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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–17]








OCTOBER 21, 2003

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JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado, Chairman
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York

LANE EVANS, Illinois
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GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington

Mary Ellen Fraser,Counsel
Diane Bowman, Staff Assistant
Danleigh Halfast, Staff Assistant



    Tuesday, October 21, 2003, Resetting and Reconstituting the Forces

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    Tuesday, October 21, 2003



    Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee

    Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Readiness Subcommittee


    Cody, Lt. Gen. Richard A., Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army

    Moseley, Gen. T. Michael, Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force

    Mullen, Adm. Michael G., Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

    Nyland, Gen. William L., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps
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[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Cody, Lt. Gen. Richard A.
Moseley, Gen. T. Michael
Mullen, Adm. Michael G.
Nyland, Gen. William L.

[The Documents submitted can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Information Submitted for the Record by Representative Gene Taylor

[The Question and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Ms. Bordallo
Mr. Frank
Dr. Gingrey
Mr. Hefley
Mr. Jones
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller
Mr. Ortiz
Dr. Snyder
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Mr. Taylor


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 21, 2003.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.


    Mr. HEFLEY. I apologize for the lack of members up here. We never know these days when we are trying to wind up a session when the votes are going to be over for the week; and we just had our last votes, which is a good-news, bad-news story. The good news is that we will not be interrupted by votes, and the bad news is that a lot of people are heading for the airplanes as fast as they can go. We apologize for that, but your statements in their entirety will be put in the record, and we look forward to your statements.

    If we could begin, let me just say good afternoon and welcome to the Readiness Subcommittee Hearing on Resetting and Reconstituting the Force. Before we begin, let me welcome the distinguished witnesses and thank all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who they represent for doing such a fantastic job every day. The global war on terrorism will be a long battle; and for that reason, today's hearing topic I think is very significant.
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    Resetting and reconstituting the forces will have different faces. There are issues and challenges facing each service at each phase as it decides what its future combat capability, size, and force will look like. We are focused today on the near-term phase, and that is repairing and replacing necessary equipment and restocking the prepositioned forces to an appropriate readiness level. No near-term objective or goal, however, can be adequately set without a sense of direction for what the long-term objective may be.

    A few weeks ago, the Commander of the U.S. Forces Command testified before the House Armed Services Committee and warned against ''victor's disease,'' he called it. That is focusing on improving the warfighting capabilities to fight the last war instead of anticipating and adopting to the next war.

    I look forward to hearing from each witness what the services' objectives and goals are for resetting the force. I am also interested in what guidance they received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this topic.

    This near-term objective of repairing or replacing equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan will not be easy. The conditions were harsh. The heat, the sand, the operational tempo together resulted in our troops and equipment taking a beating. As an example, the Marine Corps reports that Super Stallion, or CH–53E, has an average of 150 pounds of fine sand throughout the aircraft. These conditions should have been taken into account when the services calculated their upcoming maintenance requirements. I am concerned, however, that this may not be the case for each service.

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    I also hope to touch upon the value and significance of prepositioned equipment. I am interested to what level your prepositioned stock will be refilled and how long this will take. It should not be a surprise that this is a more significant challenge for the Army than the other services. In general, the Army has the greatest challenge in the near term for resetting its force. While all the services have some funding shortfalls, particularly in the procurement accounts, the Army reports a $5.9 billion total shortfall in funding needed to reset its force. Even to reset its top requirements, that is return equipment to prewar condition, there is a $2.7 billion shortfall.

    All the services do have challenges. The Navy's shipyards are at full capacity, leaving no room for error or unknown crises. The Air Force is starting the fiscal year with a $500 million shortfall in depot maintenance, and the Marine Corps still has equipment returning and is faced with the unknown. How bad is the equipment, how long will it really take, and how much funding is really needed?

    Before hearing testimony from the witnesses, let me first turn to my good friend, the Honorable Solomon Ortiz, the Ranking Member on the Readiness Subcommittee.


    Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing today, and I join in welcoming and thanking our distinguished witnesses for their presence here today.
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    I will not take much time with opening remarks, but I do want to share some of my concerns.

    First, I want to express my personal thanks and appreciation for the sacrifices and performance of our military personnel and dedicated civilian employees for what they have done and continue to do for our security of this great Nation. They should know that we are aware and care about the great sacrifices they and their families are making.

    Mr. Chairman, sometimes it is difficult to think about the future when you are bogged down with the issues of today. But it is important that we start thinking beyond where we are today so that we are ready to address the challenges of the future. We all know that the readiness of today's forces did not happen overnight. Neither did it come cheaply. Since I have been a member of this subcommittee, I have witnessed a big improvement in the readiness of our forces. When we hear the testimony of our senior military and civilian leaders, we no longer hear references to becoming like the so-called hollow military of the 1970s. There are few concerns about our ability to achieve a readiness posture to support our military strategy in the 1990s.

    Since 9/11, a substantial portion of the total force has been engaged in high-intensity security and/or combat operations. Some of these activities have taken place in the worst imaginable environments. They have taken a significant toll on both the personnel and equipment.

    It has been interesting to note that the Administration has used a variety of funding mechanisms to provide some resources to replenish and repair equipment and to support the troops. I have been informed that funds were transferred from the emergency war supplemental (IFF) to provide some money to assist in reconstitution. Both the fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 supplementals also contain some funds that will assist in addressing reconstitution concerns. The same is true for some departmental reprogrammings.
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    But my initial belief is that not enough has been done. The total request and realignment does not match today's readiness needs as reported by the services. The significant shortfall in the Army's total force availability is just one example. I believe that is why we had so many amendments related to force protection and comfort items when we were working on the fiscal year 2004 supplemental.

    There are policy issues related to reconstitution and resetting that should drive service procurements of goods and services. For example, we need to understand how did the services determine what capabilities were needed to meet future requirements? What are the priorities within the services for expenditures of the reconstitution funds? What is the capability of the defense infrastructure to respond to the requirement? What are the implications for the civilian force? Do the resources available and planned for the future responsibly respond to the future needs?

    Mr. Chairman, these is just some of the concerns that must be addressed as we focus attention on ensuring future readiness. We know that readiness requires a commitment from the Congress as well as the Department. Without some answers to these questions, it is impossible for Congress to live up to its constitutional obligations in regard to supporting the military.

    I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this hearing will assist us to better understand the Department's plans regarding this important issue; and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the indulgence. Thank you so much.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
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    What I think we will do, if the witnesses agree, is start over here with Admiral Mullen and kind of work our way down the table there. I think it speaks well for our Army that they did not feel that they had to send a full general over but that a lieutenant general could handle all of these guys with your hand tied behind your back. Is that true, General?

    General CODY. We will try to hold on, sir.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Try to hold up the Army's honor?

    Mr. HEFLEY. Admiral, if you would begin.


    Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Congressman Ortiz, other distinguished members of the committee. Good afternoon. I am extremely pleased to testify before you today, along with my service counterparts, on a topic of great importance to our military and to the Nation. With your permission, I would like to make a brief opening statement and submit my written testimony for the record.

    Seven months ago, Admiral Fallon briefed you as the Vice Chief about our record number of surge naval forces, the most capable combat fleet ever, strategically and operationally located where the Nation needs them to be. Now they have begun to return.

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    Reconstituting our forces has been and remains one of Admiral Clark's top priorities. While it has been one of Admiral Clark's top priorities, it is only through the enduring and exceptional support of this committee and Congress over the past few years that we have been able to provide the return on investment to our Nation of unprecedented levels of readiness.

    We are well on track to reconstitute and reset the forces and have clearly identified those areas in both our fiscal year 2003 and 2004 supplemental requests where support is necessary.

    I prefer to talk in terms of force constitution vice reconstitution to place the emphasis on the fact that we will continue to push ahead with our transformational goals for the force of the future; and in order to highlight that, the status quo is not an acceptable end state.

    The near-term piece of constitution which is in the interest of this committee has been defined for us by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as the 03–04 setting the force. OSD provided guidelines and examination criteria, along with a process by which constitution should be developed and assessed. I found that process and was engaged heavily in it to be open, objective and very engaging from beginning to end.

