Iraqi Freedom are. We are continually digesting those requirements and making—determining, and again, I want to let Admiral Nathman address that.

    But from an industrial base point of view, I would say we have a thin, but manageable transition. But it may be thinner than we need. And we are going to look at that in the 2005 budget and the 2006 budget.

    Mr. TAYLOR. If I am not mistaken, I had seen a memo where you are only requesting one DDG in 2005. Is that correct?

    Secretary YOUNG. The DDG—the budget request for 2005 is three DDGs.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. All right.

    Secretary YOUNG. It finishes out the swap process. That is why I believe—for 2004 and 2005, we have a very stable surface ship construction base in the combination of the DDGs, the LPDs, the multi-year and the swap. The issue becomes the transition, as you have said in 2006 that we have got to make sure we have it right.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. I had a nice meeting with, I guess it is Undersecretary Geron yesterday and others who were talking about the frustration of the number of reports that Congress asked them to do. And if I can have you gentlemen's word that you will give a serious look at trying to do something with those first five cruisers as far as converting them, I will not ask for a report.

    If on the other side, I feel like someone is doing something to me and telling me it is raining, than you can count on me asking you for that report. So I will just kind of put it that way. I wish you gentlemen would give it serious consideration.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Sir, can I talk to you a little bit about I think the reason why we have a significant number of ships deployed. It is not for the Iraqi navy. It is to project power over Iraq. And so much of our shipping is carriers and their escorts, the maritime propositioning force, our amphibious shipping to deliver the Marines.

    You know, the Marines closed Kuwait months ago, already months ago and that is the Navy and the Marine Corps pushed that shipping out there as rapidly as we could.

    So much of that shipping was to provide striking power and close air support for Marine, British, Army and coalition maneuver. And that is what we are doing right now. We are doing a tremendous amount of—at a high level of effort. So that is the reason for that shipping out there now.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, I set you up on that. But tell me, can you imagine any scenario where you would not have a significant portion of the fleet deployed? The answer is no.
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    Admiral NATHMAN. No, sir, I cannot.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And I just cannot see any scenario where we can get by with fewer ships than we have now.

    Admiral NATHMAN. All right, sir.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

    I suspect that the reason that your budget did not propose redoing these five ships is because in your judgment, that money would be better spent in developing future capabilities. And that you therefore felt that it was justified to run a short-term risk for a long-term good.

    I notice in the—in your budget that you have cut the 6.2, the applied research money and the 6.3, the advanced technology development money. And I just have an observation to make and I will come back to this when my time for questioning comes.

    You know, everybody is waving the flag now and our military personnel are the heroes of our country. If we cannot get enough money now to redo these five ships and to provide adequate money, which we are not providing, for 6.2 and 6.3, when will we ever do it? You know, if we cannot make it happen now, when will we ever make it happen?
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    We will now go to questioning for the—for our subcommittee members. And what we will do from now on is to follow the usual rules. Those who were here at gavel fall will be recognized in order of their seniority. Those that came after gavel fall will be recognized in the order of their appearance at the subcommittee.

    And so first is Ms. Davis—Ms. Davis from Virginia.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank you gentlemen for being here. Admiral Nathman, you noted that the LCS was the number one budget priority for the Navy this year. And concurrently, you note that the DDX is the centerpiece of the future service combatant family of ships.

    My understanding of the LCS originally is that it would grow from the spiral development of the DDX and the family of ships that it represents. Now it seems to be growing independently of the DDX. And I was wondering if you could tell me what that is all about.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, ma'am. First a few minutes here just on DDX to clear that up and make sure we are clear. And to go back to the chairman's point, we did see the baseline one decision as an opportunity.

    The opportunity was that we wanted to invest in the future and it goes to those gaps. One of the reasons why we are developing DDX, there are several reasons why. The most compelling war fighting need is to close the naval fires issues for the Marine Corps.
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    And I cannot help but make the point, if we were—the British right now in Basra, if we had DDXs in the North Arabian Gulf, we would be using DDX right now to clean up Basra for the British Army. No doubt about it.

    And we would have supported significantly the maneuver schemes initially out of Kuwait so that allowed the Marines to move their tubes, the Army to move their tanks, et cetera, et cetera with a lot of their fires covered by a Navy ship called DDX.

    The other thing that DDX brings is a significant amount of striking capability; long-range striking capability because of its tactical Tomahawk will be embedded in vertical launchers around the perimeter of that ship.

    And last, we are looking at DDX as an opportunity to potentially look at things like Affordable Weapon, which act as a call for fire weapon, a small—very small cruise missile, as it were, that loiters for hours, so a decent range and provides in some cases the ability for call for fire. So we are looking in those—that analysis that we are talking about is, is this the right place to put something like Affordable Weapon on DDX.

    But the other thing about DDX that spirals, ma'am, that is really important is the whole form, the integrated propulsion, the electrical power, the total computing network of that particular trip and tremendous amount of manpower savings, as it were, because we are taking the workload off the sailors because of the integrated, in this case, systems environment, computing environment, et cetera that reside in DDX.

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    So the DDX in itself, the core—if you can think it of it as the whole serves as the first place to put our, I think, our closest war fighting unit in terms of gap for maneuver, and that is naval fires.

    The next part of that is we spiral that whole form and the electrical power, the integrated computing environment, the total integrated power part of that ship, which goes to great manpower savings and that becomes the basis to build CTX because it is about the right size and it is going to have the attributes of the more sophisticated understanding we are going to have of those ships because we are going to spiral them so we make better acquisition decisions about that total investment in that ship

    So that is how we are going to spiral. But those two ships, DDX acts to fill a strike and naval fires need, CGX will be our future air defense ship. And we eventually will have to replace the Aegis hull and that—but that is how we can go to a baseline, as it were, of not only more striking in those cruisers, open architecture.

    And wherever missile defense and air defense may take us in the future, we think we are making the right investments in ERAM and in the current collaborative efforts we have with the missile defense agencies.

    So we think we have a very well thought out, succinct understanding of how to build those requirements, how to build that particular ship and how to spiral it so that you can put in the latest technology at the right time and not over invest on the front end.

    So I think that is a good acquisition strategy. Secretary Young may want to talk about that. But it is certainly—it is certainly a good way to build your requirement for those ships.
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    Now, LCS acts as our littoral combat ship. It is there to go after anti-access needs. And one of the challenges we have with our more typical ships, our larger ships like a DDG or the DDs is they have a certain draft to them, that are 35, 36 feet in some cases. And that eliminates that ship from really closing the littoral and doing fast, important work in there.

    The work we have to do, since we are going to be a near land navy and act in the littorals to support the Marines, is we have to pay very close attention to our ability to control the surface picture against small, fast boats, to go after quiet diesel submarines that will tend to act and stay in the littoral.

    Not be so active, but wait for us to come to them. And to really understand what the total mine picture is and to, in some cases, to prevent it, or in many cases, to make sure that we can rapidly eliminate a mining problem.

    So LCS is focused on those anti-access missions. While DDX and its hull are focused on a clear naval fires mission and spiraled into an air defense cruiser.

    So that is why we call it a family of ships because it supports a spectrum—excuse my hand. It supports a spectrum of the warfare that we need to have, the coherence, as you call it, warfare capabilities that our navy is going to have as we go into the littorals to project power over land like we are doing now against more coherent and more capable threats.

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    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a question of Secretary Young, but I will submit it for the record because my time is up.

    Mr. BARTLETT. We may have a second round. And thank you very much for staying with the five-minute rule. We will try to stay with the five-minute rule so that those who have come will certainly have a time to ask a question. And then we will have a second and third round for those who have additional questions and wish to stay on.

    We now turn to Mr. Shrock.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you all for being here today. I am just going to ask a couple quick questions. And something Admiral Nathman said a minute ago reminds me of something I want to ask Secretary Young.

    You talked about the UCAVs and that is something that is very exciting to me. I think that is clearly the wave of the future. We are starting to see that in combat now. How far are we to getting these things in the fleet? And in the mine part of it, do we have any unmanned vehicles that are going to clear mines under water?

