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[H.A.S.C. No. 107–29]



FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003—H.R. 4546






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FEBRUARY 20, 21, 27, MARCH 12, APRIL 11, and JUNE 27, 2002



FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
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LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LANE EVANS, Illinois
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

STEVE THOMPSON, Professional Staff Member
JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member
J.J. GERTLER, Professional Staff Member
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STEVE ANSLEY, Professional Staff Member
JESSE TOLLESON, Staff Assistant

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
BOB RILEY, Alabama
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
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ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

HARRY CARTLAND, Professional Staff Member



    Thursday, June 27, 2002, Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act—Ballistic Missile Defense

    Thursday, June 27, 2002

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    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Military Research and Development Subcommittee

    Christie, Thomas P., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Air Force
    Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense


Christie, Thomas P.
Hunter, Hon. Duncan
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T.
Wolfowitz, Paul

[There were no Documents submitted for the Record.]

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[Questions and Answers are pending.]


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement and Military Research and Development Subcommittees,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 27, 2002.

    The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter [chairman of the Military Research & Development subcommittee] presiding.


    Mr. WELDON. [Presiding.] This afternoon the Military Research and Development Subcommittee and the Military Procurement Subcommittee meet in joint session to receive testimony on missile defense from the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense; Lieutenant General Ron Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Mr. Thomas Christie, director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Office.

    Duncan Hunter will eventually chair this hearing. It is a joint hearing. We run regular joint hearings between Procurement and R&D, and since the bulk of the funding for missile defense is R&D, he will chair it, but he is tied up on the floor in an ongoing debate on this very issue. I will not give his opening statement. I will, without objection, insert it into the record.
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    Before I call upon my distinguished colleague and ranking member on the R&D Subcommittee, I just want to make one comment and it ties into the debate on the House floor right now. It is really amazing that we heard all the naysayers tell us that the demise of the ABM Treaty was going to cause the sky to fall. We heard their predictions that Russia would go into an aggressive program of building new offensive ICBMs, and that China would aggressively pursue a program against us. We have heard all this rhetoric for the past 15 years that I have been in this body.

    And then some amazing things happened. Two weeks before the ABM Treaty actually went away, I met with the CEO of the largest institute in Russia that does space launches, Khrunichev. His name Myvadev. And he came with a representative of Lockheed Martin. And they came to show me a joint memorandum they had signed to work together on missile defense. And yet the chairman, Myvadev, said to me, ''The only thing I ask, Mr. Congressman, is please don't talk about this publicly.'' I said, ''Why?'' He said, ''Well, we talked to President Putin. He winked at us and said he agrees with the program, but he doesn't want us to discuss it until the ABM Treaty goes away.''

    So here, with all these predictions of dire consequences, the leading Russian agencies now want to work with America but couldn't do it when the ABM Treaty was in force. And if I am not mistaken, General, I believe you met with those two individuals, and in your testimony I might ask you to talk about that.

    And then, secondarily, I led a delegation also to China three weeks ago with seven Democrats and six Republicans. Now, this was the first trip of a delegation going to China since the ABM Treaty was about to expire, and I had been invited to give an address at the National Defense University, the largest training of the PLA, the second time I would have done that and the only elected official to be invited to do so.
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    So we went to the National Defense University, the key training institutions in China for all their military, and because of the ABM Treaty debate you would expect, based on what you have heard in this country by the people on the House floor right now, that perhaps they would be ready to tear us apart, that they would be ready to jump on us for creating this feeling of insecurity.

    When our bus arrived, we had a full uniformed, 100-person, all-women military band playing the top Chinese military songs in honor of our arrival. We got off the bus, all the generals were lined up on the red carpeted stairs up until the National Defense University main auditorium. Three hundred senior Chinese military officers met with us after I gave an opening speech for 45 minutes and did what our defense attache said could ever be done in China: I broke the group up into four parts, four subgroups, and I had two members each assigned, two members of Congress, to interact with them, to ask and interact on individual questions, which we did for an hour. There was not one question on the ABM Treaty, not one question on missile defense.

    In fact, I think it proved the point: The real concern on the ABM Treaty wasn't in Moscow or Beijing, it was in the liberal elements here in the United States.

    So today we have a hearing for the first time after the ABM Treaty is no longer in effect, and I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses, especially in light of that actuality, and also the other work that's under way in terms of building a capable missile defense system not just on our own, but with our allies and with countries like Russia as well. And I will get into that during the questioning.
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    So I welcome you all here. And with that, I turn to my distinguished friend and colleague from Massachusetts, the ranking member on the R&D Committee, Mr. Meehan.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page ?.]

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank my friend from Pennsylvania, although I have to say that, like most of my colleagues on this side, I am kind of wondering why we are not over debating this issue on the floor. Frankly, that's really where we ought to be right now, as much as I am delighted again to see General Kadish and Secretary Wolfowitz and Director Christie.

    It seems to me the only thing that's new here that I am interested in, and perhaps the secretary can comment on it, there was apparently an agreement last night in the Senate to put $114 million back in with the understanding that there would be some kind of agreement on inflationary savings and also a policy statement saying that none of the money put back in for missile defense would be done at the expense of the war on terrorism.

    And I would be curious to hear from Secretary Wolfowitz whether or not DOD would still recommend to the president a veto on the bill if the Senate language is included. I don't know whether there was an agreement with the Department of Defense on that or how the Department of Defense, how they feel about it. And other than that, I guess I am anxious to hear, but I do think it is important that we engage over on the floor.

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    Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.

    And to our witnesses, we have 14 minutes on the vote, which is on an amendment to gut some missile defense funding. And so we can proceed with opening statements or would you rather have us go over and vote and then come back and have you proceed. What is your choice, Mr. Wolfowitz?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is up to you, but maybe we could get the opening statements done and speed things up.

    Mr. WELDON. Go right ahead. The floor is yours.

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Okay.

    Mr. WELDON. Your statements are entered in the record. You can say whatever you would like, and be as brief or as long as you like.


    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Okay.

    Mr. Chairman and members of these two subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss our missile defense program. The Armed Services Committee has been a strong supporter of this program in the past and we look forward to continuing that support as we work through the fiscal year 2003 authorization act.
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    Today I would like to provide a brief update on our missile defense policy as a backdrop to the more detailed testimony of General Kadish, but first I would like to take a moment to reiterate Secretary Rumsfeld's concerns about the missile defense provisions in the Senate version of the bill as passed yesterday. General Kadish will be prepared to address those issues in more detail.

    The current Senate version of the authorization bill would apparently permit the president to apply up to $814 million in inflation savings to the missile defense program to offset the cuts imposed by the Armed Services Committee.

    However, should those inflation savings not materialize, it would severely delay the fielding of a contingency capability against emerging medium-and long-range ballistic missile threats. It would cripple our efforts to develop boost phase defenses which are applicable against threats of all ranges.

    And perhaps most importantly, if those inflation savings are not available, it could also force the layoff of hundreds or perhaps thousands of people in the program, the bulk of them, General Kadish tells me, highly skilled engineers, and would thereby seriously affect our ability to attract and retain the finest minds of our nation to address one of our greatest technological challenges and to field an effective system at the earliest possible date.

    It is worth thinking back a few decades, Mr. Chairman, to the successful effort to put a man on the moon in 10 years. It was done by attracting the finest talent in the country. You don't attract the finest talent in the country into a program that's just had massive RIFs and layoffs. I think part of the effect of the ABM Treaty over the last decades has been to put a big question mark over the future of missile defense.
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    It would be ironic, just as that question mark is being removed, as you correctly pointed out, and with apparent remarkable easy acceptance internationally, that we ourselves would put that question mark back on the program. It would strike me as what a friend of mine, Bill Schneider, regularly refers to as podiacide, which is Latin for shooting yourself in the foot.

    The Senate bill continues to impose a number of burdensome statutory restrictions that would undermine our ability to manage the program effectively, would divert management attention away from critical program execution, and would result in further unnecessary delays.

    We will continue to provide Congress with all the information necessary to perform its oversight function. Such statutory restrictions are unnecessary, in light of the steps that we have already taken to increase accountability and oversight over the missile defense program.

    To succeed in missile defense, we have streamlined oversight. The director of the Missile Defense Agency will regularly and frequently brief the Senior Executive Council, which is chaired by myself and includes the undersecretary for acquisition and the three service secretaries. The services and other oversight organizations, including the test community, will have full access into the program and will provide advice to the SEC on a regular basis.

    I believe that's a higher level of regular oversight that almost any program in the Defense Department receives. We cannot, frankly, afford to apply that level of high-level attention to every program.
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    The end result will be faster decision cycles, while maintaining the highest standards of oversight.

    And let me underscore that we are committed to working with Congress and sharing all relevant information to allow you to fulfill your oversight responsibilities.