    The OSD criterion included maintaining our ships and aircraft ready to redeploy for a swiftly defeat-the-effort scenario; deterring opportunistic aggression; adhering to U.S. strategy, including continued advances in transformation; and providing flexible support in the continuing global war on terror.
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    Adding Navy evaluation criteria, including a detailed review of logistics, global presence requirements, life-cycle maintenance, and personnel tempo considerations, we continue to place a premium on taking care of the people who serve. We ensure that the Navy will be ready to meet the defense planning guidance by delivering transformational and tailored capabilities. These include Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, and Service Action Groups, consisting of a unique mix of combatant platforms, whether they be cruisers, submarines, amphibs, destroyers, or SSGNs. They will be able to carry out a full range of naval missions and to do so on short notice if required.

    We will be largely completed setting the force in fiscal year 2004 with a combination of funds already appropriated for 2003 and 2004 plus the fiscal year 2004 supplemental. The pending 2004 supplemental request will support a return to readiness for those ships that currently remain forward deployed and may stay on station longer than their normal rotation cycle. Given that the recently-enacted Fiscal Year 2004 DOD Appropriations Act, approved by this Congress, included a $3.49 billion recession to the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF), the Navy anticipates that we will not receive about $185 million of the required expenditure replacements. Therefore, we included those unfunded high-priority items in our fiscal 2004 supplemental request.

    One of my most pressing concerns within the 2004 supplemental is to procure additional EA–6B outwing panels and center wing sections. The EA–6B Prowler is an old airframe, it is a national mission, and the most expensive we have to operate, and it must be retired at the earliest possible time. Its wings are showing signs of fatigue and cracking. It is a low-density, high-demand asset with an average age of 20 years driven to the point where we must replace a total of 54 outer wing panels to maintain necessary inventory levels.
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    Even with an approved fiscal year 2004 supplemental, it would take about 24 months to return these airframes to the required state of readiness.

    In closing, please know now grateful we, the Navy, are for the continued support of this committee. Your efforts helped to bring out the current readiness that was necessary for our present operational success. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) demonstrated that the Navy's future requires both rotational deployments of the past and a robust surge capability. The Navy shares your concerns, and we have a good plan to get there.

    Again, I wish to thank the committee for offering me an opportunity to appear before you today; and I am very happy to answer any questions you may have.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Admiral Mullen.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. HEFLEY. Now General Moseley.


    General MOSELEY. Chairman Hefley and Congressman Ortiz, as we sit here today, thousands of America's best and brightest stand guard around the world in the watchtowers of freedom. None, however, are as dangerous or possibly as important as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just Friday, Osama Bin Laden, the cowardly terrorist, declared that al Qaeda would continue to fight us inside and outside the United States. Additionally, he squarely put our allies—Britain, Spain, Australian, Poland, Japan, Italy, and the Gulf States, particularly Kuwait, also on his target list.
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    Today, Chairman Hefley and Congressman Ortiz, you and your distinguished committee members have asked us to appear to discuss a matter that is serious and important to each of us: how we are going to reconstitute and reset the force. For that I thank you. This issue gets at the very heart of our readiness and our ability to continue the pursuit of these that supported and those that killed Americans in Washington and New York City and Pennsylvania and Afghanistan and in Iraq.

    The Air Force, along with my joint partners, was engaged right from the beginning of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE, from the first F–15 and F–16s to fly over New York City and Washington to the latest close-air support mission, combat search and rescue, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and tanker pilots and air crews who, as we speak, are airborne in defense of our freedom.

    During OPERATIONS ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, your military has answered the call. As a matter of fact, we have been answering the call, as far as the Air Force goes in this region, for the past 12 years; 285,000 sorties over southern Iraq, and 106,000 sorties over northern Iraq in support of U.N. Resolutions allowed us to create a rotational force called the Air Expeditionary Force, or AEF, that is paying benefits today. These 10 AEFs, as many know, allowed us to maintain a high state of readiness and training proficiency while being engaged year-round in the northern and southern no-fly zones. From June, 2001, until March, 2003, the two AEFs slated against this mission were part of the joint and coalition air power team that was engaged 651 times by Iraqi air defenses, including anti-aircraft artillery rockets, surface-to-air missiles. The flare-ups of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq validated the AEF construct and our ability to use it to present the most proficient forces possible to the combatant commander.
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    To accomplish our mission in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the Air Force deployed over 55,000 airmen from our active duty, Guard and Reserve forces. This total force came together seamlessly to provide General Franks with total air and space superiority. It was this aspect that allowed the total joint and coalition team the freedom to attack across all three components—air, land and maritime—while maintaining their freedom from attack.

    This force contributed over 850 aircraft and flew more than 25,000 sorties, almost 30 percent of that being air refueling sorties for the coalition effort.

    In Desert Storm, as an example, we deployed 346 tankers at five locations. For OIF, we deployed 206 tankers at 15 locations, about two-thirds of the airframes but three times as many operating locations.

    In terms of our low-density and high-demand assets, the aircraft deployed almost 70 percent of our total fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, as well as command and control assets. The Rivet Joint and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) fleet have been continually deployed supporting the no-fly zone since August of 1990 but were almost totally dedicated to OIF this spring. Additionally, we deployed 70 percent of our Special Operations Forces. This fixed wing and rotary force had to distribute its limited assets between Iraq, Afghanistan and the horn of Africa.

    Your Air Force moved over three million pounds of explosives, used in excess of 23,000 munitions and shared tons of weapons with our service partners from our fleet of prepositioned ships and storage sites. Your airmen set up or expanded 38 new air bases, including operations out of four airfields inside Iraq and one main base in Afghanistan. This took every Harvest Falcon set that the Air Force had in the inventory, except for the ones slated specifically against the Korean peninsula.
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    The Air Force built two of the most sophisticated high-technology command centers in the history of warfare, with these centers being the crucibles for the entire air operation. We established tactical communications links and provided the majority of satellite communications for the area of responsibility; and we provided base operating support, including harvest stock and shelters and logistics in support of every service and every coalition partner.

    This tremendous feat could not have been accomplished without the efforts of the best young people that this Nation has to offer, whether they were wearing Air Force uniforms, Navy, Marine, Coast Guard or Army. Additionally, this stunning victory could not have been a reality without General Franks' joint and allied team.

    Mr. Chairman, now our number one task is to continue the global war on terrorism while reconstituting this force. This will also take a joint and coalition team. To that end, it is both my honor and privilege to sit with my service counterparts to testify before you this afternoon. Today, you will hear about the importance of successful reconstitution and the resetting of America's Armed Forces. We will discuss the imperatives and impacts of ongoing stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. You will hear how critical a truly reconstituted force operating in a sustainable battle rhythm is to this Nation's finished abilities to project military power throughout globe, and you will hear loud and clear that America's Armed Forces have a plan for this very important task.

    For the Air Force, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff's plan include four main categories: First, resetting the Air Expeditionary Forces into normal battle rhythm. This includes the newly-reopened training schools and our ability to retrain our people and reset the essential key perishable skills; second, restoring our equipment to a combat-effective state required to fight in the future; third, fully incorporating the lessons learned by enhancing existing platforms or integrating technologies that prove valuable; and finally, fourth, equipping forces currently engaged in stability operations with the tools necessary to accomplish the mission.
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    In my written statement, which I respectfully request to be included as part of the official record, I have attempted to specifically address the four key questions that this committee expected us to address. Those questions get right to the heart of our number one reconstitution priority, that is resuming the normal Air Expeditionary Force battle rhythm. To resume this tempo, we must focus on reconstituting capabilities, not just commodities. Beyond just equipment, the Air Force warfighting capabilities will depend on continued emphasis on advanced joint composite force training and maintaining a sustainable battle rhythm for the entire force. Synchronizing these aspects with the equipment reconstitution will certainly ensure our combat readiness.

    While 7.3 of our 10 Air Expeditionary Forces worth of capability are globally engaged this afternoon, resetting and reconstituting this force will be challenging. However, by March, we expect our fighter and bomber force will be ready to resume normal rotations; and we will have completed the repositioning of our war reserve stocks. By March, we also expect that most of our deployable equipment and consumables will be reconstituted.

    Nonetheless, even with our aggressive efforts and the hard work of this committee, our ability to reset certain low-density, high-demand capabilities such as expeditionary combat support, intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance assets and security forces will not meet the March goal due to sustained combat operations and training. It will take the continued hard work and innovations of our airmen to mitigate these delays and ready us as quickly as possible.

