SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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83–011
2003
[H.A.S.C. No. 107–46]
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
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One Hundred Seventh Congress
BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
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HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JIM TURNER, Texas
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ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
MIKE THOMPSON, California
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
RICK LARSEN, Washington
Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
Mark Esper, Professional Staff Member
Justin Bernier, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
HEARING:
Wednesday, September 18, 2002, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq
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APPENDIX:
Wednesday, September 18, 2002
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
Stump, Hon. Bob, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
WITNESSES
Myers Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rumsfeld, Secretary Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
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Myers Gen. Richard B.
Rumsfeld, Secretary, Donald H.
Hunter, Hon. Duncan
Skelton, Hon. Ike
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 18, 2002.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA
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Mr. HUNTER. The committee will come to order. Today the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq. This morning's hearing marks a second of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nations (U.N.) resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East and the international community.
And I might let my colleagues know that this hearing in this series of hearings we have been having and will continue to have are being put forth at the direction of our chairman, Bob Stump. I talked to Bob just a little bit ago and Bob is doing well. He is still under the weather and undergoing some tests, but he gives his best to every member of the committee and every Member of the House and to you, Mr. Secretary, and wishes he could be with us.
Last week the committee received a classified briefing from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In fact, we just concluded another briefing I think some 86 Members of the House attended just a few minutes ago. We also heard from former senior U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors, about Iraq's illicit weapons programs and Saddam Hussein's persistent efforts to thwart the efforts of the UN inspectors so that he might persevere and advance his weapons of mass destruction programs.
Tomorrow the Armed Services Committee will hear how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destructions programs through the legal and illegal acquisition of Western technology, and how the United States's own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq. We also continue to plan further hearings for the coming weeks that will examine in greater detail the various aspects of the policy options before us.
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Today, however, we are honored to have Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the committee to discuss U.S. policy toward Iraq. He is the first cabinet-level official to appear on the Hill regarding Iraq, so we are all anxious to discuss these matters with him today.
Secretary Rumsfeld is joined by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. Secretary, before we ask you for your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the distinguished gentleman from Missouri, the ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer any comments he might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be viewed in the hard copy.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, general, we welcome you, and we look forward to your testimony today. This is certainly a critical time for us to be considering American action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to Congress, to the United Nations and the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and I applaud his realization that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is one that faces the United Nations as a whole, and I think all agree that Saddam Hussein is a despot who has violated the Security Council's resolutions for years.
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But having recognized the central role of the United Nations, we must take seriously its collective judgment about how to enforce these resolutions. I am not suggesting that Congress will or should only consider an option fully supported by the United Nations, but the administration must be able to answer fundamental questions about any decision to use force. Why must action be taken now? What is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or for UN action in the face of Iraqi defiance? The decision to act with or without the United Nations. I have wrestled with a series of questions which, I have shared with the President. Exercising our constitutional responsibilities requires Congress to take into account not only these near-term considerations of how to act, but also the long-term implication for American security interests globally of using military force against Iraq.
Some of these questions have to do with waging the broader war on terrorism. How will the United States ensure that we continue to have international support for our efforts against al Qaeda? Even if the Administration seeks military action without Security Council approval, do we have the forces, fiscal resources, munitions and other military capabilities to wage both campaigns effectively? How is the United States preparing to deal with likely Iraqi efforts to draw Israel into the conflict by launching missiles, possibly with chemical or biological warheads? What type of planning is going into succeeding in sustaining an urban operation or operations on the battlefield made toxic by chemical weapons?
As members of the Armed Services Committee, we all share the commitment to making sure that our troops can succeed on the battlefield at the lowest possible level of risk should we decide to put them in harm's way.
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In considering the long-term aspects and the question of use of force, I am reminded of Karl von Clausewitz's maxim, which is in his book, ''On War,'' that in strategy it is imperative not to take the first step without considering the last. We must think through carefully and now, before we authorize military force, how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of the Second World War. In today's dynamic battlefield, we don't have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and a democratic Iraq that takes all major groups, Shia, Sunni, Kurd into account? How will we handle members of the Baath Party and those scientists and those engineers that design weapons of mass destruction for Iraq? What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come? Any decision to attack Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and the long-term responsibilities that come with doing so.
With answers to these questions, Mr. Secretary and General, I look forward to supporting the President in helping to craft a Congressional authorization to do so.
I thank both witnesses for being with us today and for sharing your expertise and hopefully providing answers to these very difficult, but very important, questions. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the distinguished gentleman, and Mr. Secretary, our members on this Armed Services Committee have put in a lot of hours on this question, and we look forward to working with you and hearing your testimony.
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We thank you for being with us. The floor is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee. I have submitted a rather lengthy statement which I would like included in the record. It sets out——
Mr. HUNTER. Without objection.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. It sets forth a number of the elements of the case that the President presented with respect to Iraq in some detail and also attempts to respond to a number of the questions that have been raised over recent days and weeks. What I would like to do is to hit some of the high points of that statement. As we all know, this is not an intelligence briefing. I understand that the committee has very recently, in fact maybe this morning, received an intelligence briefing, and it is also an open hearing. So my remarks will reflect those two facts.
Today I do want to discuss the task of preventing attacks of even greater magnitude than what was experienced on September 11th, attacks that could conceivably kill not just thousands of Americans but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.
As we meet, chemists and biologists and scientists are toiling in weapons lab and underground bunkers working to give the most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality. The effect posed by those regimes is real, it is dangerous, and as the President pointed out, it is growing with each passing day. We have entered a new security environment in the 21st century, one where terrorist movements in terrorist states are developing capacities to cause unprecedented destruction.
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Today our margin of error is notably different than was the case previously, in the 20th century when we were dealing with conventional weapons for the most part. Today we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that of course tend to be used not against combatants, but against innocent men, women and children, as well. We are in an age of little or no warning when threats can emerge suddenly to surprise us. Terrorist states are finding ways to gain access to these powerful weapons, and in word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities.
Moreover, after September 11th, they have discovered a new means of delivering those weapons: terrorist networks. To the extent that they might transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups—and we know terrorist groups are actively seeking those weapons—they could readily conceal their responsibility for attacks on our people. So we are on notice. An attack very likely will be attempted. The only question is when and by what technique. It could be months, it could be a year, it could be years, but it will happen, and each of us needs to pause and think about that.
If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today would be able to honestly say that it was a surprise, because it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots, as much as as is humanly possible before the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could we have proof positive, and by then, needless to say, it will be too late.
The question facing us is this: What is the responsible course of action for our country? Do we believe it is our responsibility to wait for a weapon of mass destruction 9-11, or is it the responsibility of free people to do something, to take steps to deal with such a threat before such an attack occurs?
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[Disturbance in hearing room.]
Mr. HUNTER. If we could ask the staff to see to it that our guest is escorted.
Mr. Secretary, we will be with you in a minute. Mr. Secretary, we are going to put them down as undecided.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, as I listen to those comments, it struck me what a wonderful thing free speech is, and of course the country that threw the inspectors out was not the United States. It was not the United Nations. It was Iraq that threw the inspectors out, and they have thrown them out, and they have rejected 16 resolutions of the United Nations and stipulations, but of course, people like that are not able to go into Iraq and make demonstrations like that because they don't have free speech.
I think one other point I would make before proceeding is that there is obviously a misunderstanding on the part of those who think that the goal is inspections. The goal isn't inspections. The goal is disarmament. That is what was agreed to by Iraq. That is what was understood by the United Nations. The ease with which people can migrate over and suggest that the task before the world is inspections, you can only have inspections when a country is cooperating with you. They have to agree that that is—they have the same goal as those that are attempting to validate something. So one would hope that those thoughts could be a part of this dialogue.
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There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction: Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. These facts about the Saddam Hussein regime I think should be part of this record in our country's considerations.
He ordered the use of chemical weapons against his own people, in one case killing some 5,000 innocent civilians. His regime invaded two of its neighbors and launched ballistic missiles at four of its neighbors. He plays host to terrorist networks, assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former President of the United States. He has executed members of his cabinet. He has ordered doctors to surgically remove the ears of military deserters.
His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of over 50,000 people. His regime on an almost daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft as they fulfill the U.N. mission with respect to Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulism toxin and possibly smallpox. His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and Sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restrictions.
His regime has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts. His regime has diverted funds from the U.N. Oil for Food Program, funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi civilians, to fund his weapons of mass destruction programs. And his regime has violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without cost or consequence.