    I might say that some of the information is inevitably and necessarily classified. I am a bit amazed at the astonishment some people express that we would classify information about the vulnerabilities of our systems. We do it all the time. We would be crazy not to do it. We regularly share that information with Congress, however, at whatever is the appropriate level of classification and we will continue to do so. There is absolutely no reason to share that information with our enemies.

    For all of those reasons, if missile defense reductions and restrictions similar to those in the current Senate Armed Services Committee bill are included in the final version adopted by Congress, the president's senior advisers will recommend that he veto the bill.

    Six months ago, the president announced our intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. He took this step as part of a broader change in our defense policy to reflect a radically different world from the world we faced in 1972 and a radically different relationship in particular with Russia.

    Earlier this month, our formal withdrawal took place. And as a result, we are now free to develop, test and deploy effective defenses against limited missile attacks of the kind that might come from states like North Korea, Iraq and Iran; states, I might note, that are investing in astonishingly large percentage of their scarce resources to develop weapons of mass destruction and offensive ballistic missiles at the expense of the basic needs of their people.
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    To those who might ask, ''Wouldn't it be crazy for these people to ever use their missiles?'' I think one should ask, why are they so crazy then as to sink large amounts of their money into those programs?

    The scope of that growing threat to the United States and our friends and allies is compounded by the fact that the states that are developing these terror weapons have close links to a variety of terrorist organizations. States or even non-state actors could use ships to launch shorter-range missiles against our territory. And as the president stated in his State of the Union address, we must not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons.

    In response to this new strategic environment, the president called for a new approach to deterrence, an approach that reduces substantially our reliance on offensive nuclear weapons and emphasizes increasing our defensive capabilities. As the president stated, ''Cold War deterrence is no longer enough to maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and allies and friends.'' The president said, ''We must seek security based on more than the grim promise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us.''

    Moving forward on missile defense, taking advantage of new technological opportunities is an essential part of a strategy to provide the full range of capabilities that the nation needs to defend against the new threats and challenges we will confront in the 21st century. By reducing an opponent's incentives to seek or use missiles, defenses can contribute not only to deterring missile attack, but also to dissuading opponents from investing so heavily in acquiring those threats and assuring our allies and friends that we have the capability to protect them.
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    With the ABM Treaty now behind us, our task is to develop and deploy effective defenses against the full range of missile attacks, whether from short-, medium-or long-range weapons. We will continue to move forward with a robust research, development and testing program, one that is designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes. Recent tests provide a foundation on which to proceed. Development and testing will continue, but we will also begin to develop effective layered defenses against limited missile attack.

    Just a few weeks ago, we broke ground in Alaska on silos to house missile defense interceptors, an action, by the way, that had to wait until we withdrew from the ABM Treaty. These silos, to be completed in 2004, are part of a missile defense test bed that could also give us, for the first time, a limited emergency capability to protect our country against missile attack in a crisis.

    I hope we are not keeping you from voting. Should we recess at this point? Why don't you go? If you don't mind, I will pick up in the middle.


    Mr. HUNTER. [Presiding.] Okay, folks. Thank you so much for being with us, and my colleague Mr. Weldon for opening our hearing and starting to move it.

    And, Mr. Wolfowitz, please go right ahead and continue, sir.

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Okay. I will pick up in the middle, if I may, and with apologies, I am going to have to leave here at 3 sharp, but I think my colleagues may be able to stay a bit longer.
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    Chairman Hunter, Chairman Weldon, I had actually just gotten to the point of discussing where we are now with the ABM Treaty behind us, and we are now able to move forward with a robust research, development and testing program designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes.

    Recent tests have provided a foundation on which to proceed. Development and testing will continue, but we also will begin to deploy effective layered defenses against limited missile attack.

    Just a few weeks ago, we broke ground in Alaska on silos to house missile defense interceptors, action, I might note, that would not have been possible if we were still under the ABM Treaty.

    These silos, to be completed in 2004, are part of a missile defense test bed that could also give us for the first time a limited emergency capability to protect our country against ballistic missile attack in a crisis.

    Over time we hope to improve these initial defenses, building additional silos there and possibly in other locations for operational deployment of ground-based interceptors.

    Sea-based missile defenses and a prototype airborne laser are also capabilities we could look forward to by mid-decade, and we are moving forward with our efforts to field defenses to deal with shorter-range missile threats.
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    Might note, by the way, that anything that works in boost phase has the potential of dealing with shorter-range missiles as well as longer-range ones, and when I hear people talk about this being a threat that's somehow off in the distant future, I have to remind them that it is in fact the shorter-range missile threat is one that we faced in large numbers 11 years ago in the Gulf War and would face in even larger numbers in parts of the world today.

    As these emerging long-range missile threats also endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them, an important task that was prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

    The strategic rationale for providing missile defense protection to our allies was clearly stated by Secretary Rumsfeld in his remarks to the NATO defense ministerial earlier this month. ''Rogue states,'' he said, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to Western capitals could make building future coalitions against aggression difficult, if not impossible.''

    The defense ministers noted, in turn, in their June statement on capabilities that, ''There is currently an alliance consensus,'' they said, ''on the need to deploy theater missile defenses to protect our deployed forces, and that alliance territory and population centers may also face an increasing missile threat.''

    ''As a result,'' they concluded, ''the alliance needs to examine options for addressing this increasing threat in an effective and efficient way, through an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.''
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    We will be working with our NATO allies to explore options for providing protection for alliance territory and forces against the full range of missile threats. In July, an inter-agency team will visit NATO capitals for detailed discussions on missile defense, to include ways in which allied countries can participate in our program.

    Similar consultations will be held with our Asian allies and friends.

    The end of the ABM Treaty also marks a historic milestone in our strategic relationship with Russia. We are finally moving beyond the Cold War. We no longer had a treaty that divides us by assuming that our security is derived from our ability to destroy one another. Instead the U.S. and Russia are building a new relationship based on common interests and common values rather than the threat of mutual destruction.

    Nothing reinforces this point more than the accomplishments of the Moscow summit, particularly the agreement on reductions and strategic nuclear forces. But just as important perhaps, is that the two presidents agreed to look for ways to cooperate on missile defenses, including expanded exercises, sharing of early warning data, and exploring potential joint research and development.

    When President Bush emphasized moving forward on missile defense and a new strategic framework with Russia in May of last year, quite a few people predicted dire consequences for U.S./Russian relations, or the start of a new arms race. But, in fact, neither occurred. As a result of hard work and determination on both sides, something more like the opposite.
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    Relations with Russia, and between Russia and our NATO allies are entering a new and promising era. We have agreed to cooperate on a host of economic, political and security issues of common interest, including missile defense. And we have agreed to reduce our offensive forces to the lowest levels in decades.

    Members of the committee, we have now departed from the Cold War, or these Cold War artifacts, the ABM Treaty and the balance of terror. We have adopted a new approach to deterrence and defense and established a cooperative strategic relationship with Russia. Further, we have fostered a security environment with allies and friends that now allow us to make substantial progress on the programmatic side of our missile defense program. We need to seize this historic opportunity if we are to meet new challenges and make the world a safer place for all.

    Thank you.

    If I might now ask General Kadish to make his statement.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz can be found on page ?.]


    General KADISH. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good afternoon. The consistent support of your committee has been really important to missile defense and in the end will have a profound effect on our nation's security.
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    Our progress since I last testified before your subcommittees has been very substantial. We have had a busy four months, punctuated by a series of important events just two weeks ago. In the space of three days, we had a successful intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile by a Standard Missile 3 interceptor launch from an Aegis cruiser at sea, the United States formerly withdrew from the ABM Treaty, and we broke ground on the start of the expanded Ballistic Missile Defense System Test Bed at Fort Greely, Alaska.

    We are truly at a crossroads in the development of missile defenses. Our pace has picked up and it is important that we sustain our momentum to be able to take full advantage of the opportunities that now lie before us. Some of the momentum is the most visible in our recent testing progress.

    I mentioned the Standard Missile 3 successful intercept. The first test of this element took place last January and was also a successful intercept. So we are now two for two from the sea. With these two tests, we have fulfilled our basic objectives at this stage of the testing, and the next step is to take advantage of this early completion of our objectives and capitalize on our successes so far in the development program.

    Last March 15th, the ground-based midcourse defense element had its fourth successful intercept. Our record now stands four for six. The next intercept event, Integrated Flight Test 9, will occur this August if it stays on schedule.

    Although the missile has performed well, our initial operational testing of the Patriot 3 has not achieved all the results and systems performance that we expected to see.
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    We have had four intercept tests this year involving various mixes of Patriot 2 and Patriot 3 missiles operating together against simultaneous air-breathing and ballistic missile targets. In these complex tests, the Patriot 2 destroyed one of its two air-breathing targets and against ballistic missile targets the Patriot 3 destroyed two of four. We have some more work to do to fix these problems, but the initial production of Patriot 3 should continue as planned despite these early operational test problems.