    And then for Admiral Nathman, so I get them both in, I can get them answered. You talk about it is hard to anticipate future threats, and it clearly is. And I think we are finding that in the combat that we are in as we speak.

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    And I think the LCSs are great. The DDXs are great and I totally support those. But how—but planning for those in the future—and I know it is hard to anticipate the threat. How do you marry those two up? I cannot figure that out to save my soul. Those are my two questions.

    Secretary YOUNG. I will try to be brief. But the UCAV effort I believe is one of the key initiatives in this year's budget. The Navy was looking at a UCAV effort that was separate from the Air Force effort and probably would have delivered a product well into the 2014 or beyond time frame.

    What has been done here in harmonizing our requirements with the Air Force's requirements and determining that we can increase the size of a vehicle that is already flying, the X-45A, which was planned to be a (B), now we are going to move to a (C) that has something like 1,000 miles of range with some time on station, 4,000 pounds of payload. These are the harmonized requirements.

    Because of the work that has already been done, the Air Force was a little ahead. Now the Navy has joined that effort. So we will have a Boeing Navy demonstrator in the 2005-6 time frame. There is an X-47 that was really funded at Northrup's expense, flying now.

    We are going to scale that into—again, into that requirements space and have them build an X-47B, I suppose and have a competitive opportunity for the Navy to evaluate both those—both vehicles. One of the primary missions will be to demonstrate carrier suitability in their flight testing.

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    So we have the potential, if a good job is done in the demonstration program, to look at getting vehicles as an early user capability in the 2008-9 time frame. We are still working through those details and our really truly missionized one, though, more in the 2010 time frame than 2014.

    And we are going to work this in a joint way like JSF, where every dollar the Air Force and the Navy spends will help both of us get there faster. We will have a common and cousin competition and all the benefits it yields.

    Mr. SCHROCK. That one's obviously carrier capable.

    Secretary YOUNG. It looks that way.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Well, you got a tail hook on it, that fits.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir, that is the intent.

    Mr. SCHROCK. That is what?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Well, sir, we certainly intended for them to be parked on carriers, to be operated off aircraft carriers, because they will be part of the—they will be part of the CONOPS around how the air wing operates. They will be integrated into the operations of that air wing.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Great.
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    Secretary YOUNG. Just quickly, I would say, you know, we—a key to performing the mine countermeasure mission today is unmanned systems like the Long Range Mine Reconnaissance System, AQS-20, RMS, the Remote Mine Hunting System that supports it. And in the S&T community, we are taking steps further to make these systems more capable, smaller, and frankly, more autonomous.

    And I think you will see progress there because people are quickly coming to that cultural point of seeing—just like this vehicle, the UCAV will have long range and capabilities to go in a really hostile environment and do things that you would rather not put manned systems in because the mission durations are not suitable for pilots, et cetera.

    Mine clearing, some of that is done by people today. The unmanned vehicles are clearly—if you will, there in doing something that is really not a good mission for manned systems. And the progress there is coming very quickly now.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Should I rephrase the question, sir, because I think I am probably going to get it wrong? But I think the question was how do we close gaps more closely on like DDX?

    Mr. SCHROCK. Well, in anticipation of what you think the threat might be. We could not—10 years ago, 15 years ago, we had no idea the threat today would be what it is today. It is hard to build and plan for that I would think.

    Admiral NATHMAN. The analytic work that we do, to give you a quick answer, is we look at the threats at the end of the future year program. So we look at basically the threat six years out. But then we do risk trends for the next six years.
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    So we use our Office of Naval Intelligence, which coordinates with several intelligence agencies, then they give us an overall assessment of the risk at the end of that fiscal year. And then they give you the assessment at the end—a six-year period, another six-year risk trends.

    The reason why we look at risk trends, as an example is you may just look at your risks for the first six years, but not see that you are going to have a big problem maybe with over land cruise missiles because of it being exported by a particular country and third world countries could buy it relatively cheaply. So the idea about looking at those trends is to make sure we are not making an oversight in our investment, particularly in R&D and S&T.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Alexander.

    Okay. We then go to Mr. Vitter, who is joining our committee today. Thank you very much.

    Mr. VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the courtesy of allowing me to join the committee for today.
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    I have a keen interest in several Navy programs, but I wanted to focus today on the LPD–17 program, which I think is crucial for our amphibious capability. And also, it is very important in my part of the world, Avondale Shipyards and therefore to the continued existence of our industrial base and the continued robustness of that.

    And I will direct this to you, Secretary Young.

    How do you think the recently negotiated swap of DDG–51 and LPD–17 program production—what do you think it is done in terms of an effect on the costs of the LPD–17 program?

    Secretary YOUNG. Our analysis says that in swapping those ships, we can document that we have saved $437 million by bringing all 12 ships to a single site for construction, getting an improved learning curve.

    I would personally tell you I am sure that understates the cost savings that are there because history has shown, and the numbers document, we have had significant prior year completion builds generated when we take on lead ship challenges. And we were about to take on building a lead ship essentially simultaneously in two yards.

    And so I believe firmly that we saved substantially more money. And I am frankly not sure that Secretary Aldridge would have certified the program as having adequate understanding of costs and adequate control of the program to continue. And he had to certify LPD–17 for it to continue because it had reached the Nunn-McCurdy law. I am not sure that certification would have come had we not swapped the ships.
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    Mr. VITTER. Right. As you know, the ship building profile in the Five-Year Defense Plan shows a gap in LPD–17 procurement in fiscal year 2005. That is a big concern of a lot of people, including me. Has the Navy assessed the impact of this projected gap in production on procurement costs of the ships?

    Secretary YOUNG. We are doing that, sir. And it is clearly going to be—I am not prepared to give a precise number yet because we are analyzing exactly that. It is going to be several hundred million dollars because you stretch out the production line. That by itself generates more time in the yard, et cetera.

    We are doing what you would expect us to do, I believe, is working in partnership with the shipyard to understand that. That gap is the minimum position the Navy can take in honoring its obligations under the swap.

    And frankly, in discussions and understanding the cost of the program, the company, Northrup Grumman Ship Systems, has come back and said there may be an opportunity to level their workload and try to start an additional LPD and build it as a twin in 2004.

    And that is an interesting option that we are also studying because that will reverse the cost increase we are going to see through the change in profile and maybe even offer an opportunity to save some money over an 2006 construction of that ship.

    This is a very new thing. And again, I think it is just our due diligence to have a dialog with the company about the best way to manage it.
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    Mr. VITTER. Well, I certainly encourage that dialog.

    In the same vein, I know the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have included advanced procurement funding for LPD–17 on their list of unfounded programs. What would—if we can accomplish that, if we can fund that, what would it do to stabilize production and hold down program costs?

    Secretary YOUNG. I think these—the initial discussions to try to understand what it is going to cost to do the program of record and then the proposal the company has made to approach it differently suggest that by—you know, under the swap, we paired 18 and 19. They are to be built as twins. And that offers some significant benefits in terms of cost and learning curve.

    This proposal they might make to pair 22—LPD–22 and LPD–23 looks like it could save $100 million and basically make the employment curve at the shipyard roughly flat, avoid a substantial dip and then a recovery, which is, as you know, a challenge to manage through people issues.

    So it is an interesting proposal that we have just got to finish studying in detail.

    Mr. VITTER. Great.

    And the other part of this cost issue that I am concerned about is O&M costs. I mean, the whole purpose of this line is to replace a far greater number of older ships with much higher operating costs. As I understand it, the 12 ship LPD–17 class would replace 41 older, obsolete ships; operate with roughly one-third the manpower, 4,300 versus 13,000.
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    What sort of impact will that have on O&M costs? And related to that, if we let this time line slip, what is that going to do to costs even apart from the shipbuilding side of things on the O&M side?

    Secretary YOUNG. Admiral Nathman might want to comment on this also.

    The CNO, in the previous year's testimony, highlighted—I think because of the issues you pointed out—the need to move forward with the amphib replacement because of the age of the ships, the O&M costs we are experiencing on those ships.

    There is also a capability step up in the LPDs in terms of ship self defense and survivability. I would also point out to Admiral Nathman's comments about what is going on in the Gulf right now. I think this has been a lesson.

