Segment 3 Of 3 Previous Hearing Segment(2)
SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS Tables
Page 368 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—ARMY MODERNIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Procurement Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly With Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 5, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. WELDON [presiding]. The subcommittees will come to order.
This afternoon we will hold the third in the series of joint hearings to examine modernization plans in the fiscal year 1999 defense budget request. This is a continuing process. Yesterday we did Navy, and my good friend Duncan Hunter was in the Chair. We alternate the chairs between the two subcommittees and today I'm chairing the session.
The purpose of today's hearing will be to examine a broad range of Army modernization programs and initiatives. As before, we're sharing that Chair, as I mentioned, and our ranking member and good friend, Owen Pickett, and I, from the R&D Committee, look forward to working with both Mr. Hunter and our good friend, Norm Sisisky, the ranking member of the Procurement Subcommittee, and all of our colleagues on both subcommittees.
Page 369 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Today's hearing before our subcommittees, we're pleased to have Dr. Kenneth Oscar, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition. He's accompanied by his Military Deputy, Lt. Gen. Paul Kern.
We share a common concern for the decline in defense spending over the last years. Despite a slight increase in requested funding for procurement, the Defense Department R&D funding declines again this year and it's projected to decrease by an additional 14 percent over the FYDP. Although the Army's entire modernization budget, again, appears to be sadly underfunded, I will focus on the Army's R&D funding which has decreased from $5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1999, which represents only 13 percent of the Defense Department's $31.6 billion request.
In comparison, the Army's R&D request continues to be dwarfed by those of the other services with the Navy at $8.1 billion and the Air Force at $13.6 billion. Even the defense-wide request is $9.3 billion, almost twice the Army's request. Again, this year, modernization budgets continue to be sacrificed as the bill-payer for shortfalls in the services personnel and readiness accounts. The administration's budget submission to Congress continues to delay funding for modernization until after the turn of the century. In addition, just when the Army is attempting to develop leap-ahead technologies and systems for the Army After Next which will counter the sophisticated threats of the 21st century, research and development funding is decreasing. That just doesn't make sense. We're eating our seed corn for the future.
Last Wednesday, 23 members of both the R&D and Procurement Subcommittees received extensive classified briefings from essential intelligence agency analysts regarding a multitude of present and future threats to include proliferation of weapons systems around the world that pose increasingly stressing threats to our Army. Two days later, four members of the Procurement and R&D subcommittees took briefings and observed the Comanche flight demonstration. As impressed as they were with Comanche, they were amazed that the Army's premier program to develop the quarterback of the digital battlefield has only one single operational prototype. Nobody in their right mind would attempt to develop a sophisticated aircraft such as the Comanche without multiple prototypes. The FA–18 ENF development, a modification to an existing aircraft, has 7 development aircraft and the F–22 is planned to have about 10 for its development program.
Page 370 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We read in the press that the Army has recently been chastised for lobbying the Congress for more money because a few courageous Army officials believe the Army's share of the defense budget is insufficient. The accounts do not question the Army's assessment of its budget but, rather, state its crime was being inept at its lobbying effort. Dr. Oscar and General Kern, I hope you will both clearly understand that giving direct and complete answers here today in response to members' questions is not lobbying. We expect no less than your candid opinion when requested.
And, for the record, I'd like to submit the article in The Wall Street Journal, dated February 3, 1998, at this point in time of which the headline asserts, ''Army Officials Express Displeasure with their Share of Military Budget,'' with extensive quotes from Lt. Gen. David Heedner.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 372.]
Mr. WELDON. I hope General Heedner will not be left out on a limb to a lone speakout for the shortfalls in R&D funding for the Army.
Mr. Secretary, we welcome and thank you and General Kern for coming to testify today. Before I turn the floor over to you, I'd like to call on Duncan Hunter, chairman of the Procurement Subcommittee, for any opening remarks he might have. Mr. Hunter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Page 371 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again, thanks to you and our ranking members for forming this partnership of the R&D and procurement subcommittees, and with the massive drawdown in funding that's been undertaken with this administration, I think it's only appropriate because we're still about $100 billion under what Ronald Reagan spent on procurement in the 1980's.
Let me just paint a backdrop for you, gentlemen. I think you're probably familiar with it. We had 18 Army divisions when we fought Desert Storm I; today we have 10. That's not enough in my estimation to sustain the two MRC requirement. In fact, we fought both the MRC's; we fought Korea—that required 7 Army divisions, and we fought Desert Storm, obviously—we employed 8 in Desert Storm. Eight and 7 is 15; we've got 10.
Just before Korea, I've read the testimony of then-Secretary Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Defense, and his testimony was to the effect that was surprisingly similar to the testimony that we've received from this administration. They talk about the military being leaner and meaner, they talk about a reliance on technology, and we relied on the technology in the early 1950's. That technology was, of course, the nuclear weapon that no one else had and we presumed that nobody would mess with the United States because we had that enormous technological advantage.
So, we were shocked and amazed when the North Koreans invaded, came across the line, and almost drove this great Nation's military forces off the Peninsula. In fact, we called it, I think, the 25th Infantry Division from Japan and its Commander, William Dean—Gen. William Dean, was captured in the ensuing fighting just north of what became known as Apuson Line.
Page 372 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The point that I'm making is as much as we rely on high-tech, ultimately ground forces have to take land and hold it and we've massively cut these ground forces. And, to compound that problem, we've cut dramatically ten modernization budgets that support the ground forces.
Let me go into just a little bit of that. Now, we talked, incidentally, General Kern, we just had a good discussion about the acquisition work force. We're going to be facing flat budgets and I think it's wrong. I think we're making a big mistake. I think we're going to do the same thing ultimately that the Joint Chiefs, I believe, after we were initially beaten up in Korea, unanimously concurred that we needed to have at least an 18-division Army and we promptly tried to build back to that level. But, let's go to the acquisition workforce and your desperate need for modernization.
In the procurement accounts, it's a little over $8 billion. You have, according to what you just told me, about 67,000 acquisition workers. If you take out the depot people, that takes you down to about 53,000 and those people are not metal-benders that depot—those people are the shoppers, the people that are buying the $6.-some billion worth of new equipment. That means that we're spending, at $53,000 apiece, almost $3 billion on the shopping corps and that means that if you buy a helicopter for $10 million, you're paying around $3 million to your professional shoppers for the job of buying that piece of equipment.
I would suggest to you that, even though historically we've come down dramatically in terms of acquisition personnel, that now that we're down to the point where you folks have a $1.7 billion ammunition deficiency—and that's the latest word that we've gotten from the Army—with respect to the capability of fighting two MRC's, when you have the much smarter Army than you've had in the past when you have almost no new weapon systems coming on board, you need to greatly streamline. And that means cut in half and pick up your share of the cuts in strength that we mandated last year. DOD overall, we came down from 300,000 professional shoppers to 174,000. We figured we shouldn't have more professional shoppers than we have U.S. Marines, which is 174,000.
Page 373 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, call us arbitrary, but I think until you have the same in-strength cuts, that we have forced on your military services on the fighting arm of the U.S. Army, we're not going to have really efficient procurement systems. You have a very slim budget, even though it's come up a little bit over the last year.
And, let me go to one other point that I know is important to my friend, Curt Weldon: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. Your commanders in the Korean Theater, General Tillely, expressed yesterday extreme concern about the slowness in fielding the ability to stop SCUD missiles, which we know now carry gas as well as conventional weapons. They've got the ability to hit our airfields, to hit our troop concentrations, and to poison those airfields, I think, for a sustained period of time. We still have very little in line in terms of the ability to shoot down even the slower ballistic missiles; we basically have upgraded capabilities with the Patriot but little else.
I recommended, and I'm going to work with Curt and with the Administration officials, that we go into a focus on technology acceleration program, not necessarily with producing a lot of products. You've got PAD, Navy's got
upper tier, we've got MIAD's, but with respect to being able to shoot down incoming missiles, now that means harnessing up the labs and using their simulation capability, which was recommended this morning by Phil Coin, and I had a good talk with General Lyles. Unless we accelerate that capability, I think that all of us, we up here and you folks who are just serving the thirty-some thousand Americans who serve in uniform in the Army just south of the North Korean line.
So, we have enormous problems, and on the bright side, I look forward to listening to you to talk about what's happened on Comanche. I know you've got a pilot that's going to tell us a little bit about that today. That's a piece of good news. We've got a lot of bleak news, and I hope that you'll work with us to solve that problem.
Page 374 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And I want to, Mr. Chairman, to welcome again, as we did yesterday, my counterpart and my partner in this effort to modernize the Army, Norman Sisisky of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Mr. Pickett.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your assessment that the Army's R&D budget is not all that it needs to be if we are to achieve the objectives for the Army After Next.
That's it. I'd like to share a couple of observations that are of increasing concern to me. They have to do with how we spend our R&D dollars. The first has to do with whether the Army is getting the best return possible for its limited R&D investment. It seems to me that a disconnect is developing between Army requirements for an Army After Next and what the current spending plan would develop in the intervening years. To equip the Army After Next in the projected fiscal environment for R&D, we may need to start thinking about changing the focus of planned Army R&D investment to more leap-ahead developments as a matter of priority.
For example, most could agree that the Comanche program contained reaching helicopter technology that would be desirable in any Army After Next. But, some question whether our investment in Crusader will yield technology that we would want in an Army After Next. If so, it begs the question whether we should buy it once it's developed. And, if we don't buy it, then we've wasted a lot of R&D dollars that we really don't have in completing its development. One way to avoid this trap is to get better quality yield for our R&D investment so that the systems that result have utility desirable for an Army After Next and even beyond that.
Page 375 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The second observation has to do with budgetary discipline with the R&D accounts. We see what happens to the tech base dollars spent for advanced development and advanced development dollars being spent for what appears to be procurement. Advanced concept technology development have been particularly problematical in this regard. No doubt this condition results from attempts to keep programs on track when there's not enough of the right kind of dollars. Nevertheless, because it masks the real problem, it makes honest solutions more difficult for all of us. I think we need to call for and enforce strict discipline in the R&D accounts. This would allow us to identify and respond to R&D shortfalls in a more timely and efficient manner.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon and look forward to their testimony, and I thank you both for calling this hearing.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Mr. Sisisky.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your concerns with regard to underfunding the Army modernization but I'm also concerned about how the proposed modernization funds would be spent.
I and many others believe that the Army may be spending too much of its limited budget maintaining legacy systems that it probably would not use in future conflict and that this spending comes at the expense of modernization. For example, the Army still spends vast sums of money to operate and maintain equipment that is, for all practical purposes, non-deployable.
Page 376 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Perhaps Cobra helicopters are the good example. Why would a theater CINC use precious airlift at sealift to deploy a less capable Cobra when he could deploy, in orders of magnitude, more capable Apaches for the same lift? I think the logic can be extended to include UH–1 HUN, OH58A and Sea Kayawa helicopters, certain track combat vehicles, and many—and other weapons as well.
If, in fact, the Army is spending a lot of money supporting equipment that it likely would not deploy, I think we should consider whether or not the money might be better spent underwriting some of the procurement and R&D costs associated with the reaching modernization required to equip the Army After Next. I know this means aggressively retiring old friends and I know it will be difficult. Nevertheless, I believe the time has come for a dialog that leads to action on this notion.
I join in welcoming you, gentlemen, today and listening to your remarks.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman from Virginia and we're always pleased to have our distinguished Chairman of the full committee who amazes me with how many hearings he attends besides his duties as the full committee Chairman, and I'd like to recognize him for any opening comments he's likely to make. Mr. Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you for being here, Mr. Spence.
Page 377 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I have two introductions. One I'm going to call on Mr. Hunter but we're also pleased to have one of those who are out there ''where the rubber meets the road'' testing our programs and that is, as I understand it, Chief Foreign Officer John William Armbrust. John, would you please identify yourself so that we can acknowledge your presence? And thank you for the good work that you are doing and we hope to hear from you on your personal observations about the Comanche sometime today.
Mr. Hunter, you also had an introduction.
Mr. HUNTER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's appropriate that I introduce the gentleman I'm going to introduce following your introduction because he's a guy that has the record as a helicopter pilot for peace-time saves of pilots who have gone down. He is Dan McKinnon, presently the owner of North American Airlines and the former head of the CAB, one of the few guys who sunsetted his own agency in Washington. We're still trying to figure that one out. But, Dan is an expert on this new era of terrorists with high technology and wrote the book on the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and has been—did the play-by-play for McNeil-Lehrer for the—during the Desert Storm operation. So, Dan, thank you for being here and I'd be interested later to get your impressions of this Comanche helicopter. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. WELDON. And I join with my friend and colleague in welcoming you here and recognizing you for the work that you've done on behalf of our country.
With that, Dr. Oscar, I'll turn the floor over to you. Your statement will be entered into the record without objection and you may make whatever comments you'd like to make. The floor is yours.
Page 378 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. OSCAR, ACTING ASST. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL J. KERN, LT. GEN., MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ACTING ASST. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, U.S. ARMY; JOHN WILLIAM ARMBRUST, CWO, U.S. ARMY; WILLIAM CAMPBELL, LT. GEN., DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS, AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S. ARMY; THEODORE PROCIV, DEP. ASST. TO THE SECRETARY FOR CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION, U.S. ARMY; FENNER MILTON, CHIEF SCIENTIST AND DEP. ASST. SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ARMY; AND RON ADAMS, MAJ. GEN., FORCE DEVELOPMENTS, U.S. ARMY
Dr. OSCAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you.
Dr. OSCAR. I'd like to introduce just a few more people that we have brought that can answer selective questions in certain key areas. In addition to General Kern and Chief Warrant Officer Armbrust, I have Lt. Gen. Bill Campbell. He's the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. He's also the Chief Information Officer for the Army. So, if you have any questions on the year 2000 (Y2K) or some of our computer areas, he would be the one who has detailed knowledge. Also, Dr. Ted Prociv is our Deputy Assistant Secretary for CHEMICAL DEMIL. In addition, I have Dr. Fenner Milton who is the Army's Chief Scientist and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology. I also have Maj. Gen. Ron Adams. He's in charge of Force Developments in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.
Page 379 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Both General Kern and I would like to make a brief statement before we get into questions and answers. As you've mentioned, over the last several years the Army has gone through a very difficult process of downsizing, budget reductions, and reshaping. During this time, however, the Army has been able to support the United States with hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii, riots, floods, fires, drug wars and peace-making and peace-keeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia.
We have been able to do that in an excellent fashion. We've had to focus on readiness and quality of life and a lot of the modernization that we have desired, some of it has been slipped and pushed to the right. This has delayed some of the programs we wanted.
With your help, we've been able to mitigate that some. But, there's no doubt that we missed opportunities to put technology into some of our weapons, that we have been buying and procuring weapons at less than their optimum rate, sometimes even below the minimum sustaining rate, and that some of our equipment has, indeed, aged, especially our truck fleets. Some of our trucks in the 2.5-ton area are over 25 years old.
This fiscal year 1999 budget that we are presenting and discussing today reverses that trend. For the first time in over 10 years, the Army's budget modernization is going up. Our procurement account is $8.2 billion. While that's only about one-sixth of the Department of Defense [DOD] procurement budget, it's up over a billion dollars from fiscal year 1998 and it continues to go up a billion a year all the way from fiscal years 1999 to 2003.
Mr. HUNTER. Isn't a lot of that the CHEM DEMIL transfer, though? I didn't mean to interrupt you, Doctor.
Page 380 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. In the near-term, yes, sir, Mr. Hunter; some of that is the CHEM DEMIL. But, as you see that one billion a year as we get out to fiscal year 2003, there are some significant rises. Some of it, though, however, is CHEM DEMIL. In our Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation [RDT&E] budget, it's $4.8 billion which is about one-eighth of the DOD R&D budget. It is, however, relatively stable and toward the end of the period, 2002 or 2003, starts a gentle rise.
I believe the modernization plan that this budget includes is a very balanced program. We have tried to look at our near-term readiness, our aging equipment, and our future technology opportunities. And we have put together, I think, the best balanced budget we can to ensure that our soldiers have equipment now and in the future.
Our strategy has five major parts, and I'd just like to briefly go over them. The first is digitization, the second is combat overmatch, the third is equipment recapitization, the fourth is equipment to support the integration of the Guard and Reserve into the active force, and the fifth is to focus our science and technology on the Army After Next.
The digitization, the first area, really is going to maximize the use of this rapidly advancing information technology. For several years now, we have been putting information technology into our weapons that we are fielding and upgrading that includes computers, databases, digital radios, and Global Positioning System [GPS]. We have now realized through a series of simulations, wargames, Army warfighting experiments that we can get a leap-ahead capability if we integrate these weapons and computers together in what we call digitization.
Page 381 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Much in the same way that American Telephone and Telegraph [AT&T] or America Online integrates all the computers and telephones and TVs in your houses and kind of has a backbone or a switching capability. We have found that if we can put a mobile Internet into our battlefield and link all this through switches and internets, we, too, can get a leap-ahead capability and synergize all this information. The National Defense Panel [NDP] and the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] both complimented the Army for moving out in information technology. This linking together and, in this year's fiscal year 1999 budget, we have devoted $261 million to this linking together. This will leverage over $2.6 billion that's embedded in our weapons for the information technology portion of these weapons. Our goal is to field the digitized division by the year 2000 and field the digitized Corps by the year 2004.
The second area or major thrust is to maintain the combat overmatch that we have now, to take a look at technological opportunities, to take a look at the threats and see where can we get the most leverage with a few key weapons. An example of these programs are the Apache Longbow and Comanche helicopters, the Crusader howitzer, and several missiles, such as the Javelin and the Brillant Anti-Armor Submunition [BAT] which provides a homing submunition for the Army Tactical Missiles System, Army [TACMS].
The third area is to reverse this thrust of our aging equipment and we've had to go to a combination of some new equipment, some depot rebuilds, some service life extensions to see if how can we best put a program together that will lower our own operations and support cost, give us some younger equipment, and stretch the life of some equipment we have. We've put our major thrust in this area on our truck fleet, our cargo helicopter fleet, our power generators, our water purifiers. This, sir, is the very equipment that's at war every day. In Bosnia, today, we may not be shooting our howitzers or our missiles, but our trucks are running up and down the road and they're putting on a lot of mileage and they're getting a lot of wear and tear. So, this part of the program is to try and reverse that and get more life out of this equipment.
Page 382 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The fourth area is to increase the equipment for our Guard and Reserve as we integrate the Guard and Reserve into the active force. We have increased in the fiscal year 1999 budget 33 percent the dollars that were put in against equipment for the Guard and Reserve. For example, in fiscal year 1999, we're going to be buying 18 Avenger air defense systems, 8 Black Hawk helicopters, 7 Sentinels, 305 line-haul tractors, and 54 20-ton dump trucks.
This new equipment, together with the cascading equipment, has already resulted in a significant increase of equipment in the Guard and Reserve. For example, we have pure-fleeted the Reserve with M1 tanks; we have 10 Army National Guard field artillery units by the end of fiscal year 1998 with the Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS]; we fully fielded all 15 enhanced brigades with Bradley; we've attained 19 Reserve component battalions with Apache helicopters; we've modernized 15 Reserve component battalions with Black Hawks, and we're equipping 10 Reserve companies with the Heavy Equipment Transporter System [HETS] trucks.
The fifth and final area I want to mention is to focus our tech base on the Army After Next. This digitized Army that we are fielding from about the year 2000 for the division and 2004 for the Corps all the way up to, say, 2010, 2015, that's our next Army. That's our information age Army.
The work we're doing in technology and research today will start fielding about the 2010 timeframe; that'll be the Army After Next. We have done a series of wargames analyses to determine what's the best technical opportunity, what might that Army After Next look like. We will designate the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment [ACR] as a test bed, kind of a technical test bed, just as we've designated the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood as a technical test bed for the digitized Next Army. We're going to designate the 2d ACR as a test bed for the Army After Next and we'll start developing equipment in research and development to put on there to see what's the best combination.
Page 383 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, I feel that the Army budget is starting to go up, we're starting to look at reversing some of these trends of the downsizing. I think we have the best balanced plan to maintain our capability in the near-term and in the future to win the country's wars and to reduce our casualties.
I'd now like to ask General Kern to make a brief statement and then we'll go on to questions and answers.
General KERN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today before the committees and talk about Army modernization.
First, I'd like to comment on Mr. Hunter's comment about the experience of the U.S. Army in Korea at the beginning of the Korean War. I wear on my right shoulder the patch of the 24th Infantry Division. I served three tours with them and the lessons of Task Force Smith are not lost on me at all, and I appreciate very much the problems that we've gone through in the past and do not want to replicate them in the future.
A year ago, Gen. Bill Campbell and myself were in the Mojave Desert and Bill was the Program Executive Officer for our Command, Control, and Computers and I was the Commander of the Experimental Force Division which was working in the desert. We had a tremendous opportunity to amplify and learn about what digitization could do for our fighting forces. Now, as General Campbell pointed out to me many times, it's this new process as well as the soldiers fighting that we have brought forward very quickly a new capability.
Page 384 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I would like to read from a letter, if I could, very quickly, which Secretary Cohen wrote back to me after he visited upon his return from that exercise. He said, ''These warfighting experiments may well prove to be as important in defining the Army of the future as George Marshall's Louisiana maneuvers were to defining the Army that won World War II.'' I believe that's a true statement and we are using the money most efficiently by the new process as well as the equipping of our forces and we intend to do that even more efficiently with a focus on the acquisition work force and the process, as well as the technology.
Secondly, Secretary Cohen commented—he said, ''I saw soldiers who had mastered complex technology and turned it to their advantage on the battlefield.'' That had been a concern prior to Desert Storm, that the Army was fielding technology. Now, we showed in Desert Storm that we have soldiers today that are very capable of using the technology we give them and using it effectively. Now, we saw it again in the desert in California, as we provided these new information technologies to our weapons platforms. So, we have soldiers that are very capable and soldiers whom we want to equip for the next battle to be the best equipped again in the world as well as well-trained on that equipment.
The second point I'd like to make, if I could, is just to show you a piece of a Comanche. This is a board which we call a SEM–E and it is part of the onboard processor on the Comanche. In 1991, when they started building this, this used to be three boards and these three boards had an operational capability of about 84 operations per second. Now, you might call this a Lumbock Board. Those three boards are now one and this has one billion operations per second built on this one board. It can be taken in and out very quickly.
Another interesting part of it is that there are no wires that connect these pieces together. A little matrix fits inside there and that matrix has on top of it a piece of a chip which has contacts that are then screwed down on top. We can change this and inside those pieces are commercial technology. So, this gives us the ability to maintain currency with technology as it changes and, as we showed over the last few years, we went from three boards to one in a very reliable system.
Page 385 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, the technologies that we are producing today to give to the soldiers are keeping pace with the very fast changeover in technology that's taking place. You know, we can hear much more about how that actually performs, you know, from our test pilot as we go on later today for questions.
The last comment I would like to make would be about our acquisition work force in a different aspect. A few weeks ago, I was in Sarajevo visiting some of our contingency contracting officers. These are the same people that we have working in our laboratories, in our procurement offices, who also have jobs supporting the troops in the field. One young Major whom I had met previously at Fort Monmouth, another whom I'd met working up at the contracting command, up in the northeast. They had working for them, an Air Force Chief Master Sergeant, and a Marine Corps Sergeant—a Gunny Sergeant. They were working together to sustain our forces with the Bosnians by working contingency contracting and providing services back to our soldiers.
So, I would like to tell you that our acquisition work force has other facets as well where they are supporting directly our troops and doing it very well, and in the process of rebuilding an economy in Bosnia and teaching people who had previously, you know, suffered under a Communist regime about how a democracy works and how the marketplace should work. A very interesting aspect of something else that our work force is doing.
So, I'm very pleased to be with you today and look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Oscar and General Kern can be found in the appendix on page 347.]
Page 386 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, General. Thank you both for being here and thank you for your statements and for your work on behalf of this country and, before I begin questions, I'd like to introduce our distinguished ranking member who, like our distinguished chairman, comes to almost every subcommittee hearing that we have. And he's again here and we'd like to welcome and allow him to make any opening comments he would like to make.
Congressman Ike Skelton?
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. I appreciate your courtesy. However, I still like to ride shotgun on my friend, Duncan Hunter, having been his ranking. I'm just here to listen. Thank you.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Secretary and General, let me start off by talking about the broad-based issues of funding levels and what appears to be an inequity in the budget request for this year with the Army getting a significantly lower portion of the budget, both in Research and Development [R&D] and modernization, in comparison with the other services. Now, we're not here to put you on the spot necessarily, but we do need to have a frank, candid discussion either professionally your opinion or personally your opinion so that we take whatever steps we can take in the Congress to ultimately support your needs. And that can only happen through a frank dialog.
As you know, there have been statements made by Army officials. I'll use a couple of the quotes. One looking at the defense budget and, specifically, the R&D budget, made the comment, and I quote, ''We have major problems down range.'' This was a senior Army official. An Army slide that's being used in Army briefings says, and I quote, ''The world has changed, the strategy has changed, the requirements have changed, the Army has changed, but the funding paradigm has not changed.'' Another official, when interviewing the three top Army field commanders, characterized their statements to him as, and I quote, ''They think it stinks. They have real problems with it, meaning the Army's budget.''
Page 387 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Some would say this is caused by maybe the Army not being aggressive enough on the Hill to make its case, which is my own personal opinion. I think the other services fare much better in that regard than Army and I've said that to everyone involved with the Army itself. Others say it's the defense industry. The defense industry is so concerned with driving its big-ticket programs that they put the Congress into a position of funding the big, glorious programs with the labor unions' support and the manufacturers' support sometimes at the expense of the warfighters who are out there responding to all of our needs around the world.
In fact, one recently retired Army official said, and I quote, ''The defense industry is sabotaging our national defense and dividing the services.'' And, to be honest with you, sometimes I don't disagree with that. I think there, in fact, may be some substance to that statement, unfortunately. What's your response? And do you support the statements that have been made by Army officials both officially in your capacity and perhaps personally, if they differ? Are we short-changing the Army?
Dr. OSCAR. Mr. Chairman, there's no doubt in my mind the Army has requirements for a larger budget. It's like running a taxicab fleet in the Bronx. If you have 100 taxicabs, if you want to keep the average age of your taxicabs constant, if each taxicab lasts 10 years, you want to buy 10 taxicabs a year. And, if you don't buy 10 taxicabs this year, next year you've got to buy 20. And, if you keep on not buying them, eventually they will all wear out and you've got to buy 100 taxicabs. Now, if you also want to modernize them a little bit and add a radio or a little GPS to see where they are, you want a little extra for modernization.
Now, I've calculated that in terms of the Army, like a big taxicab fleet; I've added up all our tanks, all our trucks, all our helicopters and I said, if we want to keep the average age constant, how much money does the Army need? And it's about $9 to $10 billion a year. Now, if you want to modernize it instead of buying the same exact truck, maybe get the latest truck that meets Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] standards or the tank with the little better gun on it, you require about $14, $15 billion a year. The Army, as you know, the last couple of years has had about $6 billion. This year's fiscal year 1999 budget we're presenting today is up a billion to $8.2 billion. So, it's clear we're aging our fleet——
Page 388 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Let me just add that to correct the record, the staff tells me that that $1 billion includes actually $855 million of what Mr. Hunter said is—so, that's a significant portion of that billion dollar plus-up.
Dr. OSCAR. And so, there's no doubt that the Army's modernization budget is in stress and that we have moved out into the future a problem. Now, as far as the Navy and the Air Force, I'm not an expert on the Navy and the Air Force, so—it's hard for me to know their needs. They may also have very big needs. I know the Navy, at one time, had a 600 ship Navy and now it's smaller and, at the rate they're buying ships, each one is going to have to last about 200 years. So, they probably have similar problems.
I do know and I talked to soldiers in the field, in Iraq and Kuwait, after Desert Storm, they spoke with pride but they also kind of laughingly said how the Army did in 100 hours what the Air Force couldn't do in 100 days. And now, when I go to Bosnia, and I see our soldiers on the ground, they tell me they're very proud of what they have done; they have separated these forces, they've stopped the killing, they can't do that with harpoon missiles or bombs from B–52's. And so, you know, I don't know their problems. They might have big problems, too. I do know that we have, obviously, a lot of requirements.
Mr. WELDON. Let me phrase the question a different way and it's not, is there additional need for dollars. Every service will come in and tell us there's a need for more money.
I'm trying to get at the issue of fairness and let me use another quote from Army Lt. Gen. Richard Treffey who said, and I quote, ''The Army gets 24 percent of the money but carried 70 percent of the load.'' My question to you is, is the budget for the next fiscal year fair to the Army? Do you feel that you are getting the fair amount of the dollars for R&D in the next fiscal year and the next 5 years in comparison to what the Navy and the Air Force is getting and, in line with those quotes that I've given to you from other Army officials? That's what I'm trying to get at. Is it fair?
Page 389 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. Mr. Chairman, I really can't answer that because I don't know the Navy and Air Force needs. I know my needs and I have big needs and I would love to have a bigger piece of the pie. I assume that the Defense Department had done the same thing I've done; I've had the balance in the Army how much money to put in tanks, how much money to put in helicopters, everybody wants more and I've kind of come up with the best balance. I assume the Defense Department has done that, too.
Mr. WELDON. Let me ask General Kern the question. General Kern, you're the warfighter. You're out there on the line. Is it fair, given the parameters that I've just described to you? Because it's a real concern in the Congress that we're not being fair to the Army.
General KERN. First, I'd have to tell you upfront that, one, I count on the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines to be there in the fight with me. So, I don't want to take things away from them. So, asking of the question ''is it fair'' has a lot of different dimensions.
I think my personal opinion is that it's also been reported that the percentage of the gross national product [GNP] which goes to defense is below what it should be. I believe that to be true. So then, how do you divide the pie? I think, first, the pie is too small to begin with, and we in the Army suffer from that very much. Our programs are at the margin. When we are taxed and we take inflation cuts, we find them to be very painful to execute our programs and we have to cut things out rather than—and push them back into out years. So from that standpoint, no, the Army, I don't think is getting all that it needs to meet its full requirements.
Page 390 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. I understand. Believe me, this committee shares your concern. GNP defense spending has gone from 9 percent to 2.9 percent. In John Kennedy's era, 52 cents of every tax dollar went for the military. In this year's budget, it's 16 cents. The President spoke for 75 minutes in the State of the Union speech. There were exactly two sentences about national security and the military, patting our troops on the back and saying our readiness is ready. We have the same concerns. But the point is, given the parameters of what we're dealing with dollar-wise, we need to hear whether or not you feel you're satisfied. If you do that, then in fact we'll continue to support the requests that have been given us.
But I have the distinct impression, and maybe it's wrong, in listening to comments made by senior Army officials both recently retired and current that we're not being fair. That's what I'm trying to get at. That's the reason why I'm—George, and I'm not trying to—I am trying to box you in—I shouldn't say I'm not, I am trying to box you in to be honest with you and have you say what I think is of—in fact, supports the problem and then to help you get more money. Let me ask one more question because you have a lot of members here.
On the supporting leap-ahead technology development. I note the Army's request is only as high as it is because of transfers of defense-wide programs such as $54.4 million for the strategic environmental research and development program to the R&D accounts. It's also very disturbing to find that the Army's second largest R&D expenditure is to support $300 million of base operations. That's not exactly a leap-ahead technology. How can the Army develop leap-ahead technology in systems and digitize the force under such severe fiscal restraints? Doesn't R&D require reliable and increasing funding to support development advance systems to be procured for the future—for the Army After Next?
Page 391 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. Mr. Chairman, we have tried to balance our R&D versus our procurement accounts. Our R&D a couple of years ago was about $5 billion and our procurement was about $6 billion. Ten years ago, we had a ratio of about one to three. We had about three times the procurement as we did R&Ds. In the last few years, it's only been a one-to-one. It's concerned us a great deal because we have no procurement money to buy what comes out of research and development. So we try to get a better balance. We think our budget's in pretty good balance. Would we like more? Of course, we would. But, we have very exciting technologies and programs in our tech base and we have a little less than that in development. We do not have the money in procurement to buy all of those.
So to put money on balance—more money into tech base and to research, I think would create more in the pipeline that we couldn't afford to buy. We kind of got a balance of aging weapons today and the technology to make the best balance we can. We have, I believe, many items in technology.
An example: Our 6.1 budget continues to go up at zero real growth. It is essentially going up every year and we've been protecting that. So we've purposely trying to protect our research to make sure we take advantage of opportunities.
Mr. WELDON. Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that the $300 million of base operations should not be in the R&D account line?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir. I would support a move to put that into OMA funding. It's one isolated area where we do base ops out of R&D. It would be much better to have it all in our operations and maintenance, Army [OMA] accounts. Often when we switch back and forth, you lose no matter which way you switch. At one time, it was in OMA and they moved some to R&D and we lost some. I'd like it back in OMA, but I don't want to lose when we move it back to OMA.
Page 392 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. All right. General, do you have any other comments?
General KERN. Well, I just add that we're willing to use the dollars that we do have very efficiently. That has been one of the real challenges for us to make sure that we don't waste R&D dollars; we don't waste procurement dollars. An example is the Comanche program which was flying with one prototype; that development effort was done exceedingly well. Done a great deal in simulation and we can still continue to do that. So one of the pressures is teaching us to be very efficient.
Mr. WELDON. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Incidentally, all the quotes that you made and I think in the statements that our witnesses have made, I'm appreciative of. I think we're at a time we have a difficult—I was just getting a little litany from the staff, or a description of the number of uniformed officers who because of their statements and publications have to go see the Secretary and get taken to task for saying that the country needs more defense. Those things happen. Those times happen. We've had some great soldiers who have fallen on their swords in terms of talking about the need for military readiness.
I was playing poker last night with Charlie Bass, whose great uncle was Billy Mitchell. Billy told us a lot of things with respect to air power that we needed in the 1920's. We court-martialed him for it, but we needed that air power and to some degree he woke the country up.
Page 393 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
This is a difficult time for you folks in uniform because you see a lot of deficiencies that you want to address and sometimes there are repercussions. Just like there's repercussions for us with things that we say in the political form, but thank you for saying them. My recommendation to every uniformed officer is to be candid. Always be candid with respect to the military needs of the country. Because one thing that Curt said often—and I think Norm Sisisky mentioned it one time, too—was the fact that if you don't say that we need something and we put it in the bill, the editorial writers around the country say ''there goes that doggone Congress again putting in things that the military doesn't want.'' We know that you want it often because you've told us you want it in the confines of our offices but you haven't said it on the record.
So this system is set up so that sometimes a number of us have to take a great deal of pain. This is a painful time for a lot of military people. But my kudos to the military leadership that is coming forward that is saying we can't cut anymore and we've cut too much and we need to replenish funds here, here and here.
Mr. Chairman, I've got just a couple of questions here. Let me ask you about the Department of the Army and the National Guards' intent to re-engine approximately 130 of Vietnam-era Huey-type helicopters with T–801 engines. That's—hopefully helps us fulfill this requirement for a light utility helicopter. What are your plans?
Dr. OSCAR. Mr. Hunter, we are trying to help the Comanche helicopter. The Comanche helicopter, as most airplanes, has an engine development that's usually separate but in parallel to the main part of the helicopter. The T–800 engine is an engine we developed for the Comanche helicopter. The engine and the helicopter is almost ready, because of funding cuts in the past, has been slowed and won't be ready for awhile. So we had this gap. We got the engines ready and what we do with them?
Page 394 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Now the T–800 engine is a marvelous engine. You can take the whole thing apart with a couple of wrenches. It was designed to have low operation support costs and very powerful. The National Guard offered to us, and said, we will buy some of these engines and put them in some of our old helicopters because that will help our operating and support [O&S] cost and that will allow you to test them because you don't have Comanche helicopters to test them in. We will then give them back to you. Essentially what we're doing is loaning these engines so to speak to the National Guard. They were reducing their own cost and we're getting the test of the engine and then we'll be able to mate it up with a Comanche and they'll give us the engines back.
Separate from all of that, we are looking very seriously at what to do about our Huey fleet. Our Huey fleet is aging quite a bit and we need to do something about it. We're looking at several options to upgrade the Huey, to perhaps buy a commercial-like utility helicopter. We're looking at all of those options. But the purpose of this was not to upgrade the Huey, it was simply to solve a near-term problem we had in a Comanche helicopter of how to test these engines.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Longbow Apache, is it adequately funded?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir. It's a marvelous weapon. It's a leap-ahead technology. It's one of our highest priorities in the Army. It's a radar that cues in on top of the helicopter and then it allows us to fire and forget the missiles and have them home in on the target. It's just a marvelous technology and it is funded. I don't know of any flagrant problems.
Page 395 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General KERN. The Longbow is fully funded, but I will tell you it is funded right at the margin. So that when there are adjustments to be made to the program, and it was across-the-board reductions we took in fiscal year 1998 and both here and in inflation reduction; when you compare that the inflation indices which were negotiated in a multiyear contract, we are right at the margin right now. So while the program is adequately funded, I will tell you that there is no extra money whatsoever in that program, and some of the work is being done in later years which could be done today.
Mr. HUNTER. OK.
Dr. OSCAR. I might add this an area where you could help us. For a long time, Congress would decrement a certain program and then for a while we kind of decremented—not attached—but allowed us to figure out where to put the decrement. Recently in the last 2 years, Congress has put a decrement but demanded that it go equally for each program. So some programs, like Apache for example, we have signed multiyear contracts. Then we have to, by law, then take a certain decrement out of every program equally. That then often causes us to perhaps break that multi-year and has a tremendous penalty. So if there is a choice and you want an undistributed decrement, it would be really preferable just to make it undistributed and allow us some flexibility where to put it.
Mr. HUNTER. OK.
Mr. WELDON. Will the gentleman——
Mr. HUNTER. Certainly.
Page 396 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. To follow up Mr. Hunter's question about LongBow Apaches, there's an article running in today's Defense Daily which basically says in an effort to deal with shortfall and the resources, the Army's considering trimming a number of Boeing LongBow Apaches. Considering slowing initial production of the Comanche and considering slowing the CH–47D Chinook-improved cargo helicopter which indicates to me that you don't have enough money. Is this article wrong?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir. I think I quit my subscription to the magazine to save money.
Mr. WELDON. It says it's quoting internal Army documents.
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, that's wrong. Our budget, as General Kern said, supports these aircraft. We have Comanche and Apache-funded. We'd like more but they are funded out in the future.
Mr. WELDON. But you're not slowing them down from what you initially told us.
Dr. OSCAR. No, we have multiyear contracts for that.
Mr. WELDON. OK. Good.
Mr. HUNTER. That's all the questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pickett.
Page 397 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. I think the Comanche is a good example of a sort of leap-ahead kind of technology we like to see, particularly for the Army. I don't know that this can be a possibility, but if you did get additional funding for the Comanche program, how would you propose to use these moneys?
Dr. OSCAR. OK, what I'd like to do first is explain, again, that we have balanced our program as best we can with the resources we have.
Mr. PICKETT. I'm putting you on the spot——
Dr. OSCAR. No, I'm going to answer your question very honestly and straightforward. I'll tell you exactly how much and where. But I'm going to tell you first that we have balanced our budget the best we can. I mean, I can't buy all tanks and not buy any clothing for our soldiers.
Mr. PICKETT. I understand.
Dr. OSCAR. I can not modernize my trucks. So I've kind of taken the money we've got, and we've got a really good balance, I think. So in this era of balanced budget agreements, our very real fear is that if someone was to give me more here, I'm going to lose it there and undo all this balancing that we did. So we have that fear. Now if that money came from somewhere else, I'll have General Kern tell you exactly where to put it. [Laughter.]
Your ball. [Laughter.]
Page 398 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General KERN. Clearly, one of the issues that you know is that we have only one type prototype flying. We have another prototype which is being assembled today. So if we were given additional funds that's one of the areas that we would put it. How much does it cost to get another prototype flying? Our estimate right now—I'll tell you, it's a very crude estimate because we have not looked at that at this point. There's about $25 million to get it up and to sustain it for a year. The other part that we would like to do would be to accelerate the mission package that goes onboard the Comanche. So while sometimes you may consider whether or not we would ask for six or seven more prototypes, we feel would be more beneficial to put that into the acceleration of the mission package so that we knew in fact that we had a more capable aircraft. I would really have to go back and take a look and provide for the record, what that would be to do it.
Mr. PICKETT. I'd appreciate that for the record, please.
General KERN. We'll do that, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 373.]
General KERN. The last piece that we consider on the Comanche program would be accelerating the introduction of the Longbow. When we originally developed the Comanche helicopter, the Longbow technology was not there. We've incorporated that now, but it does not cut in until later into the production. So that would be the third area that we would consider for acceleration. Again, I would have to provide that information for the record, sir.
Page 399 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 373.]
Mr. PICKETT. Also, I understand that the Comanche can't even theoretically get into the Army warfighting experiments such as Division 2000 because you don't have the simulation technology developed. Is this a fact and if so, what does it take to get this aircraft into the fight here?
General KERN. We are looking at that right now. Remember, our goal is to put the first complete digital division on the ground in the year 2000. That's the time then that we would like the first prototype Comanches to be able to work with us in the testing of doing that. We are looking at the pros and cons right now, a couple of different alternatives of how best to do that. I really don't have a final answer that I could give you right now. Yes, there is more work that needs to get done to bring it into that 2000 timeframe for the complete digital package.
Mr. PICKETT. Do you know what that would cost? Do you have a cost number for that?
General KERN. Sir, I do not have that with me. I'll provide that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 373.]
Page 400 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. OK, thank you. And just a final question about the Comanche, because I think this is something—you're on the right track and I hope you don't get slowed down anymore in this getting fielded. Are there collateral technologies and development of the Comanches that need to be brought up to speed that you could use some money on? To go on the system to go on that helicopter?
General KERN. Yes. I mentioned the three areas I think that gives us the most concern right now as to where additional R&D investments would be made in that particular program. You mentioned a fourth area where additional technology work would be done to ensure that we have a fully compatible—with our Force XXI digitalization efforts. Included in the mission package, there is a lot of technology work which is being done in the helmet-mounted displays and how that is tied in to our entire display work which is one of the areas where technology is moving that we'd like to. Now, perhaps Chief Armbrust, who is very familiar with that, might comment on that particular area.
Chief ARMBRUST. Yes, sir. The helmet-mounted display technology is not on the prototype right now. We're not doing any development with it actually on the air vehicle. We use a great deal of assimilation and lab work to develop it. And it is a fairly significant feature because unlike other helicopters, that will be our primary flight display—will be painted in front of our eyes. There aren't any gauges in a helicopter like in a typical airplane—everything's there. So it's a fairly critical piece of the pie—that we don't have any aircraft right now in the prototype. None of the drivers, none of the computers are there, none of the sensor systems, nor image displays are in the prototype right now.
Page 401 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. While you've got the mike, could you just tell the committee, fairly briefly, how you feel about the Comanche? I know you've flown a lot of different kinds of helicopters and——
Chief ARMBRUST. Yes, sir. I should start off by saying that my experience base comes from the older Aeroscout models—OH–58A's and C's. I flew a UH–1 in January, so that's still not gone after 20 years. I also fly Apaches. Most of my test work was in Apaches prior to Comanche; that's my experience base. With the Comanche, I should point out that air vehicle one is undergoing structural envelope expansion. Which means we're just trying to make sure that all the big parts stay on so that we can start doing some of the other development work. So we're very early on in the program. The aircraft only has—I believe about 72 flight hours on it right now.
I am part of the Army's test organizations and have been assigned there to work with the contractors. There's only four of us pilots. It's kind of—for lack of better words—kind of a backyard operation we've got there. There's just the four of us—two Sikorsky, one Boeing and myself. There's a handful of engineers. We do have a nice room that we work in. We've got the one prototype and we've got the instrumentation folks. We do quite well, I believe with what we've got to work with. The aircraft itself is progressing quite nicely. If you look at any program—take any successfully fielded system like a Black Hawk or an Apache or something that's doing quite well for us now—and go back and look at their first 60 or 70 hours and you'll find that we've done quite well. We got out to our maximum level flight air speed of about 167 knots—true air speed—which is faster than any helicopter in the Army fleet right now in 58 hours after the first flight—which is pretty remarkable.
Page 402 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As a program, it's going technically, it's going quite well. There aren't any major glitches—we've got the usual stuff that comes up. There aren't any major problems with it. They really are trying to take a big step ahead here and some of the stuff, frankly, for those of us who've been in the business for awhile, looks risky. The flight control system is a huge departure from the standard or a conventional flight control system in a helicopter. What they were trying to accomplish was—when I would fly scouts, I'd say about 70 percent of my time I would devote to just keeping the greasy side down; watch out for the tree; don't hit the wire; just manipulate me and the flight controller to maintain control of the aircraft.
That only left about 30 percent of my attention to devote to whatever it was I was doing. In the case of the opt tactical operations—running a battle; directing Cobras to bring in their fire; conducting joint air tactics; calling in A–10 support and organizing it so that when the A–10 leaves, the artillery lands; and when the artillery quits, the Cobras are up on their mark. Thirty percent—70 percent—with the flight on the aircraft, the flight control that they developed or are trying to is trying to actually try to reverse that number so that you only spend about 30 percent of your time actually manipulating the aircraft—which means that you get to be a soldier for 70 percent of your time out there, managing a battlefield. Tremendous risk and frankly, from first flight on, it turned out that the area we were most concerned about flight control laws has been a flawless performer.
I think it's been due mainly to modeling and simulation that was done ahead of time—an analysis that got us through that first cut. Yes, there are some adjustments we have to make, but as a broad first cut, it worked out quite well.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 403 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Thank you for those excellent observations. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You heard me in my opening remarks talk about legacy weapons and what they really deploy. Then you said that the Apache, for instance, and I use the example of the Cobra versus the Apache is at a marginal level. Well maybe rather than modernize the Cobra, you're better off the money to get the Apache out of the mode of being a marginal funded weapon. Is there any truth in that are we deploying—if you were at commander-in-chief [CINC], would you deploy a Cobra, rather than an Apache?
Dr. OSCAR. The answer is, no, I would not. In general, you cannot always instantaneously put the new weapon in because you only have so many dollars. You've got 1,000 old weapons and now you want to buy new ones. Well you can't just buy 1,000 new ones because you don't have the money. So you have to continue maintaining your 1,000 old ones and you slowly buy new ones. As you buy new ones, you wash out the old ones and at some point and time, you hope you've washed out all the old ones and you've got all new ones. You tried to balance this with a 1,000 different weapons simultaneously, washing out old ones, putting in new ones, upgrading some. I think we've done a good job of that.
To my knowledge, though, we don't have any Cobras in the active force.
Mr. SISISKY. Well you talk about—when the gentleman asked the question about the T–801 engine—you talked about putting those on National Guard helicopters—I think.
Page 404 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. We've given the Apaches to the National Guard. I think the Marine Corps has Cobras.
Mr. SISISKY. I tell you what got my attention. Two months ago, I'm picking up the Sunday paper and why I didn't cut it out, I'll never know. Virginia National Guard had 30 helicopters in Richmond. I think half of them could not carry any troops because they weren't safe. The other half they didn't have the fuel to use it. I mean, it's nice to send helicopters, but you got to send money to do the training of it—I mean, this is ludicrous. This is what I'm talking about, we can use all the equipment that you want to send but unless you send the training dollars so these people can use it, it's of no use. All I'm saying is that maybe we need to look at the modernization dollars in order to buy the equipment that you really would like to have.
I understand that you have so much and you can't go too far. It would be interesting if you could do a study—and I'm not demanding a study here now to see what this would really buy if you just back off and say we're not going to modernize these Vietnam-era helicopters. You know, it's like a truck. If you've got a 25-year-old truck, I will bet you that you probably spend as much—I won't bet you because I don't know what I'm talking about—but that you probably spend as much repairing that truck or out-of-use of that truck as it would cost for a new one? Is that fair?
Dr. OSCAR. It does go up drastically. We've plotted an example of 2.5- and 5-ton trucks and their own cost is like your own automobile—it's pretty flat and it slowly rises and towards the end because you've got to rebuild your engine or something. We have in the Army washed out old trucks, at the same time we didn't have enough money to buy new trucks so we bought some new trucks and remodeled some old trucks and washed out some real old trucks and we tried to keep this whole thing going. But trucks are a wonderful example. We have 250,000 trucks. It's a big demand and they're getting a lot of mileage. We cannot afford, with the money we have to completely buy new trucks. So in the truck area, we do what you say—we have a rebuild program on some of the newer trucks and buy newer trucks and try to wash out the old trucks.
Page 405 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SISISKY. Well, how do you do all three at the same time? What would it cost to buy a new truck versus fixing a 25-year-old—you know figure out how many——
Dr. OSCAR. I can get you that data, sir, for the record but we don't spend more in maintenance than we do buying new.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 373.]
Mr. SISISKY. The reason I ask is the largest item in the veto of the Military Construction (MILCON) budget is something that I had in there. It was in a Navy shipyard. It was a demolition basically and it paid for itself in 2 years. It was in the Future Years Development Plan (FYDP) for 2001. I figure anything that will pay for itself in 2 years is a pretty good deal, plus it would make $48—there's $20 million, but it would make $48 million in 10 years. I said well that's a good business proposition, so I added it on. Of course, Office of Management and Budget [OMB] thought that was a lousy thing so they vetoed it. But that's why I'm saying that—like I know—I get all the time, sense the Department of Defense like a business. Well no business has a Board of Directors of 535 people and political decisions are made—and I understand that. But there are some common sense approaches that perhaps we can make. I think of using legacy systems and I know we don't like to get rid of them and maybe sometimes you're better off without a lot of them. If you're never going to deploy and just use them for training, you may be better off without a new simulator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 406 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Sisisky. The distinguished chairman of the full committee, Mr. Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you, too, gentlemen, for coming today to help us with our many problems.
Could someone tell me what the status is of the M–4 carbine contract?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir. That is on track. We have signed a multi-year contract. We've redone our patent licensing intellectual property agreement. There was some concern awhile back—or a misunderstanding between us—on the licensing agreement and whether the licensing agreement meant that the government had the right to compete the item or not. We have since redone that licensing agreement to clarify it and we have now signed a Memorandum of Agreement with them that we would buy this item in honor of this licensing agreement until the year 2011. So we have signed up with them to go sole-source to buy the carbine to 2011. They have agreed to that and we've agreed to buy the carbines we need from them.
Mr. SPENCE. I see, thank you. One other thing, one of the favorite subjects of the chairman of the subcommittee and a lot of us have is national missile defense. I'm always looking for a new way that the problem is being approached. I see in your statement here a reference made to national missile defense. Let me kind of point out the way this thing's worded and let you explain it to me a little bit better.
First of all, you say that, ''our Nation has always been vulnerable to a long-range ballistic missile attack.'' ''Always vulnerable.'' Then you skip down and say, ''This program is highly evolutionary and flexible to allow us to respond to a strategic missile threat as it emerges. Well, how can we always be vulnerable right now and then talk about when it emerges we're going to be responsive to it? From the standpoint of emerging, would you say that China's long-range ballistic missile system has not emerged as a threat? That's what I'm always trying to get the others to explain to me how you can word these things in a different way to avoid providing us with a national missile defense. This is a new one right here, I want you to explain that, if you could, a little bit better to me.
Page 407 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. I haven't read that article, but my interpretation of it from what you've read is that we have a threat and it might get worse. I mean, it's saying we have a threat; then it's saying there's more emerging. So over time that threat might get worse. That's how I interpret that. We have a threat today and it might continue to grow and get worse. As other countries come on line with that kind of capability.
Mr. SPENCE. Other countries—but China's already online.
Dr. OSCAR. There's no doubt that there's countries today that can threaten the United States—I agree with that.
Mr. SPENCE. Then we talk about what we're going to provide the option for initial capability in 2003 if directed and funded in 2000. That's the other part that I left to the last part. After saying that we're vulnerable to a missile attack and then we talk about we must prepare now to defend ourselves such a potential in the 21st century. And the potential is already here and that's why can't say one thing in one sentence and then negate that in the next sentence. That's what always worries me. What do you think about?
Mr. WELDON. If the gentleman will yield, he is right on the mark. I mean you can't say you're going to prepare for an emerging threat if the threat's already here and I think the chairman's point is well-taken. Does China have long-range missiles right now? I think you all know the answer to that. If they do, then that's a threat today.
General KERN. Sir, if I could comment, the Army takes that land-based mission of ours to protect the Nation very seriously. We see national missile defense as an Army mission. As we have taken a look at future options as to how we would employ our Army National Guard that is one of the missions that we look at as a very serious mission for them to be able to take on. The Army this year stood up as a command—at the Space and Missile Defense Command that General Anderson commands with the purpose of being able to look at our space requirements and our ability to protect the homeland. We feel the Army as our most direct threat clearly the tactical ballistic systems which we are providing defenses against. I think you're very familiar with the programs that we have under development right now with the Patriot PAC–3, the Theater High ltitude Area Defense [THAAD] program and for the Medium Extended program for the mobile forces. But General Cosumano is an Army officer who is running the program right now for General Lyles, whom you know very well, in the national missile defense. We stay very close to the work he is doing. We're very much concerned with that threat. The budget this year for the quadrennial defense review did increase our investments in that area. So we see that threat and we take it very seriously.
Page 408 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SPENCE. I won't belabor it, I just wanted to see what new way we have of explaining this thing.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We'll now go to Committee members under the 5-minute rule. Our first member is Mr. Bartlett from Maryland.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much and welcome to our committee. Returning to the Comanche development, how much is Comanche development compromised by having only one prototype? That seems to me awfully thin.
Dr. OSCAR. It slows down the development. There's no doubt about it. When you have a test incident—a generator fails, you don't have another one, you can switch over a fly to—so it definitely slows down the program. The program was funded at a larger level at one point and time. Then due to funding problems in the Department of Defense, it was cut and so we've had to kind of scrape by. That's one of the reasons it gets fielded in 2006 where our Corps is getting fielded in the digitized Corps in 2004. So we much rather match those up in time, so we can start fielding the helicopter in time for our Corps. It does slow the program down.
Mr. BARTLETT. Is it too late, now, to fix that problem?
Dr. OSCAR. No, it isn't. There's still time left to be able to catch up and marry those dates up.
Page 409 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I'd like to turn, now, to another area, that I have some concerns about, and this is the area of nuclear, chemical, and biological defense [CHEM BIO]. In that regard, if it's appropriate, I'd like to wish a happy birthday to Dr. Ted Prociv today. I understand that he's now beginning the second half of his century with us. Happy birthday, sir.
I have two concerns relative to this area. One is the asymmetric threat that CHEM BIO now presents. I'm wondering if having CHEM BIO—which is really kind of subordinate because the nuclear is so big—of having it bundled under nuclear does justice the importance of this program, and from my personal perspective I think that our Nation might be better served if CHEM BIO were standing alone, because I think it deserves that kind of visibility.
And the second concern I have is that the Defense Reform Initiative essentially—has essentially disassembled the Assistant Secretary of Defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological, an office title that we created by statute just last year. I represent Fort Dietrich where most of the biodefense work is done. My question is will the new Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] structure offer sufficient visibility so that CHEM BIO issues will be advocated appropriately in OSD or should CHEM BIO be devolved to the Army where I think the issue might be more effectively pursued?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army, as you know, has treated CHEM BIO separately from nuclear. We manage it separately; we execute it separately. You were right, it was together in OSD. OSD is now looking to devolve many things. They devolved the CHEMICAL DEMIL and they devolved that and given that to the Army. They are retaining a small, chemical, biological office that will look at policy and oversee that, and so I think over time, you'll see the Army not only executing but being in charge of the program as a lead element for OSD. We stand ready to do that, and we're organizing to do that. We have established Dr. Prociv as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, and we have plans to put that all together and manage it as one piece over time.
Page 410 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BARTLETT. You do not, now, have that responsibility that you predicted will be devolved to you?
Dr. OSCAR. We do not, now, have it all. They've only devolved the CHEM DEMIL. We do execute for them, though, the CHEM BIO defense in a joint fashion for all three services.
Mr. BARTLETT. But they are establishing policy?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, they are.
General KERN. Sir, could I add that we have asked for congressional approval on that devolvement as well. That has been the recommendation of OSD that it be moved, and it was so proposed in this year's budget, but along with that is a request for legislation to approve that change.
Mr. BARTLETT. Do you need action from us for that to be implemented?
General KERN. Yes, sir.
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 411 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Snyder.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask just a question on one topic, and that's the Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System [SINCGARS]—well, radio or whatever you call them; the communications system to kind of get, in a round about way—as Mr. Hunter was talking about the drawdown in procurement budget—and starting—really, I guess, the high point was the 1984, Congress' fiscal year 1985, and then you had the drop off over the next eight or nine years every year, actually, over three Presidents, and I guess most of us—as a first year Member, I have been assuming that that was really hitting in terms of big ticket items: missiles, and new lines of planes and so on, but as I've gone around to my National Guard and Reserve units with regard to the funding levels for the SINCGARS, is there a problem?
Or would you just give me your sense of where we're at with regard to the ability of the enhanced brigades, if they were to be called out tomorrow, their ability over the next few years for them to communicate with the active units because of the different versions of the SINCGARS, and is our funding adequate to get them in line at some point? I mean, this is something I heard from the active Army assigned to the Guards. I said, ''What's your equipment needs if you were called up tomorrow?'' And they're concerned they're going to get called out and not be able to communicate effectively. Now, I have talked with some folks with a lot of stars on their shoulder that think that that's not a problem, but I'm wondering if it's, perhaps, going back to some times when maybe they were in the field and it wasn't a problem, but with the new digitization that you're talking about, do we have a real problem and ability to communicate between our Guard units and our active units because of the different versions of SINCGARS which gets down to procurement? Is the funding adequate over the next few years to get that in line as quickly as possible?
Page 412 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General KERN. I'll comment on the fielding part of it, sir, and I went to Desert Storm with VRC–12 series of radios, and other units there were equipped with SINCGARS radios. We were able to clearly communicate through other channels, and that was not a problem. So, the Army has worked with this high-low mix of radios throughout its history.
Mr. SNYDER. Let me interrupt, if I can. But you're moving into an era that I thought your whole point—I can never say the word digitization, so you'll have to help me—but, I mean, it's my understanding you've got the four different—as you move into the SINCGARS or the System Improvement Program [SIP]—, that that put us into a problem. I mean, you're kind of like me, I still think junior high's look like when I was in junior high. I think that you've moved into a different era, now, have you not? And if you're going to equip the Guards with the ICOM units and you have your active units with the more advanced versions, isn't that where the problem comes? That's not the same as when you were in Desert Storm.
General KERN. Potentially, we could create that problem if we are not careful, but we are looking at that today to see how we interface between—we're going to have that case throughout the Army as we digitize units, and we will have, within Army organizations, some that are and some that are not active and Reserve components and coalition forces as well as were constructed.
So, we are looking very carefully today at how we build that bridge between units with dissimilar communications platforms that are part of the organization, but, as I mentioned, that's been part of the problem that the Army has always been able to do, because we've never been able to field, literally, the hundreds of thousands of radios that we would need all at the same time. I would—an offer to Dr. Oscar's comment, but then we also have our expert here on communications, General Campbell.
Page 413 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BARTLETT. If I could just make a comment and any other comments you want to make. Part of this business of—you know, as I've read some of the vision statements that you all have put out in the National Defense Panel, I mean, the whole business of technological change, I mean, the fear that technology changes so rapidly that if we fall behind with the rapidity of change that we will leave ourself vulnerable, and so we may not have the luxury anymore of doing the same—I guess, what you call a washout—where we gradually bring in the new radios and let the old radios go out. It may have to be a fairly dramatic leapfrog or the whole digitization thing will leave us vulnerable rather than be an improvement.
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, we are actually working on that. The Defense Department asked the Army, because of its expertise in radios and communications and digitization, to lead a program for the next generation joint tactical radio for all three services. We are putting together a consortium of industry to look at where the technology's going; what are the standards? How can we make a modular radio much like this modular panel here in Comanche? So, not only do we have modular hardware, but we'll have modular software, and we'll be able to insert software in different wave forms, but to do that, we need to get industry to agree on certain standards just like you have a beta or VHS kind of tape recorder deal.
And, so we're working with industry. They're very confident that in the next 6 months we'll be able to create this long-term architecture and buy radios that we'll be able to modularly switch out. In the meantime, as General Kern said, we've been trying to, the old fashioned way, make new generations of radios that are kind of backward compatible or can communicate with certain minds. I don't know the details on SINCGARS and, perhaps, General Campbell can fill us in on that.
Page 414 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General CAMPBELL. Sir, I believe I can shed light on that question. We have under contract now over 60,000 SINCGARS radios with the Systems Improvement Program, the SIP, that you mentioned earlier. That includes something called an internet controller that provides us the capability to do digitization. We require, in a division, approximately 5,000 of those radios in order to have the enabling infrastructure of the tactical internet. Currently, we do not have quantities on order of the SINCGARS radio to equip all three components: the National Guard, the Reserve, and the active Army with the new radios, nor do we have enough on order with that improvement; that internet controller to replace all of the older versions of SINCGARS that are in the active force.
Our posture over the next several years will be 60,000 radios which would be about 12 divisions equivalents which would have the basic infrastructure necessary for digitization, and, as Dr. Oscar mentioned, the—rather than going back and taking those legacy radios and upgrading all of those, we're putting our funds on the joint tactical radio which will provide us not only with the infrastructure for digitization but will give us the ability to interoperate with the allies and with the other services much better than we have today. So, it really, I think, comes down to a question of if we're going to deploy a force, what we have to do is allocate radios from within the quantities that we bought. We have, for example, just sent over to the Gulf 125 SINCGARS to flesh out the force, the ground force, that's over there.
Mr. SNYDER. My time is up, General Campbell, but the concern expressed by the young officers I talked to, apparently, that is a legitimate concern.
General CAMPBELL. That's correct. It's an issue largely of timing and of strategies for when we cut off the current version of the radio and when we build the next version, and our strategy was to go with 60,000 of the improved SINCGARS radios and then, for the rest of the force, cut over to the next generation joint tactical radio and migrate in that direction.
Page 415 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SNYDER. I don't have an experience on basing this kind of thing, I just know that when businesses decide to put in a new computer system, they replace the—everybody gets the new system, and it may be that if we're trying to head to this in the military we may have to look at a different way of funding these kinds of changes, and say it's time for the new change, and we can't have three generations of what we're calling, still calling, a radio out there when we may leave some units in the dark out there by mistake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Snyder. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Dr. Oscar and General Kern. I appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Oscar, when I get a little better acquainted with some of the information that's just come into my office, I'll probably be corresponding with you about some—precision guided ammunition that I think the Army is or should be or might be interested in. Frankly, I don't know enough about it to ask you the questions today.
Let me just make an observation that relates to your analogy of the taxicab company in the Bronx. If that taxicab company in the Bronx operates the way we, apparently, are operating now and if we continue to operate much longer, it isn't going to be in the business in the Bronx, because it isn't replacing its equipment; it isn't even able to maintain the equipment it's got, and it's not taking advantages of the technology or developing the technology that it's going to need. So, all of this is a matter of real alarm, and, of course, I'm not saying this in the context of being critical of you or the Army and the way you're balancing that budget; I have the greatest sympathy for you. And I guess I'll just conclude by saying I hope we convinced you that you need more money.