    We will naturally tend to focus on these very visible flight tests, but I believe that the thorough ground testing we are doing right now before we do flight tests is a key but unnoticed part of our program. We are aggressively pursuing a wide range of ground tests across the program with very positive results. These deliberate ground tests sow the seeds of our successes in our future flight tests.

    I mentioned we had broken ground at Fort Greely for the expanded test bed. This test bed will allow us to test our individual elements of the ground-based system under more operationally realistic and stressing conditions than we could do before. We can test the integration of those elements into a single integrated ballistic missile defense system in ways that was previously simply not possible.

    Looking out over the next year, the airborne laser will undergo ground and component tests. For ground-based midcourse defense, we are still looking at roughly one intercept flight test per quarter, with four and perhaps even five having been done by this time next year. Our sea-based midcourse defense element will conduct the next intercept flight test, what we call FM–4, sometime this fall. And the THAAD program is still in ground testing and it involves missile defense integration and qualification tests with our radars.
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    As we look ahead at the next six months, we have some 15 ground tests and 20 flight tests scheduled that include several non-intercept data gathering flights. Our exercise agenda is packed full. We have four missile defense integration exercises and two system-wide wargames scheduled over the next 12 months. Our international test agenda includes exercises this fall with Korea, with the U.S. European Command, and next spring with the U.S. Central Command.

    Let me turn now to some of the process and management changes that are now beginning to mature. There are start-up problems that we need to solve, as you would expect with such a new management approach. However, we are making good progress. We changed our acquisition approach from threat-based to capability-based. We have already taken a key step in that direction, and I have approved the initial technical objectives and goals document, or what we call the TOG, that lays out the capabilities to which our BMD system should initially be designed. This document will be the starting point for the development of the ballistic missile defense system and its various elements.

    The departmental system of oversight is also maturing. I met with the senior executive council many times last winter, and we are scheduled to do so again this summer to present our program and budget proposals for next year.

    More of our routine Missile Defense Agency activity coordination occurs with the Missile Defense Support Group that has representatives from all departmental entities with a stake in our program. The group has met virtually every two weeks since it was stood up four months ago, and we are still working out the operating procedures with what I consider normal startup problems. But again, we are making good progress.
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    The national team of government and support contractors federally funded R&D centers and industry that we have set up as also maturing to do the ballistic missile systems engineering and battle management design activities. The first engineering products focused on block 2004, and to lesser extents on the later blocks of capability, are due mid-July. These products will form the basis for any block architecture changes or risk reduction activities we need to take prior to submitting the 2004 president's budget.

    The team's work over the past four months has been most productive and I look forward to their report to be next month as to how we might best accomplish our tasks. Their recommendations will form the foundation for my own recommendations to the department for the program. And you, in turn, will most likely see some of these during next year's hearings.

    Now, I would like to summarize our financial status of the funds you authorized for fiscal year 2002 that support the progress and the momentum I just described. As you well know, the defense appropriations bill did not become law until 10 January of this year, and it was not until April 23rd, 2002 that the department allocated the entire authorized appropriation to our agency.

    We had our contracts ready and in place and we are executing our budget on time and on track. The standard fiscal year 2002 goals financially for year end are 89 percent obligated and 49 percent expended. Last year we exceeded these goals and this year we expect to exceed them again. And we are on course to meet my target of 93 percent obligated and 58 percent expended.

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    As you know, these funds are not 100 percent obligated because the R&D budget for the department is a two-year appropriation with some carryover to the second year necessary to account, for example, for award fees. Such funds must be kept unobligated during the first year so as to provide for potential awards at the end of the performance period in the second year.

    Our current execution status for fiscal year 2002 is 60 percent obligated and 18 percent expended through April 2002, even though the continuing resolution remain in effect during the first quarter of this fiscal year. And last year, our comparable figures at this time were 66 percent obligated and 21 percent expended, so we are on track. We will exceed the department's goals this year, even though we have nearly doubled our budget in fiscal year 2002.

    In short, we do not have a carryover problem in this program as of this time, and don't expect one.

    Chairman Hunter, Chairman Weldon, the missile defense program is indeed at a crossroads. With the continued support of the committee for the president's budget, we can make the right choices to keep up the aggressive pace and momentum of our development effort and set the stage for successful deployment of effective missile defenses against all ranges of threats.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Kadish can be found in the Appendix on page ?.]

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    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, General.

    Mr. Christie?


    Mr. CHRISTIE. Chairman Hunter, members of the subcommittee, I also thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and discuss the responsibilities of my office, the Office of the Director of Operational Testing Evaluation and the current plans for the development of the ballistic missile defense system.

    As General Kadish has described on several occasions, the ballistic missile defense system will be developed and acquired using a new strategy that incorporates a phased introduction of missile defense capability based on evolving technology. My responsibilities and that of my staff in this process include monitoring the demonstration of these critical technologies, providing my senior leadership with advice on the Missile Defense Agency goals and plans, and assessing the adequacy of ballistic missile defense system testing. Traditional operational test oversight will apply once capabilities are transitioned to the services for acquisition and fielding.

    Statute requires that I review and approve test plans for both operational and live-fire testing, as well as oversee and evaluate these test programs. Live-fire testing, in particular, requires early involvement in the system development phase.

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    Aside from live-fire testing, my role in the development of the ballistic missile system defense system elements is advisory in nature, and I will monitor and assess results from the testing of the new technologies.

    In response to the fiscal year 2002 defense authorization act, I will provide a report to Congress each year by the 15th of February which will detail my assessment of the adequacy and sufficiency of the Missile Defense Agency's test program. I will also report on the results of initial operational testing, which will characterize the operational capabilities of ballistic missile system elements that are preparing for transition to service acquisition programs.

    In order to effectively execute these reporting responsibilities, I plan to remain engaged with the ballistic missile system development through the missile defense support group that General Kadish has discussed, as well as with staff interaction with the Missile Defense Agency at both a system and element levels.

    I have been working with General Kadish to improve our visibility into these programs and to increase my staff's involvement in planning and working group activities.

    This process has been the focus of considerable attention from both Congress and the media. I understand the perception that this access has been a little slow in coming. General Kadish has assured me that DOT&E will have access to any data I need to fulfill my oversight responsibilities. And I am confident that I will have that access.

    As our involvement increases at the working level, I am confident also that appropriate access to any detailed programmatic information that I need will similarly improve.
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    Mr. Chairman, let me say also that I am confident I will be able to perform meaningful and comprehensive assessments of the Missile Defense Agency testing and system performance, and submit the required reports to Congress.

    I would also like to express my concern here that reductions to program funding levels have historically reduced the resources a program manager can devote to testing. In the case of the ballistic missile defense system, I do not believe the department can afford to compromise on either the scope or the depth of testing needed to characterize the capabilities of the various missile defense elements against projected threats.

    I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you, sir.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Christie can be found in the Appendix on page ?.]

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Christie, thank you very much, sir.

    And, gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us. And I know Mr. Wolfowitz is going to have to leave fairly soon, so maybe we can go through with a fast line of questioning before you leave, Paul, and then maybe we can have some more in-depth questions for other gentlemen.

    But first, I think, General Kadish, you have answered one of the unspoken questions that's been generated, I think, by the Senate in some of their rationale for cutting some $800 million-plus out of the program, and that was that you had money laying around that was available. It was not expended. That's not the case, I take it.
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    General KADISH. No, Mr. Chairman, it is not the case, not to the levels that I have heard, certainly. But as I stated in my opening remarks, carryover is normal type of monies that have to be reserved for activities that are already accomplished.

    But we intend to expend and obligate to the maximum extent that we are expected to under normal operating conditions, and we don't have extra money for next year's activities.

    Mr. HUNTER. Have you made a statement already about what effect—and maybe, Mr. Wolfowitz, you might want to comment on this—the proposed Senate cut, which was met with the Warner amendment, what that cut would do to the testing program? Have you taken a look at that?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. General Kadish can give it in more detail. But let me say that, in my view, there are three critical impacts: first of all, that it would delay the fielding of a contingency capability against emerging medium-and long-range ballistic missile threats—the system that we are trying to deploy, ground-based system.

    Mr. HUNTER. That's the silos that we are putting in the system at Fort Greely.

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That's right. Because the huge cuts, particularly in the system's engineering portion of the program, it takes more than silos to make a system work, as you know.
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    Second, the cuts targeted boost-phase defenses will seriously handicap our ability to do defense against short-, medium-and long-range missiles. And it is ironic, just when we are finally free of the restrictions of the ABM Treaty on developing boost-phase defenses, some people are proposing to handicap us voluntarily. It makes no sense at all to me.