    I know we have two more witness statements, but I would like to say that your committee and the Congress' full support and continued work on these issues has not gone unnoticed by America's airmen. We see the sessions that go into the wee hours of the night and the intellectually honest debate and rigorous questioning, we see the passage of the 2003 Iraqi Freedom Fund Bill and the votes on this most recently submitted supplemental, and we thank you.
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    The bottom line is, without these measures, the Air Force could not simultaneously reconstitute the force, support ongoing combat operations, and reset the battle rhythm. It is all made possible by your efforts. I hope that we can continue to count on your support.

    In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your leadership and valuable hands-on support.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, General Moseley.

    [The prepared statement of General Moseley can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. HEFLEY. General Nyland.


    General NYLAND. Thank you, Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

    Let me start by thanking the committee for their continuing and steadfast support for the issues and programs that are of vital importance to your Marine Corps. I would also thank you for including my prepared statement in the official record.
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    I am proud and honored to be here representing the 215,000 Marines, both Active and Reserve, in our Corps today. They are among the finest young men and women America has to offer. Their performance in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in support of the ongoing global war on terrorism has been superb.

    But they clearly did not go it alone. The Marine Corps' forward deployed expeditionary forces and our ability to rapidly deploy forces tailored for a particular mission resulted in a Marine expeditionary force reinforced of some 87,000 personnel, comprised of more than 60,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, including 21,000 United Kingdom, Australian and other forces, a truly joint force that fought a joint coalition fight which spanned 720 miles, from Baghdad to Tikrit, in just 26 days.

    Our success was accomplished through the training, skill and determination of our people, coupled with their equipment, both of which you have steadfastly supported and funded. It was the coordinated, sustained integration of fires, both air and surface, in direct support of the mass maneuver that led to victory. This ability to apply combined arms at the tactical level was key as we integrated our armor, mechanized, dismounted and motorized forces, artillery, organic attack helicopters, fixed-wing close-air support, and our expeditionary logistics to produce a synergistic power and tempo that the Iraqis could not stop.

    Throughout, our training and equipment were clearly superior to that of our opponent; and, again, your role in that cannot be overstated.

    We intend to use our experiences what went well, what did not go so well and the areas that need improvement to guide our future efforts to fine tune and continue the transformation of your Marine Corps. As the Nation's truly forward deployed expeditionary force, in concert with our shipmates of the world's greatest Navy, the relevance, agility and capability of these forces for the Nation's command authority has again been demonstrated in spades.
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    Again, I would thank you for your support and this opportunity to appear here today. I look forward to your questions.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

    [The prepared statement of General Nyland can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. HEFLEY. And now General Cody.


    General CODY. Thank you, Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the readiness of our great Army.

    I ask your consent to make a brief opening statement and insert my detailed version for the record.

    On behalf of our magnificent soldiers, I want to thank the committee for your continued support as this Nation executes its global war on terrorism. Your concern and resolute actions, your deep faith in America's sons and daughters are widely recognized among the rank and file of our service members. Like many parents around this great country, I, too, share a deep interest in your support, as my two sons are serving now in Iraq in the 101st Airborne Division.
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    Today, the Army has over 355,000 soldiers deployed in over 120 countries worldwide. 160,000 of these great soldiers are on 12-month overseas unaccompanied hardship tours, with the vast majority of these 160,000 engaged in combat operations in southwest Asia.

    The Army indeed is on the move. For example, starting in January, the equivalent of ten and a half divisions will be deploying or redeploying from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkan and the Sinai. This includes 127,000 mobilized combat ready National Guardsmen and Army Reserve forces. This will be the largest movement of the United States forces since World War II, and it is an unprecedented movement in our Army's history.

    Despite this high OPTEMPO, we have continued our modernization campaign to meet the challenges of the future fight, as evidenced by the recent deployment of the First Stryker Brigade combat team to Iraq. Our Army is trained, ready and is a dominant land campaign force for our land commanders; and the force behind all of this is the American soldier, the centerpiece of our formation.

    I have recently had the privilege to visit with these great soldiers and commanders two weeks ago in Kuwait and Iraq. They are focused and determined to win the war on terrorism, and they understand their mission and are willing to undertake their role with pride and determination each and every day while being in harm's way.

    What they ask is simple. They want the continued support of the American people, and they know they will have it through the duration of our missions around the world.

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    While I was in Iraq, in Mosul, within the 101st Airborne Division sector, I saw a thriving city back on its feet. People were moving about their daily business; and, most notably, taxicabs were present everywhere.

    In Tikrit with the Fourth Infantry Division, I witnessed the progress our military was making there. The lights were back on, police forces were graduating at a steady rate, and local educational institutions, including three colleges, were back on line and had over 20,000 students.

    In Baghdad, I had the opportunity to visit one of our combat medical units operating in a newly-refurbished Iraqi hospital. Our soldiers were treating both American soldiers and Iraqi citizens side by side on the same floor.

    Before I left for Kuwait, I had a chance to visit with CJTF–7 staff and Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez. Thanks to your continued support, they are doing an absolutely superb job in this dynamic, changing and dangerous environment.

    Our units' and soldiers' success can be attributed to our investment in our combat training centers; and, additionally, our investment in institutional educational programs has prepared our soldiers and leaders for the rigors of combat that we just faced. We have trained our leaders to be a part of a joint warfight and to think asymmetrically and strategically and with agility at all levels, from sergeant through the general officer ranks.

    The Army's system for maintaining a trained and ready force which was forged over the past two decades has provided the basis for our ability to master the transition from war to stability and support operations and back to war when required. We have taken the lessons learned from our combat experiences in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Somalia and the Balkans to develop our past training azimuth and now we are doing the same with lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, all being trained now at our combat training centers. Our combat formations are readying now to deploy to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II and ENDURING FREEDOM IV will benefit from a full spectrum train-up, either at Fort Irwin, Fort Polk, or Hohenfels, Germany.
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    Based upon these lessons that we learn, the train-up will be tough and demanding and relevant. We have a moral obligation to ensure that we train and equip our soldiers for the rigors of combat operations. This train-up and deployment will require sacrifice again not only by our soldiers but also by their families and communities and the employers who continue to support those in uniform.

    Although our initial successes have been tremendous, we must continue to resource our operations with the right equipment to complete the mission for the Iraqi people and to keep our soldiers safe, from soldier systems like interceptor body armor to force protection measures like up-armored Humvee vehicles and blue force tracking identification systems. Based on your Congressional support for the fiscal year 2003 IRAQI FREEDOM supplemental, the Army was able to full forward almost $3.2 billion worth of soldier and battle command systems' improvements and get them to the soldiers on the ground before the fight.

    We must continue to ensure that all of our forces are resourced with these critical systems to remain fully capable to take on any future challenges. Your continued support of future years' defense plan outlays and supplemental budget injects to support our ongoing operations, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, is critical if we expect our units and soldiers to continue their performance as they have so far in the past.

    In closing, I am pleased with the current status of our Army. I am proud of our soldiers and leaders as they continue to perform remarkably across the globe. We look forward to the continued support of Congress for our armed services; and I look forward to your questions, sir.
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    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, General Cody.

    [The prepared statement of General Cody can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. HEFLEY. I thought all of your statements were excellent. I appreciate your kind words for the committee because I think the committee sees itself as a partner with you in this worldwide fight on terrorism in defense of the United States. We want to get you what you need.

    I did not get a very good feel from these statements about how badly our equipment was eaten up over there by the sand and so forth and so on and how much new we are going to need and how much we can put into the depots and so forth and continue to operate. So, as we ask questions, I hope that maybe will be a part of your response.

    I don't want us to be surprised by another big supplemental unless we have a warning about it. I think whatever you can justify that you need, we will go to work and try to get it for you. But we want you to justify that need and not surprise with us a big supplemental and everyone says, oh, well, you have to do it for the guys in the field. Yes, we want to do it for the guys in the field, but we want to know about it in advance so that, in an orderly way, we can go about trying to meet your needs.

    With that, I call on our Ranking Member, Mr. Ortiz.

    Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I do have a question for the Army, General Cody.
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    I know that the Army is in the process of implementing a logistics modernization program (LMP), which is a new contractor-developed wholesale logistics system at Tobyhanna Army Depot. It calls for this system to be implemented in Corpus Christi Army Depot in November of this year. It is my understanding that the LMP at Tobyhanna has resulted in a significant delay in the receipt and requisitioning of parts, a problem that has a direct impact on the ability of the depot to meet its production schedule. Because of problems with LMP, Tobyhanna has been unable to produce financial reports.