Page 416 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Bateman. Mr. Riley.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. I've got a statement with a few questions. Dr. Oscar, the fiscal year 1998 Conference Report authorizing statutory language, $35.2 million of a total of $40.2 million authorized by provided for A3 modifications and upgrades to the M113 carrier which was a $20 million congressional inquiry for the budget request. However, report language included in the fiscal year 1998 Appropriations Conference Report directed that 15 of the $20 million plus be used for competitive procurement of reactive tiles. The statutory language should prevail since the authorization act was the last of the two bills enacted and allowed the Army to use the $5 million difference to procure additional upgrade kits of other types of equipment for the M113A3.
Rafeal, an Israel firm, produces reactive armor tiles that have been applied to the Bradley fighting vehicles as an emergency requirement for deployment to Bosnia. The firm requested a congressional plus up $20 million in Fiscal Year 1998 for tiles to the M113, however the Army has previously stated that it has no requirement for reactive tiles on the M113. Additionally, the Army has previously stated the M113 performance would be severely degraded if these tiles were applied to the currently configured vehicle due to the added weight.
So, my questions are: Does the Army intend to follow the law as specified in the 1998 authorization bill with respect of A3 upgrades of the M113?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir. We have an urgent requirement to upgrade our M113 fleet. It's very old; it cannot keep up. We need to reengine it; put better suspension in and what not. We have a requirement on the books to upgrade over 2,000 of them. We're way short. We intend to follow the authorization language that directs us to take the additional $15 million, I believe, and upgrade those, and we will do that.
Page 417 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. What will you do with the additional $5 million, the difference between the 15 and the 5—or the 20? Will that other $5 million go for additional upgrades or for reactive tiles?
Dr. OSCAR. We're looking at that. Right now, the Army has no requirement for tiles, because a majority of these M113s are in rear areas. There are a few, however, that do, in the engineer area, go up close to harms way. So, we're looking at whether or not it would be feasible to put tiles on the M113. I doubt it would be feasible to put them on M113s that aren't upgraded, because the reasons we're upgrading them is they can't go now, and so it might, perhaps, be feasible to put them on upgraded M113s that are in certain areas for the engineers. So, we're looking at how to do that.
I think we may do a study or a little analysis to figure out how to do that. We haven't decided yet; we're in discussions with a lot of people on this issue. I don't think we can procure them directly. I think some research has to—or R&D, development, anyway, has to be done just like it was done on Bradley to figure out how to mount them; what's the best way to mount them on that surface; how to put them on? And so we may do a study with some of that money; not the $15 million that we're using for upgrade, but we may work out some way to maybe take some of the other $5 million and maybe move a little of that to R&D to see how we can study this to see if it might pay off, but we haven't decided on that yet, but we will definitely do the $15 million for the upgrade.
Mr. RILEY. OK. As far as the reduction of performance in that system, does the additional weight of those tiles—has it been proven whether or not that is a detriment to the——
Page 418 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. It definitely degrades the vehicles performance. I do not believe you could put on the non-upgraded M113. I think it would so drive it down, you'd get tremendous increases in problems with the suspension system, and you'd further degrade the speed. I think you might be able to put it on the upgraded M113, and that's why we would need to do some studies to see, from an engineering standpoint, could it take the weight of the suspension, and could a new upgraded one take that?
Mr. RILEY. Do you have any kind of time table on when—well, what the current status is of this program and——
Dr. OSCAR. We're hoping to work it out in the next month or so, and we're looking to engage everybody in that discussion.
Mr. RILEY. Well, we look forward to it. Thank you, sir.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Riley. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of questions. The M1A2 tank, I understand production is going to stop sometime around 2007. There's going to be a real gap between then and the next tank that would come on line in the Army after next. What—can you give me an idea of what that tank will look like, and, in the meantime, will you be able to keep the M1A2 upgraded and ready for service in that long gap between the new tank?
Page 419 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. Our goal is to continue to be the world leader and have the best tank in the world. I believe we have that now, and my intent is to keep that. We are working on several options in tech base looking at what the future tank might look like. We do not have one selected at this point as the winner. We have several that are competing, everything from an electric gun, kind of an electric tank. We would have an electric gun, electric armor, electric suspension, electric propulsion to a two-man tank; to a four-man tank; to whether a tank should be about 30 tons or whether it would be larger and be 60, 70 tons; whether it would have kind of real buttock attachment and a wingman. So, we're looking—and we're also looking at options of upgrading and modernizing another upgrade of the current M1 tank—so, we're looking at all these different options.
I don't—I think you're right on your time estimates. I think these options—we probably will continue in a tech base with these options for another couple of years, and then once we decide, it will probably take another 10 years or so to develop such a tank. It's my personal opinion that we're not going to do anything that's going to harm our ability to use tanks on a battlefield, so I believe that we will continue to maintain an M1 capable tank until we have a substitute and then at that point in time, we're going to say, ''Well, is that substitute better, and is it worth the price, and is it worth switching?'' And we'll make that decision at that point in time.
Mr. LEWIS. My only concern with that lapse of time without any production of any tank—the vendors of supply, the parts for the tank—will the parts be available to keep that tank up and going the way it needs to be?
Dr. OSCAR. We will come up with a strategy that does that. We will not allow our tank production base to deteriorate, and we will not allow us to go without the capability to maintain and even insert new technology. I do not see a time when we would just cease everything. I think we will always continue to maintain that capability.
Page 420 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. LEWIS. The other question——
Dr. OSCAR. We've looked at a lot of options. I mean, we've always looked at when's the best time to switch over? Do we do it in 2003? Do we do it in 2006? Do we do it in 2010, 2020? I think it will be farther out, because, just in reality, of how long it takes us to develop a new tank, it's going to be a while. In that period, I do not believe we're going to have a gap. We're going to do something, and we keep studying it every year. Right now, we're funded out through the budget year to keep on buying or upgrading tanks. We haven't bought a new tank, but we've been upgrading to M1A2 tank capability, and I believe we will continue in some fashion to continue to maintain that tank.
Mr. LEWIS. The future calvary scout vehicle, is that the priority, though, for the Army and the new vehicle coming on line? Is that—as opposed to a new tank?
Dr. OSCAR. No, it is not. The scout vehicle is an urgent requirement. It is funded, and, as you know, we have a joint program with Great Britain where there's 50/50 cost sharing. I think it's a good deal for us and Great Britain. We intend to move forward on that program, but we will not move forward on it at the expense of not having a tank capability.
Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.
Dr. OSCAR. No sense having a scout——
Page 421 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. LEWIS. Without anything behind it.
Dr. OSCAR [continuing]. If you have no tank to follow it up with.
Mr. LEWIS. Yes, thanks.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. The Air Defense gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Oscar, good to see you again, and I enjoyed my trip down to see the Comanche, and part of what I think I'm trying to understand is that the Army has a history of developing weapons of different kinds where you pick up the tab on the front end on the R&D portion which is the most expensive. You know, in talking to people that are in business, they prorate the R&D portion down the road on products. I'm wondering, particularly, as we develop—and it applies to the Comanche as well as the tanks or scouts or cavalries or whatever it is that you're developing—that ultimately other branches of the services, ultimately, incorporate into their arsenal. Is there a way for the Army to recoup the R&D portion? Either by weapon or some account? For instance, giving you an example, the Hughey, as old as it is, is being used by the Navy; it's being used by the Air Force. I'm sure down the road whether it's 2004 or 2006 when the Comanche's fully developed, the Marines will use it, perhaps, the Navy; the rapid deployment forces, whatever. Is there a way to recoup R&D expenditures for the Army account?
Page 422 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. That's the best idea I've heard all day. That's one heck of a good idea; I love it. I have to tell you—yes, there's a way to do it. I guess we haven't been aggressive enough in talking to our sister services. You're right, we do develop a lot of equipment. Sometimes, we share. I know in the lightweight 155 millimeter Howitzer and the upgrade of the 5-ton truck, we've been sharing the development with the Marine Corps and then we both purchase it. But you're right, we've, often in the past, developed it completely without any funds, and then—I know in the M1 case not only did we develop it with Army funds but Congress instructed the Army to give the Marine Corps some M1 tanks with the Army money. So, that's a great idea. I will go back and figure out how I can try to do that.
Mr. REYES. Well—and, you know, I'll make mention of that because we're all in this together, so we all should share the gain, and we all should share the pain, and when I read articles that point out that the Army receives 24 percent of the budget and carries 70 percent of the load, it just makes sense from a business perspective to have other agencies or other branches pay into an R&D account for the Army, because, ultimately, they're going to benefit by the Comanche; by the M1; by the M4, whatever weapons you are developing that, ultimately, and obviously, to us it doesn't make any difference who develops the weapon as long as our soldiers, sailors, and airmen are provided for and protected, but, yet, when you're talking in this kind of an environment where every penny counts and when you have this kind of—from the Army perspective—disparity in the budget, it just would make sense to make an argument that part of recouping the R&D—which is very expensive—we might want to think along those lines.
Dr. OSCAR. I will certainly look at it. I know we take our requirement documents from each of the three services, and then they go up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they look at them for joint application. It's in that process where they say, like on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs], or something that should be joint or tactical radios, and they establish a joint office, and we all work together. There are instances when, perhaps, it hasn't worked as well as it should. I will look into it.
Page 423 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. REYES. The other thing, just for the record, as it regards—relates to MEADs, I just want you to share with us how important that piece of theater missile defense is to the Army modernization and to our maneuver forces in your opinion.
Dr. OSCAR. It's a very big requirement for the Army. It not only gives us the mobility for our maneuver forces but it is really the best weapon to defend ourselves, not only against air and tactical missiles, but against cruise missiles, slow-flying various kinds of cruise missiles that are a growing threat around the world. So, it is a big requirement for the Army.
Mr. REYES. One last thing, and this is prompted by the comment that you made in answering my colleague's question about the time frame of whether it's too late to actually be in a position to deploy by 2004. What would it take, say, for instance, if we were to prioritize immediately the program, the Comanche program, to be able to catch up? What would it take?
Dr. OSCAR. I don't have those dollar numbers. I will have to provide them for the record.
Mr. REYES. I would be interested in seeing that.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 375.]
Page 424 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Oscar, I don't want to be overly combative by seizing on what was obviously an aside in your testimony a couple of moments ago, but I think the record has to be clear. I led the effort to transfer those tanks to the Marine Corps, and I did so for good reason. Fourteen hundred tanks were coming back from western Europe. All of those tanks, M1A1s, were scheduled to go to the National Guard. The active duty Marine Corps was to stand in line behind the National Guard. The Army argued, at that point, that they could not afford to take 132 of those tanks and transfer them to the active Marine Corps where there was a severe deficiency at that point. Ultimately, this committee and the Congress did insist on that transfer, but the overwhelming balance of those tanks did, indeed, go to the Army and to the National Guard.
The reason why this is a particular sore point for me is that 4 years later the most senior Army officers came to me and without any ironic sense of historic context argued that those same Guard units should no longer get any tanks; that, in fact, the very tanks that they insisted that the Guard needed were, in their opinion, unnecessary and too expensive to maintain, and so over a 4-year period of time when they first argued against what was really a relatively modest tank transfer, they, ultimately, came to the conclusion that none of those tanks should have gone to the Guard. I disagree with that conclusion, and I'm pleased that the overwhelming balance of those tanks did go to the Guard, but that's the historic record, and so when we start talking about the cost of development and a transfer to the Marine Corps at Army expense, I think the facts need to be clear.
Page 425 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
If I can bring things down to a—and I welcome a response if you choose to make one, but I think we have to be cautious about some of those asides.
Let me bring things down to a grunt level, if I may.
Dr. OSCAR. I will comment, if you'd like to, but 134 tanks sounds like a small number, but it's probably $750 million which is more money than the Army has today.
Mr. MCHALE. It's not the Army's money; it's the Nation's money.
Dr. OSCAR. That's true.
Mr. MCHALE. And the irony is that just 4 years later, senior Army officers, all of flag rank, came to me and argued, without any reference to the debate that took place 4 years earlier, that the real mistake, they believed, was that any of those tanks went to the Guard and that the Guard should go light rather than armored in the overall total force Army; a complete reversal of position over a 4-year period of time.
My question, series of questions—bringing things back down to a grunt level—are we issuing our soldiers waterproof boots, and, if not, why not?
General KERN. Anybody know?
Page 426 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. MCHALE. That gear is obviously available through the civilian market.
General KERN. We issue a number of different types of boots based on the environment that soldiers will be working in. The basic issue boot, leather or canvas boot, is not waterproof, but we can add waterproofing to them. Clearly, the sole of our boots is waterproof——
Mr. MCHALE. I understand. Those boots are routinely available on the civilian market. I don't know that they would be practical for a wide range of environments, but it's something we ought to look at, obviously, in most environments of great benefit to the individual soldier.
General KERN. We do have a cold, wet weather boot that we do look at to meet those requirements.
Mr. MCHALE. I'm familiar with that. You walk into almost any sporting goods store and you can find a very fine quality boot with a Gore Tex liner that provides complete breathability combined with waterproof characteristics, and for that soldier who's out there carrying a pack and a rifle, that gear, in most cases, in most environments, would be a dramatic improvement.
When are we going to replace the M16A2 as the standard issue rifle?
Page 427 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. We have in early development, now, a new weapon that has several contractors in a competitive mode coming in with different versions for a follow on. I think, after testing, I think it's within—it will be several years, yet, but I can get you the exact date, if you'd like, for the record?
Mr. MCHALE. I would welcome that.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 375.]
Mr. MCHALE. When was the last that we had a systematic review of the standard issue first aid kit, and, again, I'm maybe going off on a bit of a tangent here, but that kit, I think, has remained pretty much the same in its configuration over a long period of time. There have been relatively inexpensive and significant improvements in technology. For instance, the Food and Drug Administration [FDA] recently approved a medicinal quality super glue—basically, the same thing you buy in the commercial market—in lieu of traditional sutures. Have we thought at all about looking at the contents of that kit? Similarly, there are water purification tablets that address the issue of geodiosys. Those tablets have come onto the market in recent years. Again, walk into any backpacking store and you can find them. Have we really taken a look at the first aid kit to see if it might be improved?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, we have, and we're doing extensive work at that right here, actually, at Fort Detrick, MD. I was up there about 6 months ago, and they're looking at all of the medical supplies not only the first aid kits but the gurneys and the water—the blood gizmos, little telecommunications, little cameras on the helmets to radio back to kind of digitize the soldier so the doctor can talk to the paramedic and see the patient. They do have a new kit that's already laid out, and I expect within the next year or so they'll put in to start procuring them.
Page 428 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. MCHALE. That's terrific. Let me applaud that, and let me specifically raise the issue of that super glue. Again, I'm a layperson, but I have some experience with those kits, and it seems to me that would be a relatively inexpensive way of providing, at least on a battlefield, a first aid response without sutures to, for instance, a shrapnel wound.
One final question, if I may—my light just changed. Obviously, we would like our infantry to have a full nighttime capability. Are we moving toward the point where we would issue, particularly, to every infantryman, MBGs or an advanced equivalent of that capability?
Dr. OSCAR. We agree that sitting in the dark is one of the major advantages of the U.S. Army over most armies. We have bought extensive goggles of various kinds and generations—as a matter of fact, it's one of the success stories we have, that we've driven the price down from many thousands of dollars to, now, it's about $6,000. We also have an experimental program going on with them to exchange old ones to allow them to sell commercially and give us discounts on new ones; it's very exciting. To my knowledge, we have dramatically increased—we have bought out all of the goggles in our original plan. We have relooked at that, and we have significantly increased our requirement for goggles, and we are now increasing our buys to match that.
Mr. MCHALE. I praise that effort on the part of the Army and I think you've done a terrific job. I guess what I'm really looking for is when do you anticipate that every infantryman serving in the United States Army will have a night fighting capability based on MBGs or some advance in technology that is the equivalent?
Page 429 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. To my knowledge, we have created the number of goggles we need to ensure every fighter who needs one in the situation has one. That doesn't mean every soldier in the Army has one, sometimes, but it means the people that are going to do it in the battle, at that point in time, do. There's also other means we have; most of our weapons, now, have infrared sights on them.
General KERN. If I could just comment.
Mr. MCHALE. Yes, please.
General KERN. We have created the program manager for the soldier, the individual soldier, and he is looking and has been working very hard to bring a lot of the comments that you've made into the kit bag for our soldiers today—looking at commercial capabilities and integrating them into it as quickly as possible; looking at a complete ensemble that gives them night fighting capability as part of that. You know, we are looking at trying to also be able to couple that with our digital efforts so that the communications between soldiers becomes part of the kit that they wear. That's a very successful program right now.
Night vision goggles presents another set of problems, because it's not just the infantrymen that needs it, it's—we have a, perhaps, a very critical part that we also look at and all the people who are driving supplies and trucks on the lines. So, the magnitude of that when you look at it in an entire Army, active and Reserve components, is considerable, and one of that's real. As well as has been mentioned earlier is this is a technology which moves very quickly right now to make sure that we are getting the best out to all those soldiers.
Page 430 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. MCHALE. The obvious purpose of my question,
is to define that as a goal where we work with you to achieve the result that every soldier in the 21st century is a night fighter. I think we need to keep that in mind. We do have the gear now to issue, on a periodic basis, within a given area of operation, I think it ought to be a goal of the United States Army that every soldier is a night fighter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. McHale. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start out by asking you all about the medium truck program, because it does seem as though every year that I've been here, the Army comes up and talks about what essential pieces of equipment the trucks are, how we're short, and then we look at your request this year and, as I understand it, we're spitting out about 300 of these a month now. Your request will result in about 170 a month, so the production is going to go down. We have the capability now to spit out something like 500 a month, and if we need them that bad, why are we not buying them at a, at a more economical rate and a, and a quicker rate?
And the second part of that question is, I understand that you all have indicated that you want to go get a second source for them. Why is that more efficient? Does that result in, in, in trucks being delivered to the soldiers and the people that need them quicker, which is what you all tell us every year that you want to do.
Page 431 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. On the first part of your question, trucks are very essential to the Army, and we have long recognized that our trucks have been aging. They're not only aging in time, but with all of these exercises, aging in mileage. We, as I said before, have tried to balance our budget. We've got a lot of things that are aging, and we've tried to get the best balance of our budget to keep a capability today and out into the future.
In the truck case, we have both gone into a program to rebuild 5-ton and 2.5-ton trucks, and we are purchasing new trucks, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles [FMTV] trucks, both 5 and 2.5 ton. We have, as you note in this budget, we have increased from about $250 million to $350 million the money we're putting in 1999, our 1999 budget summation, and it keeps going up in the future. So we are ramping up the dollars in our trucks so that we can get it from a minimum sustaining rate more up into a, actually below a minimum sustaining rate, up into more, closer to a, a more economical rate. It's impossible for us to do that in every area. We have many things in the Army, critical things that are below a good economic rate. But we cannot afford to get them all up into an economical rate, because if we get this trucked into an economical rate, then I, we don't have any money for my HMMWVs, or I don't have any money for my heavy trucks. So we're, we're doing the best we can to balance that.
As far as the second part of your question on why competition, first of all, it's the, it's the Competition in Contracting Act and this Congress has requested in particular on trucks that we, we look at that very seriously, and we have. We will be buying the medium family of trucks for over, well over 20 years. We will spend, when this current, we just signed a new, we had a 5-year multi-year on trucks. We've just signed another 4-year, with an option year for multi-year trucks, so we'll go out to another 4 or 5 years. When that is over, we will still be buying over $12.3 billion worth of trucks. Now, many people say that competition can gain you 10, 15 percent. Well let's forget that. Let's say it's only 1, 2, 3 percent. If it was just 1-percent savings, of $12.3 billion, you would save $123 million by going to competition.
Page 432 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. THORNBERRY. If, if you have, or your folks have prepared cost-benefit analysis of, of how the second sourcing would play out over time, I'd appreciate receiving a copy, and I know the committee would appreciate it too, because we could be talking about significant dollars and extended period of time, and I think we'd like to see what analysis you go through to see that.
You know what, I just have, as an aside, it worries me that, that as a result of trying to balance everything out, we produce nothing at the economical rate. I think back about the radio line of questions that Mr. Snyder was asking. You know, so we do everything slowly and uneconomically and result in the worst of all worlds.
But, but let me go ahead. I have another area I want to get into.
Dr. OSCAR. It bothers me, too. Not only does it bother me, but we have tried, and have killed many programs. I mean, it's bothered us to the point where we said, geez, we ought to kill some things and buy some things at economical rates. Well, we killed one heck of a lot of programs, flat out dead: Armored Gun System, all kinds of programs we killed. But our budget's gone down 70 percent, and so we're, we're doing the best we can with what we got.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I realize some of these problems are resulted from decisions at a pay grade above you all's, but, but, it's, it concerns us a lot.
Let me shift gears a little bit and give you a chance to reassure me some. The rap that one hears often on the Army is that it is the slowest and most reluctant branch of the service to change. And, and to transform itself into the kind of military that we may need into the future. A lot of folks look at Force XXI and say at best it's a modest effort, but question whether we're really even getting, moving toward Force XXI at the pace we need to. When one looks at the R&D budget for the Army this year, we see it go down slightly, we see it much less, or significantly less than the R&D budget for the other services. The, as I understand it, the second biggest item in the R&D budget has to do with base operations, or something.
Page 433 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I am very concerned about our ability to leap ahead to have the Army After Next, to meet the kinds of challenges we're going to face in the future, and, and so I guess I'd like for you to reassure me a little bit that this year our priorities are right, that we are putting the R&D into the areas that are going to make the most difference in the future, and, and that second, from your perspective, that the Army is committed to undergoing sometimes what are painful decisions to, to transform itself to meet the challenges ahead. And, and if you've got obstacles that you can identify where we can help you do that, I'd like to hear that as well.
Dr. OSCAR. I'd like to comment and then have General Kern comment also from a military perspective. I am exceedingly proud of our Army and how it has adapted, and actually led changes. And two areas I just want to briefly cover, and then turn it over to General Kern. Without question in my mind, the Army not only leads all services and all nations, but all companies in our grasp of information management and simulation. The fact that we have developed new ways of designing our force that, within a couple months we are going to be announcing a new structure for our divisions, a new number of tanks, completely reorganize our divisions and how they fight, new doctrine.
The fact that we have embraced information management and that we're, quote, ''digitizing'' this force, so that it's almost like Zen, like my eyes and your eyes are one eyes, where we're putting all our sensors together; and that Dr. Perry and now Mr. Cohen have complimented the Army. The Quadrennial Review has said ''I have seen the future and you're it.'' They have gone to the other services and said, how come you're not moving out in information management. We have accelerated this pace of change, and actually, at the quadrennial review's urging and our own urging, we have moved ahead our targets so we can digitize a division by 2000 and a Corps by 2004.
Page 434 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
At the same time we're doing that, we've changed all our processes. We have led, not only the Army, the other services, but the whole Federal Government in acquisition reform. We have more credit cards than any Federal agency. We started alternative dispute resolution, and then the President made an executive order for all other Federal agencies to do it. We changed our debriefing processes, we created a single process initiative with other Federal agencies and companies. I think there's no question that we're out in front of acquisition reform, of change, of our processes, firewall development, of what we're doing in information management.
I think we're not out in front of marketing, and we do, in my judgment, a real poor job of that.
General Kern.
General KERN. I would second what Dr. Oscar said. We are working very hard today to change the Army, to do exactly what you asked, so we are ready for the 21st century. And I believe that we have made significant progress in the last 2 years in particular in identifying how we can use the information technologies with our current weapons systems, and we are working very hard today to ensure that the tech-base effort that we put through the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations [ACTD's], which we are using, as well as some very basic research, is focused on those things which are going to be required for the Army after next.
General Hartzog, in his studies, has told us to move to the year 2025 and look back, and to take the intellectual, to lead the technological changes that we need, and that is what we are doing today with our science and technology base. The science and technology objectives that we are using, the Army Science Board work, the National Academy of Sciences are all helping the Army to ensure that the tech-base effort does bring us a very high, reliable, ultra-fast Army into the 21st century.
Page 435 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We are doing those things, coupled with industry changes, so a great deal of the work we are using not only leverages our own tech-base efforts, but leverages what is being done in the commercial world, so that we are not duplicating that effort, but in fact using those dollars efficiently to produce a 21st century Army.
As mentioned, we'll be coming out with a new division design for our mechanized and armored divisions shortly. We are starting to do the experimental work on what the light divisions will look like. We are doing that with a Rapid-Force Projection Initiative [RFPI] this summer, an ACTD. We will follow that with some light divisional experiments, coupled with the Marine Corps. We are also working that toward the Army After Next, as Dr. Oscar had mentioned earlier, with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, when it gets back from Bosnia.
And so the Army is moving ahead to the 21st century, both in the science and technology areas, leveraging the commercial world, using our intellectual capabilities to define the environment that we will fight in for the 21st century.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Excuse me. If somebody could, in the process, could comment on the research budget too, I'd like to know about, how you feel about the priorities there, and whether that's really moving ahead like we need to.
Dr. OSCAR. I'd like to just make a quick comment, and then ask to, for more on that, but I, General Kern mentioned ACTD's. There's been some confusion about ACTD's sometime, but I think it's a way that we created to not only do leading-edge research, and then involve our soldiers not only in the testing, but a longer time evaluation of that equipment, but at the same time, they have that equipment over that 2-, 3-year period. They have a go-to-war capability, and as a matter of fact, in Korea, for example, we've done that, and we're leaving, we have equipment in Korea to protect against missile strikes. And so I think the ACTD process has helped us capture that technology and put it in the hands of the soldiers very rapidly.
Page 436 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I've asked General Campbell to, to add a comment on a——
General CAMPBELL. Sir, you asked how you could help. I have two fundamental concerns with our ability to accelerate the process along the lines that you suggested. The first is a, is a continuing question about why the Army needs the first digitized division by the year 2000. And it's usually cast in, in the context of what type of threat do we face. The real issue is about re-engineering the Army, about introducing information-age technology into the forces in sufficient numbers, soon enough that we can create the doctrine, the organizations, the tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to truly leap ahead and to break that paradigm that you mentioned earlier about the perception of moving too slowly.
The second area that we have some very deep concerns about is the way the budgetary process works. When we balanced our budget, balanced our, our investment strategy this year, we made decisions to unfund things in order to add money to the digitalization program. We get feedback that where we have an increase from 1998 to 1999, or where there's been an increase in last year's projection for 1999 to this year's projection, that those funds are prime candidates to become bill payers for other projects when the appropriation and authorization process takes place. Whatever you could do to protect those funds that we put on digitalization for the Army's 21st century Army, would, would really help us to transform the process, accelerate our process of change along the lines that you suggested.
Dr. OSCAR. If you would permit, I'd also like our chief scientist to address the research part of your question, Dr. Fenner Milton.
Page 437 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. MILTON. You asked the question about our research budget. We are focusing our 6.1 and 6.2 accounts on the Army After Next vision. In the 6.1 arena, it's largely a question of establishing focused strategic research objectives; and in the 6.2 arena, I'm proud to say that, after many years of decline, we now have a 4-percent real growth between 1998 and 1999. And the support of that modest increase is extremely important to obtain the objectives that you've discussed.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, can I, can I say something?
Mr. WELDON. Just the gentleman, you'd have to ask the gentleman who will yield to you.
Mr. REYES. Will you yield 30 seconds?
Mr. THORNBERRY. Absolutely; I've used far more time than my 5 minutes.
Mr. REYES. Well, I just wanted to say that this is a lot like that old saying, that you're up to your butt in alligators and you forget that the original intent was to drain the swamp. I think we've got a situation here where the Army is, according to what we're reading, is doing 70 percent of what's expected of the military, with only 24 percent of the budget. We need to keep that in perspective and work toward a bigger budget for our military, and I think that's the bottom line.
Mr. WELDON. That's exactly what we're trying to get the Army to say today to my friend and colleague, with some difficulty, I might add. [Laughter.]
Page 438 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. Ryan.
Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] assumes that the future Army modernization plans depend upon cut in personnel. However, the QDR finds that these cuts will still fall short of providing adequate funds for Army modernization. Now, last year, Congressman Reyes, who had that great swamp analogy, and 60 other colleagues signed onto a letter to Secretary Cohen outlining our opposition to cuts in the Army end-strength. Still my position, that as long as the Army continues to have such a high Operating Tempo [OPTEMPO], there's no room really for any kind of cuts. Assuming that Congress does not grant relief from current in-strength floors, how much extra funding will be needed to fulfill the Army's modernization plan?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army modernization plan requires about $15 billion a year to stop the aging of equipment, and to modernize at the same time. It requires $15 billion a year. That's what we need. What we have now——
Mr. RYAN. Does it take into consideration——
Dr. OSCAR. Is eight, and it will slowly grow.
Mr. RYAN. I want to have a follow-up to that. I know that one of our recent briefings indicated to us that the Abrams tank, I believe, was one that we're looking at modernizing. That particular briefing indicated that perhaps once we modernize we may still be a step behind the world. What is given for consideration for research and design, and not just modernizing, but perhaps looking even further ahead?
Page 439 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. We have some exciting programs in tech-base, looking at whole new ways of designing tanks. Matter of fact, we had a competition a year or so ago across the United States with private industry and universities on designing a new tank. And we have several that look very attractive. We've kind of necked them down to about three or four. One is an all-electric tank, we would have electric gun that would dramatically increase its fire capability, but it would be all electric, it would have electric drive for better traction, and cut down on the fuel consumption; it would have electric armor, electric suspension to allow it to go faster.
There's also a two-man tank, matter of fact, we had a display out at the Pentagon about 6 months ago, where a tank automotive command brought in a two-man design of a tank, rather than a four-man design. And it was targeted to be about 30 tons instead of 70 tons. It relied, because it only had two men, it had a lot less armor that you needed. It had the same armor, but it had a lot of active protection, and stealthiness to it.
So we have a number of programs in tech-base. They will take a while to mature, but we have a number that we're looking at to keep ahead of the, the threat in tanks.
General KERN. Can I comment on that? I have some love for tanks in my life. I would argue first that the M1A2 is the best tank in the world, and I don't think I would find too many takers that want to stand on the other end of it. The problem that I think that the Army faces is how do we resource enough M1A2 tanks, not whether it's the best tank in the world or not. And we know how to make it better, with the technologies that Dr. Oscar described. So the challenge to the Army in that case is what we're going to be able to resource, not the fact that we don't have the best technology.
Page 440 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. Let's talk missile defense. Last year, this committee zeroed out funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System [MEADS] program. You testified today that MEADS is extremely important for the layered defense system that the Army's a part of, and I know it's important to the allies working on it. My understanding is you requested about $43 to $45 million for MEADS. With the commitment to, that we've now relinquished and backed off and supported the program because the administration and the Army feels it's so critical, what are the plans for the out-year funding for MEADS? Could you tell me what the dollar amount requested for the out-years after this next year?
Dr. OSCAR. We, I have to provide it for the record. We have—do you have it with you? Great.
Mr. WELDON. What's the actual number?
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 375.]
General KERN. There is no funding beyond fiscal year 1999 for the MEADS program. We have fully funded the development effort of the MEADS program, a joint program which we are working with the Germans and the Italians. That program is a program managed and operated under the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization [BMDO], and the program funding for the procurement in the future of that program will be one which will be argued in this year's program, as we go from a development program into a decision whether we go into a procurement program.
Page 441 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. But, my point is that we've just heard that it's a priority for the Army and the soldier, and yet it doesn't matter whether it's BMD or the Army, nobody's requesting funds for the out-years.
General KERN. Not in this year's budget, sir.
Mr. WELDON. Last year, you know, one of our concerns on this committee is the largest loss of life from one incident that we've seen in this decade, was when our soldiers were killed in that SCUD attack in Saudi Arabia. And seven years after that SCUD attack took place, we're not much better off today, in terms of preparation, than we were then. If we'd have gone to war in Iraq, we would have had the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 [PAC–2], which gives us some improvement, but I would argue that Iraq has not been sitting still. We've seen guidance systems transferred from Russia to Iraq since then. They've probably enhanced their capability. That's why we're so concerned.
Let's talk about the president's speech a year ago, when he went before AIPAC nationally, pounded his fist on the dais and said, we're going to defend the people of Israel and support them in adequate missile defense. We're going to build and help build the Nautilus program. We got no funding request last year from the administration, whatsoever for the Tactical High Energy Laser [THEL] program. Zero, nada. We had to get the dollar amount from AIPAC, which is $45 million. How much of your request for the Nautilus or THEL program this year?
Dr. OSCAR. Zero.
Page 442 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What's that, zero?
Dr. OSCAR. Zero.
General KERN. Zero.
Mr. WELDON. I mean is there any reason why we in this committee and the Congress really feel that there's not a commitment on the part of this administration to robust missile defense. We saw games played with the THAAD funding. In fact, during the mark-up process last year, between when we went on the floor and out of committee, and the conference, we had the number changed on us three times. We in the committee didn't know what you wanted for THAAD. It was a $200 million cut, then it was $100 million cut. We just question this administration's commitment to programs that the Army oversees relative to missile defense.
Let me say, I spent some time at Fort Bliss. You have outstanding people there doing outstanding work, who are proud of what they're doing. It offends me, as the chairman of one of our subcommittees that I don't see us supporting that effort. I mean, I see a lot of lipservice, I see a lot of saber-rattling, pounding our fists on the dais, but when it comes down to nut-cutting time, I don't see the commitment there.
Let's talk about PAC–3. When do you expect to have—and I know you're the program manager for this, but it really, these are in some cases multiservice programs. When do we expect to have PAC–3 available now?
General KERN. Sir, as you know, we are scheduled to do the PAC–3 intercept shoot, hopefully, in May.
Page 443 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. May? Deployment date is still, what, fourth quarter of 1999?
General KERN. Yes, sir. Now, we are looking at that in, in the month of May. We will go into a, a low-rate production following that. As you know, the program is designed so that the configuration which is on the ground today for the launchers has already been upgraded to the configuration to, and ready to accept, those missiles. So what we are working for is that hit-to-kill confirm in the Patriot PAC–3 in this spring. We will be able to, I feel reasonably confident that that will occur. The earlier tests that we've done with Patriot PAC–3, it has followed the trajectory exactly as predicted, so the missile behavior is doing very well. So, following that, the low-rate production decision will, will be made.
Mr. WELDON. Let's talk about THAAD. The next THAAD test, I understand, is still scheduled for May, and there's a lot riding on this test, as you know.
General KERN. Yes.
Mr. WELDON. I've asked, and I hope you can cooperate with us to get some of the THAAD equipment up on the Hill, because a lot of Members think THAAD is just one missile, and if we don't have an intercept there for the program, should be canceled. In fact, for the record, I'd like you to answer a question that I've asked General Reimer, General Lyles, and a number of other people, and that is that our, the rumor mill in the Pentagon is such that there are those who are already planning to reallocate all the THAAD dollars, assuming there's not a successful intercept, that they would want to cancel the entire program. And I can tell you there's some Members on the Hill who'd probably want to go along with that, especially the aggressive Navy supporters who want to see Navy low and upper tier perform the mission that THAAD is designed for.
Page 444 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Are you aware, first of all, of any rumors to reprogram all THAAD money if there's an unsuccessful intercept this May?
Dr. OSCAR. No, I'm not. THAAD, in addition, has had many successes. Even though it hasn't had the end-game hit-to-kill yet, we have had many tests. The radar is outstanding, it's the best radar going. It can be useful for upper tier and lower tier, it is an outstanding radar. The launcher's good. The test failures we've had have been quality failures. They've been really silly things, a screw here, a bolt there. They haven't caused us any reason to lose our confidence in the fact that we can hit to kill. Matter of fact, Extended Range Intercept Technology (ERINT), which originally did hit to kill, led us on to say, hey, this is going to be a real leap ahead.
So, I don't know of any rumors to do it. We would fight that. We, we believe this program is a high priority.
Mr. WELDON. I want to get into the, the specific points. In fact, my understanding is of the 12 or so milestones is that the THAAD Program has successfully completed 11. Is that correct?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELDON. So the only thing it hasn't completed is actually the intercept.
Page 445 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. That's correct.
Mr. WELDON. The problem is that Members of Congress who are not familiar with the program don't understand that. The media has, to some extent, trivialized the issue, that THAAD has been a failure. When I went to Fort Bliss, what I suggested there, and what I'm suggesting to the Army now is you need to bring up the THAAD radar system, the command and control system, you need to demonstrate that on the Hill so that Members and staffers can see that we already are getting successful benefits out of THAAD; in fact, a piece of legislation that we expect to move through this committee this month, which now has bipartisan support, which is a bill to enhance our short-term capability to deal with the Iranian missile threat, the North Korean missile threat that's here today, or will be here within 12 months, will use the THAAD radar, by putting additional funding in to enhance the capability and the footprint of the PAC–3 system. So, there are, we need to make that case. It's not being made right now. So, I guess for the record I should ask you, even if that intercept is unsuccessful, would that be reason that you would think that we should kill the THAAD Program?
Dr. OSCAR. I do not think so.
Mr. WELDON. How shortsighted would that be? General.
General KERN. My opinion, that would be significantly shortsighted, because I believe that, as you stated, that it's been a very successful program in, in many dimensions. And that the checkout of the missiles that we've looked at have verified for us that it also has the inherent capability for hit-to-kill. It is trying to meet an extremely difficult capable, capability in that target set that we're shooting. So, we have not taken a trivial capability to test. We are pushing that capability, of both the missile and those command-and-control, and the radar, to beyond anything that technology has demonstrated today, and it's been successful in every aspect, with the exception of the end game. And in some cases, it's been as silly as it running out of fuel.
Page 446 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. And my own feeling is, and I'm going to say this on the record, I think a lot of the fault belongs to the contractor. I think the contractor in the THAAD Program has not been aggressive in quality control. I think the contractor who was also doing the PAC–3 Program has to understand that we're going to hold the contractor firmly accountable for, for the future operation of the THAAD Program and the success of this program.
I mean, we're in a critical time frame now. It's 7 years after those young people were killed in the desert. And, doggone it, we, I mean, the problems that have been, that have been evidenced by the, by the intercept failures, as you pointed out, are simple things, in some cases stupid things, that should not have occurred. They're quality-control issues. And so I think it's important, at least from standpoint as the chairman of the R&D committee that I'm holding the contractor accountable for, for what happens in this program in the short term in 1990, but also the Army, in it's aggressive oversight, and its', it's an interaction with that contractor. Because it is critically important to us this year, so much so that I'm concerned that if we have an unsuccessful intercept in May, there are going to be many on the Hill calling for the, the complete elimination of THAAD, and some within the administration, I would say to you, who will say the same thing. Mr. Bartlett, you had a comment you wanted to make on this?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I come from an R&D background and I have some very serious questions about the R&D testing in this missile defense development. We have too few tests, we push them too fast, we expect too much of them. Do you really learn more from a failure than you do from a success? And we need to understand why we do testing. Testing is not to prove that you've done it. Testing is to help you move the development along. And we just need to educate the public, and a lot of the Members of Congress, as to why one tests. And what the, what you should expect from a test. You know, this program is going along just fine, but the expectations are that it's going to hit, if it doesn't hit, somehow the program is a failure. Somehow, Mr. Chairman, we have to, to be the apostles of change here, and change the thinking about why we do testing. But we have too few tests in this program, and, and too much is expected of those tests. I would just wonder if you would comment, gentlemen.
Page 447 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General KERN. Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Chairman, I take both of your comments very seriously about how we do this. General Lyles and myself have both met with the senior management from the president and vice presidents of the corporation on down, and gone through all of the failures in detail. The reason that this test did not occur this month, and it's been delayed, is because of many of the exact risks that you laid out that we took into account as we looked at this test, and the way we were pushing it. So we are doing end-to-end tests in simulation, checking out that system in great detail, with Government and contractor engineers looking at it to reduce the risk. We've worked out with our operational testers, and our own analysis capability to make sure that we are taking into account the risk-reduction that we can, and before we go to the next test. So I think you are, what you have said is accurate, and we are looking at that very seriously today.
Mr. WELDON. And I'm going to give every member a chance to ask questions. I know I'm hogging the time here, but I want to just do one other thing on missile defense.
We have legislation that I said has strong, bipartisan support from this committee—two-thirds, or three-fourths of the committee members are cosponsors. It was called Impact–97, introduced last year by myself and Mr. Pickett. We've modified that with the strong support of the, of the minority side. Mr. Spratt's been involved, Mr. Dellums was involved before he left. We've reached a compromise that General Lyles is now supportive of, that will authorize $147 million of what we hope will be new money. This new money will go for a joint composite tracking network, remote launch capability, PAC–3 production enhancements, Arrow inter-operability, money for basically giving us capabilities with existing components, but providing a very quick dollar allocation that support, and can enhance, our efforts with existing systems and capabilities.
Page 448 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The total value of this, as I said, is $147 million. I met with the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Committee yesterday. We have a difficult time ahead of us. We're going to try, we're going to authorize the bill, markup will be, I think, tentatively around the middle to the end of this month, and hopefully passage out of this committee before the end of the month. Our goal is to try to get an appropriation. We'd like to get new money, because this is a very real threat that was not anticipated. The intelligence community did not let us know until this past summer that Iran had acquired medium-range missile technology from Russia. We now know, the intelligence community has admitted even publicly, that that threat could evolve 12 to 18 months from now.
Where you could be of help to us in bringing some new money into the system would be to get the services to come out and strongly support that, to make sure the word goes up through the Pentagon establishment to the White House, for them to match up their rhetoric with action in terms of supporting an attempt, in a bipartisan way by this Congress, to help us deal with the threat that we see in the short term, rather than the threat we see coming in the long term. So, I would just ask you to help us in that regard to help you, and not take money away from other priorities that you've identified for us.
With that, we'll go to, who's our next member? OK, what members have questions? Mr. Riley.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Oscar, while we have the benefit of Dr. Prociv being here today, I'd like to just get your assessment on where we are on the CHEMICAL DEMIL Program, and a couple questions about it.
Page 449 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. I'll make some general questions, and I'll ask Ted to comment in detail. I'm very pleased with the program. We have two factories that are up and running. The one in Johnston Island has destroyed over 80 percent, I think, of the stockpile there. The one in Utah, Tooele, has destroyed about 10 percent. We have two more plants under construction in Umatilla and Anniston. We have another one where the contract's been let for construction and should be awarded very shortly. We have two efforts looking at an alternative way of getting rid of bulk fuel at Aberdeen and Newport. And then we have an exciting program looking at alternative technologies that the Army's gotten a lot of kudos from, actually, from the community. We've involved the community very heavily in this alternative technology process.
So I'm very pleased to say that I think, actually, that is one of the reasons that the Office of Secretary of Defense, wants to devolve it to the Army, that it's now getting mature, it's ongoing; we have plants doing it. Safety is our first concern, and we haven't had a single problem with that. And so we are destroying this terrible threat, and at the same time doing it in a very good way, and I think it's really maturing well.
Mr. RILEY. Dr. Prociv.
Mr. PROCIV. Yes, I can only echo what's just been said. I think that the transition to the Army will improve a lot of things, particularly communication, chain of command, the ability to communicate with really the true decisionmakers and get the kinds of things we want to do.
I know that one of your concerns, Congressman, of course, is how we can help some of the situations out in the communities, where we realize that we're creating quite an impact. We'll move some 500 people in for 10 years and move them out, and I assure you we are now looking very hard at how to deal with that issue. We've had an Overarching Integrated Process Team [OIPT] looking at whether we can provide impact statements. We'll have a senior-level group meeting here pretty soon to work it out. And we're going to need some legislative help on this. There is no legislative means by which we can accomplish some of the things we want to do, but we certainly are exhausting all kinds of means to do that.
Page 450 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. As we move through this, Doctrine, and we try to establish a means of providing impact funding for these CHEMICAL DEMIL communities, just logistically, how do you expect that to take place?
Mr. PROCIV. That's the actual subject of the Integrated Process Team [IPT] right now. Because of various constraints that we have, we're unable to simply provide economic adjustment payments, things like that, unless we have some legislation, some means to do that.
As you know, we were able to do that in the State of Utah, but that's because under their Federal Facilities Compliance Act, they had already enacted local ordinances which required us to do that.
So there's a number of different avenues. Before the end of this fiscal year, we'll be back to you with a recommendation, and hopefully, some proposed legislation that we'll put through our process.
Mr. RILEY. The impact funding that was used in Tuello was after the plan was up and running and burning. Do you foresee that in this case, or will the monies be available, or should they be available, before the final construction of the facility?
Mr. PROCIV. Right now I can't answer that because that is exactly what the lawyers are debating, as to how do we make these payments. In the case of Utah, it was Utah had an ordinance that required anyone who was incinerating any kind of material to pay on a volume basis. There are two other incinerators in that area. That ordinance was already on the books. So in Utah, basically, we're providing impact payments based on the volume of material destroyed. We can use other parameters, and that's exactly what the lawyers are looking for.
Page 451 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. One final question: As far as alternative technology, and you said it was being developed today, for the plants outside of the ones that are being developed now, do you anticipate that being an alternative technology plant or would it be probably another incinerator?
Dr. OSCAR. It really depends. We have some exciting technologies, some of which look pretty mature. We have, I think, seven contractors looking at different alternatives, and we're prepared to go to demonstration on those. That's really the question that we will be looking at: Can it be done in time to meet the treaty requirements of 2007? It probably will be able to on the plants we haven't built yet. Whether it would be in time and whether it would be cost-effective, certainly in a place like Johnston Island it wouldn't; we're 90 percent done already. So some of these places we'll be done before you could bring on a new technology.
Mr. RILEY. What kind of timetable do you expect for this alternative technology?
Mr. PROCIV. We're going into the demonstration phase with the seven contractors. The demonstration phase will be completed in December, at which point we submit a report to Congress. That report to Congress will have the various timetables that we anticipate. Congress will take 180 days to decide how to proceed at that point, and we'll make a recommendation. Obviously, we'll work together on that recommendation. We have some opportunities that are coming out that we're going to look very, very hard at.
Page 452 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. Thank you.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Oscar, you testified that the M1A1/M1A2 tank is the best tank in the world. I agree with that assessment. I remember when General Sullivan was the Chief of Staff of the Army, he sat almost exactly where you are now. I don't know why I remember it, but I remember him testifying that the M1A2 compared to the M1A1 is 18 percent more lethal. That was the figure that he used that day several years ago.
Is it correct to say that the M1A1 is the second best tank in the world?
Dr. OSCAR. I don't know.
General KERN. I'd say it. The M1A1 heavy-armor tank with the current munitions and with some proposed munitions that we have that are about ready to go into production is the most survivable and most lethal tank that's out there. There are others who will claim that they can do it, but they do not have tanks in production and the capabilities that we do. So if you asked me to go fight a battle in M1A1 today against anybody else, I'm comfortable with that.
Mr. MCHALE. I concur in that analysis as well. So we've got the two best tanks in the world. My question relates to a recent briefing that we received from the National Defense Panel, and my question is not presented with any preconceived notion as to what the answer is. This is not an argumentative question at all; I really don't know.
Page 453 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Let me simply present to you what was told to us by the National Defense Panel during that briefing. They raised the prospect that, since we have the two best tanks in the world, that in terms of maximizing procurement dollars, some on the National Defense Panel argued that we should stick with the M1A1, that it's the best there is, and in an environment of relatively low armor threat, rather than upgrading from the M1A1, the second best tank in the world, to the M1A2, the best tank in the world, they suggested that that money would be better spent moving more rapidly to a new generation of tanks. They had some suggestions as to size and capabilities, but that instead of taking a half-step forward, we ought to take a whole step; that we are secure in our armor capability with the M1A1, and rather than going at great expense to the M1A2, we ought to move to an entirely new generation of armored capability. I have no idea whether or not that's a valid approach, but it's one that has been presented to us, and I would welcome your comment.
Dr. OSCAR. We are also concerned about that, and we have studied that a great deal. There's two factors that come into play. One is how fast you can bring on such a new tank. We do, as I mentioned earlier, have some tanks that are in tech base, but I don't believe we could bring them on in under 10, 15 years, and then we'd start production at the rate we typically produce, 100 tanks a year. It would take us 80 years to switch out the fleet at 100 tanks a year.
So the second factor is supporting what you have: Why it's the best tank today? Will it be the best tank 80 years from now? Probably not. Will it be the best tank 30 years from now? I think the M1A2 will be, but over time the M1A1, which is a predominant part of the fleet—we only have about 1,000, or plan to have about 1,000 A2's and only about 6,000 A1's. I think as we start getting 10, 20 years from now, we may not be able to still say we have the first- and second-best tank in the world.
Page 454 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So I think it's critical we look at bringing on a new tank. The question is: When? I don't think we have a technology today that will allow us to leap ahead and immediately do that. I think it's going to take 10 years or so to mature that. On the other hand, while we're doing that, we've got to keep supporting the tanks we have.
There's also some significant increases between the M1A2, not only the 18 percent fightability of the M1A1, but it provides this digital battlefield. This new battlefield is very synergistic in capability. It's sort of like—and I hate to keep saying this; my friend here is always annoyed when I keep doing it, but it's like an analogy of I'm hiding behind this tree, and I see the enemy, and my buddy is hiding behind that tree with a different set of eyes, and I call him up and I say, ''The enemy is coming.'' And he says, ''Where?'' And I say, ''In front of my tree.'' And he says, ''What tree are you hiding behind.'' And that communication goes on.
Now you can have a map and you can see where I am. I can see where my buddy is. When he designates the enemy, I can see where the enemy is. I can help him. This kind of digitization is going to be in the M1A2 tank. So while individually it may only be an 18, 20 percent increase over the M1A1, it has a synergistic effect throughout the battlefield because it provides 1,000 more eyes and 1000 more sensors. It helps the Bradleys; it helps the aircraft, and they help each other, and one tank can help defend another tank, which they can't do now. So while it only as a per-vehicle maybe 18 percent, but by getting this digital capability throughout the battlefield, which is going to take the M1A2 tank, you increase the whole force dramatically.
General KERN. I would just add, I think you probably are keying-in on what may be one of the most controversial decisions that we have to make in the next few years as we look at the production of the current M1A2 modifications, the mix between the M1A1 with its digital capability with the A2s, and when we bring on the next, what we're calling today, our future combat system.
Page 455 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Army Training and Doctorate Command [TRADOC], today has taken that on as a study that they're working very hard. General Adams will be looking at prioritization among all of those systems that we have to do as we build the next years' program, and that will be front and center as one of the toughest decisions that we make this year.
Mr. MCHALE. We will share, obviously, in that responsibility. I anticipate, based on the briefing that we received from members of the National Defense Panel, that one or more members of this committee may well offer amendments during the course of this year's authorization process. As someone who has a completely open mind on this subject, and who really is soliciting your advice and your professional judgment, let me suggest to you that you prepare maybe a 5-page point paper for timely distribution, because we are going to confront that issue, I expect. There will be Members who, in complete good faith, reach the conclusion that that money is not wisely invested in the M1A1 upgrade. As I made that decision, I would very much like to have in my possession your strongest arguments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. McHale.
Let me just add to this discussion—and we have to be careful because we can't discuss what I'd like to discuss here in open forum, but I've attended two classified briefings on tanks, and while you've made some very provocative statements about our superiority in tanks, I think we ought to have a discussion in private session with what the Russians are doing and what's about to come out with the Russians, because I don't know if I necessarily share the robust nature of our confidence. I'm not saying that we don't have the best, but I'm also aware of what the Russians are about to bring out as well. We don't want to mislead any of our colleagues in terms of development of new systems like that around the world, and certainly from what the intelligence community tells us about Russia's technology, it is certainly something that we have to weigh-in as a factor.
Page 456 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Let me get into a lead-in that you provided for me on my final question, which is the Army's second-largest weapon system, the Crusader. The self-propelled, 155-millimeter Howitzer replaces the aging Paladin. And I understand you're trying to develop a late transportable system. The Crusader and its resupply vehicle weigh approximately 60 tons each. The National Defense Panel [NDP], which you just alluded to, questioned a large projected Crusader buy, and one NDP member actually went on record as saying, ''It's a fine weapon, but it weighs 70 tons and has a heavy logistics tail.''
Even more to the point, recently, a senior Army official stated clearly that the Crusader, ''Is not an Army After Next system.'' Since the Crusader deployment began, the Army had more clearly defined its weapons system requirements for the Army After Next. Would it not be best perhaps to free up scarce resources by doing as the NDP suggested and bypass Army XXI systems and directly develop advanced systems for the Army After Next?
I guess what we're saying to you is the signals are mixed, even within the Army, regarding the Crusader program. So what's the bottom line?
Dr. OSCAR. I don't think the signals are mixed. This is a much more dramatic and easier decision than the M1 tank that we just discussed about the future versus the present. The Comanche—or the Crusader Howitzer is our future. It is a dramatic, not an 18 percent, but about a threefold increase over our current Paladin. It will allow us to, with the same lift capability, whether it be by sea or air, take and get three times the capability for the same lift, or for the same capability we can have one-third less planes take it there.
Page 457 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I think it's a little deceiving sometimes when people talk about weight. Whether the Howitzer is 40 tons or 60 tons, you can only put one Howitzer in a plane. It really doesn't make a difference. I mean, it's a volume problem, not a weight problem; it's a cube problem.
The Crusader will start fielding in about 2006, and it will provide a leap-ahead capability from our current Paladin Howitzer in every respect. It goes from, instead of the 30-kilometer range, to 50-kilometer range; instead of 2 to 4 rounds per minute, it's 10 to 12 rounds per minute. It have unbelievable increase survivability. It's under armor with its under-armor supply vehicle feeding it bullets, or whatever they call them, rounds. So it's better in survivability; it's better in mobility.
One of the key problems we had in the gulf war was the Howitzers couldn't keep up with the tanks and Bradleys. This one will have the speed and the mobility to do that. So it has increased mobility; it has increased lethality; it has increased survivability. It increases both in a large war or a contingency operation kind of small war, it solves our strategic lift capability because it lowers the lift. And to boot, all of that, it dramatically lowers our O&S cost because it goes from an 8-gun platoon, 8 guns to 6 guns, and allows us to take one-third of the soldiers out of the force.
Mr. WELDON. I appreciate all of those comments, and I don't think we have a prototype for the device yet. But, be that as it may, does it fit the Army After Next?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, it does. The Army After Next focuses on two main criteria. One is increased mobility, both tactically, agility, and strategically—the ability to project the force, and clearly, this can do it with one-third the lift.
Page 458 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The second thing is logistics support. With the resupply vehicle married up, it allows us to have a continuous supply of rounds for the vehicle in a much better logistics chain. It has modern logistics in it as far as tagging the rounds, tracking the rounds, and putting them into the Howitzer. So I think it does.
I think the comment TRADOC made was the fact that it will be both because it starts fielding in 2006, it will be in the next Army; it will be part of the digitized Army. It's also digitized. But it only starts fielding in 2006, and it continues for 20 years beyond that. So it will be part of the Army After Next also.
Mr. WELDON. So the comments by this one TRADOC official are basically unfounded, or that's just—were they taken out of context or what?
Dr. OSCAR. I think they were taken out context. He as saying it will be in the next Army, but it will also be in the Army After Next.
Perhaps General Kern can——
General KERN. Yes, what he said was accurate, but it was taken out of context, I think, and amplified to say a prerogative view of the Crusader, which was clearly meant to be. The Crusader, as Dr. Oscar described, is a tremendously improved capability. We ought to go back and remember how we got to where we are with Crusader. When we returned from the gulf war, we had an armored systems modernization [ASM] program, of which then the Advanced Field Artillery System [AFAS] was part of. When the Army leadership looked at the world as we saw it at that time, and the environment that we had to fight in, we concluded that the system which we had to put the highest priority on was our artillery system. So out of that ASM program, the Crusader moved to the forefront, and it is our technology carrier for the 21st century for the ground systems.
Page 459 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Now having said that, it was designed for Army XXI. Army After Next concepts came about after we developed that Army XXI and the Crusader as a centerpiece of that. So that the comment that was made was focused on the fact that we designed the Crusader to meet an Army XXI requirement. It will be here, however, in the Army After Next battlefield as clearly a system which will be just being fielded early in the 21st century.
Is it a system which meets all of the requirements, however, in what we see in Army After Next? Those are the technologies which we're trying to develop now. So, yes, it's going to be with us, we believe, for quite some time. It is a critical need for the Army to meet, but I expect that the 21st century Army After Next, somewhere around the year 2025, many of our systems will look quite different than they are today to meet those requirements. So I expect to see further developments in that area as well.
Mr. WELDON. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Just in closing, I would like to make one observation. Our military is just now beginning to develop the capability to protect themselves against chemical or biological agents. For us back home here, there is zero protection and zero planning. We're living on borrowed time, and I hope that what you're doing in the military can hurry up what really needs to be done for us here. We have been incredibly lucky so far, and by and by, this luck is going to run out.
Page 460 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, and thanks for sticking around for the entire hearing.
When we ended votes today, a lot of members took off, but we appreciate your being here and answering your questions for us.
Two additional things I'd like you to comment on, both dealing with enhanced roles the Army's playing domestically in terms of terrorism and incidents involving disasters involving weapons of mass destructions—issues that are very close to me, not just as a member of this committee, but also as a member who works fire and life safety issues nationwide with that group of people.
One is the issue of spectrum and frequency allocation. I'd like you to comment on the record, so that we have a clear indication of the concerns of the Army about the future use of the spectrums, so there's no doubt in the minds of Members of Congress that we'd better be careful what we're doing here.
And the second is in the role I've taken in supporting the Army, and especially the enhanced role of the Guard in terms of training and helping assist our domestic response capabilities nationwide, I want to have you comment on the fact that, again, while the Army and the Guard will play a lead role—and, again, those people that we need to really fully empower are the first responders, the 1.2 million men and women who are in the 32,000 organized departments across the country in our cities and in our counties, 85 percent of whom, I might add, are volunteers.
Page 461 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
There's a great deal of concern in the country that the Army is attempting to go in and take over this function. I deal with this all the time. In fact, I'm speaking at two terrorism conferences for them in different parts of the country over the next 2 months.
I need to have the Army reassure the public safety people, because I know this is your feeling, that they are not, in fact, attempting to do that, and that's not a part of what the Army's about. So if you could comment on that and the spectrum issues, I'd appreciate it.
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, I agree with your assessment totally. There's no way our intent that the Guard is going to take over the defense totally. We are looking at using the Guard. We're setting up 10 regional centers to help assist the State authorities and local people to be able to do this job, provide them access to technology, provide them expertise, advice, to help them do this.
I agree with you totally; we are not trying to take this over from them. We're looking at the Guard to help them, and we're looking from the equipment modernization side to provide the Guard with equipment that they need to be able to display that and help the local authorities make choices on what to buy and how to buy, and those kinds of things.
On your first question, again, the Guard is really going to train the trainer kind of concept. They're really out there to figure out how best to do it, and then train the local people and assist them as they need it.
On your first, the spectrum, I'd like to make just a general comment and turn it over to General Campbell, who's really the technical expert. I am very, very concerned. We have a real problem with spectrum just nationally, and then we have the one in the Army. I think we need to figure out a better, cost-effective way to do this. We have dire problems. As you know, for just one simple example of GPS, it was created by the military to do a military job. It was found that it has a wonderful civilian application, but we're running out of frequency to do that.
Page 462 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
At the same time, the thought of let's sell frequencies is a good thought, but, as the last auction showed, we didn't get very much money for it, and as we sell it, I'm having to incur costs to redesign radios, to buy more radios. And so it's costing the government instead of netting the government money.
So we need to work out some kind of compromise, and I've proposed Department of Defense [DOD] help work with Department of Commerce and Congress and others and figure out a way that's a win/win for everybody. Maybe perhaps the military can say, here are the weapons we want to develop or our needs in radios, and maybe that would entice a contractor to buy the spectrum for that purpose, or maybe we can give the spectrum to a contractor and allow him to develop something for the military. Or maybe we should allow the military to bid on it. I don't know what the solution is, but I know it's a grave concern. And to help articulate that——
Mr. WELDON. Before you turn to the general, staff has told me that even potentially the guidance system for the Patriot system could be impacted by this problem. So, with that, I would ask for additional comments.
General CAMPBELL. Sir, the spectrum is a national asset. It's absolutely critical for national defense, and we need a national strategy, in my view, to protect it. Tomorrow afternoon the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the services are meeting with Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], Office of Management and Budget [OMB], and the Joint Staff on this very issue.
Page 463 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 require the auction of 20 megahertz in that portion of the spectrum that's below 3 gigahertz. That is the prime area for the military spectrum. Currently, in that area, that below-3-gigahertz area, there's only 24 percent of that that's reserved for the military, and more of it is at risk of being sold off.
From the Army perspective alone, we estimate that it would have an impact of, in dollars, probably about $2 billion. From an operational perspective, we have to do more work and really lay out the impact that the loss of the spectrum would have on our flexibility from in an operational context.
I believe that, at a minimum, there should be a moratorium on further selloff of the spectrum until that national strategy has been replaced, and if I had a vote, I would vote for not selling off that current 20 megahertz until feedback is provided by the services, OSD, and the Joint Staff following the review that's ongoing now.
Mr. WELDON. Well, I agree with you, and, unfortunately, in our rush to try to find new sources of revenue, this issue is not just negatively impacting the services, although that is absolutely severe and critical; we've had the same problem with public safety. In fact, I led an effort last year working with Senator McCain, which we finally got the Commission to agree with us on, that we should protect some of the frequency of the spectrum for public safety purposes. I mean, we have situations now where public safety units can't communicate one with the other, and there's no available spectrum for them. So it is a critical issue, but the problem is it's being lost in the rush to look at revenue. What you're saying, it's actually going to become a negative in terms of the military, and we've got to make that case.
Page 464 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I hope you can provide for us that data, specifically to the committee, and I'd like to have it personally, so that I speak to the budget people, who want to continue to press this issue, and talk about the negative consequences on the defense side. That's an argument that I don't think we're making loud enough and well enough, and I'm concerned we may well lose this argument. So we need to focus on this over the next several months.
General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELDON. Could you include the ranging requirements for the testing, and so forth. Staff says—do you want to comment?
Mr. LAUTRUP. Just that you would include the problems that the ranges are having for now and in the future to be able to get the telemetry, and what-not, that they need in the spectrum.
General CAMPBELL. Yes, indeed, we can show you that in the five bands of this 20 megahertz that we're talking about now, that two of those bands are currently used for telemetry, and we'll lay out that impact.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginnign on page 373.]
Mr. WELDON. Thank you very much. And, again, we thank you both for coming, and thank all the support personnel for coming in. We appreciate your candor, and look forward to working with you on what will be a very challenging and difficult year.
Page 465 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned subject to the call of the Chairs.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WELDON
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)
Mr. WELDON. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted the fact that the Army was the only service that would be unable to achieve its major modernization requirements through planned savings. The report affirmed that the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-propelled howitzer—the Army's only two new modernization programs into the next century—are essential to the Force XXI concept but noted that significant savings will also have to be gained from base realignments and closings in order to procure these systems on the projected schedule. It also noted that programmatic changes, including reducing currently projected peak procurements and rephasing other major programs, may also be necessary. Why does the QDR single out the Army?