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As the President warned the United Nations last week, the Saddam Hussein regime is a grave and gathering danger. It is a danger we do not have the option to ignore. In his U.N. address, the President explained why we should not allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and he issued a challenge to the international community to enforce the numerous resolutions that the U.N. passed and that the Iraqis have defied and to show that the U.N. is determined not to become irrelevant.
President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work with the U.N. Security Council, but he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued defiance. He said, ''The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced or action will be unavoidable, and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.''
The President has asked Members of the House and the Senate to support actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He urged that the Congress act before the recess. He asked that you send a clear signal to the world community and to the Iraqi regime that our country is united in purpose and prepared to act. It is important that Congress send that message before the U.N. Security Council votes. Delaying a vote in Congress would send a wrong message in my view, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand and as we are cautioning the Iraqi regime to respond and consider its options.
It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime change by the passage of the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy.
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A decision to use military force is never easy, and it is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed and debated. In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by Members of the Congress and others. Some of the arguments raised are truly important. And in my prepared testimony, I attempted to discuss in detail a whole series of those questions and what I believe to be appropriate responses. Let me touch on a few this morning.
Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract from the U.S. global war on terror. The answer is that Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war, and we can fight all elements of the global war on terror simultaneously. As the members of this committee know well, our strategy includes the ability to win decisively in one theater and be able to occupy a country, to near simultaneously swiftly defeat a country in another theater, to provide for homeland defense and a number of lesser contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. That is what our force sizing construct is. That is what was briefed to this committee. So let there be no doubt but that we can do both at the same time.
Our principal goal of the war on terror is to stop another 9/11 or a WMD attack that could make a 9/11 seem modest by comparison, and to do it before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our objective is to stop them regardless of the source.
Another question that has been asked is where is the smoking gun? Well, the last thing we want to see is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired, and the goal must be to stop such an action before it happens. As the President told the United Nations, ''The first time we may be completely certain that a terrorist state has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, they use one. And we owe it to our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming,''.
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If someone is waiting for a so-called smoking gun, it is certain that we will have waited too long. But the question raises another issue that is usually discussed, and that is what kind of evidence ought we to consider as appropriate to act in the 21st century. In our country it has been customary to seek evidence that would prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. That approach of course is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused, but in the age of weapons of mass destruction, the objective is not to protect the rights of a Saddam Hussein. It is to protect the lives of the American people and our friends and allies, and when there is that risk and we are trying to defend against closed societies and shadowy terrorist networks, expecting to find that standard of evidence before such a weapon has been used is really not realistic, and after such a weapon has been used it is too late.
I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence really are thinking back in the 20th century in a pre-9/11 context.
On September 11th, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction, and that awareness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate. We will not have, we do not have and cannot know everything that is going on in the world at any time.
Over the years, despite the very best efforts of enormously expensive talented intelligence capabilities, we have repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities in a variety of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six, eight, ten and in one case more years between the time a country developed a capability and the time that the United States of America became aware of it.
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We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and we do know they are currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal and that they have a proven aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten their neighbors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all.
Committees of Congress are interestingly—they are currently asking hundreds of questions and pouring over tens of thousands of documents, pages of documents, about September 11th, and they are asking the question, who knew what, when and why didn't we prevent that tragedy?
Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information that the government had before September 11th to the volumes of information the government has today about Iraqi's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility towards the United States and then factor in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11th, the case the President made should be clear.
If more time passes and the attacks we are concerned about were to come to pass, we would not want to have ignored those warning signs and then be required to explain why we failed to protect our fellow citizens.
Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent, that Saddam Hussein is at least 5 to 7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was about 5 to 7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found that the Iraqis were probably 6 months to a year to 18 months from having a nuclear weapon, not 5 to 7 years.
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We do know that he has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They are simpler to deliver and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq's fingerprints. If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreck on our country with a biological attack, consider the recent unclassified Dark Winter exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It stimulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three separate locations in the U.S. Within two months the worst-case estimate indicated up to one million people could be dead and another two million infected. Cut it in half. Cut it in a quarter. It is not a nice picture.
Some have argued that Iraq is unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction against us, because unlike terrorist networks, Saddam Hussein has a return address. That is to say, he is probably deterrable is the argument. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. that it would necessarily have an obvious return address. There are ways Iraq could easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable.
We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. We don't know who is responsible for last year's anthrax attacks. Indeed our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks is a very effective way of attacking the United States seemingly with impunity.
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Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than Iraq. Well, why not deal with them first, the question goes? Well, Iran and North Korea are indeed threats and problems. That is why President Bush named them specifically when he spoke about the axis of evil, and we do as a country have policies to address both, but Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, using them against his own people, launching missiles against his neighbors, brutalizing and torturing his own citizens, harboring terrorist networks, engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assassination of foreign officials, violating international commitments, lying and hiding his WMD programs from inspectors, deceiving and defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again.
As the President told the United Nations in one place in one regime, we find all of these dangers in their most lethal and aggressive forms. Some have asked if containment worked on the Soviet Union. Why not just contain Iraq? First, it is clear from the Iraqi regime's 11 years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, containment is breaking down.
Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that already possessed nuclear weapons, thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons.
Third, with the Soviet Union we believed that time was on our side, and indeed we were correct. Time was on our side. With Iraq the opposite is true. Time is not on our side. Every month that goes by with his weapons of mass destruction programs, they are progressing.
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Fourth, the containment worked in the long run. The Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they—while containment did work in the long run, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they invaded their neighbor Afghanistan, if you think back. Does anyone really want Saddam Hussein to have the same deterrence so that he could invade his neighbors with impunity?
Some have argued that if we do go to war the U.S. should first lay out details of a truly comprehensive inspection regime, which if Iraq failed to comply would provide a casus belli.
Well, I would respond this way. If failure to comply with weapons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli, the U.N. already has it. It is preceded over a period of many, many years. The United States, as the President indicated, is not closed to the idea of inspections as an element of an effective response, but our goal can't be inspections. It has to be disarmament. That is where the threat is. The purpose of inspections is to prove that Iraq has disarmed, which would require that Iraq would reverse its decade-long policy of pursuing those weapons, and that is certainly something that Iraq is unlikely to do.
Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting in all of his weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile. They can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception techniques.
There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be effective if the target nation is actually willing to disarm and wants to prove to the world that they are doing so. They are looking for a way to prove to the world that they have in fact done what the world has asked them to do. They tend not to be as effective on covering deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to disarm and to try to deceive. And Iraq's record of the past decade shows that they want weapons of mass destruction and are determined to continue developing them.
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Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting Saddam Hussein and that most of our key allies are opposed. First, the truth is to the contrary. There are a number of countries that want Saddam Hussein gone and increasing numbers are willing to say so publicly, and a quite large number are willing to say so privately, although because a number of countries live in the neighborhood and he is not a nice neighbor, it is not surprising that some of them are reluctant to say so publicly.
The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror includes 90 countries, literally half of the world. It was not there on September 11th. It was built one country at a time over a long period of time. During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition there eventually included 36 nations when Iraq was attacked, but they were not there on August 5th when President George Herbert Walker Bush announced to the world that Saddam Hussein's aggression would not stand. That coalition was built over many months.
With his U.N. speech, President Bush has begun the process of building international support for dealing with Iraq, and the reaction has been very positive. The President will continue to state our case, and I suspect that as he does so we will find that additional countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and participate. Certainly that has been our experience over the past days.
Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act, it might provoke Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction. That is a useful point, and certainly there are ways to mitigate the risk of a chemical or biological attack, but it cannot be entirely eliminated. And it is true that that could be a risk of military action, were the President to make a decision for military action. But if Saddam Hussein is that dangerous today, then I would think it would only make the case for dealing with such a threat stronger, because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime becomes.
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Moreover, consider the consequences if the world were to allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a message to the world about the value of having weapons of mass destruction that we would deeply regret having said. The message the world should want to send is the exact opposite: that Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has not made it more secure but less secure, and that by pursuing those weapons they have attracted undesired attention to themselves.
But I would suggest that even Saddam Hussein—that if he were to issue such an order to use a chemical or a biological attack, that that does not necessarily mean his orders would be carried out. He might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose. Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use weapons of mass destruction.
Some have asked what has changed to warrant action now. Well, what has changed is our experience on September 11th. What has changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks that this country faces from terrorist networks, terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction and the nexus between terrorist networks and weapons of mass destruction. What has not changed is Iraq's drive to acquire those weapons and the fact that every approach that the United Nations has taken to stop Iraq's drive has failed.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical moment for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test that unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in recent history with unfortunate consequences. Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kamph indicating what he intended to do, but the hope was that maybe he would not do what he said, and between 35 and 60 million people died because of the series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early at a minimum cost of lives had the vast majority of the world's leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting.