    There are some permissive ports for entry there, but even in that environment, the amphibious ships and their capability to offload at will and wherever necessary has been a big contribution to the force.

    So, as you, I am sure, are aware, there is a forcible entry study to be done. I think the lessons from Iraqi Freedom will inform that study substantially and potentially make a very strong case for the capabilities LPD-17 brings, because it also recovers some lost cube and volume for the Marines as far—particularly for vehicles, which is important to them in getting their package to the fight, if you will.
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    Mr. VITTER. Well, I appreciate all your comments. My time is up, but just to close quickly. As you can tell, my concern is that this present gap in 2005, which was largely, as I understand it, sort of created as a bill payer for other things and not—does not really go to the heart of the LPD–17 program, is really going to cost us a whole lot more money over the long term.

    It also is going to create havoc in terms of that shipyard and stability of that shipyard and the industrial base. So I really hope we are putting a lot of work toward avoiding that sort of gap both from our taxpayer cost perspective and the big change in tempo it is going to cause to the shipyard.

    Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir.

    Mr. VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Israel, then following him will be Mr. Saxton.

    Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I have two questions. And in the interest of the five-minute rule, I would appreciate it if you could answer the first question very briefly, because I would like to spend some additional time on the second question.

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    The first question concerns our ASW capabilities. I know that there is some concern that we may be weak in terms of our ASW capabilities in shallow waters. You have set up an ASW task force. I am interested in the status of that task force and whether you believe we should be rethinking, in particular, how we are spending on ASW science and technology.

    And ask the secretary if he could respond.

    Secretary YOUNG. I am——

    Admiral NATHMAN. I think he wants to defer to the leader of testing, which is me.

    Mr. ISRAEL. Fair enough.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Sir, the CNO in this—trying to make sure that he is doing the best analytic-based decisions on war fighting felt like our analysis into our ASW challenges was not deep enough. So he specifically tasked me to lead a Task Force ASW, which was to look at two areas specifically, to make sure that we are making the long-term science and technology investments for a future look against what our challenges are going to be, which are littoral ASW.

    So we are out doing science. In fact, we were just up at Penn State last week looking at an applied physics laboratory up there that does a lot acoustic work and to see where they were in undermanned vehicles, et cetera.

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    But we are looking at the long-term science and technology that may lead us to a path, a technological path which may—a technology path which may allow us to do ASW a lot better than we do it right now.

    The other thing that we feel is part of this is do we have the training properly aligned with the challenges? And quickly, you know, the Navy had a horrific problem off of Lebanon in 1982 when we lost a couple airplanes over Lebanon supporting the Marines.

    And we created a Strike and Air Warfare Center to make sure our training was truly robust and integrated around air strikes. We think we are going to do the same thing around ASW. We are going to really strongly reinforce the training of our ships and our aircraft in a coherent, integrated way.

    You will see a Center for Maritime Dominance grow out of this in terms of its stature. You will see battle group commanders probably embedding their sea combat commander training into this particular course structure. And I think it will lead to what we saw out of Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon, Nevada as a real center of excellence for ASW.

    So those are the two paths. And we do not have the answers yet. But the CNO wants some because he wants to make sure he is making the right investment.

    Mr. ISRAEL. When will the task force have its initial recommendations, Admiral?

    Admiral NATHMAN. We report out to the CNO in the middle of this month. And I will tell you right now, it is to go look at certain areas. It is already leading us to some conclusions about acoustic versus non-acoustic multi-statics, some of these things that we really—things that really bring about a certain capability in littoral waters.
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    Mr. ISRAEL. I have a very strong interest in this. And so to the extent that you are able to, if you could keep me posted, I would appreciate that.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ISRAEL. Let me turn to the secretary. There was an editorial in the New York Times several weeks ago entitled, ''The Weapons We Need Now.'' And I am sure you will be pleased to know that the New York Times actually said that the Navy was wise in some of its transformational activities.

    I am a very strong supporter of Secretary Rumsfeld's view of transformation, although I hope it goes even further than it is now.

    Let me just read you very briefly just a few sentences from that editorial and ask you to comment on it. The Times said, ''The Navy wisely plans to convert four of its ballistic missile submarines to cruise missile launchers.

    But it also needs to introduce more unmanned subs and more high-speed sealift ships to ferry troops and equipment into battle. It should switch from the new F–18 fighter to the even newer F–35, which is stealthier and better able to link up with advanced battlefield information systems.''

    I wonder if you could just comment on what the Times has to say.

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    Secretary YOUNG. Can I—I will take them backwards.

    Mr. ISRAEL. Okay.

    Secretary YOUNG. I think we have made a very prudent decision to stabilize EF procurement at 42 a year. There were discussions at one point about buying more, buying faster, et cetera. We have to demonstrate that we can develop and deliver the F–35, the Joint Strike Fighter on time and on schedule. EF provides—it provides a force structure and a capability we need today.

    When I went to the Persian Gulf, Admiral Kelly and the sailors on the Lincoln who have been out nine going on 10 months now, love the limited capability—limited number of Super Hornets they have, tanking capability, mission flexibility for the range.

    That airplane also is the path to replacing the A–6Bs, which are—we are flying the wings off and the engines, if you will. So it gives us the new electronic attack capability.

    So the stability of that line and the plans for that line to buy the right number of EFs provide a hedge against the timely development of JSF and then transition to providing the EAG to replace our EA–6Bs, which we cannot afford to keep flying and they do not have life in them, is critical. So we are somewhat aligned with them, but doing it in a risk-managed fashion.

    To talk briefly on the others, I think we talked about UCAV, and I believe you might have heard the discussion. That is an important platform coming off the carrier decks for what the CNO talks about as persistent surveillance. It is just critical.
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    And then I think we are going to make strides in those persistent surveillance and persistent attack areas with UUVs, relying to some degree—there are unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles.

    A lot of that work is really in our S&T community and coming along quickly. Because again, this culture is embracing the capabilities that you get out of performing missions that are better suited to unmanned than manned.

    Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Saxton and then Mr. Kline.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Mr. Secretary, good to see you.


    Admiral NATHMAN. Sir.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you for being here.

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    I have two questions. I will just fire them right out and let you have at them.

    My—the hat I wear on the committee is basically to chair the Terrorism Subcommittee. And as such, I have—our subcommittee has jurisdiction over the Special Operations Command. And in talking with General Holland not long ago, and some of his people, they mentioned the high degree of interest they have in the littoral combat ship, using it as a platform from which they could launch operations.

    And I was wondering if you would tell us in a few short words about what type of planning and the level of cooperation that may be going on between SOCOM and your Navy planners?

    And second, with regard to DDX, I see here in our notes that the Navy is going to request the first DDX in 2005 and the second—another one in 2006, a third one in 2007 and two more in 2008 and finally get to full production in 2009. And that raises a question in my mind about how we maintain the industrial slash technical base through that period of time. Could you walk us through that, please?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Sir, I will take on the question about special forces and their integration into our efforts.

    We specifically have special warfare officers, SEALS on my staff. They are integrated into the naval capabilities called Sea Strike so they can represent their warfare mission needs in the requirements and program process inside of my staff, which represents future programs for the Navy. So we integrate the SOFs, you know, rigorously and formally through that staffing process.
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    The other part is, to answer your question specific about LCS, and Admiral Cohen may talk about some of the experimentation. But there are several high-speed vessels that have the capability to move SOF rapidly into the battle space, particularly in the littoral because they would be closing from maybe an SSGN, or they would be closing from an aircraft or from a surface ship.

    So one of the inherent capabilities we believe we will have in LCS is it can act as a platform, a sea craft as it were, to rapidly move SOF—to close a water space. Because of their shallow draft and high speed and covertness, I think these are really good attributes for what the SOF would need.

    So we have brought in those requirements into what I call the inherent capability we believe we are going to have in LCS.

    Admiral Cohen may want to talk about some of the experimentations we are doing right now with some high-speed vessels.

    Admiral COHEN. Congressman Saxton, and perhaps we can put up the X-Craft. But Admiral Nathman has it exactly right. Today, we have the HSVX–1, which as you know, is a leased vessel from the Australians in the very upper reaches of the Persian Gulf.