Page 466 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General KERN. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) focused on the elements of our National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare, and recognized the key strategic role that land forces play across the full spectrum of operations both now and in the future. Further, it emphasized the link between the National Military Strategy and the Army's Modernization investments. The QDR cites the funding dilemma that the Department of Defense (DOD) faced in the years following the end of the Cold War which resulted in disproportionate reductions in procurement spending. The Army has clearly felt the effects of these reductions on their procurement accounts. Our RDA budget has consistently been the smallest within DOD. When supplemental funding for the Gulf War is excluded, fiscal year 1998 was the 13th consecutive year of decline in the Army's share of Total Obligation Authority. During that period Army Procurement has declined 73 percent. At the current level of funding, the Army must assume increased risk that a peer threat will not emerge until 2010 and concentrate funding on key efforts like Digitization and systems like Comanche and Crusader to maintain a balanced modernization plan.
Mr. WELDON. Does the Army agree with these findings? If so, how does the Army intend to address these issues?
General KERN. The Army believes the QDR outlines the strategy and addresses the necessary concerns that will require our forces to remain prepared to respond to the full-spectrum of operations, from small scale contingency operations to major theatre wars. It is imperative that we remain prepared to respond to any crises in the near-term and prepare for the future.
Numerous studies conducted by the Army reflect the need for robust research, development and acquisition funding in the neighborhood of $15–16 billion per year as necessary to both maintain current equipment and develop and field future systems. The Army's current modernization strategy, supported by the appropriate level of funding, creates a capabilities-based Army with full spectrum dominance. Our near-term strategy focuses on achieving information dominance. In the mid-term (2004–2010), the emphasis continues on information dominance capabilities, coupled with technology insertion to extend system lives. In the far term (2011–2020), leap-ahead technologies are expected to come to fruition as next generation systems, like Comanche and Crusader, are fielded to the Total Army in sufficient quantities to provide an operational impact. Throughout these three phases, we will maintain investment in combat overmatch and focused research and development. Additionally, we seek to maintain recapitalization funding to guard against fleet obsolescence and rising operation and support costs.
Page 467 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Army will implement initiatives such as Army National Guard Division Redesign Study that, in part, converts lower priority reserve component combat units to combat support/combat service support units. This addresses the imbalance between combat and combat support capabilities. Further, the Army's goal remains to digitize a Division by 2000 and a Corps by 2004. The QDR clearly recognized the role that information technology will play in providing our warfighting forces with information dominance and has pledged its support in accelerating our digitization efforts.
MEADS
Mr. WELDON. Let's talk missile defense. Last year, this committee zeroed out funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. You testified today that MEADS is extremely important for the layered defense system that the Army's a part of, and I know it's important to the allies working on it. My understanding is you requested about $43 to $45 million for MEADS. With the commitment to, that we've now relinquished and backed off and supported the program because the administration and the Army feels it's so critical, what are the plans for the out-year funding for MEADS? Could you tell me what the dollar amount requested for the out-years after this next year?
Dr. OSCAR. The Department recognizes that the MEADS program has a funding shortfall in the out-years and options are currently being considered to fund/mitigate this shortfall. This shortfall is approximately $1.3 billion.
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
Page 468 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Could you include the ranging requirements for the testing, and so forth. Staff says—do you want to comment?
General CAMPBELL. Two of the bands that will be transferred as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 1432–1435 MHz and 2385–2390 MHz, are used at Army ranges for the purpose of moving data between airborne platforms and ground stations. These telemetry links use multiple frequencies in one or the other of the two bands to simultaneously transmit measurements during each flight. When the spectrum in the two banks is transferred, there will be fewer frequencies available for each flight; therefore, more flights will have to be made to recover the same amount of data. Because many of these flights involve developmental systems, the cost per flight can be significant. Army testing can be accommodated after the transfer; however, the result will be additional cost as research, development and test programs are extended because of the extra flights.
UH–60 BLACK HAWK
Mr. WELDON. The UH–60 Black Hawk is the Army medium lift helicopter and workhorse of the Army utility helicopter fleet. Accordingly, the Army has determined in its Helicopter Modernization Plan that it will require 90 additional Black Hawks through fiscal year 2003 (FY03), primarily for the Army National Guard to fill newly identified requirements. Have these aircrafts been budgeted for?
Dr. OSCAR. Not entirely. The FY99 budget begins to address the Army National Guard out-year requirements. The Army funded 50 additional UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters (ten each in FY99 through FY03) toward its 90 additional aircraft requirement.
Page 469 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. If not, how many aircraft are unfunded and what is this cost?
Dr. OSCAR. The remaining 40 UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters are unfunded and will compete in the Army's Program Objectives Memorandum. The estimated total cost of procuring and fielding 40 additional UH–60 Black Hawks is $360 million ($9 million per aircraft) to as much as $440 million ($11 million per aircraft). Cost estimates are dependent upon quantity and year of purchase. Furthermore, cost savings beyond FY01 will depend on a negotiated follow-on multi-year contract and cannot be determined at this time.
CH–47 IMPROVED CARGO HELICOPTER (ICH)
Mr. WELDON. The Army has stated that the CH–47 ICH upgrade is critical for not only aviation support operations but also for personnel and cargo movement. This upgrade will provide increased lift, fuel efficiency, greater range and safety. What is the status of this program?
Dr. OSCAR. The ICH program successfully completed an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council on December 12, 1998. The Army Acquisition Executive approved the program to proceed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) for formal OSD review and approval of the program to enter engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). The OIPT is scheduled for April 22, 1998. Army leadership fully expects the OIPT membership to recommend that the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) approve the program to enter EMD. Following EMD approval by the DAE, the program is projected to enter into EMD contract in May 1998.
Page 470 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What is the cost and schedule for the ICH program?
Dr. OSCAR. The cost for the ICH program is $3.2 billion in constant fiscal year 1997 (FY97) dollars. In terms of schedule, the ICH program, given OSD Milestone II (EMD) approval in April 1998, is projected to be on EMD contract in May 1998. The period of EMD and test and evaluation spans from 3rd Quarter, FY98 through 4th Quarter, FY02. Milestone III (production) review is projected for July 2002. Low Rate Initial production (LRIP) consists of 12 aircraft with first delivery in May 2003. Full rate production would slightly overlap the LRIP effort. Full rate production period of performance is from March 2003 to July 2014. Production rate will be 26 aircraft a year for a total program procurement of 300 aircraft. First unit equipped is projected for September 2004. Program production effort completes in 2015.
Mr. WELDON. Is the program fully funded in future years? If not, why?
Dr. OSCAR. With regard to program funding, the ICH program is fully funded in all years.
Mr. WELDON. As part of the ICH program, what is the status of the T–55–GA–714A engine upgrade program that Congress provided a $52.3 million increase for in FY97 and is it on schedule?
Dr. OSCAR. The T–55–GA–714A engine upgrade program is on schedule and progressing well. The non-recurring effort for engine/airframe installation design went on contract on September 30, 1997. A partial LRIP quantity of 45 engine conversion kits was also put on contract in September 1997. Total LRIP quantity is 115 engine conversion kits. Remaining LRIP conversion kits are scheduled for contract award by the end of 3rd Quarter, FY98. First deliveries are projected for December 1998. First airframe/engine installations are planned for 2nd Quarter, FY99. The upgraded engine procurement spans from FY98 through FY07. Engine deliveries complete by FY08.
Page 471 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. If the ICH program is not funded, what are the alternatives for the Army that will provide a suitable heavy cargo helicopter that will meet the Army requirement and what will it cost?
Dr. OSCAR. If the ICH program is not funded, there are no near term alternatives other than continued sustainment of the current fleet via normal Army Aviation maintenance procedures. The envisioned replacement for the current CH–47 heavy lift cargo fleet is the Joint Transport Rotocraft (JTR). Per the latest approved Army Aviation Modernization Plan, the JTR is not expected to begin displacing the aging CH–47 fleet until 2020. The ICH program was specifically devised to bridge the gap to the JTR. Currently there is no approved requirement or funding in place for the JTR. If the ICH program is not funded, the current fleet will require substantial overhauls just to sustain itself until completely displaced by the JTR. Assuming the JTR begins to displace the current CH–47 fleet in 2020, and has a production/fielding rate comparable to that currently envisioned for the ICH program, the JTR will completely replace the CH–47 fleet by about 2031. In addition to the cost of recurring overhaul, the CH–47 fleet will also continue to operate under the conditions of high operations and sustainment (O&S) costs. The O&S costs will continue to increase over time. The approximate cost to sustain the current fleet (both overhauls and increasing O&S burden), until completely displaced by the JTR is estimated by the program manager to be $5.6 billion in constant FY97 dollars.
JOINT PRECISION STRIKE DEMONSTRATION ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION
Mr. WELDON. The Joint Precision Strike Demonstration (JPSD) Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) originated from a January 1992 Director of Defense Research and Engineering memo that established the Army as the lead service. The primary focus of this demonstration was to enable United States Forces Korea (USFK) to conduct joint rapid counter fires against North Korean long range artillery and multiple rocket launchers forward deployed along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. (A heavy artillery barrage is expected to precede a North Korean military invasion of the South.) The demonstration was designed to improve and demonstrate adverse weather, day/night, senor-to-shooter joint precision strike capability to locate, identify, eliminate high-value, time critical targets and assess damage within rapid time frames. The technology demonstration proved its worth and residual technology has been left with USFK.
Page 472 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As a result of the residual technologies left with USFK, is there a procurement or modernization implication to ensure that forces maintain current updates to hardware, software and command and control systems?
Dr. OSCAR. There are no plans to update hardware, software and command and control systems within the scope of the Counter Multiple Rocket Launchers (CMRL) ACTD. Capability and functionality enhancements developed during the CMRL ACTD will migrate to the appropriate Army Battle Command System (ABCS). This is possible because of the extensive use of developmental versions of Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) software throughout the CMRL ACTD and updates to the system will occur in accordance with the fielding schedules established for ABCS. JPSD and ABCS Program Managers are sharing technical information to facilitate the design for this integration and fielding dates for these systems in Korea are currently scheduled during FY00–01.
If so, what are the implications?
Dr. OSCAR. The implication is that the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is developing formal requirements documentation to support programming and integration of the CMRL products into the Acquisition Program Baseline for the Army Battle Command Systems, which will make this capability available for Army wide use.
ENHANCED FIBER OPTIC GUIDED MISSILE (EFOGM)
Mr. WELDON. The EFOGM had its origins in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) as part of the Rapid Force Projection Initiative Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The missile is supposed to be deployed to the 18th Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division and give them the ability to engage and defeat armored combat vehicles, other high value ground targets and hovering or moving helicopters that may be masked from line-of-sight direct fire weapons. FY98 research and development (R&D) funding, the FY98 conference report provided $31 million to procure 96 development and evaluation missiles and to complete the ACTD. Since FY97, $66 million of R&D funding has been authorized and the missile has not had a successful test flight to date. Additionally, the Army's FY99 budget request includes $13 million for the procurement of 96 additional missiles. Ultimately, the Army intends to use this ACTD as a vehicle to procure missiles for early entry forces, however, the test missiles have not had a successful test. What are the 96 missiles requested in the FY99 budget supposed to be used for?
Page 473 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. In FY98 $13 million of procurement funding was provided by the Congress to buy 96 missiles to be used in the Extended User Evaluation following the RFPI ACTD field experiment. The President's Budget for FY99 also includes funds for an additional 96 missiles. These additional 96 missiles will complete the basic load of 192 (96+96) missiles to equip A Company, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 18th Airborne Corps with one load of ready missiles providing a go-to-war capability in accordance with the Chief of Staff of the Army's direction.
Mr. WELDON. When is the next test flight scheduled for?
Dr. OSCAR. The next test flight (flight #3) is scheduled for late Apr 98 when Controlled Test Vehicle (CTV) #1 will be flown at the White Sands Missile Range. CTV #1 will demonstrate pitchover and transition to stable flight, sustainer motor ignition, control of missile via test profile maneuvers/commands, and verification of flight #2 canister latch mechanism redesign.
Mr. WELDON. If this missile test shot fails, what will the Army field to the 82nd Airborne Division?
Dr. OSCAR. One of the critical EFOGM evaluations will be the July 1998 RFPI ACTD Large Scale Field Experiment. This is where the Army will evaluate the totality of the system-of-systems and sensor-to-shooter approaches. The results of this experiment will directly feed the EFOGM procurement decision review scheduled for September 1998. The 82nd Airborne Division is currently in the process of getting Javelin and this fielding will be completed by 3rd Quarter FY98. One LOSAT company, as residuals from the LOSAT ACTD, is scheduled for combat certification within the XVIII Airborne Corps in FY03. Final assignment and stationing decisions regarding the LOSAT company has not yet been made. Also, the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), the 2nd Generation FLIR for the HMMWV TOW, is scheduled to begin fielding to the 82nd Airborne Division in FY99. The Follow-On To TOW missile is scheduled to begin fielding in late FY05.
Page 474 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Will the Javelin work as an interim weapon system?
Dr. OSCAR. While the Javelin, an extraordinary weapons system in its own right, certainly mitigates some operational risk against threat armored forces, it is a direct fire line-of-sight system with far less range then EFOGM. EFOGM is designed to use the sensor capabilities of emerging systems, in combination with digitization, to engage and defeat high priority targets with a precision munition beyond the line-of-sight. In this way, EFOGM will significantly increase force survivability and increase lethality while adding a precision capability to the Brigade Commander's arsenal. It is also important to note that EFOGM is itself a Forced/Early Entry Force risk mitigator because of the cancellation of the Armored Gun System and the deactivation of the 3–73rd Armor Battalion (M551 Sheridan) at Fort Bragg, N.C.
MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) ROCKETS
Mr. WELDON. This system is a primary fire support weapon for the Army; however, the Service has failed to include adequate funding for continued production of rockets over the last two years. The production line would have gone ''cold'' if not for a $12.0 million plus up authorized in the fiscal year 1998 (FY98) conference report. The system is funded at $16.5 million in the FY99 budget request. Because of design flaws and production delays on the self-destruct fuze (SDF) XM85 grenade for the Extended Range MLRS (ER–MLRS) rockets, production of the ER–MLRS rockets may be further delayed. What is the status of the engineering changes being made to the self-destruct fuze?
Dr. OSCAR. All engineering changes have been made to the SDF. In July 1997, the performance of the SDF in ER–MLRS rocket tests met the less than one percent hazardous dud rate (HDR) requirement. At that time, though, the SDF prime contractor declared that changes to the design were required to enhance safety and producibility at the necessary future high production rate. These changes were made and flown in ER–MLRS rocket tests in December 1997 with successful results (less than one percent HDR). Additional rocket flights were conducted 30 March through 3 April 1998 to verify the SDF design. These rocket flights verified that the final SDF design achieves the required less than one percent HDR. Although, ER–MLRS rocket production with SDF has been delayed the Army is producing ER–MLRS rockets using the M77 grenades (without SDF). The SDF requirement for these ER–MLRS rockets was waived to fulfill an urgent U.S. warfighting need for longer range MLRS rockets and to fulfill foreign military sales (FMS) orders from countries that do not require SDF.
Page 475 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. When will the corrected self-destruct fuze be delivered for the ER–MLRS rockets?
Dr. OSCAR. Development of the high rate equipment (HRE) necessary to produce the SDF at the required rate has experienced delays due to the complexity of the equipment involved and latest SDF producibility changes. Current completion date of the HRE is 30 September 1998. Based on this completion date and the availability of long lead materials (i.e., thermal battery, integrated chip, and the electro-explosive device), SDF-equipped grenades should be available for loading into ER–MLRS rockets in late 2nd Quarter, FY99 to support the FY98 ER–MLRS rocket requirements.
Mr. WELDON. Are the corrections to the fuze affordable for procurement?
Dr. OSCAR. The government and the contractor are continuing to work to reduce the price of the SDF. However, the price still exceeds Army budget plans. The current SDF production contract proposal contains a price of $12.94 per SDF for the low production rates planned for the U.S. Army ER–MLRS rockets. The price of the SDF is heavily dependent on the initial low rate production quantities. The Army expects to make an SDF affordability decision for ER–MLRS rockets by the end of April 1998.
Mr. WELDON. If not, what will be done to get an affordable fuze?
Page 476 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The price of the SDF is largely based on the total quantity produced and the yearly rate of production. In the future, U.S. Army and FMS artillery cannon shell production has the potential to be the primary user of the SDF. SDF requirements for these programs have the potential to significantly reduce the SDF price for the Guided MLRS rocket program which begins production in FY02. The SDF prime contractor has provided data that shows the cost of the SDF will decrease to approximately $8.00 after the five millionth SDF has been produced and to approximately $5.00 at the fifteen millionth unit if producing at a yearly rate of 2.3 million. These future SDF price estimates and total expected SDF production quantities will be taken into account when the Army makes the SDF affordability decision for ER–MLRS rockets. If the decision is made that the current SDF is not affordable, the Army will remain committed to the less than one percent hazardous dud rate requirement and will explore more affordable SDF alternatives.
Mr. WELDON. What is the status of the pending FMS opportunities of ER Rockets as a result of the SDF delays?
Dr. OSCAR. ER–MLRS rocket production for FMS requirements is ongoing. In FY97, Korea and Bahrain made FMS procurements of 1,338 ER–MLRS rockets with M–77 grenades (non-SDF). Currently we are processing an FMS request from Greece for 876 ER–MLRS rockets using M–77 grenades (non-SDF). ER–MLRS rocket FMS cases with Norway and Denmark are pending and are dependent on the production availability and price of SDF since both Norway and Denmark will buy ER–MLRS rockets only with SDF.
MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) LAUNCHERS
Page 477 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. The fiscal year 1998 (FY98) Conference Report authorized a $25.1 million plus up for a total of 35 MLRS launchers for the Amry's 2 × 9 MLRS force structure configuration. How many more launchers will be needed to fulfill Army requirements and is this requirement adequately funded in FY99?
Dr. OSCAR. After the planned FY98 MLRS 2 × 9 battalion fieldings, the Army has four more MLRS 2 × 9 battalion fieldings to complete. Each 2 × 9 fielding requires nine launchers for a total of 36 launchers. The Army plans to integrate these additional 2 × 9 fieldings into the launcher fielding schedule during the FY00–03 time period. Therefore, the Army does not plan to conduct any 2 × 9 fieldings in FY99.
Mr. WELDON. If not, why?
Dr. OSCAR. Due to resource constraints, the Army does not plan to conduct any 2 × 9 fieldings in FY99 and plans to conduct the remaining 2 × 9 fieldings in the FY00–03 time period.
ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM (ATACMS)/ANTI-PERSONNEL, ANTI-MATERIAL (APAM)
Mr. WELDON. The Army planned to enter into a multiyear procurement in fiscal year 1997 (FY99) for the Block IA ATACMS missile, however, it did not because of deficiencies experienced by the missiles during operational testing prior to going into full-rate production. What is the status of the corrections being made to the ATACMS program and is there any plan to enter a multiyear contract in the future?
Page 478 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The Army took a three-fold approach to addressing this issue. First, we requested a survey by the defense intelligence community of the projected target sets for the Block IA missile. This survey included validation of the current target sets and certification of the target configurations. Second, the Army reviewed the tactic, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for Block IA employment and revised the allowable number of missiles fired against certain targets to achieve the required effectiveness. Third, the Army completed a series of tests, experiments and analyses to characterize fully the effects of the M74 bomblet and updated the effectiveness models to better capture bomblet effects. As previously planned, we have run the updated models, using the revised TTPs, against the validated target set and have determined that the missile is effective against all target sets.
There are no plans for a Block IA multiyear contract at this time. The Army is assessing the opportunity to initiate a multiyear contract for ATACMS–BAT programs in the FY00–05 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build.
Mr. WELDON. If not, is adequate funding included in the FY99 budget request and the Future Years Defense Plan?
Dr. OSCAR. Adequate funding is in the FY99 budget request. However, the user has completed and recently validated a quantity study, including the updated threat analysis, on the required Block IA quantities. There currently is a difference between the number of missiles the user requires (652) and the number of missiles funded for procurement in the Future Years Defense Plan (573). With the addition of the 70 missiles procured with the FY97 Supplemental Bill there will be a nine missile difference. We are addressing this difference in the current POM build.
Page 479 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM (ATACMS)/BAT
Mr. WELDON. The BAT is a gliding acoustical sensor munition that is designed to be dispensed out of the ATACMS missile against armor targets. Funding in the fiscal year 1999 (FY99) budget request is $100 million, which will procure 420 BATs. What will the basic BAT submunition be used for if the pre-planned product improvement (P3I) BAT is to be fielded?
Mr. OSCAR. The warfighter has the requirement to engage and destroy moving armor at depth. The basic BAT provides the corps commander with a submunition for shaping the deep anti-armor battle, in near all weather conditions without placing personnel at risk. The Army needs the capability to deny the enemy of uncontested maneuver at depth—this is especially important for our light and early entry forces. Given the proliferation of armored vehicles in over 140 different countries, not fielding BAT and waiting for P3I BAT would deprive the war-fighter of a near-term capability to engage and destroy moving armor at depth. ATACMS Block II with basic BAT provides the capability to satisfy that requirement—it will provide the corps commander with the ability to begin influencing that anti-armor battle up to 140 kilometers (km) forward of his own line of troops. P3I BAT is currently structured as an improvement program, not a full development program. The P3I BAT program develops upgrades or improvements to selected components of the basic BAT: development of an improved seeker that uses leading-edge technology, improved acoustic target acquisition capability, and an improved warheard. These improved components will be integrated into the base BAT system. Basic BAT meets a critical operational deficiency today; P3I BAT expands performance to meet the threat tomorrow.
Page 480 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Is this one of the causes of the deficiencies in the ATACMS Block IA operational testing?
Mr. OSCAR. No, the operational issues involving ATACMS Block IA had nothing to do with BAT or ATACMS Block II. The ATACMS Block IA with anti-personnel/anti-material (APAM) bomblets is used against a soft target set and ATACMS Block II with BAT is being developed to attack an armor target set.
Mr. WELDON. Is the BAT program adequately funded in the FY99 budget request?
Mr. OSCAR. When the President submitted the FY99 Budget the restructured BAT program was fully funded. However, in January, Northrop Grumman submitted their proposal for the BAT Test Hardware Contract (THC) that was significantly higher than the government estimate. Consequently, the Army estimates a significant difference between the final negotiated contract cost and the funding provided in the FY99 budget submission. The Army is proposing a phased approach to P3I BAT which fully funds the THC, reduces risk in the P3I BAT program and does it within the available funding.
M1A2 ABRAMS TANK
Mr. WELDON. The fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget request included $1.4 billion for the procurement and modification of weapons and tracked vehicles for the Army. The FY98 Conference Report authorized an increase of $200 million for small arms, Bradley Fighting Vehicles (Operation Desert Storm variant), Paladin Howitzers and Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles. According to the Army, the System Enhancement Program (SEP) is the ''essence'' of the M1A2 upgrade. Is the SEP retrofit fully funded?
Page 481 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. Yes. The Army plans to retrofit all 627 early M1A2s to the SEP configuration. The program currently starts in FY01 and is expected to end in FY07.
Mr. WELDON. Numerous press articles have recently alluded to the Army's consideration of transferring some funding from the M1A2 Abrams tank upgrade program to fund the Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS). What is the Army's official view on upgrading less M1 tanks to fund the FSCS?
Dr. OSCAR. Bottom line, we aren't upgrading fewer M1 tanks to fund the FSCS. The Army has been consistent in expressing the current requirement for M1 to M1A2 upgrades. The program was approved for a minimum of 998 upgrades (1,079 M1A2s) in April 1994. In fact, the FY99 budget is the first submit which raises the bar on the upgrade program. This year's budget raises the upgrade quantity from 998 to 1,069 and increases the M1A2 total from 1,079 to 1,150. We intend to complete the multiyear procurement as scheduled in FY00 and propose to continue buying Abrams upgrades until we reach at least 1,150 M1A2 tanks (estimated to be in FY03). We have not sacrificed any of these vehicles in order to fund the FSCS. The Army desires to put every tanker into an M1A2. In anticipation of expanding the upgrade, we had earmarked funding in the out years (beyond FY03) to continue production beyond 1,150 M1A2s; however, we have never committed to producing more than the minimum requirement for upgrades. The issue is affordability within a constrained budget.
For each budget cycle, we consider the projected threat, our current total capabilities, and then assess our ability to meet National Security Objectives. Army priorities in the budget process have been to protect readiness and quality of life and to provide balanced modernization within an austere budget. While the Army desires to resource sufficient M1A2 upgrades to outfit our entire armor force and training base requirements, we're currently only able to provide for a mixed fleet of M1A2s and M1A1s. Affordability within a balanced modernization strategy is the key issue and our desires will continue to be challenged by the changing geostrategic environment, changing National Security Objectives, expanded missions, and declining budgets. As a result, the uncertainty portrayed in the media regarding many Army programs, including Abrams, is likely to continue. The Army will continue to revisit Abrams modernization and sustainment efforts in the upcoming FY00 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). During the POM process, the Army will resource the number of M1A2 upgrades needed to attain at least our minimum operational requirements at affordable production rates.
Page 482 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. If it is not determined at this point, when will a decision be made?
Dr. OSCAR. Since the underlying National Security Objectives and funding guidance change every year, these decisions are revisited every year. The Army will submit a revised POM covering FY00–05 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in May 1998 and submit the FY00 Budget to Congress in early February 1999.
Mr. WELDON. How will this decision effect the health of the tank industrial base of which only one manufacturer still exists?
Dr. OSCAR. The FY99 budget submit assumes we will layaway much of the tank industrial base at the end of our minimum production requirement (1,150 upgrades). For some vendors, this may be as early as FY02. The Army is concerned about the sustainment of the tank fleet. In addition to expanding the M1A2 program beyond 1,150, we have a significant retrofit program (627 M1A2s to M1A2 SEP) and we are considering an M1A1 remanufacture effort to sustain the life of the fleet and workload some portion of the vendor base.
Mr. WELDON. Is there a range of number of tanks that can be upgraded in the M1A2 multiyear contract?
Dr. OSCAR. The multiyear procurement (MYP) is structured around a ten vehicle per month production rate. There is a contract re-opener that would allow a reduction of up to 18 tanks per year. The last year of the MYP is FY00. Given that we've already started buying the FY99 tanks with FY98 advance procurement and we've requested FY99 advance procurement for the 120 tanks in FY00, we don't anticipate exercising this option.
Page 483 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What is the status of the pending foreign military sales (FMS) for the M1A2 and are costs of the current U.S. Army multiyear contract tied to potential FMS sales?
Dr. OSCAR. We have no firm cases for additional FMS and the current costs of the MYP are not tied to any potential FMS (current cases with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt were factored in). However, this isn't the total picture. During the MYP negotiation process, there was growing conviction that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was going to buy 150 additional tanks. Because both parties felt the 150 tank buy was imminent, MYP prices were finalized with the expected increase in business volume factored into the contractor's overhead rates and general and administrative rates. Locking in the contractor's overhead business bases was one of the late issues settled in reaching a definitized firm fixed priced agreement in September 1996. Both parties accepted risk. Since then the entire KSA 150 tank procurement has been deferred and we benefited by an estimated $75 million at the expense of General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS).
SMALL ARMS INDUSTRIAL BASE/M4 CARBINE
Mr. WELDON. The U.S. Army Material Command briefed its Small Arms Industrial Base Study to Congress in July 1997. The study concluded that it was most economical to maintain one supplier for each type of small arm, except the M16 and M4 Carbine. Colt's Manufacturing was to produce 6,000 M4 Carbines at 500/month and the remaining requirement was to be competed for best value. What is the status of the M4 contract?
Page 484 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The 1997 Small Arms Industrial Base Study concluded that it was in the Army's best interests to maintain one supplier for each type of small arm, except the M16 Rifle and M4 Carbine, to meet near-term war reserve requirements until fiscal year 2000 (FY00). The Army has since implemented the results of this initial study. As a result, a sole source, four-year multi-year contract was awarded on October 28, 1997 to Colt's Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, West Hartford, Connecticut, for the production of 24,000 M4 Carbines.
Mr. WELDON. Does the Army still intend to follow its plan to compete the remaining amount of M4 Carbines outlined in the Small Arms Industrial Base Study?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army intends to sole source the balance of the Army's M4 Carbine requirement (approximately 31,000 weapons) and unique components from Colt's until the year 2011.
Mr. WELDON. If not, why not?
Dr. OSCAR. Subsequent to the recommendations of the 1997 Small Arms Industrial Base Study, the Government and Colt's reached legal agreement and signed, on December 24, 1997 an addendum updating the original 1967 M16 license agreement. The addendum did not change the terms of the agreement; however, some terms were clarified and addressed in greater detail. By executing the Addendum the parties settled the legal controversies of rights and responsibilities; use of M4 Carbine technology; contractor's right to terminate the license; and claims against the Government for failure to restrict the use of Colt's proprietary data. The key provision of the addendum restricted the use of licensed M4 Carbine technology for the purpose of competitive procurements of end items and critical components until the year 2011.
Page 485 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. In the FY97 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed in law that modifications and repair parts for small arms be provided from the small arms production base defined by the Army Science Board's (ASB) January 8, 1994 independent panel assessment entitled, ''Preservation of Critical Elements of the Small Arms Industrial Base''. Has the Army Material Command redefined the small arms industrial base beyond this existing statute?
Dr. OSCAR. the FY97 Defense Authorization Act provided instructions to the Secretary of Defense that, ''to the extent . . . necessary to preserve the small arms production industrial base,'' the Secretary of Defense ''may require that any procurement of property or services . . .'', (to include modifications and repair parts for small arms), ''. . . be made only from a firm in the small arms production base . . .'', as described in the ASB report. To date, the Army has not redefined the small arms production industrial base beyond the 1994 Army Science Board recommendations for preservation of the small arms industrial base.
Mr. WELDON. If so, what authority have they acted under and why?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army recognizes that actions may be necessary beyond FY00 to preserve the small arms industrial base. To that end, the Army is currently conducting a Phase II Small Arms Industrial Base Study to specifically address the future composition of the industrial base and what unique capabilities (if any) are present within the small arms weapons components manufacturing segment which warrants preservation beyond FY00. This study is being conducted at the direction of the Senate Armed Services Committee and in accordance with the Department of Defense Handbook 5000.60, ''Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities,'' dated April 1996. We anticipate completion of Phase II by April 30, 1998.
Page 486 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES (FMTV)
Mr. WELDON. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 Conference Report authorized the Army to enter into a second multiyear procurement contract beginning in FY 1998 for FMTV. The FMTV, which includes 14 variants of trucks within the program, is funded at $336.3 million in the FY 1999 budget request. Army officials have repeatedly stated that trucks are essential pieces of equipment for Army operations, however, the Army seems to fail to include in its annual budget requests adequate funding for this basic type of equipment. Is the FMTV program adequately funded in this budget request to maintain an efficient economic rate of production to field badly needed trucks?
Dr. OSCAR. The FY 1999 budget request of $336.3 million buys at a rate equal to or exceeding the minimum sustaining rate (MSR) of 150 per month.
Mr. WELDON. If not, why not?
Dr. OSCAR. The budget request meets or exceeds the MSR.
Mr. WELDON. Does the Army intend to include adequate funding in its future budget requests to fulfill the multiyear requirements?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, last year in the mini Program Objective Memorandum (POM), we added over $600 million to the program.
Page 487 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Does the Army intend to qualify a competitive second source for future procurement of these trucks and what are the benefits and costs associated with establishing a second source.
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, because there is a reasonable, common sense basis for assuming that the introduction of competition into the FMTV program will have a beneficial price impact for the Government. In a program of the duration of the FMTV, with over 20 years of production remaining, it is anticipated that the competition will have a long-term effect on prices, rather than dramatic, short-term savings. Based on our research, we estimate that the reduction in overall costs could range between 1 and 5 percent. Beside the cost advantages associated with competition, the Army believes that competition will:
Increase the Government's bargaining leverage.
lower the acquisition costs through less need for cost surveillance such as audits, cost or pricing data.
Increase technology.
Increase quality.
Increase technical base and system alternatives.
Increase the industrial base and enlarge our surge and mobilization capacity.
Page 488 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Ensure a more equitable process in awarding Government contracts and offer a practical method to ensure fair distribution of public funds.
The additional costs required to bring on a second source are estimated to be up to $57 million depending on the contractor. These costs include the pre-production qualification phase, manufacturing premiums, facilitation, engineering support, and testing costs required to qualify the second.
FAMILY OF HEAVY TACTICAL VEHICLES (FHTV)
Mr. WELDON. The Fiscal Year 1998 (FY98) Conference Report authorized an increase of $105.0 million—no production funding was requested—for badly needed Heavy Equipment Transport Systems, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks and Palletized Load Systems. The FY99 budget request included $189.6 million for FHTV. Has the Army included adequate funding in the FY99 budget request for these trucks if these type vehicles are essential to combat service support operations?
Mr. OSCAR. Yes. Given the fiscal constraints, the Army has included adequate funding in the FY99 President's Budget request. Following last year's Congressional plus up of $105.0 million for Heavy Tactical Vehicles, the Army took to heart congressional guidance to adjust future years to provide a stable funding profile.
Mr. WELDON. If not, why not?
Page 489 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. OSCAR. As I said, even with fiscal constraints the Army has increased the amount of funding for these vital truck programs. Of course additional funding, if available, would be used to accelerate the program and buy out our required quantities sooner.
SHORTSTOP ELECTRONIC PROTECTION SYSTEM (SEPS)
Mr. WELDON. The Fiscal Year 1998 (FY98) Conference Report authorized an increase of $6 million for the procurement of 42 additional SEPS—no production funding was requested. The Committee understands that this relatively inexpensive system has met or exceeded all of its test requirements, yet the Army has not funded this system and the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea has an urgent requirement for 62 SEPS. Is the Army satisfied with the most recent test results to enter into procurement for this system?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes. The Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS) is comprised of three configurations; vehicle-mounted AN/VLQ–11; stand alone AN/GLO–16; and manpack AN/PLQ–7. All three configurations were subjected to live fire Developmental Testing and Operational Testing (DT/OT) last July at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona. However, because of design immaturity (i.e., battery pack), the manpack configuration was not subjected to all required testing. We are currently building only vehicle mount systems, AN/VLQ–11, to satisfy a U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) urgent requirement for 69 SEPS.
The SEPS exceeded operational requirements against the weapons fired during the DT/OT, providing almost double the effective zone of protection required by the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). It did, however, prove less effective against certain threats when targeted directly in front of the system. This deficiency can be overcome by establishing overlapping zones of protection with two or more SEPS which was always the planned scheme of employment for the system. The AN/VLQ–11 did not meet the requirement of the ORD with regard to mean time between failure. This was attributable to the physical design of the antenna and will be corrected in production. Minor software related problems are also being addressed during production.
Page 490 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Commander, USFK was advised of the limitations of the vehicle mounted SEPS and supports the Army's decision to proceed with production to satisfy the USFK urgent requirement. The Army, however, will conduct additonal testing of SEPS prior to any decision to pursue full-scale production.
Mr. WELDON. Since this is a relatively inexpensive force protection system that has demonstrated solid performance in tests, why has the Army not funded this program to meet these urgent theater Commanders'-in-Chief (CINC's) requirements?
Dr. OSCAR. Because of budget constraints and higher priority programs the Army has been unable to fund the production of the Shortstop systems required. This requirement will compete for funding in the fiscal year 2000 budget process.
Mr. WELDON. How much funding would be needed to fulfill these CINC requirements?
Dr. OSCAR. An additional $5.8 million would be required to fund the remaining Shortstop Systems for U.S. Forces Korea.
FORCE XXI
Mr. WELDON. This is the Army's premiere initiative to field a fully digital division by fiscal year 2000 and digitized corps by fiscal year 2004 is fundamental to its information dominance strategy of the enemy on the twenty first century battlefield. A series of Advanced Warfighting Exercises (AWEs) have been conducted over the last two years. What are the key lessons learned from all of the previous Advanced Warfighting Exercises at Fort Hood and the National Tranining Center?
Page 491 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. In March 1997, the Army conducted one of the largest, most complex experiments of its kind in land warfare in the decades since World War II. The Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (TFXXI AWE) was one of a series of AWEs designed to lead to a digitized division and corps. It consisted of live and constructive simulations from March 1996 through June 1997 for a digitized brigade task force consisting of two heavy battalions, one light infantry battalion, and a support slice. The live simulation consisted of training exercises conducted at platoon through brigade levels at Fort Hood, Fort Lewis and the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. They provided opportunities for data collection during train-up on the effects of digitization, new equipment initiatives, new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and organizational initiatives. The constructive simulations were integrated with the training exercises in a model-experiment-model design.
There were five major objectives of the TFXXI AWE identified by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). They included: providing information to support investment decisions on the most promising of the 72 initiatives considered in the experiment; refining digitized TTPs for brigade operations; experimenting with advanced technologies and concepts that leverage capabilities of information-age technologies; assessing digitized brigade combat service support (CSS) concepts; and, assessing Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and below (FBCB2) Appliqué and tactical Internet Capabilities.
The TFXXI AWE was a highly successful experiment that exceeded the expectations of planners and participants alike. Not only did it reveal a clear vision of the dynamic potential in the digital land force, but it also validated the Army's whole approach to experimentation. AWEs serve not only to put concepts to the most rigorous examination possible, short of actual combat, but they also serve as ''forcing functions'' to synchronize and bring to fruition all the complex pieces of the digital force in one place at one time. The Army saw remarkable progress as a result. Technical obstacles that were initially declared to be insurmountable were solved in a matter of weeks and sometimes days. These accomplishments would have taken years in the old requirements determination model.
Page 492 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE) was conducted November 5–13, 1997 at Fort Hood, Texas. The DAWE was a command post exercise (CPX) in which the experimental force (EXFOR)—4th ID and III Corps—fought against a world class opposing force (OPFOR), using Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) tools to portray a European scenario in 2003. The EXFOR was equipped with digital command and control (C2) technology and organized according to the Conservative Heavy Division (CHD) Design.
Digitization of the battlefield led to EXFOR achieving and sustaining situational awareness and information dominance over the OPFOR. This, in turn, permitted EXFOR to conduct distributed, non-contiguous operations over an extended battlefield. As the enemy attempted to maneuver against the Blue forces, EXFOR was able to locate and track the enemy's most critical forces, and bring massed, destructive fires on them. The resulting close operation allowed cohesive, mobile EXFOR brigade combat teams to engage and defeat disrupted, attritted OPFOR units.
Along with the many advantaged of the extended battlefield are some challenges. At times during the DAWE, the EXFOR saw deep into the enemy's territory and interdicted his movements effectively. However, some smaller (platoon or smaller) forces slipped into the EXFOR rear went undetected and caused disproportionate damage until neutralized. Visualizing the battlespace means more than just seeing deep. It must include accurate and continuous perception of the entire battlespace.
Tactics in the DAWE focused on the early detection of enemy activity, followed by rigorous tracking and analysis of the enemy to determine the highest payoff targets. The EXFOR then engaged with long range systems—tactical aircraft, aviation, and artillery—destroying or disrupting key enemy capabilities before the enemy could close to direct fire range. While the Army must continue to develop this method of fighting, however, we are also developing measures to deal with an enemy that disperses, hides in urban or environmentally sensitive areas, or mitigates the effects of our sensors and fires in other ways. Even as we optimize for the long-range engagement of the enemy, we will see a balanced development that accounts for the close fight.
Page 493 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Is there adequate funding included in the fiscal year 1999 budget request to meet the Army's digitization requirements and timeliness or will additional reprogramming requests be required in fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999?
Dr. OSCAR. Our digitization efforts are a subset of ongoing modernization efforts of approximately 97 systems encompassing 538 budget lines. The total funding for all 97 systems in fiscal year 1999 is $2.6 billion. Of this total approximately $261 million was added to digitization by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 1999. The $261 million provides for improved interoperability, increased integration, improved security, network management, and more robust common architectures. Currently, the Army does not foresee the need for additional funding in fiscal year 1999. However, given the ever-advancing nature of information technologies, and the process of discovery that the Army is going through to harness the benefits of this technology, there may be requirements for additional funding for critical programs that we cannot perceive at this point.
Mr. WELDON. Is there adequate funding in the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) to meet digitization requirements?
Dr. OSCAR. At this point in time, there is adequate funding to field the First Digitized Division by the end of fiscal year 2000 and First Digitized Corps by the end of fiscal year 2004. However, the Army is undergoing a significant transition in the way it does business. This revolutionary change, known as ''spiral development'', is a process that will lead us to Force XXI, and our future vision for Army After Next. This process of experimenting with change leads us to changes in warfighting requirements. As these changes appear, additional resourcing may be required. We all need to understand that constantly changing threats and rapid technology advances are going to be the norm for an information-based force. Our resourcing needs to be responsive to these changes.
Page 494 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
WARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS (WRAP)
Mr. WELDON. The WRAP was established by the fiscal year 1997 (FY97) Appropriation Act and provides the Army a vehicle to rapidly procure promising technologies in the Research and Development phase, by reprogramming request, that originate out of the Force XXI digitization initiative. The WRAP is funded at $99.5 million in the FY99 budget request. What is the status of the program and what promising technologies have been identified to accelerate through this initiative?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army will spend $63.1 million of its FY98 Force XXI initiatives money for the second year effort on the following programs. The remaining $36.9 million will be used to fund FY98 initiatives currently being staffed to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The $50 million Congress provided in FY97 funded the following 11 candidates:
Mr. WELDON. Is the WRAP adequately funded in FY99? If not, why not?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes. The Force XXI Initiatives (WRAP) program is adequately funded in FY99.
CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
Mr. WELDON. The fiscal year 1999 (FY99) request for the Chemical Defense Program total is $425 million, an increase of $20 million from the FY98 funding level, and includes a total of $88 million for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's biological defense technology program. The procurement requests totals $284 million, an increase of $54 million from the FY98 funding level and includes $128 million for individual protection, $121 million for decontamination, $28 million for the joint Biological Defense Program, $20 million for collective protection, and $96 million for contamination avoidance.
Page 495 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
In response to Congressional direction in the FY94 Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense implemented an improved management structure for the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense program. The Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, ATSD (NCB), as the focal point for NBC defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and appointed the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DOD to coordinate and integrate research, development, test, evaluation, acquisition, and military construction requirements of the military departments for the NBC defense program. A joint Service Agreement for Joint NBC Defense Management was implemented in 1994 and a program management plan established in 1996. The Secretary of the Army accomplishes Executive Agent responsibilities from the Joint NBC Defense Board and two subordinate supporting joint groups, the Joint Service Integration Group and the Joint Service Materiel Group.
The Defense Reform Initiative recommends a number of changes in the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Among these are assignment to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering of those ''corporate level policy functions'' that are currently assigned to the ATSD (NCB) would be assigned to a new Defense Treaty Compliance and Threat Reduction Agency, which would be formed by combining the Defense Special Weapons Agency, Defense Technology Security Agency, and On-Site Inspection Agency. What are the Army's views on the Chemical-Biological Defense Program? Is the program meeting the needs of the Army? In its role as Executive Agent for the program, what has the Army done to ensure that the requirements of the other military services are integrated in the program? How effective have the Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Defense Group and its supporting Joint Service Integration Group and Joint Service Materiel Group been in coordinating and integrating service chemical-biological defense requirements and development programs?
Page 496 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has undergone a multiyear transition period during which it has evolved into a true Joint Service partnership. The Army is satisfied with its role as Executive Agent and believes there has been considerable progress in meeting not only the needs of the Army but of the other Services. As Executive Agent, the Army has coordinated and integrated research, development, test, and evaluation and acquisition requirements of the military departments. The management structure established for the CBDP includes the Joint NBC Defense Board (JNBCDB) which is co-chaired by Army Acquisition Executive and Vice Chief of Staff, Army with membership from all Service acquisition and operational representatives Supporting the JNBCDB is the Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) and Joint Service Materiel Group (JSMG). JSIG coordinates and integrates NBC joint training, doctrine and requirements for all Services including Special Operations Command (SOCOM). JSIG also develops the Joint Modernization Plan and Joint Priority List. JSMG uses the priority list to develop the Joint Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) Plan and Joint Logistics Plan. The Joint RDA Plan provides a blueprint for developing and fielding chemical biological defense systems and for understanding the operational impact of our warfighters of the future. Department of Defense made a significant investment to the program based on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directive. High priority program procurements were increased to satisfy shortfalls in two Major Theaters of War Requirements. The joint process established for the program is working and if allowed to remain stable, will continue toward maximum effectiveness. This process allows for a truly coordinated Joint Service effort and provides equipment necessary to protect the force.
Mr. WELDON. What are your views on the proposed assignment to the new Defense Treaty Compliance and Threat Reduction Agency of the program management functions for the NBC Defense program that are currently assigned to the ATSD (NBC)? Should these management functions be assigned instead, to one of the Military Services?
Page 497 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The Army is satisfied with Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) visibility and advocacy for the Chemical-Biological Defense Program (CBDP) in their oversight role. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) proposed charter does not change the mission and responsibilities of the oversight management. The movement to DTRA of the CBDP oversight will be transparent to the Joint NBC Defense Board (JNBCDB). The Army's understanding is that NBC defense dollars will remain fenced and will not be part of the DTRA Program Objective Memorandum process. There will be no change to the way we do business today. We believe that oversight management should remain a DOD function and not assigned to one of the Military Services. Department of Defense (DOD) provides a check and balance with the Services and ensures necessary visibility and interaction within OSD and the Joint Staff.
CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION
Mr. WELDON. In accordance with the recommendations of the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), the fiscal year 1999 (FY99) budget request would transfer program funding and milestone decision authority for the Chemical Demilitarization Program from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the Department of the Army. Milestone decision authority for the program would be transferred from the Defense Acquisition Executive to the Army Acquisition Executive. The FY99 request totals $855 million and includes $183 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) (a $116 million increase from FY98 and $70 million above the original FY99 projection contained in the FY98 President's Budget); $141 million in Procurement (an increase $69 million from FY98, but $263 million less than originally projected); and $531 million in Operations and Maintenance (an increase of $118 million, but $47 million less than originally projected); and $125 million in Military Construction for the chemical demilitarization sites. Overall, the FY99 budget request represents a $300 million increase above the FY98 funding level, but is $239 million below last year's FY99 projection. Total estimated cost of the demilitarization program is in excess of $12 billion.
Page 498 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Chemical Demilitarization Program was established by the FY86 Defense Authorization Act, which mandated that funding for the program be set forth in a separate account and not included in the budget accounts for any military department. The reasons given for keeping the funds separate from the budget accounts of the military departments were to avoid artificially inflating the total obligation authority of any single military department with the funding for chemical demilitarization on the grounds and to segregate the funds so that they would be controlled at OSD level and not become a bill payer for programs judged to be of higher priority within any particular military department. In 1991, the Secretary of the Army was designated as Defense Executive Agent for the destruction of all Department of Defense (DOD) chemical warfare related materiel and the Chemical Demilitarization program was designated a major Defense Acquisition Program in December 1994.
The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) was established in 1988 to improve emergency response capabilities in communities near the eight sites in the continental United States where chemical weapons are stored. The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provide emergency response/preparedness support to the communities surrounding the eight disposal sites and share management responsibility for the program, with the Army providing the funding. (In accordance with state laws, state and local officials have primary responsibility for developing and implementing emergency response program within the communities). In July 1997, the Secretary of Defense advised the Congress that the Army and FEMA has reached agreement on changes in management of the program which would provide increased flexibility to state and local community governments in implementing the emergency preparedness program. The FY98 Defense Authorization Conference report indicated that the Congress would review proposed legislation required to implement the new agreement, as well as progress made in emergency preparedness, the implementation of site-specific integrated process teams, and the working relationships among Federal, State and local authorities involved in the CSEPP.
Page 499 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
What progress is being made in the demilitarization of the chemical weapons stockpile? Please summarize the status of the program.
Dr. OSCAR. The Chemical Demilitarization Program is well underway. Two baseline incineration facilities are operational—Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal Systems (JACADS) at Johnston Island in the South Pacific and Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility (TOCDF) at Deseret Chemical Activity in Utah. Over 1,494 tons of agent have been destroyed at JACADS which represents approximately 73.6 percent of the original chemical agent stored on the Atoll and over 1,504 tons of agent destroyed at TOCDF which represents over 11 percent of the original chemical agent stored at Deseret Chemical Depot.
Systems contracts have been awarded for disposal sites at Anniston Army Depot, AL and Umatilla Army Depot, OR. Construction of the Anniston Chemical Disposal Facility is underway and is approximately 17 percent complete and construction of Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility is underway and is approximately 14 percent complete.
The systems contract for the disposal facility at Pine Bluff, AR was awarded in July 1997. A protest on the contract award was filed by an unsuccessful offeror. The protest was upheld by Government Accounting Office in November 1997. A decision resolution of the contract award is expected in early April 1998. We anticipate receiving necessary environmental permits in fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998, at which time construction will begin.
The projects for Pueblo Chemical Disposal Facility and Blue Grass Chemical Disposal Facility are on-hold as directed by Public Law 104–208 which prohibits baseline facility construction until 180 days after the Secretary of Defense provides to Congress the final report evaluating the demonstrated alternative technologies to incineration for assembled chemical munitions. This program, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program, is managed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).
Page 500 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Army is proceeding to initiate the necessary activities to support pilot testing of neutralization-based technologies at the bulk-only storage sites, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD and Newport Chemical Depot, IN. At present, the Army has entered the procurement process to acquire system contractors for these facilities. The Aberdeen Request For Proposal (RFP) was issued in November 1997 and proposals were received March 2, 1998. The Newport RFP is expected to be issued in March 1998 and proposals are due in early June 1998.
The Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System is conducting statistical sampling to collect and analyze agent samples from the ton containers in storage at Deseret Chemical Activity, Utah to ensure that the containers do not contain agents other than GB nerve agent.
The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provide emergency response/preparedness to the communities surrounding the eight continental United States stockpile storage sites. Army and FEMA signed a new Memorandum of Understanding on October 8, 1997 that agrees to give FEMA full authority, responsibility and accountability for managing and directing the off-post emergency preparedness. The Army will continue to manage the on-post aspects of program and provide technical support and expertise to assist FEMA. The Army and FEMA will continue a partnership to execute the program and will continue to use Integrated Product Teams as a management tool.
Public Law 102–484 directed the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a report on the Army's plan for destroying all chemical warfare materiel not part of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) was established to carry out this plan. The project manager NSCMP continues to support the emergency chemical warfare materiel recovery destruction operations, plan for future chemical warfare recovery efforts and is preparing documentation and plans to meet the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As part of this program, the components of binary munitions (the alcohol component) are being destroyed at the Hawthorne Ammunition Plant in Nevada.
Page 501 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What is the Department of Defense (DOD) plan for reassigning the chemical demilitarization program to the Department of the Army? Does the Department's plan also include the program for assessment of alternatives for demilitarization of assembled chemical munitions? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Plan? What fiscal control measures would the Department propose to ensure that sufficient funding is requested for the program in the annual budget submission and that the funding for the program is not diverted to other purposes?
Dr. OSCAR. This action is consistent with efforts within DOD, and the expressed intent of Congress, to reduce the size and complexity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff. DOD Reform Initiative Directive number 28, dated February 12, 1998, mandates the integration of the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization function for the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) USD (A&T) with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Development) Chemical Demilitarization office within the office of the Secretary of the Army.
The Congress has mandated that the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program (ACWA) be directed by USD (A&T) through Public Law 104–208. The decision authority for ACWA will remain with USD (A&T) until completion in December 1998. However, oversight for ACWA is expected to be delegated to the Army Acquisition Executive. This program is of limited duration and will be completed with the submission of the final report in December 1998 followed by a supplemental evaluation in April 1999. Incorporation of the results of the ACWA study will ultimately become the responsibility of the program manager for Chemical Demilitarization, however, and will effectively be part of the devolved chemical demilitarization program.
Page 502 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
A series of integrated product teams were conducted last year to determine the best approach to devolve the chemical demilitarization program. Consensus was that the responsibility and authority for the program are not separable. Sound business practices must be applied to realize additional dollar saving through de-layering and elimination of unnecessary overhead infrastructure, and to provide an incentive to the Army to minimize costs by allowing the Army to retain all cost underruns.
Funds for the chemical demilitarization program are allocated under a separate appropriation, Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army. The Secretary and I are committed to ensure the chemical demilitarization program is funded and remains protected. More importantly, the Congress must approve all reprogramming of funds from the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction appropriation to resource other programs.
Mr. WELDON. What is the Department of Defense (DOD) plan for reassigning the chemical demilitarization program to the Department of the Army? Does the Department's plan also include the program for assessment of alternatives for demilitarization of assembled chemical munitions? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Plan? What fiscal control measures would the Department propose to ensure that sufficient funding is requested for the program in the annual budget submission and that the funding for the program is not diverted to other purposes?
Dr. OSCAR. This action is consistent with efforts within DOD, and the expressed intent of Congress, to reduce the size and complexity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff. DOD Reform Initiative Directive number 28, dated February 12, 1998, mandates the integration of the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization function for the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) USD (A&T) with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Development) Chemical Demilitarization office within the office of the Secretary of the Army.
Page 503 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Congress has mandated that the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program (ACWA) be directed by USD (A&T) through Public Law 104–208. The decision authority for ACWA will remain with USD (A&T) until completion in December 1998. However, oversight for ACWA is expected to be delegated to the Army Acquisition Executive. This program is of limited duration and will be completed with the submission of the final report in December 1998 followed by a supplemental evaluation in April 1999. Incorporation of the results of the ACWA study will ultimately become the responsibility of the program manager for Chemical Demilitarization, however, and will effectively be part of the devolved chemical demilitarization program.
A series of integrated product teams were conducted last year to determine the best approach to devolve the chemical demilitarization program. Consensus was that the responsibility and authority for the program are not separable. Sound business practices must be applied to realize additional dollar saving through de-layering and elimination of unnecessary overhead infrastructure, and to provide an incentive to the Army to minimize costs by allowing the Army to retain all cost underruns.
Funds for the chemical demilitarization program are allocated under a separate appropriation, Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army. The Secretary and I are committed to ensure the chemical demilitarization program is funded and remains protected. More importantly, the Congress must approve all reprogramming of funds from the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction appropriation to resource other programs.
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Page 504 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What progress is being made in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to make it more responsive to the needs of the states and local communities? What changes in legislative authority do the DOD and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommend for the program?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army and FEMA negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was signed by the Honorable Robert M. Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Army and the Honorable Kay Goss, Associate Director of FEMA on October 8, 1997. This latest agreement amended the original MOU, which was signed on August 3, 1988. The latest agreement established clearer roles and responsibilities for both agencies.
The Army has transferred responsibility for managing the program from the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD) to the Chemical and Biological Defense Command, which is the organization responsible for managing the stockpile. This has two advantages: one, it will relieve the PMCD from unnecessary distractions to the primary mission of getting rid of the stockpile, and two, it places full responsibility on the stockpile manager, which is and was always the primary authority for responding to chemical agent events at the stockpile storage installations.
FEMA also has made management changes within their organization to push down decision making authority to the Regions and thereby give Regions and states more flexibility in making site-specific decisions. This change also results in the program being more responsive to the needs of state and local governments. Full implementation of FEMA and Army management changes are expected to be completed by the end of this fiscal year.
Page 505 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Army and FEMA have been working since September 1997 on a legislative package for the program to give FEMA full authority, responsibility and accountability for managing the off-post emergency preparedness requirements for the program. This legislative package cleared DOD and the Office of Management and Budget the week of March 9, 1998, and has been forwarded to the Congress for consideration. This legislation, if passed, will provide direct appropriations to FEMA under a defense related activities account. Since 1989, funds for this program were appropriated directly to DOD and subsequently transferred to FEMA for awarding grants to states for implementing the program. Since the program was established as a result of and in support of the chemical demilitarization effort, the funds are to be linked to Defense related activities. Chemical demilitarization and CSEPP are and will remain inextricably linked since CSEPP will be required as long as we have a stockpile of chemical agents and munitions.
SUPPORTING LEAP AHEAD TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Mr. WELDON. The Defense Department fiscal year 1999 (FY99) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) request, down slightly from the FY98 appropriation, is projected to decrease by 14 percent over the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The budget request shows the Army, our largest service, with only $4.8 billion (13 percent) down slightly from last year. In comparison it has $13.6 billion for the Air Force, $8.1 billion for the Navy, $9.3 billion for Defense-wide RDT&E.
It is noted that the Army's request is only as high as it is because of transfers of defense-wide programs such as $54.4 million for Strategic Research and Development to its Research and Development (R&D) accounts. It is also very disturbing to find that the Army's second largest R&D expenditure is to support $300 million of Base Operations, not exactly a leap-ahead technology. How can the Army develop leap-ahead systems and digitize the force under such severe fiscal constraints?
Page 506 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. Oscar. The Army believes that digitization of the battlefield provides essential capabilities required by Joint Vision 2010 to support the National Military Strategy, and therefore it is our top priority. Given the Army's Total Obligation Authority and its requirement to balance near-term readiness with future investment, we developed an investment strategy that determines those programs to modernize, those to recapitalize (upgrade), and those to defer until technology advances provide leap-ahead capability improvements. Our strategy maintains overmatch throughout the near- and mid-terms with minimum necessary improvements to most combat platforms. Focused Research & Development accelerates essential leap-ahead capabilities required for full-spectrum dominance and provides a significant, almost revolutionary, improvement over current capabilities.
Mr. WELDON. Doesn't R&D require reliable and increasing funding now to support development of advanced systems to be procured in the future for Army After Next?
Dr. Oscar. The Army has done its best to balance near and future readiness. Deferring modernization leaves a capability gap as current systems approach wearout dates and replacement systems are not available for fielding. To attain the required physically agile systems in the far-term, we must field leap-ahead capability systems to bridge the gap caused by modernization deferrals.
COMANCHE
Mr. WELDON. The Comanche program is the most robustly funded single program the Army has and yet it limps along with a single prototype. Its program has historically been restructured to delay fielding due to fiscal constraints. Comanche, is in effect, the Army's joint strike fighter, and yet it struggles along with less than $400 million while F–18, JSF and F–22 developments have a combined $2.3 billion in R&D requested in fiscal year 1999. Just how good is Comanche and how essential is it to the Army After next?
Page 507 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. Oscar. The Comanche is proving to be a very good system. The initial prototype was delivered in May 1995 and achieved first flight in January 1996. Since that time the Comanche has performed very well, with only minor faults that are normally experienced in any development program. With less than 70 flight hours it has already reached the forward flight speed objective of 171 knots and is currently flying on a daily basis to demonstrate the remaining flight envelope objectives. As you noted, there is only one flying prototype at this time. The second prototype has been built but is not scheduled to be flight worthy until early in 1999. While this is the approved program schedule, it is not as efficient as a multiple prototype program could be in demonstrating the capability of the Comanche. The Comanche program is executing on schedule and is expected to achieve all of the program objectives as planned. When fielded, the Comanche will be the premier reconnaissance helicopter in the world. There are no known development programs that will produce anything close to the capabilities that Comanche will provide for the next 30 years. The Army plans for Comanche to be a core system within the Army After Next. The Comanche is being designed with the leading edge technology that will assure that when fielded in 2006, and for many years, there will be no other helicopter that will have a comparable reconnaissance functionality and mission capability. The Comanche will be the eyes of the ground commander and the communication centerpiece for the Army.
Mr. WELDON. What does the Army have to do if Comanche is canceled?
Dr. Oscar. The Army has no plans to cancel toe Comanche program. The Comanche is being developed to provide a mission capability that is not currently available but is essential to the battlefield commander in the 21st century. The Army has looked at upgrades of the current aviation systems and none can provide the mission capability required. Comanche is being designed to fill a specific deficiency and is the lowest cost alternative program known. The Army must have Comanche as a Force XXI and Army After Next system.
Page 508 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. How much more money is needed to get the second prototype fielded and get technology improvements such as the Longbow radar integrated and delivered with the first production Comanche?
Dr. Oscar. The second prototype has been built and the contractor is in the process of adding the test instrumentation necessary to provide data during flight test. That process was originally planned to be completed this year but was delayed due to an $8 million Congressional reduction to the fiscal year 1998 (FY98) President's Budget. It is currently scheduled to be ready for first flight in April 1999. If additional funding was provided in FY99, the first flight of prototype #2 could be accelerated to late January 1999. The Comanche flight test program is operating on a very limited budget and has not been able to fly prototype #1 as many hours as would be desired. With only two prototypes to perform all of the flight testing it is essential that a maximum number of hours be flown on each prototype. The current resources do not allow for a full flight test plan. It would take an additional $24 million to accelerate the first flight of prototype #2 and to continue to fly both prototypes during 1999 at an effective rate.
The Longbow (millimeter wave radar) requirements is being designed into the production configuration of the Comanche. Due to limited resources only the space, weight and power provisions will be on the Comanche at the initial fielding in 2006. The Longbow radar development will not be completed until 2009 and will be incorporated into the production line Comanche in 2011. The Army is aware that there has been some technology breakthroughs in millimeter wave radar development and will be evaluating that capability. The Army does not have the available resources to accelerate the Longbow development program as currently planned. The current estimate is in excess of $600 million and would have to come from outside the Army's resources. If it proves to be feasible to accelerate the millimeter wave radar capability on the Comanche by 2006 within the current resources it would be a desirable program change.
Page 509 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. How does the Comanche compare with other helicopters? Do you have anybody here today who has operational experience that can speak to this question?
Dr. OSCAR. Flight test results from prototype #1 are encouraging. The aircraft has already met its 170-knot dash speed requirement, which exceeds that of the Kiowa Warrior it will replace by 60 percent. The aircraft has also been tested out to 45 knots in lateral flight, indicating that its maneuverability and agility will far exceed that of Kiowa Warrior. Comanche brings several key capabilities, in addition to improved digital connectivity and situational awareness, to the force that Kiowa Warrior simply does not have: self-deployability, stealth, and twin-engine survivability. Commanche can carry 14 Hellfire missiles, compared to Kiowa Warrior's four. Testing of the mission equipment package will not begin until 2000, but the leap-ahead technologies being integrated into the aircraft will result in a generational increase in capability, similar to the leap from Cobra to Apache. Comparisons conducted by independent research agencies predict a substantial increase in combat effectiveness when using Comanche. In a Southwest Asia scenario, projections are as follows: 50 percent fewer casualties, 57 percent fewer fighting vehicle losses, and 74 percent fewer helicopter losses. Comanche compares favorably in terms of supportability and cost-effectiveness as well. It will require roughly one-third the maintenance man-hours per flight hour of the Apache, and cost only 70 percent as much when normalized against Hellfire missile loads.
STRENGTHENING ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Mr. WELDON. The Army, as has been in the past, continues to have the largest service and yet the smallest Research and Development (R&D) budget. It has two major new system acquisition programs, Comanche and Crusader. Comanche ''the quarterback of the digitized battlefield'' is limping along with a single prototype and has a history of program delays due to fiscal constraints. Crusader is a much newer development, that has not yet developed a prototype, but has been identified as not being a system that fits in the Army After Next. Many other Army R&D programs are similarly constrained. Would it not make sense to reduce funding for one of those programs to provide additional funding that could make other programs fiscally healthy?
Page 510 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The Army has experienced a reduction of approximately 50 percent in Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) accounts since 1989. The Army has done its best to balance near and future readiness. Crusader and Comanche are ''on the road to the future'' and it is critical that we buy these systems to keep the force modern as we make the transition to Army After Next (AAN). Deferring modernization leaves a capability gap as current systems approach wearout dates and replacement systems are not available for fielding. As the Army moves towards Army After Next and strives to maintain overmatch, we will reach a point when continuing to improve existing weapon system platforms will not be practical or efficient.