    Now I am concerned that these problems have not been resolved, yet the Army has not delayed the planned implemental at the LMP at Corpus Christi this coming November, next month. What is the Army doing to resolve the deficiencies in LMP, and have the appropriate corrections been identified and programmed into the system? Or are people having to do extraordinary work-arounds to deal with the problems called by LMP? Given that the depots are being challenged to respond to increased requirements of supporting the war on terrorism, would it not be better for Corpus Christi to stay with the current system until the problems with LMP can be solved? And what is scheduled for resolving the problem with LMP implementation at Tobyhanna?

    To me and to some of the civilian workforce and even those in the field, this is very, very important. So maybe, General, you can enlighten me a little bit. Maybe there are some corrective measures to correct this problem in Tobyhanna, because we do not want to go with the same problems that we had with the Corpus Christi Army Depot or any other depot.

    General CODY. Thank you for the question. I share your concerns about any type of shift right now, especially in long-lead component items. I am not fully up to speed, so I will take for the record and get back to you with what corrections actions we are taking at Tobyhanna Depot and how we are working through on those issues.
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    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    General CODY. I can comment on Corpus Christi a little bit.

    As you know, we depend on Corpus Christi to be a huge player in the reset of our aviation fleet—the UH–60 alpha to alpha recapitalization, the CH–47 delta model recap, and prep for the CH–47 Foxtrot, as well as a crash damage repair of some 14 aircraft this year and another 12 next year.

    Army Materiel Command reported to me last week that all the long-lead items for Corpus Christi have been placed on order, as well as requirements for T–701 and T–701 Charlie engines. So I feel pretty confident that we are working through the repair parts and components pieces for Corpus Christi.

    I am not as up to speed as I should be for Tobyhanna, and I will have to take that for the record, sir.

    Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

    I know that we have been involved in several deployments and now the war with Iraq. What is the size of your maintenance backlog that we have, not only on the different equipment but monetarywise, if you can give us an idea as to what we need to expect as far as funding and equipment and stuff like that.

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    General CODY. Let me set the stage this way, if I could, sir: We had over a thousand aviation systems in Iraq for the war; and we still have over 650 aircraft, 5,700 combat track vehicles, 46,000 wheeled vehicles, 1,400 missile systems and 6 Patriot battalions, not to mention all the other radios and stuff like that that we will have to reset.

    We recognize there is about a $3 billion requirement to reset that equipment to what we call our 1020 standards, pre-war conditions. We have a shortfall right now of about a billion dollars in this budget to reset all of that equipment. We have about a $502 million shortfall to reset the equipment and buy equipment in the Operation & Maintenance, Army (OMA) account to reset our Army prepositioned stock.

    Right now, our method of calculating and predicting what the repairs will be, that model that we ran, is not as precise as I would like it to be. I think we will know better after January and February when we have a large sample size of different types of equipment that was running through the depots and will know exactly what the harsh damage was. We had some pretty good data coming out of the first Gulf War, but we have different sets of equipment, so I am not as confident in the model.

    I think we are in the random order of magnitude of about a billion dollars for the 1020 standards against that fleet that is there now.

    The real challenge will be the second fleet. We are getting ready, as I told you, in January and February, to take out quite a bit of our forces that are there and replace them with three more divisions. That fleet will be in there for another year. So in 2005, we will have another fleet of equipment that will have spent one year of high OPTEMPO in that desert environment; and that is of concern to us.
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    Mr. ORTIZ. You know, going back to my first question, because of the seriousness of LMP, I would like to request the Army to reconsider, instead of implementing this program in November, that it be delayed until we are sure that all the kinks are worked out of it. This would be my request to the Army, to delay it until it is corrected, to see if it works—it might not be able to work—and to expect what a lot of people expected it to do.

    I think my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

    Mr. Hefley wanted me to talk at length about Fort Bragg and how important that was, but I am going to pass on that.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Please, we want to hear more about Fort Bragg.

    Mr. HAYES. The epicenter of the universe?

    I appreciate you all being here. General Nyland and General Moseley, let's talk about airplanes for just a minute. Reconstituting means putting your equipment back in the condition it was before the war engagement began. Are you going to put your equipment back in the condition it was in before which war? Talking about 53s and KC–135s, relate to this committee—Chairman Hefley was right on the money. These are not new airplanes that you are reconstituting. Talk to us so we do not get surprised about how that is going to impact reconstituting as it is.
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    General NYLAND. Well, sir, let me talk first about the 53 Echo, which is, of course, our heavy lift helicopter. Our efforts in that regard are to return it to pre-this-last-war and then get ready. We are working inside aviation now for a program that will look at a service life extension program for that which will upgrade not only the engines but the rotor head, the blades, the cockpit, and hopefully in the process of doing that also utilize parts that will be in common with other airplanes. For instance, we could select the right engine; we could have a common engine with the MV–32 and the 130–J. With the right cockpit, we could have a common cockpit with the new Yankee and Zulu Cobras and Hueys.

    So, in the interim, the answer is to get the 53s back to do the heavy lift mission until we answer the question of the heavy lift for the future with the 53 service life extension program (SLEP) or potentially a successor as that analysis of alternatives is ongoing right now.

    As for the 130s, of course, which are old ones, I am pleased to report that we have now taken delivery of eight to ten of the J models, which is going to bring us out of airplanes that I refueled off of as a lieutenant in Vietnam into a tremendous airplane with not only significantly more capability but a lot smaller logistics footprint, much more reliable and much more maintainable.

    General MOSELEY. Mr. Hayes, thank you for the question relative to the specific critical piece of our inventory which is the tanker.

    Sir, let me address the KC–135 first, because that is the piece that we are working our way through to recapitalize and modernize that fleet. As the air commander for both OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, I can tell you that the tankers were the backbone for the joint and combined effort. Because of the ranges that we operated both in Afghanistan and Iraq, no strike asset was able to reach targets, whether they had United States Air Force or United States Navy or United States Marines or Royal Air Force or Royal Australian Air Force painted on side of them, without the tankers. Close to 30 percent of the total sorties generated for the effort were tanker sorties.
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    The KC–135 fleet, which is the preponderance of that fleet, is aging. You know, sir, from your aviation experience those were 1950s aircraft. In fact, I flew one of those within 60 miles of Baghdad on the 3rd of April that was built in 1960. The corrosion problems on those aircraft began to surface in the late 1980s, and we have been struggling with that ever since. The engine struts on the KC–135E model are near the end of their service life.

    Some data points for you: When Boeing built that airplane, the structural parts were hand drilled and spot welded with no intention of flying these aircraft this long. In the last ten years, the depot costs have tripled. We are having extreme challenges with keeping these aircraft on line with operational readiness rates that are acceptable to a combatant commander like myself.

    We have several proposals to address this aging fleet, one of which is the current proposal to lease 100 of the new Boeing 767s which will give us 60 new aircraft in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). For a combatant commander, I welcome the addition of 60 new aircraft for all of us to be able to refuel off the same aircraft a Marine, Navy, or coalition aircraft with the same flight of being able to refuel the Air Force aircraft or either bomber or fighter.

    Congressman Hayes, we have had a chance to discuss this in some detail, and I am here to tell you that the tanker fleet is the backbone of any force projection or global presence. To reconstitute this fleet and get it back to where we can fight the next war is going to require some hard work and new airplanes.
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    Mr. HAYES. Thank you, sir.

    I was interested in the SLEP, the extended life program in the military. I got to checking the civilian side, and they have something called the More program to extend the life of that airplane. Guess what? The insurance companies are not anxious to write insurance when you go down that road. It is more expensive and diminishing returns. I appreciate you all keeping us up to speed on the fact that the older it gets, the harder it is to maintain. I question if you can reconstitute it at all.

    The Army has a lot of vehicles, tremendous wear on track vehicles because of the abrasive conditions, a lot of running gear besides the track. Are you all allowing enough room in your calculations to handle that and again have the prepositioned forces ready and restocked? How is all of that working out?