    It has been show on the evening news where it is tending between six and 12 special operations forces high-speed boats as they work to demine the harbor entrance and insert and extract forces, especially in the early stages.
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    Same right here, it is a Hill initiative. This is what is euphemistically called X-Craft. It is about 1,100 tons. It is about 73 meters. It is currently under construction. We will go to sea on it in June of 2004.

    The CNO strongly backs it as a hydrodynamic test demonstrator. You can see it is a catamaran with a lifting body. It makes 50 knots. It has the attributes that Admiral Nathman just described.

    But additionally, you do not see it on this, the stern we have designed to be like a cowcatcher so that at speed, the rib boats and the special operations forces as well as unmanned vehicles, surface and submerged can be launched and recovered.

    And finally, because helicopters are so critical to enable our forces today, including our special operations forces—as you can see, it is a lily pad, in this case with two H–60s, or four special operations helicopters.

    SO experimentation is alive and well. And with the leased vessel, the HSVX–1 in the Persian Gulf, we are demonstrating that war fighting capability today, sir.

    Secretary YOUNG. I will take just a second, if you do not mind, and pick up on some of those pieces. I think in my mind an important thing that Admiral Nathman and I are working to get right is the hull form. And that is why we have looked broadly at non—as the Congress has asked us, non-traditional providers, people that have ideas to get the right hull form to provide the sea frame for LCS. It has got to have good stability in the littorals so the sailors can perform the mission.
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    It has to have the speed to move in the littorals, as Admiral Nathman highlighted. And I think those tools—having that sea frame that we can then bring mission modules on board in a flexible way and tailor the ship to the mission is idea for the special forces.

    That is why we have a partnership, or an agreement with the Coast Guard to try to keep them informed and work with them on it. And it offers a lot of potential.

    I will move quickly to your questions about DDX. Discussed this briefly with Congressman Taylor. We have—I could look at this two different ways. Because of the swap, we have loaded three DDGs in 2004, three in 2005 and yes, we have one in 2006 and one 2007 DDXs. But the combination of those ships is roughly two a year, probably thin, but potentially adequate to maintain the industrial base.

    We need to keep DDX on schedule, that is for sure. And then in the 2005, 2006 budget bills, I think we will continue to look at the mission taskings we see the destroyer community getting, as well as the industrial base issues and make sure we have it right. Because the importance, as you said, of transitioning through the end of DDG production and into DDX production is very important for us.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

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    Mr. Kline and then Mr. Simmons.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, gentlemen, again, for being here today.

    I am going to cover three things very quickly. And your answers can be very short or perhaps not at all. But let me start by saying that I share the concerns of Mr. Vitter about the amphibious fleet.

    I hate for it always to be a bill payer for anything. And I am concerned that we keep the square footage and the cube available for the Marines. I do not think we need to pursue that any further, but I am concerned.

    Again, I want to share my concerns about what we are doing about mine countermeasures. We have talked a lot about transformation here. And it seems to me that we have got a pretty big chunk in our mine countermeasures and legacy systems. I have shared that concern before.

    If you have got any updates or anything you would like to add, I would of course, like to hear about that. And you know I am talking about the continuation of the helicopter and moving to the SH–60 in the mine countermeasures.

    And then thirdly, the DDX has got a gun that looks to be a 155-millimeter gun. But as I understand it—and if I tread on territory that is outside of this venue, wave at me vehemently. As I understand right now, the projectile in that gun is tied exclusively to GPS guidance system.
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    There is no other backup for it. If anything were to happen to GPS, there is no ballistic capability, there is nothing else we can do. Is that true? And do you have any comments about that?

    Admiral NATHMAN. You know, sir, I do not know about the ballistic qualities of the round. I have to go find out. I will take that for the record. But I assume it does——

    Mr. KLINE. That is that there is no ballistic capability if you do not have the—you just cannot shoot it as a regular 155 round is what I am saying.

    Admiral NATHMAN. All right, sir. Well, I will take that on fact, sir. But if you look at what we are connected with, since it is a common round—a 155 round is the—it is common with NATO. It is common with the Army. And it is common with the Marine Corps. And there are efforts to go look at what you can do for terminal guidance for that particular round.

    So right now, yes, the weapon is a GPS weapon. But our experience with GPS weapons—I assume what you are talking about is potential—if we lose the GPS signal or jamming. But one of the things about—which we see with our current weapons, not to go into a closed session here. But one of the things we see here is that there is a certain amount of GPS protection for our weapons.

    The fact that the acquisition of that particular signal occurs before they come under the influence of jammers, i.e. because they get it from the platform, et cetera, this gives you—the round the ability to be fairly accurate even with—even if it goes into a jamming environment because of where it acquires the signal.
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    So we are going to have to cover some of this in a closed session, or come back to you and specifically brief it to you. And then talk to you about what we think is the opportunity when we go to that size round in terms of lethality and in terms of potential terminal guidance efforts which would not rely on GPS.

    So just like I owed you some answers on the helicopter mine countermeasure issues and probably we can—I would like to come spend some time with you on this one. But if you would agree to that, go into those in detail.

    Mr. KLINE. That is fine. That is fine.

    Secretary YOUNG. Could I offer a couple of comments?

    Mr. KLINE. Oh, Sure.

    Secretary YOUNG. Picking up on what the admiral said. Consistently in our systems now we are conscious of the potential for GPS jamming and try to take steps to be able to operate with it, in it or through it, if you will. That is a cost and it is an effort we have to take on in providing a system that is capable.

    And then to the mine countermeasures question, an initiative of my reorganization is create a—for littoral mine warfare. I believe we do need to have coalescence. And I look forward to working from the acquisition side with the requirement side to coalesce what we are doing in this space.
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    I believe that is why the CNO has come so quickly to favor LCS, because it gives us a flexible platform that does not have the constraint of the diameter of a submarine torpedo tube, or the limits potentially of what you can get on a ship that is already got a lot of helo missions, like a DDG. We are going to have some flexibility to get a converged and coalesced approach to the difficult problem of mine warfare.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

    Mr. Simmons and then Mr. Langevin.

    Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to share with the panel that earlier this week, Congressman Langevin and I joined the chairman up in Rhode Island and Connecticut for a visit to Electric Boat.

    And my impression was that the U.S. Navy-Electric Boat at Quonset Point and at Groton and the Newport News Shipyard are doing a marvelous job of designing and building the next class of sub, which is going to be the Virginia class. And it was an impressive presentation and visit.
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    Secretary Young, you refer to the teaming agreement in your testimony. And I think the teaming agreement is a critical component of the success of the program to date and a critical component in the years to come.

    And I certainly hope with the sale of Newport News Shipyard to another contractor that that teaming agreement is not in any kind of jeopardy. And I hope you will keep us informed if there does appear to be any jeopardy to the teaming agreement. I think it is critically important.

    Design build is a critical part of the Virginia class.

    Yes, would you like to respond to that?

    Secretary YOUNG. Can I comment for a second?

    Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, please.

    Secretary YOUNG. I am not prepared any teaming agreement is in jeopardy. I mean, in fact, as you well know, to build a Virginia class right now, it is critical to have both companies providing parts of that submarine.

    Having said that, though, as you know also, our initial bids on the next block of Virginia classes was substantially higher than the resources the Navy had available at that point in time. I feel it is incumbent on me and my responsibilities to you and the department to look at every option to build those submarines and build them in a way that makes it more affordable to the department.
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    Hopefully, any of those tools that we might apply to the program can be executed within the teaming agreement. But I do have, I think, a requirement to look very hard at trying to get an efficient build process.

    Mr. SIMMONS. I hear what you are saying and I will just simply say that in the late 1970s and early 1980s when I worked for Senator John Chaffee, there was no teaming agreement. There was what they called, quote, unquote, competition. It was feast and famine and it did not produce good subs.

    It did not produce good labor relationships. It did not produce safe subs. And we can have the discussion off record. But I believe, from my experience, which is limited, I agree, that this teaming agreement is the best thing that has happened to submarine production. And that the submarines we have today and we are producing in the future are better, safer and more capable. And that is because we have the best minds working together to produce them that way, the way we have with aircraft carriers for the last 45 years.