LIGHTWEIGHT 155MM HOWITZER PROGRAM
Mr. WELDON. The joint Army-Marine Corps lightweight 155 millimeter howitzer (LW155) program is to develop a replacement for the aging M198 howitzer. It is to have improved transportability, mobility and enhanced survivability and lethality. It is reportedly on cost and schedule to meet the requirements of the Joint Operational Requirements Document (ORD). While the Marine Corps has the lead on development of the basic howitzer, the Army has responsibility for development of the pre-planned product improvement (P3I) program. The Joint ORD specifies ranges of 30 to 40 kilometers (km). It is my understanding that the LW155 has already demonstrated ranges of over 31 km, firing rates of five rounds per minute, and with extended range guided projectiles now under development, will achieve 40 km range. Is this correct?
Dr. OSCAR. Most of your statement is correct. The LW155 is currently on schedule and within cost. It will have improved transportability, mobility and enhanced survivability and lethality. While it is incorrect to say these have all been demonstrated, it already appears that LW155 is well on its way to meeting these Joint ORD requirements. Testing of the XM776 cannon tube at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona in 1997 indicates that the LW155 will indeed be able to achieve the 30 km threshold range during firing table tests in engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). Although the LW155 did achieve five rounds per minute on occasion during the rate of fire portions of the competitive shoot-off in 1996, the reported rate from the operational assessment, which is based on a statistical average, was less than five rounds per minute. We are confident that the EMD design will meet the five round requirement. The automatic rammer should increase that capability, and will definitely provide the needed crew labor savings. We are now developing the XM982 extended range projectile, designed to extend ranges from 30 km to a projected 37 km with 39-caliber cannons like the XM776. Additionally, even greater potential range is possible with LW155's long-range barrel study technology demonstration in 1999.
Page 511 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. It is understood that the Army has lead for development of the pre-planned product improvements including the digital fire control system with Global Positioning System, advanced direct fire sight and semi-automatic loader. Is it possible, with additional funding to improve the product improvement schedule such that it will be ready for first production howitzers? Wouldn't this make sense?
Dr. OSCAR. Although it would appear to make sense, it is not prudent to accelerate the P3I program so that they are ready for first production howitzers in fiscal year 2001 (FY01). Although additional funds would cover the increased program costs, accelerating the digital fire control system (DFCS) EMD schedule would significantly increase the technical risks. We cannot just bolt on Paladin-like hardware and software to a towed howitzer which lacks space, power, hydraulics, suspension, and environmental protection. The P3I program will provide a 21st century DFCS comparable to the capabilities being fielded otherwise only on self-propelled howitzers. Significant hardware challenges include miniaturizing, consolidating, and hardening components for increased shock and vibration and integrating the automatic cannon positioning and navigation enhancements.
While these technical risks make it imprudent to accelerate the P3I for the first production howitzers in FY01, we could feasibly accelerate P3I by one year. This would require both an increase and acceleration of the existing Army Research, Development, Tests, and Evaluation (RDTE) funding shown below.
This funding would make the P3I available in FY03, and would allow the production of 120 Marine Corps Howitzers with DFCS, subsequently reducing their total retrofit effort. This would also allow acceleration of Army LW155 deliveries if desired.
Page 512 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
FUTURE SCOT AND CAVALRY SYSTEM
Mr. WELDON. The Army has recently signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the development of Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) with the United Kingdom. Why is this system being developed and is it essential to the Army After Next?
Dr. OSCAR. FSCS is essential to replace the existing scout vehicles which were not originally designed to perform in the reconnaissance role, and which have an inadequate capability to acquire threat information, locate targets and synchronize fires, perform security missions, identify air and ground targets beyond visual range, detect hazards, operate in Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) conditions, and integrate information for battlefield decision making. In exercises at the National Training Center, whenever scouts are located by the enemy they are ''killed'', and about half of the scouts are ''killed'' in a typical scenario. This statistic takes on greater importance when one considers that there is a very high (over 90 percent) correlation between success of the scouts and success of the supported task force. The M3A3, based on an infantry squad carrier design, is easily detected due to its size and acoustic signature, and it is too heavy for transport by C–130 aircraft. The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) lacks sufficient mobility and is vulnerable to a wide range of threats, including small arms fire and artillery fragments. The user has attempted to fix the scout deficiencies with non-materiel solutions, such as changes in doctrine, improvements in training, and different organizations. None of those steps have worked, so the Army has concluded that a materiel solution, the FSCS, is necessary. FSCS will bring to the battlefield leap ahead technologies as the first new platform for the Army After Next. These technologies include; advanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) suite, advanced integrated multi-spectral sensor systems, advanced mobility, long range 3rd generation sensors for target location and designation. Additionally, the FSCS will be the first vehicle designed from its inception to achieve survivability through non-traditional methods such as multi-spectral signature reduction and threat warning sensors.
Page 513 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. What is the cost and schedule for the FSCS?
Dr. OSCAR. The FSCS is envisioned to be a three phased program: Phase I; Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD). The ATD phase is to be 50/50 cost shared by both countries and the U.S. share is scheduled and funded as follows:
Phase II; Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD). The EMD phase is scheduled FY02–FY06 and will be 50/50 cost shared by both countries. The current estimate for the U.S. share is about $506 million. Phase III; Procurement. The procurement phase is scheduled to bring in FY06 and will be funded by each country according to procurement volume. The U.S. estimate for procurement, spares and training devices for 1075 vehicles is $8,350 million.
Mr. WELDON. What new capability will the FSCS provide our Army?
Dr. OSCAR. The FSCS will be required to collect, collate, process, and disseminate battlefield information to answer the commander's critical information requirements in a timely manner. The FSCS will be able to operate continuously, in all weather conditions, day and night, through natural and man-made obscuration, in order to accomplish reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition missions. The system communications suite will provide a linkage to external intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance platforms and tactical battle command systems for the horizontal and vertical integration of intelligence among battlefield operating systems. In order to perform these mission requirements, the FSCS will operate primarily by signature management, employing long range surveillance, target detection and identification systems. Additionally it will be required to coordinate fires, acquire and designate targets for external direct and indirect fires and precision guided submunitions. FSCS capabilities/ characteristics are expected to include the following: Advanced, long range sensors, 3rd Generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, acoustic sensors, active emitter for inclement weather operation. Advanced chassis with multi-spectral signature reduction (visual, thermal, radar, acoustic). Digitization—first optimized reconnaissance vehicle to be fully integrated into the digitized battlefield (i.e., Army Battle Command System). Open electronic architecture-advanced crew cockpit to use and display data from multiple sources. Communications—multi-band, multi-mode programmable radio. Mobility—advanced propulsion for quiet operation and improved dash performance, Armament—medium caliber cannon for self-protection (possibly 35 millimeter (mm) or 40mm cannon leveraging current industry solutions). Fuel, logistics and training—state of the art, commercial, fuel efficient propulsion, with efficient electric drive; embedded prognostics, diagnostic, mission planning and training devices.
Page 514 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
LINE OF SIGHT ANTI-TANK (LOSAT) ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (ACTD)
Mr. WELDON. The Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) system consists of kinetic energy (KE) missiles and a second generation forward looking infrared sensor mounted on a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) chassis. Why is this system being developed? Is there a validated requirement for the system? Why is LOSAT being developed along with Follow-On To TOW (FOTT) when they seem to provide the same capability?
Dr. OSCAR. The LOSAT weapon is being evaluated as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) so that a full assessment of the system capabilities can be made with significant soldier involvement. The ACTD objective is to demonstrate the enhancement in lethality and survivability of LOSAT in light force tactics. The residual hardware will be available to provide a ''niche'' weapon to fill the Early Entry Force's lethality gap caused by the inactivation of the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor (Sheridan tank), and the termination of the Armored Gun System (AGS) program. LOSAT provides a ''silver bullet'' shock effect weapon—the advanced KE missile for defeating enemy armor or high value hardened targets. The system is highly resistant to countermeasures, and effective against emerging and postulated explosive reactive armors and active protection systems. LOSAT offers advanced capabilities in lethality, rate of fire, survivability, and hypervelocity (short time of flight). Mounted on a M1113 up-armored HMMWV chassis, the system will be capable of C–130 low velocity air drop, and helicopter slingload transportability by UH–60L Black Hawk and CH–47 Chinook helicopters.
The ACTD requirement was validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on 28 June 97. In addition, a Memorandum of Agreement for Operational Requirements has been specified by the user organization.
Page 515 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
While LOSAT and FOTT are both line-of-sight missiles with similar ranges they are very different in size and engagement characteristics. FOTT leverages existing technology to provide over 5,000 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) platforms with a ''new bullet'' which can counter active protection systems and reactive armor appliques postulated for 2005 and beyond. Current technology development does not support a near term KE missile sized to fit existing TOW platforms. FOTT answers the current Army requirement while LOSAT builds the basis for evolution to the Army After Next.
Mr. WELDON. What is the Army's future plan for LOSAT?
Dr. OSCAR. The ACTD will lead to an assessment of military utility in fiscal year 2003 (FY03) based on results of three warfighting experiments, and fielding to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. At that time, a major milestone review will determine the future of the LOSAT system, based on extensive soldier evaluations of the system capabilities. The LOSAT ACTD, in addition to developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures for use of a KE missile on the future battlefield, provides the supporting technologies for tech base initiatives leading to a much more compact KE missile (projected to be available in about ten years). A compact KE missile could be the answer for a highly lethal, high rate-for-fire, shoot-on-the-move munition for future light, high mobility combat systems of the Army After Next.
Mr. WELDON. Why does the Army need FOTT?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army requires FOTT to leverage and improve the warfighting capability of 5,000+ TOW platforms that will remain in inventory through at least 2020. The size and weight constraints of the TOW platform drives the munitions choice to a chemical energy solution. Current KE technology is not capable of meeting a size and weight envelope consummate with the TOW platform. With a first unit equipped date of 4th Quarter, FY05, FOTT will address four primary deficiencies of TOW: exposure time of the TOW crew during target engagement; range disparity between TOW and existing threat anti-armor missile systems; reduced effectiveness against advanced armor packages and active protective systems; and a non-modular design that prevents viable shelflife extension or performance upgrades. Current TOW missile inventory will be depleted by FY12 due to shelflife. The FOTT missile will address these deficiencies through fire and forget capability, increased range, counter-active protective systems and a modular design. Platform applique will allow TOW platforms to fire the FOTT missile and preserve the Army's $26.6 billion TOW platform investment.
Page 516 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
ARMY FORCE DIGITIZATION
Mr. WELDON. The Army has invested significantly to digitize and connect its forces. It is often difficult to determine what the Army's total request is for digitization because it has content in many diverse programs. What is the purpose of Army digitization and how much is being invested?
Dr. OSCAR. The digitization strategy is an integral subset and underlying guiding principle of the Army's modernization effort. Digitization applies modern Information Technology concepts to the military environment resulting in an integrated, high-speed Command and Control structure reaching from the National Command Authority to the individual soldier.
The Army is using a process called ''Force XXI'' to evolve from our current Army of Excellence (AOE) structure to the ''Army XXI'' structure. The Force XXI process consists of three axes: redesigning the tactical Army; redesigning the institutional Army; and integrating digital technologies. Force XXI includes battle lab experimentation, Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and other innovative processes to inform our efforts to modernize for the 21st century. Among the many initiatives of Force XXI are the Division Design Analysis, which provided a solid analytical foundation for redesigning the division, and the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).
Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st Century and provides them the right organizations, the most realistic training, robust and predictable sustainment during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems our Nation can provide given the resources available. We will leverage technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and achieve decisive victory. Digitization will allow the Army to effectively integrate command and control hardware and software with communications systems and weapons systems to provide information sharing both horizontally and vertically, in the Army as well as Joint and Combined forces. The strategy is to leverage the latest mature technology advances in information management from the commercial sector. The improved and increased level of integration and interoperability will provide for highly effective Joint and Coalition operations.
Page 517 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Our digitization efforts include the ongoing modernization of approximately 97 systems encompassing 538 budget lines. The total estimate of the digitization effort is $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1999. Of this total, approximately $2.61 million was added to digitization by Office of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1999. The $2.61 million provides for improved interoperability, increased system integration, improved security, network management, and more robust common architectures. It is key to the horizontal efforts that go across these systems.
Programs receiving increases from the $2.61 million in fiscal year 1999 include the Longbow Apache, Kiowa Warrior, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams Tank, Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) family, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), (ISYSCON) network management, Tactical Operations Centers, architecture development, and training support. Other adjustments identified include increased funding for Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Information Security, Satellite Communications, and the Warfighter Information Network.
Mr. WELDON. What assurance is there that the Army at all levels will be interoperable and compatible with other services and combined ally forces?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army continues to pursue many ongoing efforts with the other services and allies to ensure interoperability and seamless communications throughout the battlespace. Additionally, the common, minimal set of information technology standards developed by the Army on behalf of digitization is the basis of the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), now mandated for use throughout the Department of Defense.
Page 518 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Interoperability between digital and analog units was an issue during the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at Ft Hood, Texas in November 1997. It was concluded that digital and analog units can interact and fight well together. The problem is how to transfer the information between a paper map and a computer. This is solved, in part, by sending liaison teams with digital equipment to the analog units. The transfer of information can then take place in one location, taking into account that the analog unit requires a significantly longer period to pass operational overlay information through its ranks. This solution creates new requirements for additional liaison officers and equipment that are not yet clearly defined.
There are a number of initiatives underway between the Army and other Services leading toward systems interoperability. For example, the Marine Corps has purchased the Army's Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). In addition, a number of Secretary of Defense-sponsored Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) cut across Service boundaries. The Army Digitization Office (ADO) has recently begun an initiative to work Joint Service interoperability issues, to produce a coherent Joint interoperability strategy and coordinate, where possible, with Army digitization advances. These efforts include steps to identify a single point of contact within each of the other to provide a digitization focus for Joint interoperability. For the FDD, we will have implemented two primary Joint message standards in all of our key command and control systems.
We successfully integrated the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Newton systems during the Task Force XXI AWE in March 1997 and have been working with the U.S. Air Force on the Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) development, fielding and joint doctrine.
Page 519 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
For international digitization interoperability issues, there are a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and multinational forces available for discussion and resolution. The principal NATO groups include the NATO Command, Control and Communications Board (NC3B), the Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (JC3RCSC) and the NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG). In the multinational environment, groups range from American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) to bilateral staff talks and exchanges with multiple countries. We are also heavily involved in the Quadrilateral Army Communications and Information Systems Interoperability Group (QACISIG). The QACISIG manages and oversees requirements for interoperability and its implementation through various bilateral/multilateral cooperative development programs. QACISIG activities will lead to demonstrated database-driven coalition interoperability by fiscal year 2000.
The Army Digitization Office (ADO) is responsible for the Army's International Digitization Strategy (IDS), which identifies the high level requirements for international interoperability. Practical steps towards interoperability are extensively worked at the weapon system level (British and Dutch purchase of Apache). At the corps through battalion levels, the Command & Control System Interoperability Program (C2SIP) is a major step forward. C2SIP brings work from three previous international initiatives into a single US program C2SIP will both refine already developed capabilities and lead to fielding of these capabilities in the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) by 2000. It provides two integrated levels of interoperability based on legacy requirements and future technology. By 2003, the U.S. Army will have interoperability at either one of the other of these levels with the armies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Two other initiatives, the Artillery Systems Cooperative Agreement (ASCA) and the Low Level Air Picture Initiative (LLAPI), are aimed at achieving interoperability with multiple ally artillery and air defense systems. An international interoperability agreement has been reached in the Low Level Air Defense Picture Initiative (LLAPI) and is being negotiated in the Artillery Systems Cooperative Agreement (ASCA).
Page 520 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELDON. Does the Army have a master plan?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army is using a process called ''Force XXI'' to evolve from our current Army of Excellence (AOE) structure to the ''Army XXI'' structure. The Force XXI process consists of three axes: redesigning the tactical Army; redesigning the institutional Army; and integrating digital technologies. Force XXI includes battle lab experimentation, Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and other innovative processes to inform our efforts to modernize for the 21st century. Among the many initiatives of Force XXI are the Division Design Analysis, which provided a solid analytical foundation for redesigning the division, and the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).
Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st Century and provides them the right organizational structures, the most realistic training, robust and predictable sustainment during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems our Nation can provide given the resources available. We intend to leverage technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and achieve decisive victory. Digitization is the part of this overall modernization effort that provides the capability to achieve information dominance.
Digitization is not new to Army modernization. It has been an underlying guiding principle of modernizing the force. Initially the Army automated many administrative and logistical functions. As information technology became more advanced and less expensive, the Army began to build these technologies into weapons systems as a part of modernizing them. Additionally, the Army realized the potential value of incorporating these technologies as part of battlespace command and control (C2) systems and produced systems to capitalize on that capability, such as the Army Tactical C2 System.
Page 521 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
In 1994, the Special Task Force on Digitization identified the need to formalize the exploitation of information technologies within the modernization process and take full advantage of ''Digitization.'' The result is not a program in the traditional acquisition sense, but is a strategy to integrate command and control software and the underlying communications systems with weapons systems to provide information sharing both vertically and horizontally, in the Army, as well as Joint and Combined forces. The Army digitization strategy leverages the latest advances in information technologies from the commercial sector (internet technology, portable laptop computers, direct broadcast TV). Digitization is a ''subset'' of modernization.
Mr. WELDON. Does it fully conform to higher level requirements and standards?
Dr. OSCAR. In 1994, the Army developed an over-arching concept for achieving interoperability among all its systems, on the advice of the Army Science Board. The concept involves three mutually interdependent architectures termed the Operational, Technical, and System Architectures. Together, these architectures provide both the high level and more specific requirements and standards upon which the Army expects all its systems to be developed and/or acquired.
The Operational Architecture describes (often graphically) the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to support the warfighter. It defines types of information to be exchanged, frequency of exchange, and the tasks supported by these information exchanges. The Systems Architecture describes the specific systems, and their interconnections, which are to be developed in support of the warfighter. It defines such things as physical connection, location, identification of key nodes, circuits, networks etc., and allocates system and component performance parameters. For example, the Army is documenting the Operational and System Architectures for the First Digitized Division. The Systems Architecture also includes the identification of common software and hardware components, such as horizontal technical integration (HTI).
Page 522 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Technical Architecture—often referred to as the Building Code—provides standards governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the elements of the System Architecture. It provides technical guidelines for implementing systems upon which engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are built, and specific products are developed.
The Army Technical Architecture (ATA) (Version 4.0) was adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and became the basis on which the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) was developed and published. System compliance with the ATA (now termed the Joint Technical Architecture-Army (JTA–A) is monitored through JTA–A Migration Plans and through the use of JTA–A compliance as a criterion at all milestone decision reviews.
COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY
Mr. WELDON. Security of computer systems is of greater concern. What is the Army doing to ensure that its digitized systems are safe and secure from our enemies?
Dr. OSCAR. To protect the Army's tactical digitized systems, we are implementing a defense in depth strategy. This strategy includes: (1) the use of intrusion detection systems and security technologies, such as firewalls and secure routers, employed at all perimeter entry points into our tactical networks to detect and block unauthorized access to our network; (2) network mapping and discovery software employed by a central tactical security management element to monitor all connections to the tactical network and enforce internal network security policies; and, (3) a suite of COTS and NDI security software to detect abnormal operations on each of the computer systems that are a part of the tactical network. These security features and capabilities were tested in the recent Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment at Ft. Hood, TX. We are continuing to test and refine these products, and plan to integrate them into the architecture for the First Digitized Force. Protection from jamming is more difficult to address. Jammers may interfere with the signal transmitted by the systems that support our tactical information network. The most successful method we have to deter jamming by enemy forces is to identify the source, and then destroy the jammer or neutralize it in some manner using anti-jam countermeasures. Finally, we recognize that training of operators, system administrators, network managers, and information system security personnel is key to our overall program to reduce our risk of system disruptions or compromise of information. We have already started teaching Information Systems Security courses within the Army. In May 1998, we will expand our systems and network management courses at Fort Gordon to include training on the information systems security tools and techniques that were tested and proven successful in the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
Page 523 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
CRUSADER
Mr. WELDON. The Army's second largest weapons system development program is for Crusader, self-propelled 155mm howitzer to replace aging Paladin. Though the Army is ostensibly seeking to develop light, transportable systems, the Crusader and its re-supply vehicle weigh approximately 60 tons each. The National Defense Panel (NDP) questioned the large projected Crusader buy, and the NDP member is on record as saying it will be ''a fine weapon, but it weighs 70 tons, and has a heavy logistics tail.'' Another member questions development of Crusader since its development reverted from a liquid to a conventional solid propellant gun. Even more to the point, recently a senior Army official stated clearly that Crusader ''is not an Army After Next System.'' Since Crusader development began, the Army has more clearly defined its weapons systems requirements for the Army After Next. Would it not be best, to free up scare resources by doing as the National Defense Panel suggested, and bypass Army XXI systems to directly develop advanced systems for the Army After Next?
Dr. OSCAR. First let me say that Crusader is an Army After Next (AAN) system. It is important to remember that AAN will have two components; Campaign Forces and Battle Forces. The Campaign Forces will be equipped with legacy systems such as MLRS, Abrams, and Bradley and will make up approximately 75 percent of the Army's combat forces. The Battle Forces will be equipped with future more lethal systems and will make up approximately 25 percent of the Army's combat forces.
Crusader will be the keystone fire support system for Army XXI and AAN. It will be the primary fire support system for the Campaign Force portion of AAN and will provide fires to the Battle Force portion as well. In addition, Crusader is a technology carrier for future ground combat weapon systems for both the Campaign and Battle Forces.
Page 524 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Our current planned procurement of 824 Crusader systems will only fulfill 60 percent of the Army's requirement for self-propelled cannon artillery. Any number of Crusader systems fielded less than 1378 will result in a substantial number of Paladins remaining in the force (based on a 35-year-old chassis). Today's Army Procurement Objective (APO) of 824 still leaves 554 Paladins in the force well beyond the Paladin fiscal year 2012 Refit, Retire, Replace (R3) Point.
The weight requirement specified in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for both the Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) and Resupply Vehicle (RSV) is 55 tons combat loaded. With Crusader's increased capability it will require only one third of the strategic lift capability to deploy the equivalent firepower of a Paladin equipped force. Crusader also reduces the logistics burden associated with all field artillery systems. The Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) recently conducted a study that shows Crusader actually reduces the logistical footprint. Their study looked at a 36-hour defensive fight in Korea. While the Crusader force fires twice as many 155 rounds as Paladin, the Crusader force will still provide the ground commander with the same lethality—while reducing the amount of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets fired by 44 percent. This trade off in rockets fired to achieve the same results will decrease the overall logistics burden by 225 tons of ammunition, as well as reducing the associated transport and maintenance costs.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN
Page 525 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
ARMY FORCE DIGITIZATION
Mr. BATEMAN. The Army has invested significantly to digitize and connects its forces. It is often difficult to determine what the Army's total request is for digitization because it has content in many diverse programs. What is the purpose of Army digitization and how much is being invested?
Dr. OSCAR. The digitization strategy is an integral subset and underlying guiding principle of the Army's modernization effort. Digitization applies modern Information Technology concepts to the military environment resulting in an integrated, high-speed Command and Control structure reaching from the National Command Authorities to the individual solder.
The Army is using a process called ''Force XXI'' to evolve from our current Army of Excellence (AOE) structure to the ''Army XXI'' structure. The Force XXI process consists of three axes: redesigning the tactical Army; redesigning the institutional Army; and integrating digital technologies. Force XXI includes battle lab experimentation, Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and other innovative processes to inform our efforts to modernize for the 21st century. Among the many initiatives of Force XXI are the Division Design Analysis, which provided a solid analytical foundation for redesigning the division, and the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).
Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st Century and provides them the right organizations, the most realistic training, robust and predictable sustainment during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems our Nation can provide given the resources available. We will leverage technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and achieve decisive victory. Digitization will allow the Army to effectively integrate command and control hardware and software with communications systems and weapons systems to provide information sharing both horizontally and vertically, in the Army as well as Joint and Combined forces. The strategy is to leverage the latest mature technology advances in information management from the commercial sector. The improved and increased level of integration and interoperability will provide for highly effective Joint and Coalition operations.
Page 526 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Our digitization efforts include the ongoing modernization of approximately 97 systems encompassing 538 budget lines. The total estimate of the digitization effort is $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1999. The Army did not take this $2.6 billion from other programs to create a new effort. It was already part of the Army Total Obligation Authority that was allotted to these many existing programs. Of this total, approximately $2.61 million was added to digitization by Office of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1999. The $2.61 million provides for improved interoperability, increased system integration, improved security, network management, and more robust common architectures. It is key to the horizontal efforts that go across these systems.
Progams receiving increases from the $2.61 million in fiscal year 1999 include the Longbow Apache, Kiowa Warrior, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abram Tank, Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) family, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), (ISYSCON) network management, Tactical Operations Centers, architecture development, and training support. Other adjustments identified include increased funding for Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Information Security, Satellite Communications, and the Warfighter Information Network.
Mr. BATEMAN. I understand that in the past the Army has not fully participated in joint exercises with the other services to assess its vulnerability. Will it in the future?
Dr. OSCAR. Eligible Receiver conducted in June 1997 was the first exercise ever to integrate computer network penetration/monitoring. Eligible Receiver was a no notice exercise with a limited number of trusted agents. In March 1997 the Army senior leadership was approached by the Joint Staff J7 with a request to have a Red Team conduct computer network attacks against Army networks during the upcoming exercise. Upon the advice of the Army Office of the General Counsel, the Army did not consent to this request. It was assessed that technology had outpaced both Office of the Secretary of Defense and Army policy in this area. The existing policy was outdated, largely focusing on telephone monitoring and did not address the broader implications of computer network monitoring. After the exercise, Army leadership placed a high priority on developing comprehensive policy governing all aspects of vulnerability assessments. This policy provided a detailed framework for planning and executing ''Red Teaming'' of friendly computer network. In November 1997 this draft policy was evaluated as part of the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments (DAWE) at Ft. Hood, Texas. During the DAWE, the Land Information Warfare Activity executed computer network attacks and coordinated jamming of data links against the 4th Infantry Division. Subsequently, in January 1998, the Secretary of the Army approved the revised vulnerability assessment policy. With this policy now in place, the Army can actively participate in future Joint exercises involving computer network attacks.
Page 527 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY
Mr. BATEMAN. Security of computer systems is of greatest concern. What is the Army doing to ensure that its digitized systems are safe and secure from our enemies?
Dr. OSCAR. To protect the Army's tactical digitized systems, we are implementing a defense in depth strategy. This strategy includes: (1) the use of intrusion detection systems and security technologies, such as firewalls and secure routers, employed at all perimeter entry points into our tactical networks to detect and block unauthorized access to our network; (2) network mapping and discovery software employed by a central tactical security management element to monitor all connections to the tactical network and enforce internal network security policies; and, (3) a suite of COTS and NDI security software to detect abnormal operations on each of the computer systems that are a part of the tactical network. These security features and capabilities were tested in the recent Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment at Ft. Hood, TX. We are continuing to test and refine these products, and plan to integrate them into the architecture for the First Digitized Force. Protection from jamming is more difficult to address. Jammers may interfere with the signal transmitted by the systems that support our tactical information network. The most successful method we have to deter jamming by enemy forces is to identify the source, and then destroy the jammer or neutralize it in some manner using anti-jam countermeasures. Finally, we recognize that training of operators, system administrators, network managers, and information system security personnel is key to our overall program to reduce our risk of system disruptions or compromise of information. We have already started teaching Information Systems Security courses within the Army. In May 1998, we will expand our systems and network management courses at Fort Gordon to include training on the information systems security tools and techniques that were tested and proven successful in the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
Page 528 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PICKETT
COMANCHE FUNDING
Mr. PICKETT. I think the Comanche is a good example of a sort of leap-ahead kind of technology we like to see, particularly for the Army. I don't know that this can be a possibility, but if you did get additional funding for the Comanche program, how would you propose to use these monies?
General KERN. The second prototype has been built and the contractor is in the process of adding the test instrumentation necessary to provide data during flight testing. That process was originally planned to be completed this year but was delayed due to an $8 million Congressional reduction to the fiscal year 1998 (FY98) President's Budget. This prototype is currently scheduled to be ready for first flight in April 1999. If additional funding was provided in FY99, the first flight of prototype #2 could be accelerated to late January 1999. The Comanche flight test program is operating on a very limited budget and has not been able to fly prototype #1 as many hours as would be desired. With only two prototypes to perform all of the flight testing it is essential that a maximum number of hours be flown on each prototype. The current resources do not allow for a full flight test plan. It would take an additional $24 million to accelerate the first flight of prototype #2 and to continue to fly both prototypes during 1999 at an effective rate. In addition to flight testing, the acceleration of the reconnaissance Mission Equipment Package is a high priority element in the Comanche development plan. If more than the $24 million could be provided in FY99, the Army would use those funds to accelerate the design and testing of the Electro-Optical Support System. The sensor systems are a critical part of the Comanche reconnaissance capability and earlier design, integration and testing of those technologies would significantly reduce the schedule risk of the remaining armed reconnaissance development.
Page 529 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
COMANCHE
Mr. PICKETT. I understand that the Comanche can't even theoretically get into the Army warfighting expirements such as Division 2000 because you don't have the simulation technology developed. Is this a fact and if so, what does it take to get this aircraft into the fight here?
General KERN. The Army digitization schedule will field the First Digitized Division (FDD) in fiscal year 2000 and the First Digitized Corps (FDC) in fiscal year 2004. The only concern is the current Comanche schedule is about two years out of synch with that schedule. The current plan only provides an interface to FDD planning through limited Comanche simulation. At a minimum, increased simulation capabilities in fiscal year 2000 are needed to support the Army's training of the systems designated to support the FDD. It is also important to have a limited number of Comanche aircraft available to support the FDC Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE) in fiscal year 2004. The current Comanche schedule provides support to the FDC AWEs with less than the full digital capability that will be fielded in December 2006. Comanche is planned as the central communication link between the FDC systems and training with less than the full capability in fiscal year 2004. If additional funding were available, the critical digitization elements could be accelerated to be in line with the Army digitization schedule. The Army is considering an unfunded plan during the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process that could resolve this problem.
COMANCHE PROTOTYPE COST
Page 530 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. Do you know what that would cost? Do you have a cost number for that?
General KERN. The Longbow millimeter wave radar requirement for Comanche is being designed into the initial production configuration. However, due to limited resources only the space, weight and power provisions for the radar will be on the Comanche at the initial fielding in 2006. The radar development and integration will not be completed until 2009 and will be incorporated into the Comanche production line in 2011. The Army does not have the available resources to accelerate the millimeter wave radar development as currently planned. The current development and integration estimate is in excess of $600 million and would have to come from resources outside the Army. The Army is aware, however, that there have been some technology breakthroughs in millimeter wave technology that might lower the development costs and the Comanche program will be investigating this recent technology. If affordable, it would certainly be desirable to accelerate the millimeter wave radar capability on the Comanche.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. STUMP
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JSTARS)
Mr. STUMP. As you know, Congress has taken special interest in the JSTARS Common Ground Station (CGS) and provided funds to accelerate the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle version, systems to the U.S. Marine Corps and funds to the Army for an element at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Consultation, Command, and Control, Agency to insure interface with the NATO Command and Control Systems as well as NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). How is the system proceeding?
Page 531 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The JSTARS CGS is currently in low rate initial production and undergoing initial operational test and evaluation at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Based on the system's performance to date, we anticipate a successful Milestone III review for full rate production in August of this year. Initial fielding of CGS to operational units will begin this summer in the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Marine Corps is scheduled to receive two CGS in May and June of 1999, respectively. The NATO AGS effort is in the concept development phase. In April, the NATO Conference of National Armament Directors will consider five alternative concepts for NATO AGS, including the U.S.-recommended alternative of an improved JSTARS sensor on an Euro-Canadian air platform and a European-led ground station development effort. The Army has vast experience with the JSTARS ground station and is prepared to contribute to the development of the NATO ground station solution. In order to operate effectively during contingencies in the expanding NATO theater, we believe it is imperative that the Army's CGS be interoperable with both the air and ground components of NATO AGS. We also desire that the Army's CGS benefit from NATO ground station development through technology flow-back and that the NATO ground station benefit from re-use of technology already developed for the CGS, to preclude having to pay twice for the same technology. To ensure these imperatives are addressed, we have contracted for a multi-national architecture study to define the best architectural approach for NATO's ground station. The study team is led by Motorola Space and Systems Technology Group, Scottsdale, Arizona. European team members include Dornier (Germany), Alenia (Italy), and Matra (France). The architecture study will be completed this fall.
Mr. STUMP. We are glad to hear that the JSTARS system (E–8 aircraft and the associated JSTARS workstations as well as the Ground Station Modules supporting the Ground Component Commander) that has been deployed on various exercises to include the Korean Winter Training Exercise is performing the mission very well. We also understand that the Department of Defense is considering upgrades to the JSTARS radar. Will these upgrades include commonality with the CGS and associated workstations deployed with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force tactical commanders?
Page 532 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. We have just recently begun technical discussions with the prime contractors for the JSTARS radar upgrades and the Army's CGS to ensure commonality. The introduction of these upgrades, designated Radar Technology Improvement Program (RTIP) will result in a vast increase in the volume and quality of data available for transmission to the CGS and stand-along work stations. Our foremost concern with RTIP is that we retain the principle on which the existing JSTARS Concept of Operations is based, which is support of the Ground Component Commander. In order to ensure commonality with this new capability, the Army is in the process of assessing what enhancements will be required to the CGS existing data link and CGS data management architecture to keep pace with RTIP. Without an effective broadcast data link, the Army's requirements for JSTARS data, as well as new requirements emerging from the other services now expressing interest in JSTARS connectivity, can not be met.
LONGBOW APACHE
Mr. STUMP. Would you please comment on the importance of the AH–64D ''Longbow'' program, including the value of the Prime Vendor Support (PVS) proposal or PVS? I'd like to submit for the record a statement by Secretary Walker last month regarding the PVS concept.
Dr. OSCAR. The Longbow Apache is one of our most important programs. As the world's premier attack helicopter, it will provide the ground commander with a versatile, rapidly employable, long-range aerial weapon system capable of massed, rapid, fire-and-forget Hellfire missile engagements against a wide range of fixed and moving targets. In fact, the Longbow's digitized target acquisition system will provide automated detection, location, classification (air defense weapon, fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, tracked vehicle, and wheeled vehicle), prioritization,and target hand-over in day, night, adverse weather and obscure battlefield conditions.
Page 533 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Apache PVS is a type of Contractor Logistics Support that assigns total wholesale support responsibility to the original manufacturers (Boeing and Lockheed-Martin) that the Army is currently considering. By taking advantage of best commercial practices, this initiative has the potential to provide badly needed funds for modernization by significantly reducing support costs (estimated $200 million over the first five years, and $1 billion over the life of the program). System readiness and reliability will also improve through the modernization through spares program and improving the availability of spare parts.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (ATD)/ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT (EMD)
Mr. BARTLETT. I am aware of the many Acquisition initiatives that have been employed in the development of programs, which can contribute to the reduction of cycle times and which would move programs from initiation to fielding more quickly. I have become aware of the concept of Fast Track programs, which in effect, jump from advanced development to EMD, via the device called ATD. What programs are using the ATD to EMD approach, and how many programs have made the jump so far?
Dr. OSCAR. The Fast Track program designates certain selected ATDs for increased management attention to ensure a more rapid but smooth transition to development. To be selected, the ATDs must: (1) involve technology that is sufficiently mature that can be demonstrated during a 6.3 ATD program with moderate risk, (2) is a likely candidate for skipping the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase entirely and transitioning directly to EMD, and (3) which is already funded in the POM. If these ''likelihoods'' are realized, a Fast Track approach can result in measurable time and cost savings.
Page 534 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Fast Track process focuses on synchronizing technology demonstrations with the acquisition process to ensure a quicker transition to EMD for high priority programs. Until the end of the ATD, requirements will remain flexible. The ATD will assist Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in understanding the ''art of the possible'' and will provide the basis for finalizing requirements into an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) before the end of Phase 0.
Fast Track designation does not guarantee entry into EMD. At the end of Phase 0, the MDA can approve a Milestone I/II (MS I/II) decision and entry into EMD or, if the ATD was not fully successful, approve entry into a PDRR phase or cancel the program. Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) is currently the only program that is designated as Fast Track. If the ATD is successful and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) concurs, FSCS will transition directly to EMD in fiscal year 02 (FY02).
Mr. BARTLETT. What programs are scheduled to go through the ATD and directly into EMD in the next two to three years?
Dr. OSCAR. As previously stated, FSCS is currently the only program with a Fast Track designation and if the ATD is successful will make the jump to EMD in FY02. Additional programs will be added as we learn form the FSCS Fast Track experience and as qualified candidates are identified.
Mr. BARTLETT. How has this changed the composition and funding of your overall tech base program?
Page 535 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. In the process of establishing the FSCS ATD as a Fast Track program, we shifted some FSCS development funds to the tech base program. This change eliminated unwarranted concurrency and allowed us to fully fund the ATD.
Mr. BARTLETT. While transitioning from ATD to EMD is very attractive, how are you resourcing the additional Acquisition Milestone activities, which are required to move to EMD (MS I and II)?
Dr. OSCAR. Fast Track designation is contingent upon sufficient funding in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to advance the technology to an MS I/II decision, through EMD and into production. The robustness of the ATD is enhanced to ensure enough data is collected to provide the MDA with sufficient information to determine if moving to EMD is warranted. An approved Fast Track program loses the Fast Track designation if program funding for EMD falls out of the POM/EPP.
Mr. BARTLETT. Congress has supported programs, such as the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW), which provide the soldier with the tools for even greater lethality. Could you provide, as an example, what steps you have taken for this program to assure proper planning and funding to achieve the successful transition sought and the reduced cycle times for the program?
Dr. OSCAR. It is clear that the intent of ATD programs, such as the OICW, is to move quickly and with a heightened degree of confidence into EMD and fielding. The OICW program is a good example that may move directly from Science and Technology (S&T) to EMD. To insure a successful transition of this program we have done the following.
Page 536 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Fist, at the onset of the ATD, we reached agreement with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on exit criteria for system effectiveness, hit performance, weight, interface, and expected production cost, via a jointly-approved OICW ATD Management Plan.
Second, we have employed Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) methodology. The Government user, developer and Industry partners were specially trained at Motorola University, a highly regarded school in the U.S. for IPPD training. The OICW team implemented the IPPD methodology by emphasizing the use of commercial products, components, and practices and design for manufacture and maintainability.
Third, with the assistance of the Congress in fiscal year 1997 and 1998, contractor competition was maintained through prototype downselect. Maintaining contractor competition leveraged contractor IR&D funding and facilitated maturation of first prototype systems. Mature first prototype systems greatly reduce the risk of transition.
Finally, planning, programming and budgeting for EMD are currently being worked jointly by the user, S&T, and engineering development community. Joint planning throughout the life-cycle is part of the IPPD process for seamless transition.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PAPPAS
CROSS-SERVICING
Page 537 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PAPPAS. I asked this yesterday to the Navy folks and I will ask you, what areas of cross-servicing are being done, how much savings are being realized, and what remains the biggest obstacle to furthering this issue? I ask this because I have listened to all services say essentially, we are broke, we need more money. You know we do not have any money this year, the only way we can do this is to cut out redundancies and apply to modernization. Your comments?
General KERN. The Army is involved in numerous cooperative efforts with other services focused on development and experimentation in the areas of land combat capabilities and joint interoperability. We currently manage seven Advanced concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) that are joint endeavors. Key among these ACTDs are the Rapid force Projection Initiative (RFPI), the Military Operations Urban Terrain (MOUT) and the Theater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO).
The RFPI ACTD is being conducted with USMC involvement and will demonstrate enhanced lethality systems for the light contingency forces including the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile, the High Mobility rocket system, and the Digitized Towed Howitzer. The MOUT ACTD addresses 32 requirements for operations by soldiers and Marines in urban terrain. These requirements were developed in concert by the Army and the Marine Corps. The TPSO ACTD will focus on the integration of Joint C4ISR capabilities to identify the critical pieces within the enemy's main attack. The Army's Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office leads this effort with participation by USN, USAF and USMC. Other examples of joint efforts include Army and Marine Corps development of a Light-Weight Cannon, Non-Lethal Weapons and Soldier Enhancements. The Army's Air Maneuver Battle Lab is conducting an experiment called Intrepid Vanguard with USAF and USMC participation. The experiment focuses on manned and unmanned ground and airborne systems control for reconnaissance missions.
Page 538 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Although we currently have no way of determining how much savings have been realized, all of these interservice cooperative efforts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of our total force and to save defense dollars that might otherwise be wasted on redundant systems.
Mr. PAPPAS. I will be more specific. Is there any function, role, item that the Air Force or Navy/Marines do now, that the Army does?
Mr. OSCAR. The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) examined this question extensively in 1995, and its findings have been revalidated by both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP). In essence, these internal and external reviews said that the warfighting roles of the Services were not redundant but complementary, and necessary to spur innovation. Missions that may appear similar are in fact key to ensure a capability can not be denied by a single countermeasure. Redundancies identified by all three studies were in support infrastructure. The QDR found that 61 percent of the personnel employed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1997 (both military and civilian) performed infrastructure functions.
Mr. PAPPAS. Can you name them?
Mr. OSCAR. There are quite a few infrastructure functions which fall into this category such as training, logistical support, personnel services, medical care, and central command, control, and communications.
Page 539 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PAPPAS. For example, we do not need four branches looking into night vision devices, we have Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) and Fort Belvoir to lead the way.
Mr. OSCAR. One initiative which began in 1990 is Testing and Evaluation (T&E) Reliance. Reliance assigns a Service lead test responsibility for investments in a certain functional area (like night vision testing). This has not eliminated all redundancies, but it has reduced the amount of duplicative testing infrastructure investment across the Services. Another initiative begun as a result of language in the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act to reduce infrastructure was Vision 21. This was a comprehensive review of requirements to support Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation of current and future weapon systems, and the development of a five-year plan to enable the DOD laboratories and T&E centers to meet the needs of the warfigher in the 21st Century. In support of the current acquisition reform initiatives, we are considering creating an all-Service Test Command. This command could provide a vehicle for streamlining and consolidating test facilities and focusing investments. It would bring together under one umbrella all test ranges and facilities, eliminate duplication of facilities, and reduce government infrastructure. In order for this to succeed, DOD would require establishment of a unitary funding mechanism under the control of this Test Command. This initiative would require up front working capital and possibly relaxation of personnel statues. Additionally, as participants to the Defense Management Council, we are in the process of identifying new reform ideas that have big dollars associated with them. We believe that through the so-called Revolution in Business Affairs and Revolution in Logistics Affairs, we can cut this percentage a good deal, thereby improving our tooth to tail ratio.
FORCE XXI INITIATIVES/WARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS (WRAP)
Page 540 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PAPPAS. I believe that the Force XXI program must be defended and I hope that you will fight any efforts to raid this fund. I also want to emphasize the importance of utilizing WRAP to get the best of the private sector into the Army as soon as possible and cut out the bureaucratic nonsense of three year studies and paperwork. In many cases the private sector is outpacing the slow defense department and we need to tap them now and not be a slave to form and bureaucracy. I know our enemies seeking the same technology are not going to be as slow. Your comments.
Dr. OSCAR. This program is a means to accelerate fielding of systems which emerge from particularly successful Warfighting Experiments conducted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and get those systems in the hands of soldiers earlier. The WRAP acts as a bridge, linking TRADOC experimentation and systems acquisition. It is also one of our major acquisition reform programs. Each fiscal year, Congress has appropriated funding for Force XXI Initiatives candidates selected by the Commanding General, TRADOC, which the Army has submitted to the Congress for review and approval.
Each proposed Force XXI Initiative is submitted through the WRAP approval process, and must meet criteria Congress established for this process, specifically: urgency of need, affordability, sustainability, technical maturity and compelling success. Throughout this process, the Department of Army works closely with TRADOC and the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command in selecting new emerging technologies.
The WRAP Process allows the Army to begin developing emerging technologies on the average twenty months ahead of the current program and budget schedules, and fund new starts that would have difficulty competing with the larger programs. The Army continues to improve the WRAP selection process. The Force XXI Initiative program is the Army's viable and valuable acquisition reform process.
Page 541 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
CRUSADER
Mr. PAPPAS. On Crusader, I hope that this technology has been offered to the Navy for their new battle support platforms they plan to implement soon. Is there communication on this issue?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, the Army and Navy conduct a continuous dialog at the laboratory and program management levels to ensure technical information is shared and to ensure that their respective cannon development programs remain complementary.
RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
Mr. PAPPAS. What is the latest status on radio frequency spectrum availability for digitized battlefield? Do you have enough? Are the true costs of less spectrum accounted for in the budget? I.e. are we going to have to rent spectrum that we used to own?
Dr. OSCAR. Several trends support the conclusion that access to radio frequency spectrum will not be adequate to support all digitized systems in training environments and in some live mission scenarios. Those trends include rapidly increasing Department of Defense (DOD) demands for spectrum for use with telecommunications systems, sensors, and other spectrum dependent devices; and decreasing usable DOD spectrum due to reallocations, sell-offs, and sharing with non-military systems. Although the former trend of increasing demand for spectrum should be allowed to run its natural course (this is the result of the warfighter discovering ways to increase lethality, survivability and mobility), the latter trend should be reversed. Spectrum reallocations and sell-offs should be halted.
Page 542 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The true cost of less spectrum is not accounted for in the budget. The most recent example of lost spectrum is the 20 MHz that DOD was directed to transfer for auction as a result of the Balance Budget Act of 1997. Although the Military Departments collectively provided cost estimates of the impact of the lost 20 MHz of spectrum that ranged in the billions of dollars, no money has been programmed to offset this cost. So far, DOD has not been forced to rent spectrum that we formerly owned. However, much of the spectrum that DOD is losing will transition to the commercial sector in the next two to four years. As that spectrum is transferred, it is possible that DOD will have to rent spectrum that it formerly owned in order to meet mission requirements.
BATTLEFIELD COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Mr. PAPPAS. I noticed your comments for Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS). I would say that the BCIS system should be procured, and I will strongly encourage you to do so. If you need to, take a family victim of fratricide from the Persian Gulf to the White House and talk the President into the importance of this technology to avoid this tragedy in the future.
General KERN. As expressed in my opening statement, the Army leadership is firmly committed to solving the fratricide problem experienced in the Persian Gulf to preclude recurrence in future conflicts. We believe that BCIS technology will go a long way toward solving the fratricide problem, which is why we have included in this year's budget request funding to begin procurement of BCIS to equip the Army's Digitized Division, the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Because the causes of fratricide are varied and complex, we are evaluating whether we need both situational awareness information provided by digitization technologies and BCIS to solve the problem, or whether one will be sufficient. Equipping the Digitized Division will help us to confirm which approach is prudent in an operational environment. Further, we are currently considering whether or not to fund the procurement of additional BCIS to equip the Digitized Corps. That decision will be made this spring.
Page 543 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT
BLACK HAWK UH–60
Mr. EVERETT. I've been told that the Army and the National Guard have agreed on a plan to reduce the Black Hawk shortage in the National Guard. My understanding is that the Army will include 10 additional UH–60's in their budget, each year beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1999 to meet the Guard's shortfall of 90 Black Hawks. Is my understanding correct?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes, however, we have funded only 50 of the 90 required. We are still trying to determine how we will fund the additional 40.
Mr. EVERETT. Budget pressures notwithstanding, have you given any thought to increasing the Guard add from 10 to 18 Black Hawks per year—we can save $90 million, and have the aircraft in the fleet by 2003, rather than 2007?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army has reviewed the cost and savings that would be associated with procuring additional UH–60s under the current contract. The current Black Hawk multi-year contract runs through FY01 and is based on a procurement strategy of 18 H–60 helicopters per year for all services (Army, Navy and Air Force). To achieve any savings, the Army would have to exercise an option in the contract that permits the Army to re-baseline to a more economic rate of 36 H–60's per year—yielding a total savings of $33.2 million over three years ($10.9 million in FY99, $10.7 million in FY00, $11.6 million in FY01). This assumes the Navy buys six CH–60's in FY99, eighteen CH–60s each in FY00 and FY01, and the Army funds eight additional H–60s in FY99, FY00, and FY01. However, in order to achieve the more economic rate and save $33.2 million the Army would have to invest an additional $237 million ($73.8 million in FY99, $74.8 million in FY00, $88.4 million in FY01) into its Black Hawk program.
Page 544 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
COMANCHE
Mr. EVERETT. With regard to the Comanche, the Army's battlefield ''Quarterback'', is the Army still fully committed to this program, and will the Comanche be fairly represented in Advance Warfighting Exercises (AWEs)?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army is committed to the Comanche program and is counting on the Comanche being the battlefield ''Quarterback'' in the 21st century. The Comanche program continues to be the number one aviation development program in the Army and will be a core system to support Force XXI and Army After Next. The Comanche is currently being represented at AWE through simulation. The army has developed a Comanche Portable Cockpit (CPC) that is easily transportable to the various sites of the AWEs. If the schedule of AWEs continues to grow, additional CPCs will be required to adequately support them. The long term plan is to have aircraft available to support the AWEs but that will not be possible until around 2004. Until then we will continue to use fixed base and portable forms of simulation. The feedback from the current AWEs is that Comanche is well represented and is providing invaluable information needed to support development of tactics, techniques and procedures for future mission planning.
Mr. EVERETT. Can increased funding enhance the digitization development and testing of the Comanche?
Dr. OSCAR. Additional funding beginning in fiscal year 1999 (FY99) could certainly accelerate the digitization aspects of the Comanche. The Comanche, when fielded in 2006, will be in a digitized configuration. The only concern is the current Comanche schedule is about two years out of synch with the Army digitization schedule. If additional funding were provided, the critical digitization elements could be accelerated to be in line with the Army digitization schedule. The Army is considering an unfunded plan during the current Program Objective Memorandum process that could reduce the impact of this problem. Any additional funding in FY99 would provide significant support and increased effectiveness for that plan. The flight test program for the Comanche is being executed at a minimal level due to lack of available resources. Additional funding for flight test could accelerate the first flight of prototype #2 and provide for increased flight test hours during 1999. The current estimate is $24 million to accelerate first flight of prototype #2 and increase the flight hours for both prototypes to a full flight test schedule during 1999.
Page 545 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
LONGBOW APACHE
Mr. EVERETT. With regard to the Army's Apache Longbow request, how important is multiyear contract authority?
Dr. OSCAR. Multiyear contract authority provided for the Apache Longbow airframe in 1996 and the Fire Control Radar (FCR) in 1998 are very important to the program. Through the use of multi-year procurement the Army will be able to procure an additional 50 aircraft during the period of 1996 to 2000 and save approximately $132 million. Estimated cost avoidance associated with the five-year multiyear procurement contract for the FCR is approximately $80 million. This allowed the FCR product manager to procure the remaining 207 FCRs within projected 1998 to 2002 funding.
CHINOOK CH–47D IMPROVED CARGO HELICOPTER (ICH)
Mr. EVERETT. How important is the ICH program to our warfighters?
Dr. OSCAR. The ICH program is very important to the support of the warfighter efforts. Without ICH, the impact to the warfighter would be significant. First, we would have a 30 year-old CH–47D fleet by fiscal year 2012 that would reflect significant unscheduled maintenance man-hours per flight hour, significantly reduced fleet wide availability as a result of increased maintenance burden, and escalating operations and sustainment costs. Second, we would have a heavy lift fleet which can not communicate digitally within the Army XXI battlespace. This void would constitute an inability to achieve essential situational awareness resulting in a muted ability to coordinate/task mission changes on the move with supported/supporting units. Additionally, in light of the envisioned Army threat scenarios, a ''digitally blind'' CH–47 aircraft would seriously jeopardize the survivability of its crew/payload and the success of the given mission. In short, the ICH program is essential to the Army's Army XXI warfighting requirements. The ICH aircraft will be one of the most relevant logistical enablers within the modern battlespace.
Page 546 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SAXTON
CRUSADER
Mr. SAXTON. I have seen press reports that the Army is considering ending the M1A2 program in FY03 after 1,050 vehicles—about a third of its active force. The Crusader and the Abrams tank are automotive and technological contemporaries. There is nothing in Crusader more advanced that the M1A2. Why is it that the Crusader is called a ''technology carrier'' and the Abrams is called a ''legacy system.'' How can one be a part of the future and the other part of the past?
Dr. OSCAR. In truth, both are part of the future. The Army After Next (AAN) concept relies on a small, mobile cadre (battle forces) of yet to be developed light, ultra capable vehicles as an initial entry force. The bulk of the force (campaign forces) will be comprised of Crusader and current systems like Abrams and Bradley.
Abrams is both a legacy system and a technology carrier. It's a legacy system, because we have produced 7,880 for the U.S. Army alone. It's a technology carrier, because we are still integrating new technology via upgrade and retrofit programs. Both Abrams and Crusader are pushing technology such as digitization and thermal sensors for Abrams and advanced ammunition handling, self-protection, and artillery capabilities for Crusader. These are further explained below.
Page 547 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The M1A2 tank entered low rate production in November 1992 and completed a production run of 62 new vehicles. The M1A2 upgrade tank uses hulls and some hardware from older M1 tanks that are refurbished at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, plus a new turret and hardware manufactured and/or installed at the Lima Army Tank Plant, Ohio. The Abrams Upgrade Program was approved for full rate production in April 1994 and production started in October 1994 with a two-year Phase I program for 206 tanks. The Phase II program started in October 1996 and is a five-year multiyear contract at ten tanks per month. The current Army plan is for an additional three years of production after the multiyear until a total of 1,150 M1A2 tanks have been built. Starting with the fourth year of the multiyear contract, the M1A2 will convert to the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) design which includes an upgrade to the tanks electronics package. The M1A2 SEP also incorporates second generation forward looking infrared technology into the Gunner's Primary Sight and the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer. The Army will retrofit the 627 M1A2 tanks built prior to the M1A2 SEP tank (production starts in August 1999) to the SEP configuration. Funding for the retrofit program begins in fiscal year 2001 (FY01). The SEP is a series of engineering change proposals being applied to the M1A2 with a concurrent production date of August 1999.
Crusader will incorporate some technologies from existing systems, such as the M1A2, along with entirely new technologies to deliver a cost-effective solution to meeting the required operational capabilities. This merging of current and future technologies into a cost effective design solution, which meets all requirements, distinguishes Crusader from the legacy systems. Crusader's ability to sustain rate-of-fire, survive, sustain itself, and move with the maneuver force are all well beyond the capabilities of existing domestic and foreign artillery systems.
Page 548 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Crusader is a component of the AAN and the technology carrier for future combat systems for both the campaign and battle forces. Much of the technology critical to Crusader is currently being developed only by Crusader: hit/detection avoidance, liquid-cooled cannon, drive by wire, projectile tracking, laser ignition, and fully automated ammunition handling are some of these key technologies. Additionally, Crusader is cooperating with other programs to advance other technologies critical to AAN: decision aids, system prognostics/diagnostics, modular reusable software, composite armor, remove secondary armament, and real time common software operating environment are some of the more significant cooperative developments. The designed-in application of technologies that automate ammunition transfer, loading and handling, improve survivability, improve and sustain rate-of-fire, and transform the howitzer section from ammunition handlers and loaders into a crew that fights their vehicles is what separates Crusader from the legacy systems.
In addition to new technology, Crusader uses or modifies existing components where possible to reduce development, production, and operating costs. Crusader is leveraging technologies the M1A2 SEP is pioneering in many fields, including software, computer hardware, and automotive components.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
COMANCHE PRIORITY
Page 549 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. REYES. One last thing, and this is prompted by the comment that you made in answering my colleague's question about the time frame of whether it's too late to actually be in a position to deploy by 2004. What would it take, say, for instance, if we were to prioritize immediately the program, the Comanche program, to be able to catch up? What would it take?
Dr. OSCAR. The current plan is for Comanche to have Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in December 2006. Considering the many priority items that must be accomplished within the Army and the limited available funding, this is the right time to field the Comanche. Accelerating the IOC to 2004 would require a large amount of money, for which there are higher priorities within the Army at this time. The preferred approach would be to maintain the current IOC for the production aircraft, but accelerate some portions of the mission equipment package so that Comanche prototypes could participate in the First Digitized Corps activities in 2004.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MC HALE
M16 RIFLE STANDARDIZATION
Mr. MCHALE. When are we going to replace the M16 A2 as the standard issue rifle?
Dr. OSCAR. The Army's Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) is the next generation combat weapon that will replace selected M16 series rifles, M4 Carbines and M203 grenade launchers in late fiscal year 2006 (FY06). This system will combine advanced fire control systems with thermal optics, laser range finder and video displays and will have the capability to engage defilade targets with air bursting munitions. OICW is currently in the tech base and is expected to enter engineering and manufacturing development in FY00 with production beginning in early FY06.
Page 550 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WATTS
CRUSADER
Mr. WATTS. Mr. Oscar, would you please comment on the status of the Crusader program? Is this program on track and making progress?
Dr. OSCAR. Yes. The Crusader system is the Army's highest priority ground combat modernization program. We can achieve the urgent necessary improvement to battlefield indirect fire support only through development and fielding of Crusader. Crusader is required to ensure our continued dominance on the battlefield well into the 21st century.
Crusader satisfies urgent warfighting deficiencies. There is an urgent need for a more lethal, mobile, survivable, longer range and less manpower intensive system. Crusader will be the keystone fire support system of Army XXI and an integral component of Army After Next (AAN). Crusader with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System will provide the fires in support of the AAN battle forces—approximately 25 percent of the force. Crusader and the Multiple Launch Rocket System will provide the fire support for an AAN campaign/decisive forces—the remaining 75 percent of our force. Crusader is an integral part of the adaptive full spectrum force, required to defeat an asymmetrical enemy. Crusader will provide tomorrow's war fighters with the flexibility to choose between providing firepower equal to today's Paladin with one-third the strategic life, or three times the firepower with the same lift.
Page 551 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
In addition to being a component of AAN, Crusader is the technology carrier for future combat systems, decision aids, hit/detection avoidance*, system prognostics/diagnostics, liquid-cooled cannon*, modular reusable software, composite armor, drive by wire*, projectile tracking*, fully automated ammunition handling*, remote secondary armament, and real time common software operating environment, are some of these technologies. (Those marked with an ''*'' are unique to Crusader.) Crusader will reduce the requirement for manpower (one-third fewer crew), reduce ownership costs by 25 percent, and improve operational capability (three times the firepower plus improved mobility and survivability).
Crusader remains on track and is making satisfactory progress toward equipping the first battalion with Crusader during the 4th quarter, fiscal year 2005.
LIGHWEIGHT 155MM HOWITZER PROGRAM
Mr. WATTS. Dr. Oscar, the joint Army-Marine Corps lightweight 155 millimeter howitzer (LW155) program is developing a replacement for the aging M198 howitzer. It is to have improved transportability, mobility and enhanced survivability and lethality. I understand the program is reportedly on cost and schedule to the meet the requirements in the Joint Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The Joint ORD specifies ranges of 30 to 40 kilometers (km). It is my understanding that the LW155 has already demonstrated ranges of over 31 km, firing at rates of five rounds per minute. With extended range guided projectiles now under development, a range of 40 km is expected. Is this correct?
Dr. OSCAR. Most of your statement is correct. The LW155 is currently on schedule and within cost. It will have improved transportability, mobility and enhanced survivability and lethality. While it is incorrect to say these have all been demonstrated, it already appears that LW155 is well on its way to meeting these Joint ORD requirements. Testing of the XM776 cannon tube at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona in 1997 indicates that the LW155 will indeed be able to achieve the 30 km threshold range during firing table tests in engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). Although the LW155 did achieve five rounds per minute on occasion during the rate of fire portions of the competitive shoot-off in 1996, the reported rate from the operational assessment, which is based on a statistical average, was less than five rounds per minute. We are confident that the EMD design will meet the five round requirement. The automatic rammer should increase that capability, and will definitely provide the needed crew labor savings. We are now developing the XM982 extended range projectile, designed to extend ranges from 30 km to a projected 37 km with 39-caliber cannons like the XM776. Additionally, even greater potential range is possible with LW155's long-range barrel study technology demonstration in 1999.
Page 552 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WATTS. Pre-planned product improvements (P3\I) include the digital fire control system with Global Positioning System, advanced direct-fire sight and a semi-automatic loader. How much additional funding is required to accelerate the product improvement program schedule so that it will be ready for first production howitzers? Does this make sense?
Dr. OSCAR. Although it would appear to make sense, it is not prudent to accelerate the P3\I so that they are ready for first production howitzers in fiscal year 2001 (FY01). Although additional funds would cover the increased program costs, accelerating the digital fire control system (DFCS) EMD schedule would significantly increase the technical risks. We cannot just bolt on Paladin-like existing hardware and software to a towed howitzer which lacks space, power, hydraulics, suspension, and environmental protection. The P3\I will provide a 21st century DFCS comparable to the capabilities being fielded otherwise only on self-propelled howitzers. Significant hardware challenges include miniaturizing, consolidating, and hardening components for increased shock and vibration and integrating the automatic cannon positioning and navigation enhancements.
While these technical risks make it imprudent to accelerate the P3\I for the first production howitzers in FY01, we could feasibly accelerate P3\I by one year. This would require both an increase and acceleration of the existing Army Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding shown below.
This funding would make the P3\I available in FY03, and would allow the production of 120 Marine Corps howitzers with DFCS, subsequently reducing their total retrofit effort. This would also allow acceleration of Army LW155 deliveries if desired.
Page 553 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
LIGHTWEIGHT 155MM HOWITZER
Mr. WATTS. What is the Army's commitment to the development and fielding of this lightweight 155MM howitzer?
Dr. OSCAR. As you know the Lightweight 155MM (LW155) program is a joint Army/Marine acquisition program to develop a 155MM towed howitzer to replace the M198 towed howitzer as the Army's light general support (GS) artillery weapon system and all existing cannon systems in the United States Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC is responsible for the development of the howitzer and the Army is responsible for the development of a Digital Fire Control System (DFCS). The second generation of the DFCS will participate in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (REPI) Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in fiscal year 1998 and in an Extended User Evaluation (EUE) through fiscal year 2000. The Army is totally committed to fulfilling its obligation to the USMC of developing the DFCS. The Army is fully funded in the fiscal year 1999 Presidents Budget (PB) to develop the DFCS and begin production in fiscal year 2004. In the Extended Planning Period (EPP) the Army is funded to procure the Army Procurement Objective (APO) of 273 howitzers. The Army First Unit Equipped (FUE) is scheduled for fiscal year 2005 and will be fielded to 2 and 2/3 Active Component (AC) Field Artillery (FA) Battalions and 6 and 1/3 Army National Guard (ARNG) Battalions. LW155 in conjunction with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) will replace all M198 Towed cannons in the total Army. As the Army struggles with budgetary constraints we will continue to evaluate our options for modernizing our light GS artillery.
Mr. WATTS. What is the Army's commitment to the development and fielding of the 155MM Direct Fire Support Weapon System? Is this the Army ''reinventing the wheel'' and potentially wasting millions of dollars by looking into this system?