    General CODY. Yes, sir. We haven't focused just on the road wheels and the tracks, but they are the most when you see a broken-down vehicle. But we have gotten light at the end of our tunnel on the Bradley tracks and tank tracks in the last two months. Our calculations and models that we ran take all the drive train, all the sprockets and all the running gear of a wheeled and track vehicle into account.

    As I said, I think we are about—right now, about our calculations, we are about a billion dollars short right now in the 1020 standards OMA accounts based on the budget; and we are working through that.

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    Mr. HAYES. I appreciate that.

    I am out of time, but I would like to call attention to a letter I got from a Marine serving in Iraq right now. He talked about the fact—and there are so many good stories, and I hope we all do everything we can to get those stories out—but this particular incident he talks about our forces working jointly with the Iraqi retrained police force. Prior to this, there was no respect for the police and any authority they might have. But now, because of our jointness and working with them, there is this respect for authority that is being built and created.

    His response came in reply to my question, is the $20 billion as important as the 60? And he said, every bit.

    So I appreciate you all hanging in there for that, and thanks again not only to you but the men and women that you represent.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.

    Dr. Snyder.

    Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I wanted to ask—I guess, General Cody, I will start with you. Several of us on the committee were in Iraq this weekend, and I think—on the world's shortest trip to Iraq and back, 65 hours. Thirty-seven of them were in airplanes or helicopters or C–130s. I visited with the 101st Airborne who are doing a great job up there.
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    One the issues that has come up over the last several months, and it certainly came up this weekend while we were in Iraq, was the issue of the Kevlar vests and the up-armored Humvees. I will direct the question to you because you have so many troops still there and more coming to replace. Would you outline in a way that definitively answers the question, how did we get to where we were? Are we on track to get it solved? And when can we make assurances not only to our troops but to their families and friends back home that there is absolutely no shortage of up-armored Humvees and Kevlar vests?

    General CODY. Thank you for the opportunity to clear this matter up.

    First, dealing with the interceptor body armor, the newest body armor that we had. We sent all of our troops that went over to Iraq and in Afghanistan with outer tactical vests or with the flak vests. That gave our soldiers protection to nine millimeter and flak protection. The interceptor body armor adds to that with the small arms protective insert, the plates that they showed you, the front and back plates. That gives us up to 7.62 millimeter body armor protection.

    We had a production rate of about 1,600 per month when I assumed the job here last year, and as we were looking at building up the forces for 1003 Victor, we only had in the budget a certain amount based on the production rate; and we only had three vendors that could produce these SAPI plates. Once we realized what the requirements were for the number of soldiers that General Franks was going to need, we rapidly started cash flowing our money to start buying extras so that we could not only just outfit our infantry and our combat soldiers but our combat service support and our combat service support soldiers with the SAPI plates. All of them would have flak vests and outer tactical vests, but we wanted to get everybody with SAPIs.
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    Unfortunately, we were not able to do that when the war started because of the production rates. I think we peaked out about 8,700 plates per month that we were able to produce. We are now on a current schedule, because we have six vendors, of 25,000 SAPI plates; and by the end of November every soldier in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait will have SAPI plates in addition to the flak vest they have.

    Dr. SNYDER. So we can tell everybody by the end of November, five, six-and-a-half weeks from now we should never again have a question about the body armor?

    General CODY. No, sir.

    Dr. SNYDER. How about with regard to the Humvees? If I might bring this question home, we had dinner a couple of times with soldiers from our home states; and I met with Arkansans and a couple of young soldiers in order to understand what their daily life has been like. In order to have them drive me for 30 minutes, they were putting their life at risk to have dinner and then it would be a lot less risky if they had the up-armored Humvee. This is a very important question.

    General CODY. Sir, we originally had issued the up-armored Humvee for our combat support and our medical personnel; and it was in small quantities. In the Balkans office, we started buying some more of them. We never intended it as an Army vehicle to field every unit. It was for combat service support or combat service support with up-armored Humvees.

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    Frankly, we would not want them, because in some cases you are limited in reacting with up-armored Humvees because you cannot see everything; and our infantry soldiers would rather be up out of the Humvees in the pintles with their weapons systems and their sighting systems so they can engage the enemy before getting ambushed.

    Having said that, the requirement we received was for about 235 additional up-armored Humvees in the August time frame. Once the commander came back and realized the combat service support troops and long supply lines, they came in for a requirement of another 1,233. That grew to 1,407 six months later, and now we just received a request for another 1,500 from the combatant commander.

    The problem was the production rate was 60 per month. We have upped it to 80 a month, and we are ramping up to 220 a month. We took all the up-armored Humvees shy of 80 out of the Balkans and shipped them there. There were 600 there in the Balkans with the National Guard in Kosovo and in Bosnia. We made a decision and moved them all out of the Balkans, and most of them are there now.

    We took all of the other up-armored Humvees with units that are getting ready to go for the second rotation of OIF, and we moved them and took them out of those units and flowed them over. We anticipate to meet the 1,407 initial requirement here soon. The 1,500, we are going to have to go back and look for more money.

    That is where we are with the up-armored Humvees. Even when we do this we will not have every soldier in an up-armored Humvee.

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    Dr. SNYDER. I want to be sure I understood you. Are you saying that you still are going to have a money shortage after we pass the supplemental?

    General CODY. Yes, sir. Because when the calculations for the supplemental went in, it was based on a 1,407 requirement that the commander over in Afghanistan—excuse me, Iraq had put in. Since that time, they have come back—because of the nature of the fight and taking our troops out of Bradleys and tanks and motorizing them, they have come with an additional requirement of another 1,500 up-armored Humvees; and we are working through the costing and how we are going to do that.

    Dr. SNYDER. This is a sensitive topic, since most us just voted for an $87 billion bill. How much additional money do you need? This thing is not finalized yet.

    General CODY. I think—in all fairness, I think in the 2004 supplemental, plus what you gave us, plus the $60 million we just received from OSD as part of the force protection, that will max out the capacity of 220 up-armored Humvees production line for 2004. I think that we will not be able to take a bite out of the additional ones until probably the end of 2004, just because of the production rate.

    Dr. SNYDER. I see. But I mean the question still, though, is you do not—what you are telling me you do not have a calculation of how much additional money you need? Is that what you are saying?

    General CODY. Not right now, no, sir. I do not, but I can take it for the record and get it to you. We are still working it.
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    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, I know there is a time figure here, but this is so important. We are still in conference. I do not want to get into a dispute about it, but we know what the cost of one of these armored vehicles is. Just give me two seconds here.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Are you through, Mr. Snyder?

    Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Surely, surely, we know how much 1,280 of them are.

    General CODY. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, how much?

    General CODY. Sir, I do not have the figure. It changes.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How much is one?

    General CODY. Sir, I do not have that figure.
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    Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Let's see. Mr. Larsen.

    Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to just start by thanking Admiral Mullen for his comments on the Prowler. The EA–6B Prowler is really the premier platform for electronic warfare in our Navy and the military, and it also happens to be based in my district, and the Appropriations Committee in the House actually passed a supplemental that included a plus-up beyond the $55 million. The President requested an additional, I think, $30 million for center wings and outer wing panels as well, severely critical to keep the Prowler up and flying because it tends to be a go/no go asset for our military, until we can get the follow-on up and flying at the end of this decade.

    To the extent we can move the Prowler follow-on to the left a little bit, I would be happy, but I do not know that is going to happen, but I appreciate you, Admiral Mullen, highlighting that for this committee. I think it is a critical element.

    I want to ask a question, one question. I would like each of the panelists to try to address it, and it has to do with military—a broader question about military policy that I am trying to understand. The Administration has talked about regime changes of policy, and I think it is really what Iraq has shown, that regime change is really a military policy, as opposed to a national security policy.
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    Let me tell you what I mean by that, that a few months ago or about a month ago, some folks in the Administration were in here and said that we have enough in the people in our military for our military commitments. I think we would all tend to agree with that, but I think what Iraq has shown is that, for our post-military commitments, we have a challenge meeting the post-military commitments with who we have in the active duty military. That is why we are seeing possible National Guard/Reserve call-ups, additional multi-national divisions in Iraq.

    So I want to ask a question with regards to this, and I want you to think about the post-military action commitment of our military as it relates to the reconstitution and resetting exercises and to the extent that you can help us understand how much thinking you have all put into the possibility that there may be another military action down the road which will require us to leave parts of our military in that country in the future and thereby make it more difficult for us then to go do something else down the road.