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Today we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his intentions clear. He has used those weapons. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of his neighbor. He plays host to terrorist networks. He is hostile to our country. Because we have denied him the ability he has sought to impose his will on his neighbors. He has said in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has at this moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to deliver those weapons to our shore, the world would be changed. Our people would be at risk. Our willingness to be engaged in the world and our willingness to project power to stop aggression and our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral actions all could be put under question, and many lives could be lost.
We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh the risks of living in the world that we see, or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting?
The question comes down to this, how will the history of this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of history, we see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that were not anticipated. ''At Dawn We Slept.'' ''The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.'' ''December 7th, 1941, the Day the Admiral Slept Late.'' ''Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment.'' ''From Munich to Pearl Harbor.'' ''Why England Slept.'' ''The Cost of Failure.'' The list of such books is endless, and unfortunately, in the past year historians have added to the body of literature. And there are already books out on September 11th wondering why those attacks weren't prevented. Each is an attempt by the authors to connect the dots, to determine what happened and why it was not possible before the fact to figure out what was going to happen.
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And our job today, the President's, the Congress and the United States is to connect the dots before the fact. It is to anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happen and to make the right decision as to whether or not it is appropriate for this country to take action before it is too late. We are on notice, each of us. Each of us has a responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that when the history books of this period are written, the books won't ask why we slept, but to ensure that history would instead record that on September 11th, the American people were awakened to the impending dangers and that those entrusted with the safety of the American people made the right decisions for the country.
President Bush is determined to do just that, and that is why he has come before the Congress and why he has come before the United Nations and why he has set forth his case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, for your perspective of the security balance in the Middle East when Saddam Hussein acquires the nuclear systems?
Oh, excuse me, General Myers, did you have a statement also?
General MYERS. I do. I have a short statement, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. HUNTER. Well, why don't you go ahead and then we will lead with questions.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General MYERS. Okay. Chairman Hunter and Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Before I start I would like to take a minute and just thank Chairman Stump for his 26 years of service to our Nation as a Member of Congress. His service here and in the United States Navy of course, is an example for all of us in uniform, and we wish him and his family well in the days ahead and hope we can work again with him here in Congress.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, General.
General MYERS. It is certainly an honor to appear before you to discuss the nature of the threat that Iraq represents to America and our interest and those of our allies and friends.
Mr. Chairman, I request that my written statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. HUNTER. Without objection.
General MYERS. Thank you, sir.
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I will make some short introductory remarks, and then we will go right to questions. The first thing that I wanted to cover with you was the nature of the threat that Iraq presents to us and the capabilities of our Armed Forces today, but I don't think there is anything I can add to Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks. I agree with those, and so I will leave that point and go on to my second point, and that is to tell you that our Nation's military forces are ready and able to do whatever the President asks of them. Our Armed Forces have made dramatic strides and capabilities over the past decade, and let me just highlight a few.
As a result of support of Congress and the American public, our Armed Forces have improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability. These capabilities together with an enhanced command and control network give our joint warfighters a faster, more agile decision cycle than the one that we had a decade ago. For our warfighters, this means that they have updated tactical information that is minutes or hours old, not days old. We also enjoy much better power projection capability to move our joint warfighting team. The strong congressional support for programs such as the C–17 and the Large-Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships have meant that we can deploy and sustain the force much, much better than in the past.
And finally, our Nation's combat power has increased dramatically over the past decade. For example, the Joint Direct Attack Munition provides all of our bomber aircraft and a majority of our fighter aircraft a day-night, all-weather precision attack capability. Our ground forces have improved and have more accurate long-range weapons with the improved Army Tactical Missile System and a faster Multiple Launch Rocket System.
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Today, we have sufficient forces to continue our ongoing operations, meet our international commitments, and continue to protect the American homeland. At the same time, of course, some key units are in high demand. Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces have helped to reduce the stress on some of these key units, but any major combat operation will obviously require us to prioritize the tasks given to such units. While our military capabilities have improved over the past decade, the foundation of our success remains our Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen. Their superior training, discipline and leadership are the core of our effectiveness.
In my view, these qualities are the reason that our men and women in uniform enjoy the respect and high regard of other professional militaries around the world. It is also for these reasons that our military forces are so effective partners in any potential coalition.
Once again, I welcome the opportunity to be here today and make those two important points. First, Iraq remains a threat to our region, to the region, our interests and to Americans. And second, our Nation's joint force can accomplish any task that this Nation may ask them to do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Myers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General, and Mr. Secretary and General Myers, you may wish to comment on this. I would just restate this question. How do you see the security balance in the region with respect to U.S. interests when Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear systems?
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Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Mr. Chairman, my personal view is that a biological threat and a chemical threat is of a kind with a nuclear threat, and he has biological and chemical weapons, and he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons.
The region knows that. The region knows this man very, very well, and they are frightened of him. And I don't know precisely what it would do to the balance in the region for it to be demonstrated that he has a nuclear capability and the ability to deliver it, not just to his neighbors but to others. In my view, the thing that is critical in the region is the role that the coalition forces have played since Desert Storm to dissuade him from invading his neighbors. He threatens the regimes of his neighboring countries frequently, and it is the United States and the United Kingdom and the fact that the U.N. resolutions have been a constraint on him in terms of the sanctions and the like, not a successful constraint because his programs have gone forward, but probably a constraint against him invading his neighbors. My impression is that it is probably the most critical element of the balance of power in the region at the present time.
General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just add that when you think about Iraq developing nuclear weapons and the fact that they have an active ballistic missile production program, that when you put those two things together, you have to be very, very worried, like the Secretary says. And I would say that it makes a very bad strategic situation. Given that he has chemical and biological weapons, it makes it a very, very bad strategic situation for his neighbors, much worse.
Secretary RUMSFELD. One thing I would add, if you postulated that he had a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it, for example, some distances, which he is aggressively attempting to have, imagine trying to put together a coalition like was put together for the global war on terrorism, and put together a coalition as was put together for the Gulf War. When countries know that by participating in such a coalition they and their cities and their populations could conceivably be targets, it would cause a—the purpose of a terror weapon is to terrorize, and it need not even be used to still be very effective, because it alters behavior. And in the hands of the likes of Saddam Hussein, that is a significant shift in capability and power.
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Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, I was going to ask you about the offer by Saddam Hussein and Iraq to have so-called unfettered inspections, but I think you fully covered that in your earlier comments and your opening statement.
Mr. Secretary, you made a reference to the Second World War, what led up to it, a, regarding Pearl Harbor, b, regarding the rise of Adolf Hitler. We must look ahead in this whole effort, and I use the Second World War as an example. What happens after we remove Saddam Hussein from power, he and his regime, hopefully with a coalition? But after the decision is made and after that action is taken?
We had a plan in place regarding Japan, the occupation thereof, and it worked. We had a plan in place in the occupation of Germany, and it worked, even despite the fact that the Soviet Union thwarted it for a while, and today we have, as you know, democracies in both Japan and Germany, and a great deal of that is because of our foresight in putting together what we do after victory. And there is no question in my mind that the United States, either alone, hopefully with other coalition partners should this come to pass, could decisively defeat the Iraqi forces. But I pride myself being somewhat of a student of history and know that planning for the aftermath of a successful military action is very important. Clausewitz's maxim said that in strategy it is imperative not to take the first step without considering the last, so let me ask you these—really there is really one question, Mr. Secretary, but I will split it into two parts.
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What preparations are being made now for the administration of Iraq after Saddam falls and for the longer-term transition to a more permanent government? The second part of the question is what is the level of diplomatic and military commitment to be made to Iraq after Saddam falls and particularly, what is the estimate of American troops needed to ensure stability for the first year, or in the long term, or both? In other words, what does the future hold for us once victory is achieved?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman Skelton, that is, of course, an exceedingly important question, and it is one that the President and the National Security Council have given a good deal of thought to. If the President were to decide that some action were necessary with respect to Iraq, there is no doubt in my mind but that the effort would be undertaken with partners, as in a coalition, as you raised in your question.
I feel the same way about a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, that it would be clearly a coalition, conceivably a U.N. role, but it would require over a period of time some military forces while that country transitioned from a repressive and vicious dictatorship to something notably different from that.
On the one hand, there is broad agreement with those that have been discussing this question that Iraq should be a single country and not be broken up into pieces; second, that it should be a country that does not have weapons of mass destruction, a country that does not attempt to impose its will on its neighbors, a country that is respectful of the fact that it is ethnically diverse and is not a central government that would repress minorities in that country.