Page 554 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. OSCAR. The Army is exploring the possibility of developing a lightweight 155MM (5000 lbs.) howitzer, known as the Advanced Technology Light Artillery System (ATLAS), to replace the M119A1 105MM-towed howitzer in order to increase the lethality of our light direct support artillery. Government and industry are assessing individual technologies and conceptual designs that are deemed critical to the feasibility of the ATLAS. The tech base continues to evaluate the technical feasibility of meeting the user needs stated in the ATLAS Mission Need Statement. Funding for the current effort comes from the following PE/PROJECTs: 62618/AH80, 62624/AH18, 63004/D43A, and 63004/D232. We do not believe that we are wasting money, rather we are using our tech-base funds to explore the possibility of providing our light forces with a more lethal direct support artillery weapon and possibly establishing 155MM as the common caliber for all cannon artillery systems.
ARMY PROCUREMENT AND R&D ACCOUNTS
Mr. WATTS. Mr. Oscar, it is the general opinion of this committee that the Army's procurement and R&D accounts are underfunded, for the record, will the administration's inability to adequately fund the Army lead to a hollow force?
Dr. OSCAR. As we look to the future, the Nation's interests require America to continue to field the best Army in the world. For fiscal year 1999, President Clinton has submitted an Army budget of 64.3 billion. This represents the first real increase since 1985, except for Desert Storm and will afford the Army some relief in balancing readiness, quality of life, and modernization challenges. In the near term, our modernization focus is on maintaining our current combat overmatch and achieving information dominance. In the long-term, we seek to field an Army capable of achieving Full Spectrum Dominance. This modernization strategy reflects the linkage of our modernization plan to the operational concepts described in Joint Vision 2010 and the patters of operation outlined in Army Vision 2010. This strategy, supported by continued levels of appropriate funding will insure tomorrow's readiness and preclude fielding a ''hollow force''.
Page 555 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
M2A3 CONTRACTS/BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE PROGRAM
Mr. WATTS. Dr. Oscar, the Bradley A3 combat fighting vehicle continues to enjoy significant support from the committee due to improvements in lethality and situational awareness. How does the Army intend to award future contracts for this system? Will it be on a multiyear basis?
Dr. OSCAR. In fiscal year 1999 (FY99), the Army will award a single year contract for 73 M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs), which will conclude the low rate initial production of 126 M2A3 BFVs. In FY00, the Army intends to enter full-rate production with an award of a four-year multiyear contract for the M2A3 BFV. The multi-year contract would extend from FY00 thru FY03.
Mr. WATTS. Dr. Oscar, some of the Army's major programs are being managed by a single prime contractor/system integrator. I am fearful that some of these programs, including Crusader and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, lack a fully open and competitive atmosphere in the bidding for major subsystems. Can you explain the apparent lack of competition in these two programs when there are over a dozen capable, cost-effective suppliers in the market who wish to compete in such bidding?
Dr. OSCAR. The Crusader's approved Acquisition Strategy (AS) is based upon capitalizing on the Government's previous investment in critical technologies and the available contractor expertise for critical technologies through the contractor team led by United Defense. Competition has been realized to the maximum extent possible at the major subsystem level as evidenced by the downselect for the system powerpack with Perkins, Limited being selected for the engine and Martin Marietta selected for the transmission. The primary armament was competitively awarded to the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development Center (ARDEC). Displays and digital mapping was competed and awarded to Honeywell, and extensive use of subcontract resources for system software has been made. Overall, in excess of $200 million has been competitively awarded to approximately 30 subcontractors. Competition at subcomponent level is strongly encouraged by the Government through the award fee provisions of the contract and managed by United Defense through the subcontract competition plan with an optimum balance of system cost, schedule, and performance as the ultimate goal.
Page 556 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below contract was awarded to a consortium of 9 companies headed by TRW and United Defense as a result of a negotiated, best value, full and open competitive solicitation. The acquisition strategy for the period after the Milestone III, Full Production Decision (FY00), anticipates that a competitive Leader/Follower solicitation will be issued leading to a downselect in FY04. The Automatic Data Processing (ADP) orientation of this procurement has clearly contributed to a fully competitive atmosphere for not only the initial award, but the subsequent production phases of this procurement.
OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZING
Mr. WATTS. Dr. Oscar, in your view, have any procurement or Research and Development (R&D) accounts benefitted from the Army's attempts to save money by outsourcing and privatizing different functions in the service?
Dr. OSCAR. Our current outsourcing focus is in the area of depot maintenance, materiel management, housing, base commercial activities, education and training, and finance and accounting. These activities are primarily associated with operation and maintenance accounts of base operations/installations, and are therefore, being pursued to achieve savings or avoidances in those accounts. Inventory reductions in the Defense Logistics Agency of $1.6 billion since 1993 have been identified. Reduced purchase, storage and distribution costs in excess of $700.0 million and increased response time to orders from 75–90 percent have been achieved. In order to achieve savings/avoidances that would benefit the procurement or R&D accounts, it will be necessary to also focus on the weapon systems currently in or anticipated to be introduced into the inventory. In this regard we are attempting to expand the use of the Prime Vendor concept to Contractor Logistic Support for maintenance, repair, and materiel support for two weapon systems—the Apache helicopter and the M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV). The Apache program is estimating $200.00 million in savings over the first five years and $1.0 billion over the life of the program. The M109 FOV program is estimating annual savings of $7.0-$10.0 million and $150.0–$200.0 million over the life of the fleet. The actual achievement of these projected savings/avoidances in all aspects of the functions in the service should make it possible to achieve some degree of measurable benefit to the procurement and R&D accounts.
Page 557 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT
IMPROVED CARGO HELICOPTER PROGRAM
Mr. SPRATT. The Army has an ongoing program to upgrade the CH–47 cargo helicopter known as the improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH) Program. What improvements are included in the ICH program?
Dr. OSCAR. The ICH program is a service life extension program (provides an additional 20 year economic service life) that will include measures to upgrade the analog (communications/navigation) system based cockpit, and reduce operations and support (O&S) support costs. Specifically, the airframe will be rebuilt, an open electronic architecture that is Army XXI compatible will be introduced, and vibration reduction technologies will be added to provide for holistic, long term O&S cost reductions. The ICH program serves to bridge the Army's heavy lift requirement gap until the Joint Transport Rotorcraft (JTR) arrives in 2020 to begin to replace the aging CH–47 fleet.
Mr. SPRATT. What is the cost and schedule for the ICH program?
Dr. OSCAR. The cost for the ICH program is $3.2 billion in constant fiscal year 1997 (FY97) dollars. In terms of schedule, the ICH program, given Office of the Secretary of Defense Milestone II Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) approval in April 1998, is projected to be on EMD contract in May 1998. The period of EMD and test and evaluation spans from 3rd Quarter, FY98 through 4th Quarter, FY02. Milestone III (Production) review is projected for July 2002. Low rate initial production (LRIP) consists of 12 aircraft with first delivery in May 2003. Full rate production would slightly overlap the LRIP effort. Full rate production period of performance is from March 2003 to July 2014. Full rate production will be 26 aircraft a year for a total of 288 aircraft. First unit equipped is projected for September 2004. Program production effort completes in 2015.
Page 558 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SPRATT. If the ICH program is not funded, what are the alternatives for the Army that will provide a suitable cargo helicopter that will meet the Army requirement and what will it cost?
Dr. OSCAR. If the ICH program is not funded, there are no near term alternatives other than continued sustainment of the current fleet via normal Army Aviation maintenance procedures. The envisioned replacement for the current CH–47 heavy lift cargo fleet is the JTR. Per the latest approved Army Aviation Modernization Plan, the JTR is not expected to begin displacing the aging CH–47 fleet until 2020. The ICH program was specifically devised to bridge the gap to the JTR. Currently there is no approved requirement or funding in place for the JTR. If the ICH program is not funded, the current fleet will require substantial overhauls just to sustain itself until completely displaced by the JTR. Assuming the JTR begins to displace the current CH–47 fleet in 2020, and has a production/fielding rate comparable to that currently envisioned for the ICH program, the JTR will completely replace the CH–47 fleet by about 2031. In addition to the cost of recurring overhaul, the CH–47 fleet will also continue to operate under the conditions of high O&S costs. These O&S costs will continue to increase over time. The approximate cost to sustain the current fleet (both overhauls and increasing O&S burden), until completely displaced by the JTR is $5.6 billion in constant FY97 dollars.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RILEY
Page 559 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
ENHANCED FIBER OPTIC GUIDED MISSILE (EFOGM)
Mr. RILEY. Dr. Oscar, as you may know, the EFOGM had its origins in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) as part of the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (RFPI ACTD). The missile is designed to be deployed to the 18th Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne division and provide them with the ability to engage and defeat armored combat vehicles, other high value ground targets and hovering or moving helicopters that may be masked from line-of-sight direct fire weapons. FY98 research and development (R&D) funding in the FY98 conference report provided $31 million to procure 96 development and evaluation missiles and to complete the ACTD. We all know that the EFOGM has experienced some difficulties in two test flights. Despite these test problems, General Reimer, indictated that Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM) was one of the Army's top priorities in FY98. I am concerned that some in Congress do not fully understand the R&D process. In the development of any new weapon system you are going to have successes and failures. In my opinion, we may be putting too much pressure to early test flights to be successful especially on programs like EFOGM and Theater High Altitude Area Defense. The whole concept of R&D is to prove out weapons systems so that failures in the lab and on the test ranges don't occur on the battlefield. If we eliminate the ability programs to develop over time, I am concerned that our next generation weapons systems will not reach their full potential because contractors will be too afraid to push the envelope for fear of failure. Dr. Oscar, is EFOGM still considered a priority program for the Army? If so, what do you see as the EFOGM's primary function/role on the battlefield?
Dr. OSCAR. EFOGM is a priority program for the Army. EFOGM is an Advanced Technology Demonstration and a critical component of the RFPI ACTD. The RFPI ACTD is an effort that brings to the forefront system-of-systems issues associated with sensor-to-shooter capabilities that empower light forces, especially our Forced and Early Entry Forces, with greater effectiveness against heavily armored forces in both open and dense terrain. EFOGM will provide the following operational capabilities:
Page 560 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Additional precision non-line-of-sight firepower to Forced/Early Entry Forces at Brigade (close and deep) and potentially battalion (deep) levels.
Virtual line-of-sight—from masked firing position against masked targets.
Denies enemy tactical sanctuaries.
Provides realtime enemy information, battlefield damage assessment and video and digital imagery playback up to target destruction.
Designed for digital communications and architecture. Cued by digital battlefield sensors to provide immediate detection to destruction of targets.
Permits mission abort after launch.
Versatility uniquely suited to force projection operations.
Ability to defeat enemy capabilities based upon Information Dominance.
Mr. RILEY. When is the next test flight scheduled for?
Dr. OSCAR. The next test flight (flight #3) is scheduled for May 1998 when Controlled Test Vehicle (CTV) #1 will be flown at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. CTV #1 will demonstrate pitchover and transition to stable flight, sustainer motor ignition, control of missile via test profile maneuvers/commands, and verification of flight #2 canister latch mechanism redesign.
Page 561 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. If this missile test shot fails, what will the Army field to the 82nd Airborne Division?
Dr. OSCAR. One of the critical EFOGM evaluations will be the July 1998 RFPI ACTD Large Scale Field Experiment. This is where the Army will evaluate the totality of the system-of-systems and sensor-to-shooter approaches. The results of this experiment will directly feed into the EFOGM procurement decision review scheduled for September 1998. The 82nd Airborne Division is currently in the process of getting Javelin and this fielding will be completed by 3rd quarter, FY98. One Line of Sight Antitank (LOSAT) company, as residuals from the LOSAT ACTD, is scheduled for combat certification within the XVIII Airborne Corps in FY03. Final assignment and stationing decisions regarding the LOSAT company has not yet been made. Also, the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), the 2nd generation FLIR for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle TOW, is scheduled to begin fielding to the 82nd Airborne Division in FY99. The Follow-On to TOW missile is scheduled to begin fielding in late FY05.
Mr. RILEY. Will the Javelin work as an interim weapons system?
Dr. OSCAR. While the Javelin, an extraordinary weapons system in its own right, certainly mitigates some operational risk against threat armored forces, it is a direct fire line-of-sight system with far less range than EFOGM. EFOGM is designed to use the sensor capabilities of emerging systems, in combination with digitization, to engage and defeat high priority targets with a precision munition beyond the line-of-sight. In this way EFOGM will significantly increase force survivability and increase lethality while adding a precision capability to the brigade commander's arsenal. It is also important to note the EFOGM is itself a Forced/Early Entry Force risk mitigator because of the cancellation of the Armored Gun System and the deactivation of the 3–73rd Armor Battalion (M551 Sheridan) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Page 562 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
AIM XXI/M1A2
Mr. RILEY. Dr. Oscar, last year the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended that we maintain a fleet of about 2,200 tanks, the National Defense Panel (NDP) recommended we maintain a force at least 1,600 battle ready tanks, and yet the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) only funds about 1,100. In recent remarks, General Kern, you referred to the Army After Next (AAN) proposal, which suggest terminating the production of M1A2 tanks until 2025. The AAN makes these recommendations despite the fact that the M1A2 is the only digitized combat system in the entire Army. I am concerned that if we follow that AAN proposal we won't have an Army After Next, but instead an Army After Nothing. I believe that the Army should fully study the ramifications of these actions before making any final decisions. Dr. Oscar and General Kern, I would like to know what your plans are to address the shortfall in the 2000–2003 POM for the M1A2.
Dr. OSCAR. Neither the Quadrennial Defense Review or the National Defense Panel recommended specific fleet levels for Army tanks; however, the issue with the M1A2 program is affordability. As of this budget submit, we intend to complete the multiyear procurement as scheduled in fiscal year 2000 and propose to continue buying Abrams upgrades until we reach at least 1150 M1A2 tanks (estimated to be fiscal year 2003). Army priorities in the budget process have been to protect readiness and quality of life and to provide balanced modernization within an austere budget. While the Army desires to resource sufficient M1A2 upgrades to outfit our entire armor force and training base requirements, we're currently only able to provide for a mixed fleet of M1A2s and digitized M1A1s. Affordability within a balanced modernization strategy is the key issue and our desires will continue to be challenged by the changing strategic environment, changing National Security objectives, expanded missions, and declining budgets. As a result, the uncertainty in the Abrams program is likely to continue. The Army will revisit Abrams modernization and sustainment efforts in the upcoming fiscal year 2000–05 Program Objective Memorandum.
Page 563 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. Furthermore, if the Army does not plan on requesting additional funds, how do you plan on equipping an active armored force that is truly ready?
Dr. OSCAR. At this time, we do not envision procuring more than 1150 M1A2 tanks. The M1A2 Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) is scheduled to begin fielding fiscal year 2000. It integrates the Army's common operating environment into the M1A2, and brings the tank in line with other Army software and digitization efforts. Retrofit of existing M1A2s with the SEP package will provide all armor units equipped with M1A2s with the same capability, simplifying operational procedures. The M1A2 SEP will be fielded to one brigade and the division cavalry squadron in each of the heavy divisions, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) 3 and part of APS 5. Concurrently, procurement of retrofit for existing M1A2s to SEP configuration will begin in fiscal year 2002. At current funding levels, we will complete fielding of the M1A2SEP in fiscal year 2008. The remaining two-thirds of the active component armor force and the National Guard Enhanced brigades will remain equipped with the M1A1. To ensure compatibility the M1A1s in the active component will have a digital appliqué command and control package applied as divisions field the M1A2SEP. Appliqué will provide situational awareness and ability to automate command and control functions. The plan to digitize the Enhanced Brigades is not final.
The initial production version of the M1A1 will be 30 years old in 2015. These tanks will remain in the force well beyond 2020 and must remain capable of providing sufficient combat overmatch until the transition to the AAN. AIM XXI is the program to ensure the M1A1's viability. AIM XXI involves an innovative teaming of government and industry, through the identification of core repair and manufacturing competencies to provide fleet sustainment and results in a better than original production tank. this is achieved through the insertion of subassemblies rebuilt using advanced technology materials and processes. AIM XXI offers the opportunity to standardize M1A1 configuration by upgrading all versions of a common configuration. This program also ensures performance compatibility, sustained readiness and survivability within the M1A1 fleet.
Page 564 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
ABRAMS INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT (AIM) XXI
Mr. RILEY. Congress in the fiscal year 1998 budget supported OMA funding for the AIM XXI tank sustainment program on the condition that the Proof-of-Principle tests proved the program to be a success. I would like you to provide the commitment with a report on the status of the AIM XXI program. I would also like you to include test results, program details and funding requirements in this report.
General KERN. Pursuant to the fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense Authorization Bill, Section 306, Public Law 105–85, the Army validated the Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) XXI program through user trails at Fort Irwin, California. Analysis of test results showed the AIM XXI program to be both a successful and cost effective sustainment approach. Under rigorous conditions, AIM XXI tanks demonstrated improved availability, reduced maintenance effort and inventory requirements, and earned the confidence and praise of soldiers.
The AIM XXI program satisfied an Army requirement for comprehensive sustainment of the M1A1 Abrams tank, which will remain in the force well beyond 2020 and must remain capable of providing sufficient combat overmatch until the transition to Army After Next. AIM XXI optimizes efficiencies and competencies of government and industry through partnership with Anniston Army Depot (teardown and component rebuild) and General Dynamics (manufacturing). The Tank is returned to M1A1 production specifications and common configuration, with improved readiness, increased maintainability, and lower life cycle support costs.
The Army will fund $35.0 million for AIM XXI in fiscal year 1998, and is seeking funding for fiscal year 1999.
Page 565 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RILEY. My office has been informed that the $35 million allocated by Congress in statutory language for the AIM XXI program may have been designated for other Army programs. Can you provide the Committee with the current status of these funds? Additionally, has the Army included funds for AIM XXI in its FY99 budget and if not why?
Dr. OSCAR. The results of the Proof-of-Principle (POP) tests for the AIM XXI program were briefed to MG Sullivan, Director for Supply and Maintenance, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, on March 5, 1998. LTG Coburn's, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, position is that the Army will execute the AIM XXI program of $35 million in FY98. Because funding AIM XXI was contingent on the results of the POP, no special allocation was submitted in the President's Budget for AIM XXI. Since the POP has now been approved, the Army intends to fund AIM XXI in the year of execution for FY99.
JOINT U.S. ARMY AND U.S. MARINE CORPS PROGRAMS
The following is a list of current ''joint'' programs which involve both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. This listing is not limited to those programs only in research and development. The term ''joint'' is by definition considered to be inclusive of systems which are procured and used by more than one Service (DOD Regulation 500.2–R, para 3.3.5.3).
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
Page 566 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Joint Tactical Radio (JTR)
Objective Crew Served Weapon (OCSW)
Joint Service Food Program
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Advanced Threat InfraRed CounterMeasures (ATIRCM)
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicles (TUGV)
Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW)
Non Lethal Weapons (NLW)
Multipurpose Individual Munition/Short Range Anti-tank Weapon (MIPM/SRAW)
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV)
Marine Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS)/Ground Based Common Sensor (GBCS)
Page 567 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT)
5 Ton Truck Extended Service Program
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Mounted Medium Range Air to Air Missile (HUMRAAM) Air Defense System
Lightweight 155
Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR)
Profiler
Gun Laying Positioning System (GLPS)
Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART–T) (AN/TSC–154)
Super High Frequency Tri-Band Advanced Range Extension Terminal (STAR–T)
Global Broadcast System (GBS)
Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS)
Page 568 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Joint Biological Point Detector System (JBPDS)
Chemical/Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS)
Lightweight Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance System (LNBCRS)
Joint Services Lightweight Standoff Chemical Warfare Agent Detector (JSLSCAD)
Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)
Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN)
Joint Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM)
Joint Service General Purpose Protective Mask (JSGPM)
Joint Service Aviation Mask (JSAM)
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suite Technology
Joint Service Fixed Site Decontamination
Page 569 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Critical Care Support for Trauma and Transport (CSTAT)
Various Chemical/Biological and Infectious Disease Vaccines
PRODUCTION
Laser Hellfire (USMC buys missiles from Army)
MEWSS/GBCS
HMMWV
Stinger Block I
Avenger
Advanced Field Artillery Data System (AFATDS)
Meteorological Measuring System (MMS)
Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (L/TACFIRE)
Spitfire (AN/PSC–5)
Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA)
Page 570 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM)
Protective Clothing
Shop Equipment Contract Maintenance Truck Mount
Generators and Associated Equipment
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES 2000)
Tank Weapon Gun System/Precision Gun System (TWGSS/PGS)
Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
Heavy Expanded Mobile Tactical Truck (HEMTT)/Logistical Vehicle System (LVS)
Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HET) (trailers only)
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)
Enhanced Position Locating Reporting System (EPLRS)
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Page 571 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) (AN/TMQ–40)
Information Systems Security Program (ISSP)
Army Key Management System (AKMS)
Night Vision Goggles (AN/PVS–7)
FIELDED
Laser Hellfire
Javelin
TROJAN SPIRIT
PRD–12
Common Ground Station
Counter Intelligence (CI)/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Automated Support Tools (CHATS)
HMMWV
Page 572 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Stinger Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP)
Stinger Block 1
Avenger
NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS)
Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)
Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm, M8A1
Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)
M40/M41 Protective Mask
M42 Protective Mask
Protection Assessment Test System (PATS)
M17 Lightweight Decontamination Apparatus
M16A2 Rifle
Page 573 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
MK19 Grenade/Machine Gun (GMG)
MK93 Dual Mount for MK19 and M2.50 Cal
M4 Version of Modular Weapon
M903/M962 SLAP/SLAP–T Cartridge
M24 Miniature Binoculars
MODIFICATION/UPGRADE
MEWSS/GBCS
PRD–12
HMMWV
Avenger
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
UH–60 BLACK HAWK
Page 574 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Ms. SANCHEZ. The Army has determined in its Helicopter Modernization Plan that it will require 90 additional Black Hawks through fiscal year 2003 (FY03), primarily for the Army National Guard to fill newly identified requirements. Have these new aircraft been adequately budgeted for?
Dr. OSCAR. Not entirely. The FY99 budget begins to address the Army National Guard out-year requirements. The Army funded 50 additional UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters (ten each in FY99 through FY03) toward its 90 additional aircraft requirement.
Ms. SANCHEZ. If not, how many aircraft are unfunded and what is this cost?
Dr. OSCAR. The remaining 40 UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters are unfunded and will compete in the Army's Program Objectives Memorandum. The estimated total cost of procuring and fielding 40 additional UH–60 Black Hawks is $360 million ($9 million per aircraft) to as much as $440 million ($11 million per aircraft). Cost estimates are dependent upon quantity and year of purchase.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Procurement Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly With Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 10, 1998.
Page 575 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The Subcommittee on Military Procurement and the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittees will come to order.
This morning, we conclude our series of modernization overview hearings with the Defense Department acquisition executive and the service acquisition executives. Today we are going to focus on the Air Force.
Despite the Pentagon's proclamation that the ''procurement holiday'' is over, as we have learned from our hearings with the Army and the Navy, things are not as rosy as they may seem. I think the same assertion applies to the Air Force.
Although the Air Force has requested $1.5 billion more for procurement in its fiscal year 1999 budget than was appropriated for this fiscal year, the request is, nevertheless, $1 billion less than was forecast this time last year. According to our witness' statement, this request, as a percentage of the overall Air Force budget, remains below the all-time low of 20.1 percent set in fiscal year 1975 during the hollow forces period of the 1970's. Let me repeat that: below the all time low. Not a very convincing argument that the procurement holiday is over for the U.S. Air Force.
Page 576 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Indeed, the commander of the Air Combat Command, Gen. Richard Hawley, went on record at last week's Air Warfare Symposium as stating that the Air Force needed another $4 to $5 billion a year to fix major shortfalls that plague the service.
This observation notwithstanding, to convince us that the Air Force has begun to turn the corner with respect to a sustained increase in its modernization spending, we have with us this morning Lt. Gen. George K. Muellner, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Let me note we invited both the General and his boss, Asst. Secy. Art Money, to testify today. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense recently announced that Mr. Money is to become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. Consequently, as he prepares to assume that role, General Muellner is currently testifying in the service acquisition executive's role before the various congressional defense committees.
General Muellner, your formal statement asserts that the fiscal year 1999 budget request represents a balanced and time-phased modernization approach which captures the recommendations of the quadrennial defense review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, while providing modernization program stability. I hope you will explain what this means in light of QDR-validated procurement shortfalls and in contrast to what General Hawley had to say.
Your statement also counsels congressional restraint with regard to altering the Air Force budget request. Again, I trust you will clarify what you mean by this suggestion and specify precisely to whom you are directing it.
Page 577 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
However, before we give you the opportunity to respond, first let me call—since Curt Weldon is not here yet, our Chairman of the R&D subcommittee—let me call on Owen Pickett, the ranking member, for any remarks that he would like to make; and then I will call on my ranking member on the procurement subcommittee, Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. Pickett.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the appendix on page 457.]
STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we all join you in the comments you made concerning the adequacy of the research, development and procurement budget. I join you and my other colleagues in welcoming General Muellner this morning as our witness.
For some time now, I have had a growing concern regarding what I perceive to be some excessive risk in the tactical aircraft development programs, especially between the Joint Strike Fighter program, about which I would like to make a couple of observations.
First, it appears to me there is too much concurrency built into the Joint Strike Fighter program, given its relative lack of maturity. I think I am perhaps talking about two issues here, and I want to try to distinguish between the two of them.
Page 578 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
One is the concurrency that takes place within a particular program, and I suspect what I am trying to point out here is what I refer to as the overlap between the F–22 program and the JSF program.
We know that unrealistic cost and schedule pressures often result in increased use of concurrency as a tool to help contain costs and keep the program on schedule. I also know that concurrency used in this manner seldom works out, especially when the program is as immature as I believe the JSF program is at the present time.
The current development schedule for the F–22 and the JSF do not appear to be optimized one to the other. This is where that overlap comes, because it is my understanding there are a number of systems in the F–22 program that are expected to be proved out in the F–22 program and then to be incorporated into the JSF program.
That is what I am trying to point out and that is the part that concerns me with the F–22 program being followed too closely by the JSF program so that the JSF program will not really get the benefits from the F–22 program that we are expecting to accrue.
I hope that in your remarks, General Muellner, you will be able to help us out on that. Because it seems to me that I think I am correct that some of the items that are going to be used and incorporated into the JSF are expected to be in the F–22 and to be proved out fully in the F–22 before we get into production of the JSF. If we have these two programs going too close together, I don't see how that element can adequately be taken care of.
Page 579 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I thank you very much and look forward to your testimony; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you for your very incisive observations there, Mr. Pickett.
Now my partner on this subcommittee, Mr. Sisisky, who brings a great deal of expertise and dedication to the Armed Services to this job as ranking member.
Norm, as I have said in our previous hearings, it is a real pleasure to be working with you here. Norm Sisisky.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are going to bust my head, the way you keep talking about me.
Good morning, General Muellner, and welcome to the subcommittee.
In my view, it is not likely that future DOD budgets will be significantly better than what we see in the current 5-year defense plan for sometime to come. That said, I am concerned as to whether we will actually be able to procure the DOD's planned modernization programs when they complete R&D. Even though I recognize that the Air Force chose to reduce force structure and infrastructure in order to pay for modernization, I am concerned for them as well.
Page 580 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
To its credit, the Air Force has a lot of big programs in R&D—the F–22, Joint Strike Fighter, Airborne Laser, Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile and launch vehicles, to name just a few. But many of these programs are slated for procurement at about the same time and before some current major procurements, like the C–17, are completed.
In the past, the Congressional Budget Office has testified that, in order to pay for just the tactical aircraft procurement bow wave, a greater share of the modernization program would have to go to Tactical Airforce. But that may not be possible if you are also modernizing space assets, missiles and everything else at the same time. Moreover, you may have already cut force structure and infrastructure to the extent you can.
Thus, I am concerned whether or not our budget planning is realistic, whether or not we will have more programs coming out of R&D at one time than we would be able to procure down the road.
I hope our witness this morning can allay my fears in this regard. I look forward to his testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Sisisky.
General, thank you for being with us today. The floor is yours.
Page 581 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE K. MUELLNER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
General MUELLNER. Thank you, sir. I do appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and discuss our Research Development Test and Evaluation and procurement budgets as submitted in the 1999 President's budget.
We did indeed put together a very fragile, time-phased, balanced program. I will describe that to you I think in some detail as I go through it and, hopefully, address the questions that have been raised and you might raise later.
As I address these questions, I would like to point out that indeed this program was laid out throughout the Fiscal Year Defense Plan as time-phased to deconflict the real issues that your previous speaker just brought up. As I describe those, I think the charts will hopefully help to allay your concerns that these are faced from both the procurement and a RDT&E funding standpoint to avoid those humps that are indeed unexecutable from an annual budget standpoint.
The basis of our vision, if you will, is what is called global engagement. It is our contribution to the national war-fighting strategy. It is based upon six core competencies. As I describe our programs, I will group them and describe them in the context of those core competencies.
A key part, though, of those core competencies and the support structure for them lies in improving the efficiency of our acquisition and sustainment functions. I will address later on what we have done in those particular areas and also try to describe where we are going in the future.
Page 582 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Clearly, a key part of this is something that I know the Chairman is very interested in, and that is rightsizing our acquisition work force to be more efficient.
As we look at the 1999 President's budget submission——
Mr. HUNTER. General, excuse me.
Could you pull those charts forward, Major, if you could, just a little bit for us? We have got some shortsighted people up here who we will not identify, me being one of them.
General MUELLNER. I think you should have hard copies of these charts in your posture statements.
Mr. HUNTER. We do. It is a little easier to follow if we have it.
General MUELLNER. You bet.
Our budget does reflect an upturn in the modernization funding for the year. Again, it is an upturn from last year, which was a low year, back to the year you referenced. It is up to almost 33 percent of the total Air Force budget authority.
While procurement is up, RDT&E is actually down slightly, and this was part of managing the difficult trade-off and indeed in trying to increase procurement, getting ironed out in the ramp, balancing the RDT&E needs for future procurement and maintaining the quality of life and readiness, which is obviously essential for us maintaining our war-fighting capability on a daily basis.
Page 583 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I might add, while the RDT&E is down, it is very close to the historical average, so it is not down to the point of being a major concern to us in fielding future systems.
We were able to keep our key core programs on track. However, one of the challenges we were presented and one of the issues that you mentioned in your statement is the fact that, in last year's appropriations bills, there were significant congressional cuts undistributed and then taxed on the programs.
If I could make a few comments about these, these have been rising in past years. As you can see, they are now up to somewhere in excess of 4 percent across all the programs. The key impact, however, is that normally the bills include multiple cuts.
If I could use one example just to illustrate the impact of these, we take the Joint Direct Attack Munition program, a very important program to our Joint warfighters that will deliver an inertially guided, Grand Positioning System-aided weapon to all of our warfighters. When I lay in all the cuts against that program, it amounts to a 12-percent cut. These are due to some economic assumptions, three separate sections of the bill which laid in incremental cuts as a result of a general cut, a cut for the support national missile defense, another tax, in this case, because they use Systems Engineering Technical Assistance [SETA] contractors, which was a separate one.
When I finally lay in the small business innovative research tax, this amounts to a 12-percent hit to that program. That is very, very difficult for a program to execute in any given year.
Page 584 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
What I would petition of you is, since we all understand this is a team effort to come up with the best solution for our warfighter, that you allow us the flexibility to mitigate those cuts across the various programs, rather than have them as a percentage tax, if you will.
Clearly, funding stability is a key part of keeping our programs on track; and, to do that, we need to be able to mitigate the impacts of current year bills; and these taxes clearly fall into that category.
As I mentioned earlier, our key systems fall into some general categories. The first of these will be air superiority. So let me describe our core programs in each of these areas and maybe try to answer some of your questions.
First, in the case of the air superiority systems, the F–22 is our preeminent acquisition and is, as you know, in the middle of engineering and manufacturing development at this time. The No. 1 aircraft is out at Edwards getting ready to resume flight tests. The No. 2 two aircraft is in the fuel barns and will follow it out to Edwards this summer.
We have been working the engineering and manufacturing development program hard. There have been several manufacturing challenges that we have come upon, primarily in working the titanium sections. We had to remodify the process for casting the fuselage attach point for the wings. These are 200-pound titanium castings, and we found the process just did not adequately flow the material. They have done that, but it did impact some of our Engineering Manufacturing Development airplanes. It will not impact the schedule for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, and that has been absorbed by reflowing the EMD Program.
Page 585 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
A similar problem was seen in manufacturing the tail booms. These are assembled, welded sections of titanium. The process just had too much tough labor in it, too many man-hours involved, so the prime contractor, working with his subs, has redefined this process to the point now where significant touch labor has come out of it, and they will be back on schedule here shortly.
The third issue we had, and I might add we just had this last Friday, is we had an engine that was down in the test cell at Tullahoma that shed a section of a seal, and this did some damage to the compressor section. Fortunately, the section that failed is a well-proven design. It is not a major design element with the weapons system. So, as a result of that, we do not expect it to impact our flight test activities or, for that matter, production certification of the engine.
The key issue in my mind that we were able to wrap up this year with the F–22 is that we got the contractor's firm agreement on a firm fixed-price contract that will execute the program out for lots 1 and 2 and then an affordability assessment for the entire program that says they will deliver 339 aircraft under the 434 cap.
Equally important, the EMD Program, which is right now at 18.7, will execute out and deliver the necessary maturity to production.
The only changes we have had in the funding for that profile this year is, according to the direction of the previous appropriations bill, we were tasked to move some money from production back to EMD to the tune of about $118 million. We did that in our submission this year, and it does not change the aggregate cap number.
Page 586 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The second major system you see there is indeed the Airborne Laser. The Airborne Laser is truly a revolutionary system; and, from my standpoint, it is probably one of our more successful programs. It is on cost, on schedule, and has met every one of its demonstration milestones to date.
I might add, because of our skepticism about speed of light weapons, this program was heavily demonstration focused, and all those demonstrations have met or exceeded our requirements. So, right now, I am very confident that the task remaining with the Airborne Laser is to engineer that into the back end of a 747 aircraft. Indeed, already the laser has been brought down—the laser modules have been brought down to flight weight, so we are very optimistic that schedule will remain firm.
I might add before I leave this chart, the Navy is doing an excellent job of managing the AIM–9X Program, which will give us an Infrared weapon to complement the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile in our systems in the future.
As I move to space superiority, there are just a couple of programs on here I would like to highlight.
First, on our Communications Programs [COMM], Military Strategic Tactical and Relay System continues to execute well. This year we will launch our third and procure our fourth satellite in that series. It is providing great support to the warfighter right now, with the two-ball Constellation that is up there.
Page 587 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
At the request of Congress, we accelerated the Space Based Infrared System Low Program to better align it with the concerns for national missile defense. The low altitude Constellation here will indeed first start launching in 2004. The SBIRS High Program remains on track. The risk associated with that program are predominantly in the SBIRS Low side of it though. There is some new science that has to be demonstrated in the flight demonstrator, and that will occur about the turn of the century.
Finally, in the launch environment, our strategy toward the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle changed this year driven by the market. We found that there was so much market for launch affordable launch in the outyears that we elected to take both of our contractors that are competing into EMD together. So, as a result of that, we will have in the outyears two different competitors that will continue to provide us competitive launch services.
In reality, we are focusing on the commercial market heavily. The demands on those systems capture not only the military needs but also the commercial needs in the outyears, with promises of 25 to 50 percent reduction in cost to orbit for a pound of mass.
Again, both those contractors are executing those programs well.
As I get into the area of global attack, I am happy to say that the help you all have given us in accelerating the mods in some of our bombers are starting to come to the ramp these days. In particular, in the case of the B–1, by the end of this year we will have Joint Direct Attack Munitions and defense improved survivability capability and improved communications on a small number of those airplanes, growing into the beginning of next year. They already have Cluster Bomb Unit capability on those aircraft. As you probably know, we have B–1's right now deployed over to Southwest Asia.
Page 588 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The B–2 continues to mature. Our focus here has been primarily on improving maintainability and the weaponization of the airplane. As I sit here, we have five block 20's and four block 30 aircrafts at Whiteman that are ready to go to war with both 2,000-and 5,000-pound Ground Positioning System-aided weapons ready for delivery. Those airplanes have been offered to the warfighter; and, obviously, it is General Zinni's call as to how he would employ those.
All of the funding for 1998 is still on hold pending the release of the Welch study on long-range combat air. We have agreed not to release those funds until that study is out. General Welch assured me he is going to meet his deadline by the end of this month.
Across the bomber force, again, the major improvements are in the area of survivability on the B–1, maintainability on the B–2, and weaponization across all three of them. I will talk about the weapons in just—more detail in just a second.
In the area of precision engagement, the one weapons system here I would like to talk about to address, hopefully, Mr. Pickett's questions is the Joint Strike Fighter. That program, as you know, is in the concept demonstration phase. Both contractors are in a neck-and-neck race there, and they will fly their airplanes just prior to the turn of the century.
I might add that the Joint Strike Fighter Program was specifically put together, the schedule for it, to build off of the F–22. I had the opportunity to set up that program and to be the first program manager. And having had experience with the F–22 from my days in the Air Force, obviously the two programs were aligned not to have concurrency but rather to build upon maturation from the other.
Page 589 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Probably the best examples of this I think are found in the F–119 engine. One of the reasons why the Navy elected to go with a single engine vice a two-engine airplane was because the F–22 would provide a core to the Joint Strike Fighter that had 100,000 hours on it prior to ever having to go operational in the Joint Strike Fighter. The same is true with some of the avionics.
It is important that we not get too long a time between these programs, because in the avionics program in particular, the half life of these technologies is something less than 2 to 3 years. So, as a result of that, while we want the technology to be mature, we do not want it to be out of date.
I think if you go through the programs, the specific technologies that are being exploited from the F–22 indeed are laid into the Joint Strike Fighter plan and I think are pretty well harmonized right now.
Along with the Department of the Navy, we did agree to and Dr. Gansler certified to the Hill here that we would fund the alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter. This is a General Electric engine. It will be available out in production to compete. We are hoping to see real cost savings as we did in the previous competitions between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric.
While it does not help us mitigate the risks on the front end because it is a substantially less mature engine than the 119, it will be available in production, and we think it is important to have it available.
Page 590 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As I look at the weapons programs, clearly the core programs here, one of them is JDAM, the one I mentioned to you earlier. The program is executing well with McDonald Douglas being the prime contractor—excuse me, Boeing McDonald Douglas being the prime contractor.
We had a minor problem this year with some software which they fixed to reacquire the full envelope. Then they did have a carriage problem on the F–18 at low altitudes, high speeds that required them to put a locking pin in one of the fins to keep from having problems. Those are behind the program. Neither of them impact the unit cost in the outyears, so, as a result of that, I think it is an effective EMD Program.
The other key weapon on there is the JASSM Program. JASSM, as you know, is a standoff weapon. It is absolutely key to our bomber forces, in particular in the outyears. Right now, that program is executing well, with a competition between Boeing and Lockheed Martin.
We are also conducting an AOA, an analysis of alternatives, comparing the outgrowth of that program with an improved version of the Standoff Land Attack Missile, the SLAM, that the Navy currently has fielded. This was at the direction of the Hill here. We previously looked at it, but we have robusted that study right now. That Angle of Attack is due through the joint staff and the Joint Requirements Overview Council the latter part of this month, and then the rulings of that will be reported to the Hill before we decide which way we are going to go.
My personal view is I am very confident that the JASSM weapon will prove to be not only much more effective, more survivable, but also cheaper than improving the Stand-off Land-Attack Missile, which is an older generation of technology.
Page 591 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As I look at information superiority, I would like to talk to three issues. One of them is the Joint STARS Program. This program underwent some major changes this year as a result of the Quadreminal Defense Review; and, because of an inference that NATO was going to purchase six of these aircraft, the quantity was reduced from 19 to 13. That NATO buy has not materialized, and right now the Department has a study underway as to what indeed needs to be done to robust MTI, moving target indication, capability.
Clearly, 13 aircraft will not give us the capability to support two major theater conflicts simultaneously. It would require a swing, and they provide inadequate flexibility. So we are going to Virginia to robust this. The question is, is that done with additional Joint STARS? Is it done with some sort of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle solution? Or do we move more of that capability to space?
Along the space side of this, we formed a partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency this year and kicked off a new program that will put a two ball Constellation up just past the turn of the century to look at putting an affordable Moving Target Indicator capability up in space. While it will not be near as frequent a revisit as Joint STARS, it may function as a cueing and relieve the need for Joint-STARS-like solutions in the air.
The other good news is Global Hawk. It successfully flew here a week ago. It had a very successful first flight out at Edwards and is basically starting off a year-long flight test program. This is a very important program for the Air Force in fulfilling our outyear surveillance and reconnaissance needs.
Page 592 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We also have other applications we are looking at as a low altitude COM satellite, if you will, as an advanced COM node.
The third area in information superiority is really on the ground. We are paying a lot more attention these days to protecting our information assurance, if you will, of our ground systems, those systems that access through the Internet. There are a lot of folks out there. The Air Force over the last several years has invested in protecting all of our bases. We have intrusion detection devices on all of our bases now; and, by the end of this year, we will also have firewall protection set in such that we can indeed isolate attempted penetrators from impacting any of our unclassified systems. Fortunately, our classified systems, of course, remain separate and are safe.
The last area is in the area of global mobility.
Obviously, the C–17 is the core procurement program in the middle of this. It is executing well. The last 26 airplanes have delivered early, and the quality has been absolutely superb. The C–17 is one example of a program that, because of the tough decisions that we had to make to balance procurement, RDT&E and readiness and the quality-of-life issues, we had to cut back on some of the RDT&E investment in this program, which hurt some of our preplanned product improvement [PPI] buy activities. This is one we are going to end up just moving to the right somewhat.
We are also spending about $500 million through this next year on improving the C–5's reliability, both performance of its engine, the TF–39, and also the performance of some of its really bad actors, if you will, in the avionics system, which is primarily in the flight control system. We are working hard to get its dispatch reliability, which is what is really important to the warfighter, how often it gets out of the gate on time, up.
Page 593 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The bottom line is, as I have gone through these programs, is while we have kept these core programs on schedule, the program is fragile, and a number of our lower priorities have slipped to the right. We have delayed procurement of some weapons; and, as I mentioned earlier, we delayed procurement of some of the PQ buy activities we would like to pursue.
If I could move to science and technology right now, I will point out that the Air Force, obviously, as much as any other service, is strongly dependent upon a strong Science and Technology program. It is necessary to keep our warfighters on the technological edge. We have focused on balancing this throughout the last year, despite the fact that we had to reduce the program by $90 million from the previous year. We have still leveraged that investment, however, by increasing our partnership with DARPA, with NASA, the NRO and other activities. So we believe that we have kept all the core technology areas in focus.
An area where reform has helped us here is we were able to take about 500 people out of the acquisition work force segment that is represented by our labs, consolidating all their planning and overhead functions. This improved the efficiency of our lab structure. It gives us a really more focused planning activity, and I think it will reap real benefits for us in the outyears.
You see on the charts there some of the areas we are investing heavily on. You see a lot of focus obviously on space, which is a primary driver in global engagement, information-based technologies, and then also the issues of dealing with some of our aging weapons systems to deal with structural and avionics age-out problems.
Page 594 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
In addition to strengthening these S&T efforts, we have also, as I said, increased our partnering with the other services, and I think this will leverage us all a lot more in the future.
Again, we continue to make acquisition reform initiatives work. I will cite a number in just a moment, but the bottom line is there is a lot more capability for the warfighter.
A key part of this is the continued rightsizing of our acquisition work force, I know an issue of great interest to Chairman Hunter. We are down through the 1989–2003 timeframe by the Air Force definition 36 percent; by the definition that has been used by the Hill in the 1998 appropriations bill, actually 46 percent through that timeframe, from 1989–2003.
I might add, this work force downsizing has been aggressive in the field. It has been somewhat hindered by the fact that some of the definitions that come out as to what units are excluded from work force downsizing really preclude us from making the right decisions as far as taking non-value-added out of the stream.
Mr. HUNTER. Are those the shoppers or are those the people bending metal?
General MUELLNER. The bottom line is that group there is the shoppers on the Air Force standpoint, if I go to the broader definition, which would include the bending metal and so on.
Page 595 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Those are strictly acquisition people.
General MUELLNER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. OK.
General MUELLNER. I might add, downsizing this work force though is not going to totally allow us to rightsize our infrastructure. As I am sure you have heard, the Air Force Chief and the Secretary say we also need to reduce our infrastructure out in the field; and, unfortunately, this has that bad taste of actually closing facilities.
As we move downstream, there are going to be some activities that the Secretary and the Chief I think are going to continue to propose that we are going to have to get better efficiency out of and getting rid of our excess infrastructure.
Our revolution in business affairs continues to, I think, show real benefits. To date, we have saved or avoided $18.9 billion in costs. That is almost $19 billion that has gone back into modernization, that has allowed us to pay for increased operating tempo, allowed us to put additional money into spares and to maintain the readiness of our forces and also to improve quality of life. The bottom line is acquisition reform works, and we really need to continue down this path.
Our focus this year in particular in acquisition reform is a focus on reducing long-term costs of ownership, life-cycle costs, if you will. The methods of doing that involve new ways of sustaining our forces in the field, new ways of getting better efficiency across various commodities for reducing the costs of that support, and new ways of dealing with diminishing manufacturing sources, that is where the manufacturer of a given proponent has basically gone out of business or moved on to something else when it comes time to buy spares. There is a lot of focus on this not only in our service but the other services also this year.
Page 596 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, sir, as I wrap up, the Air Force is committed to this time phase, again, sequentially through time. If you looked at where those programs were laid out in the charts timing-wise, indeed, it is attempting to smooth flow. We are helped in the Air Force by the fact that our weapons systems generally age out between 25 and 30 years, or 20 to 30 years, so therefore we can indeed time-phase our acquisitions as replacements come on.
We are going to continue to reform our business practices and streamline our organizations to become more efficient; but we do need your help, as I mentioned a moment ago, in rightsizing our infrastructure. We would also appreciate help with your appropriator colleagues in managing the reductions such that we have more flexibility to mitigate the impact of those across the acquisition programs.
Sir, thank you for your attention. I would be more than happy to take any questions you might have at this time.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Muellner can be found in the appendix on page 462.]
Mr. HUNTER. As soon as Mr. Hansen gets here, we will have him help you on the infrastructure side.
General MUELLNER. Sir, I am really looking forward to that.
Page 597 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Maybe Mr. Sisisky will help as well.
Our last several hearings, at least in the Procurement Subcommittee, I think perhaps in R&D, we have had some of the same problems. We have had some very lengthy hearings, and our more junior members literally have sat for hours and not had a chance to ask a question. I apologize for not moving the hearings along, at least when I was in the chair, faster.
So I want to yield my time to Ms. Granger from Texas, who did not get a chance over the last several hearings.
Mrs. Granger.
Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Let me ask a question about the F–22. Did you say, if this program falls short of its full funding it will not impact that program's ability to stay within the caps under development in production?
General MUELLNER. No, ma'am. I certainly did not say that.
The program that we have negotiated with the contractors, which was a difficult negotiation, I might add, requires us to deliver on the funding goals that we have budgeted. If those funding goals are not met, then we do not meet our commitment to the contractor. So it is absolutely essential that we deliver on those goals, both Engineering and Manufacturing Development [EMD] and production.
Page 598 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The caps, as you know, were actually numbers provided by us that laid out the baseline program; and, as a result of that, if those funding lines that underpin that are disrupted, then the program has to be refaced. If it is refaced, I guarantee you the cost is going to go up dramatically.
We are at a very formative period for that program right now because we are executing Engineering and Manufacturing Development and the production wrap-up has started. So we have a large work force out there that is ready to go. If we take away the funding for them, that work force will still be there. So the efficiency that we will get back on our dollar of investment will go down dramatically.
Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.
The second one, about the F–16, it is my understanding the F–16 is still over 50 percent of the Air Force's fighter force until at least the year 2010. Is that correct?
General MUELLNER. Yes, ma'am, it is. The Joint Strike Fighter will start replacing the F–16 in about 2008, but it will not really replace it at a very high rate until 2010 and beyond.
Ms. GRANGER. I also understand the Air Force predicts a shortfall of 25 to fill attrition needs, is that correct?
Page 599 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General MUELLNER. Yes, ma'am. When we looked at the attrition reserve needed to carry the force in the outyears for both the F–16 and F–15E, we identified specific numbers. With the acquisitions we have had to date for the F–16, that leaves that force structure possibly 25 short in the outyears.
We have various backup ways of filling those, pulling some aircraft out of the boneyard and schlepping them. We can reduce the demand such that the aircraft lasts longer, because that is predicated upon them aging out at 8,000 hours. So the Executive Officer community has some options.
The additional attrition reserve aircraft, unfortunately, were just not affordable in the budget.
Ms. GRANGER. Are you concerned about that? Is that risky?
General MUELLNER. There clearly is a risk there. I am not concerned about that because I think we have a fund to fix that if we need to in the outyears. Thanks to the FSX sales, the F–16 line remains viable for a while longer. That will give us time to look at the Joint Strike Fighter and also give us an opportunity to look and see what our OPSTEMPO is going to balance out at in the outyears to see if we really need those aircraft.
Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
Page 600 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.
General, would you please enumerate some of the taxes you are talking about put on by the appropriators and/or the Department of Defense? I assume what you are talking about is the appropriators—they have got too much money—will just cut across the board. Am I correct in that?
General MUELLNER. Probably. That is a succinct way of putting it.
I think at the end of the appropriations process we ended up with a number of levies; and these ranged from some economic adjustments that had to do with, obviously, what is happening with inflation. There were three separate sections—actually, there were four—that applied.
Section 843 laid across the board a percent and a half cut on everything. Section 848 laid an additional cut to fund some National Missile Defense [NMD] activities. Section 8041 tasked all those programs that used advisory services, CITA contractors. There was an additional one number, I cannot recall it, that actually tasked all those. 8035 tasked all those programs that used federally funded research and development center [FFRDC] support. Of course, the Small Business Innovative Research Program taxes everybody.
So the end result of those, depending on what program, in some cases, for instance, the Joint Technical Informaton Distribution System program, actually was taxed by all of those separate sections of the bill. So the aggregate against JTIDS was a 13.8 percent cut.
Page 601 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Now, back to the second part of your question. Clearly, within the Department of Defense and the executive branch also there were some changes in inflation and what have you that may not be realized in the short-term in these programs. So they imposed an additional constraint on the program manager in executing the program.
Mr. SISISKY. Any suggestions as to how we can solve the problem across the board?
General MUELLNER. Well, I think, one, minimizing the magnitude of these cuts would really be good. That is a great starting point.
I think the second one is by providing the acquisition executive more flexibility to apply these cuts disproportionately across the programs, to try to mitigate the damage, if you will.
Clearly our warfighters have a priority of needs, and it would probably be better to take those lower on the food or kill chain, depending on your perspective, I guess, and save those that are much higher in their needs list.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Hansen is not here. I will ask this question anyway.
Page 3 of your statement, you go into details concerning infrastructure production. I think you said it in a few other places in your statement. So you amplify on that statement with reference to privatization in place on Kelly and McClellan?
Page 602 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General MUELLNER. Obviously, the effort that is going on at those two log centers enroute to their closing is right now somewhat held up by the assessment of how much headroom we have, if you will, in the core versus that that we can indeed outsource. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, is indeed going through that assessment right now, and that will determine how much of that we can privatize versus how much we have to keep within the other log centers to maintain the appropriate balance.
I think what is important to the Air Force is not only that we privatize where we can as long as it saves money, because from my standpoint what is important is freeing up more Total Obligation Authority, getting more efficient, such that I have more money to put iron on the ramps somewhere for the warfighter. So that means that we also have to get the capacity levels of our remaining log centers up such that they become more efficient in producing the goods and services that they provide us.
Mr. SISISKY. One more question. You talked about congressional general reductions, and you talked about good business practices. May I ask if you are replacing any of these employees with consultants that you are hiring, doing some of the work that Federal workers did before? Do you see any growth in the hiring of consultants?
General MUELLNER. I have not seen that clearly. In our area, when we talk about streamlining, we are talking about a different way of doing business. The only transference that may occur in some cases is not to a consultant or a CITA contractor, it would be to the prime contractor, who assumes more responsibility under what we call total system performance responsibility.
Page 603 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
If I use the GPS Program Office as an example, we drastically reduced the size of that as a result of getting us, the U.S. Air Force, out of the business of being the integrator of multiple contracts in order to put a signal up in space. We have transferred that responsibility to a single contractor, and that allowed us to dramatically reduce the sites of the GPS Program Office.
Just this year, in the case of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile contracts, we went to what is called an ICBM prime. Rather than the Government integrating more than 100 separate contracts with a very large program office, we went to a single contractor who now has responsibility for delivering us the availability of those weapons systems, the ICBM's.
I might add, we significantly reduced the cost to the tune of about $150 million a year.
It is not toward consultants nor CITA. That is not downsizing from my standpoint, because I still have to pay that bill.
Mr. SISISKY. We found last year, and we haven't gotten the figures yet, a tremendous increase in consultant fees just in the readiness budget alone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
Page 604 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I have three brief questions. If time remains, I would like to yield the balance of my time to Mr. Thornberry, who has been here at previous meetings.
It has been reported in the press over at the Joint STARS initial operational capability ceremony you said that you believe that more than 19 Joint STARS are required by the 93d Air Control Wing. Would you please comment on the JSTARS requirement?
General MUELLNER. OK. I think the validated requirement is indeed 19 by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Originally, the requirement that was put forward by the warfighters, and I, unfortunately, happened to be at the authoring end of that at the time in a previous life at Air Combat Command, was for 26 to meet the needs that were established at that time.
The JROC reviewed those needs and stated 19 was the stated requirement. The JROC requirement is what then goes on the books, and 19 was what we were working against, until the Quadrennial Defense Review just recently reviewed that.
As I mentioned earlier, the movement from 19 to 13 was predicated on NATO having some capability in this area, pursuing what was called the fast track acquisition. NATO elected not to pursue that course. They went back to their normal mode, which is considerably protracted. So those six aircraft are not going to be available in the near term.
Page 605 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As a result of that, the Department of Defense has a study under way right now to determine what we really need in this area. They know 13 is inadequate, but they do not know what the right mix is to satisfy our needs and the needs of the theater warfighters.
I think the end game solution is probably going to have a combination of Joint STARS, some unmanned aerial vehicle-based solutions and possibly some space contribution also.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
It is my understanding that the Air Force will, as part of their reprogramming request, attempt to use $12 million that was added to the President's budget for the digital terrain system to pay for other budget cuts with the hope of adding the money back in 2001. I believe that failing to protect our pilots by not giving them this important system in 2001 is perhaps irresponsible and harmful to Air Force modernization. Would you comment on the need for the Digital Terrain System and the harm withholding it does to our pilots?
General MUELLNER. Well, clearly DTS is an important system. I have had the opportunity to fly that system extensively, and it is a great contributor to situational awareness and to avoid hitting the ground, especially in low-altitude flight.
I think the decision to move this to the right was made because we are not operating in the low-altitude environment near the degree that we ever have in the past. We found that the current mode of war fighting allows us to use laser-guided bombs, GPS-aided weapons, wing-corrected munitions for our Cluster Bomb Units, says we now operate up in the median altitude environment.
Page 606 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So ground impact or controlled flight into the terrain, that is just not as prevalent an issue to deal with. As a result of that, we felt that the risk was mitigated and allowed us to move that to the right.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
In your first chart on science and technology, you mentioned radiation-hardened electronics. Would you tell us what you are doing there and could you please tell us to what extent you are waiving the requirements for both chemical hardening and Electromagnetic Pulse hardening of your new acquisitions?
General MUELLNER. Well, the vast majority of our weapons systems, everything from the bomber force to the F–16 to the F–22, for that matter, are EMP protected. That is certainly true for our command and control systems. There may be a few systems in that they do not have EMP protection, but it is very rare.
In the case of chemical operations, almost all of our weapons systems. I cannot think of one offhand, but we will be glad to respond for the record, that are not designed to be operated in a chemical environment.
Clearly, my own history of going through aircraft like the F–15 and the F–16 and, for that matter, even Joint STARS, they were all designed to be operated in chemical gear, to be maintained and serviced in chemical gear, and so the vast majority of the systems—it would be a rare occurrence of a system that would not operate in a chemical environment. Obviously, it operates with some reduction in surge capacity because of the difficulties in working in that gear though.
Page 607 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We will be glad to take for the record a response to you as to what systems we would have that would not operate in the chemical—EMP, like I said, there may be a few systems out there that were never designed to operate within that environment, just because of the nature of the system, but they are rare.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 525.]
Mr. BARTLETT. We are getting kind of mixed signals here. In our testimony last week, one of the Commanders in Chief indicated with an EMP lay-down he would lose much of his command and control. We would appreciate it if you would take a look to make sure that we are where you say we are.
General MUELLNER. You bet. Hopefully, that was not one of our strategic CINC's, because, clearly, those systems, if it was a theater CINC, I am not sure what he was referring to. We will be glad to do that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 525.]
Mr. BARTLETT. If I have time remaining, I would like to yield to Mr. Thornberry.
Page 608 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. I don't think you have any time remaining.
I appreciate that. We are going to come back, because Mr. Thornberry and Mr. Gibbons, I know, have gone for a couple of hearings without having much of an opportunity to question the witnesses. So we are going to pick up there at the lower level.
I also want to say on the Democrat side, I know, Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Smith and Mr. Reyes, we have closed out several hearings without you having opportunities to ask questions. Mr. Snyder is usually getting in all of his licks, but you folks have missed out.
I know Mr. Pickett is going to work to see to it that you get your full questioning time today. Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, can you bring us up-to-date on where the Air Force is at the present time with its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program and tell us whether or not the efforts of the Air Force are being fully integrated with the efforts of the other services with this weapons system?
That is my only question. Mr. Chairman, when he answers that, you can recognize any of our junior members that you want.
General MUELLNER. Sir, at the moment, other than the Global Hawk, which, as I mentioned, still has had one flight under its belt and is still executing under Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency until the end of this year, Predator is our primary UAV that we have operating out of Indian Springs, out of Teser most of the time, although it is back home right now. It is performing reasonably well, given that we had to mature its reliability post the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration process. We had to modify it with a new engine, some deicing capability. Right now, our main emphasis is getting the training in place to deploy that.
Page 609 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
That provides support directly down to the Army warfighter. In the long term, we will have a COM on-ground station that is being developed by the Navy Joint Program Office [JPO], that will be used by all the services for the tactical side.
The high altitude endurance vehicles right now look like that is going to be Global Hawk and Dark Star, from the Air Force's perspective. Global Hawk, as I mentioned, just flew. Dark Star, hopefully, is going to fly again here in the next couple of months.
Global Hawk is probably going to be the workhorse of that force in the outyears, employing both electro-optical and radar sensors, infrared sensors, and also as a COM node as I mentioned.
Again, the communications and the sensor information gets fed through a COM on-ground station directly into the global command and control systems. So that information can be accessed by all warfighters, regardless of what your service of origin is.
The last program that we just started, I might add, a week ago here, is an Uninhabited Combat Vehicle program. That is a joint program activity that we have going with DARPA. The intent of that program is to deliver an uninhabited, unmanned, if you will, but probably with a pilot not located in the vehicle, that would provide defense suppression. We have just opened that up with the contractors, and we will end up with two competing contractors that will deliver that capability here in the outyears.
So those are the general programs.
Page 610 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SKELTON. May I interrupt and ask how does this tie in with the so-called UAV program?
General MUELLNER. The UAV probe?
Mr. SKELTON. Program.
General MUELLNER. It is not one of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance platforms under DARO, because it is not designed for surveillance. It is designed to be a lethal weapon on the battlefield.
Mr. PICKETT. Did that complete your answer? I did ask you whether or not there was full interchange of ideas and information between the services.
General MUELLNER. Yes, sir. It is a Navy program, the admiral that runs the Joint Program Office. It is an Air Force colonel that is the Predator. In the case of DARPA, it is a DARPA program manager with an Air Force lieutenant colonel deputy who will assume the program. In the case of the UAV, it is a DARPA program manager with an Air Force lieutenant colonel deputy.
Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to such junior members as you wish to recognize the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. We figure you have some time left.
Page 611 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Your time is up.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Please, just one question.
Good morning. Actually I have one question on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. What is your long-term version for how the launch ranges would be operated? And does it make sense for the Air Force to own and operate and maintain and upgrade the launch ranges in the near term?
General MUELLNER. Well, I think, long-term, we see the amount of commercial launches far exceeding the military launches and the number of commercial suppliers of launch activity going up dramatically.
In the near term, we have a significant program under way, close to $900 million in activity, to upgrade the launch ranges. Because a key part of the ability of these various companies and, for that matter, any government launches that would occur, is being able to reconfigure the ranges rapidly to handle the increased throughput.
To date, we have invested $800 million or so; and I think, like I said, we have $880 or $890 million in the FYDP to continue this.
Page 612 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The long-term solution I think is a better partnership with industry to make a more efficient range, i.e., be able to handle more launches in a given period of time, to allow a reconfiguration of the pads, to handle multiple times of launch vehicles, which we now do not have. They are kind of focused on the singular launch vehicle. And then to improve the tracking capabilities.
To this end, we are moving to a space-based tracking system that will actually exploit GPS rather than the life ground-based tracking systems which, right now, are very resource intensive and also delay our flexibility on the range.
Ms. SANCHEZ. So you would anticipate that this would be a long-range operating program.
General MUELLNER. I think that is the case.
Long-term, we are trying to move to a partnership with industry so we can recoup the launch costs and their share of the range costs, if you will. What industry keeps telling us, however, is that their foreign competitors effectively have subsidized range support, subsidized launch support. This is indeed a key issue with an awful lot of them. They are provided as part of the national infrastructure.
We try to recoup as much of, certainly, all the variable costs as we can with each one of these commercial launches.
Page 613 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Ms. SANCHEZ. I know that the American companies or corporations that deal in this, what would be the competition and under what block are they subsidized? Is this out of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example?
General MUELLNER. This is everything, from both the Russian and the Chinese launch operations all the way down to those supporting Ariane and the other launch activities associated with the French launches.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, let me start out with a follow-up from some questions Ms. Granger was asking you on the F–16s. As I understood your answer, we know that there is a—or we are expecting a 25 aircraft shortfall. I would not hold your breath on operation tempo going down any time sooner. That means we are either going to take them out of the boneyard or count on foreign military sales to keep the line active.
The concern is that, when we quit buying, the sales dry up, because people see the best Air Force in the world is not buying that airplane anymore. Is that a concern to you? And if our options are being narrowed, I guess I am a little unclear as to why the Air Force seems so reluctant to keep one or two going a year, or a few a year, to replace a shortfall you know you are going to have.
Page 614 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General MUELLNER. Well, sir, to begin with, I am not sure we know we are going to have it. The range of analysis said that we could have a shortfall of up to 25, as I mentioned. There is an awful lot of variability, though, in what produces that shortfall in the outyears, everything with the structural variability of the airplane, as to how long they will actually last and the cost of structurally enhancing or extending the life of the airplane and so on.