    The design build concept is critical to that program. And that leads to my question for the panel that you can answer it as you see fit. But it is my understanding that the fiscal year 2004 request reduces the Virginia class RDT&E by $82 million over 2003 and $2.87 million over the FYDP.

    And I guess my concern is this, the whole point of the program, as I understood it, was to incorporate the design build features, to be able to design in computer the enhancements in the out years so that certain elements of the submarine class would be the same, but others would be different as the technology moves forward.
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    But if we are undercutting the investment in research and development in an effort to achieve certain production goals, which I support—I support the multi-year production goals. It seems to me that we are building in a degrading of the system and that concerns me. And I wonder if this Congress should not act to restore those research and development funds to keep this program on track.

    Secretary YOUNG. If I could, Congressman, I would make a couple of comments.

    Obviously, in an unconstrained resource environment, there are a lot of things we would try to do. Having said that, as you know, a letter came over I think this week notifying that the Virginia class submarine program has breached the previous acquisition program baseline and the costs are up 24.1 percent.

    With resource limits, we have to find ways to pay those bills because I think you are exactly right. This is a new capability, an impressive capability and we want to buy the submarines.

    We need to buy them in a multi-year environment to gain good control of those costs. And one place where reductions were made was in the advanced submarine technology so that we could pay the bills that we have to pay.

    Another comment I would add about that is hope in LCS and in DDGs and in Virginia class, we will look to build more—we will seek in general to try to build blocks of ships, like the LPD situation where we are going to build two ships as twins.
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    I think it will be difficult on the fleet to have every submarine, every ship, be different. We should build two to four ships that are common so we can get our training procedures right. We can get our maintenance procedures right.

    And the fleet has a tool that they predictively know how to use in the force. So there is a compromise between having every ship have the next best thing on it and having something that addresses our training and maintenance and other needs and can affordably do it.

    Design build has been a great tool for delivering a ship to the production line, if you will, that can be assembled and assembled efficiently without significant rework or change orders. And design build opens the door to make changes to future hulls more easily than we have had in the past.

    But I think it needs to be done in a very planned and careful way, as we are doing with JSF and other programs where we have block upgrades as opposed to looking to make every single submarine different where we are going to have a very difficult time maintaining a learning curve and production efficiencies.

    Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the chair. My time has run out. I will submit some questions for the record. And thank you, gentlemen, again, for appearing here today and for the great job you have been doing with the submarine force.

    Mr. BARTLETT. We will recognize Mr. Langevin and the bells have rung for a vote and we can wait through his period and then we will recess for the vote and come back after that.
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    Mr. Langevin.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And gentlemen, thank you for your testimony, for being here today.

    I want to echo many of the comments that were just made by Mr. Simmons. And first of all, I enjoyed my visit with the chairman to Electric Boat, which is in my district. And we are very proud of the submarines that we produce from the Electric Boat facility in Quonset/Davisville and of course, Groton, Connecticut.

    To build on Mr. Simmons question and his comments, I agree the Navy's 2004 budget demonstrates a significant commitment to transformation efforts in many respects. And I really do commend you for the work that you do when you help our navy adapt to the changing needs of sea warfare.

    But like Mr. Simmons, I am greatly concerned about the proposed cuts to advanced submarine systems research, development, testing and evaluation. The Virginia class submarines, as we all know, are going to offer the Navy considerable new capabilities. And I believe that we have to remain committed to an aggressive procurement schedule for them.

    But I would really like to hear your thoughts, if I could, about—additionally to why advanced submarine system research received such a substantial cut in the 2004 budget proposal?
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    And again, what additional impact do you think this is going to have on future capabilities of Virginia class subs? And you know, would not you agree that this is going to be a setback doing transformation goals for our submarine fleet overall?

    Secretary YOUNG. I offer a couple of comments. As we—Virginia class presented the Navy, I would say, with a couple of challenges as we built the 2004 budget. And one is this 24 percent cost growth, it is coming as an acquisition—a revised acquisition program baseline. About 20 percent of that is new costs in materials, labor, other issues.

    The Navy needs to try to maintain balance. And so we did take steps across the Navy, but some within the submarine program, to pay that bill. And that is a huge—I mean, that are billions of dollars when you have 24 percent on a program of that magnitude.

    I think there is some prudence to that because we will have the chance to build some submarines that have the same capabilities. And then in a block upgrade fashion work to—with the sub tech monies that are left, work to define the next block of upgrades of capabilities to those submarines.

    And Admiral Nathman might want to comment on this. You know, from my piece of the world in acquisition, this is far and away the most capable submarine in the face of the earth. So I think we have done a prudent thing within the resources to try to deliver these submarines and face the challenges that were presented to us in terms of cost on Virginia class.

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    Admiral NATHMAN. I think Secretary Young's got it exactly right. You have an enormous affordability challenge with basically a bill presented to the naval service over a short period of time to be handled in this budget year.

    So faced with those challenges, we see a Virginia class bringing transformational capabilities to our submarine force. And so the fact that you are using in investment in the Virginia class is in fact can be looked upon, I believe, as a transformational investment.

    And so part of this is there is an expectation because of affordability that how do we—where do we take those risks? And if you are buying a new class of submarine, I think it is appropriate to assume that you can accept some risk why you are buying the new class to slow down the potential technology insert that you are putting in the next block of submarines.

    So I think it is really an affordability decision made by us. Clearly, we did not have many places to go.

    Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I appreciate your comments. We are going to be watching this one closely, as sure you can understand. And I may have some additional questions for the record.

    Thank you.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

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    The second bell has rung. We will recess the committee for the vote. If this is but a single vote, it should be 15 minutes or so. The committee stands in recess and will return after the vote. Thank you.


    Mr. BARTLETT. We will reconvene our subcommittee.

    We have gone through round one and let me ask a few questions now and then we will turn to whatever other members are here for their questions and then come back again for some other questions we need to ask to get some information on the record.

    I would like to ask now a question that I ask at most hearings where it is appropriate. And that is, for 10 years now about we have been waiving EMP hardening and chemical hardening on almost all of our new weapons systems procurements. And I will ask this for the record because I will suspect you will not have this information with you.

    I would like to know how much of our war fighting capability—how much of your war fighting capability would remain—let me use the word will remain because I think this for some time in the future is a very high probability—with a robust EMP lay down?

    And you might note for us those weapons systems for which you have waived EMP and chemical hardening and why.

    If the only weapon—the only enemy against which you need these weapons is a sophisticated enemy, which is why we are developing these really high tech weapons, then we would not want him to deny us their use with an EMP lay down.
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    And so my concern is, why would we develop weapons systems that will not be available to us when we face a really robust possible enemy in the future?

    Admiral Nathman, prior to announcing the LCS program, the Navy did not conduct a formal analysis, that is, an analysis of multiple concepts or analysis of alternatives to demonstrate that a ship like the LCS would be the more cost-effective way for performing the LCS stated missions than potential alternative approaches.

    In the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress raised a series of issues with respect to the development of LCS meeting the requirements of a major defense acquisition milestone division—decision for initiation of concept and technology development, the acquisition strategy for development of the ship and development integration and evaluation of the mission module packages that will be employed on the ship.

    The Navy's February 2003 report that was submitted in response to the legislation, and I have it here, was a brief six-page summary document that provided little detail with regard to the analysis performed by the Navy in developing the requirement and the concept of LCS.

    Does the Navy plan a more rigorous analysis of the operational requirement and cost effectiveness of the LCS? If so, when might we expect to see the results of that analysis?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir. To spend a little bit of time with you on this question, I think the Navy saw a clear gap in the is war fighting capability, particularly in the littorals.
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    And I know CNO's commitment to the littoral combat ship was a result of his clear understanding as the head warfighter for the Navy that we had a surface combatant gap and a capability gap in the littorals that went to a lot of our access challenges.

    Because I think he strongly felt, and I certainly agree with him, he strongly felt that we had access challenges that we needed to answer and that our current complement of ships and aircraft were not necessarily specifically target after that—at that access—anti-access or access denial challenges of operating in the littorals.