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The numbers of troops that it would take in the early period I don't think it is probably useful to discuss in this forum. It is interesting to go back to the Gulf War. The Iraqi army demonstrated its attitude about Saddam Hussein when 70 or 80,000 members of the Iraqi army surrendered and changed sides almost instantaneously within a matter of days, some hundreds surrendering to single soldiers because they have no great respect for their leadership in that country.
The going to the next step and beginning to talk about democracy or things like that is a step I can't go, because it seems to me that what is important is in that transition period it would be important for the Iraqi people in Iraq and people—Iraqis from outside Iraq who have been persecuted to participate in fashioning what would follow, and clearly it has to be something that would be not a dictatorship and would be respectful of minority rights in the country and the rule of law and respect for his neighbors.
What that template might be is beyond my task, and clearly it is something that the President and the Secretary of State, the Department of State and other countries in the coalition would be thinking through.
But the answer to your last portion of your question as to whether or not the United States would have to make a military in the short run and a diplomatic and humanitarian and reconstruction effort in the longer term, the answer is ''Yes, one would.'' One doesn't change what is without recommending something better.
The difference between this and Afghanistan, however, is that this is a country that has large oil revenues. So from a financial standpoint, it is an easier problem for the international community than a country that has been devastated by decades of conflict and does not have oil revenues to help buoy it up and bolster its recovery.
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Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished gentleman from Utah, Mr. Hansen.
Mr. HANSEN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the comments by the Secretary and the General.
Mr. Skelton hit on a very tantalizing question there. What is going to happen if that does occur, who fills the void. It makes you wonder if there is someone in the wings there to do it like we saw in Iran, back in that era. We have seen in other nations that somebody is waiting to do it.
The question that I would kind of be curious about is also there is always a question there is another nation that feels that we brought her to her knees and now we can take over. You know, that is a very volatile area, and there has been some very tremendous battles between Iraq and Iran before, and I would wonder how the Administration would look at a situation, wondering if the southern nation of Iran would say, ''No, well, now, here is our chance,'' and how you would handle that?
I guess you have possibly answered part of that when you said yes, it would require a military presence at that particular point just to make sure that didn't occur.
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You know, a lot of us on this committee get awfully tired of our military being in Korea for 50 years and Kosovo and Bosnia, and it just seems how do you ever get out of these places, how do you do that?
And the second thing I would be curious to know, having been to the Prince Sultan Air Base a couple of times, what would be the reaction of the Saudis? I have read a few things that they have kind of said they would be willing to let us use that base. I would kind of like to hear it from your mouth.
Secretary RUMSFELD. First, with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo, we have been pulling our forces down over the past couple of years fairly significantly. We have been doing it with our NATO partners and partnership-for-peace countries that have been participating, and the way you end something is to decide you do not want to be there permanently, and we know that we covet no other country's land. We are not looking to occupy any country. Our goal is to be helpful and then go about our business. The way you do that in the case of Kosovo and Bosnia has been to help build up the civil side, and what we are going to have to do in Afghanistan is see a lot more international support on the humanitarian side and the civil works side so that the security situation will continue to improve.
In the case of Iran, the small clique of clerics that are running that country I think have their hands full right now. They have a lot of foment in that country. People are unhappy, and women and young people are putting pressure on the leadership. And while one has to be attentive to all the things that could conceivably happen, I think that the likelihood of what you have suggested is somewhat less than modest.
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Saudi Arabia speaks for itself. They have said what they have said. Every utterance publicly and privately that I have heard in the last several weeks have been increasingly—what is the word?—friendly, supportive, measured. They live in the neighborhood. Saddam Hussein has a vastly more powerful army than Saudi Arabia does. He has weapons that Saudi Arabia does not have. He threatened Saudi Arabia when he was invading Kuwait, and so they have been measured, but I would characterize, in answer to your question, their public and private comments as recognizing a good number of the things that I have characterized here today.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, General Myers, thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. Secretary, you have described yourself as a skeptic on the efficacy of inspections. Let me make a case, though, for what inspections did achieve, at least in the first half of the 1990s, when UNSCOM was there. They uncovered and dismantled 40 nuclear research facilities, including three uranium enrichment facilities and a laboratory scale plutonium separation plant. That was in the mid-1990s. As late as May of 2000, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found and destroyed an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge which was stored in Jordan, and they also removed a lot of reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated.
On the chemical weapons side, they uncovered and destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals and 426 pieces of production equipment. There is still a lot of stuff unaccounted for, but that is a pretty substantial record there. It is at least worth the effort.
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As to biological weapons, the issues are more unresolved, but it is my understanding that they found about 19,000 liters of botulin, 8,400 liters of anthrax, 2,000 liters of aflatoxin. They monitored 86 sites. They dismantled one south of Baghdad. They destroyed some biological bombs and some biological missile warheads, and as to missiles, they were able to identify and account for 817 of 819 Soviet-delivered SCUDs, and they destroyed the SCUDs that they were still able to find in the inventory. They speculate that there may be anywhere from 40 and 80 additional SCUDs that they have been able to cobble together, but that is still a pretty substantial record of success, too.
And with respect to other means of discovering these facilities, if you look at what happened in the Persian Gulf War, we launched 2,400 sorties looking for SCUD missiles. We saw 42 launched plumes. We launched eight preemptive strikes. We didn't take out a single one in the boost phase. So we actually accomplished something here with inspections that we weren't able to do with active combat means.
If inspections are robust, if they are fully backed by the Security Council, unfettered, don't you think there is still something to be accomplished? And in particular, this concerns me. We don't know for sure what they have in the way of biological agents, and we aren't sure how robust their VX—their dusty VX, persistent VX might be. Wouldn't it be worthwhile before we launch an attack and send our young men and women in harm's way if we could get into that country and ferret out and find some of these final stocks so that they won't be used against us?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, first, let me say that no one with any sense rushes into war. It is something that everyone thinks through very, very carefully. And that is why the President has not made a judgment as to precisely what he believes needs to be done. He has laid out the problem and he is looking for ways that it can be dealt with.
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You are right about inspections. There is no question but that the inspectors found large numbers of chemical and biological weapons and they found significant nuclear activities. It is also true that when they finished, they came up with a list of things that were unaccounted for that they had had reason to believe existed but they could not find, no matter how long they spent—years. And they tried. And it was a significant amount of chemical and biological capability they could not find.
Now, the Iraqi nuclear program which exists today proceeded at a pace while the IAEA was actually doing their job. And it is a very difficult job to do because, as I said earlier, an inspection regime is designed to work with a cooperative country that has made a decision that they want to actually confess and have the things known, and they work with them. A good deal of what the inspectors found was not because the Iraqi regime was working with them; it was because defectors came outside the country and cued them as to places they could look. And, of course, a couple of the most important defectors who came outside the country were sons-in-laws who went back into the country and were later assassinated by Saddam Hussein. So it is—no one ought to think that inspections don't have a role. And in my opening remarks I indicated I believe they could. The question is, under what circumstances, with what countries, and after what kind of a decade-long record ought one to put their faith in those?
Now, is it conceivable that someone could—of course, the goal is not inspections; the goal, as you point out, is disarmament. Is it possible that you could have a sufficiently intrusive inspection approach that would enable you to disarm that country if the same regime was in there and was determined to try to prevent you from doing that? At that point it is something other than inspectors. It is so intrusive and so powerful that it has the ability to enforce itself. And, of course, that kind of force people generally call something other than inspectors. But——
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Mr. SPRATT. I think it is important to note the UNSCOM inspectors not only discovered and uncovered, they did destroy what they came up with.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly. No question about it. As you know, the UNSCOM inspection regime is not what exists today. What exists today in UNMOVIC is a series of backtracking off of that because Saddam Hussein says well, you can't go to—you could only inspect military installations, and that puts most of the country off base—you can't do that. And put in restrictions. You had to give notice. And furthermore, they have had another decade to—another period of years to bury under the ground. They now have massive tunneling systems. They have mobile biological capabilities. They have been developing unmanned aerial vehicles, which are worrisome. They have got all kinds of things that have happened in the period when the inspectors had been out. So the problem is greater today and the regime that exists today in the U.N. is one that has far fewer teeth than the one you were describing.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Hefley.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary. You did a wonderful job I think of anticipating a lot of our questions and laying it out. And I appreciate that. We know Saddam Hussein is a bad guy, a terrible guy, probably a psychopath, but I don't know that anyone has said he is stupid.