    So are you reconstituting and resetting just for what we had or to support a regime change, the implementation of a more active regime change policy which this Administration seems to support? I am trying to understand that. Can you help me out?

    Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I will start.

    The process that we have been through in this reconstitution effort has actually been very joined, very open, very much debated in the building with I think very good guidance.

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    From the Navy's perspective—and again we spent an awful lot of time—I spent an awful lot of time with my counterparts in this process. From the Navy's perspective, we are reconstituting and I mentioned that we will essentially be back in pretty good shape by the end of '04. In fact, it is not that far in 2004 where we could actually surge a great deal of the kind of capability we just brought home or are bringing home. But from a strategy standpoint, the way we are approaching that is for a different world. That one is very uncertain. Two is much more global, and it is——

    And you talked about the regime change policy. From a military standpoint, the way I look at that is really the requirements that we have to deliver capabilities will mean that we will have to execute a certain strategy, whether it is that, whether it is a swift defeat or, in fact, just deter in other areas of the world. So we are really trying to, right now, reconstitute and set for that uncertainty, wherever it might be. For us less so than some of the ground—than my colleagues who have a significant number of troops on the ground.

    For the Navy, that is less of a challenge, in terms of postwar per se, as we understand it. But we have invested a lot of our time and effort into the uncertainty and unpredictability in the future, specifically with regards to the global war on terrorism, which we see placing—potentially placing great demands on all the services, including those that we have to get ready, right now. So there is a real sense of urgency for reconstituting for—not for what we have done but for what we have to do in the future, and we are not—and in that uncertainty lies a lot of maneuver space about exactly what is going to happen in terms of what the potential is.

    General MOSELEY. Sir, I would echo my neighbor colleague; and I would emphasize a couple of things I believe would be useful for you.
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    In the case of the EA–6, we were truly partners in the operation of the EA–6 and the maintenance of that; and that is certainly a critical air asset. As an air commander, there were not too many places I would send airplanes in Afghanistan and Iraq of the EA–6 off an expeditionary airfield, so I echo your notion of that it is a very valuable asset today, and it will be tomorrow.

    Sir, we are refitting and reconstituting this force based on a potential global tasking and potential global presence, as well as ongoing ops and as well as on previous expenditures of things like munitions, vehicles, expeditionary combat support, et cetera.

    We track in the Air Force 15 critical career fields, both as officer enlisted to include Air National Guard and Reserve; and we are looking for ways to move people between career fields to move into and take pressure off of those stress career fields, a variety of those to include security police, fuels, maintenance, intelligence, targeteers, et cetera. We rely heavily on the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve to the notion of during the OIF portion of the global war on terrorism, I had over 100 Air National Guard and Air Reserve commanders of units deployed in the field to include squadrons, groups, and wings in key staff positions. On any given day in the global tasking of the Air Force, 25 to 30 percent of those people out there on average are Guardsmen or Reservists.

    I think that gets at another level of your question, and that is the commitment of the total force to this global fight. So I would answer that we are posturing ourselves to recover from past operations, ongoing operations and to set the stage for global tasking, with our priorities being the availability of preferred munitions, to be able to refill those stockpiles, particularly of penetrating weapons, precision munitions, the ability to reconstitute our combat intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets and to get at expeditionary combat support and force protection.
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    I hope that helps frame at least the Air Force side of a joint and coalition fight, sir.

    General NYLAND. Yes, sir.

    Let me be the third to echo the value of the Prowler, since I got a little time in that baby myself, and you know how highly the Marine Corps thinks of that great airplane. I believe, as do my colleagues, that the process that has got us where we are as we reset has, in fact, been very joint, very open, and we are all working, I believe, to address the uncertainty that Admiral Mullen talked about.

    So if I were to try to summarize, to keep it short, I would say simply that we are trying to reset the Marine Corps for a global response for the future, such as our Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) fully deployed, our Marine pre-positioned squadrons, our unit deployment program (UDP) units, as well as also looking at the ability to serve, as we demonstrated, the capability with the two amphibious task forces that went to Iraq, but being mindful not only of the uncertainty that we are preparing for to be ready to respond to, but we, because we also are a ground component as my brother in the Army, are looking at the potential if we have to commit ground forces back into Iraq. So our reset covers not only the forward look, but it cannot ignore what we are living with today, which has just left us where we are.

    In a nutshell, sir, that is where I am.

    General CODY. Yes, sir.
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    Very similar to the other services. We are looking as we reset our force, one, to prepare ourselves for the possibility of another fight so we can get our forces back, especially the ones that are there now and get those divisions like the 3rd Infantry and the 4th and 101st reset and ready for the next contingency.

    As we reset our equipment, we are trying to pull forward much of the technology, blue force tracking on all our vehicles, and new engines for—like the Apache helicopter, put as many as 701 Charlie engines into the Apache helicopters as we can; and, as we recatch some of our tracks and our vehicles and our aircraft, to pull forward some of those technologies while we have them taken apart so we end up resetting them at a much higher capability than we had when we started.

    Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Follow up, Mr. Chairman?

    Appreciate the chairman's indulgence.

    Just when we were in Iraq a few weeks back, General Sanchez said that he didn't need any more U.S. Troops, but he couldn't do the job with any fewer and that if by next April, as we cycle people out of Iraq, you know, if we didn't get multinational help, it was going to require National Guard and Reserve call to fill that gap. That has been a concern of mine on several levels,obviously, the role of National Guard and Reserve and the increasing pressure that we are placing upon them—and we are sorting through that in the committee.

    But, also, again, it really brings up the foundation of my question, about whether or not we are going to be truly able or get caught short if we have to try to do something like we did in Iraq again somewhere else, relatively soon. Not that we are, but just the challenge that we face.
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    Because of all the folks that we are having to leave in Iraq to do the job to maintain stability in Iraq, we cannot just pull those folks out to go somewhere else. Otherwise, we leave Iraq unstable as it stands. That is the concern I am trying to get allayed in my own mind as we try to address these challenges of readiness, reconstitution, resetting our force, while all ensuring that the work we have already done in a place like Iraq doesn't go by the wayside if we have to move on to somewhere else sooner rather than later.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Abercrombie.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Gentlemen, if you listened to the testimony you gave, everything is perfect. All we have to do is put into place what the 2004 budget calls for and that is it. Nothing needs to be done. But we get down to the questioning, and it doesn't come out that way.

    Now you look through this. It says, the training, particularly for the Army, tough, demanding irrelevant and, in the testimony here, trained, ready and dominant. Now if I understand what you are saying here—and, you know, part of the thing that happens is we get to have this testimony and, believe me, we do our homework here.

    With modularity, I read this: the enhanced brigades, enhanced separate brigade concept, the readiness concept. You supported everything.

    This particular Member, I am sure you will recall, was among one of the first people to be supportive for the transformation of the Army and giving credit to the Army for leading the way for the Armed Forces. I know all the criticism the Army has had to take and all the external carping that is going on and all the rest as you have gone through this transition, but this subcommittee and the committee of the whole has been supportive of it.
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    That is why it is a little disconcerting when I say to you, as an addendum to what Mr. Snyder was asking, when we are still in conference and we are dealing with this supplemental, which, by definition, is supposed to be an emergency—it is one of the reasons I voted against it. Because I think we should be authorizing what is necessary for the Armed Forces, not waltzing into the Appropriations Committee at odd times during the year with what is called an emergency supplemental, as if we had no clue, not an idea, as to what was happening and now, like a hurricane or a flood that came on, all of a sudden we have to do it.

    That is why we hold these hearings, and the chairman has been on this for years in terms of trying to anticipate where we need to go. I have had the privilege of serving with him for a long time, and I can say that this is not a partisan issue.

    So it is very disconcerting to read this testimony and then have you say the nature of the fight, with the changes coming from the transformation with respect to Bradleys and tanks, that we are 1,500 up-armored, high-mobility, multi-winged wheeled vehicles, Humvees, short, even though you have tried to maximize, according to the testimony you gave, the leveraging of the dollars that are already available in the 2003, the anticipated 2004 budget and the emergency supplemental.

    Now, if I understood you correctly, you thought that you could, out of those last three items that I mentioned, leverage 220 of these up-armored Humvees, which go for about $236,000.