    But worst of all, I believe, is the impact on talented people, hundreds and possibly several thousand whom General Kadish tells me are predominantly engineers; exactly the kind of talent that we need to attract to this program if we are going to make it another one of those American technological successes.

    And as I pointed out before you were here, Mr. Chairman, we did not get to the Moon in 10 years by laying off talented people. We got to the Moon in 10 years by attracting America's best capabilities, and we need to do the same thing in this program.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. We will move on and let the other members ask questions. And I have a number of other questions for Mr. Christie and General Kadish when we get finished. But since you have to go, Mr. Wolfowitz, let me turn to my co-chairman, Mr. Weldon, and ask him if he has any questions here, and then we will move down the line.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you all for appearing.

    I just want to go back in a general way, because I know your time is limited, and discuss what I mentioned in my opening statement, and that is, what we heard repeatedly throughout this year was that the sky was going to fall when the ABM Treaty went away. And I was one who believed that the treaty served a useful purpose early on, but believed in the end that it had to be either modified significantly or, in fact, scraped, which is what the president did.
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    And it seemed as though in the end, the only ones opposing or raising a voice against the scraping of the treaty were from this country, not from the other nations. In fact, as I mentioned, two weeks before the treaty finally ended I had the CEO of the Khrunichev Space Launch Institute in my office, his name is Myvadev. And he was accompanied by Lockheed Martin officials, who had with him a document that had been signed, a joint memorandum of understanding that they wanted to apprise me of.

    And if I am not mistaken, General, you met with them the same day, did you not?

    General KADISH. Yes, Congressman, I did. And we had a pretty good conversation.

    Mr. WELDON. And the interesting irony here, which I think we have to put on the record again is, that the Russians said, ''We talked to Putin about this. But Putin asked us not to discuss it, as he winked to us and said he supported it, until after the ABM Treaty went away, because you could not do this work with the ABM Treaty in place.'' And the Russian side said, ''We are looking forward to being to work aggressively with Lockheed Martin and Boeing, because there are many things that we can do together.''

    So Mr. Wolfowitz and General Kadish, are there, in fact, a number of initiatives that we, in fact, are discussing with the Russians? And also, other discussions that have taken place are going on with Ukraine of, perhaps, technologies could not have been worked on under the ABM Treaty?
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    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. By the way, if one goes back 10 years, I think it's not surprising that we have this Russian reaction. They have always been much more enthusiastic about defenses than the United States was historically. They were, obviously, more enthusiastic about their defense than ours. But they have a threat they have to deal with also. And when we had first started discussions with them in 1992 in the Ross-Mamedov talks, we saw a great interest in missile defense and it seemed to go away over the subsequent years, but I think it has come back.

    Mr. WELDON. Well, wasn't that because the Ross-Mamedov talks were canceled in 1993?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Exactly.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

    General, do you want to comment on the current discussions?

    General KADISH. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, as well, that we have an ongoing program with the Russians called RAMOS, the Russian-American Observation Satellite Program. We have been trying to do for some years. And there is a host of discussions we have had with the Russians that I am aware of on specific technologies, as well as some of the discussions you just mentioned. So there's a lot of opportunity to have a relationship with the Russian Federation on these issues. And we are certainly prepared to continue those discussions and even bring them to fruition.
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    In regard to the Ukraine, we just had a delegation from my office, as well as the DOD, visit the Ukraine as a reciprocal visit from one that they made. And those discussions are also ongoing.

    Mr. WELDON. Very good.

    Just two minor questions. One relates to Russia, but I want to get to the China issue first, because we also heard that China would use this as a symbol to take aggressive action. And as I mentioned at the outset, I took a delegation of 12 of our colleagues to Beijing. We spent four days there. I met with Jiang Zemin. Jiang Zemin did not raise the issue of missiles or the treaty during our visit, I might add.

    And then we went to the National Defense University, the lead training agency of the PLA. They only have one. And we were greeted, not by a bunch of hecklers and critics, but rather by a 100-person, all women, full uniform band playing military songs as we arrived. And I went in and I addressed 300 of their top military leaders, but not one of them in questioning a 13-member delegation in the university mentioned what the country had done on missile defense or the ABM Treaty. In fact, several of the questions were, ''Is it possible that China and Russia could one day cooperate in building defensive systems?''

    I only say that, because we continue to hear the rhetoric coming out that this was a destabilizing move. And, in fact, now that it is over, the silence is deafening.

    My one final point, though, is a troubling one, General, and that is, as much as I work with the Russians, the proliferation of technology to Iran is still continuing. Jane Harman and I did a letter signed by 32 colleagues to the White House, basically saying, ''We have to raise this issue repeatedly with President Putin.'' And the president did, and he is going to raise it again in the G–8 Summit meeting coming up.
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    Now, I know you just talked about the RAMOS, which I supported aggressively. What other things can we be doing to let the Russians understand that as much as we are moving closer together, this technology cooperation with Iran—and Iran just tested their Shahab-3; I think, they certified it about a month ago, moving on the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5. Are there any other things that you think we should be doing?

    And, Mr. Wolfowitz, also the things you think we should be doing, in terms of ways to convince the Russians that this cooperation with Iran has got to be stopped in terms of proliferating this very capable missile technology. Are there other ideas that you have?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We agree strongly with you that it is a serious problem. We need to keep raising it. We need to emphasizing how important it is. And I think we need to find means of leverage.

    I do think that the more we can actually develop useful ideas for cooperating with them in the missile defense area is an automatic, kind of, leverage that develops, because there's no way we can cooperate with them on missile defense if the technology goes out the back door to countries like Iran. And I would think, in the long run, the Russians have much more to gain from working with us than whatever they are gaining illicitly with Iran.

    There are, of course, some things that go on beyond the control of central authorities in Moscow, but I think that's often just an excuse for activity that's at least winked at.

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    Mr. WELDON. Of course, there was a deal cut in 1995 that the congress was not made aware until 2000, that specifically allowed Iran to receive technology from Russia for five years. The congress was not informed of that decision until it came out in a news account in the fall of 2000. You are aware of that, right, Dr. Wolfowitz?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am. In other words, we winked at what they were doing and they winked at what—

    Mr. WELDON. And then we wonder why they continue to do it, by the way.

    But, one final point I would ask you to comment on, if not now for the record, when the minister of atomic energy was recently here, he came to my office, Minister Rumyantsev, he is a friend of mine because he had worked at Kurchatov before he took over Minatom, and he was preceded by Velikhov, who heads Kurchatov, who used to be his boss, and Velikhov came up with a suggestion that Rumyantsev was interested in; it is not in the missile defense area, but I want to raise it with you. I raised it this past Monday morning at the International Conference of Nuclear Materials Management down in Florida.

    Russia doesn't trust what we are doing in our cooperation with North Korea, with the KEDO project. They have suspicions about our intent, and they throw it up to us whenever we talk about Iran and the Bushehr nuclear power plant. We, obviously, don't fully feel that we have any transparency with Russia on what they are doing, not just with Bushehr, but in cooperation.

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    Dr. Wolfowitz, what about the possibility of what the Russians proposed to me, which was establishing a joint bilateral entity that involved both the U.S. and Russia equally that would oversee the relationship of both countries with their programs with Iran and North Korea? Is that a possibility?

    Now, this was thrown at to me by the Russian side. Is that a possibility that could offer some opportunities for us to provide greater transparency? And might that be a way to have that leverage that we need to fully understand and perhaps deal with what Russia is doing in cooperating with Iran, not just in nuclear but in their other programs as well?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Weldon, I think it is an interesting idea. I hadn't heard it before but I think it has a lot of interesting dimensions, including the obvious geographic fact that Russia is right on the border of North Korea, and that opens up some possibilities. I will have some people give me some advice on it.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    And Mr. McIntyre?

    Mr. Saxton?

    Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, Director and General Kadish, first of all, congratulations on your recent successes with the missile hits. You have impressed a lot of people with the capabilities that we have been able to demonstrate, and I am very pleased and encouraged by those results.
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    I have two questions. One has to do with the Arrow missile and the other has to do with a subject that General Kadish and I have talked about on numerous occasions, and that is, of course, the continuing evolution of the radar to be used in missile defense involving several at least dual bands, or maybe several bands of radar, S-band and X-band, and I understand that in some quarters there are some other bands of radar which may be of some use.

    Would you discuss for us where we are with regard to that subject?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think I will ask General Kadish to address that.

    General KADISH. Yes, Congressman Saxton. We are taking a real hard look, as we have discussed a couple of times, on what we need for a radar capability now that we are talking about an integrated, layered defense system.

    Each one of the bands for the radars, whether we call it S-band or X-band, have a different capabilities to provide because of the nature of the physics involved, and it turns out that there are a number of ideas offered by many people over how to solve this problem of sensors for radars.