Do you have any hope at all that if there is renewed pressure by the United States and the United Nations through resolutions or whatever, that the guy is going to say—you know, it has been my sense that his bottom line is he wants to stay in power. He knows what we can do to him. Do you have any hope at all that he will say, well, I got to take another course if I am going to stay in power, this isn't working?''
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Secretary RUMSFELD. As long as he has options, he will certainly take the best options he can find. And it seems to me that it is the task—and the President put it before the international community—that the task for the international community, if we want the United Nations to be relevant and their resolutions recognized as having some specific density, then what we have to do is to demonstrate to that regime that they don't have a lot of options other than disarming. And you know, is it possible he could wake up one morning and decide he wants to go live with Baby Doc Duvalier or Idi Amin or one of the former dictators of the world or some country of choice? Who knows? He clearly won't do that of choice.
If his next best choice is to stay there and acquiesce in everything that is requested of him, he has certainly given no indication of that in his background. And you are quite right, he is not stupid. I have met him and talked to him and spent time with him. And he is a survivor, and he is a brutal, vicious dictator.
Mr. HEFLEY. Would you comment as far as you can in an opening hearing on the strength of their military at this point? I guess I have—well, Bill Clinton said the other night on the Letterman show, he thought a couple weeks of bombing, a week of ground forces, and it would be over. I don't know if we can be that optimistic.
One of the things I had concern about is that the—if we attack him, he showed in the Persian Gulf War that he will send missiles to Israel—if he sends dirty bombs to Israel, we know he has them, we know he has the capability of delivery. If he does that, I don't think we restrain Israel this time and they will just back off and say, ''Well, we will take it.'' Maybe they will. And then what does that do to our situation there in the whole Middle East? Do we have the capability do you think of hitting him hard enough, fast enough, and in the right places to see that he is incapable of doing that kind of thing?
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How strong—I understand that the Republican Guards, that he fairly recently has purged their leadership, they are not too keen on him either, so that might not be a great strength for him this time. But we hear so many things that I don't know what is true and what is not.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, we have to begin questions like that, of course, with the fact that the President has made no recommendation at this stage with respect to using military force in Iraq. He has said what he has said.
There is no question but that Saddam Hussein's military capability today is less than it was during Desert Storm, and is also no question but that the capability of the United States is considerably greater than it was during Desert Storm in terms of lethality. And there is also no question but that, as General Myers said, the United States is capable of doing those things that the country decides it would like it to do.
With respect to Israel, there is no question but that Iraq's neighbors, were there to be a conflict, would have a degree of vulnerability. And there is also no question but that would probably not last for a very long time, that they would be vulnerable. And there is also no doubt in my mind that it would be in Israel's overwhelming best interest not to get involved.
General Meyers.
General MYERS. Let me just add a couple of things to that. His ground forces are roughly about half of what they were a decade ago. He has got 23 divisions today, of which 6 are Republican Guard. You never know for sure, but the reports are that the morale is low, particularly in the Regular Army units, higher in the Republican Guard units because the regime pays more attention to those units. He has got about 300 combat aircraft of which less than half are mission-capable on any given day, and from what we can tell from reactions to some of our reconnaissance vehicles, not very tactically adept.
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In terms of the threat that the forces there would present to Israel, clearly that would be in the missile regime. And to not address Mr. Congressman Spratt's comment on that, but to just make one little comment, I think we are much better today because of some of the things I said in my opening statement: In terms of our command and control and communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance will be much more effective in thwarting that threat to Israel today.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome the Secretary and General Meyers this morning.
You know, we have huge responsibilities as we listen to all this testimony, whether it is classified or in open hearing, and as we listen to the experts, sometimes it gets to be a little confusing to try to sort out all this testimony. In my district, they quite often show me a statement that was made by General Zinni back in Florida when he was speaking to a group, when he said, ''Most of us who have either fought in a war, have worn the uniform, do not want to go to war, but those that wear the civilian clothing are eager to go to war.''
I am just wondering if there is something much deeper in today's information that we do not have, because when we get that resolution, this is going to be very serious business when we vote on it.
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And I can remember when President Reagan was here and we decided to expand the time of the troops in Lebanon, I voted for it. And then we had 245 Marines who died. I mean, this is very, very serious business; and we are trying to picture that to be sure that whatever we do, that we make the right decision.
Another thing that my constituents ask me, will this escalate? And for the first time if we do that, if we attack Iraq, are we going to begin to see suicide bombers within the United States because we don't have the right intelligence? We know that there are cells in the United States. And these are the things that we have to sort out.
I want to make the right decision. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can ask the general, whom I have a lot of respect for, to come and testify before this committee because we have huge responsibilities.
Maybe, Mr. Secretary, you can elaborate a little bit on this.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. It is an important question. And you can find generals and admirals on every side of these issues. You can find civilians on every side of these issues. Oversimplifying it, I think, is a disservice. And it seems to me that anyone with any sense at all would approach the subject of using military force with a great deal of caution, with a great deal of care to the things that can go wrong. And there are any number of things that can happen and go wrong.
To go directly to your question, which was something like if we were to engage in a military effort in Iraq again, is it conceivable that that could stimulate terrorist attacks and suicide bombers and the like? I think we learned from September 11th that we don't have to go to war with Iraq to stimulate suicide bombers. They are already there. They attacked us. They killed over 3,000 people. And it wasn't because we went to war with Iraq. It was because they decided that that is what they wanted to do. And that there are thousands of those people that were trained in Afghanistan and other countries spread across this globe who were financed by people who think it is good to finance people to kill Americans and other people.
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So I think that it would be fundamentally wrong to assume—that there would be a cause and effect, because we have already seen the effect without the cause. And there is no question free countries are vulnerable to people who are willing to give their lives to kill innocent men women and children. That is the world we are living in. The thing that is critically different today is this nexus between terrorist states that have weapons of mass destruction and have relationships with terrorist networks. And suddenly the people who are not deterrable, the people who are suicide bombers, to use your phrase, only have not conventional capability potentially, but unconventional capability and the ability to pose enormous destruction on innocent people.
So I would like to add one comment on Mr. Spratt's question on inspections if I might take this moment. There is no question but that Iraq went to school on the inspectors, and the longer they were there, the more they found how they worked and what they did, and developed the ability to use more underground, more tunneling, burying more weapons in different locations, using many, many multiple locations, hundreds as opposed to one or two or three locations. And it is a moving target I think it is safe to say.
I should also add to Mr. Skelton: Congressman, I am reminded that the Department of State has had a Future of Iraq Project effort going forward, and they would be the Department that obviously would be able to give you a greater granularity on that.
General MYERS. Could I chime in a little bit for Congressman Spratt? I would like to tag along with what the Secretary said. I think another way of saying that is that Iraq over the last decade has become a master, a regime—a master of deception. As he said, they have gone underground, they have gone mobile, they combine their biological and chemical weapons production with legitimate facilities, making it very difficult to sort out one from the other because they can convert so quickly.
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I think we found out when we had U.N. inspectors over there that very often inspectors would come to the front door, and out the back door went the evidence. We know that as well. So it is going to make this problem of discovery just very, very difficult.
Mr. SPRATT. I simply want to make two points. One is what they did accomplish shouldn't be diminished, particularly in the early part of their efforts. It is substantial. And second, they need to be backed up if they are going to be put back there. There might be some advantage to sending them back there robustly to try to ferret out, particularly the VX and the biological weapon agents that we might see thrown against us if we later invade.
Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a fair comment. I mean, those are issues one has to put on the balance. The potential advantage is that you are characterizing that they are not nothing, they are something that isn't trivial, and balance it against the attitude of the regime and the determination of the regime, which is for us to not have knowledge of what it is they are doing. If there is anything that is clear, that is it. And second, the fact that time is passing, and how much time, how many years, does one want to allow to pass given the progress that is being made with respect to their weapons programs?
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. And, Mr. Secretary, we had the inspectors in front of us. The essence of their testimony was in the early years, when we had a virtual occupation of the country, they were acquiescent, and that is when we made the fairly major finds. But then in the later years, the only person there when they got to these facilities, the vast majority, was the piano player. There was nobody else there. And that they were met by the Iraqi bureaucracy at over 1,200 of these facilities, with nothing inside. They were virtually hollow inspections.