    General CODY. Yes, sir.
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Humvee itself is about 73, $76,000. The upgrade is about 236. Let's call it a quarter of a million dollars. That leaves 1,280. Now do you need $3 billion more now?

    General CODY. Sir, let me see if I can say it a different way; and, hopefully, I will say it better so we both have——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, it is not a question of better or worse.

    General CODY. No, sir. I want to accurately portray the picture.

    We have an additional requirement for 1,500. Congress, Congressional average, $31 million in the fiscal year 2004. We cash flowed or—excuse me, we used $73 million in the '03 supplemental. We requested—and this is where I misspoke earlier. We requested $177 million as part of the fiscal year 2004 supplemental. That, coupled with what OSD gave us as part of the force protection, that was $59 million. The $177 and the $59 million, if we get all that money, should meet the additional 1,500, if we get the 220 per month rate that we are ramping up to.

    Right now the rate is 80 per month, and we think in 6 months we can ramp up to 220 off the line. If we get the $177 and the $59, we think that will satisfy the requirement which has now grown from 1,400 up to about 2,900, so I may have misspoke.
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You need about $300 million?

    General CODY. Yes, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And you think you have that?

    General CODY. Sir, we have—remember, we moved some around, and we have moved some additional ones out of the Balkans; and we are going to reprogram some of the diversions. But, right now, with the $177 million that we have asked for in the '04 as well as the $59 million that OSD gave us, we think that we can meet the requirement.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So when the question was asked previously about no supplemental, we will not be seeing an emergency supplemental request in this area.

    General CODY. Not by Humvees, no, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does this take care of the Guard and Reserve as well?

    One of your points in the one Army concept is the Active component. With the Active component, the Army National Guard and Army approve an air combat team, et cetera, share an incredible portion of the Army's mission ever since 9/11. Do you have sufficient funds, now?

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    General CODY. Sir, as I stated earlier, initially when we bought the up-armored Humvee, we bought it for military policemen and some of our combat support units. We are now taking infantry and armor formations and taking them out of Bradleys and tanks and putting them in—and you saw that when you were over there—putting them in Humvees. It is a mixture of up-armored Humvees and Humvees that aren't up-armored, but they have different types of protection. That has caused us to reorganize our enhanced separate brigades, the National Guard as well as our Active Duty units, into a motorized concept to fight the type of fight that General Sanchez and the division commanders want. So we are having to re-look what is our true requirement later for up-armored Humvees once we come out of this type of fight.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand it. I have read it. I have seen it. I am working very hard, right now, to get the training facilities prepared on the Island of Oahu to enable training to take place, exactly along the lines that you are speaking of.

    My question and why we are holding the hearing is, does this budget reflect what is necessary to accomplish that or not? And if it doesn't, maybe we can move into that with this supplemental, because that does constitute an emergency.

    You do not have to answer anything about all the foul-ups that took us into this situation in Iraq where we are now engaged in this political farce of good news and happy news, like it is some damn ratings deal for some carnival barker on television. That is not what we are talking about. We are talking about what we knew to actually support the troops, rather than the politicians. That is what we have to have an answer on.

    Do you need—do any of you need money in this emergency supplemental that is not in there right now? That is how you can truly support the troops, is to tell us whether or not what is there is going to work right now. What I see in there doesn't work—$250,000 to train cops in Iraq. I do not see that as supporting the troops.
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    General CODY. Sir, I will take it first.

    Again, I think for the up-armored Humvees and the interceptor body armor, the two biggest force protection issues, I think we have the requisite money to meet the formations that we are putting in there, understanding that the formation for OIF II will be smaller than the formation that is there now.


    General CODY. And the up-armored Humvees will stay there as well, as we have got a few hundred going to the 25th Infantry Division soldiers that will be assuming the Afghan OEF mission. The interceptor body armor will stay there and be issued to troops as they come in and come out, and then we will be able to build our stockpile. So I think in those two critical areas we are fine.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will let it go at that, and if I have more I will ask it later, because time is running out.

    Now there isn't, in this case, in anybody's testimony—and I had to read it last night late so I might have missed it—there is not a word in here about Afghanistan heroin production. I do not understand how we can have resetting of and reconstituting the forces if we are not going to deal with heroin production in Afghanistan, my information being that the production of the base material for heroin is larger than it has ever been before in the history of the world. Anybody have an answer on that?
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    It is not an accusation. Because you want to talk about finance and terrorism? They can do all the fancy footwork they want with the FBI and all the rest of it. If they are selling heroin, they are making money.

    General CODY. Sir, I am not up to speed as to what the eradication program is in the Kandahar Province and some of the other provinces. I used to be up to speed, and I am not. I will get back to you.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Anybody else have anything on that?

    Admiral MULLEN. No, sir.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, my request is that we, in taking into account what we need, in terms of resetting the forces and reconstituting the forces, that we have a definitive understanding from the Administration and from the Department of Defense, I should say, as to what they intend to do in regard to the production of heroin in Afghanistan and our role in it militarily.

    Thank you.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Excellent question.

    Let me follow up just briefly on something Mr. Abercrombie touched on, because he and I do share the same concern in this, and that is my concept of what a supplemental is, is that it is—that you do the best you can to anticipate every need and so forth that you can; and we authorize that during the normal process, but you cannot account for every contingency. So the things that come up and surprise you, those go into a supplemental later on.
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    Sometimes I get the feeling that the culture of the building over there is that—do not put this in because it is too high a figure. We will just put it in the supplemental.

    Which concept is right? How do you all see a supplemental? Is it just part of the normal budgeting process that you do every year or do you try to get everything in the normal process and are surprised? I do not know.

    Admiral MULLEN. I can take a shot at that, Mr. Chairman. I have been working supplementals in the budgets for the Navy for the last couple of years, starting with the post-9/11 '03 piece and throughout that process, and it continues today. The supplementals have focused on those areas that we are not anticipating.

    Now is it 100 percent pure? If I went back to every single item across the board, there probably are some—you could probably take issue with some of them. But, by and large, it is a process that has been focused on that which you need, certainly from the Navy's perspective, that you had not anticipated.

    So that $775 million that is currently in the '04 sup., the Navy doesn't need any more money than that, but it needs that because that is, in particular, maintenance money for airplanes and ships that we had not anticipated because of this war; and that is very representative of the kinds of supplemental actions that had been taken that I viewed from the building at the center of that process over the last two-plus years.

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    Now the other significant one that I have dealt with, and General Moseley mentioned it earlier, is the munitions piece, the need to replenish. We have come a long way with that in terms of increasing production lines and ability to replenish and the kinds of precision weapons for the future.

    For the Navy, in particular, we are in a very sensitive spot right now with respect to Tomahawk, because we are transitioning to a new weapon. The old production line for the block three million is going away; and we are bringing on a new weapon, so we need to watch that very carefully as we transition, based on what the future portends. But I think, by and large, it has been a process that has focused on that, which was not put in the original budget.

    General MOSELEY. Let me also take a stab at that.

    The Air Force uses a supplemental as a supplemental. In this particular '03 and '04 supplemental, we have worked with the Department to look at pipeline spares, contract, logistic support, replacement of key expeditionary combat support assets, some depot maintenance, procurement of replenishment ammunition stocks to include precision missiles.

    For example, we lost eight of our UAV Predators through OEF and OIF; but in this supplemental, we are only looking to replace three of those because the rest of that could go into the normal authorization process or the normal budget process. So I agree with Admiral Mullen that we use these supplementals to get at these unforeseen needs that are immediate to conduct the operations that are ongoing or be prepared to conduct over the next few months.

    General NYLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would echo that same, obviously, between the Navy and the Marine Corps, as ours are built together. That has certainly been my experience, that we tried to cover everything of whereof in the budget. The supplementals have been beneficial in taking care of those things that were unanticipated at the time the budgets were submitted.
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    General CODY. Mr. Chairman, I would have the same comments. I think our budgets take care of our sustained readiness for what we are called upon to do—our training, our recapitalization and our modernization—so we can transform.

    The supplementals are helping us with the unanticipated usage but also the unforeseen procurement of items based upon the ever-changing war on terrorism, things like robotics and other things that are absolutely helping our soldiers combat the improvised explosive devices. Those types of things are emerging, and this is where the supplemental is very helpful to us.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.

    Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to thank you gentlemen for staying here.

    First, Mr. Chairman, our colleague, Mr. Marshall, has recently had surgery which prevents him from being here today, so, with your permission, I would like to add his questions to the record.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Without objection.