    We don't have an answer yet. There's a wide-ranging set of opportunities by expanding S-band radar that are currently on the Aegis fleet as well as putting new capability in the X-band, both small and large radars, either on Aegis cruisers or some other platform or someplace in the land regime.
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    I do believe, however, by the time we submit the 2004 president's budget, we will have come to terms with at least the first phase of those kinds of ideas, and will be reflected in our budget submission next year.

    And as soon as we are able, and come to some conclusion on this, I will be happy to come and talk to you as we have discussed.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    Also, Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Arrow missile technology, I understand that a partnership has been formed between the Israeli missile defense organization and Boeing with regard to joint production of the Arrow, and that perhaps as much as 50 percent of the components will be American-made. Can you tell us how this is proceeding?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Again, I will ask General Kadish to address that.

    General KADISH. The last look that I had at that situation, it was proceeding very well, in terms of getting the proper authorities, the contracts written, and the actual design and transfer of the agreements. So I expect that to be on track, and I can give you a response for the record as to the details. But so far it is working very well, best of my knowledge.

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page ?.]
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    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    Mr. Taylor?

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Secretary Wolfowitz, thank you for coming.


    Mr. Christie.

    As you probably know, we just passed the defense appropriations bill. Did a lot of good things, spent about $350 billion. Something it didn't do is spend much money on shipbuilding. If my memory serves me right, there was money in there for two destroyers, one TAKE, one submarine. I think that's it. Your typical Navy ship lasts for 30 years, that leaves a legacy fleet of 120. That's nothing to be proud of. I think we are down to 314, which is the smallest our fleet has been since 1933.

    I say this because we have now spent, and I will let you correct me, but at least $65 billion on national missile defense. And what I find particularly troubling about that is that there were news reports, and justifiable news reports, that there was about $18,000 worth of malicious vandalism at the Old Executive mansion and at the White House during the transition, and the American people were justifiably angry over misspending $18,000. There was sincere anger, and there ought to be, should have never happened.
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    My question is, after $65 billion, which is approximately 1,000 times 1,000 times 1,000 times three times what the American people were over that $18,000, General Kadish, what have we got to show for it? Because I asked you a question in February, and I hope the answer is better. So I am going to ask the question again and hope the answer is better than it was then.

    In February my question was, after $65 billion, if the North Koreans gave us a week's notice that they were going to fire one missile, and they told us where they were going to fire it from, they promised no chaff, no decoys, no balloons, they told us the day of the week, the time of the day, they told us where the missile was going, what was the percentage of chance that you thought you could shoot that missile down? You remember what your answer was then, General Kadish?

    General KADISH. Not in detail, Congressman.

    Mr. TAYLOR. It was pretty simple: It was zero.

    And I am going to ask you that question every time you come before this committee, because, quite frankly, I am tired of telling the shipbuilders there's no money, but we got money for missile defense with no results. I am tired of telling the military retirees who somewhere along the line had their retirement pay reduced by the amount of their disability and are justifiably angry that they cannot get both, and they are being told there's no money.

    And so I am going to be the guy who holds your feet to the fire to make this thing work, because $65 billion is 12 aircraft carriers that were never built. It is 60 destroyers were never built. Those are birds in the hand, those are things we could be using right now.
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    So I have just posed the question again, so what is the answer now, four months later?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Taylor, I respect very much your position because I know you are a person who's serious about defense and the questions you raise are serious questions.

    Mr. TAYLOR. And I would only spend this money on other vital defense needs.

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. But let me say that, first of all, I think we have made a good deal of progress. We would have made a lot more progress if we hadn't been restricted by the ABM Treaty. And the reason the answer is zero is that until a few days ago we were prohibited by an international agreement from even building that kind of a defense.

    Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, Mr. Secretary, I have been on this committee for 13 years. That subject has only come up in the past six months. For 13 years, no one ever came before this committee and said, ''We shouldn't be spending money on national missile defense because we cannot be so sure that it works because of this ABM Treaty.'' So I have a little credibility problem there with your answer, because how come no one ever said it in the past 12 years?

    Now, I understand the treaty's gone, and that's one less excuse out there. But I am dead serious that in 13 years no one ever came to me and said, ''Hey, can you call your Senate colleagues, who are responsible for treaties between nations, and ask them if they would mind if we revoke this treaty?''
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    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, Congressman Taylor, I know that I have been before, I believe, this committee, certainly other committees of Congress in the last 12 months saying that we cannot build a missile defense unless we get out of the treaty, and I believe, though I would have to go back and check the record, it was certainly my strongly held view 10 years ago when I was an undersecretary of defense, and it was the reason why we began those Ross-Mamedov talks with the Russians, because it was a problem.

    But let me, if I may, there are a couple other points that I think are important. First of all, there has been a good deal of progress. It hasn't brought us to the point of putting those numbers on the board yet, but they are going to get up there. The fact that, as General Kadish said, we are two for two in the Standard Missile 3 tests against the midcourse system, that we are four for six in our tests of the ground-based midcourse defense element.

    And most importantly, in my view, and here, it seems to me, there is, I hope, ultimately some agreement between us, the fact that we are up to 70 percent on a system that we are about to deploy operationally, the PAC–3, we have demonstrated now that we can hit a bullet with a bullet. Ten years ago, we were trying to hit those bullets with PAC–2 missiles that would explode off in the side and it turned had very little effect on incoming Scud missiles.

    The ballistic missile threat is a very real threat. And it is not only a threat to the American people, it is a threat to those ships that you and I want to see us build, it is a threat to the air bases from which we will fly airplanes, it is a threat to the troops we put in the field. We need much better capability to defend against those ballistic missiles threats.
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    Frankly, I think it was very wrong for the last 10 years to constrain our program artificially by the constraints of a long-obsolete treaty. But we are now free of that. We are much better capable of defending our troops, and we will be in the future.

    It seems to me that to spend 2 percent of our defense budget on defending against ballistic missiles when it is the one enemy capability that we have no capability against today is not a poor allocation of resources. If we don't have something like, at some point in the future, I don't know when it will come, we will not be able to keep ships on the surface of the ocean because they will be targeted and they will be destroyed.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, I just came out of—and I know that everything that Mr. Hunter and I just heard in this hearing cannot be said, but one of the things that's already been in the media and therefore I guess can be said, is that less than 1 percent of all the cargo containers that come into this country are inspected. And as of right now we do not have the technology to look down into that ship that's carrying 6,000 of those cargo containers and determine whether or not there's a thermonuclear device or any other weapon of mass destruction in there.

    And so therefore, they are coming in every day without being checked. And what has happened thus far, not what has happened in the future, is that terrorists have used our own things against us. They took out the Cole with nothing more than a motorized rowboat. They used our own airplanes against the twin towers in New York City, and the Pentagon.

    What is being done to address that threat, Secretary Wolfowitz, because I happen to think that is a more credible threat for the near future, of someone sneaking a nuclear device into this country than firing a nuclear device at this country from across the oceans?
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    General KADISH. I think the programs that are designed to find hidden nuclear weapons are in the Department of Energy and I would be glad to get an answer for you for the record. My impression is that there's a basic problem of physics there, that if it is shielded, we don't know how to penetrate shielding yet. But we are working on things that could improve our ability to detect.

    I don't think that our investment in missile defense comes at the expense of our investment of looking for hidden nuclear weapons. That is certainly way up on the priority list, and I believe it is getting all the funding that it can usefully have, but it is not our program so I cannot tell you directly.

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page ?.]

    Mr. TAYLOR. General Kadish, I am going to pose the question again. What is the answer four months later? What is the percentage of chance you have of shooting down that one missile, no decoys, we have had a week's warning, we know it was fired, we know where it is going?

    General KADISH. If it is a long-range missile, zero. If it is a short-range missile, very high.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Short range is how far?

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    General KADISH. From North Korea into South Korea.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, thank you very much, sir.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlemen.

    And I know, Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Secretary, you have to leave here shortly, so you may want to—Mr. Spratt has arrived here and you may want to comment, because we have just had—as I understand and he may want to describe this in a different way more specifically, but I think we have at this time had a $30 million cut in boost-phase kinetic space-based systems. And I believe that the HAC took about $10 million out of that pot in committee. So I think there's about $14 million left. But if you wanted, and maybe General Kadish to comment on that, what effect that leaves in that particular part of the program, and what effect that will have on your program.

    This is your shot at Mr. Spratt, so why don't you tell us that and then I will let Mr. Spratt ask the question?

    Mr. SPRATT. Let's stand the thing at least straight up and explain to General Kadish first of all what I am—

    Mr. HUNTER. In that case, Mr. Spratt is recognized to state it his own way.
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    Mr. SPRATT. Highly constructive amendment.

    What we did was the committee took $30 million out of the airframe acquisition for the second 747, $30 million out of long-lead components. which I understand to be more critical than the airframe in terms of timeliness. So they took $60 million out there and they took $10 million out of the space-based boost-phase interceptor, which left $44 million.