So I think the plain reason the decision was made to defer this decision is because we don't need to make it right now. Because, in reality, there seemed to be a fairly good supply of commercial customers out there.
Obviously, I think you are familiar with the UAE is considering an F–16 follow-on buy. They just received one from Bahrain. The Norwegians are looking at a 60-aircraft buy. All of these things keep the line both modern and moving on; and so, in the near term, we do not see any real threat that that will not be a viable option until well past the turn of the century. That gives us time to better assess our needs I think in the outyears.
Clearly, a key part of this is, at some point in time, we need to identify the F–16 as a sunset system, so Joint Strike Fighter is the sunrise system. It can come into being and receive its share of Target of Evaluation to replace it. Clearly, the F–16 will remain the workhorse of our fleet out through 2010, and we think we can support it with a decision point downstream.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I guess the only other thing I would add is we certainly hope there are no more accidents or things like that, but that 25 shortfall may even increase, I guess, if terrible things were to happen.
Page 615 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Let me then follow up. I know this was not what you meant but you made some comment that, basically, we are taking F–22 technology and plugging it into the JSF. I think if we are taking really the F–22 and going to use that for the JSF, the JSF is going to behind, of course, once it gets here.
I would appreciate just some comments, particularly from your perspective and the programs you have worked on, on how in the world we can reduce the time it takes for technology to get into the field, into airplanes; and, secondly, what we are doing and should be doing more of to make sure that if we get a platform out there like the JSF we can switch out the avionics or whatever to keep technology updated so that it is not outdated once it gets fielded.
General MUELLNER. Sir, that is a real challenge. It is certainly a real challenge in the avionics side.
I can tell you that the transference we are getting from the F–22, for instance, in the engine, fortunately, the half-life of engine technology is considerably longer than avionics, and its maturation in the F–22 spins off directly.
When we set up the Joint Strike Fighter program, the two things we put in place were that we took F–22 technology and we invested a substantial amount of money, over about a 6-year period, in introducing cost reduction efforts to that technology; that is, that technology had pushed the edge of the envelope in a lot of areas.
What we now needed to do was bring specific technology that would drive down the cost of fielding that technology—not improves performance, but drives down the costs, one of the basic tenants of the JSF program.
Page 616 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The second thing we did is that—and I will give you an example from the F–22. Early on, we wanted an open system. The way you went and devised an open system back in that time frame is you went to a commercial vendor and you said, Intel, what kind of chip are you going to be producing when I field this airplane? I want to use that computer chip in my airplane so I am aligned with the market.
Well, it turned out we did that. We committed to that Intel chip. And, lo and behold, Intel was four chips beyond that. So now we end up with something that is going to be a diminishing manufacturing source very, very quickly, because the half-life has just changed so dramatically there.
What we have done in the case of the JSF is we have laid in a much more open system, because we now better understand that. The technology has matured so much more. We made a decision early on, rather than lock in a configuration for the avionics architecture, we would define those things that absolutely had to be defined. Because people had to go out and invent a process or what have you. Those things that we could wait to make a decision on, we did not make that decision.
If you now go to the Internet and pull up the avionics architecture for the JSF, you will see decision points in the future for a lot of those technologies.
So I think the intent is to open the system up even more, try to keep more vendors in the game. At some point in time, however, you have to commit, and it is just your best guess as to whether you are inside that technology cycle or outside it.
Page 617 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. THORNBERRY. Just from my perspective, and I don't appreciate all the difficulties, but if you could have a system where you could keep updated as the chips mature and develop, rather than locking in on one, certainly we would be better off.
General MUELLNER. Sir, that is what an open system is. You can go to your PC right now and pull out the 486 and put a Pentium in without much impact. That is exactly what we are moving to.
The other big approach is one best characterized by the F–16, and this is have block upgrades. Each block of the F–16 brought a lot of new capability to the table and really didn't hinder the support ability.
Mr. THORNBERRY. If I might, let me just ask one final question, and that is relating to your chart on global attack.
I realize that there is a study coming out later in the month, but I am concerned that if you look at the platforms that we are relying on, well, all the way through 2015 as shown on your chart, we are looking at things that are certainly older than I am and going out that far. I would like some reassurance that we are looking at how we are going to project our influence in a situation where we probably will not have forward bases and all of those kinds of concerns that the QDR National Defense Panel is talking about, and without talking about any particular airplane, whether it is something that is big enough to get some firepower halfway across the world and on missiles.
Page 618 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
If you look at what some of our potential competitors are doing, they are doing a lot of work, and we are on Minute Man IIIs out to 2015.
General MUELLNER. Well, sir, I think in the case of the global attack platforms you are referring to from that chart, obviously that is the bomber force, to the largest degree, for long distances.
The B–52, while it is indeed old, in many cases, and I think we are indeed on a third generation aviator somewhere in the system, it is still a very formidable weapon as a result of changing the way it is employed in the battlefield. The B–52's started out as high-altitude platforms, went to low-altitude penetrators and are deployed primarily in the standoff role. They have done well delivering Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile [CALCM's] and will do well in the future delivering Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile [CALCM's] and Joint Air to Surface Combat Missile [JASSM's] and those kinds of weapons.
I think the B–1 has indeed matured to the point where it is really a valuable contributor either in or outside the theater, a lot of global power missions where it melds very well with a support-rich carrier battle group where it has a lot of jamming and other type of support. But whether it is somewhat weak on firepower, you add a couple bombers to that strike baggage and they can certainly robust that capability.
Also, in the case of the B–2, obviously, as that system matures, we have a system that can penetrate all but the very highest threat areas without much support and deliver with near precision accuracy anything up to 5,000 pound weapons. So we see a lot of capability.
Page 619 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
All three of those platforms, by the way, will be significantly enhanced by things like JSOW and JASSM in the outyears. So I think our power projection capability, I think, has matured reasonably well.
We continue to look at improvements to the B–2 to improve its not only reliability and supportability but also its survivability in the outyears.
So I think we are going to keep those things viable. And, obviously, in the technology side, we are looking beyond the B–2 as to what you need to do if you have indeed a manned penetrator, a manned weapons system out there to deliver.
Mr. HUNTER. Our ranking member of the full committee is here with us today, and we are privileged to have him with us. Mr. Skelton.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have just one question, General, and then I will relinquish the rest of my time to Mr. Smith so we can move our questioning along.
I wish to ask you about aircraft safety modifications. This, of course, came out as a result of the tragedy when the then Secretary of Commerce perished in the CT–43 crash. I have an interest in the efforts to accelerate various aircraft safety modifications aboard all passenger military aircraft.
Page 620 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Congress had $32.5 million this past year to improve this capability. Could you share with us the status of the modernization effort, such as how is the application being executed? Are our troop carrying aircraft receiving first priority? Could you answer those as succinctly as possible?
General MUELLNER. Yes, sir. Clearly the NAV safety mods—as you know, in response to the CT–43 accident where we lost Secretary Brown, Secretary Perry at the time directed that those safety mods indeed be accelerated. We have accelerated those things. They are fully funded in all of our budgets for all of our passenger carrying aircraft. So those things will be fielded on those aircraft that carry passengers.
As a result of the 141 midair that occurred off the coast of Africa, obviously, there has been increased emphasis on expanding the TCAS, collision avoidance capability, into the airplanes. In fact, that has indeed also been accelerated.
For instance, the C–17, which does not come off the line with it right now because it was neither required nor really viable when the aircraft was designed, will be fully capable by the end of 2002 with all aircraft either retrofitted or coming off the production line in that particular case.
The only aircraft that we have that is not fully funded right now and is passenger capable, not only passenger carrying, is the C–130. We expect to fix that in our 2000 program objective memorandum (POM). It is the highest priority, and Secretary Cohen made that clear to us.
Page 621 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SKELTON. I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Smith, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Skelton, for doing that.
I just have a couple of quick questions, sort of following up on Mr. Thornberry's questions about the bombers and the B–2.
There was a lot of talk as we were building up and dealing with the Iraq crisis, rumors back and forth about whether or not the B–2 was going to be used. It was generally said that it was not going to be used, and there was all kinds of speculation as to why, some of it not very charitable.
I was just wondering if you could give us sort of a specific example. You sort of laid out the B–52, the B–1, B–2, here is their projected missions. But looking at a specific example, the Iraq situation, what is the thought process into whether or not the B–2 would be used in that situation; and, if not, why not?
General MUELLNER. Well, obviously, that is General Zinni's call; and his map or air attack plan, if you will, will identify what is and what isn't used.
If you look at the use of the bomber force, the B–52's would be primarily used to deliver CALCM weapons, probably from a standoff location like Diego Garcia or potentially I guess Moron. I don't remember where they are bedded down right now.
Page 622 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The B–1's are in theater right now. I think they were at Shakes or one of the in-country locations. They will be employed, incorporated within strike forces.
As I mentioned earlier, we have right now 5 block 20 B–2's and four block 30 B–2's at Whittman. They are ready to be used, the 2,000 pound GPS-aided weapons and 5,000 pound GPS-aided weapons capability on both of these blocks of airplanes, and they could be employed from Whittman.
I think the decision as to whether or not to use them would be based upon the campaign strategy of General Zinni. I really cannot address what that is in this particular hearing.
Mr. SMITH. I understand, to some extent. I mean, the assumption was made in the press that the decision had been made not to use them. It is like we are planning a war here. Forgive us if we don't send out a press release in advance on what we are going to use. I understand that, to some degree, so I didn't want a specific example, just sort of a general scenario of where they would be used. I think you explained that quite well.
Mr. SKELTON. May I interrupt?
After all this discussion, the press got the B–2 not being used, I got a call from the General at Whittman Air Force Base to tell me they really were ready.
Mr. SMITH. I had to suspect that at some level. It has got to be odd conducting a potential war where you see on the news the night before what your targets are. It has got to be a unique experience for some of you.
Page 623 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Just one quick question on the Airborne Laser. I have actually visited the Boeing plant where they are working on it and seen some of the basic explanation of how it works and what it can do. It looks like an exciting program, just because we have been struggling for so long with missile defense, trying to hit a bullet with a bullet. Here is a situation where you have a laser and potentially at least significantly better odds of success.
Despite that, there is a lot of general criticism that the technology will never be mature, will never quite get there. People just do not believe it is going to work.
I think a lot of that is because it is something totally different from what we have tried before. From what I have seen, and I am not a physicist by any stretch of the imagination, I don't see any reason why it could not be successful. I am curious as to what your reaction is to that criticism and how confident the Air Force is that Airborne Laser will be on line for them?
General MUELLNER. Sir, we are very confident. What the Airborne Laser brings—obviously, it is a speed-of-light weapon which has distinct advantages, obviously, in dealing with these targets at long-range.
The other key part of it is it is a closed-loop system. As you illuminate a target, you keep it illuminated until the target goes away. So it is not a single shot, hit or miss. That offers great benefits to ensure you get target kill.
I might add that the technologies that we are seeing in this, and there are about three or four key ones, one of them is the laser itself, the coil laser. We have already demonstrated that on the ground, the flight weight version of it, and it performed in excess of what the design point was.
Page 624 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The other is the adaptive optics that allows us to do the atmospheric operation. Those are operating right now in places like down at Albuquerque and a lot of other astronautical applications, and they work very well also.
I think the third part of that is just the engineering task of getting all that to flight weight and getting it in the airplane.
The basic technologies I think were all there. It is a case of engineering it. I don't mean to belittle that, that is still a task, but it is not one we are fearful of.
As to whether it is going to work, I would offer to you that the legacy technology program back in the early 1980's successfully shot down six air-to-air weapons that were shot at and also a cruise missile. So we are really confident that the technology is there to allow us to deliver this thing to the warfighter.
Killing something over the other guy's territory is really a big advantage, if you have got bad warheads in it with bugs or chemicals or even nuclear warheads.
Mr. SMITH. I think it is a program with tremendous potential, and I am very supportive of it. I am happy to see the Air Force's support for that.
Thank you, and I thank my distinguished ranking member for the time.
Page 625 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For the first time in a long time it is a pleasure to be at this end of the list. I appreciate that.
General, I want to follow up on a question of Mr. Pickett in dealing with UAV's. I was interested in your comment that the UAV's are back in Indian Springs.
Maybe you know something I don't know. Sunday I was told that the 11th Reconnaissance Group out of Indian Springs had just been deployed back to Yugoslavia. That means the training that they were using in that group at that location no longer is going to take place, which concerns me a great deal.
What are you doing specifically to incorporate modernization of our Guard and Reserve forces with UAV's so that we can have either a fill-in or an optional deployment capability with Guard and Reserves of UAV's? Will you explain that to us?
General MUELLNER. There are two aspects of backfilling that capability. As I mentioned, one of the issues with transitioning Predator is we ended up with a system coming out of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration that was loved by the end game information user, the warfighter, but was ill-provisioned to really provide that service. It did not have a training infrastructure, we did not have enough of the vehicles, and the delivery rate was low, plus we had some technical issues.
Page 626 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As you know, the Guard and Reserve, both General McIntosh and General Weaver, have been looking at the Guard picking up some of those responsibilities. The same is true on the Reserve side, not only from the standpoint of providing the training but also as to whether this is a mission well-suited for our Reserve components across the board.
That was a topic of discussion at our most recent CORONA down in Florida here recently, and I think we are going to see some additional activity.
In trying to backfill the issue at Indian Springs, we have got another system plus two additional vehicles coming out this year, a system being four vehicles, that will be coming out of General Atomics.
The other key part of that is we will have another one of the training devices that General Atomics has contracted for that will come out to provide us additional training capability.
But, as you well know, the 11th has had a tough time keeping up with the OPSTEMPO, much less getting their people trained.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, General, on that issue.
As we talk about this modernization of our forces and we consider the F–22 as part of that modernization and in discussing one more time about the Guard and Reserves, the modernization of our Guard and Reserves with F–22's is going to be a reality and, in fact, a necessary part of the future.
Page 627 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
What is your understanding, what is your belief in this future total force which will require Guard, Reserve and active duty forces to be modernized in a single unit with our most modern equipment? Are you in support of that?
General MUELLNER. Absolutely. I think, as you well realize, the Air Force has probably been as seamless in using our Reserve components certainly as any one of the services. Right now, you go overseas anywhere and you have got both Guard and Reserve organizations on the same ramps, operating in deployed locations. This has been occurring for quite some time. Obviously, it occurred all the way back through Desert Storm.
I think as we start looking at our modernization profiles, as we bed down various systems—and, obviously, a good example of that is the C–17. A large percentage of the C–17 pilot force are Reserve members through various associate programs and other Reserve support programs.
But as we start bedding down new weapons systems, our strategy for doing that has historically been those things like the F–22, which are enablers, we will put in our most ready component able to deploy. Historically, that has not in the past been necessarily the Reserve components. It took longer, in many cases, to get them to the theater.
As we get farther downstream and this transition becomes more seamless, we may find they are going to be just as ready. If you look right now what the taskings are on our squadrons of deployment time, reaction time to be able to get into the theater, there is still a disparity between the active forces and Reserve components. We see that diminishing in the future. So that may well change our bed-down strategy, if you will, in the future.
Page 628 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. GIBBONS. General, one final question that I have to you, it deals with our force multipliers, whether it is RC–135's, under JSTARS or Airborne Warning And Control System. We see a trend, I see a trend, that is disturbing, if not indefensible, that in the year 2000 and 2001 the reengining of some of these RC–135's takes a hiatus. In other words, there is zero programmed in for that.
I think that is indefensible, when you start looking at the need and the demand for this capability, whether it is battlefield management or surveillance, to put at risk those force multipliers. By not reengining that group of aircraft during that period of time not only jeopardizes that capability but also says something about our projection of the need for that service.
As you well know, last December there was an aircraft which failed to be able to complete its mission because of an engine failure. It needed a reengining. Why, in your opinion, are we failing to modernize the RC–135 fleet at a projected predictable rate for the year 2000 and 2001?
General MUELLNER. Well, I think the answer, the short answer, is just inadequate resources to do all the things we really need to do, I think, especially in preserving the Reliability, Maintainability and Availability, the revolution in military affairs, contribution that those platforms provide.
I think the issue with Joint STARS is another good example of this, with a reduced number of those platforms and the need to deal with that.
Page 629 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. GIBBONS. We also have a projected deficit, I am not talking about current deficit shortfalls, either due to spending money on operations other than war, where we must take today's dollars to spend for those expenditures. But I am talking about 2001. There was not even one reengine incorporating configuration package projected for that time frame. What I am trying to find from you is the rationale behind that hiatus that sits there between the year 2000 and 2001?
General MUELLNER. I think the rationale was, one, while reengining provides better efficiency of operation of those platforms, they are not necessary for their ability to do the job.
When we looked at the overall package of those airplanes using that family of engines, as you know, that engine, that same engine is used on the Joint STARS, the same engine is used on the AWACS, that same family of engines is used on the B–52, for that matter. We have an overall effort going on right now that is looking to either reengining all those platforms with a common new engine or reengining them in partnership with some of the engine contractors who have some novel approaches.
A good example is we have a lot of KC–135's out there that still are not in the R configuration. There is certainly a desire to bring them up to a newer engine. Also, there is an opportunity possibly to go with a commercial engine like the JT–8, which is readily available on the market, where we can almost do that with minimal cost because it has been designed.
Page 630 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So movement toward that CFM–56 solution, which is the one we have been dealing with in the past, is not the only option. In some cases, it is a more expensive option, without necessarily having more value added.
So the study that we owe back to you all I think at the end of April, if memory serves me correctly, is trying to address those issues. It was in deference to that study that we delayed any further funding.
Mr. GIBBONS. Are you saying the study will be due in our hands in April? That is when it is promised to be here?
General MUELLNER. I think it is June, is what I am being told here, in the past.
Mr. GIBBONS. The data was due at the end of February in '97 in your hands. Now we are looking at——
General MUELLNER. I am not familiar with what was due in '97. What this says is, the final report is scheduled to me in late April of '98 and due to you in June of '98.
Mr. GIBBONS. May I take from your answer that the projected reengining that is going to occur in 2002 and beyond takes into consideration the data and supporting information that will be in this report due to us in January—or June?
Page 631 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General MUELLNER. Our intent is to make a decision on reengining all these platforms, the KC–135, Joint STARS, rivet joints, B–52's, based upon what this recommends. That is correct, sir.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
No, we are not going to call on Mr. Snyder, because he was the first one here.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have got just one quick question regarding the capabilities and the reliability of the C–5, since I represent the district where Patriot batteries are deployed.
From time to time, I hear that the C–5, the capability of the C–5, is questionable in terms of the maintenance. Can you comment on the reliability and our ability to deploy units based on the C–5?
General MUELLNER. Sure. I would be glad to.
Page 632 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As I mentioned earlier, C–5 dispatch reliability has been a major area of concern for us. That is one of the reasons why we are spending almost $500 million in that area this year.
The primary problems with the airplanes have been in two areas. One is in the TF–39 engine; and the second one in some of the avionics units, especially those associated with the flight control system, things like the autopilot and stability augmentation systems and so on. That is where the investment is this year.
The engine problems have been twofold, in that we went from a 3-level to 2-level engine maintenance, that is, we did away with our field activities that would do engine overhauls and so on. And, in all honesty, the depot, the log center, was not able to accommodate this. So we have now stood up another TF–39 engine activity back out at an Air Mobility Command base.
So we hope to see the engine availability to improve, and that will improve our dispatch reliability. Clearly, the engines are a bad actor as far as dispatch reliability.
The other part of it is the avionics; and, like I said, we are investing a fair amount of money in improving those this year. In all honesty, right now the availability of the airplane is on an upswing. It has been coming up over the last couple of months as a result of General Cross's personal attention in driving that system, getting that TF–39 capability back out in the field and in pushing the avionics upgrades.
Page 633 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Long-term, General Cross is evaluating a program that they call the C–5M, which would look at reengining those airplanes to improve the availability and, at the same time, doing an avionics upgrade to exploit more modern avionics.
Mr. REYES. Do we have a backup aircraft to the C–5 that has the same capability? What do we rely on?
General MUELLNER. Obviously, as far as bulk capacity, there is nothing, although some of the craft carriers provide bulk capability. Clearly not the ease of use and the ability to get in and out of a lot of fields.
The C–17, of course, has wide-body capability. That is one of the key reasons that we bought the C–17, so it can carry a large amount of the outer sized cargo that the C–5 originally was bought to carry. The issue is just the bulk of it. How many C–17's versus C–5's do you need to do that? Clearly, improving C–5 availability and reliability is a key emphasis item of General Cross.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very good.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. Thank you for the dedication you bring to the subcommittee. We appreciate it.
Mr. Snyder, you were the first guy in the room. Thanks for allowing us to catch up with some other members that had not had many questions. We appreciate that.
Page 634 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SNYDER. Good morning, General. Good to see you.
You mentioned a couple of times in your opening statement about—I think you used the word fragile, referring to the budget. I think if I went back to Arkansas and asked folks, do you consider the defense budget to be a fragile one, I suspect that is not the word that would come to mind. You used it a couple of times.
As a first term member, this is my second run through the budget cycle now as we started this year. For the last few weeks I have been kind of making a list in my mind of things that Congress needs to do to deal with some of this fragility.
We talked about the supplemental process, and if we add on so much money for the Bosnia operation, that it ought not be offset in your budget, because then that just aggravates the kind of problems you are having. You mentioned the CGR's and the problem that causes for you. I assume that comes about because we do some add-ons and systems that—programs you did not want, but we fund them whether you ask for three and we add on six, and money has to come from somewhere.
Then you mentioned the word flexibility. My specific question with regard to the flexibility, and it may be I need to sit down with the staff and figure it out, is that something we do every year? We put language in the appropriations or authorization bill that restricts your flexibility? Or do we need to put language in on an ongoing basis, language you have to have in an appropriations bill? What specific language and where does it need to appear?
General MUELLNER. Well, sir, I think you rightly characterized the fragile issue. I think it is indeed a delicate balance between the three areas of focus for the Air Force, which is the quality of life, readiness and the modernization.
Page 635 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
That balance can be perturbed, obviously, by things like bills for Bosnia or Desert Scorpion or what have you that we have to pay in real time that then requires me to deobligate money and programs. Obviously, you never get back a dollar for a dollar by doing that.
The flexibility issue I think is if you look at the way those various sections that I described earlier are laid in, they specifically describe how they will be taxed, if you will, or how they will be laid against programs.
A lot of flexibility could be provided to the acquisition executive by just identifying the amount, if you will, and saying, if you will deal with it, take this amount out of the program, and then I will go find content that the warfighter would rather give up, and do that in a more efficient way to execute the programs.
What happens when we get these across-the-board taxes, in some cases, as I illustrated, upward of 10 to 12 percent, our programs do not have management reserves certainly to cover that. Then they have to incrementally start removing content across all of those programs. In a lot of cases, that may not be an efficient process, certainly. It would be a lot easier for me if we do indeed have a bill to pay for me to go kill a program that is lower on the warfighter's hierarchy of needs and then move on with the others and execute them in a more efficient manner.
So I think it is not specific direction as much as it is when those offsets are laid in, just giving us the flexibility to apply them where necessary to come up with the bottom line.
Page 636 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SNYDER. I appreciate your explanation.
In your statement when talking about infrastructure, I think you used the number $750 million could be saved from what you describe as excess operating costs for infrastructure, and you say that comes out of the modernization. How did you arrive at the $750 million?
General MUELLNER. The $750 million number is not necessarily a direct savings in infrastructure. What it is, it is an illustration. It was the bills that we had to pay out of the modernization accounts last year to deal with inefficiencies of our infrastructure in delivering goods or services. A large part of that was through the working capital fund which supports those activities that occur in either the maintenance or supply accounts executed by our logistics centers.
So the end result of that is, because we have either excess capacity in those centers or because of some other efficiencies in the procession, those come as bills due in the working cap fund; and, as a result of that, that working capital bill comes in any given year back to the modernization accounts to be paid.
Interestingly, in the past there was a 2-year lag between when that bill came due and when it had to be paid in order to stabilize the rates and the structure. Last year, the Secretary, or Deputy Secretary, made the decision the bills needed to be paid in the year of disclosure. So, as a result of that, now when I have inefficiencies out there in our infrastructure that require us to source additional funds to balance the infrastructure, because the working capital has to be a balanced account, that means I have to go to my modernization accounts to source that money in the year of execution.
Page 637 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you.
The last question I wanted to ask, you mentioned in your statement, and briefly a while ago talking about the C–130's, you talk about modernization of the E models and the H models. This current fiscal year 1999 budget proposal has no money for the modernization of the older models, is that correct? I assume you all are in the process of talking about exactly what kind of modernization you are talking about. Is that a fair statement?
General MUELLNER. That is a fair statement. We do have funds in the budget to deal with some of the navigation safety and Global Air Traffic Management [GATM] issues that I referred to earlier. But what—the program you are describing is what General Cross called the C–130X program. That would standardize the configuration of those with a standard cockpit and probably a standard engine across those aircraft, as the various versions of the aircraft have different engines on them all, such that in the outyears we would end up with a mixed fleet of C–130X's as a standardized older airplane and C–130J's.
Currently, General Cross is planning to bring that in as an initiative in the 2000 Program Objective Memorandum.
Mr. SNYDER. Without hooking into a number, I assume we are talking about something in the $7 to $12 to $13 million range. Is that just a ball park?
General MUELLNER. To be honest with you, sir, I haven't seen the specific costs per airplane. I have seen the justifications for it as far as reducing cost of ownership and all those sorts of things, but I don't think the specific program has really been identified to that level of detail.
Page 638 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Muellner. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Snyder.
Mr. Evans, did you have any questions you wanted to ask?
Mr. EVERETT. No, thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me give Roscoe or Mr. Thornberry a chance. Do you gentleman have any follow-ups you wanted to ask?
Mr. THORNBERRY. I have one brief one, Mr. Chairman.
General, could you update me on where we are with replacing T–37's with the JPATS? There is a brief mention in your statement, but it doesn't say anything about time frame or where we are with doing that.
General MUELLNER. Well, as you know, the JPATS is executing out. We are in our third year of acquisition on that program right now. I think in 1999 we are procuring 19 of those aircraft, and then we will be ramping up to something in the area of 22 or 23, I think it is.
Page 639 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The fielding schedule for those is pretty well laid out. The contractor right now is going through the Federal Aviation Administration certification process for that. The first of those airplanes will actually go into Randolph Air Force Base to stand up the very first unit, to start training the instructors and so on.
The program is executing well. The contractor has had a few minor delays in the FAA certification, but they don't seem to be driven by any technical issues.
Mr. THORNBERRY. We are pretty much on target then?
General MUELLNER. Yes, sir.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. We have had several questions relative to modernization in the future. What dollar figure or percent increase in the budget for the future will it take to make you whole as far as modernization is concerned?
General MUELLNER. Sir, I will take that for the record, but let me answer it I think in general terms, because I am not sure I can give you an absolute number. Because ''whole'' is difficult to describe or define. Clearly, we have some programs that would benefit from accelerations to more efficiently procure things.
Page 640 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Right now, our core programs are whole. The programs that would realize I think benefits are things like the fielding, for instance, of some of our upgrades to C–17's, C–5's, the C–5M program, the C–130X. That would ease the workload out in the field, provide a more standardized environment from an air crew safety and operations standpoint.
I think the numbering that has historically been used is that we need to get up to a $60 billion procurement for the Department. To be honest with you, I have never seen any factual underpin pinning for that number. I am sure there was some at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level.
As our procurement budget ramps up through the FYDP, I think most of our programs by the end of the FYDP are reasonably healthy; that is, they are executable, and they satisfy the warfighters' requirements.
But I will pull out the specific numbers and send them back over to you.
Mr. BARTLETT. We appreciate that.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 525.]
Mr. BARTLETT. You mentioned the $60 billion, which is what I was thinking about which is what the Joint Chiefs said we needed. I was just questioning to see what part of that was represented by Air Force needs.
Page 641 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Thank you very much.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
General, I thank you very much. You have acquitted yourself very well here, I think, this morning on going through really a broad array of programs.
I have in front of me one of the news statements to the effect, ''Ryan to Congress: Cannibalization is up, mission capability is down.'' It says, ''The goal for the Air Force's overall capability rate has fallen 7 percentage points,'' General Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said at the Senate budget hearing February 12th. ''For the Air Force's stateside fighter flight, the rate has fallen 10 percent over the same period, Ryan revealed. The cannibalization rates have gone up significantly, particularly on our stateside aircraft where they have a lower priority for parts.''
First, do you agree with the general proposition that cannibalization is up, mission capability is down?
General MUELLNER. I do indeed as an aggregate statement.
There are certainly some weapons systems where that is not the case. The 117, for instance, is more healthy now than it was at the time of Desert Storm. There are a few others. But in general, certainly General Ryan's statement reflects the fact that, for a large part of our force, because of underfunding in our depot level repairables in the past and other spare part activities, the need to cannibalization [CANN] now is higher.
Page 642 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I think over the last couple of years we have significantly ramped up; and I think our assessment—and I think General Ryan shares this—is we expect our mission capable rates and our CANN rates to stabilize this year and continue to improve. We are already starting to see that in some weapons systems like the C–5 that I pointed out earlier.
Mr. HUNTER. Wouldn't you say—I am further reading this statement—the B–1 was only mission capable 63 percent of the time last year and has dropped to 51.2 percent this year; and, according to the Air Force, 9 of the 14 platforms are, to date, not meeting their mission capability requirements.
Now we are coming up with this supplemental that is, hopefully, going to pay for some of the drain that has evolved as a function of our overseas operational requirements, and we are going to call that an emergency supplemental. That keeps you from having to take that money out of hide.
It would appear to me that getting our mission capable rates up to the standard that we have set, which 9 of 14 platforms are not meeting now, is an exigency, an emergency, a priority. Would you agree with that?
I think we should do more than simply come in with a few bucks to meet the drain that has been zapped. I think we have obviously drawn our readiness down to some degree, and we need to fill that bathtub.
General MUELLNER. Sir, I think we have filled that from the standpoint of getting the spares up, which there are two drivers obviously behind it, and they are somewhat reinforcing. One of them is the lack of spares. The other is we have got an aging fleet in a lot of our areas; and, as a result of that aging fleet, there are more surprises that occur and there is more maintenance activity that occurs.
Page 643 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As a result of that, with not having the spares, that they add on each other. And, obviously, every time you can, you have doubled. Because I have got to take it off one and put it on one where I would rather pull it off the shelf and go fix the other problem.
We increased our spares funding by 50 percent. I think we have driven the backlog in that area off the table. We still have some backlog in the depot maintenance, but I think we understand what that is and we are going to deal with that in the 2000 POM.
So I think General Ryan, if you asked him point-blank, would tell you he thinks our MC rates have both opted out, if you will, and are on the mend in most of those systems, and we expect to see them rise as a result of the funding you all have helped us with.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Thank you for giving us a very robust answer to all of the questions. We appreciate that.
General MUELLNER. I am happy to do that.
Mr. HUNTER. One last thing. We do have some questions for the record, and I know Mr. Jones particularly has some questions, so we will give those to you for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 525.]
Page 644 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
The subcommittees are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
F–22
Mr. HUNTER. New manufacturing problems could delay by up to five months six of the engineering development F–22 models. The problems are centered around production of large, single-piece titanium castings that attach the wing to the fuselage and welded titanium assemblies—known as booms—that carry tail and wing loads in the rear fuselage section of the aircraft. What is the status of the ''fixes'' to these problems?
General MUELLNER. With respect to the aft fuselage boom ''fix,'' this problem has been solved. The contractors have made minor design revisions to simplify the welding process. Regarding the wing side-of-the body manufacturing ''fix,'' improvements to the process are being implemented. One of the two solutions developed by the manufacturers was to increase the wing side-of-body mold to provide adequate strength and durability. Metrics indicate that casting quality is improving. The other solution has been to redesign the manufacturing process, including the mechanism which feeds liquid metal into the casting mold. To date, we have poured 15 satisfactory castings.
Page 645 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. What, if any, impact have these caps had on the program?
General MUELLNER. The Air Force/contractor team has high confidence that the EMD program will execute within the cost cap. However, the total EMD cost cap puts the program in a fixed-price environment, where the contractor is not obligated to deliver a product once the cap is reached. During development, a cost-type contract buys the contractor's best effort. Hence, the congressionally mandated EMD cost cap is inconsistent with this concept.
The Air Force/contractor team has high confidence that the production program will also execute within the cost cap. However, the total procurement cap eliminates the flexibility to adjust for funding reductions, changes in requirements and other factors that affect total costs. In addition, the procurement cap dollar value was based on a computer cost model, not a detailed estimate from the contractors. The Air Force believes it is unwise to apply a cost cap to a 15-year production program a year before the first production contract is awarded.
AIRCRAFT CANNIBALIZATION AND SPARE PARTS SHORTAGES
Mr. HUNTER. What is the outlook for FY98, given the 150% increase in spare parts funding increase from FY97?
General MUELLNER. Although there has been an overall decrease in Mission Capable (MC) rates and an increase in cannibalization rates, these trends are not compromising the Air Force's ability to handle operational requirements. Based on improved FY98/99 spare parts funding, together with implementation of our Engine Life Management Planning initiatives and streamlining supply chain management, we expect FY98 MC rates to stabilize and begin recovery. However, we should point out that aging aircraft issues will continue to pose tough challenges to our logistics support systems.
Page 646 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Is the 50% increase over FY98 funding that is requested in FY99 short of the required amount? If so, by how much?
General MUELLNER. Fiscal Year 1999 flying hour costs have increased beyond our projections. Increases are due principally to continuing growth in scheduled and unscheduled engine removals, increased sub-system failures, Time Change Technical Order weapons systems enhancements, and parts coming out of warranty. We are currently in the process of revalidating our FY99 flying hour costs. Our preliminary estimate is that an additional $219M may be needed to fully fund our FY99 programmed flying hours. We plan to address our FY99 shortfall as we make our allocations after receipt of the FY99 budget.
Mr. HUNTER. Are spare parts shortages the principal cause of the decline in mission capable rates that has been steadily ongoing for the last seven fiscal years?
General MUELLNER. The decline in aircraft mission capable rates since FY91 has been driven by both maintenance problems and spare parts shortages. The Total Not-Mission Capable for Supply (TNMCS) rate has increased 5.5% since FY91 (8.6%) to first quarter FY98 (14.1%) as a result of increased parts shortages. The Not Mission Capable for Maintenance (NMCM) rate has also increased 3.3% since FY91 (8.0%) to first quarter FY98 (11.3%) as a result of increased maintenance requirements.
Spare parts shortages are driven by fleet age, contractor delinquencies, organic repair constraints, technical surprises, and excessive component repair part lead times. FY97's 82% spare parts funding compounded supply problems, especially in FY97/4. Maintenance requirements are driven primarily because of engines and aging aircraft problems. These maintenance problems include increasing aircraft structural inspection requirements, fuel leaks, landing gear system maintenance, structural corrosion, and engine risk mitigation inspections.
Page 647 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We expect MC rates to stabilize in FY98 and begin recovery based on improved FY98/99 spare parts funding, Engine Life Management Planning, and streamlined supply chain management. The F–16 service life improvement program and increased KC–135 depot maintenance will correct known major structural and corrosion problems. Aging aircraft issues will continue to pose tough logistics challenges.
Mr. HUNTER. Are the hollow forces of the 70's about to be repeated?
General MUELLNER. The Air Force is not a ''hollow force'' because we can meet our operational requirements. Although aircraft MC rates meet operational requirements, the overall Total Not-Mission Capable for Supply (TNMCS) rate has increased 5.5% since FY91 to first quarter FY98 (14.1%) as a result of increased parts shortages. This TNMCS rate increase together with Not Mission Capable for Maintenance rate increases drove an overall 8.8% MC rate decline from FY91 (83.4%) to first quarter FY98 (74.6%). The long-term cannibalization rate decreased from 3.6 cannibalizations per 100 flying hours in FY91 to 2.1 in FY95, but, from FY95 to FY97, the cannibalization rate rose to a peak of 4.2 per 100 flying hours. This increase reflects a higher level of effort to work around spare part shortages. The first quarter FY98 cannibalization rate declined to 3.5 per 100 flying hours.
Spare parts shortages are driven by a variety of reasons that include fleet age, contractor delinquencies, technical surprises, organic repair constraints, and excessive component repair part lead time. FY97's 82% spare parts funding compounded supply problems, especially in FY97/4. We expect TNMCS rates and cannibalization rates to stabilize in FY98 and begin recovery based on improved FY98/FY99 spare parts funding, implementation of Engine Life Management Planning, and streamlined supply chain management. However, our aging aircraft fleet will continue to pose tough logistics support challenges. We do not expect MC rates to fall below the level required to meet operational requirements nor repeat the conditions of the 1970's ''hollow force.''
Page 648 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WATTS
ACQUISITION
Mr. WATTS. General Muellner: the Air Force has a wide variety of new weapon systems in both the research and procurement stages. Is there a particular order of importance for the acquisition of these programs within the Air Force?
General MUELLNER. The FY99 President's Budget (PB) represents the Air Force modernization priority, supporting the Air Force's time-phased, balanced modernization plan. Program priorities are not ranked within the PB. The time phasing is:
Near-term: Global Mobility to include buying 63 more C–17s for a total of 120.
Mid-term: Global Attack and Precision Engagement to include bomber upgrades, such as the B–1 Conventional Munitions Upgrade Program and Defensive Systems Upgrade Program, and procuring over 75,000 Precision Guided Munitions. In Air and Space Superiority, the F–22, Airborne Laser development, SBIRS EMD, and EELV EMD are also mid-term priorities.
Far-term: Space and Air Superiority, Global Attack, and Precision Engagement, including JSF development.
Page 649 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WATTS. General Muellner: the Committee understands that many Air Force accounts are seriously underfunded. Will the Air Force be able to pursue all of its procurement and R&D initiatives while maintaining its current high operational tempo? Will these accounts be tapped in order to fund operations and maintenance functions?
General MUELLNER. The FY99–03 program supports Air Force goals—keep people first, sustain readiness, and protect time-phased modernization. The Air Force budget is properly balanced, with each of the goals linked to the others, although few programs are fully funded.
The Air Force recognizes the necessity to balance near-term operations and maintenance (O&M) against current and future modernization to ensure the ability to meet national security requirements. High operational tempo is a concern, but one way the tempo can be mitigated is through replacement of older, high maintenance equipment with newer, more efficient maintenance requirement systems that are not stressed from age and tempo.
Obviously, the constraining budget environment means the Air Force must time-phase its modernization. Procurement and R&D initiatives must be reviewed and prioritized within a balanced Air Force budget. O&M requirements could have an impact, especially with non-programmed and unforeseen contingencies, but normally only after O&M itself is prioritized to meet the most critical needs. The Air Force goal is to maintain an appropriate balance so that people, readiness, and modernization programs are accommodated to the maximum extent within available topline.
Page 650 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WATTS. General Muellner, the Committee believes that the Air Force remains in material violation of the depot law passed last year. In order for the Committee to make its displeasure known to the Air Force, it is considering several actions that would directly impact Air Force acquisition. How would the Air Force view a possible reduction in funding to the F–22 or any other of its major programs?
General MUELLNER. The Air Force believes that it is compliant with the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act.
The FY99 Air Force budget is delicately balanced and executable. The FY99 President's Budget represents the Air Force modernization priority—all modernization programs identified are needed. Program reductions could drive significant program content impacts, such as cost growth, schedule slips, and Acquisition Program Baseline breaches; ultimately delaying essential joint and service warfighter capabilities.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
Mr. BARTLETT. What are the Air Force's views on the Chemical-Biological Defense Program?
General MUELLNER. Public Law 103–160 consolidated all the Services' nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense research, development and acquisition (RDA) funding into a Joint NBC POM managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force is benefiting from the Joint consolidation and streamlining effort by fielding new equipment sooner. Additional benefits include: procurement savings through larger quantity buys; operations and maintenance (O&M) savings due to all Services having the same equipment configurations; consolidated NBC defense training at Fort McClellan, AL; and consolidated doctrine.
Page 651 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BARTLETT. Is the program meeting the needs of the Air Force?
General MUELLNER. The Air Force needs are being met within the Joint resources available. We feel the Air Force is getting a fair share of equipment items, and more importantly, better equipment is being fielded sooner to our warfighters. During FY98 we begin fielding the following new or improved capabilities: the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) groundcrew ensemble; the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA); and a biological detection capability at air bases in Korea and Southwest Asia.
Mr. BARTLETT. How effective have the Joint NBC Defense Group and its supporting Joint Service Integration Group and Joint Service Material Group been in coordinating and integrating service chemical-biological defense requirements and development programs?
General MUELLNER. These Joint organizations have been successful in coordinating and integrating chemical-biological (CB) defense requirements and development programs. All CB operational requirements documents are created at a forum where all Services are represented. Likewise, each Service provides a program manager for each development program. Each Service is allotted one vote in every decision. Due to the success of these efforts, during FY98 we begin fielding the following new or improved capabilities: the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) groundcrew ensemble; the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA); and a biological detection capability at air bases in Korea and Southwest Asia.
Page 652 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BARTLETT. What dollar figure or percent increase in the budget for the future will it take to make you whole as far as modernization is concerned?
General MUELLNER. The FY99 President's Budget (PB) reflects the outyear, FY00–FY03, budget requirements to support the Air Force time-phased, balanced modernization plan.
These figures represent that portion of the Air Force TOA which is directly managed by the Air Force. As such, this amount excludes such accounts as NFIP, SOF, and DHP. Percentage change is from previous year, and for FY99 the previous year is FY98 PB.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RODRIGUEZ
F–15C/D
Mr. RODRIGUEZ. General Muellner: I understand there is $17.8 million in the FY99 budget to continue F–15 C/D E-Kit modernization. How much additional funding is necessary to completely upgrade one F–15 C/D squadron in FY99?
General MUELLNER. At 18 aircraft per squadron, 45 engines (which include spares) are needed. Approximate total cost is $70.88M. Funding for FY99 is $17.76M to buy 13 Kits. Total–220E program Kit buy as planned, is for 241 kits at a total cost of $355.48M. After the planned upgrade, approximately 859–100/–200 engines will still remain to be upgraded. Approximate cost per engine in FY99 is $1.58M.
Page 653 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. RODRIGUEZ. General Muellner: Do you expect to modify all remaining F–15 squadrons with upgraded F100 PW–220E's? Will this include the Air National Guard? How long do you expect it will take to complete all squadrons?
General MUELLNER. No. After the planned upgrade, there will be approximately 859 –100/–200 engines without the upgrade. In addition, there is currently nothing in the budget for the conversion of National Guard Bases. There are seven ANG bases with –100s: New Orleans, Hickam, Otis, Portland, Bridgeton, Jacksonville and Kingsley. The current number of –100 engines for ANG bases is 320 of which 73 are spares. The following is the current schedule for the installation of the 241 Kits:
MAJCOMS scheduled for installs are: PACAF (150), USAFE (18) and ACC (73).
Subject to funding availability, kit installation can be accomplished at 60 per year starting in FY05 for ANG.
Mr. RODRIGUEZ. General Muellner: Since modified engines are more reliable and less expensive to maintain, and particularly in view of the accelerated operational temp over the next few years, would not accelerated acquisition benefit readiness, reduce support requirements and generally lower the cost of F–15 operations?
General MUELLNER. While there are obvious benefits to accelerating the –220E acquisition, the Department supports the President's FY99 Budget request. The –100 engine has significant operational deficiencies in comparison to the –220E which result in increased cost and reduced tactical advantage for the warfighter. Benefits to converting to the –220E include:
Page 654 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
(a) Lower air abort rate per 1000 engine flight hours (KEFH): .09/KEFH (–100) vs. .08/KEFH (–220E).
(b) Fewer Base maintenance man hours (MMH) —0— level per engine flight hour (EFH): .52/EFH (–100) vs. 0.37/EFH (–220E).
(c) Significantly lower unscheduled engine removals (UER) rate per KEHF: 2.81/KEFH (–100) vs. 1.82/KEFH (–220E).
REPORT OF THE LONG-RANGE AIR POWER REVIEW PANEL
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Procurement Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly With Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 1, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order.
Page 655 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
This morning the subcommittee meets to hear testimony from General Larry D. Welch, former commander in chief Strategic Air Command, and Air Force Chief of Staff, and current president of the Institute for Defense Analyses.
Because of his unique experience and expertise, General Welch was asked to chair the panel on Long-Range Air Power which was established by the fiscal year 1998 DOD Appropriations Act. This panel's charter was to ''evaluate the adduce of current planning for United States long-range air power and the requirement for continued low-rate production of B–2 stealth bombers.''
The panel recently issued its findings, all of which are of great interest to the subcommittee. It concluded that long-range air power is an increasingly important element of U.S. military capability, that the demand for long-range air power is likely to increase in the future, and that stealth significantly improves survivability against heavily defended targets.
At the same time, however, the panel concluded that the B–2 funding provided by Congress last year should be used to support and upgrade the existing fleet of 21 B–2 bombers rather than acquisition of additional aircraft. And I might add, if you read the unclassified summary of principal findings, you will see also that the panel recommended that the Department develop a plan to replace the existing force over time—and meaning to build bomber aircraft. And that could be done in one of several ways.
One, a variant of the B–2 incorporating upgrades that are suggested in the report and those that will emerge in the future for development of more advanced technologies that might lead to a better solution for the next generation aircraft, meaning, I presume, the B–3 bomber.
Page 656 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, General Welch, thank you for your leadership on this very important issue. And I think that this panel served the Nation very effectively in making an analysis that was one of the few analyses, from my view, that was not heavily influenced by politics. One that was done on the merits and one that looked at the bomber base and the fact that we are going to go out of business at some point in the future if we don't build new bombers.
And that came to the conclusion that we need to build new bombers, that we also need to upgrade and to make more effective the bomber force that we have right now. And you know, this subcommittee has had a program over the last several years, which I've called Armed Bombers, in which we've put additional precision-guiding munitions, especially into the President's budget, to make our bomber force effective including the entire array of bombers. You know, a lot of us, as we've looked at the force, which still is primarily comprised of B–52's, and we remember that in Operation Linebacker in 11 days and 19 closing days of 1972 that when we hit the heavy air defenses around Hanoi, we lost about 10 percent of the bomber force that we employed there in about 11 days including, I believe, 7 B–52's that went down the first day. And it's disturbed us that some 30-years-plus later, we are still to a large degree relying on that force which proved so vulnerable 30 years ago. And not just that force, but to some degree, the same aircraft. I think the last B–52 was manufactured in 1962.
So I think that this panel has been very timely. The constitution of this panel and your report has been a very timely thing, a very important analysis for our Nation.
We thank you, and we also noted that, you know, that one thing that's bothered us is the fact that in, I think, in 1962, we had 81 major overseas airbases and today we have 14. And a number of us have looked at the fact that we are spending over the next 15 years or so $350 billion on long-range—or on short-range aircraft, while we have a declining number of major overseas bases that accommodate short-range aircraft that can move in tactical fashion to their targets. So we've gone from 81 overseas bases to only 14 major overseas bases, and yet we're spending $350 billion in the 15 years on short-range aircraft. And presumably, under the Clinton administration's blueprint, not a dime on long-range aircraft. And you've addressed that concern and that issue.
Page 657 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So many of us agree with the conclusions of the panel on the importance of long-range air power and stealth. And it's precisely because we do understand the importance of a survivability long-range bomber force that can deliver precision-guided weapons that many of us have advocated continuing acquisition of the B–2.
And, consequently, I'm looking to your more detailed explanation of the panel's conclusions concerning additional B–2's. And I think it would also be useful to explore in more depth the panel's conclusions as they pertain to the future of the bomber force as a whole.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the appendix on page 565.]
Mr. HUNTER. So, with that brief introduction, let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, my good friend, Norm Sisisky.
Norm, for any comments you may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to you, General Welch. It's indeed an honor to have you before the committee. I was going to open with a question about April Fool's Day, but I decided not to do that.
Page 658 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
You know, Mr. Chairman, last night, imagine the response to language contained in the fiscal year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act. The President sent a message to the Congress—as a matter of fact, they read it—certifying that no additional B–2 aircraft shall be procured. This means the funds added for the B–2 Program last year are available, as you said, for modifications and improvements to the existing aircraft.
Today, our witness will testify to the conclusions of the panel to review long-range air power established by the Congress last year. As I understand it, the conclusions are the funds added last year should be used to improve the deployabilities, survivability, and maintainability of the current fleet of B–2's. The President and an independent panel are recommending the same thing. Thus, I'm hopeful that we can abide by the recommendations of the President and the panel as we prepare to mark up our fiscal year 1999 bill and avoid what has become an annual struggle over the B–2 Bomber Program.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming General Welch this morning, and I look forward to his testimony.
Thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank my good friend. I just want to remind him that there's one thing that the panel did recommend that the President did not recommend. The panel recommends that the Department develop a plan to replace the existing force over time, including a variant of the B–2 or development of more advanced technologies that might lead to a better solution of next generation aircraft, that presumably a B–3. So the difference, my good friend Mr. Sisisky, between the President and General Welch's panel is that General Welch's panel has made a recommendation for the future that will involve construction of new bomber aircraft. And I would hope that the President will look at that report carefully and that we can start planning together this body, and the administration, for a new bomber program.
Page 659 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Thank you for your statement and your brief commercial. And I do thank my good friend; we work together on these issues. Let me also recognize the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, Ike Skelton, from Missouri, for any statement he would like to make.
Mr. SKELTON. Well, I might say I miss being your ranking, but I'm enjoying what I'm doing, Duncan.
General Welch, thank you for being with us today. You continue to serve our country and we thank you for your leadership and your efforts in this regard. I must apologize, I will be bouncing between this committee and the Intelligence hearing. So if I walk out, you'll understand, sir. Thank you again for being with us. Thank you, Duncan.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ike. And if there's any other members of the panel who would like—the subcommittee—would like to make a statement, feel free. And if not, General Welch, thank you for the job you do for this country. You head a number of panels and one reason you do that is because we consider you an honest broker, one of that rare species of individual that the United States seems to have as a real asset in these times when we make difficult decisions on national defense. And, then you had a really excellent panel of very talented folks with a lot of integrity who—it was interesting—Democrats, Republicans, pro-B–2, anti-B–2 folks looked at your panel and said there are some people we can trust and rely on.
Thank you for being with us. The floor is yours.
Page 660 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
General WELCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've done an excellent job of summarizing the unclassified report, so I will just take a few minutes to talk about some of the conclusions that the panel arrived at as a result of hearing lots of information, some of it, of course, highly classified. And I'll briefly cover just five such conclusions that I think very, very much on the three recommendations that the panel finally made.
First, as you have mentioned, long-range air power is an increasingly important element of U.S. military capability. The heavy payloads in the long range of bomber aircraft have played a role in virtually every major conflict. But the additional precision-guided munitions to include stand-off munitions is transforming this bomber force from the ''aerial truck'' common to past employment of the bombers to a precision attack system. And that multiplies the potential of these bombers. And to realize this potential, there will also need to be major improvements in mission planning and in the command and control communications for controlling these bombers.
The second conclusion is that stealth characteristics markedly enhance the capability for survivable attack of defended targets. And that remains true, even though evolving modern air defenses available on the international arms markets have increasing capability against currently deployed levels of stealth. Hence, to continue to operate effectively in the face of these defenses, stealth has to be supplemented with other survivability features. Nonetheless, stealth aircraft operate at much lower levels of support than conventional aircraft and even small numbers of stealth aircraft can greatly leverage the capabilities of the remainder of the bomber force and of the tactical fighter forces. So this panel did not see a competition between long-range air power and other aircraft. We see long-range air power as a very important enabler of the overall force.
Page 661 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Third, it will take several years of upgrades to bring the current fleet of B–2 aircraft to more nearly its full potential. For example, key upgrades are needed to improve low observables maintainability, which will increase sortie rates, and to further enhance B–2 survivability features. We found reasonably mature proposals to achieve these goals. Some of these upgrades are underway now, and the panel felt very strongly that disrupting these upgrades would be ill-advised.
The fourth conclusion is that as the emerging long-range, high-payload, precision attack system is better integrated into operations' plans, there is likely to be an increasing demand for these capabilities. But to meet this demand, there is significant unrealized potential in the current bomber force, in numbers of aircraft that could be supported, in precision weapons payloads, in delivery accuracy, in survivability, and most important, in sortie rates. By using more of this potential is the most cost effective approach to attacking more targets with long-range aircrafts.
Finally, the Department needs a plan for maintaining the bomber force over the longer term. Numbers of airframes available will sustain the currently planned force for the next 15 years or so. And given smart upgrades, the B–1, B–2, and B–52 should remain effective platforms through at least 2030. Still, eventually the Department will need procurement to sustain this important capability. And given the very long lead times that we are experiencing, it's not too early to begin initial planning to sustain and replace this bomber force over time.
Those conclusions, along with others, lead to our three recommendations which you have already summarized and I will not repeat.
Page 662 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And I'm now ready for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Welch can be found in the appendix on page 569.]
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General Welch. And what I'm going to do is hold off my questions until we go through our subcommittee. So, Mr. Sisisky, do you have any questions?
Mr. SISISKY. I'm going to do the same thing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. General, I, too, join in thanking you for being here. I think a number of us are trying to struggle to see where we go in the short, medium, and long term with the bomber force, particularly given the controversy surrounding B–2—certainly since I've been here. Did I understand that your panel's general conclusion was we're probably OK for about 15 years with upgrades to existing airframes and that we probably have enough airframes with the B–52, the B–1's, and B–2's to be OK for about that period of time?
General WELCH. The panel reviewed a wide variety of studies conducted by the Department and by other people and arrived at that same conclusion. That is that given that we bring the B–2 fleet to more nearly its full potential—and I think we know how to do that—and given that we get on with putting precision weapons on the B–2 and the rest of the bomber force and leverage the potential of that existing force, then our conclusion was that we probably have adequate capabilities for the next 15 years. That is correct.
Page 663 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. THORNBERRY. Did the panel look at the future of the bomber force in terms of the cost to support it, the cost to defend it? As you, I'm sure, know, there are a number of writers and commentators who are talking about that say 15 or 20 years in the future, that really missiles are much more efficient. It prevents getting people into harms' way. You can deliver a bigger payload without the risk. And the cost of TACAIR and refueling and all the things required to operate a heavy bomber force means that it will become somewhat obsolete into the future. Did you all look at the role of heavy bombers out and into that sort of time frame?
General WELCH. Well, there was certainly not a charge to the panel, but there was a number of people on the panel who have paid a lot of attention to those issues over the years. I think the issue for this particular moment, or the issue that we address, is that the Nation has made a large investment in the bomber force. That we own it, and that we can leverage that large investment and get a very great payback for a number of years by continuing to make some additional investments in upgrading our force. So, I don't think any of us had any question in our minds that that's a very cost-effective approach. Now as to what transpires in the longer-term future, I don't think any of us can know that.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Did you look at any characteristics on what a next generation bomber might need to look at—affordability, some of the trade-offs that come into play as you try to look at designing a system out?
General WELCH. We looked at the affordability issue only in terms of the overall budget today and what kind of investment that it would take to make the two choices that we were given. As for the long-term affordability, there are a number of initiatives underway, as you well know, that could substantially reduce the cost of new airplanes. Now whether or not those will come to pass, the jury is still out. But beyond that, we didn't do enough of a detailed look at affordability for me to have anything very useful to say on that subject.
Page 664 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. THORNBERRY. OK. Thank you, General Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. And just a follow-up on Mr. Thornberry's question. One of your statements in the summary, General, is that current plans do not adequately address the long-term future of the bomber force. I take it that when you looked at the administration's blueprint there wasn't a blueprint for the long-term bomber force.
General WELCH. We could find nothing that we would characterize as a blueprint for the long-term bomber force.
Mr. HUNTER. OK, what would you—if you were going to advise this subcommittee which is going to have to start the planning, along with the National Security Committee and the full committee and the Research and Development Subcommittee [R&D], what would your advice be in terms of how we should approach this requirement for a next-generation bomber or the future of the bomber force?
General WELCH. Well, at the risk of being oversimplistic, I would simply ask, ''What's the plan?''
Mr. HUNTER. Well, what, in terms of once we say we haven't got a plan, which we—and we don't a plan, obviously—how would you go about addressing the problem or putting together a blueprint?
Page 665 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Well, I think, of course, that the primary service that you look to for this kind of force is the Air Force. And the Air Force has a long-term plan in process. I think you simply have to ask to see the long-term plan in process as it applies to bomber force.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Would you recommend a series of hearings with some—a good deal of notice and interaction with the Air Force?
General WELCH. I would never dare get into the business of running your business, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. OK, well I think that that's probably going to be in order to get into this issue.
The ranking member has left, but the chairman of the full committee is here, Mr. Spence. Mr. Spence, we're thankful that you've attended this very important hearing. Thank you for being with us, sir. And if at any time you have any questions, the mike is yours.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, General Welch, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to test one idea. I mean, when we do as you have done, a report strictly on the bomber force, obviously, it's a very critical component of our national defense.
But I'm struck by the fact that compared to the decisions that we struggle with most of the time here—how to deal with TACAIR, how to deal with theater and national ballistic missile defense—it strikes me—and I guess I'm asking for your reaction to this—that the bomber force right now is more stable, more comprehensive for the missions for which it is designed than most other aspects of our forces. Whether you're talking about personnel or infrastructure or the major weapons issues that come before this committee—TACAIR, missile defense, it strikes me that the bomber force is stable. And that if we talk about long-range planning, we are talking about long-range planning, because for the foreseeable future we got a force that is adequate to our needs. And I'm not trying to put words into your mouth, I'm just asking for a reaction to that point of view.
Page 666 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Well, if I understand the question correctly, the fact is that in spite of all the controversy that has surrounded various aspects of the bomber force, it is a fact that we've made very wise investments in the bomber force in the past. And it is also a fact of life that these kinds of aircraft have a long life. They have a long life because of the design of the airframe and the employment of the airframe. And they can have a long life because they are far more easily upgraded than smaller aircraft that operate in different environments. So all of those things do add up to a bomber force that, in spite of some of the impressions, is not an old force.
Now I understand that when you say that about the B–52, that raises eyebrows. But the B–52 so far has used less than half of its expected airframe life. So what it takes to keep this force viable and alive is first, it does take constant upgrades. It takes continuous upgrades. And second, they're not going to last forever. You are going to—and there is very long lead time to replace or improve this force. So that does require attention.
Now, none of those things that I've just described are so characteristic of the fighter force. It's a much more dynamic force that operates in a different environment. The aircraft would operate off of aircraft carriers; obviously, increase complexity.
And when it comes to theater missile defense force, that's a brand-new business. There is no force. So we're in the business of creating a force; we're in the business of doing something that we've never done before. And that obviously carries with it enormous complexity. So I don't know if that helps or not, but that's about——
Page 667 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. ALLEN. That does help, General, and I appreciate the response. With the chairman's leave, I know that General Welch is not here today to deal with the question of his recent report on missile defense. Would it be appropriate to ask one question in that area?
Thank you very much.
In your report on missile defense which came out recently, you indicated that high-schedule risks and inadequate test assets and testing planned in the ''3 + 3'' formulation on the planned schedule is highly unlikely. Do you concur that there is high risk in the ''3 + 3'' national missile defense plan? And could you address the concern that I have that grows out of your report that if we push national missile defense faster than the technology will allow, we are increasing the risk that we will get a less adequate system at higher costs? And if you simply address that portion of that report, I'd appreciate it.
General WELCH. Well, let me preface it by saying that if you look at the panel of people that produced that report, that panel is characterized almost exclusively by people who feel strongly that we need ballistic missile defense and people who recognize that there is an urgent need to field ballistic missile defense. So everything that we had to say was in the context of a commitment to field in this capability as fast as it can be fielded, but with not trying to attempt to field it faster than it can be fielded because that leads to these test failures. And test failures, inevitably, lead to long delays.
So, the characterization, or any characterization that we want to delay the program is quite wrong. That we want to see it field it as rapidly as it can be fielded. I don't know anyone in the business who won't say to you unequivocally that the ''3 + 3'' schedule is high risk. The Director of BMDO will tell you its high risk. The people who are executing the program will tell you its high risk. We all accept that that's a high-risk program with the hope of fielding it as early as possible. What the panel said is that we are adding excessive risk to that program, and it has reached the point where we think the risk is counterproductive.
Page 668 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. ALLEN. Just in layman's terms, could you—and this is my last question—in layman's terms, could you describe what high risk involves? What are the risks you're describing of too rapid the development?
General WELCH. Well, one of the characteristics of the panels that I chair, Mr. Congressman, is that we focus very much on the question we're asked. And the question we were asked had to do with test risk. And the reason why test risk is of such great concern is that excessive test failures excessively delay programs. And so our risk assessment, as we were laying it out, had to do with the test program that's laid out for the first phase of the National Missile Defense [NMD] Program, and we felt that the risk associated with that test schedule and the probability that we would successfully—that those tests would be successful enough to make the kind of decision that's being looked for in 2000. We felt the probability of success was very low.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.
General WELCH. But it had to do with the test.
Mr. ALLEN. I understand. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Since you digressed on this, Mr. Allen, let me follow up on a conversation I had with you, General Welch. As I understand it, you think that the panel thought that we should do a lot of simulations and a lot of component testing before these tests. And that we actually needed to spend more assets and do a more robust simulation program and component testing program. Is that right?
Page 669 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Yes, sir. We felt that there needed to be a significantly more robust ground testing to include simulation and component qualification.
Mr. HUNTER. OK, I just want to make it clear to my colleague before he leaves that line of testing or questioning that the answer—that at least that I received and that you've just manifested in your answer there—isn't that we shouldn't spend money on this program, but it's that the testing that is having full-up testing without having spent a lot of resources and a lot of time on the component testing and the simulation in which we can put more money is less productive. And that that component testing and simulation is the foundation for these full-up tests. So, the answer isn't slow down the program. And I think that's why General Welch said, ''I'm telling you about testing.'' And his answer was limited to testing. We actually put more money in these other aspects of the program and probably do a better job of it. Is that an accurate characterization?
General WELCH. Absolutely.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General.
Let me now recognize Mr. Ryun. Back to the B–2.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Welch, thank you for your time this morning. I want to comment, first, on the B–52. I happen to have the privilege—my father—I'm from Wichita originally, so I not only remember the B–52 but the B–47, so I feel like I've dated myself a little bit. However, in your opening comments, you mentioned that you felt that these three aircraft—the B–1, the B–2, and the B–52—would be our range of long-range bombers until 2030.
Page 670 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
My question is this; it's actually two-fold. One, when we get to 2030—and let's say beyond—are we going to be looking at three components for our long-range bombers? Now, because we have three different aircraft now. Having said that, if we are, and we are dropping the B–52, at that point, which will have lived a very long life of almost 80 years, what will we do with the fewer number of bombers that are available since we'd be giving up a large sum of aircraft?
General WELCH. Well, in responding to the specific considerations that we were asked to consider, we really looked at the overall health of the force for the next 15 years. That's what we were asked to do. And for the next 15 years, that's not a consideration. For the longer term, we looked hard at the analysis that's been done on what's the—first, airframe life of these airplanes, and then what's the prospects for keeping these airplanes viable and useful over that period of time.
So, I wouldn't want to give the impression that we think you can maintain this triad of bombers at their current capability up to 2030 and then that's the end of it; that's not the case. Certainly, we're fairly confident that for the next 15 years you can maintain that bomber force. Now after that, you're going to begin to have shortfalls.