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Nonetheless, I think this is an area that our members are very, very interested in. And the gentleman has spent a couple hundred hours on this issue, the fine gentleman from New Jersey Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on the Chairman's comments, Mr. Secretary, last week we hosted before the committee Dr. David Kay, who is the former United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq, and Dr. Richard Spertzel, who is the former head of the biology section of the inspection team. And the message was unmistakably one of frustration; of inability to get the cooperation of the Iraqis; of experiences like being made to wait in parking lots for days, and then to be turned away from a facility; and just a general notion that at least the inspection effort that was made in the nineties was unsuccessful, to the point of finally being ejected from the country.
So that is a frustration which we talked about at length with Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, and then asked them what it would take to be successful in a future effort at such an inspection. And they said that without the total cooperation of the Iraqi Government, that it would be next to impossible to do; and with a team many times the size of the team that was previously in Iraq, with those two conditions, perhaps it would be successful.
Now, I heard—with everyone else, I observed the events of recent days when the Iraqi Foreign Minister wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations. And forgive me for being skeptical, but I read this letter, and I would just like to read the two—what I think are the operative paragraphs.
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Paragraph 2 says: ''I am pleased to inform you''—to the Secretary—''of the decision of the Government of the Republic of Iraq to allow the return of United Nations weapon inspectors to Iraq without conditions.''
And then several paragraphs later it says: ''To this end, the Government of the Republic of Iraq is ready to discuss the practical arrangements necessary.''
I guess this is kind of symptomatic of the problem. The problem is in one paragraph we use the words ''without conditions,'' and several paragraphs later we have to talk about the ''arrangements.'' So I guess I am asking you for your take on this. Is this the same kind of thing that we ran into in the last inspection effort already in the invitation to come?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I asked Secretary Powell about that—who has been dealing, of course, with the United Nations—about it, and I asked him this morning. And his view was that it is very obviously a tactical step on their part and not a straightforward without-conditions approach.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you for that. I wanted to just verify that I was reading the words and interpreting them as you did.
Let me ask another question. Going back years, we know that the Soviet Union was successful in developing a whole array of weaponized diseases known as biological weapons. They ranged from anthrax and smallpox, which are familiar terms to us, to weaponization of plague and tularemia and Marburg and many others diseases. Do we know to what extent the Iraqis have been able to borrow technology from others, perhaps including the Soviet Union or the Russians, today—or others, or former Soviet States? And to what extent is this program developed in Iraq?
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Secretary RUMSFELD. That really is a subject I would prefer to have asked of the Intelligence Community and in closed session. But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They have taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they have a range of choices with respect to it.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you for coming, Mr. Secretary and General Meyers.
Mr. Secretary, there is not a single thing that you have said today that I disagree with. In fact, I think based on history and the element of surprise that was attained first by the Israelis in 1967 and then by the Egyptians and the Arabs in 1973, I would even add the element that since we as a Nation are talking about going to war—and it is obviously being carried on a daily basis on all the cable networks—that we as a Nation should not rule out a preemptive strike on the part of the Iraqis, particularly an act of terror against our citizens for all the reasons that you outlined.
To quote you, ''We should anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happen.'' With that in mind, there are two questions that I would like to hear you address.
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Number one, half of our forces were in the Guard Reserve for the Gulf War. One of the things President Bush, then-President Bush did, correctly, was almost a total mobilization of the Guard Reserve for the military factors that were involved, and also because in my opinion it made it clear to the American people that this is everybody's war. It is not the poor draftee from across town, like Vietnam. It is everybody's war.
And I happen to—having served in Congress and saw the mood shift of the American people, that is when the signs went up in front of the city halls and the county courthouses, ''The following people from St. Louis, the following people from Waveland, proudly served in the Gulf War.''
I think if we are talking of war, I think there has to be a mobilization of the Guard Reserve prior to that vote, because we had best expect the Iraqis to act either prior to that vote or immediately after that vote.
Second thing, Mr. Secretary, I just had a conversation with one of the senior chiefs from the New Orleans Fire Department. New Orleans, by southern regions, is a huge city, and yet that huge city by southern standards has only 18 people trained in chemical and hazardous material. I am talking about a huge city by southern standards. One of the things that this House voted very strongly on in just the past couple of weeks was the desire to have a weapons of mass destruction civil support team in every state. We now have, I believe only 30, in the process of 30. It is my understanding that——
Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will suspend, we will accommodate your question here. Let me just let colleagues know we have got a vote coming up, but we intend to continue the hearing through the vote. And, Mr. Hefley, if you could go vote early perhaps and come on back, we will continue to hold the hearing. We will have some continuity. I believe it is only one vote. Staff, correct me if I am wrong.
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Go ahead, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the House voted almost unanimously for a weapons of mass destruction civil support team in the National Guard in every State to be the first responders, to have the training and the equipment to help out what are in many instances volunteer fire departments in this—almost every instance, underfunded fire and police departments to respond to what we know is eventually going to happen, just as you laid out very well.
My question to you is, sir, why is your legislative shop over on the Senate side telling them that we don't need one of these in every state? And this comes from conversations that we have had with Senator Levin's staff and others.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Two comments on your questions and your statements. My understanding is that a study was made and the number of these chemical-biological elements units that were needed was calculated, and it was something less than 50. It was something less than one for each state. And it was based not on historical state lines, but it was based on population centers and geography and the ability to move these things around where needed.
The counter to that was that some people said, well, every state ought to have one. And they did not have a similar study that said that the additional cost would provide a benefit that merited that cost. And when one is looking at the difference between shipbuilding and the difference between chemical-biological units and antiterrorists and force protection and all of those things, they tend to make calculations about where those funds can be best invested.
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Now, that is not to say that any state can't have one themselves, if they want one themselves. They can do it. But at the moment, in terms of priorities, the plan, the study that went forward, I am advised, reflected the best judgment of the people who understand these things as to how the coverage of our country could be best employed.
Second, with respect to Reserve forces and the National Guard, you are quite right, they represent an enormous fraction of our total capability. And you are also quite right that they were activated in large numbers in the Gulf War.
Clearly, all the discussion about the President coming to the Congress and seeking a resolution, the President going to the United Nations, helping them understand the circumstance, security circumstance we are in takes away any strategic surprise for Saddam Hussein. He is going to be watching what happens and making his calculations and his judgments. That does not mean that you have lost all tactical surprise, but you certainly have lost a strategic surprise, so to speak.
I disagree completely that there should be a complete activation prior to a vote in the Congress. I mean, we already have 70,000 reservists activated and we already have 20,000-plus people on stop losses who are not leaving the service. And we have got a very sizable force. And there is no question but that we would have to activate the Reserves for various functions and the National Guard, depending on what decisions are made. But I think it would be a fundamental mistake to think that it had to precede some kind of a vote.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, if I could, you made allusion to the Dark Winter scenario study done by Senator Nunn and others. One of the things it talked about was simultaneous biological attacks on a number of cities. One of the things that my friend from New Jersey has pointed out as recently as September 11th of last year, when the attacks occurred in New York and his home State of New Jersey asked for one of those weapons of mass destruction teams from other states to participate, the answer from the Governors was ''No, we are going to take care of our own.''
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As you so correctly pointed out, do we have to wait to be burned before we address this? Even if we started to, those teams aren't ramped up for at least 18 months to 2 years. But a journey of 61,000 miles starts with a single step. We have to start now.
If you really believe that the Iraqis possess these weapons of mass destruction and have the intention to use them, why do we delay a single day in ramping up these teams so that every state has some degree of protection and every state has some degree of training and we know that the responders don't themselves die when they go to find out what happened? At least they have the equipment. Because I think it is safe to say that if there were only 18 chemical-biological suits in the city of New Orleans, I doubt there are 18 chemical-biological suits in the entire State of Mississippi.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Correct me if I am wrong, but is this a Department of Defense-controlled matter or is it Homeland Security?
General MYERS. I think there are pieces in both places. If I—the only thing I recall for first responders I think is, as Governor Ridge has said, first responders should be the civilians, and then we fold in where they cannot handle the task. And I think that is the policy.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, with all due respect, this is an attack on the American people. It is not a flood, it is not a tornado.
Second thing is, the cities are not equipped for this. The city of New Orleans has over 1 million people. They have got 18 hazardous material suits and the people who know how to respond to this, 18 out of 1 million. And they are better prepared than most cities in the South. This is a national defense priority. I would certainly hope that you all would make it a national defense priority. And let's not wait to be burned before we respond to it.
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General MYERS. I think, Congressman, one of the things that the Department has done that is going to be really important in this area is to stand up the new Northern Command, because that is exactly one of the things they have got to address, is the planning and the training and so forth. So those requirements could change over time, no question about that.