    So as a result of that, he—besides his strong endorsement and the support he has gotten from the House and from the Congress on LCS, he felt he had to back that up with strong analytic rigor about what was the capability of LCS.

    So when he reorganized his staff last—two years ago to create the Future Requirements and Program Staff, N7—N67, which that is my current title now. And part of that was the start of this rigorous analytic capability looks as well as—it is based on CONOPS, which have a high fidelity to current war plans.

    It is based on a risk assessment that goes out for six years and risk trends for 12 years. And then it is based on, as you would expect, a computer-based modeling and simulation system which can give you in come cases hundreds of different runs.

    So we put what we thought were the embedded capabilities with these modules of LCS into this analytic campaign plan. And then tried to see the trades of having LCS there or not having LCS in terms of delivering the capabilities.
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    So we specifically tested LCS in this campaign analysis against a mine threat, against small surface swarm threat, against submarine threats. And we tried the differences in the length of the time of the campaign, the amount of losses that we would be subjected to or the inability to achieve objectives—our objectives in these campaign plans.

    And I will tell you that the—not to give you the very specific details of the runs, but LCS was a very strong contributor in terms of a force that could be put forward, that could come out under the umbrella of a—as it were, a FORCEnet that was supported by a expeditionary striking force of carriers and amphibious trips, cruisers, SSGNs. But this could act as a very strong precursor in terms of shaping that anti-access battle space for us in the near land environs.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral, I think that my question goes to a process that I would hope would have occurred before LCS. And that is, you are very correct that we had a gap. We had a mission for which we did not have the right platforms.

    And my concern is, did we really compete that mission? We clearly were deficient in our ability to fight in the littoral areas. But there are lots of other ways that we might have chosen to accomplish that by standoff smart weapons, by submarines, by helicopters. There are a lot of different platforms that we might have used to do that.

    And I think my question was addressed to the rigorous program that we thought you ought to have gone through before deciding that LCS—I am sure that if you want a ship to do this job, LCS is going to be the best ship that we can have out there. I do not have any doubt about your competence in outfitting this ship so that it will be the best that we can provide as a ship.
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    But my question goes before that, I think. Did we really compete that mission? Is this the best of all ways to accomplish that mission?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Well, we——

    Mr. BARTLETT. I think that was what we had asked for in our—in that report which was just a very summary six-page report. And we are now asking, if you did more work, could you tell us what it was? And if you have not, do you plan to?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir. We have done a lot more work since we made LCS a program. We put a lot of rigor into our analysis. And I will be happy, sir, to come over and specifically share that analysis with you and the campaign plan to show you the value of LCS. I think that might be the best way to do it.

    I certainly believe that CNO strongly felt that he had an anti-access challenge, which was, I believe, the genesis of littoral combat ship. Because he felt like—it was very obvious to him, he had a tremendous breadth and depth of experience in this arena.

    He knew from his service on the joint staff there were significant war fighting gaps that the Navy had and exhibited in terms of campaign planning. And this—it was a clear, as it were, gap filler.

    Mr. BARTLETT. I think nobody denies that what there was a gap. Was the decision then to go with a ship rather than other platforms that might have accomplished this mission? Was the decision an intuitive one that this certainly had to be the best way to do it? Or was there a rigorous analysis that brought us to that conclusion?
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    Admiral NATHMAN. The more rigorous analysis occurred after the decision to move to LCS. The rigor in the analysis has been——

    Mr. BARTLETT. Most of that occurred after the decision to go to a ship?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, okay. Still concerned that we should have competed the mission. But here we are and so what do we do now?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Well, yes, sir, what we do now is I think the path we are on right now. I think if you look at the attributes of LCS, and I think Secretary Young is going to comment on this too. But the attributes were we knew the mission clearly, anti-access. That is—so we knew exactly the focus. We knew the requirement in terms of how do you develop those capabilities? So what are those gaps that you have to get?

    So those were very clear to us about how do you accelerate it. It is also, I think, an opportunity, as it were, to use what I would call the innovation of where we are with our industry and the fact that we want to rapidly transform our capabilities. And so some of these things occur almost simultaneously.

    And I think the CNO saw in the transformation leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld that the Navy needed to step out and in fact take some chances and not be so typical, as it were, in the way we developed requirement in previous history.
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    So these were opportunities I think the CNO saw for him to rapidly transform part of this force that he needed to transform in terms of a capability because of where we were. We were clearly a near land force, and it went to those—it went to those specific capabilities that went after those anti-access challenges or access denial. And he saw that in spades when he was director of the joint staff.

    So I know I am not filling you with goodness here about how we did it. But after the decision to move—but we did not move in terms of a commitment, in terms of here is the actual structure of the ship. What we moved to was, here is a sea craft. And the sea craft is going to have this type of inherent capability. It is going to be relatively stealthy.

    Mr. BARTLETT. I understand. But Admiral, once you decided it is going to be a sea craft, then I do not have any question about that you did a really great job.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. And the path that we have chosen to take may in fact be the best path to take. We would just be a little more comfortable if in fact the mission had been competed and you had looked at other possible ways of meeting this challenge so that we would know for sure.

    This will be good. Will it be the best? And without that rigorous analysis, I do not think that we will ever know whether it would have been the best or not.

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    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, could I add a couple comments?

    Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

    Secretary YOUNG. I think there is a substantial amount of that analysis behind this in that decisions have been made to put MH-60S' and R's with mine countermeasures capabilities on DDGs, the long-term mine reconnaissance long mine reconnaissance system on submarines. So there is a lot of that underpinning analysis.

    So then you come to where the CNO and Admiral Nathman have come to and that is is it the best way to have a billion dollar DDG or $2 billion submarine employing these systems? Or would it be smart to have something that we hope is more like a $250 million LCS to do it?

    And then the other thing I would say is we—when we did not put an excessive—we put a modest amount of money in study contracts to look at what—whether an LCS could be built and what capabilities it could provide so that could then inform Admiral Nathman's analysis and we could do something that looks like the rigorous AOA you are talking about.

    The alternative is what we have done in the past where I would guarantee you we can spend three to five years and not necessarily get to a better solution. We can have an AOA, work to get it in the budget, do an RFP, evaluate the RFPs.
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    Or, instead, we can go a few steps down and try to inform our requirements with the art of the possible for industry. And if it is a dead end, stop and go somewhere else. But as long as that work continues to support our intuitions and our previous decisions, we keep moving ahead. And that is where I would say LCS is.

    Everything about it, what we have heard from industry, the potential for this hull has confirmed it. And now Admiral Nathman has much more detailed AOA-like analysis that say this is the most affordable way to employ this and free up the precious time on DDGs and submarines for the other key missions in that space.

    Mr. BARTLETT. If you will make the analysis that you believe answers the question that we asked, if you will make that available for the record, we will look at that. And if we—that does not bring us to a reasonable comfort level, we will be back to you if that is okay.

    We have today very effectively—and not just today, but through lots of hearings and public occasions, very effectively communicated to any future enemy that we are going to be very vigilant in meeting any threats that he provides to us with submarines and mines in the littoral areas.

    But do not you think that the message that sends is that, gee if you are going to use mines and submarines, maybe you ought to do it somewhere else because we are really going to be looking for you in these littoral areas. And doesn't that mean that if this is a meaningful enemy that we really have to be pretty much everywhere?
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    Admiral NATHMAN. I would agree. And I think our program, our record, you know, between LFA and multi-statics S&T investments kind of tells you where we—how are going to have it.

    Mr. BARTLETT. I kind of got the notion that we were saying that the only really threat we had was littoral, therefore, we do not have to worry about the blue water and we are not going to have any more global monitoring system and so forth.

    Admiral NATHMAN. No, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. That is not where you are saying we are going?

    Admiral NATHMAN. No, sir, I am not. What I am saying is we have great inherent capability in blue water right now and that is not going to go away. That is not going to atrophy.

    Mr. BARTLETT. An ASW and the detection and so forth?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Much of what we had during the Cold War is gone, is it not?