And one of the things that we specifically think is missing from the planning, or at least we were unable to find it, is—what is the planned requirement for numbers beyond that time? So all the comments that we made about the adequacy of the numbers of airplanes to support the force assume that the current plan numbers are the right numbers. Now I can't tell you if the current plan numbers are the right numbers. But that's the assumption that we made.
Page 671 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So all of these issues about what is the right number of long-range bombers out in that time period, and what would that family consist of, were issues that we think need to be addressed. But we certainly didn't have the time or the competence for the charter to address those.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Ryun. Mr. Ryun, just to take off on your question. So your point is, General, that at the end of 15 years we need to have something else in place?
General WELCH. I really can't answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I can tell you that viability beyond that 15 years is pretty dim. And you certainly need to have a plan that has done a far more careful study of what happens beyond that time period. And certainly, if you wait very much longer to begin to address the issue, you're going to be late to need.
Mr. HUNTER. How long does it take to develop a bomber and delta bomber?
General WELCH. Well, if you look at past history, you would say that 15 years is—I'm not convinced you can't do it faster than that, but if you look at past history, 15 years is not optimistic, or pessimistic, excuse me.
Page 672 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. In layman's language, that says to me that we need to get started.
General WELCH. We think you need to get started on the initial plan. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. We're pleased to have Ms. Harman with us today on the panel, too. And without objection, we're going to include her in the testimony. She's been a very valuable member of this full committee.
Our next questioner is Mr. Taylor, and then we'll do one Republican and then Ms. Harman.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind, I'm going to yield.
Mr. HUNTER. Then go right ahead.
Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Taylor's trying to get on my good side. That's why he did that. [Laughter.]
General, as I think you know, I have long felt that the B–2 bomber was a critical asset for the United States to protect our national security. I'm obviously somewhat disappointed in your findings, because my preference would be continued B–2 production. My question relates to the timing of your report: if you had been asked to do this report two years ago or so when the B–2 line was still up, would you have made the same recommendations?
Page 673 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. I have no idea. Let me tell you why I say that. This panel in receiving the amount of information we received converged on a unanimous set of recommendations. This was not a unanimous kind of panel. This was a panel made up of people with very different persuasions and a very wide divergence of views. And so the set of factors that led this widely divergent panel to arrive at a unanimous set of recommendations is the full set of factors.
And one of those factors is that there is no production line. You know, the last major assemblies were delivered in 1994, and the last airplane was delivered last year. Now, whether or not that is a compelling difference, I simply can't speak for the other eight members of the panel. It would have made a difference to me.
Ms. HARMAN. It would have made—that's what—in your personal opinion what would the fact be?
General WELCH. It would have made a difference to me, yes.
Ms. HARMAN. And so if you had been involved in this panel 2 years, you might personally have reached a different conclusion.
General WELCH. I might have.
Ms. HARMAN. Right.
Page 674 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. But, let me add one point to that. Is that even as much as I thought I knew about the bomber programs, and even as much as I thought that I knew about stealth, and the fact that I've had all these clearances for a long time, even I had a number of surprises as we were exposed to the full set of information regardless of compartments. So I just simply know a lot more than I knew two years ago, also. So that's why I'm giving you this fuzzy, complex answer because it's a fuzzy, complex issue.
Ms. HARMAN. Well, I certainly would agree with that. Let me just ask you a different question about forward bases. I know you have some recommendations for making sure they are more functional in the future; I may have missed this because I arrived late. But my question is, in geopolitical terms, did your group assess the stability of forward basing in the future given how uncertain our world is and some of rouge actors in it? And what were your findings?
General WELCH. We were specifically asked to consider the possibility of a lockout from forward bases and the impact of that. One of the conclusions that you arrive at very quickly is that even long-range bombers will not be very effective in a demanding situation if they have to operate from reconnaissance. It's too long a sortie. It does too much violence to the sortie rate. And to provide the weight of effort that you need in a large contingency from these precision-attack systems which long-range bombers are becoming, you need to drastically shorten that mission and drastically increase the sortie rate, which means you do need forward bases for long-range bombers. Now clearly those forward bases can be more removed from the threat so they don't face all the same threats as the tactical bases. But, nonetheless, you do have to have forward bases.
Page 675 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
On the other end, along with that, bombers require a great deal more support to be effective from forward bases. So you have to pay more attention to ensuring that you have the right kind of support and the right kind of capabilities. And there are limited numbers in forward bases that really are suitable for these large aircraft operating off of them.
So, from a strategic viewpoint, within the confines of the classification of this hearing, clearly there are two very important forward bases that I think all of us have great confidence in that are suitable for bombers, and one in each theater. Now, certainly there are more than that, but we can easily name two that we have great confidence that they're going to be available to us and that we probably should be putting some investment in ensuring that they have the right kind of support.
In the end, we concluded that you can't simply withdraw from the need for forward bases and that the Department has to address how you defend those forward bases and how you deal with certain kinds of weapons of mass-destruction attacks.
Ms. HARMAN. Right.
Mr. HUNTER. Biological, chemical—those kind of attacks are a grave concern wherever your forward base is. In fact, some of those attacks are of grave concern at U.S. bases.
Ms. HARMAN. Oh, I agree with that. Last comment, though, if the Chairman doesn't come in ahead of me in terms of support. Long-range bombers with stealth capability may need a lot of support on the ground, but they need less support in the air. And so, it's a trade-off. And for some of us who have been fighting this battle for years and years and years, we saw—and still see—the B–2 as a singular opportunity to protect U.S. national security because of its characteristics. And I'm sad that we apparently, won't have more, but I intend to continue to advocate for upgrading these and for using these because I think they are far and away a better product than the other alternatives, you know, in terms of our future national security needs.
Page 676 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Harman, and just to ask for—you didn't put a question in your last statement, but I think that's a good question for the General. Is the B–2 an effective bomber? And, is it quite a bit more effective than, in a number of ways, than its brothers in the force—that is the B–52 and the B–1?
General WELCH. Let me respond first to the comment that while B–2's take a lot more support on the ground, they take much less support in the air. I think there's an opportunity to make B–2's not take much more support on the ground. And one of the very strong recommendations of the panel was that we make the investments necessary to drastically improve low-observable's maintainability, and that can be done. If you visit Whiteman and spend some time with the maintenance troops at Whiteman, who are all dedicated, hard-working troops, then you will become dedicated to improving the maintainability of this airplane. And it can be done.
And because it has these unique characteristics that is even this fairly small force of airplanes can provide such an enormous leverage to the rest of the force because it has unique capabilities, it's even more important that we leverage this force by insuring that it fly higher sortie rates and that it can be there when you need it. So even a little force of 21 airplanes is quite a small force, but what that force can do for the rest of the force, as well as what it does on its own is what makes it, in my view, such an important part of the force.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you just yield for one comment? I just hope we bottle that last answer. I think that was a very important answer and I thank you for putting what I had to say into a question.
Page 677 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Harman. Because you know, General, we've had a spate of stories—the cartoon with the B–2 not flying in the rain—and, really, press stories that sold a lot of print and a lot of newspaper, but when we got the briefings from the testing folks were just totally off the mark.
I think it's important for Democrats, Republicans, conservatives, liberals, pro-defense, anti-defense folks who trust you and your panel—as you said, ''a panel put together by the President and by the Congress''—that we deal this thing down. In your estimation, then, the B–2 is a highly-effective aircraft with a lot of value to the country. Is that right?
General WELCH. In my estimation, let me say this very carefully. The B–2, clearly, has a potential to provide a very unique capability. As it stands today, the B–2 is a valuable asset, but it has nothing like the value that it ought to have. And we know who to give it that value with these upgrades and improvements that, in our view, are quite mature, and that's why we stressed in our report that only the $174 million in 1998 is needed to keep the force going, but the $157 million should be dedicated to improving low-observables maintainability.
And that currently is, in our view, the largest need to make this aircraft capable of more fully realizing this potential. I don't think there is any question about the value of the B–24's. But it needs this continued attention in order to realize that potential.
Page 678 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. OK, and it also needs precision-guided munitions——
General WELCH. Exactly.
Mr. HUNTER. Do you think our Arm the Bomber Program is on the mark that this subcommittee has been working on—and full committee?
General WELCH. Yes, sir. Our view was that the new joint family of precision weapons—the Joint Stand Off Weapon, [JSOW], the Joint Direct Attack Munition, [JDAM] and the Joint Air to Surface Strike Missile, [JASSM]—are a very valuable contribution to the overall effectiveness of all the bomber force to include the B–2. In looking at those munitions plans, as noted in the report and in the unclassified summary, we found no fault with the emphasis the Department is putting on that with the exception that we thought there ought to be more emphasis on the JASSM, that is the Joint Air to Surface Strike Missile. Thank you.
Mr. Pappas.
Mr. PAPPAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for being here. The question of morale of our uniformed personnel is something that we talk an awful lot about. In your opening statement, you mentioned that 2030 could be the year up until which a combination of B–52's, B–1's, and B–2's could be utilized. Could you elaborate a bit on what combination of each of those may be in use through that time? And then, also, what effect could usage of B–52's for an extended period of time have on retention and attraction of pilots which, I'm sure you know, is a problem?
Page 679 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. If you assume a static situation, which I think is a wrong assumption, the only way I can answer your question would be to assume a static situation beyond the 15-year period. But based on the past decade's experience, not based on the models—the models are far more optimistic about the numbers of airplanes you'll lose—but if you base it on the past 10 year's of experience, then we will begin to run out of B–1's in that 15-year period.
And all I'm doing now is comparing the available airframes to the current plans for the numbers of those aircraft that will be maintained. And so, we will begin to have a shortfall of B–1's within the 15-year period. That there will be adequate B–52's to last far beyond that simply because there are far more airframes than we are currently planning to maintain in the primary force. Now we have no experience on the B–2. It's very clear that, given the value of the B–2, the B–2 will be operated in a very conservative manner. But, nonetheless, we have no experience on the B–2. But at the current time there is no electrician reserve, so as to the numbers we only concluded you could maintain the overall numbers for about the next 15 years. And after that, you'll begin to see some deterioration.
The morale issue is a far more complex issues. No one will deny that air crews like new airplanes. And I've spent a lot of years as an air crew and I flew a lot of new airplanes, and I was always thrilled to death to be one of the first ones to fly the new airplane. On the other hand, I also chair the Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Surety which takes me to Minot, ND, about twice a year. And I can tell you the crews that fly the B–52 in Minot, ND, are immensely proud of what they do. And, in some cases, they take more pride in the fact that they have a tougher job. Because that older airplane takes a bigger crew, it's harder to extract its performance than it is in the newer airplanes. And they take enormous pride in what they do everyday.
Page 680 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Will there be a retention problem? If there is, I don't think it will be because we have old airplanes. The retention problem will be for a dozen other reasons that we all well understand.
Mr. PAPPAS. Thank you. Just a comment to follow up. I don't dispute the sense that our pilots are proud, and we're proud to support them whenever we can. But it seems that Federal Government—really, just about any level of government—but in the Federal Government you hear from employees that, ''Gosh, you have a new computer that's available.'' And if something's 6 months or 1 year old, people are upset and frustrated because they don't have the newest technology available to them. And I think we try to accommodate that to make our personnel as efficient as possible. And yet, at times, there are other incidences with equipment that were not always as responsive.
One other general question, maybe not to what we've just spoken of, but just a comment about panels such as the one that you're chairing. How effective do you think panels such as this are? And I'm wondering if you know how much the panel that you serve on costs? What expenses are involved?
General WELCH. Well, I would have to leave the effectiveness to other people. Let me say, I certainly never seek such opportunities and most of the time I don't even welcome them. But I can assure you that this panel was dirt cheap. [Laughter.]
Mr. PAPPAS. Can I ask one other question? It may not be pertinent to this, but since we have you here, one of the things that we hear from many people, from the Secretary of Defense to the secretary and acting secretaries of the various services, that one of the things that would be important for the bigger picture for financing our operations is two additional rounds of BRAC. And I'm wondering if you have an opinion on that?
Page 681 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. I have lots of opinion on that. They have really nothing to do with this subject.
Mr. PAPPAS. OK, thank you. [Laughter.]
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON Mr. Chairman, thank you. General, thank you for being with us today. General, I guess I'd like to ask the question to which I suspect I know at least part of the answer. As I look at the members of the panel that you served with, I see the name of Don Rice. And when I see the name of Don Rice, I think of B–2. But I also see the name of General McPeak and General Rutherford. And when I think of General McPeak and General Rutherford, I think of airlift—at least that was the job from which they retired.
And so I guess I'd like to ask you a question about B–2 in the context of air power, generally, and I guess what I would like to see is that your panel had a specific job to do and we're more general in trying to sort out what it is that we should spend the scarce dollars that we have on in terms of our priorities. Obviously, for example, we need to worry about funding for the F–22; we need to worry about funding for the joint strike fighter; the Marines, obviously, would like us to ramp up the procurement for the new tiltroter aircraft, you know, and we understand all that. When I think of General McPeak and General Rutherford, I think of my days here working with Mr. Hunter, Ms. Harman, and others on the C–17, and I understand that General Cross has recommended the 120, plus another 15 or 20 aircraft for a special mission which is an extremely important mission. A week or so ago, I traveled out to Travis AFB to be briefed on why we need to modernize the C–5 which is about a $400 million a year ticket. And, of course, that's to say nothing of the readiness issues that Mr. Pappas was talking about.
Page 682 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And this afternoon at 1 o'clock, I'm going to meet with a young lady by the name of Monica Sindridge, who is a friend of mine and whose husband was among the crew members in that 141 that went down off of Africa not long ago, and she's coming in to talk to me about the Terminal Collision Avoidance System, [TCAS]. So within the framework of all the needs that we have relative to just air power—I mean, this morning at 9 o'clock, I met with some people who think that the notion of discontinuing the M–1A2 tank and 03 and 04 is crazy.
So, within the framework of all these things that we need to do, how do we allocate our resources the most effectively? And I don't say this is any way to denigrate or to down the B–2. I voted for the B–2 right beside Mr. Hunter every year since I've been here. But it leaves us with the resourcing that we have available, it leaves us with—what I think—an impossible job to do. And I just would like to have your response to that.
General WELCH. Well, I want to make a couple of comments. You know, obviously, my panel nor myself are in any position to make judgments on the overall priorities within a department. You wouldn't expect us to. But the first thing I would comment on, and I have said this to my—I guess by third removed successor in the office that I used to occupy—that I thought I had a very complex life when I occupied that office. And compared to his life, I had a very simple set of things to deal with. But the demands on today's defense forces, today's military forces, in the far more complex world that we live in are wildly different. Far more variable than they were when I was responsible for helping to make those kinds of decisions.
So that, furthermore, it's very clear that we have lived for a number of years off of past years off of past investments. Certainly in the case of bomber force, the good news is that we can afford to do that for a few more years. You can't—it's not free; there has to be some additional investments. But, by and large, in a bomber force we can afford to live off past investments for a few more years. In the other forces, we have lived off those investments probably beyond the time when we should have done that. That's part of the reason why the Department is making such an effort to increase procurement funding as you all know. So that while it's quite frustrating to people in your position that now we have all of these needs, the fact is that we are reaping the legacy of having lived off past investments longer than we should have.
Page 683 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SAXTON Well, thank you, General. Let me ask you another question which is, I think, directly related but slightly on a different track. Over the past year or so, I have become more and more aware of what Secretary Chaney said when he sat in this room in—I think it was 1990—he said when the Soviet Union goes away the threat will change. Then he said, ''Notice what I said. The threat will change.'' He said, ''I didn't say the threat's going to go away.'' And we see more and more evidence that that's correct.
One of the areas of the world which is, in my view, extremely dangerous currently is the Far East, particularly with regard to some studies that some of us have been doing relative to the threat posed by Korea. If you were, sir, able to order up a deterrent relative to the Korean threat, how would you proceed to say, here is a list of things from the most important on down that we ought to do relative to that situation?
General WELCH. Well, certainly, high on the list of things you would concern yourself with is the threat of weapons of mass destruction of North Korea. And I, specifically, have reference to chemicals, but also the other weapons of mass destruction. And that's part of the reason, of course, why there's such a sense of urgency at fielding some defense against those kinds of things. But I certainly don't have anything on my list that doesn't already appear on the Department of Defense's list of high priorities, in terms of handling any one of those contingencies. In fact, if you were to list the whole series of threatening situations that's faced by the country, the two situations that we probably feel the best about are the two major theater wars that we base our planning on. And that's, of course, Korea and Southwest Asia simply because we have devoted the most attention to how to deal with those threats. It doesn't mean we're satisfied with our capabilities, but at least there's a fairly clear understanding of what the priorities ought to be. So I really have nothing to add to the Department's priorities on that score.
Page 684 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SAXTON Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Saxton, appreciate it.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for what you've done over the years for the country, for serving on this panel, and for being here today. The B–2 final assembly has been done in my district in Palmdale. And when I first ran for Congress in 1992, I went out there and visited and, of course, the building was full of various stages of planes in production. Now, as I go out there and visit, it's an empty building or maybe there would be a plane in there being upgraded. And, the tooling has all been ''moth-balled'' or done away with. But maybe you could tell me when, from the thought of the first B–2 to the delivery of the first plane, when was that? What was the time frame?
General WELCH. Well, I'd put it exactly around we were flying the predecessor in the late 1970's, that is the technology demonstrator.
Mr. MCKEON. So about 15, 16 years?
General WELCH. Yes, I don't remember when we got the first delivery. OK, so the dates are July 1989, first flight; December 1993, first production delivery. So that's 23 years.
Page 685 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. MCKEON. Twenty-three years.
General WELCH. No.
Mr. MCKEON. From the first flight, there would have been some thought that went into it before that. That would have been from the late 1970's.
General WELCH. It's about 15 years from the technology demonstrator to the first production airplane.
Mr. MCKEON. But before that flight of the—or the technology demonstration, there was planning and some work that went into it a few years, I would imagine. So even if we could do it in 15 years, from your report, we're now behind because we don't even have a plan. We have not even given the thought to what the replacement would be. And I know when we were going through debate as to whether we should have more, I remember some of the opponents of the B–2 were saying that there would be some other kind of bomber. We would have a new plane developed. Do you know what the research and development and tooling costs were for the B–2?
General WELCH. No, I don't. I don't have that number. I'm sure the Air Force can provide it.
Mr. MCKEON. I think the number that I've heard is about $40 billion. I'm not sure.
Page 686 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. The total program costs for the B–2, to date, is $44 billion. That's the total cost for the 21 airplanes.
Mr. MCKEON. That's right. So it would be maybe $20 billion—20 would be more accurate. My concern is when we could not come up with the—I think in the last Congress we were talking $90 billion—you said your latest number here was $14 billion from Northrup to build 9 more aircraft. That's because from the last time we were talking about this, there has been more shut down. And every month that goes by it would cost more to bring the production line back. But in the last Congress or the last time we went around this, we were talking about $9 billion for 9 more aircraft. And I know now, it's kind of gotten out of sight.
But even at that, if we did spend the money for re-tooling and for starting all over and even took this latest number of the $14 billion for the 9 additional aircraft, $14 billion would give us 9 planes. And if we start from scratch now and start to plan for what we do 15 years from now, and then that plan includes building a plane and doing some research and development, and if we were able to do it for the same costs as the B–2, then we would have another $20 billion of R&D before we tool up to start a plane.
So, to my way of thinking, it looks to me like the B–2 would still be the cheapest bomber that we could build, even if we had to start all over with retooling and getting the production line going and all the other things. We could spend $14 billion and have 9 more planes. Even if it took us to the year 2005. As you say, it's probably optimistic to come up with a start of all that and have the first plane roll off. I would imagine that plane would be the latest that we're talking about now if we're going—you're talking about putting the $174 million and the $157 million into upgrading the planes that we have now. I imagine, in the $14 billion that probably includes all of that. It would be the latest models, block 30 or block 40 aircraft that would come off the line.
Page 687 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
What is the risk of not spending that money? Not spending the $174 or the $157 billion and doing the upgrades? What is the downside risk of not bringing the B–2 up to its full potential and not going forward with these modifications?
General WELCH. Well, the reason I'm pausing is classification. I don't like to make that claim, but neither am I going to say something in an open hearing that has something to say about capability.
Mr. MCKEON. And I'm not asking for that.
General WELCH. So, let me say that—let me just give you the panel's view which was stated absolutely unequivocally in the report. And the panel said that doing anything to disrupt the upgrade programs would be extremely ill-advised. That is, it was our strong feeling that it would really be a very bad decision to not do the work needed to make these 21 airplanes reach their potential. Because if that work is not done, they clearly will not serve the purpose that you would hope that it would serve. So just let me leave it there.
Regarding the $14 billion for the 9 airplanes, I would say a couple of things about that. One is I don't want to grabble about the validity of the proposal except to point out that proposal did not have the backing of the major sub-assembly. In other words, it did include a commitment from the major sub-assembly producers because they're not in that business anymore. And it did not include any commitment by the vendors, 75 percent of which are not in the business any more. But if you accept that at face value, there was no member of this panel even the most advocate supporters of the B–2 who thought that you ought to spend $14 billion for 9 airplanes. That indeed if you're going to buy more B–2's, you would not buy nine B–2's. Nor did we feel that a low-rate production line was the way you want to buy more airplanes. That's the most expensive way to buy more airplanes. So, regarding that particular proposal, the only reason it's in the report is it's the only number we had, and we were asked to say something about affordability.
Page 688 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
A very pejorative way to look at that, which is not in the report, is that you'd be paying $4 billion for the next airplane. That's the cost of the next airplane. And if you don't do these upgrades they were talking about for that $14 billion and 9 airplanes, you'd be buying for little sortie rate. So it's much more cost-effective. If you believe that you need more B–2's, what you really mean is you want more B–2 sorties. You want more B–2's over targets. And the way to get more B–2's over targets is to fix the airplanes so that you have the sortie rate that you ought to have. That was the reason why, in spite of the fact that we went through all those same numbers you quote, we, nonetheless, concluded unanimously that the way to get the capability is to bring these airplanes to their potential.
Mr. MCKEON. May I just summarize, then, that it sounds to me like you're saying that, your recommendation is that, for sure, we spend the $157—$174 and upgrade these planes to their full potential. Would that be sufficient to do that? Would that bring all 21 planes up to their full potential?
General WELCH. Oh, no, sir.
Mr. MCKEON. That's just——
General WELCH. That's the 1998 funding. There will need to be a continuing stream of funding over several years in order to complete the upgrades on these aircraft.
Mr. MCKEON. At about the $150 level a year or——
Page 689 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. I don't know, sir.
Mr. MCKEON. OK, but your recommendation would be that as a minimum we should do that.
General WELCH. Absolutely. You have a very large investment in these airplanes. You have the potential of having a very, very valuable fleet of capabilities here. And the additional investment is a good deal.
Mr. MCKEON. So at minimum we should do that. And as a minimum we should immediately ask for a plan for what you do at the end of 15 years?
General WELCH. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. McKeon. Let me just expand on that. Mr. McKeon's question was to the extent-or with respect to the money that you recommended we use for upgrading the effectiveness of the current B–24's which is the $300-plus million that we authorized and appropriated last year. And you said we definitely need to use that for the upgrading of the capability of the existing force. Now you understand, General Welch, that money was not in the President's budget. I mean, that's money that we put in above and beyond the President's budget, initially and presumably to build more B–2's. So you're saying that the amount of dollars that the President's budget had planned for upgrading was, in itself, inadequate.
Page 690 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. Have you looked at the administration's blueprint for upgrades that exist today? For the next three or several years?
General WELCH. We have. We looked at two levels—we actually looked at three levels. We looked at all of the current upgrades that are recommended by the Air Force that are funded or that are in the request for funds. We looked at additional upgrades recommended by the Air Force that are not in the request for funds. And then we looked at some upgrades that are recommended by others to include Northrup that we strongly felt should be funded. Let me be sure I'm clear. Of the $331 million, $174 million was in the President's budget. A good part of that should not be characterized as being for upgrades. A good part of that is just for the routine continuation of maintaining the airplanes. The $157 million that was added by the Congress—that's the part that we said should go to get started on the LO maintainability and those other kinds of improvements. The Air Force plan is to use that $157 million for those purposes.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, I understand that. But until we appropriate it, until this committee put that money in, presumably to start new B–2's, it didn't exist.
General WELCH. That's quite true.
Mr. HUNTER. So you're saying that absent that plan, the President's program for upgrading B–2 was inadequate.
Page 691 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. That's the panel's conclusion.
Mr. HUNTER. So, is the blueprint that we have in place now, the administration's—I'm just trying to get a feel for where we should go, where you folks think we should go with respect to additional dollars for the upgrading that we speak of, and that you speak of, in the classified report. You feel that we need to spend additional dollars put in congressional adds above and beyond the President's program with respect to upgrading and arming the bomber force.
General WELCH. Well, me—you know—let me repeat—not to be repetitious, but we were presented with proposals and initiative by the Air Force that we thought constituted a fairly robust upgrade program. There were some additional improvements that we thought could be combined with the Air Force program that we were briefed on. There were some additional improvements that we recommended be included in that program. As to what to the state of the Air Force program that was presented to us—as to what the state of that program is in the Department of Defense approval process, I don't know.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Well, I think our point is, we want to be able to get a fix on the—since you're a very valuable panel. I think you've done a good service to the country. We want to get a fix on where you think we should be with respect to the upgrade program. Because we, obviously, want it to be as robust as it needs to be. To leverage, since the point of your report is that we should leverage the existing force and render it more effective and efficient with our dollars. We want to do that. We may need to consult a little bit later with you on this. We get to get a fix on that.
Page 692 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We're privileged to have Mr. Norm Dicks with us who has been a real student of our bomber force and bomber strategy. And without objection, we will ask Mr. Dicks to ask some questions and make some comments. Thank you for being with us, Norm.
Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to say first of all that I appreciate the great leadership that Congressman Hunter and this committee has provided on this very important subject in national security. And I want to thank General Welch and his entire commission for doing a job under extraordinary short time frame. And, frankly, I thought it was an outstanding report. Obviously, I wished that the commission had believed, as I believe, that we should still keep the production line open. But, except for that one point which is an important one, I think what you have done is render a very important service to the country. First of all, I was, frankly, shocked a couple of years ago when I asked John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, about what our plan was for a follow-on bomber and the future of the bomber force. And in essence, he said, ''Well, we're never going to build another bomber again.'' Now, as far as I'm concerned, if you look at the United States Air Force, its reason for existence is long-range power projection and epitomized by bombers.
And I believe that the lack of a plan, and the commission pointed out that we need to have a plan for future. And you lay it out to alternatives. You can go back, preserve the tooling, and reopen the B–2 line, build more B–2's. Or, you could go and have a new development, a new program for the future. Isn't that basically correct?
General WELCH. Those are the alternatives we saw at the moment.
Page 693 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. DICKS. Right. The other point here was that, for the first time, we got an honest look at bombers and the importance of bombers, especially when you think about bombers with stealth and combining them with precision-guided weapons. And I quote from the report: ''With the addition of precision-guided munitions, this force can now attack multiple discreet targets with high effectiveness, fundamentally altering the role of bombers.'' And the point being that in the past, we only had basically dumb bombs. And bombers would carry them in, drop them, but without the precision that we now have and without the stealth that we now have. So all of a sudden these bombers can be much more effective.
And, frankly—I'm not speaking for the commission—I don't think this has been properly evaluated by the Department of Defense. I think there are elements within the Air Force who have an appreciation for this and who have tried to advocate it, but in the spirit of jointness of been slapped down, especially in the QDR process because it made bombers look too potentially good and effective for the future.
And our job up here on the Congress, in my judgment, is to think about the future. And I'm afraid that the Defense Department has been so wrapped up in budget wars and divided up the money among the services that we're not getting the kind of look to the future about what capabilities we're going to need and how take advantage of our asymmetrical advantages and our technological superiority. And I think stealth precision-guided weapons, bombers, have a tremendous role to play, especially in the early-going of any one of these conflicts.
So I, frankly, also agree with the report in that first of all, all the independent studies showed 40 to 60 bombers was the right number. This was done by Brand, General, Jasper Welsh, and I asked about JDAM and JSOW. I said, ''What did you recommend to Chaney when he went to 21 or 20?'' He said, ''I recommended 50.''
Page 694 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, I mean, that would be the right number of these bombers if we had the resources to do it. Now, the point that's important here today that I really want to emphasize is this idea of upgrading increasing sortie rate. Because that's why you need the greater number is to increase sortie rate. And I think what you're saying in this report is that there are a number of things that we can do to increase the sortie rate of the B–2's. And that that is the thing that we should take our money and add it to so that we can fly those things in, fly them out, fix out whatever has to be fixed up, load them up again with more precision weapons, and go right back in. And that sortie rate is what is important. Is that—have I got this figured right?
General WELCH. That's absolutely correct.
Mr. DICKS. And so the other thing that you recommend—and this is another issue that this committee is going to have to address—and that is the fact that the reality is that these surface-to-air missiles are proliferating throughout the entire world. And so having a system like JASSM which gives you a standoff capability and I don't think that's—but I'll just leave it that way—a significant standoff capability is important for all three of these bombers. Isn't that also correct?
General WELCH. That's correct.
Mr. DICKS. So you want them on the B–52's, you want them on the B–1's, and on the B–2's.
The other thing I think is important in talking about how to enhance this bomber force, obviously, working on all aspects of maintainability so that you can use these bombers so that—again this turnover time, trying to increase the sortie rate. And the demeaning of this program by some in the press and the GAO, frankly, upsets me because I've gone out there and seen the tremendous progress that's being made in terms of the materials and how they're being used so that you really speed up the time frame in which you can do this turnaround. That's another aspect of this upgrade program. Isn't that correct?
Page 695 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. That's correct.
Mr. DICKS. So, I guess if you'd get to the bottom line here I feel that those of us who supported this program in essence have been vindicated.
That one, the administration didn't have a plan and still doesn't. I have been promised by the White House that—based on your report by the way—that there will be a plan. That the administration, that the White House will insist that the Defense Department develop a bomber plan. And I think we in the Congress have a responsibility, frankly, to legislate a requirement for them to develop a bomber plan.
And, second, I hope—and I think it's absolutely essential—that there is a budget request for these upgrades to fix all these bombers. And, you know, the B–1 has potential. I mean, I would argue that if we're going to have to deal with the bomber force as it exists today, one of the things that we should do is to make certain that we have good defensive management systems on the B–1's. And, secondly, that we ought to put all these smart weapons that we've been talking about for the B–2 on the B–1's, as well. So that, especially in the case of advancing armor, you could use that capability with sensor fuzed weapon, gator mined, a number of these sub-munitions against advancing armor. So that you could really maximize the potential of this entire force. Do you think that would be an appropriate thing to do, as well?
General WELCH. Yes, sir. I would point out—you know, I'm agreeing with everything you're saying, but I would point out that there is a very substantial program to upgrade the B–1's which you have supported. And there are currently plans to put these precision munitions on all the bombers, which you have supported. So, you know, I wouldn't want to give the impression that we didn't think anything was going on.
Page 696 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. DICKS. I agree with that. It's just that it's been so slow.
General WELCH. Yes.
Mr. DICKS. And if you want to enhance the bomber force, I think it's one of those areas that we have a little discretion, where we can add some money, where you can get a big dividend in a hurry in upgrading the capability on these existing programs.
The other thing I would point out again—and I still think this is something that we all need to think about. We have JDAM's, the weapon of choice on the B–2, at $13,000 a weapon or $14,000 a weapon, compared to a standoff cruise missile at $1.2 million. I mean, there is an enormous difference in the cost of these weapons. And being able to use these smart weapons, in my judgment, that are cost effective gives another avenue to enhance capability in a hurry by buying a lot of those kinds of weapons. But I don't want to overdo my chairman's goodwill here.
I just want to thank you for your efforts. Now, you believe that we should preserve the tooling, right? That one thing we should do is protect the tooling?
General WELCH. There's very low cost.
Mr. DICKS. I mean, at one point, the Air Force—with all due respect and I know you were the great leader of the Air Force—the Air Force was going to get rid of this tooling until we said, ''No, that's not a wise idea.'' Now, I think we've changed their mind. But I just want to make sure that you agree that the tooling ought to—with the cost of it, we should preserve it?
Page 697 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Well, as I say, there's a very minor cost. I don't know what the other considerations are, but I certainly wouldn't be hasty about doing away with that.
Mr. DICKS. Well, I want to thank you again for your hard work and effort. And we appreciate your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dicks can be found in the appendix on page 579.]
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Dicks, and thank you for bringing your expertise to this important issue and debate over the last several years.
Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Yes, I'll just take a few moments, Mr. Chairman. I promised myself I would not get confrontational and even though the big words of vindication—and I could after that real easy—but I won't do that.
But I think what's important even 40 or 50——
Mr. DICKS. You want us to support your aircraft——
Page 698 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SISISKY. Come on——[Laughter.]
Mr. DICKS [continuing]. The airplanes——[Laughter.]
Mr. SISISKY. I said I would not be confrontational. [Laughter.] Now if you want to be confrontational, I'll be glad to join you. [Laughter.]
I mean, that's a fair assumption. I think what's important though—you've already said this, but I'm just going to go down the line with about five questions. The report recommends B–2-related investment to increase its sortie generation capability or rate. Am I correct in that?
Further, it identifies investments to reduce maintenance time and provide for forward basing as ways to increase the sortie rate?
General WELCH. Right. You're correct in that.
Mr. SISISKY. In your judgement, would it be possible to double the B-2 sortie rate by the kind of investments the panel is recommending?
General WELCH. Absolutely.
Mr. SISISKY. That's easy then.
Page 699 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. More than that.
Mr. SISISKY. Now from the—I was just being kind of—from the theater CINCs point of view, if we were able to double the B-2 in theater sortie rate, wouldn't that be equivalent to operating 42 aircraft the way we do now.
General WELCH. No, sir, it would not be in that the expectation for the sortie from the airplane in the CINC's original plans certainly is significantly higher than it is at the moment.
Mr. SISISKY. Would 21 planes doubling, tripling, quadrupling the sorties, it would certainly give that CINC?
General WELCH. Well, yes.
Mr. SISISKY. So there's encouragement.
General WELCH. I would say there is no CINC happy with the current number of sorties he's going to get from this force.
Mr. SISISKY. But the key really is increasing the sorties?
General WELCH. Absolutely.
Mr. SISISKY. And the availability of the aircraft—to do that.
Page 700 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. OK, thank you, Norman. I think that General Welch's answer to your question, that was instructive for all of us. And that, as I understand what you're saying is, we really don't—we really haven't—haven't spent the dollars to make the upgrades that are necessary to meet expectations, the original expectations in terms of sortie rates. Is that right, General Welch?
General WELCH. Yes, that's true.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you, Norm, and thank you for your attention to this important issue. I want to mention, incidentally, to the hearing that we are joined by our good friends, Glen and Sharon Huber, from Imperial County in my district. And Glen, I know, has a great value and great importance to my buddy, Norm Sisisky, because he's one of the national leaders in the Navy league. And we just had a wonderful time with the Blue Angels under that El Niño California desert which is almost a marsh at this point, with the greatest desert wildflowers in the world. We had a great Blue Angel demonstration here just about a week or so ago. So, thank you, Glen and Sharon, for being with us in this important hearing.
General, let me just ask you to go over briefly, because we didn't really do it because you have it in your very instructive unclassified summary, the three elements of the force.
We've got the B–52's, the last one of which was made around 1962. We have the B–1 force, a little under 100 aircraft that we funded in the 1980's. And we have the B–2's, the 21 B–2's. Now when I led off the committee this morning, I mentioned the Operation Linebacker in the closing 11 days of 1972 when we lost about 15 B–52's in just a few days, which was about 10 percent of the force that we dedicated to that mission. As I recall, we lost seven B–52's the first day. The bottom line of this—one of the bottom lines of your panel is that we can go for a few more years without building more bombers.
Page 701 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
But my question to you is, How can we be guaranteed that we are not going to have the same military situation and the need to make a deep strike in targets that are just as heavily defended with now-upgraded successors to those very effective surface to air missiles that really dealt a devastating blow to our bomber force in comparative terms in those few days in 1972 which was over 25 years ago?
General WELCH. Well, let me make a couple of points relative to that. One, of course, you can't. We don't, you know, buy forces for work on attrition. We buy forces to take care of peacetime attrition, and wartime attrition is something that none of us can calculate.
On the other hand, if we today were to undertake anything like that after these airplanes are equipped with standoff precision-guided munitions, the loss would have been ''zero.'' In other words, there is nothing that we attacked over in North Vietnam or in Desert Storm, for that matter, that we couldn't have attacked with the bomber force that we're talking about with very, very low loss rates if we equip these airplanes with these standoff precision munitions. And that's the key to the survivability of things like the B–52 and the B–1.
Mr. HUNTER. But, General, doesn't that presuppose that we're going to have enough standoff munitions because if you look at the number of munitions we expended over North Vietnam, it went far beyond the inventory of what we possess today?
General WELCH. The Probability-of-Kill of the weapons that we expended over in North Vietnam was so long that I can't even tell you what it was. So, yes, in order to destroy any kind of targets in that day and age, we had to use mass forces and aggregate lots of airframes to produce the liftability required to do anything useful to a target.
Page 702 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Today, one of those precision-guided munitions will do what a squadron, or more than a squadron, did during the Vietnam war. So, I certainly agree with you that we have to have adequate numbers of these weapons. But these weapons are so much more effective than anything that we had used in our experience from bomber airplanes, that it is really almost hard to visualize how much difference that makes.
Mr. HUNTER. Then if we had the dollars to do it, and you could replace B–52's with B–2's, aircraft for aircraft, would you do it?
General WELCH. Without any concern for money?
Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely.
General WELCH. Well, of course, I would.
Mr. HUNTER. Yes, and the same with B–1's?
General WELCH. Well, let me say it a little differently. I would with the B–2 that's been raised to its potential, which can be done.
Mr. HUNTER. And how about the B–1's?
General WELCH. I think that—I don't know that I would. And that's an off-the-top-of-the-head answer because I don't need all of my capabilities to be the absolute top of the line. You know, I need enough of those kinds of capabilities to do what that needs to do. One of the things I would really emphasize, again, is that the great leverage of the small B–24's, smaller than anyone would like it to be, but the great lovers of that force is that against those kinds of opponents that have these kinds of capabilities, the B–2, equipped with whatever kind of standoff it needs to deal with that trap now can very quickly have an enormous impact on that defense capability.
Page 703 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, certainly in the earliest days of the conflict, some of these other aircraft are going to have to stand way off. And there will be targets that they can't strike. But the great leverage of the stealth force is they can quickly open up the way. By beating down those defenses, they can quickly open up the way so that these other aircraft can be very effective.
So, it certainly would not be cost-effective to equip your entire force with this particularly unique capability if indeed, as we suspect, it will cost you a great deal more. So I think that you will always want a balance of forces from the top of the line, most capable, to some lower cost forces that carry heavier payloads and that can be used once the work is done do suppress those defenses.
There's not a clear answer.
Mr. HUNTER. OK, so to go back to the part of your question where you said we don't build forces for war, we build them for peacetime and peacetime attrition levels—what I'm getting at is that we've seen a time in recent times when we had very high rates of B–52 attrition, to what we look at today as being fairly crude surface to air missiles compared to what the other side at this point. If you look at the deep, underground capability and the protective apparatus that the North Koreans, for example, had built, the caves, the systems that are going to be hard to—you're going to have to hit them a number of times to get them, and you're going to have to hit them right on target to really get them. And the fact, that we may have to expend even more of precision-guided munitions than we wanted to, isn't there an element of risk in having this historically small bomber force?
Page 704 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Certainly there is. And what that does is multiplies the importance of equipping those bombers with the kind of weapons that we are talking about.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Now if you couple that risk, the fact that there is a risk—because if you have a tougher enemy that requires more ordinance than you planned on, you may run out of the ability to standoff and hit him, then you have a number of planes that have to standoff if they're going to survive, like the B–52. If you couple that with the fact that it takes 15 years to develop a bomber—and I say that in the context of a guy that comes from San Diego where I think at one time we were building a bomber a day in San Diego in World War II—then isn't this risk increased by the fact that should we arrive at that point in the conflict where we have to be able to deliver coordinates on target and we haven't knocked out defensive capabilities the way we would like to? That we are going to have to penetrate as we did on Operation Linebacker and just take the hits and take deaths of our pilots?
General WELCH. Well, I certainly——
Mr. HUNTER. Because we'll be 15 years away from building a new aircraft to replace what we've lost.
General WELCH. I certainly don't like that scenario, and the solution to avoiding that scenario is to do the things that we need to do to these airplanes. If, in fact, you have this force of B–2's equipped with the proper kind of precision munitions and you have the other bomber force upgraded along with all the other forces, then we have in our hands the means to ensure that the scenario you're describing does not come to pass.
Page 705 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Now General Loh described in his testimony and his letters—I asked him about the swinging bomber strategy, because having this low number of bombers requires that you—if you have a two-war scenario—if we had the war in Iraq and we had a war, also, the North Koreans took advantage of that and invaded the south part of the peninsula—I asked him if swinging the bombers at the wrong time—that is at a time in which you shortly, thereafter, had an armor offensive, if that couldn't result, in fact, in large numbers of American casualties—swinging the bombers from one theater to another. He said, ''Yes, it could.'' Do you concur that there's a risk in the so-called swing-the-bomber strategy?
General WELCH. I can imagine any number of scenarios, but most of the analyses that I've seen from various sources indicates that you swing the bombers—you can swing the bombers because they have largely done what you needed for those bombers to do. No one can ever tell you exactly how many bombers you're going to need in any of these scenarios. But let me also reemphasize that the panel felt and stated that as we gain more understanding and operational experience with the precision attack capability, there will be a demand. There will be more demand for the qualities that these bombers bring. But the fastest, best way to meet that demand is to exploit the unused potential of this bomber force that is currently available. They can carry payloads or precision weapons. You can support more of these airframes than we are currently planning to support. You can increase the precision attack capabilities of these bombers which makes every one of them more effective. You can raise the sortie rate. So you have more sorties than were planned in any of these scenarios, and you have more effectiveness per sortie.
So, in spite of all that, can I imagine a scenario where you still wished you had more? Of course I can. But I can say that about almost any element of the force.
Page 706 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. OK, thank you, General.
Norm.
Mr. DICKS. Well, let me ask one further thing and I completely understand what you're saying and I agree with much of it. One of the things that has bothered a lot us who have been advocates for the bomber force or enhancing the bomber force has been this notion of lock-out or lock-in, as some say, where the enemy would use—let's say the North Koreans would use chemical or biological weapons on airfields in South Korea which would make it impossible for us to bring in TACAIR in the early going of a major confrontation. Or if they got there, that they would be covered with chemical, biological, whatever, and they wouldn't be able to get out in terms of airload. Now—and so the value of having a bomber force that one could come from the United States or could go to—say Guam, or Diego Garcia, and you mentioned facilities—having facilities there for a bomber force in these locations really becomes an imperative. If you can't get the TACAIR there, if you can't get the—your F–141's, your C–17's—excuse me—cargo planes in there. How do you feel about that? What does the commission think about that issue?
General WELCH. Well, we spent a good bit of time on that issue. There are a couple of points I would make regarding that. One is that that you're going to have to operate the bomber force from forward locations in order to generate anything like the kind of sortie rates we're talking about. You simply can't imagine that you could ever buy enough bombers to provide the weight of effort that would be required in the situation you described operating from the United States. I mean, that's a 36-hour round trip plus all the maintenance manhours that go with the 36-hour flight. So, that you have to be able to operate from forward bases. Now while the bomber bases are somewhat more removed, somewhat less, nonetheless, from the kinds of attacks that worry us the most you simply have to be able to defend yourself against those attacks. So, we looked at several scenarios where there were severely restricted ability to operate for some period of time, and you have to allow for that.
Page 707 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. Let me——
General WELCH. To postulate a scenario where you can operate no forward forces other than the bombers, that's a loser. We simply cannot settle any of these kinds of contingencies we're talking about if we can't use any forward forces. Eventually we have to be able to do that, or you simply can't prevail.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me pursue that, General. A minute ago when I asked you about whether we didn't need to have a lot more and to avoid the situation where you have to penetrate and take losses, you mentioned that because of precision-guided munitions today you can throw one bomb and it can do what a huge payload of bombs was used for in the past. If that's so, how can you decisively say that a bomber force operating out of CONUS, if they all have these precision-guided munitions can't, in many cases, be very effective operating from CONUS without a large sortie rate from forward bases?
General WELCH. Well, to avoid over-complicating it, in the first place, the bomber force simply can do it all alone.
Mr. HUNTER. I understand that.
General WELCH. That there does have to be air superiority. There does have to be forward bases where you can operate the tankers. So my point is that that you simply cannot fight a war from the CONUS.
Page 708 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. HUNTER. I understand that, but for the bomber package you've got two conflicting ideas. One idea is the one that you need to make a lot of sorties over target. That conjures up the old Vietnam scenarios where you put a lot of bombs on target with high sortie rates. But the second one that you introduced was that a few bombs selectively placed can do what literally hundreds of bombs did in the past. And those two ideas to some degree, your second proposition, that precision-guided munitions give you enormous leverage and a few well-placed bombs delivered by stealthy vehicles can be extremely effective. That would seem to give a CONUS-based bomber force at least in some scenarios, maybe not an all-out way and sustained war, but in some scenarios great effectiveness.
General WELCH. Well, I think we're mixing up a couple of concepts. Certainly if you increase the effectiveness per sortie, every sortie's more valuable. On the other hand, the whole reason for this discussion was the concept—I certainly would not prefer to operate from a CONUS, I would prefer to operate from forward bases because regardless of the effectiveness per sortie, I still want more sorties. I don't want to deliver a few PGM's. I want to deliver a lot of PGM's. And I want—so because I need multiples of the kind of effectiveness that we're talking about.
Mr. HUNTER. But your mission might be for a few PGM's——
General WELCH. Oh, sure.
Mr. HUNTER. Because it might be limited targets in some cases.
Page 709 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General WELCH. Oh, sure. Absolutely, there will be scenarios where you can do that. You know, in the whole of scenarios, there will be scenarios where you can do that. But the point is to postulate a situation where I can operate bombers from CONUS and solve the problem is simply not realistic because I—if I'm against any opponent——
Mr. HUNTER. I think we all agree with that, yeah.
General WELCH [continuing]. That requires this sort of thing that I have to have some forward help.
Mr. HUNTER. Yeah, I'm just saying in the array of responses that you'd make from maybe a Libya-type strike where you're delivering a few on a few targets to an all-out war, there is a lot you can do now from CONUS because of PGM's that you couldn't do in the past. Would you agree with that proposition?
General WELCH. Absolutely.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, General Welch. We've got a vote on transportation, the surface transportation bill's taken all of our money, so I'm going to vote on that.
We sure appreciate you and your panel and what you've done for our country. The subcommittee is adjourned.
General WELCH. Thank you, sir.
Page 710 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. HUNTER. The panel recommended the Department of Defense provide ''operational support for the maximum practical number of B–1, B–2, and B–52 airframes. What number do you believe is necessary to sustain a robust force structure? Is the force structure of sufficient size to support the kinds of contingencies that we might see in the foreseeable future? Is the size, age, and health of the force adequate to meet our needs for the next 10 or 15 years?
Mr. WELCH. The Panel did not independently assess the numbers needed. Instead we assessed the ability to sustain the Air Force planned force over the next 15 years and concluded that the numbers of attrition reserve B–1s will not sustain the planned B–1 force. Hence we recommended the Air force plan to retain additional B–52 aircraft as attrition reserve to compensate for the likely shortfall in B–1 airframes.
Mr. HUNTER. At what point do you believe we will have to assess the need to acquire additional bombers?
Page 711 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELCH. The bomber force, if sufficient attrition reserve is maintained, should be adequate to meet operational requirements well beyond the 15 years assessed by the Panel (the 15 year span was at Congress' direction). However, there is a need now for an Air Force long-range plan to ensure a viable force can be sustained in the long term.
Mr. HUNTER. What specific programs in your view would most contribute to the increased effectiveness of the B–2s in the current force?
Mr. WELCH. The LRAPP report recommended highest priority to upgrades to low-observables maintainability and performance. In addition, there are key upgrades needed for the aircraft to realize its potential as a long range, heavy payload, precision attack system. Those upgrades include timely mission planning capability, connectivity for dynamic command and control, improved situational awareness, and increased support for operation from forward bases.
Mr. HUNTER. Has the Air Force, in you understanding, fully funded these efforts?
Mr. WELCH. The Air Force has not yet programmed for all these recommended upgrades. They are in the process of prioritizing a number of needs for the bomber force.
Mr. HUNTER. Do you see any technical showstoppers in the effort to improve the performance of the B–2 fleet?
Page 712 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELCH. The level of survivability improvement recommended by the LRAPP requires additional technical definition, development and demonstration but we saw no showstoppers.
Mr. HUNTER. What programs would contribute most to sustaining and improving the effectiveness of the B–52 and B–1 fleets?
Mr. WELCH. Incorporating the ability to carry and employ the maximum practical loads of precision guided munitions—with heavy emphasis on reasonable standoff ranges.
Mr. HUNTER. Are these efforts fully funded?
Mr. WELCH. Not fully. Again, the Air Force is in the process of evaluating and prioritizing a broader set of needs that includes those recommended by the LRAPP.
Mr. HUNTER. Your panel recommends development of more advanced technologies that might lead to a better solution for the next generation bomber aircraft. What kind of advanced technologies do you believe are important in this effort?
Mr. WELCH. The technologies have to do with observability.
Mr. HUNTER. What is your view of the future of stealth?
Page 713 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELCH. Stealth is an increasingly important operational enabler though, due to continuing advances in and availability of air defense systems, companion measurer will increasingly be needed to leverage the levels of stealth currently fielded and being fielded.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DICKS
Mr. DICKS. Can you provide the subcommittee with an overview on the type of enhancements the panel believes ought to be done on the B–2 as well as the B–1's and B–52's?
Mr. WELCH. The LRAPP report specified some recommended high-priority upgrades to the bomber fleet. The highest priorities for the B–2 include upgrades to low-observables maintainability and improvements in signature, and improved situational awareness. For all the bomber fleet, there are key upgrades needed for the aircraft to realize their potential as long range, heavy payload, precision attack systems. Those upgrades include timely mission planning capability, connectivity for dynamic command and control, and increased support for operations from forward bases.
Mr. DICKS. Which of these enhancements, in your judgement, ought to be given top priority by the congress and DOD?
Mr. WELCH. Low-observables maintainability is the strongest detractor from achieving needed sortie rates.
Page 714 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. DICKS. Done at an efficient rate, what would the time frame be for completion of all enhancements envisioned by the panel?
Mr. WELCH. Probably 2005–2007.
Mr. DICKS. What is the estimated cost of the entire package of enhancements?
Mr. WELCH. The Panel did not attempt to cost the entire package. I suggest that ongoing Air Force work can give the best answer to the cost question.
Mr. DICKS. What is the current DOD plan with respect to future bomber production?
Mr. WELCH. There is no currently available plan for future bomber production. The Air Force is in the process of preparing a long-range plan to sustain the bomber force.
Mr. DICKS. You mention that attrition rates will not sustain the integrity of the current force in the future. Can you give the Subcommittee an overview of your projected attrition rates for the three bombers through the year 2030—the time frame that DOD plans to utilize the current bomber force?
Mr. WELCH. The Panel did not project attrition to 2030 since the Congress specifically directed that we evaluate the viability of the force for 15 years. The Panel based its estimates on the actual attrition for the past ten years though that rate is considerably higher than the estimates produced by the Air Force attrition models. Based on that experience, the Panel concluded that the attrition reserve would not sustain the total numbers in the planned force through the expected life of the force. Further, using historical experience, the attrition reserve for the B–1 will not sustain the force through the 15-year period. That led the LRAPP to state that additional aircraft will eventually be required to sustain the force and that the Department needs to develop a long-range plan to upgrade and sustain the future force structure. The Panel concluded that the total number of bombers could be sustained for the next 15 years provided that additional B–52s are retained to hedge against losses in the B–1. There is no attrition experience for the B–2.
Page 715 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. DICKS. Why do you think the Pentagon has not put forward, as you say, ''an adequate long-term plan?''
Mr. WELCH. With the long projected life of the current bomber force and the ongoing upgrades (e.g., the B–1 Conventional Mission Upgrade Program), the Department probably did not feel a sense of urgency in long-range planning. Further, the uncertainty regarding the future of B–2 production probably complicated the planning issue.
Mr. DICKS. Are there any options for future bomber production other than the two I have identified?
Mr. WELCH. There are likely to be unmanned possibilities considered and there has been some discussion of a multi-mission long-range aircraft that could deliver heavy payloads of precision stand-off munitions.
Mr. DICKS. Which of these options do you believe makes the most sense from a cost and performance standpoint? Which of these options would allow us to get to production most quickly?
Mr. WELCH. The Panel was unable to make any useful judgements about the best path to a future bomber. From a survivability and flexibility standpoint, an advanced technology solution might be attractive. From an availability standpoint, an upgraded version of the B–2 might be attractive. From an overall force cost standpoint, either a multi-mission long-range aircraft or an unmanned approach might be the most attractive. It will take extensive analysis to combine all these considerations to support the best overall decision.
Page 716 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. DICKS. What are your thoughts on the notion of using enhancements over a period of time to reconstitute the current production line?
Mr. WELCH. As we discussed, continued enhancements to the current aircraft could lead to a future version as the next bomber. However, it is unlikely that the production line that would produce this or any other future bomber will bear much resemblance to the now closed production line that produced the current aircraft. This is due to changes in the status of the producers of the current aircraft, the conversion of facilities to other uses, and to changes in technology impacting both aircraft design and manufacturing.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Procurement Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly With Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 11, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:03 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement) and Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS COMMITTEE
Page 717 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BATEMAN [presiding]. The joint subcommittees will come to order.
In the interest of expediting things, and as a courtesy to our witnesses, as well as to those who are here to listen, I think we ought to get started. I have before me the opening statement of the chairman of the R&D subcommittee, who would normally be presiding, the Honorable Curt Weldon. If I may, I am going to not present that, but, of course, when he is here, I'm sure that he can make the election as to whether he delivers it or just asks that it be made a part of the record.
That having been said, I think we now turn first to Dr. Jeffrey Hunker as the leading witness.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. HUNKER, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY LINTON WELLS II, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. CAMPBELL, U.S. AIR FORCE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS [J–39], DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. HUNKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SISISKY. Excuse me, I would ask unanimous consent to put my statement in the record.
Page 718 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sisisky can be found in the appendix on page 634.]
Mr. BATEMAN. I'm sorry, or deliver it as you see fit. And Dr. Hunker also asks leave that his opening statement be made a part of the record.
Dr. Hunker, obviously I'm anxious to hear you.
Dr. HUNKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm delighted to be here for my first visit in front of this committee. I wanted to thank you and the members of the subcommittees, ladies and gentlemen. I am Jeffrey Hunker, I am now the Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office [CIAO] and am very pleased to be here.
I'll be brief in my opening statement because there is a lot of material to cover. But Americans expect their light switches, their telephones, their ATM machines to work. We are in a new environment, however. More and more we are living in an age of a digital economy where these types of basic services depend on computer systems that are interdependent. With this interdependence has come new vulnerabilities, examples of which in the earlier briefing this committee heard about. But they can potentially include things like disruption of banking and financial services, the creation of regional and sustained power outages, the interruption of important transportation modes, and the crashing of vital communications networks.
This administration has been in the lead in promoting the availability to all Americans of these new information technologies. At the same time, the President has recognized that we must focus not just on information connection, but also on information protection. On May 22 of this year, the President, in his remarks to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, outlined two new Presidential directives to combat international terrorism and attacks on our computer networks and other critical systems upon which our society depends.
Page 719 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The President's two new directives are PDD–62, which contains major initiatives to combat international terrorist threats, including threats to our critical infrastructure, and PDD–63, which is devoted entirely to protecting the Nation's critical infrastructures from physical and cyber attacks. In my remarks today, I'd like to discuss PDD–63 and share with you the goals that the President has established for securing our infrastructures and the milestones and mechanisms he has established for achieving these goals. First, PDD–63 identifies critical infrastructure protection as a national security priority. PDD–63's intent is to put in place a process that will take the necessary measures to eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including, especially, our cyber-based systems.
As a national security issue, it is especially challenging for several reasons that I'd like to emphasize in my remarks. First, it's a new issue. This is an issue that really reflects the nature of our digital economy, something that has occurred over the last 10 to 15 years. Second, because over 90 percent of our critical infrastructures are privately operated, even a full-court press by the U.S. Government, without the cooperation of private industry is unlikely to achieve the goals the President has established. And, third, never before in any other area have we seen economic, the law enforcement, and the traditional national security issues so intertwined. And, I might add, to add to the challenge of this issue, our infrastructures are not only privately operated but they are also interconnected and interdependent so an attack on, let's say, the Internet, can also have repercussions on our electric power supply or other infrastructures.
PDD–63 also establishes a national commitment of protection within 5 years and an interim security capability by the year 2000. In order to achieve that, it calls for a number of new mechanisms to coordinate critical infrastructure protection within the Government. It establishes the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, an interagency group which, by the way, will be meeting for the first time this afternoon, and it also creates and calls for the newly-appointed national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism, designated in PDD–62 which will be chairing this and several other interagency groups addressing new and emerging threats.
Page 720 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
PDD–63 also establishes several other mechanisms for the Government and encourages the private sector to create its own mechanisms for information sharing and cooperation. It creates a national planning office, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, of which I'm the Director; it also establishes the National Infrastructure Protection Center within the FBI which will be an interagency office that will provide a focal point for coordinating the Federal Government's response to incidents, mitigating attacks, and investigating threats and attacks.
PDD–63 also recognizes that protecting our critical infrastructure is not a job where one size fits all. And, therefore, it calls for the development of sector plans in each sector of our critical infrastructure. In order to do that it calls for the appointment within the Federal Government, within critical departments that have responsibility for different parts of the economy, of a senior liaison official responsible for specific infrastructure and for that individual to identify and work with a private sector coordinator or coordinators to develop a plan that is specifically tailored to address the unique facets of each of our critical infrastructures. So, for example, the Department of Energy will work with the energy sectors, the Department of Transportation with transportation, Treasury with the banking and finance sector, and so forth.
PDD–63 also calls for the development of the national plan which draws on the sector plans and for this plan to be coordinated by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. At a minimum, this plan is going to have six elements. There will be an initial vulnerability assessment. It will call for a remedial plan to mitigate the intentional exploitation of identified vulnerabilities. It calls for a national center to warn of significant infrastructure attacks, and it calls for a plan for responding to in-progress attacks as well. And there are two other components to the national plan that I want to highlight here. Education and awareness is clearly critical in addressing this issue and because this is at its core a technology issue, it also calls for federally sponsored research and development that will help to develop and disseminate the technologies and practices that we need to protect our Nation.
Page 721 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
PDD–63 also calls for the Federal Government to lead by example in securing its own infrastructure. And one of the immediate tasks called for under PDD is for each of the departments and agencies within the Federal Government to assess their vulnerabilities and to develop a plan for responding to them. Two other points I'd like to make about the structures of the presidential directive. It calls for the establishment of a public/private partnership to accomplish its goals, and I'll speak a little bit more about that in a moment. And, finally, because we recognize that there are important national issues, which are the primary responsibility of the Federal Government, it also calls for the appointment of functional coordinators in the Departments of State, Defense, the Justice and FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency to take the lead in addressing issues having to do with foreign affairs, because this is very much of an international issue, national defense, law enforcement and internal security, and foreign intelligence. Those are the mechanisms and the goals that the PDD sets forth.
I'd like to highlight that there are some underlying themes that cut across these mechanisms and really go to the intent of the President's directive. First, as I've been mentioning, building a public/private partnership is going to be critical. The fact is, right now, best practices as how to protect against attacks and even information about attacks that are under way or have occurred is oftentimes not shared, for a variety of reasons, and we have to work to overcome those barriers. There are cultural barriers; there are informational barriers; there are legal barriers, or the perception of legal risks, that are all at the core of building the public/private partnership.
Education and awareness is also critical. We need to have our universities and schools to focus in on computer ethics and also on developing the skills and the advanced computer security technologies that we are going to need to address this problem. I have mentioned, and I'll reiterate again, the importance of best practices and of sharing best practices, both best practices that are developed within the Federal Government, such as in the Department of Defense and elsewhere, and also practices that may have been developed in the private sector, but aren't currently widely shared.
Page 722 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
There's a large legal and legislative agenda that may be here and, as was discussed earlier this morning, I think it is going to be very important that we look both at the legal structures and possible legislative remedies, working with you very closely, to address that, both domestically and internationally.
And, finally, once again, I'd like to reiterate the cross-cutting importance of research and development. There is significant work that we believe is underway in various parts of the Federal Government; there is clearly work that is being done in the private sector, and we want to ensure that both the proper resources are being put to that and, also, that we are avoiding duplicative efforts.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to just talk for a moment in terms of the role of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. To put it succinctly, I see the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office as the engine that is going to help drive the train in the development of this interagency plan of this national plan and capability. We've been very fortunate to be able to take advantage of the unique expertise and talents of the former Commissioners of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure which released its report last fall and these recommendations really provided the basis for the President's directive.
We hope to assist the National Coordinator to achieve the creation of a successful national plan to protect the Nation's critical infrastructures from intentional debilitating attacks.
In conclusion, I'd just like to emphasize that PDD–63 provides a workable and innovative foundation to build the capability that we are going to need to protect our critical infrastructures. Like any foundation it is going to require an extensive amount of understanding, cooperation, coordination amongst all the participants. I personally and we, collectively, welcome your interest, your assistance, and your wisdom in this endeavor. And at this point, thank you very much and I'll open it up for questions.
Page 723 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hunker can be found in the appendix on page 635.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Hunker. We appreciate your being here and that testimony. Let me at least make reference to the fact that we have at the witness table Dr. Lynton Wells and Gen. John Campbell, who were earlier on a panel of witnesses with Dr. Hamre from the Department of Defense in a closed session of the joint subcommittees, who provided us with information of very deep interest and major concern. We appreciate their being here and their expertise being available as we begin the questioning period.
The chairman will rejoin us shortly. In the meantime, Dr. Hunker, I note that toward the end of your testimony there is a reference that the Department of Defense is presently the executive agent for the CIAO, but beginning with 1999, is it?
Dr. HUNKER. That's right, this October.
Mr. BATEMAN. This October, it will be an office within the Department of Commerce? Frankly, my own view is we've been burned before by national security concerns becoming something executed by the Department of Commerce instead of the Department of State or the Department of Defense. Do I need to have any concerns along those lines? I think I do; can you disabuse me of that?
Dr. HUNKER. I certainly will attempt to, Mr. Chairman. And, let me address your concerns on several levels. I think, first, we have to recognize that this is a national security issue that really speaks to the evolving notion of national security as involving not just traditional military preparedness and defense, but also to the economic health of our Nation. Many of the critical infrastructures that I've emphasized are in private hands and the ability of those who wish to do us harm, to attack us, not just in traditional military ways or not just directly against Defense Department installations, but against purely civilian targets, whether it be our power supply, the functioning of our financial markets, or our telecommunications systems.