    My amendment took $30 million out of the space-based interceptor, leaving you $14 million, which is enough to do conceptual studies, engineering studies, added to the $23 million that you have this year. But it restored $30 million to the ABL, the airborne laser, particularly for critical for long-lead components.

    And the argument I made for that, General Kadish and Secretary Wolfowitz and Mr. Christie, was that, if you want a boost-phase intercept system, the most promising thing in the near term, in my opinion, is the ABL.

    And it is a long way from being approved. You have a huge technological hurdles ahead of you and bringing all of those modules together and getting them up to the power level required for them to be effective, and then putting a 200,000 to 250,000 pound laser in a 747 and getting that platform stable enough for it to operate. It is a tall order.

    But we have tried twice on boost-phase kinetic interceptors, once was the old SBI under SDI days and then Brilliant Pebbles. And if they were going to cut, I thought that the allocation money that I provided, which would protect the ABL system, at least your long-lead components, and allow you to maintain the testing schedule, that was the more important of the two.
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    General KADISH. Well, I think if I could go back to the basic premise, is that we would like to have all the money we requested, Mr. Chairman.


    That way we wouldn't have to have the discussion.

    However, given that there are cuts, what the fact of the matter is, it will be as Congressman Spratt indicated, that we will be doing conceptual studies and not our current plan for the space-based interceptor program, which was to take it to the next step of aggressive experimentation so we could move it along as quickly as possible. So there would be a delay.

    And I cannot argue with the optics part of the ABL, because I think that is exactly where we need to shore up the industrial base after we complete the first set which is going to go on the first airplane here very shortly.

    So the bottom line is that we would basically put off at least another year any activity beyond studies for the interceptor on orbit.

    Mr. SPRATT. Would you be able to find out the testing schedule for the airborne laser system?

    General KADISH. The testing schedule I think is a little bit independent of the optics issue. This would be a separate set of optics that would reduce our risk in the process and become spares, if nothing else. And therefore if we have a cracked optic in the baseline test program then we can replace it and move on.
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    So that it that sense it would protect our testing schedule, but it is designed more to keep the industrial base and protect our future options on ABL.

    Mr. SPRATT. Overall, how do you feel about the prospects of the airborne laser as a boost-phase intercept system, albeit a fairly short-range one?

    General KADISH. The prospects, I think I can probably divide that answer into two parts. First, from a theoretical perspective, we have been working at high-energy lasers for over 30 years, and this is the first opportunity that we can actually prove that it could work, and if it could work as designed it would be very powerful in our architecture in the boost phase.

    The second part of it is, will it work in the prospects of meeting our targets for the development program? We have taken a delay, there have been some issues that have delayed us up until the 2004 time frame. However, as I look internally into the program today—and I watch this at least three or four times a week in great detail, tracking specific objectives—we are making good progress against our revised schedule. And within the next 12 to 16 months we will be doing ground tests that will answer that question, I think, definitively, prior to first flight.

    So, I am very optimistic about our progress on ABL and being able to make it actually work. But we have some big milestones ahead of us, and so I would be happy to keep you appraised of that because we are watching these very closely.

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    Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but I have to leave.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman, I know that, Mr. Secretary, you have to leave. Are there any parting comments you would like to make, any final comments before you take off here?

    Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think I have really gotten my comments in pretty well, but thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. I think you did, too. Thank you very much for being with us.

    Mr. Kirk?

    Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I wanted to follow up on the threat and how it is progressing that you have seen lately. We have seen some progress testing in the missile program of the government of Iran. I wonder if you could review that for us.

    General KADISH. I think, if we might, I would offer you to do it in closed session with more detail, because I think it is more appropriate there. But in open session I would say they are aggressively pursuing the upgrades to their ballistic missile defense systems, and we are seeing across the board ground testing as well as flight testing from Iran.
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    And I think the national intelligence estimate probably says it the best when it says that they are aggressively pursuing these technologies and that they will have a capability within 15 years, and if they get assistance it can be as little as one year.

    Mr. KIRK. We also saw some reports, I know denied by the Egyptians, but when I was in the State Department I handled the Egyptian attempted sale of missile engines from Argentina to support their missile program. Now we have reports of Egyptian purchases of Nodong missile engines from North Korea. You obviously know how seriously we would take a move of that nature by the armed forces of Egypt.

    I don't know if you can comment on that publicly, or anything that you can say, because, obviously, it rattled some nerves on Capitol Hill.

    General KADISH. Well, we would take that very seriously, too, Congressman. And I think the discussion of the threat at the level that you are probing I think would be best handled if we could go classified.

    Mr. KIRK. I am also worried about any potential contingency in the Middle East, and if it involved Iraq, certainly first move would be to launch the Scud inventory at U.S. armed forces and at Israel. I am somewhat concerned about the pace of delivering early warning to the Arrow system, and the ability to have sufficient number of reloads for Arrow to absorb an Iraqi contingency. Could you talk about your thinking on that subject?

    General KADISH. I think that's a very good question. We have mentioned earlier this idea of having Boeing co-producing the elements of Arrow in the United States.
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    And the primary reason I had in supporting that effort was to allow the Israelis to build more inventory quicker than they would ordinarily build. So they are building a limited inventory every month of Arrow, so they will have a capability against Iraqi Scuds just because they have that in place right now. And the Arrow system is, from all of the testing I have seen, very capable.

    I would also suggest that we could augment that capability with U.S. systems, because we have done a lot of interoperability testing with Arrow and Patriot, for instance. And the combination of Patriot-2, what we call the GEM capability, as well as our limited PAC–3 inventory, which I think is getting close to 30 missiles here shortly, will add to the Arrow and be as effective a force that we could field during this time frame.

    And then as time goes on, it will get better and better.

    Mr. KIRK. Let me just urge you,I think a port visit, even if the crew doesn't set foot in Israel, of an Aegis class cruiser to Haifa would send an important signal on the missile defense abilities of the United States to upgrade those of Israel. And I think that would be an important statement.

    I know that the Navy is very loath to send sailors off into a place where it might worry about the individual security. But the crew doesn't have to disembark. But the presence of that ship visibly outside Haifa would, I think, send a very important signal of the capability of the U.S. could offer if we needed that.

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    Last, had some problems with PAC–3, especially in the launch. What went wrong?

    General KADISH. I can tell you, Congressman, that is really frustrating to me, because those are the type of glitches however that Mr. Christie and the operational testers always push us in to find. And unfortunately, in the Patriot system, we found them at the end of the program instead in the beginning, where I am trying to orient the rest of our test programs as we re-architect them.

    I am not satisfied with that situation, quite frankly. When you press the button and the missile doesn't fire because of a tiny glitch in the system that's rather easily fixed, that is very frustrating. But we will fix those.

    And the good news is we have done the testing to find them, and we are going to do more testing to continue to wring out the system and make sure it is as best as we could get it.

    Mr. KIRK. It is far beyond my engineering capability, but you wonder what is going right with the Navy igniters that is going wrong with the PAC–3.

    General KADISH. Well, to be fair about it, we have done two of the Navy launches, and if you count the non-intercepts, we are probably up to five. And one of those did not launch correctly. In fact, it didn't get out of the launch system, as I recall, because of a minor glitch.

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    So this is systemic in a sense, but that's why we do engineering. That's why we have people on board to make sure that those things are hooked up right and designed right. And unfortunately, it isn't until you do testing where Murphy can come in and screw things up that you find these issues.

    So the Navy system, the SM3, has had experience with that. Probably will experience it more. But we are going to do everything we can to make sure that's either at minimum or zero.

    Mr. KIRK. Well, I understand. And I have enormous confidence in you because you seem free and able to tell us about problems in the programs, warts and all, which is exactly what we need to hear. As a development program, I think we understand that the Wright Brothers failed at every attempt to fly right up until the time they flew. And we understand that with this program.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman.

    Mr. Allen?

    Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank you, General Kadish and Mr. Christie, for being here.

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    General Kadish, this may not be a fair question. If not, you have my permission to duck it. But Secretary Wolfowitz said before he left that we needed to get rid of the ABM Treaty in order to develop a national missile defense system or words to that effect. I had always understood that the land-based system that the Clinton administration was committed to was treaty compliant.

    To your knowledge, was that system treaty compliant?

    General KADISH. The treaty allowed us to conduct testing of land-based systems but it was not the national missile defense system we were proposing in that framework was not treaty-complaint.

    Mr. ALLEN. Because of the location of the—

    General KADISH. No, because as soon as we would break ground on a missile defense capability that's operational, the silos in Alaska, for instance, it turned out to be the radar at Shemya that was the treaty breaker. So although we could proceed to test, we could not deploy. And that was pretty clear in the treaty.