    Admiral NATHMAN. No, sir, it is not. In fact, I think we made—we made—if you look at the AIP investments, the advanced ASW queuing that we have in our P–3 force——
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    Mr. BARTLETT. Our monitoring nets are still in place? I think they are not, the SOSAS and so forth.

    Admiral NATHMAN. Some are and some are not. Some have atrophied because some of these were very focused much on the Cold War submarine threat. And they are not going to do us any good because the type of submarine force that may have a potential threat have that may go way from their coastline, not be in the littoral is not going to go through those particular choke points.

    So I think some of those arrays that we have chosen not to refresh or let atrophy over a period of time, those are good decisions for us because they do not go to the particular threat.

    So I am trying to say that the inherent capability we have in blue water that we had built up over the decades of the 1970s, certainly in the 1980s and the early 1990s resides with us today. What has atrophied there is probably our training because our focus has been Iraq in 1991, or it has been Libya, or it has been the Taiwan Strait crisis. It has been where the problem has been.

    So our focus has been where the problem has been. And part of this Task Force ASW, sir, was for CNO to make sure that we were not making the mistake of looking past what you are suggesting, looking past where that threat could go and that we were going to reinvigorate, in many cases, things that we had seen atrophy.

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    Is our training right? Is our S&T investment right, particularly in submarine warfare?

    So it—the littoral investments are not meant to say that we are walking away from a blue water challenge. It meant saying that we think we have a significant capability there. Now, let's reinvigorate it with the right training.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Let me ask just one more question and I will turn to my colleagues and then may need to come back for some additional questions for the record.

    I am concerned that the funds for 6.2 and 6.3 are down. They were down in the administration's budget last year. We replenished those funds during the process here. And again, the question that I asked when we started and did not give you time to answer and I am not now asking for an answer. I think that the answer will be how we respond to it in the future.

    You know, if we cannot get enough money now for S&T, if we cannot get enough money now to redo these five boats that Mr. Taylor wants to redo, that, you know, 20 years old is not very old, less than—about a fourth of my age, as a matter of fact.

    And if we cannot get enough money to do those things when everybody is waving the flag and the biggest heroes in our country today are military people, when will we ever get that money?

    Now, if you despair—if you despair now that you cannot get enough money to do the right thing, when will we ever be able to get it if not now? And therefore, why wasn't it in the budget? I mean, I think you needed to have put it in the budget and then we needed to have fought for that.
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    Now, you know, putting it in the budget or not may have been above your pay grade and you know, this question may be addressed to DOD as an entirety. But I am concerned that if we now give up, that we cannot get enough money to outfit these trips—and $200 million is a real bargain compared to $1.2 billion, isn't it?

    And if we cannot get enough money to put adequate funds in there for S&T, which really puts at risk our future developments—if we cannot do it now in this environment, do we just give up? That we are going to have increasing problems in funding an adequate military.

    As Mr. Taylor pointed out, we now have all more than half of our ships out. This is not a big scrap we are involved in compared to things we might be involved in in the world. Are we just going to give up that we are never going to be able to do the right thing?

    So why didn't we have adequate amounts of money in here this time is the question?

    Secretary YOUNG. Do you want us—well certainly understand and kind of agree with that perspective. I will not be able to address it as directly as you would like, but I will talk around a couple of pieces of it. I mean, this year's budget has $650 million of prior year completion funds. That is critical to us to finish out those ships.

    I will be candid with you, and I do not mean this disrespectfully, but had prior contracts been negotiated to the right targets, that $650 million could be spent somewhere else in the enterprise to do good things. So we are paying for some mistakes that were made in the past that would free up resources.
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    We are also paying, as you well know probably better than I do, sir,—health care that is affecting companies, it is affecting the DOD team with escalating costs. So a significant amount——

    Mr. BARTLETT. I know all of the other challenges you have. Let me just end with a Bible quote that I think is a very appropriate here. ''This ought you to have done and not to have left the other undone.''

    The things that you are saying you had to spend money on, we agree you had to spend money on them. We would just like for you to have included adequate monies in this budget for S&T and for doing things like outfitting these five ships.

    Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to follow up—and I apologize for missing much of Congressman Schrock's line of questions, but I have a feeling they are going to be fairly similar.

    If I were to go to a beer-tasting contest and there was only one brand of beer, there is a pretty good chance that guy is going to win the contest. Having used that analogy——

    Secretary YOUNG. We can all relate to it.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. Looking at the littoral combat ship, apparently there is only one brand on the table and that is the twin hull.

    Admiral COHEN. Oh, no.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Now for the sake of the—well, haven't you leased an Australian vessel and aren't you using it now?

    Admiral COHEN. Let—since I am responsible for experimentation in the Navy, we started out with the HSVX-1, which you know came from the Incat Group. It is an aluminum wave piercing cargo transport vessel of about 1,700 tons. There are advantages and disadvantages to catamarans. We have—our British allies have the Triton, which you may have had a chance to go on board here about two years ago when it visited the Washington Navy Yard. That is a tri-hull. It has certain advantages, it has certain disadvantages.

    Today we are looking at advanced steels. We are looking at composites, many of which are coming from Mississippi and their initiatives there. We are looking at aluminum hulls, especially in smaller size vessels. And you look at damage control consequences with today's extremely lethal high-speed sea-skimming Cruise missiles, does it matter with you make the hull material out of? Or is it one shot and you have lost the ship?

    So I will let Secretary Young address the specific details of the competition for LCS because that is not—that is S&T enabled, but it is not an S&T program. But there are between five and six very different designs ranging from a mono-hull to a trimaran, to a modified trimaran, to a catamaran. And I would tell you—again, not speaking for acquisition, there is a growing sense, I think, in the naval architecture and marine engineering community, just like in aviation, one size or one design does not fit all that we may very well need to look at two or more of these in competition.
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    So I think the beer industry can look forward to competition in this area.

    Secretary YOUNG. Can I——

    Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, please.

    Secretary YOUNG. Just, I am sorry if we gave you the wrong impression. That is an experimental hull. There has been an experiment to lease a ship that the Marines were very happy with in the Pacific for transporting Marines. It is not clear those hulls have all the attributes we seek. LCS initially picked 12 hulls, exactly as Admiral Cohen said, a total range of hull forms.

    And I do not want to prejudge any of the competitive space here. Every hull has advantages and disadvantages. And as I testified earlier, ride quality is an important factor. And it is going to have to be proven that any of the hulls, including the catamarans have the ride quality to let sailors perform their missions in littoral space where the waters are rough, et cetera, at low speeds.

    So we have not made a hull decision. The competition is still proceeding. We are going to neck down to three design teams here. And I expect there is a very good chance there will be a variation in hull forms amongst those three before we pick what could be one or two designs depending on how the mission requirements shape out and how we see these hulls can respond to those requirements.

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    Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, I guess my point is, will there be an opportunity for someone to come forward with a mono hull made of composites, just as you have got somebody out in the field right now?

    Because I have got to tell you, just in casual conversations with senior Naval officers, senior people from the Special Operations Command, I keep hearing that they—I just keep getting the impression they have made up their mind, it is going to be a twin-hull vessel.

    Secretary YOUNG. Well, sir, because this is in source selection, I have got to be careful how I talk about this, but——

    Mr. TAYLOR. And the only reason I point that is if you have made that decision, why do not you tell all the competitors and at least everybody bid on the thing you know you are going to buy?

    Secretary YOUNG. It is just absolutely not the case, sir. I mean, at least the one—I have been on an international hull, it is a v-hull if you will, and it has a stabilization system to improve the wide quality in the littorals at slow speeds in rougher waters.

    So it begins to check some of the boxes that we are interested in and it is composite construction. I think it is the very hull you are talking about. And I find the composite construction has some appealing attributes in terms of payload and mass fractions. But so do other hulls.
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    And the—I am not aware of anybody—and if they have this view, it is unacceptable because we are looking, exactly as I described to Chairman Bartlett, for industry to tell us the art of the possible, see how that matches against Admiral Nathman's requirement space and pick the right hull. And we are not wed to a hull form at this time.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And your time line on this decision is when?