Page 724 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We now have increasing vulnerability to those sorts of attacks. So at its very core, the issue of protecting critical infrastructure has to take an expanded view that recognizes that national security now encompasses much more than simply the Defense Department.
I think the second point to emphasize, and it was brought up earlier, is the importance that our defense infrastructure has on commercial systems. I think it was mentioned before that 95 percent of the telecommunications within the Defense Department, in fact, go over publicly owned switches or publicly-owned non-Defense Department types of systems. And, therefore, we have a close intertwining of these.
And the third point I'd like to emphasize is the distinction between budget funding and the actual process of developing a national plan. You are correct in noting that, starting in the next fiscal year, the Commerce Department is, according to the PDD, going to be picking up the budget responsibility for the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. We, in fact, are in discussions and we look for and hope that there will be support from other departments and agencies in this effort on a budget basis.
But let me assure you that the work in developing the national plan is one where we have the interest of the Defense Department and of defense and national security interest of the intelligence community, of law enforcement, both at a national and at a State and local basis, and, also, the economic interests. And all of them have to be working together. It is truly a unique agenda in that sense and you have my commitment that it will be an interagency agenda that reflects all of these interests.
Page 725 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me with just some follow-up observations on that—Dr. Hunker what you've told me is encouraging. It is not persuasive to me that the most appropriate call is to transfer this function to the Department of Commerce. The Department of Defense and our national security are the driving factor and certainly no one that I know in the Department of Defense is so stupid as to not to understand that there are economic microimplications of this. I suspect they not only understand it, they understand it more fully than the commercial world.
I think we also need to be concerned that a large part of our problem in many aspects of American trade and economic practices is that our corporate world insists and demands of its leadership the next annual report or even quarterly report to stockholders. This is a problem that isn't going to get fixed by that mindset. And putting this is the realm of commerce as opposed to our national security, where we can be more assured that the real genuine, incredibly significant concerns that are here, get addressed, I, frankly, stand unconvinced that this is something that ought to be reposed in the Department of Commerce.
Dr. HUNKER. Let me assure you that the issues of national security are primary in our concern about protecting critical infrastructure. In order to protect national security, we are going to have to make certain, as we are developing the national capability, developing the national plan, that private sector providers of telecommunications, of electric power, all these other vital services, and paying attention to, are aware, and are taking the appropriate steps, not just to protect their own private sector clients and customers, but also in terms of supporting very vital national security, defense, intelligence missions. The two are very closely intertwined.
Page 726 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I am very sensitive to the agendas of, and the concerns that you raise in terms of the immediate need for the annual report or the quarterly earnings in the private sector. That may, in fact, speak to some of the concerns and the reason why this agenda has not—it is now a new problem which we recognize and have to move forward on. It is a challenge. It think there are solutions to it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, I don't want to extend this unduly, but I would just make this note of caution. I know that the Department of Defense is concerned about our competitive position, our microeconomic circumstances in which we operate. I don't have the same conviction; I have no reason to have the conviction; they have no reason to have the conviction that the private sector, whose charge is to make a buck for their shareholders, have the same concern. Heck, that has been demonstrated too many times, whoever has been in charge of what technology we did or did not transfer and to whom we transferred it. It is just more than apparent that there isn't the same sensitivity in the private commercial world to our national security concerns as would, hopefully, be reposited in the Department of Defense.
Enough said from me.
Dr. HUNKER. Thank you.
Mr. WELDON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bateman. Thank you for moving in while I was, unfortunately, retained with the votes, and I apologize to you, Dr. Hunker, and to our other distinguished guests.
I will ask at this point in time unanimous consent to enter my statement and the statements of my good friend Owen Pickett and Mr. Sisisky and Mr. Hunter into the record.
Page 727 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The prepared statements of Mr. Weldon, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Pickett, and Mr. Sisisky can be found in the appendix on pages 627, 630, 632 and 634.]
STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. WELDON. And I would just like to make some very brief comments, and this is going to be an open process where every member will get to ask whatever questions they want to ask. But as the three of you know, you sat through the two hours of closed session that we had with Dr. Hamre from 9 until 11, and I would just characterize the beginning of this public session with my statement that in the 12 years that I've been here that was the most provocative briefing I've ever sat through, and I know the 15 members—and we on average had 15 members from both sides of the aisle here throughout the 2 hours—the members that talked to me during the break on votes felt exactly the same way I did.
The message, the concern, not the scare, because there was no scare applied here—the factual reality of what's happening today, the incidences that we have seen, the vulnerability that we suspect, not just in our defense systems, but, more significantly, in our civilian systems, gives me a great reason to be concerned, even more than I have been. And this has been an issue that these subcommittees have been focusing on for the past 3 years.
We had a hearing where we had Duane Andrews come in, as the former chairman of the Defense Science Board, and fully outline the recommendations of that board in this issue. I guess that was 2 years ago this summer, 1 year ago. We also had a hearing last March where we focused on what contingency plans are being put into place and what actions are necessary.
Page 728 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
But the session today, and I have to publicly comment on Dr. Hamre's presentation, was the most thought-provoking, cohesive, and logical presentation that I've seen. And I just want to say on the public record, I would hope that every Member of Congress who stands up on the House floor and rails about some of these issues had better take the time to sit down and spend 30 minutes with John Hamre and get a full assessment as to the vulnerability of this country's—not just our defense systems, but our civilian systems and the cooperation that we need to move forward to make sure that we are properly engaged in helping to protect this Nation and our people.
In the article that appeared, in the June 10 Post, which I'd like to at this point in time, without objection, to enter into the record, I think further underscores this concern.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 657.]
Mr. WELDON. In fact, one of the comments in that article, written by Bradley Graham, was that Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre had actually notified President Clinton early in the search of an attempt to defeat some of our systems in February, and he confirmed that today for us. And, in fact, that confirmation did take place. So I think we cannot underscore enough the importance of this issue.
As you heard members express in the closed session, we want recommendations for legislative action as quickly as you can get them to us. We want recommendations for increase in dollar amounts that we need to put forward as quickly as you can get them to us. But it comes to more than just the dollars and reactive legislation.
Page 729 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And one of the things I want to focus on today is that we need to have almost a cultural change in this country, because this whole information process has overtaken our country so quickly that we have a whole new generation of people and capabilities that haven't had time to think through access and haven't had time to think through the need to protect other people's systems.
And so, Dr. Hunker, if you could comment on both the need for international cooperation, mid-level education of people, that in fact will have access to our Internet systems, education, and awareness of companies that already are online in terms of what they need to do to improve security capability, if you could just comment on some of those items, all of which were the subject of some of the discussion this morning.
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could summarize by saying that I could only hope that your comments could be broadcast to all Americans, because I think you very succinctly summarized the importance of this issue and the need for a complete mind change out there. Let me speak to this, and I want to put it into the context of the rapidity by which our world has changed. Ten or 15 years ago this was not an issue; it wasn't an issue because the Internet was used by only a small number of people in the research and the in the military community, and we had largely distinct systems that would be difficult to electronically attack. We are now in a world where already today the systems are all interconnected, in many cases increasingly with a shiftover from dedicated lines over into Internet-based systems for ease of convenience and the like, and we are waking up to the fact that these systems are incredibly vulnerable to manipulation, to unauthorized entry in a variety of forms.
Page 730 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
We heard a very serious briefing this morning. I would characterize that many of the public, publicly known incidents that one reads about really take the form of background noise compared to the sorts of events that could happen.
I'd emphasize, Mr. Chairman, your concern on the international agenda. This is not an issue that stops at our borders. And, in fact, it is almost impossible to draw a distinction between the domestic and the international agenda. And there is a great deal of work that needs to be done there in a number of ways. I'm heartened that at the Birmingham Summit this issue was talked about by the President and seven other leaders. There has been work of consultation between justice ministers in the last year, but there is a great deal more work that must be done both in creating the framework for information sharing when there are incidents and of cooperation in the terms of developing the sort of protective measures
It is an important area and, frankly, it is one where, for example, the President's Commission, which made a number of recommendations leading to the basis for the PDD, didn't look into it specifically. The State Department, in the President's directive, has been charged with taking the lead in the international area, and I can assure you that the international focus will receive a great deal of attention.
I'd also just like to emphasize again the foundation of education and awareness that needs to take place at all levels right here. We are truly talking about a cultural shift. It's a cultural shift that has to take place in terms of how people view hacker attacks. I can't tell you, sir, how many times I've been at dinner parties and the like and people have said, ''Well, why are you concerned about hackers? Why shouldn't we be rewarding these people? They are really not doing anything damaging.''
Page 731 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
That's the sort of cultural attitude that has to change. We have to make those leaders in the private sector, whether it be systems administrators or chief financial officers or presidents of companies, become more sensitive to the fact that the decisions they are making about the choice of computers, about the choice of information networks has serious implications for national security, for the Nation as a whole, and very directly bears on our military and our intelligence capabilities as well. This is the beginning of a very difficult agenda.
Mr. WELDON. I thank you, Dr. Hunker, for those comments, and I agree fully with the perspective that you are bringing here today. And I didn't want to use this term but since the article in the Post yesterday refers to it publicly, I can mention that what Dr. Hamre said this morning is that this country faces the potential of an electronic Pearl Harbor. And, we had, you know, I think the Nation had the time to prepare for what would eventually occur in World War II; we had some advance indications that in fact we might have to go up against a major world superpower militarily. We need to be prepared to understand in the next century, because of the rapidly escalating use and capability of information systems, an adversary only has to look at taking America down by incapacitating our electric grid system or our transportation networks, or even by going in and wreaking havoc with some of the records maintained by our institutions.
And for us to solve this problem, it is not going to be DOD alone, or even the Federal Government alone that is going to be able to solve it. I mean, all of these companies that are now placing their assets on the Internet have to understand that when they have their computer operators and their terminal operators interacting, they have to understand that security is a key part, because that, in effect, could let someone get access to that system or that capability and then use it to defeat other systems.
Page 732 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And I think the point that was made both by you and by Dr. Hamre is we need to have this cultural change in America; that it's got to be the entire business community, the health care community, the education community, all of whom have access to this data system, for America to understand they have to play a role in helping to secure it.
And it's not just a debate over encryption. Encryption is only one part of the solution, and I know that's the part that we tend to focus on the most in the Congress, but it's much more, I would think you would agree with me, than just the process of sophisticated algorithms to protect the data itself to encrypted needs.
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Chairman, encryption is certainly part of the solution, but it would be my hope that the current debate over encryption can result in a solution soon that will be satisfactory to all parties because there is a risk in discussions about critical infrastructure for the encryption debate to simply suck all the attention and for people not to spend the time on the rest of the agenda. So it is my fervent hope that we will soon be able to come out with a solution that will satisfy all parties on that particular debate. It is a part of the solution to protecting critical infrastructure; it is not the total solution.
I would like to emphasize one or two points in response to your remarks. This is very much an interagency process. There are 12 significant departments and agencies, ranging from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, Health and Human Services, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the intelligence community, the FBI. The fact that we have such a broad-reaching interagency agenda reflects the fact that we do have—the importance of this issue and the breadth of this issue.
Page 733 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And I would add to that, then, the importance of working with the private sector. Because, again, I will emphasize the importance of their cooperation and the simple fact that they own and operate most of these systems. I think there is a great opportunity for innovative practices and solutions. It will take some time, but let me just cite two examples that I think might help begin to motivate decisionmakers in the private sector, both of which are very nascent, and so I am going to speak as really a potential future agenda right here.
But I think one, for example, might be developing the sorts of standards or certification so that customers, people who are installing electronic systems, would have some sense of how secure their systems actually are. To put it as an example, and this is an example that doesn't exist right now, so I'm just—understand it as such. But at some future point, if system administrators could go out and there would be a sticker on a computer system that said this is a level 6 secure system as of the year 2000, and that meant something, it would enable purchasers then to make tradeoffs or to make informed decisions about how much security they are getting and what the tradeoffs and risks are. We don't have that sort of system in place right now. And it is going to require some significant research and some significant effort, both within the Federal Government and in the private sector, to develop that sort of standards and certification.
I also think that in the private sector that the attention of banks that are lending to companies, of auditors and accountants that are looking at the books of companies, of insurance companies that are providing insurance coverage for companies, that the issue of what sort of exposure the private sector has to attack on their critical infrastructure needs to be something that these guardians of the commercial world need to be focusing in on. And I think that will be an important part of the education and awareness program as well.
Page 734 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
So, I'm giving you two examples, both of which are speaking to agendas that cut to the private sector as well as potentially being of use within the Federal Government that might help advance this.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Hunker. Let me turn now to Mr. Sisisky.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to have to leave in a little while. I do want to associate myself with the chairman in his remarks. However, I would like to say another thing, Mr. Chairman. I think it would be very wise of you to talk to the chairman of the committee, and I certainly will. I think this matter is of such importance that we need to have the whole committee here. It seems strange that there's always three from Virginia in the room. I don't know if you ever noticed it or not. You talk about 15; there aren't 15 around here, but——
Mr. WELDON. I know security is a concern in Virginia.
Mr. SISISKY. Yes, security is a concern, and you basically covered most of the things that I was going to cover, but there is one thing—see, I'm not tuned-in. In the PDD–63, you talk about lead agencies, I think the sector liaison and lead agencies for special functions. No. 1, I need to know the difference, and I'm not satisfied that all of the different Cabinet officers are going to—in other words, like the Secretary of Transportation would do transportation; the Secretary of Energy would probably do power, and other things. But who is going to be the key in that to drive everybody to be sure that it happens? Is it going to be the Office of Science and Technology? Is it going to be your Department? I'd hate to be you to try to force those Secretaries with their egos to do something that they don't want to do, and I think it's of special importance to know how we are going to coordinate it.
Page 735 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
And then I also noticed that you said that, you know, everyone should be obliged of this hearing. I said it this morning and I'll say it again; I think it is an obligation of the President of the United States; somehow he is going to have to communicate with the public to let them know how serious this program is. I mean, he's done it, you know, with this thing, but I think he is going to have to do a lot more of it to let the public, and Members of Congress also. We can just do our committee, but we're just one little part of this entire thing.
Dr. HUNKER. I'm certainly not in position to speak for the President's schedule, but the fact that he has spoken about this and acted upon the recommendations of the President's Commission, which just came out, concluded its work last fall, and there have been two PDD's that are the result of a very intensive interagency process that the President signed and talked about this May, indicates a level of attention and a level of concern that I think you will see carried into the future at the highest levels of the government. And having had discussions also at the Cabinet level myself, I can assure you that this is an issue which is receiving from the breadth of the administration a very serious level of attention. And perhaps my colleagues from the Department of Defense could also speak to that as well.
Let me also note that not only speaking to how will this happen, how will it be coordinated; it is very important to recognize the breadth of this agenda and its complexity, which is why the PDD does charge specific departments to be working either—you ask in terms of what is the difference between functional and sector liaisons. In the case—some departments are being charged in working with parts of the private sector that they have a natural relationship with. So the Treasury Department is being charged with working with the banking and finance sector in order to address their unique problems. Similarly, the Transportation Department with various sectors in the Transportation Department. There is a very important underlying assumption here which recognizes that this agenda is far too broad and far too complex for any single office, whatever its capabilities to deal with it, and we need the buy-in; we need the support; we need the resources of the entire Federal Government to be dealing with this agenda.
Page 736 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Similarly—and this is where the functional lead agencies come in—there are some very important functions which are really the responsibility of the National Government, intelligence, as in the DCI; law enforcement and internal security, with Justice and the FBI; national defense, with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs; and foreign affairs, as in the State Department. And so the PDD specifically acknowledges that, for example, the State Department doesn't have a part of the economy that they work with, but they have a very vital role in terms of coordinating the international agenda associated with critical infrastructure protection.
The PDD does two further things. It appoints a national coordinator within the National Security Council who will chair the interagency group, which, in fact, as I noted in my initial comments, will be meeting for the first time this afternoon to coordinate the activities of all of the different agencies and of their work with the private sector and internationally on these special issues. It also calls for a small coordinating staff, which is the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, to help make this process happen. There's a number of cross-cutting issues that are going to be very important: the role of R&D, the whole legal agenda, and legislative agenda; I mentioned before the possibility of developing standards or best practices that would be applicable both in the Federal Government and in the private sector. These are issues that need to be identified where learning needs to be shared in the course of creating this national capability and, frankly, of updating this national capability, because this is not a static agenda. It is going to be evolving as technology evolves.
So it requires at—I take your point, and I think it is extremely important to emphasize that this is an agenda that will take the support and the attention from the very highest levels of the Government in order to make it happen. But I believe that that support is there.
Page 737 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELLS. If I may, in support of the interagency coordination, Dr. Hamre has met in the past month or so with the representatives from Commerce, with the National Security Council; he has established a very close relationship with the attorney general, and in these roughly bimonthly meetings he's been having in the course of this year, infrastructure issues have been high on the agenda of discussion.
We have within Defense established what we call a Critical Asset Assurance Program which is trying to look at those key nodes in the network of systems on which we depend that are important, primarily for Defense to execute its military mission. You know we recognize that this is an extremely broad problem. We recognize that we do not have all of the pieces of the puzzle. We have done a lot of thinking about it and are prepared to offer any assistance we can to other agencies of government. So I think there is a lot of, you know, below the national coordinator level, a lot of horizontal integration already under way within the executive branch.
Mr. SISISKY. What is this group meeting going on this afternoon?
Dr. HUNKER. Within the PDD, it calls for the creation of the critical infrastructure coordinating group. Each agency is tasked with providing a senior official at the assistant secretary level or above to focus on this agenda. In the case of agencies that are tasked with working with a specific sector of the economy, that individual is also tasked with having the lead responsibility working with that part of the economy, so Treasury with the banking sector, for example. And the critical infrastructure coordinating group is the interagency group that then will be developing and formulating policy, the national policy, that will lead into the national plan. It is intended to be——
Page 738 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. SISISKY. Who is the lead in that? Or is there a lead in that?
Dr. HUNKER. Well, it will be chaired by the National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism who is at the National Security Council. That's Dick Clark.
Mr. SISISKY. Is that a secretarial level, the Chair? I mean, he's going to be dealing with Assistant Secretaries or Under Secretaries. I mean is he on a level with those?
Dr. HUNKER. Yes, he is a principal.
Mr. SISISKY. OK, that's what I wanted to be sure of. Thank you.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Sisisky, and also thank you for sitting through the entire classified section this morning. I appreciate that.
Mr. Pickett.
STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Page 739 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hunker, I notice on page 5 of your written statement here you list six different elements that the administration is going to be pursuing under the PDD–63. I wonder if you could tell us what kind of timetable has been established to achieve these elements and what kind of structure that you envision to carry these out and whether or not the resources or the resource arrangements to execute this plan are presently available or whether congressional action is going to be required to make these resources available.
Dr. HUNKER. Let me speak first in terms of the timeframe and then address the other parts of your issue. The PDD sets forth a number of very aggressive timeframes. With a program that has truly just emerged onto many of our radar screens, it calls for a full capability within 5 years for the Nation to protect itself and be able to respond, and isolate, any attacks that do occur. And it calls for, by the year 2000, for us to have that initial capability. Now 5 years sounds like a long time, but when we're talking about critical infrastructures that span both the breadth of the Federal Government as well as much of the private sector I believe that that in itself is quite a challenge. It sets forth, furthermore, some very specific and immediate time frames. It calls for, within 180 days of the PDD being signed, so the clock is ticking, for each Federal department or agency to have conducted its own vulnerability assessment of its own critical infrastructures and then to put in place a plan for correcting or responding to those critical infrastructures.
It also calls for within 180 days for us to have an outline and a time plan with significant milestones for the creation of the national plan which is the foundation for the national capability. And it further calls for, within that same 180 days, for the administration to have made recommendations about the creation of what it calls—of the mechanisms for sharing information between the private sector and the public sector and the Government. There are other time frames that are called for as well, there's an annual update. Departments and agencies within the Federal Government are required within a 2-year period to have fully operational their own plans to be protecting their own critical infrastructure as well and then there is a yearly updating process. So there's a number—and I'll be pleased as we progress further to provide the committee with more specifics in terms of the schedule of work and the structure therein.
Page 740 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
It's very important also to emphasize, with regards to resources, that this, the PDD, calls for a structure not of a single office located in one particular part of the Government, but rather for lead agencies spread across the economic, national defense, intelligence, and law enforcement responsibilities to each take responsibility for a portion of this agenda and then for it to be coordinated and built on an interagency basis. So, we are looking for 12 significant parts of the Government, at a minimum, to be doing substantial work in that regard.
There is, there will be, and we are looking very carefully at the issue of additional resources. The President's Commission, for example, in its report last November, called for a very substantial increase in Federal R&D spending. That recommendation was not carried forward in the PDD. OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Production] and other technology-based agencies are currently looking at both the level of Federal spending and private-sector spending and we anticipate that in the year 2000 process, we will be coming forward with specific budget proposals that will speak both to R&D and to other resources that are going to be required. But it is very important before we start throwing money at this problem that we understand specifically where is money already being spent, where can it best be spent, and how do we avoid duplicative resources, duplicative spending? And we are currently in that phase right now. But we are in an very aggressive program to define the resource requirements needed.
Mr. PICKETT. Do you envision that there will be a set of standards or benchmarks or reference points or something that these 12 individual agencies are going to follow in making their agency analysis?
Page 741 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. Sir, it will be a fine line between allowing, recognizing that different agencies, because of their responsibilities. Responsibilities in the missions in the Defense Department are, as was noted before, very different than the responsibilities of some of the economic agencies, similarly within different sectors of the private sector industries. There are going to be different issues that are going to be faced. So on one hand we have to be very sensitive that there is not a one-size-fits-all, and we have to allow for the bubbling up of creativity in specific circumstances. At the same time it is very important that we be recognizing the cross-cutting issues and that everybody be marching on the same, essentially to the sheet of music. And it is the tension between those two. There will be common framework that everyone will be following. It will be one of the responsibilities of my office to help, be working with the agencies and with the private sector to create that common template, but I also want to emphasize it is very important to recognize that there are differences between both the missions of different departments and different sectors within private industry.
Mr. PICKETT. Is it the administration's position that in the year 2000 budget cycle that there be a separate spending line in each of the agencies to provide for carrying out the functions and responsibilities set forth in PDD–63?
Dr. HUNKER. Well, far be it from me to speak for OMB, but if I have my way, yes.
Mr. PICKETT. Or for anybody to speak for them.
Dr. HUNKER. If I have my way, yes.
Page 742 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. PICKETT. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Washington Post article of yesterday which has been referred to and now being made a part of the record makes reference to, as did earlier testimony, to two 16-year-old high school students in Northern California, with the advice of an 18-year-old, I believe it is, who is a foreign national, of being able to penetrate our defense systems. Mention has been made that we need a change in the culture. Someone made reference to the fact that these two 16-year-old high school students are looked at as heroes among their peers. It occurs to, at least this member, that someone who is 16 years of age, undertaking to do these kind of things with the sophistication involved, and in consultation with someone who is 18 years of age, they likely ought to be prosecuted not as a juvenile, where everything is kept confidential and not disclosed, but should be prosecuted as an adult who, and our Government, aware of how critical this is, should be the person on the phone with the prosecuting authorities saying this is a problem of national concern. These people ought to be prosecuted as if they were adults.
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Bateman, I share the concern and the, as I've mentioned, and it's come up in the earlier briefing. Cyber crimes and hacking incidents challenge our current legal structure and some of the popular views of how we treat these sorts of incidents. I'll let my colleagues from the Defense Department speak to the specifics of that particular incident since it was directed against them. It's very important that we be looking at——
Page 743 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BATEMAN. You've confirmed my notion that maybe we ought to leave this function with the Department of Defense.
Dr. HUNKER. Well, if I could continue. The Justice Department and the FBI are specifically charged within the FPDD with looking at the legal and legislative sets of issues. There are obviously other departments and, that will have views in terms of this. But we recognize the importance of working with you in a review of the current legal structure, both domestically and internationally to reflect the nature of this new challenge. It is absolutely something that needs to be on the table and needs to be on the table soon.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me just say that everything that I have heard leads me to the impression that this is regarded as a matter of having the utmost significance and sensitivity to our national security, to our national well-being economically, that we need a change in culture. Why is it that you are unwilling to say, by golly, I'm the person the President put in charge of these concerns, I'll make the doggone phone call? If you want to change the culture, you don't keep people who engage in conduct such as this as significant as it is to our national security left to say, ho, ho, ho, that was a great stunt we pulled. It boggles my mind why somebody isn't in communication with prosecuting authorities, at least pressing the case of how significant this is and that such conduct ought to be one which is well publicized, and the consequences of it, when established in a court of law, are well publicized as a deterrent for others who might think it's a great big wonderful game to demonstrate how smart they are.
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Bateman, within hours, and certainly within days, there are going to be discussions on this set of issues that will involve the right law enforcement and legal authorities within the executive branch and I will certainly make certain that your concerns are conveyed in the strongest possible sense. And, as I said, that will be within days and——
Page 744 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. BATEMAN. Very good, but, you know, it's a little late for that given the fact this incidence came to light, I think, as late as February, maybe earlier.
Mr. WELDON. Did you want to add something?
Mr. WELLS. Just, one, to amplify what Dr. Hunker has said, and this is to Mr. Bateman: Both Secretary Cohen and Dr. Hamre have been consulted very closely on the location of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office in Commerce and they have concurred with it, not because they have any concerns, or are not concerned about national security, but they recognize that this infrastructure initiative has got to reach out to a very wide breadth of America and Commerce is certainly well suited to do that in one sense. In addition, we all realize that this has got to involve a cooperative project across the executive branch and the actual location of the office, we think, is less important than the fact that we will be working together on it. So I think Defense has not been cut out of this process; Defense has been aware of it and we are certainly prepared to support the structure of the PDD.
Mr. BATEMAN. Dr. Wells, and other witnesses, certainly I have no doubt but what the Department of Defense will continue to show and display an interest, and I'm much happier that something is being done than I am about the question of where is the focal point of it going to be and in which department. I would, nonetheless, remain deeply skeptical that the Department of Commerce, given its historic interest and concerns, and with some grave reservations about its performance in the past in areas sensitive to national security, is the agency of Government that will illicit the same degree of concern, activity, performance, that would come from those who are the arbiters, principally, of our national security, which is the bedrock of what this concern is all about.
Page 745 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Bateman, if I could simply emphasize an important point which I touched on earlier in my testimony. Institutionally the office, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, is located within Commerce, but in its mission, in its structure of personnel and, I commit to you, in my view of what it is, it is a very much of an interagency process and an interagency office where the concerns of national defense are absolutely critical. It is true it may be institutionally or bureaucratically an office of the Department of Commerce, but in its spirit and its functioning and in the output, it is very much an interagency office and will be so reflected in terms of the personnel and the issues and the way issues are dealt with.
Mr. WELDON. We are going to continue the questioning since my colleagues are sticking around. How many are in the office, Dr. Hunker?
Dr. HUNKER. It's small at this point; we've got about 20 people, we——
Mr. WELDON. That's a pretty tough assignment to monitor all of the agencies with 20 people. If you can do that, you are on to higher things, I'll tell you.
Dr. HUNKER. I can assure you that I spend a considerable amount of my time in discussions, interagency discussions and with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] in terms of getting the right resources. We're at a point right now where the office that I am currently directing is really the remnants of the staff from the President's Commission, which is quite valuable because these people, in many cases, have 2 or more years worth of experience on infrastructure protection, a valuable resource in an area where many people don't have much experience at all. It's also true that in the time between when the President's Commission ended and the Presidential Decision Directive was signed, which was about 6 months, a number of people left, either to go back to their agencies or back into the private sector.
Page 746 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I spend a considerable portion of my time, and my colleagues at the office, as well as many people at the Defense Department and the Commerce Department and OMB are spending a considerable amount of time right now in restaffing.
Mr. WELDON. Dr. Hunker, I just want to add to the comments being made by Mr. Bateman in regard to the seriousness of this issue relative to hackers and we're not just here talking about the military. I mean, I've been involved in a major project in a four-State region involving secure information systems and what oftentimes worries me is a hacker who, in the case of the two from California looked up to as heroes, who may go in and disrupt the medical records at a hospital. I mean we have to understand as a society that when someone who gains the ability to go into an information system decides they are going to go in and access a system illegally and then disrupt the records or the material in that system, this is a serious crime. And we ought to go in, and I think aggressively as possible, bring the hammer down on them. I mean you go into a hospital and mix up the patient records, you could cause a loss of life. Isn't that the case?
Dr. HUNKER. I'm not a lawyer, so I'm free to make comments like this about our legal structure. The distinction between how society views physical crimes and how society or parts of society view hacker attacks or cyber crimes, there is still a gulf there and we need to bridge that gulf and we need to do that both from a cultural standpoint and I think also with a serious examination of our legal frameworks, both at the Federal and at the State level on this issue. Absolutely, I agree with you.
Mr. WELDON. And so my point is, who will give us the recommendations in that area that we can take to toughen up our legislation and our laws to show that the Congress is serious about this issue and wants to send a signal that this is not a trivial issue, not just because of the national security implications because of the impact it can have on our citizens in their daily lives?
Page 747 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. I hope that shortly myself, my colleagues here from the Department of Defense and from the Department of Justice and the national coordinator, some combination of those, can appear before you and begin the dialogue in terms of making recommendations.
Mr. WELDON. Dr. Hunker, in your statement you mention that the Department of Defense has requested $69.9 million in fiscal year 1999 funding for research to protect infrastructures. This committee, and, in particular, my subcommittee, has been very supportive of the efforts in the R&D area. What are the other agencies putting on the table? We're putting $70 million of DOD money, what are the other agencies doing dollarwise?
Dr. HUNKER. For fiscal year 1999, it's my understanding that there is a small amount of money which the Department of Justice has also requested in this area. But in addition, those are the two budget requests that I'm aware of.
Mr. WELDON. How about Commerce? What was the Commerce number?
Dr. HUNKER. Commerce is going to be spending, the discussion currently is on the order of $20 million, but that is not in the fiscal year 1999, that is going to be coming out of reprogramming.
Mr. WELDON. Well, I will just say that we will live up to our part of the responsibility on DOD, but as all of our witnesses are saying, both in public and private testimony, this is not a DOD issue alone and all of the agencies have to understand they have got to step up to the plate. I remember the funding for Next Generation Internet last year. DOD was to my understanding the only agency that put up its fair share of the Next Generation Internet funding, if I'm not mistaken, so the administration needs to understand it's not just a broad-based responsibility, but there's also got to be a broad-based way to pay for this, not just DOD dollars.
Page 748 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Now, let me just ask a question and reverse the roles here. Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Wells.
Mr. WELLS. If I could I just ask, Mr. Chairman, for your assistance. I understand that the Appropriations Committee has zeroed that mark and to the extent that you could help us with it would be very appreciated.
Mr. WELDON. I will lobby, as I did last year, for money in that area, but I think the administration has got to really make, they've to make the case as to what the threat is. And I know you can't speak for the President, but if the President would give the speech the same amount of time on this issue that he has on the supposed detargeting of Russian nuclear ICBM's, which at my last count was 190 times across the country, we wouldn't have a problem. The American people would understand this threat is real and it is serious. So the White House needs to take the lead here and convince the American people that they need to support their legislators putting more money into this critical problem and challenge. We'll follow suit; in fact, we are already leading the curve, but we need that leadership coming out of the White House from the top down. And I've been impressed with both your statements and Dr. Hamre's statements as well as Dr. Wells and General Campbell, but, you know, you've got to help us convince the man at the top to make this a national mandate, if you will, because I think that's what it is. Certainly, in what I've learned from today, that is what it is.
Let me kind of turn the tables here and ask this question: We have a terrible problem here. As we said, the classified briefing today was very troubling. So if it is troubling to us, imagine the problem in the former Soviet Union. Now I do a lot of work with Russia. I'm very concerned about the instability now, and I would make the case, as I have repeatedly, that Russia's more stabilized today than at any point in time under communism. Now they have a nuclear mechanism, a nuclear capability, that certainly is unequaled except by us in the world. If someone can compromise our smart information systems, which they have attempted to do, I would imagine that same capability would apply to Russian systems. Is there an enhanced threat then, from the instability in Russia, to control of their nuclear arsenal and to their critical components and weapons of mass destruction?
Page 749 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. I'm looking to my colleagues from the Defense Department who might be able to deal with the specifics of that. Let me note——
Mr. WELDON. Well, personally then, would you think there would be an enhanced possibility?
Dr. HUNKER. Yes. Yes, and I would speak in terms, in two contexts. As we are all aware, the year 2000 is approaching and there is a serious problem, which is overlapping but distinct and separable from the larger issue of critical infrastructure protection, having to do with the year 2000 and the operation of computer systems then, and it is a problem that is going potentially affect not only our Nation but other nations that have computers, including those in the former Soviet Union. And then, I think you make a very logical case for the concern about the stability of other nations and their concerns here. And I lead into, again, the importance here of looking at this as an international issue and one truly that speaks to our national—concerns about our national security in many, many different facets. It is a big problem.
Mr. WELDON. Dr. Wells or General Campbell, do you want to comment on the enhanced Russian, perhaps, threat?
Mr. WELLS. This is a problem I know that Dr. Hamre has spent a lot of time worrying about and certainly the Y2K problem is of particular importance because, as you point out, the Russian nuclear threat remains and anything that cause that, whether it's—I don't think many people worry that the fiscal year Y2K problem, for example, is going to cause a Russian missile to launch. The concern is more what it may cause their perception of what is going on in the world to be. And so there's a fair amount of effort underway to build confidence, find information, sharing mechanisms leading to that time, so we can at least get back through that transition period more comfortably.
Page 750 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
In terms of the longer issue about security of Russian nuclear weapon sites and things like that, that's not really so much an infrastructure issue, it is a, you know, a reflection on their turbulent personnel situation and, I'm obviously not prepared to comment, particularly on that right now. With regard to the infrastructure, one of the problems we're finding is that, as Dr. Hunker said, the infrastructure is an international issue and problems that crop up in Europe may well turn out to be migrating through the networks to become problems for us. And so as Russia gets more and more on line with the Internet, we had the example this morning about the Russian—Nunn, Lugar people looking at what the appropriations were—and as they get more and more connected, as their systems become more and more linked to ours, there is both the potential for attacks from overseas and there is the potential that disruptions in their networks will migrate and affect us, whether it is corrupted data, whether it is perceptions that financial markets may pick up illnesses from foreign markets. So I think, in the worst case, say, launches of nuclear weapons caused by this, we don't see that. In terms of general concerns of Y2K, we do see that. In terms of general infrastructure, interconnectedness, that's a concern probably less with Russia than it might be with, say, Western Europe or Japan at this point.
Mr. WELDON. Well, Dr. Wells, I would like to share your degree of confidence on the control of our nuclear arsenal, but in light of what happened in January three years ago, I can't, where the Norwegians notified Russia of a multistage missile launch to detect weather conditions, notified Russia, but because of the very point that you make, and that is a lack of modernization of Russia's internal communications mechanisms, they misread that launch as coming from an American submarine. They put their entire offensive IBM system on full alert, which meant they activate the checklist controlled by Boris Yeltsin, Pavel Grachev, the Defense Minister at the time, and General Koleznikoff, which meant they were on the countdown, which they publicly admitted, to a nuclear response to a signal that they had been forewarned of as being a weather rocket.
Page 751 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
It doesn't give me much degree of confidence that a hacker, knowing how to get into the Russian systems, couldn't provide false information that might lead to another activation of the checklists controlled now by those, now two or three are different leaders, that could cause us to be concerned.
Mr. WELLS. I think you are absolutely right and that is one of the reasons why, although it is triggered in this case by Y2K, the need to have these kind of confidence-building measures, to have these discussions. It is crucial, essentially, especially since the Russians own national technical means, if you will, are decaying over time, so it's very, very important to have that and we share your concern. I didn't mean to downplay that.
Mr. WELDON. No. General, did you have any other comments you'd like to make on this?
General CAMPBELL. I'd just like to comment that, as we observed this morning, part of our vulnerability has developed as we have shifted away from the closed loop command and control systems to Web-based technology and my suspicion is that the Russians, perhaps, are not as quite as far along in that path and, therefore, may be less vulnerable to a hacker in that type of instance. I would be more concerned, as I think you are, about the potential Y2K problems and deterioration of the general infrastructure over there which could cause problems.
Mr. WELDON. I have some questions, but I want to go another round before I get into some other issues from my colleagues, so that they begin to ask other questions as well. So, I guess what I'll do now is go to Mr. Pickett. Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I'm going to ask is a follow-up to my line of questioning before, Dr. Hunker, about the PDD–63 development of a national plan.
Page 752 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. Yes.
Mr. PICKETT. I intended to, when we were talking about standards and reference points, I was also intending to ask you about the capability and experience to carry out these responsibilities of drawing up the national plan; if you envision this capability being established and maintained in-house, so to speak, or do you envision this as something that the various agencies will be contracting out to private providers, private contractors in the commercial sector?
Dr. HUNKER. It is going to involve a number of different resources, but I will tell you that within the Federal Government, I would hope that, for the most part, that we would be relying on our own in-house capabilities to be developing this because I think it is very important, as we are addressing this issue, and this may require some consideration in terms of changes in Federal personnel practices that we look hard at the issue of what are the capabilities within the different departments and agencies in the Federal Government to deal with issues of cyber security.
I have heard many comments, and I can't speak in terms of the specifics, but heard many comments about the reliance across the Federal Government on contractors for dealing with security issues or, more generally, with computer issues. And I think it is important that we look very hard at that. There are a number of resources.
I met yesterday with the National Academy of Sciences. They have done considerable work in many of these areas, starting, in fact, at the very head of that organization on issues of infrastructure and cyber security. National Security Agency [NSA], within the Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], have also got considerable resources. So it's not as though we don't have resources within the Federal Government to be dealing with this.
Page 753 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I'd also just like to emphasize that a big chunk of the work that will be done in developing the national plan needs to appropriately be coming from the private sector. We truly need to have a partnership here and so I am hopeful, and certainly intend to encourage the private sector, the different industries that are named in the PDD, to be devoting their resources to this issue. And my discussion so far with both corporate leaders and with trade associations has suggested that people do recognize this as an important issue and are willing to devote resources to be developing it.
Mr. PICKETT. If you don't have the capability in the government today, although you may have components of it, and you're saying that you don't really plan for this to be a contracted-out activity, how long do you think it will take to establish this capability in the 12 Government agencies that are going to be participating in the PDD–63 plan?
Dr. HUNKER. It's going to be a difficult process, but I would note that we have three years to have the initial capability as called for in the PDD. I think with the focus and with close cooperation of Congress and with the attention at the highest levels of Government, that we can build those capabilities within key agencies. I think that the attention which has been demonstrated by the Department of Defense on this issue, and I might note also within the Justice Department and FBI in other ways, already signals the importance of this issue. The fact that resources are being requested by the Department of Defense on this signals an importance. There are other agencies that are clearly lagging behind in that area. But I'm hopeful that, it will not be easy, but that we can create that capability within the timeframe called for.
Page 754 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I also note that I'm not saying that we can't use outside resources. Clearly, this is an agenda where the people who have the expertise, the people who have the knowledge need to be drawn in, and I think that outside resources, contractors, and the like, can play a very important role. But I think it is also very important to remember that, particularly when we are talking about a Federal Government capability, that we look carefully at building that capability internally as well as in lieu of simply relying exclusively on outside resources.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Dr. Hunker, you heard this morning Dr. Hamre provide his characterization of the importance of the action of this committee on the encryption bill that was moving through the Congress, is moving through the Congress, and you have testified—and I agree with you—that encryption is not the only answer to this problem that we have in this country and worldwide; that it requires a much greater degree of action; it requires a change in the mind set of the country, in corporations to toughen up their control mechanisms and personnel training issues.
But on the public record, would you agree with the characterization that Dr. Hamre made? Would you disagree? Would you say he overemphasized? I would like to have that on the record for the members of this full committee, the 54 members who are here, as to the action we took on the encryption bill and your thoughts on the encryption debate in the Congress.
Dr. HUNKER. Mr. Chairman, I can share with you my thoughts. I would like to state for the record that I have not devoted, I think, the study and the attention on the encryption issue that would be necessary for me to render an opinion. I've a great deal of personal respect for Dr. Hamre on that, and I just want to emphasize that I have not devoted the attention to the encryption issue specifically so far.
Page 755 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
I haven't for a very specific reason which is, as I mentioned before, it is my hope that, in fact, that we will soon be able to put the encryption issue behind us with a solution that respects both the very important concerns about national security and also the international commercial concerns that are out there. If that doesn't seem to be the case in a very short time period, I'm afraid that, yes, I will have to devote the study to come out there.
The President's commission took a similar tact in recognizing that encryption was important, but really staying out of the debate that was raging during the period when it was looking at the larger issue. I'll be happy to study it, the issue, and I'll be happy to get back to you.
Mr. WELDON. I'll just say for the record that the administration, if it is going to be serious about critical infrastructure, can't take a walk on the very difficult issue of encryption and the debate going on in this country. I mean, it's easy for us to walk away and say, you know, we see multimillions of dollars being spent by the software industry; we don't want to offend them. But, you know, we do have some security concerns. But you are going to have to bite the bullet. If you don't want to do it today, I understand it. But you remember what Dr. Hamre said this morning, and I'm not going to reveal what he said in a classified setting, but you were here and you heard it.
We took a position as a committee, not because of anyone prodding, but because we were concerned about what the National Security Agency was saying, what the Director of the CIA was saying, and this administration has got to come out with a consistent policy that sends a signal to this Congress. This is a major issue. This bill is right now being subjected to possible floor action, so you don't have a couple of months to read and make a decision. We were talking about critical infrastructure; I don't know of anything that is more critical than the legislative impact we would have than if we passed an encryption bill. So, I would just admonish you not to get on—I don't want to put you on the spot today because I read what you're saying, but I'm telling you, eventually, you are going to have to make a decision and not try to please everybody. That's not going to happen; I've already tried to do that.
Page 756 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. Wells, do you want to add anything to that? Do you want to——
Mr. WELLS. I would just—Dr. Hamre clearly made clear his view on the importance of this. In order to back up his views on this, he is putting the Department's money, if you will, where his mouth is, especially with regard to the procurement of key recovery systems for our commercial practices. His view is that DOD executes something over 40 million dollar's worth of contracts an hour, and there is no way that he is going to not allow, from an internal controls point of view, if nothing else, some means to recover that information, should it be locked by a disgruntled or dishonest employee. So, we are going to be using key recovery in that business practice.
Mr. WELDON. General, do you have——
General CAMPBELL. Nothing. No, sir.
Mr. WELDON. Let me ask a question, actually, Roscoe Bartlett is not here; he was here this morning, but I'm going to ask the Roscoe Bartlett question. My colleagues who aren't here and the staff will know what I'm going to ask because it is an issue that he raises at all of these questions, and it's a critical issue, actually. We've discussed the vulnerability of our information systems in this country, but it is this committee's understanding that the one overriding way to bring down our capability would be to have a low complexity missile at a rather low level have a nuclear burst in the atmosphere that would create an electromagnetic pulse that would basically wipe out all, or a significant portion, of all of our information systems within a given region. Is this something that the Critical Infrastructure Office is looking at?
Page 757 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. Electromagnetic devices of the sort that you are talking about come in a variety of shapes and sizes, and the answer is yes, and it reflects, again, the importance of the Defense Department and its capabilities in building the national capability to protect ourselves. This speaks very directly to both an information technologies threat and a conventional military threat, and it's a serious issue. My understanding is the technology in these sorts of devices is continuing to advance outside of the United States in countries that might be hostile to us, and it's an important issue absolutely.
Mr. WELDON. Radio frequency weapons?
Dr. HUNKER. Yes, radio frequency weapons.
Mr. WELDON. A specific question relative to a topic that is getting a lot of play here on the Hill, and I just want to ask one very specific question about the failed launch of the Chinese Longmarch rocket in southern China. My understanding is that most of the wreckage was recovered, but one specific piece was missing, and I understand it was a softball-sized module containing telemetry guidance and encryption chips that are on our munitions list controlled by export of the State Department, DOD, and the Department of Commerce. My understanding is the Air Force was able to recover nearly all the parts of the satellite, but this critical portion was missing. Are you aware of that and does that present a significant challenge to us in this country, technology——
Mr. WELLS. I'll have to take that for the record, Mr. Chairman. I'll find out and get back to you.
Page 758 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 695.]
Mr. WELDON. Thank you. One other issue I want to raise, and unless staff has additional questions, I'm going to try to wrap it up because you've been very kind with your time. One of my basic thoughts—and really staff prodded me to get involved in this issue 4 years when I took over chairmanship of the R&D subcommittee and it's really opened my eyes—is that the answers can't come from Washington alone in this very serious problem. We've got to start a massive effort within the private sector, within the culture of the country, in our schools, to basically reorient the American people to a major generational change that is occurring with the spread of information.
And so, 3 years ago, I embarked on an initiative to link up four States, basically all of the institutions in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland, through an interconnected networks that we call HUBS, which stands for Hospital, Universities, Businesses, and Schools, which is designed to create the first smart region in the country, linking all of our universities and our tech centers and our government processing centers, including some nonclassified DOD installations, together, at the same time demonstrating that you can build in protection for that information at the same time.
Is this the kind of model that we should be encouraging in regions around the country to take it on their own to begin to look at ways that they can move ahead in the information age, gain additional capability by building on the specific computing capability of each institution, but in the process of providing that interconnect and that wide bandwidth that you need, also building in the protection for that data at the same time? Is that something that we should be encouraging as a country?
Page 759 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Dr. HUNKER. Absolutely. Absolutely, and I just wanted to highlight the importance, some of the key words that you used: the bandwidth, the interconnection, but also the protection into that system. It's very important. If we look at the sort of economic growth and the impact on enhanced productivity and quality of our economic output, clearly the information structure that we're building, the savings that result from being able to transmit information over these networks is a critical component both in terms of providing direct employment in information technology industries, and indirectly, we look at AMAZON.COM, I mean, a very traditional book retailing business that is conducted over the Internet, as an example.
So, your leadership in terms of helping to provide that sort of advanced infrastructure is, I think, exactly the sort of model for the 21st century economy and it's a model for U.S. world leadership. The agenda in terms of critical infrastructure, in particular, the cyber dimension, is ultimately one of ensuring that that structure is safe and secure and protected from both destruction, but also from data manipulation as well.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you very much.
Let me ask staff if they have any additional questions? We would ask unanimous consent to put certain questions in the record, and if you could respond to them in an appropriate amount of time, we'd appreciate that. And if you have any follow-up items you would like to put into the record, without objection, we would give you the permission to do that.
I would like to also, without objection, move to include an unclassified version of Dr. Hamre's briefing this morning into the record. Since there's no one to object, it looks like it is OK, and I'd also like to include in the record a letter from the General Accounting Office which addresses the emerging results of their review of DOD's effort to protect and defend its information, information systems. This review is being conducted at the request of the Research and Development Subcommittee. Each member got a copy of that letter. Since there are no objections, each of those items is ordered.
Page 760 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 644.]
Mr. WELDON. And, again, let me thank you. You've been very kind; you've been very generous; you've been very open, and I understand the pressures that you are under in certain key issue areas, but I hope you understand the pressure that we're under. And, unfortunately, this pressure is building as each day goes on, and we're trying to be helpful to the administration in this regard, both dollarwise and policywise. So we'd appreciate your understanding of our pressure here in the Congress as well.
Thank you, and the hearing now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned subject to the call of the Chairs.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WELDON
Mr. WELDON. Each of the military departments has its own information security or information assurance program. How are the independent activities of the military departments being coordinated to ensure that an information assurance weakness or flaw in one department does not comprise the entire Defense Information Infrastructure?
Page 761 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELLS. The observation in the question in large measure precipitated the recent creation of the Defense-wide Information Assurance Program (DIAP). Under the leadership of the Department's Chief Information Officer, the DIAP and its staff will compare the Information Assurance (IA) resource investments of the Department's Services, CINCs, Agencies, and activities against a prioritized and balanced set of functional activities. This enterprise-wide IA function and resource review will produce an integrated, efficient, and effective IA program that provides a continuous and effective defense for the systems and networks that comprise the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII).
Mr. WELDON. What measures are being undertaken to address the issues of increased vulnerability of the Defense Information Infrastructure that results from increased use of commercial off-the-shelf systems and communications and computer networks?
Mr. WELLS. The use of untested commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and/or use of software that has not been independently verified and validated, constitutes a threat to not only the Department's but every system and network in use today. Within the Department a number of activities are underway to address and mitigate these threats. These activities include:
a. The development and operation of Component Information Assurance organizations (e.g., Service Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) the Defense Information Systems Agency's Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST)), and their conduct of vulnerability assessments and on-line surveys to detect and fix known system and network vulnerabilities.
Page 762 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
b. The continuous development of analytical tools, continuous conduct of penetration testing, security monitoring, and ''Red Team'' and exercises such as Eligible Receiver, to test existing network configurations to discover and fix previously unknown vulnerabilities and weaknesses in Defense systems and networks.
c. Creation of the Defense-wide Information Assurance Program (DIAP). The DIAP will provide Defense-wide oversight, and will integrate and continuously assess the effectiveness of the Department's development and employment of both Government and COTS security products.
d. National Security Agency (NSA) sponsorship of the Network Security Framework Forum, which brings together industry and government to define standards and specifications to ''set the bar'' for security functionalities and robustness in commercial products and solutions.
e. Joint NSA and National Institute of Standards and Technology sponsorship of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP). The NIAP and its associated laboratories will assess security enabled COTS products and validate vender security claims. The NIAP certification mark should stimulate the creation of, and consumer demand for, evaluated security enabled COTS products. Given economies of scale, the Department and the nation should be able to benefit from both the quality of NIAP certified products and their lower per-unit cost.
Mr. WELDON. What new legislative authority may be required for the DOD to implement an effective information assurance program?
Page 763 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Mr. WELLS. The Department is constantly revisiting existing legislation and exploring the possibility of new legislation to determine what would assist us in dealing with the increasing threat to the DOD's operational readiness by attacks on its information infrastructure.
Mr. WELDON. Certain elements of the radio frequency spectrum reallocated from military use to civilian sector. What is the impact of such reallocations to the Department's information assurance program.
Mr. WELLS. Losing spectrum access is like losing any other important resource. Unless adequately compensated for, the loss of spectrum and force structure, combined with the Department's increasing operational requirements, will combine to create a reduction in the effectiveness and overall capabilities of the Department. Compensating for the loss of spectrum in an increasingly information reliant military is essential but requires additional resources to develop, test, and field alternative capabilities which, in many cases, will be less effective than the capabilities they replace. Many of the technology advantages the Department employees rely heavily on access to specific portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Over 90% of the Department's permanent frequency assignments are below 3GHz. Of the 235 MHz reallocated under the Omnibus Budget Reduction Act of 1993, 135 MHz was below 3GHz—all of it used by the Department.
From an Information Assurance perspective, the reduction in the Department's available frequencies allows an adversary to focus and make more efficient use of his Information Warfare, intelligence, and surveillance assets. Further, such reductions force compression of the U.S. systems and networks operating within remaining spectrum, and provide an adversary an easier and increasingly higher-payoff target. The loss of electromagnetic spectrum and its associated capabilities adds even greater urgency to our efforts to protect the Defense systems and networks utilizing the remaining frequencies, and has the potential of requiring the creation of a Defense-wide minimum essential information infrastructure built on the highest availability and reliability standards.
Page 764 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
General CAMPBELL. Reallocation of radio frequency spectrum has no direct impact on the Department's information assurance program. Indirectly, however, it does impact the availability of pathways over which our information travels. Assured access to the radio frequency spectrum is a key enabler of the information superiority component of Joint Vision 2010. This access, not only for our forces but for our allies and coalition partners, must be adequately protected during spectrum reallocation actions currently underway in the United States and abroad. Assured spectrum access is critical for military operations. The proposed frequency spectrum sell-offs directly impact warfighting capability. Title III of the Balanced Budget Act 1997 (BBA–97) will impose constraints in many critical areas, including tactical communications for close air support of ground troops, long-range air defense radars, and aircraft and missile test telemetry systems. Cost estimates from the Services as a result of BBA–97 range from $.500 to 2.5 billion. Fewer frequencies will make it harder for the military to train, will reduce our national defense posture, and will increase the cost of weapon and sensor development programs significantly.
Mr. WADE. One of the keys to a successful critical infrastructure assurance program will be the willingness to share information within government, between government and the private sector, to define critical systems and how they operate, to identify and share [information on] vulnerabilities, and to indicate when an attack on critical infrastructure such as an information system has occurred. What are some of the impediments to such information sharing? What kind of cultural changes will be necessary to face the threat of information warfare.
Mr. WELLS. There are several impediments hindering the exchange of information regarding critical infrastructure protection within and between the public and private sectors. Impediments include technology limitations, infrastructure complexities, legal constraints, the fear of Constitutional infringement on the rights of American citizens, the lack of an organized information exchange network with efficient communication mechanisms and established reporting protocols and procedures, and institutional and industry cultural differences.
Page 765 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Identifying the source of cyber attacks is often a labor-intensive effort that requires the cooperation of many public and private sector entities. Technological improvements that will expedite the entire investigative and response process will be needed to encourage reluctant parties to participate in the information sharing process.
At present, the Federal Government can not identify with sufficient specificity the critical nodes and networks that make up the nation's critical infrastructures. The public and private sectors are just beginning to understand and appreciate the complexity and interdependent nature of many of the nation's critical infrastructures. Until the government better defines its needs, the private sector will not feel compelled to participate fully in the development of a national risk management strategy. It should also be noted that the Federal Government will need to equitably compensate the private sector for the level of security the government requires.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center was established, in part, to permit the DOD to participate with the DoJ in the defense of the nation's critical infrastructures without violating laws such as the Posse-Commitatus Act. Additional effort will be required, however, to ensure the federal government fulfills its national security obligations while continuing to safeguard the Constitutional rights of all American citizens.
Public, private, and public/private sector organizational alternatives are still under review and development. Without a well-established network of public and private sector organizations, the information sharing needs of both parties will remain largely unfulfilled.
Page 766 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Finally, industry and institutional biases also have created cultural perceptions that pose impediments to the information sharing process. Many within the private sector, for example, do not view the threat of information warfare or efforts to enhance the security of the nation's critical infrastructures as issues they must address. On the other hand, some within the U.S. Intelligence Community have been reluctant to accept the fact that resolving the information warfare indications and warning problem requires private sector support.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 provides an action plan to address all of the impediments listed above. Within the next two years, significant progress will be made toward minimizing, if not eliminating, many of these impediments.
a. provision of investigative authorities such as those described listed above, and swift and certain penalties for those who knowingly, and without authorization, penetrate defense and all elements of the national information infrastructures; and
b. continues integration of effort between the Computer Emergency Response Team, law enforcement, counterintelligence, and intelligence communities, and local, state, and federal governments.
General CAMPBELL. As government organizations and civilian companies were established, each developed methodologies and information security systems that were tailored to the individual organization's particular mission and goals. The function of these systems is to protect the organization's critical information from outsiders and control its availability within the organization. To that end, each organization has its own cultural history of information security, has developed their own levels of information classification caveats, and does not generally trust anyone from outside the organization to be able to safeguard their most critical information, especially those that reveal the organization's weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
Page 767 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The civilian sector is especially wary of the government's ability to protect its proprietary information. From their viewpoint, the stakes are very high. Loss or compromise of critical information to a competitor could lead to potential loss of business and in the worst case, the economic demise of the company. The banking industry is especially sensitive with divulgence, of any information that could weaken the public trust of the nation's banks, thus undermining the very foundation of their existence.
Within government, the various agencies do not always have a common set of security classification levels and requirements, Also, the departments will often decline to submit to another's requirements. For example, the CIA requires full life-style polygraphs to be administered to many of it employees dealing with sensitive information. However, the DOD does not, preferring to use a less intrusive counter-intelligence polygraph.
To face the Information Warfare (IW) threat, and especially Computer Network Attack, will require the development of interagency organizations. To effectively build these organizations will require breaking down that inherent mistrust of other organizations, and especially the mistrust of the government by the civilian sector. Alleviating mistrust will take time and commitment, but as more interagency structures are built in this arena, there will be more opportunities to expose personnel to other agencies and organizations, gain appreciation, and develop those bonds that will be critical to combat IW. I believe the Information Sharing and Analysis Center associated with the National Information Protection Center may be a good start at developing an arena within which trust will grow among the participants.
Dr. HUNKER. You obviously appreciate that the development of better information flows across and between government and the private sector may call for legal as well as cultural change. Genuine sharing of sensitive threat and vulnerability information will only occur in an environment of mutual trust, and only if sensitive information can be adequately protected from outside disclosure. Trust takes time to build. It must be earned. And some changes in law may be required to adequately protect this information, whether it is housed with government or the private sector.
Page 768 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The President's plan contains elements to address both the ''legal'' and ''cultural'' aspects. The plan instructs the President's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism to conduct studies on, among other topics, legal impediments to information sharing (with emphasis on removing existing impediments), and liability issues that may arise through private sector participation in the information sharing process. The plan provides for these studies to be reviewed, through the interagency process, by the Critical Infrastructure Coordinating Group.
The President's plan provides that the National Infrastructure Protection Center, housed in the FBI, will sanitize law enforcement and intelligence information and provide it to owners and operators of the critical infrastructures, as well as any private sector information sharing and analysis centers. The plan also encourages the creation of just such a center within the private sector—an Information Sharing and Analysis Center—and calls for the National Coordinator to identify ways the government can help get the center up and running.
Mr. WELDON. How can government or the private sector be assured that its information protection programs are being successful; in keeping a ''smart penetrator'' from penetrating critical elements of the information infrastructure?
Mr. WELLS. There is no perfect defense for the Department's or nation's information infrastructures, and more than likely, never will be. We must acknowledge that attacks against the Department's and the Nation's information infrastructure, from both external and internal sources, will continue and will become increasingly more sophisticated. The focus on protecting the Department's and Nation's information infrastructure (the ''keystone'' or integrating infrastructure for all critical infrastructures) will center on:
Page 769 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
c. Continuous research into emerging information technologies and the development and use of attack resistant systems and networks,
d. continuous development and fielding of improved attack detection and analytical tools,
e. continuous testing to find existing vulnerabilities and continuous ''Red Teaming'' efforts to discover and correct previously unknown system and network vulnerabilities,
f. continuous training and certification of system and network administrators and users to ensure that security features are properly installed and are being properly used,
g. provisions of investigative authorities, and the swift and certain imposition of penalties for those who knowingly, and without authorization, attack and/or penetrated systems and networks within the Defense Information Infrastructure.
Dr. HUNKER. Protecting critical elements of the information infrastructure is a dynamic task. Our most successful assurance will come from continuous updating and testing of our protective measures. One effective means of assuring that government or private sector information protection programs are being successful in keeping a ''smart penetrator'' from penetrating critical elements of the information infrastructure is by assuming the role of the ''smart penetrator'' and attacking the infrastructure. This is common referred to as ''Red Teaming.'' At the joint hearing held by the House National Security Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Research and Development on June 11, 1998, the Department of Defense described its recent and very effective ''Red Teaming'' exercise called ''Eligible Receiver.''
Page 770 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
The private sector could ask for government assistance to ''Red Team'' critical elements of the information infrastructure. In some cases they are already forming the equivalent of a ''Red Team'' from technically competent personnel within their respective companies or from third party contractors. To be effective over time, ''Red Teaming'' must be performed regularly, and be a component of a systematic security review, because information technologies are evolving very rapidly and new risks are likely to emerge.
Another very important component of protection policies will be to improve security program management. Several examples of this approach are explained in the recent General Accounting Office Executive Guide to Information Security Management, ''Learning From Leading Organizations''. This publication reported on the results of a GAO study of private sector organizations with superior security programs to identify management practices that could benefit federal agencies in strengthening their security programs. A copy of this publication is enclosed for your information.
General CAMPBELL. The short answer is that you can't. Information technology is advancing at such a rapid pace, you can never be 100% certain that the security systems you put in place today will not be made obsolete tomorrow. For example, the June 15 issue of ''Defense News'' has a front page article about an investor who has developed ''a so-far undetectable and unstoppable information warfare weapon that is the electronic equivalent of the ebola virus . . .'' Naturally, this has generated great interest not only from within the US, but also amongst several foreign nations that have dedicated Information Operations efforts, including France, UK, and Russia. However, as the article points out, ''someone will counter this and then we will counter what they're doing . . .'' Technology will advance.
Page 771 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
Realistically, the best one can hope for is to make it as hard as possible by developing layered defenses, the ability to rapidly detect potential intrusions quickly, and the ability to rapidly counter and/or restore affected systems. It will also take a greater commitment of people and resources than is currently being employed to develop the monitoring systems and the organizations tasked with defending the critical infrastructures. There will have to be maintained a robust R&D effort to ensure that advanced research will continue to discover potential system vulnerabilities and the methods to counter them. There will also will be a need for continuous testing through exercises and Red teaming to ensure that the processes and procedures will be effective in various threat scenarios. Finally, it will take cooperation and coordination across all government agencies as well the civilian sector to ensure we can successfully protect our critical information infrastructure.
Mr. WELDON. The Department of Defense has been working on its program for the protection of the Defense Information Infrastructure for several years. Are there lessons learned from the DOD's experience in critical infrastructure protection that can be applied to the problems faced by other government agencies and by the private sector? Are there lessons that government can or should learn from the private sector.
Mr. WELLS. The principal lesson learned (and cultural shift made) in creating a program for the protection the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) was that no individual DOD Component of group of DOD components have the resources, ability, or authorities required to adequately protect any Defense-wide infrastructure. Overcoming historic equities and competition, and recognizing that it takes a Defense-wide effort to protect a Defense-wide infrastructure, was key to the Department's success in creating the Defense-wide Information Assurance Program (DIAP) and the related oversight mechanisms and procedures needed to ensure an integrated and coherent defense for the DII.
Page 772 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3
As it takes a Defense-wide effort to protect the DII, so will it take a nation-wide effort to protect the nation's critical infrastructures. Fora such as the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection brought together Americans from all sectors of society to address a shared challenge. The continuation of such efforts are essential to nation-wide team building, the creation of trust and confidence, and the development of effective infrastructure protection solutions that will ensure the continuation of the freedoms, security, and quality of life all Americans enjoy.
General CAMPBELL. In the area of information infrastructure protection, there are valuable lessons to be learned and shared between the public and private sectors. Activities such as the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC), the National Security telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC), and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) sponsored Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University currently provide forums for the sharing of information in this area. In the afermatch of last February's intrusions into the Department's unclassified computer networks (SOLAR SUNRISE), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Hamre, hosted a conference with a group of commercial information technology executives. He discussed SOLAR SUNRISE and laid out the Department's plan to move forward with information assurance. He enjoined the executives to partner with the department in a cooperative effort in its move forward. As a result of the recently signed Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, a more formally established information sharing structure is being put in place. Under the direction of a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, information sharing and analysis centers for each of several critical infrastructures will provide the fora for information sharing between and among public and private sectors. I believe the greatest lesson we have learned from our recent experiences is that, because of the mutual interdependence of the defense and national information infrastructures, we will have to develop ways of cooperatively dealing with the threat. It is true that ''a risk accepted by one is a risk shared by all.''
Page 773 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 3