Mr. TAYLOR. I ask that you keep an open mind on this, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. I know this is an important issue and would have to—maybe a follow-up briefing for Mr. Taylor on this. But Mr. McHugh has been waiting to ask his question. We have a few minutes left before the vote.
Secretary RUMSFELD. I will get back to you on that.
Mr. HUNTER. I will get back to Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, welcome; and General Myers, thank you for your service. As has been mentioned here a number of times, it is very difficult to talk about this issue in the open session. All of us have had the opportunity for briefings and I would hope all of us, or certainly most of us, have taken those.
But I get a bit concerned when I hear about, as you noted, Mr. Secretary, the fact that somehow the public record does not in any way justify, legitimatize, or give cause for what we all hope never comes about, and that is military intervention. And I just want to say to those in the audience—and I hope the two active participants in the hearing, in an informal nature earlier, as well take the chance to read your written testimony, Mr. Secretary; because in a very clear way, as you can do so well, it spells out things not off the record—not that we have to make conclusions about or guesses—but the things this regime has done, particularly vis-a-vis the United Nations, that really gives, I think a rational person little reason to think that we have many options left.
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My father had a couple of sayings. One was, ''Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice, shame on you.'' That is a popular one. I am not sure what the hell ''Fool me 16 times'' means, and I hope we don't find out what ''Fool me 17 times'' means.
The other saying he had—and he would use it towards Saddam Hussein if he were still with us—people like that have a motto: ''Play ball with me, and I will stick the bat up your nose.'' He wouldn't say ''Nose,'' but I will clean that up.
It just seems to me that, as I mentioned, the options are becoming less. But let me get off the editorial comment and go to a question. I would be interested, either Mr. Secretary or General Meyers, to the extent you can tell us—in Afghanistan, obviously, we had a very active surrogate army in the Northern Alliance involved there. There has been a lot of discussion about the dissident groups, whether they get along or do not get along; the Kurds, the Shiites, et cetera, in Iraq. To what extent would our military action, if it comes about, be predicated upon their involvement, relied upon, their advancement as it was in Afghanistan?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, let me start by saying that the Iraqi people are repressed and are being subjugated by that regime. There is no doubt in my mind that the overwhelming majority are anxious to be liberated and be free of that regime. There are Iraqis inside that country by the thousands who feel that way. There are Iraqis outside that country by the thousands who feel that way. There are people in Iraq today who clearly would be helpful, not as well organized in many instances as in the case in Afghanistan, and there are people outside the country who are anxious to be helpful.
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I would prefer not to get into numbers, and it would be a notably different situation than Afghanistan, but there is no question but that there would be Iraqis who would be helping to liberate their own country.
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just a follow-up. General Meyers, I want to make sure that I understand, because this is for the record, are you actually contending that this Northern Command is going to take over the responsibility for the Nation with respect to terrorist attacks in local communities and first response?
General MYERS. No, absolutely not. That is not what I intended at all. I just said that the roles of the Department of Defense do not change with the stand-up of Northern Command. But for once we will have a command with a commander that will worry about the planning and training for support to lead federal agencies or civil agencies or state agencies in responding to disasters, be they natural or be they terrorist disasters. That is all I said. We will have a command to help find the balance that Congressman Taylor was talking about.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How is that going to be any different from what is required by the Joint Forces Command right now, other than the fact that you are going to spend $300 million to put it together, just to get it started, so it can start worrying?
General MYERS. I think it is having one person in charge of it. Right now in the Department of Defense you have several people in charge of this. I think putting one person that says, that is my job, to protect the American people.
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Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are answering my question by saying that person is going to be in charge. Are they or are they not? The question here is the practical realities involved. Is the Department of Defense going to participate in some way other than consulting? Is the Northern Command supposed to consult with the 50 States? We are already on our way to doing this. The President has already said, or is in the process or has vetoed the supplemental bill that we put forward to try and fund some of these things. Now you have got to make a decision. I don't think you need this Northern Command. I would like to see the $300 million go into financing what Representative Taylor was talking about, so responders can do this under the National Guard all across the country. How is the setup of the Northern Command supposed to aid and assist in one iota what Representative Taylor was putting forward?
General MYERS. I will go back to my original comments, Congressman. Right now in the Department of Defense there are several entities that are responsible for whatever it is the Department of Defense is going to be asked to do to respond to either, as I said, natural disasters or chemical or biological or nuclear attack. What we want to do—and we have one entity, then, that is responsible for their defense.
What we want to do is put that responsibility under one command. We think the situation has changed sufficiently; the strategic environment has changed sufficiently not just since September 11th. This is an issue that goes back, as you remember, Congressman——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are the local forces to be in charge, General, or is the Northern Command supposed to be in charge of I guess, national civil defense?
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General MYERS. As I said, the roles of the Department of Defense will not change; in most cases will be in support of lead Federal agencies or other civil agencies, be they State or even more local.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Department of Defense does not intend to fund in any way, shape, or form all of these requirements at the local level.
General MYERS. I don't know what requirements you are talking about.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. You know, the requirements we are talking about is to be able to respond to a terrorist attack, which you contend has to have a Northern Command in order to respond.
General MYERS. The Department is certainly going to fund the parts of that that are the responsibility of the Department and——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It will fund the Northern Command so that you will have this gigantic new bureaucracy set up initially, drawing on apparently overstaffed other commands, because that is where you are getting the people from. So all the commands now must be overstaffed, because you are able to bring in apparently hundreds of people——
General MYERS. Congressman, when we stand this new Northern Command up—I may have to correct this record—my recollection is it will be the smallest command that we have in the United States Armed Forces. It will be the smallest. As you said, we are not adding people to this. We are taking people from other staff reductions that have been mandated by Congress. By the way, that 15 percent cut—we are going to take the manpower from those positions and put some of those, not all of them, of course, but some of those in this new Northern Command headquarters.
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Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are they going to do?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me leap in here, if I may, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. By all means, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary RUMSFELD. The Unified Command Plan allocates responsibilities throughout the world. Heretofore, we have not had certain portions of the world covered by a unified or specified commander. They included Russia, the United States, Mexico, Canada, and some other portions, water portions of the world. As we proceeded, we decided that given the changes in the world, we should allocate every portion of the globe to a commander and a command.
The cost for this command is going to come out of other commands. And the idea that it is going to be $300 million and a bunch of people milling around wasting money is just not going to be the case.
Second——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Despite the fact—excuse me, Mr. Secretary—that is the way it is proposed right now in the Joint Forces Command budget.
Secretary RUMSFELD. What I said is correct. The change—the role of the Department of Defense will not change with respect to the United States of America in this important sense: We are not asking that posse comitatus be changed. We are not suggesting that we go into a role where we are the principal, and other states—state, federal, local agencies support us. We would be functioning as we have in the past, in a supporting role.
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The general was exactly correct when he said that at the present time we have got NORAD that functions in a supporting role to some extent. We have got DOMS. The Army manages a whole host of things. We had 5- or 6,000 people at Salt Lake City for the Olympics.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All of which exists, Mr. Secretary, without a Northern Command, and apparently functioned very well; unless you are saying they have not done a good job to this point.
See, what I am trying to say, Mr. Secretary, is actually we are doing a good job. I can tell you, Hawaii is only one part of the 50-State picture which is doing an excellent job of preparing for this, and they have excellent relationships, like with General Smith and the 25th out in Hawaii. The Department of Defense is very well represented and the coordination is already there. What they need is support. And they don't need another command to come in on top of this.
And the question has yet to be answered whether this Northern Command will in any way, shape, or form support what is already being accomplished in all 50 states. How is it to support it other than by standing there nodding its head?
Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess I don't know what you mean when you say how it will support all the things that are already being done so well by the 50 states. Any state can do what it wants. Any city can do what it wants. They can have their fire department. They can have chemical-biological outfits.
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Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are they going to pay for what is required of them under the kinds of scenarios that are outlined, which are likely to occur if we go to war with Iraq?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Who pays is a function of what the Congress and the executive branch decide—whether it is a federal responsibility. If so, which department or agency, which state or local governments have to do what? That is a mix the Congress and the executive branch sorts out every year as they make their decisions.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fair enough. Thank you.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. Let me also thank you for what I consider a very clear and persuasive statement that effectively deals with a lot of the questions that are on our minds, as well as issues that are swirling around there.
As you were talking I was reminded of a story line in a television program, I don't even know if it is still on, but the main character would get a newspaper delivered to his door at the beginning of the program, and in that newspaper it would have a story of a tragedy which was going to occur two or three days later, and the character's job was to try to prevent the tragedy before the newspaper became reality. It seems to me that is kind of where we are. We know the end of the story; we note the tragedy if we do nothing. The question is how, when, we prevent it from occurring.