    Secretary YOUNG. I think by July, we are going to neck down to three. And by January of next year, we are going to try to pick one, potentially two, depending on how, again, those proposals from industry, how attractive they are and how they match against the requirement space.

    Mr. TAYLOR. When you narrow it down to do, is that for acquisition purposes?

    Secretary YOUNG. Yes.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Or for final competition?

    Secretary YOUNG. I mean, the fiscal year 2004 budget requests monies to begin to design the hull. And so the hope is to neck down and pick the primary, or the preferred hull to meet the mission requirements and begin design work on that in January with fiscal year 2004 funds if Congress authorizes and appropriates them.

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    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Schrock.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman, let me make two comments, then I have a couple questions for the secretary.

    As I recall, Gene, one of the testimonies were the CNO came before us, he made it—somebody asked him if they had decided on the hull—or what it would look like and he said I do not have a clue because they were still on the design phase of that. And I just asked him that recently, he said we do not know yet. So I really believe that is the case, they are trying to narrow it down.

    I was a little puzzled when I heard Mr. Israel make the comment that the New York Times is agreeing with the Navy. Makes me wonder if we ought to have a special investigation on what the Navy is up to if the New York Times is agreeing with them.

    But that being said, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned CETEC, and the surface fleet has identified, what 286 programs that are funded to provide components to the fleet. But hey also have determined that only 104 of those are needed.

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    What is your office doing to ensure that the Navy is not spending critical dollars on unnecessary programs, one? And what are the obstacles that you foresee to eliminating these nonessential or unnecessary programs?

    Secretary YOUNG. It is an excellent question. The Navy—and this has been the subject of discussions today. We face challenges going forward because we would like to free up resources to invest in additional ships, additional missiles, additional airplanes.

    The effort I am specifically asking my team to work with Admiral Nathman on is, I call it disinvestments. But we are going through and looking at programs of record, existing capabilities—the primary one that was tackled last year is Phoenix. Phoenix is an aging asset.

    It is costing more and more to maintain and it is not clear that its capabilities currently match what he warfare space requires. So we are retiring Phoenix and hopefully all the tail that goes with it.

    We are going to look forward—Admiral Nathman and myself with a team of people to recommend those things that are limited capability in the current inventory or will bring less capability for the dollar in the future and maybe we ought to relook those investments and make a decisions to vertically cut some things to free up resources for the enterprise to do more of the things that I think we all agree is necessary.

    So we have an aggressive effort to do exactly what you have asked.
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    Mr. SCHROCK. And there will not be problems getting rid of some of that stuff?

    Secretary YOUNG. No, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Great.

    Secretary YOUNG. Well, it is always a challenge to take things out.

    Mr. SCHROCK. Well, I know it is.

    Secretary YOUNG. Let me take a step back.

    Mr. SCHROCK. But if the fleet clearly says they only need 104 of the 268, that should be listened to I would think.

    Secretary YOUNG. I am kind of counting on that. We actually have a different challenge. You know, we need to prove to the fleet that once they neck down to the things that we can all agree are required, we will buy those things. And I think in the past, people have been concerned to give up anything because they are afraid once they give that up; they will have to give something else up. So we have to have some discipline in our process so what they do give up, they give up. But what they keep, we keep and deliver.

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    Mr. SCHROCK. Great. I think Mr. Israel also asked a question I probably did not hear the answer to. Did he ask you what we are doing to build troop ships?

    Secretary YOUNG. No, sir.

    Mr. SCHROCK. I do not know why I thought he asked something about troop ships. What we were doing to create platforms where we can transport troops? I do not know why I thought he asked that. I am sorry.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

    One more question, Secretary Young and Admiral Cohen, why is funding for the Joint Forces Command Experimentation Program included in the Navy science and technology appropriation? Should that funding be in the defense wide rather than the Department of Navy budget account? If we are short of money, how come we are paying for this?

    Secretary YOUNG. Admiral Cohen may want to add, but the Navy for the last several years has been the executive agent for the Joint Forces Program. I think we have no concern about which account the money is in. We are the executive agent and OSD has chosen to put the money in our lines.

    Admiral COHEN. It is customary for different services to be the executive agent, as the secretary has said, for different combatant commanders. I think the Navy has both Joint Forces Command and I think Pacific Command.
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    When the pass through was more modest in size, before Joint Forces Command under the current secretary of defense significantly expanded the role that he sees for Joint Forces Command in transformation, it was an acceptable impact on the overall naval S&T budget just as a fact of life.

    But as that budget has grown so dramatically this year, and this is a discussion I have had personally with Admiral Giambastiani, who is the combatant commander at Joint Forces Command, it is appropriate that this line migrate to a defense wide line.

    He has indicated to me that he is making efforts to accomplish that. But at $170 million, that is a very significant percent of the overall 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 line and is having impacts on naval S&T.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Did they give us some monies for this? Or they simply give us a total dollar amount and this was one of our responsibilities?

    Admiral COHEN. This was one of our responsibilities, sir and that is how it works.

    Mr. BARTLETT. We have had no specific allocation for this function? Is that correct?

    Admiral COHEN. I am not a—I am just research man. I am not a budget expert, sir.
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    Mr. BARTLETT. Well, it is spelled out as a program element. My concern is, did they put money in there to match spelling it out as a program element?

    Admiral COHEN. They put the requirement in for us to satisfy.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Could you find out for us for the record where that decision was made and what decision was made? It would be of interest to us.

    Admiral COHEN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Just one other question that I would like to ask. Then I will see if my colleagues have any additional questions and we can adjourn.

    This last week I visited Rhode Island and Connecticut and I went through our submarine building program there, very impressive. I was impressed with the multi-mission module for the Jimmy Carter.

    And I think that we are probably doing as good a job as we could do in making sure that these boats are the best that they can be. But I have a question that goes beyond that.

    As we look to the future and note the kinds of threats that we will be facing, I think that it would be instructional if somehow somebody somewhere could simply be oblivious of what we now have and in looking at the threats that we will face in the future, what would we like to have to meet those threats?
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    I am concerned that the combination of inertia and momentum and a bureaucracy and all of the thousands of great people that build these assets are going to determine where we go without a rigorous analysis is that in fact the best way to be going.

    No matter how we decide we ought to be going, we are going to building submarines of some sort. They may not be 34-foot diameter boats. And we are going to be building ships. They may be, as Admiral Zebowski imagines, one-tenth the size and one-tenth the cost of—well more than one-tenth the size, one-tenth the cost of present ships.

    Is there anybody anywhere who is doing this? We would be more comfortable that we are going to be able to adequately meet future threats if somebody, somewhere was looking at these future threats and without regard to what we now have and what the momentum is and the inertia and the food chain and the bureaucracy, what would you like to have to meet those threats?

    Then having determined that, we need to look at where we are and can we get there? And there may be some compromises in getting there.

    But I have a concern that we are probably not in any meaningful way doing this. Am I correct?

    Secretary YOUNG. The reason that I took the microphone from Admiral Nathman is that he is more modest than I. This is exactly what Admiral Nathman is doing. This is exactly what the CNO envisioned when he separated——

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    Mr. BARTLETT. Well, then you need to have a better educational program because I have not heard it.

    Secretary YOUNG. Well, I will let Admiral Nathman educate you as he—as you and he work that out. But I can tell you that Admiral Nathman is not making a lot of friends in the Department of the Navy because he is not looking at aircraft. He is not looking at submarines.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Well, if he is doing that, he will make friends here.

    Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. He is looking at the gaps and then determining in an integrated day how we best meet those gaps; fulfill them in innovative ways, coupled with traditional ways. And it is very uncomfortable for people who are platform-based. And so I will turn it over to him.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Well, let me not spend any more time here on it. Thank you very much for that. And if you will simply put in the record what you think is an answer to our question, we will look at that. If that brings us to a reasonable comfort level, we will not be back. If it does not, we will be back. Is that fair enough?

    Admiral NATHMAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. BARTLETT. Okay.

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    Mr. Taylor, you have additional questions?

    I want to thank you all very much. Thank you for your service to your country. And working together, I am sure that we will have the best Navy that we could possible have in the future.

    We stand in adjournment.

    [Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]