    Mr. ALLEN. Okay, thank you.

    General Kadish, you have repeatedly testified to your confidence that a hit-to-kill system will work. And the report on the House defense authorization bill endorses examinations of alternatives to hit-to-kill technology, including nuclear-tipped interceptors.

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    If you had to choose, would you rather spend your agency's dollars perfecting hit-to-kill technologies, or exploring non-hit-to-kill alternatives?

    General KADISH. We have already made that choice, and we are aggressively pursuing with good success the hit-to-kill technology.

    Mr. ALLEN. Before a Senate committee in March, you said that, ''The Missile Defense Agency has no plans to develop nuclear missile defenses.'' Can you confirm that statement for this committee?

    General KADISH. I would confirm it.

    Mr. ALLEN. I have a series of things that I would like to ask you and I think they can be answered yes or no, but if not, obviously just some things that I want in the record.

    Does the administration plan to have a rudimentary anti-ICBM capability in place at Fort Greely, Alaska, by September or October of 2004?

    General KADISH. That's our current plan.

    Mr. ALLEN. By the fall of 2004, will you have in place in and around Alaska, an X-band radar, without which, as you testified in June 2000, we would not have early warning coverage adequate enough for the Korean threat in that area of the world?

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    General KADISH. Our current test bed does not include that plan, however, I would not rule it out.

    Mr. ALLEN. Okay. By 2004, will the existing Cobra Dane Radar at Shemya provide equivalent coverage that an X-band would of an ICBM launch from North Korea?

    General KADISH. Equivalent?

    Mr. ALLEN. Well, will the Cobra Dane Radar at Shemya provide coverage equivalent to an X-band radar system?

    General KADISH. They would not.

    Mr. ALLEN. By fall of 2000, will the planned upgrades to the Cobra Dane Radar be complete?

    General KADISH. I expect them to be, yes.

    Mr. ALLEN. By the fall of 2004, will SIBRS High be operational?

    General KADISH. That's a difficult question, because they just restructured the program, as the first satellite is not until 2006. However we intend to use the Defense Port satellite constellation that already exists. So, in fact, that's what we are testing on today.

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    Mr. ALLEN. By fall 2004, will SIBRS Low be operational?

    General KADISH. No, we just restructured the program.

    Mr. ALLEN. By fall 2004, will you have conducted a flight test from the Fort Greely site?

    General KADISH. Not from Fort Greely.

    Mr. ALLEN. By that time, will you have conducted a ground-based mid-course test without advance information on the trajectory of the target missile?

    General KADISH. We have plans to do that, and I cannot remember right now whether it falls before the September of 2004 or a little bit later than that. And, in fact, on last Friday I just reviewed the potential to do what we are calling pop quizzes in the flight test, where the exact configuration of the target suite is not known by the interceptor community before it is launched.

    Mr. ALLEN. Let me give you, sort of, three different questions that are connected. By fall, 2004, will you have conducted a test without advance information on, one, the speed of the target missile, two, the launch time of the target missile, and three, countermeasures accompanying the target missile?

    General KADISH. I need to get that for the record. Like I said, we are planning to do that, I just don't remember exactly when in relationship to the test bed start-up time.
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    And, the questions, however, are implying that we are not going to have an effective rudimentary system, if I get the—

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page ?.]

    Mr. ALLEN. Actually it is not quite that devious, General Kadish. I mean, what I am really trying to do is nail down what you expect to have accomplished by 2004, when this rudimentary system is in place, so that we can understand just what the capabilities are, just what the tests are. I am not trying to trap you. I am just trying to get the basic information laid out for the record. And if you want to submit answers for the record later, that would be fine.

    General KADISH. Okay. As far as this last question goes, I will reiterate again, our intention is to do that. I just don't know when in relationship to the time frame you are talking about. I think it will be relatively soon right after that if my memory serves me, but I would rather give it for the record.

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page ?.]

    Mr. ALLEN. Right. Okay, I would be happier too if you could check on that.

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    By the fall of 2004, will you have planned and conducted a test in inclement weather conditions?

    General KADISH. We had radars looking through rain storms on the last test as a matter of a fact; the last three tests as near as I can remember. I don't think we have had rain or any kind of adverse conditions at the launch of the interceptor, but in the area, there have been showers.

    But that's an interest I think Mr. Christie and I will have as time goes on, but you cannot necessarily order up weather when you need it, so we are going to have to take what we get for a while.

    Mr. ALLEN. By fall of 2004, will you have conducted a test without the beacon attached to the target missile?

    General KADISH. That's our intention.

    Mr. ALLEN. Will you have conducted a test with the planned operational booster?

    General KADISH. That's our intention.

    Mr. ALLEN. Will you have conducted a test with a decoy that mimics the warhead rather than just a large balloon?

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    General KADISH. I don't know the answer to that right now because we are taking the countermeasures a step at a time, and we haven't come to closure on the sweeps after the next flight test yet.

    Mr. ALLEN. You may have the same answer to these final three questions, but by fall of 2004, will you have conducted a test with a tumbling re-entry vehicle with a striped decoy?

    General KADISH. With a striped decoy? I don't know, but we are looking very carefully at when exactly we can do a tumbling decoy. And my intention would be, if at all possible, to do it before we get the test bed operational. Whether that's in September before or later.

    What is interesting about that tumbling decoy or that tumbling RV, however, is that we are going to have to design that. Our systems don't do that right now.

    So that is another complicating factor in this process. You just don't go out and tumble those things reliably enough for a test.

    Mr. ALLEN. Sure. I understand.

    Two more. By the fall of 2004, will you have conducted a test with a radar jammer aiding the target missile?

    General KADISH. I think that's our intention, but I would have to go back and check.
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    Mr. ALLEN. By fall 2004, will you have conducted a test with a re-entry vehicle that separates into dozens of sub-munitions?

    General KADISH. No.

    Mr. ALLEN. Okay. I would appreciate it if you could go through those questions and provide an answer to the record wherever you said that you cannot—

    General KADISH. Be happy to.

    Mr. ALLEN. —if you could just do that, just so I have a sense of how those components of the testing program either precede or follow the planned date in September or October 2004.

    General KADISH. I will be happy to.

    I would just like to make one comment, though, that we, because of the nature of the program that we are operating now, we make decisions rather rapidly about those very issues based on both results of the tests and our success in accomplishing the tests.

    So you need to understand that what I might tell you even for the record is subject to change.

    Mr. ALLEN. That I do understand. And I would expect that. I am just looking for the schedule as it stands today.
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    General KADISH. Be happy to do so.

    Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman.

    And Mr. Saxton had another follow-up here.

    Mr. SAXTON. General Kadish, I would like to give you an opportunity to tell us about the progress in the technological development of various aspects of missile defense. But I would like to just do it within the context of something that has occurred to me while I was listening to several of the other members ask questions.

    When I was first elected to Congress in 1984, C–17 was a concept. And we were very pleased 12 or 14 years later—you can tell me now long it was. 1998 first operational production model came off the line. That was 14 years of producing a slightly different kind of system, but conceptually not much different than its predecessors, the C–5 and the C–141. Better, more capable, but the same concept, and yet it took 14 years to develop that new airplane.

    Sometime in the early 1990s or early 1980s, I accompanied other members of this committee to visit with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, because there was some talk about canceling the V–22. Today, we are still trying to manage and perfect the system that we call the V–22.
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    And I am not saying that in any way to be critical. I am just using this as an example of how long it takes to perfect changes in older technology to make more capable weapon systems.

    Some years ago, and I cannot remember when, my friends in the Navy brought me a picture of something that was going to be an arsenal ship, because we had to figure out what we were going to do about the next generation of ships. Today we are still trying to figure out the new generation of ships with the experimental DD(X). And so, to do a more capable ship appears like it takes a long time as well.

    And my friend Chairman Hunter and I are spending a lot of time now talking about the Crusader, a weapon system that was developed over a long period of time. One of my friends calls it a revolutionary development, rather than an evolutionary development, because it is so much more capable than the artillery platforms and systems that we have today.

    But that took years, and is going to take more years because now we are going to change from this system to a lighter system, which is going to take four or five more years to develop.

    So keeping all of those developmental time lines in mind, carried out by people who are very capable and determined and aggressively trying to meet our defense needs, I remember in 1991 watching the Patriot streak skyward with some success; appeared to be successful for a while, but then we found it couldn't discriminate between the explosive part of the Scuds and the other part of the Scuds, so we really didn't have any effective missile defense system during the Gulf War in 1991.
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    Earlier today I was able to say to you congratulations on the last two shots, which I have seen films of, and I think that's real progress. I would just like to give you the opportunity to detail the successes that we have had since the Gulf War, and suggest maybe that we have been a little bit more successful than maybe Mr. Taylor maybe thought we have been. Because I think we have made some real progress over a period of time where, frankly, we are trying to do something that man's never done before: hit a bullet with a bullet.