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I guess the primary question on my mind—and General Meyers, I may direct this to you—is if the President decides to take military action in Iraq, are we ready? And, in particular, are we ready to have forces in an environment where weapons of mass destruction may be used against them? Maybe not initially, but eventually if things all fall apart, as we think they will for that regime, desperate people use desperate measures. I am concerned we have not given adequate consideration to our troops dealing in that environment for the last decade—not under your watch—but I guess I would ask you, are we ready to deal with that environment and to do what the President orders you to do?
General MYERS. Congressman Thornberry, let me first say that the short answer is ''Yes''. The longer answer is over the past decade, and I would admit earlier in the decade, our capability to deal with weapons of mass destruction for our soldiers and sailors and airmen, marines, coast guardmen was uneven. But, in the last part of this decade, for the majority of it, we have made very good improvements in terms of sensors that detect attacks, in terms of being able to net those sensors together to provide area warning for collective protection, and in the kind of protective suits that our troops wear. So, we have made improvements in all those areas.
And without getting into much more detail, obviously our forces are prepared for that, they train for that, and would be ready to deal with that type of environment.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask you one other question which goes to the issue of can we do both—or the existing war on terrorism as well as this other aspect of the war on terrorism? There are reports today that the command for the existing war on terrorism may be shifting to the special operations folks. Are you able to comment on that? Is that happening and, if so, why; and what you hope to gain by it?
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Secretary RUMSFELD. You are addressing that to me?
Mr. THORNBERRY. Whoever wants to.
General MYERS. I think what is being reflected in the paper—and I haven't read the article, I read the headline and maybe a couple of paragraphs—is the fact that, and the realization, of course, that this is a global war on terrorism. And the combatant commanders, as they are organized today, most of them, the theater ones, are organized on a regional basis. We have some that cross regional countries: U.S. Space Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the current Strategic Command and the new Strategic Command that is proposed to stand up or that will stand up here on 1 October.
Another one of those commands that can look globally is Special Operations Command. It has a global view of things. And for some aspects of the war on terrorism it is useful to have that global view. And without getting to the operational details of that, that is I think what we are seeing. I don't know that this reflects a great change in our strategy. And there are some elements—and again I haven't read the article—but there are some elements that have not been finally decided yet that the Secretary and the rest of the National Security Council will have to decide on. But what we are trying to do is ensure that in a global war we have the kind of view—in some cases a global view is required, because these networks—I mean they don't respect any boundaries, and as we know, they are in over 60 countries—is actually a network, and it has to be addressed kind of in this total.
Secretary RUMSFELD. I skimmed the article and it is fairly typical of articles that are reporting on something that hasn't happened. It wants to be first, not right. And my guess is that when it is sorted through by the Chairman and others and by me and the National Security Council, it will look somewhat different than that article characterized it. But the general is obviously quite right; you have got global problems, and having a global view of that is useful in some instances. But the idea that there is going to be a massive change, and the Special Operations people will in every instance be the supportive CINC or combatant commander is just not the case. They are going to be both, one would think, sometimes supporting and sometimes supportive.
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Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Mr. Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General, for your testimony. Appreciate it very, very much.
Mr. Secretary, can you tell me what you envision a weapons inspection, or perhaps I should call it a disarmament regime in Iraq, how would you envision that? I understand, and agree totally with the notion, that weapons inspections are really not the goal. The goal really is disarmament. How would you envision that? And also, should that vision of disarmament be included in a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for such disarmament?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Those are questions that the President and the Secretary of State have been addressing in the United Nations over the past period and are ongoing, and I have really no idea how what will evolve. There have been a whole series of thoughts about what the U.N. might do, and I know that Secretary Powell is discussing those with people up there. So I guess I am really not in a position to know what either the U.N. will ultimately decide or what the President will ultimately decide with respect to what it looks like the U.N. might be marching toward.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, could we accomplish disarmament, in your opinion, short of declaring war on Iraq? In other words, is there—is there a disarmament strategy that could be accomplished, short of declaring war?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, sure. Saddam Hussein could decide that his future is limited and he would like to leave, and you would have a regime that decided it wished to cooperate with the United Nations with respect to those resolutions. And if you have a regime that does in fact want to disarm, which is what the stipulation is, what the U.N. has said, then obviously, you could have inspectors participate and assist in that project and an international coalition to do it.
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Another way to do it would be to persuade enough people in Iraq that the world would be a lot better world if that regime weren't there and they decided to change the regime. That is another option.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, how would we know we had a regime that really wants to disarm?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, you would have to have enough people from the international community physically in there, disarming them, to know. And you probably wouldn't know for a period of time. But any idea that a regime like the current one would be sufficiently intrusive, which is much less intrusive than the one that existed previously, the one that is currently up there on the drawing boards. I mean you are not going to get people to defect and give you information about where these capabilities are if their families are in Iraq, for example. How could you have a person who has a family in Iraq and relatives walk up to U.N. inspectors, with this regime sitting on top of that power, and say, ''Hey, fellows, here is where you ought to go look? I know this tunnel or that area is an area of opportunity for you.'' They are going to be killed. Their families are going to get killed. It is a tough crowd.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on my friend from Texas, the comments that he made relative to the war against terrorism and the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. And let me first of all congratulate you and the general on the tremendous job that our men and women in uniform have done in Afghanistan. I had an opportunity to travel there to see firsthand the outstanding job that they have done, getting rid of the Taliban and putting al Qaeda on the run. At the same time, I am troubled about reports of various terrorist cells that are still active in that country.
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Indeed, earlier this month, the attempted assassination of President Karzai—terrorists have already killed two ministers. It seems that in the past two or three months, there has been a marked increase in violence, in terrorist activity within Afghanistan. And clearly this terrorism and violence is going to have to be addressed if the new government is to succeed there.
Do you see a need to increase our military presence within Afghanistan in response to this resurgent threat of violence and instability? And, if so, what sort of commitment would that be?
Secretary RUMSFELD. It is not clear to me there has been a marked increase in violence in Afghanistan in recent weeks or months. It tends to be uneven. It spurts for a while, and then it declines. Second, it tends to be geographical. There has been more of it in Kabul, where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is, interestingly. No correlation, but the point being that the existence of the ISAF in Kabul is not an assurance of no violence. But it has tended to be more in the northeast and southeast of Kabul where there has not been a stable set of warlords who have calmed down. There is competition, there is disagreement, it is local.
Second, it is along the Pakistan border, and that is where a lot of al Qaeda and Taliban are. They want to go over the border, and we know that. So that is the worst area, the most difficult area, although even that has been improving and we have got some good news just in the last three or four days there where we are getting tipoffs and what have you.
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I regret to say this, but—thank goodness the assassination attempt against President Karzai failed—but I don't know that in that part of the world we are going to end assassination attempts. I think they have been going on for decades. They went on before September 11th, and it is a dangerous part of the world. What has to happen over time is the security situation is going to be affected by reconstruction, and the countries of the world that promised money have got to step forward and help that country develop the kinds of infrastructure so that they can cope with the millions of displaced persons and refugees who are returning home.
I think the indication that the security situation is not bad is that the refugees are voting with their feet. They are leaving where they were, going in there, and so are the internally displaced people. They are saying, pretty good, things are better than they were. They are better than they were where I was, so I am going to go back where I belong and that is a good thing.
Now, numbers of troops. We are high right now. We are probably up over 9,000. We were averaging 46, 5, 4,600, 5,000, something like that, 5,500, 6,000. We are now in the process of transferring people in, getting people out. Some other coalition countries have been reducing some of their forces in some instances as their forces were stressed.
Secretary RUMSFELD. The ISAF, the Turkish government, fortunately stepped forward and took over for the Brits, but their period comes to an end in December, and we ought not to be looking for someone for ISAF for another six months. We ought to look for somebody for a year, a year and a half, two years, and we would be delighted to have more coalition forces in the country helping.
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Do I think that the United States will have to make large increases? No, I don't. I think that we have got to keep chasing after the al Qaeda, the Taliban that exists in the country; we have got to make life uncomfortable for those in Iran and Pakistan who want to get back in the country; and we have got to support the Karzai government so that that reconstruction takes place and people begin to be convinced that their future is in that country and in that government and in the Loya Jirga process, rather than at the end of a rifle.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Hostettler is going to be the next questioner.
Mr. Secretary, I know you and General Myers have been receiving some messages from your staff. Do you want to take about a five-minute administrative break here to see if there is anything you have to do with your—here? You all set?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Hostettler.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for your att