    When we developed airplanes and it takes 14 years; that's one set of problems. But when we try to do something that no man has ever been able to do before, that's quite a different kettle of fish.

    Would you talk to the progress that we have made?

    General KADISH. Well, Mr. Saxton, I would be happy to, because one of the things that I have been talking about lately is that we have answered the question of whether or not hit-to-kill can work and whether you could hit a bullet with a bullet.

    In fact, as Chairman Hunter points out, many times we are hitting vehicles that are going much faster than a bullet—much, much faster than a bullet.

    So in the short time frame, building on the legacy of the money we spent since 1983, we have seven for 10 Patriot in-the-atmosphere hit-to-kill successful demonstrations and tests. We are two for eight, I believe, in the THAAD, in the transatmosphere and in outer space against intermediate-range missiles. And we are four for six against intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with our ground-based system. And we are two for two in the mid-course in outer space with Standard Missile 3 from Aegis cruisers against intermediate-range missiles.
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    So, I believe we have answered the first question in this hit-to-kill, can we hit a bullet with a bullet, by saying, ''Yes, we can.'' Now, the challenge is going to be, in our development program, to do it reliably and do it reliably in the presence of countermeasures across the board.

    So we have done something that's never been done before, and we have done it a number of times now over the past two years.

    I would also point out, and I think you have correctly characterized, the fact that even when we have mature technologies, we take 14 to 20 years, potentially, to put major weapons systems together. I think that's a documented fact.

    And I have talked about the idea that next year will be 100 years of manned flight; 100 years since the Wright brothers flew in 1903. And still today we are pushing the state of the art in airplanes, both commercially and militarily, very aggressively, but it still takes time to do that.

    I believe if you look at this time horizons, F–22 and JSF and V–22 have been many years in development already. And missile defense activities and hit-to-kill we have been at since 1983. So it is not unreasonable to expect that we take time to actually perfect these technologies, and that's what our development program is designed to do.

    We have made good progress in answering the first question on hit-to-kill, and we have a budget and a program planned now to answer the second, too, as well as add to different phases of flight and boost phase with different technologies.
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    So it has been a remarkable journey by a lot of our predecessors in getting us to where we are today, and we are trying very hard to capitalize on it in the post-treaty environment.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman very much for his very excellent question. And, you know, I wish my friend Gene Taylor was here, because he is asking you the question now, ''Can you knock down an ICBM?'' and you answer, ''No,'' and if he wasn't here to ask the question I would be doing it, because I always used to ask SecDef, ''Can we shoot one down?''

    But my reason for asking him the question was to show the fact that that's an area where we need to work. I think Mr. Taylor's position is that if we cannot do it, we should use that money in other places.

    My feeling is we need to use it to address that one major vulnerability that we cannot meet right now, which is incoming ballistic missiles.

    But, General, the idea of hitting a bullet with the bullet, I am reminded of your midcourse test where we fire a missile from Vandenberg Air Base, near Santa Barbara, California, we shoot it west, and at Kwajalein Island—how far away is Kwajalein from the California coastline?

    General KADISH. I think it is about 4,500 miles.

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I21Mr. HUNTER. Forty-five hundred miles. So about 1,500 miles past Hawaii, we launch an interceptor bullet, or missile, they are both going roughly three times the speed of a high-powered rifle bullet, and 148 miles about the Earth they run into each other. And the critics say, ''Well, doggone it, you guys had help. and did that really portray a real live scenario?''

    I think a lot of my colleagues don't understand what the ABM Treaty did. The ABM Treaty didn't keep us from being able to do research on a missile defense, and that's where a lot of that $65 billion went. It kept us from being able to build one. So it was tantamount to saying, ''You can do all of the blueprints you want, and all the research and development you want on building tanks, but you cannot build any tanks.''

    And then the Mr. Taylor of the day would say, after we lifted that ban, ''Well, General, where are your tanks?''

    And I remember the many times when we would go to the floor or be in committee and we would be looking at the budget for missile defense—that is for research on missile defense—and our more liberal friends or folks who didn't think missile defense was a good idea would make it very clear in their cross-examination: ''Now, General, this is only for testing; there will be no deployment. You are not actually going to build a tank here are you?'' ''No, we are not going to build a tank. This is just for testing.''

    And so, it is a little bit unfair, after we have just a few months ago emerged from this ban on production, and said, ''How come you haven't produced anything over the last 15 years?'' ''Well, because it is against the law is the reason we haven't produced it.'' And now we have lifted that ban, and we are able to look at all types of basing, and we are able to meet that threat.
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    So, I think one thing all members like, whether they are for missile defense or against missile defense, is the fact that you are engaged in a robust testing program. And you are going to throw out the losers and you are going to reward the winners with more money. And that's why we are trying to keep a little discretion vested with you so that you can do that without congressmen rushing over to save their program or to bash a program that they don't like.

    And I think you have done a pretty good job at that. And I like the fact that you are walking through an era now in which we are going to do a lot of testing. And we are going to do tough testing.

    And the idea behind the Alaskan missile defense range is to make the test tougher, because as you said, we have that shot down pretty well now where the bird flies out of Vandenberg, goes over Hawaii. After it clears Hawaii, we shoot at it from Kwajalein, and we hit it most of the time.

    But now we are going to do different angles. We are going to do different speeds, and we are going to make this test more complicated and make it approach, at least, in many dimensions an operational test.

    And that's a very important thing, whether you are for the missile defense program or against it. Now we are going to see some tough testing, tougher than we have seen in the past.

    Now, Mr. Christie, you mentioned your oversight responsibilities here, which are very, very serious responsibilities. Are you getting all of the information you need to get from General Kadish's shop at MDA?
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    Mr. CHRISTIE. I guess if you had asked that question a few months ago, I would have said, ''Probably not.'' But I think we are at the situation now to where we have access to what we need to do the job we are doing.

    There's programs like ABL, which are far down the pike that we might not be getting as much information today as I would like, but the relationship that we have with General Kadish and his office, I am pretty confident that we will have what we need, in particular, to provide the reports that we have to provide to Congress with our budget next year on the progress of every one of these programs. So I have to answer that positively.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So do you think you need a Senate amendment in order for you to have a good monitoring program?

    Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, we have language in the 2002 bill that says that we will provide to the Congress, with the budget, an assessment of the test programs laid out for each of the elements of his program. And I think the Senate language that's being proposed now adds some a different reporting process of operational assessments, or I believe.

    I can say that the existing report that is called for by statute that we will provide the assessment that is being called for in this additional language. I don't see any need for the additional language.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay, thank you very much.

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    Now, General Kadish, you have gone over the fact that pulling this $800-plus million out of the program, which was the Senate amendment that was then met with the Warner amendment that restored the money with the discretion vested in the executive to spend that money on terrorism or missile defense, should the money arise from projected inflation savings. Have you studied that match-up of amendments in the Senate?

    General KADISH. No, Congressman, it just happened last night, and I haven't had a chance to look at it in detail.

    Mr. HUNTER. When you have some time on your hands, could you take a look at that interchange in that series of transactions and provide for us an estimate of what you think it would do to the program if the dollars weren't restored?

    And second, you may need to talk to your lawyers and have them give us an estimate as to whether or not the monies, in fact, are available for missile defense, should that be the president's decision. Because there's some question has been raised by some members of the Senate who think that somehow there's now a new prioritization that should deprive you of some of those dollars.

    General KADISH. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. You can imagine we would be very interested in what the net effect of that is.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay, if you could let us know what your take on this thing is, and where we stand when the dusts settles, we would certainly appreciate that.

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    And you might tell us briefly, too—I know Mr. Weldon was interested in this—the essence of our cooperative programs with Japan. What are we doing with Japan right now on missile defense?

    General KADISH. I would be happy to. You want me to answer now or for the record?

    Mr. HUNTER. If you have a short answer, that would be great.

    General KADISH. Okay, what we are doing with Japan right now has to do with the Standard Missile 3 and the Aegis weapon system. So we have a cooperative program of technology development with Japan that we are pursuing a number of technologies to help us upgrade that particular capability.

    And I think we are progressing pretty well on that effort. And I expect that we will expand, potentially, our efforts in that area in the coming weeks and months.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay. Thank you very much.

    Gentlemen, thank you. And we appreciate your patience.

    And, General Kadish, I know you have some tests that are remaining on the schedule this year. And I want to make sure we offer an invitation to all of our members to take that short trip to Kwajalein Island or other locations and be observers.

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    General KADISH. All right. On behalf of our organization, I invite all of the members to come see our next testing. If you cannot get to the locations where they are, we can come to my conference room and we will watch it real time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Outstanding. I will be happy to send out an invitation to do that.

    Thank you very much, and the hearing's adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]