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    Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. TAYLOR. I also probably have got more questions than I can possibly do in five minutes, so I would also like to add mine for the record.

    Mr. HEFLEY. All right.

    [The information referred to can be found in the hard copy.]

    Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, I have two kids who are the age of your typical soldier, sailor, Marine. They happen to be young daughters, but this problem with the vest troubles me.

    When I visited the troops in September, I wasn't sure that the problem of the ceramic vest would be solved in October. Now, it is not till December. Quite frankly, I think if it were the Bush twins over there serving with the Texas National Guard, that problem would have been solved already; and, quite frankly, I do not think I can look one parent in the eye that we lose between now and December if it is because of lack of those vests.

    Now something has got to give; and if it costs more money to run those factories on the weekends or add a fourth shift, then we need to solve them and we need to solve them right now.

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    This is an identifiable problem. On an annual basis, you come before us to talk about things that might be a threat in 15 years from now that we spend billions of dollars on. This is a real problem, and I am concerned, and I think every American is concerned.

    This article by David Haxworth that I would like to add for the record gives me even more reason for concern. If there was one mom and dad that had to go out and spend $1,000 for something that we as taxpayers ought to be doing, something is wrong; and I would like you to comment on that.

    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. TAYLOR. Second thing, I became keenly aware of the problem of the improvised explosive devices; and, without going into a classified setting, I am aware that there are things we can do to lessen the risk from some of those devices, particularly those that are remote controlled. In a briefing I had in my office, I got to tell you I was appalled at the target number of vehicles that we seek to protect with that.

    Again, we spent $10 billion this year on national missile defense on something that might happen. This is something that is happening every day. Again, since the supplemental is the vehicle to come up with money for unanticipated needs, I cannot look a mom or a dad in the eye because their child happened to be in the Humvee that wasn't protected by one of these things.

    This is crazy, and I would certainly ask you gentlemen who spend your whole lives being advocates for the men and women in your services to be stronger advocates on two identifiable threats that are killing young Americans every day.
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    Third thing, General Cody, my Adjutant General from the State of Mississippi tells me that only five percent of the Humvees from Mississippi are up-armored. I feel very strongly that we are going to be there for at least ten years, which means we need to be thinking right now about who is going to take the rotation a year from March. My hunch is by that time, we will have a heck of a lot of Guardsmen and Reservists included in that mission.

    What is being done now to make the request so that the funds are available, so that the manufacturing lines are in gear, so that when we send those folks a year from March, that those vehicles are protected? Because after the fact just doesn't get it.

    Fourth thing: General Moseley, I am told that some of the training for the heavier cargo planes, the 130s, the C–17s, that because of the mobility requirements that some of the training has been diminished. I do not know that to be a fact, but that is what someone has written to my office and asked me to ask you when I got the opportunity and that is today. So if you could mention that, I would greatly appreciate it.

    General CODY. Thank you, sir, for your questions.

    I will take the first three:

    One, I absolutely agree with you on the SAPI, the penetrator plates. One of the hardest things I have had to do from assuming the job back in August was try to figure out why we didn't have enough of them. We worked it very, very hard; and every time we lost a soldier, the first question I asked was, did he have a flak vest or SAPI plates? We did not like the answers, and we are working as hard as we can.
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    We have got the money for it. We now have six vendors. We have even changed it so it is a little heavier. They told us if you come in a few more ounces heavier, we can produce them faster, so I believe we are doing everything we can to get this resolved, but we were slow in doing it. There is no excuse for it, and I have seen the soldiers and the parents that have lost people because of this, and we take it very, very seriously.

    On the IEDs, the explosive improvised devices——

    Mr. TAYLOR. General, if I may, what can be done now to move that December target forward? Is there anything this Congress can do to help you move that target?

    General CODY. Right now, sir, I am looking at the requirements.

    One thing, by the way, as you know, we have got 130 some odd thousand troops there. Part of the problem, and no excuse, because we were ramping up as fast as we could, is no one anticipated we would have as many troops here at this time, as well as——

    Mr. TAYLOR. If I recall, General Shinseki did.

    General CODY. Yes, sir, but that didn't stop us from buying a whole bunch. We are still working it. I do not know if there is anything we can do right now, because we are pushing this as hard as we can. I do not know anything we can do that will get them there faster, to clean up and make sure all 132,000 requirements that we have right now for Kuwait and Iraq could go any faster than what we have right now.
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    Mr. TAYLOR. What about on the—without getting too specific, the efforts that can be taken to protect a vehicle electronically from an improvised explosive device?

    General CODY. Sir, we are taking several actions. As you know, we are using bolt-on armor that we are putting in. We are testing, and we are doing that now. We have got several different modifications to our LMTVs, the light medium tactical vehicles, and the FMTVs, family of medium tactical vehicles, as well as the Humvees, to put on bolt-on armor to protect them and give them added protection for those that aren't up-armored.

    We have several systems, as you know, that address the signal of the explosive device. I stood up a task force under a brigadier general that is working with our rapid equipping fielding team and working in Iraq with the soldiers on the ground. So every time one of these goes off we are doing the quick forensics and getting as much as we can back so we can start putting more defensive measures in place but also to get ahead of the countermeasures that we know will come after we solve the first problem. It is a daunting issue.

    We are working several other devices that we think will help us, but we are also looking at the tactics, techniques and procedures of how we conduct convoys and how we conduct reconnaissance along those routes, and we are doing that now with the units that we are preparing to go over for the next rotation.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Will the Stryker—will the armor on a Stryker stop a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV)?
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    General CODY. Yes, sir, with the flak armor that we have right now that we have built for the Stryker vehicle. We have tested it at Aberdeen. I have gone out there personally and driven it.

    General MOSELEY. Might I add some detail to that, also?

    In a setting—we are out of the classification setting here to discuss some of this, but I will tell you that a dear friend and a great soldier who General Cody and I have been working with on a couple of initiatives to get at some of this that you are talking about, and that is bearing fruit. There are other ways to watch and other ways to influence and other ways to negate some of these attacks, and that effort is ongoing; and there are a number of people that are engaged in that right now, both in the theatre at various locations and here, to use a variety of applications and techniques and technologies again that are beyond the classification of where we are sitting today. I would be happy in another setting to share that with you, because I think you would be very proud of the people that are working that and the partnership between the services and inside the Department.

    Mr. TAYLOR. You mean, the flight training hours on the 17s and the 130s?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, let me address that for you.

    As the Air Commander, General Handy, the commander and myself, in fact, enhanced the training requirements for people deploying in C–130s and C–17s into the theatre. We focused on operating out of expeditionary locations that, in fact, increased the training for low altitude and night vision goggle work and in and out of specific locations to simulate operations in Afghanistan and also Iraq with night vision goggles, without night vision goggles, and low visibility conditions. Sir, that includes C–130 Echoes, which are some of the oldest, C–130H, the special operation C–130s, the new C–130J, as well as C–17s.
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    Specifically, when we discussed the equipage of units with new aircraft like the 172nd at Jackson, we engaged with the commander down there who tells us he has the flying hours available—he has the flying hours available to transition from the C–141 to the C–17, and he is happy with what he has on the books.

    The Air Force certainly, because it holds the Air National Guard specifically, these units which provide strategic mobility, in such high regard because of the critical nature of that, if he needs more flying hours, that is an easily and readily available source. But as of this afternoon, the commander is okay with what he has got; and he is okay with what is on the plan.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Franks.

    Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for your wonderful commitment to human freedom. I know that it is people like you that pay the cost for freedom and that people like us have the privilege of observing that and doing what we can to be of assistance to you; and it is terribly unfair to ask open questions, but, nevertheless, that is what I am going to do.
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    If in this process of reconstitution, resetting, as I understand, about 80 percent of those killed in battle are light infantry and if indeed you were going to have one process or program or one initiative to try to ameliorate that, what would that be and what could this committee do to assist that effort there? General Moseley, General Nyland, I will ask both of you, if I can do that.

    General MOSELEY. Congressman, if you are asking a fighter pilot how to alleviate casualties by light infantry, I can tell you I do that with close air support, I can do that with interdiction, I can do that with precision munitions, ballistic, with 20 millimeter or 30 millimeter. But it is all at the behest of my land component brother, relative to when and where he wants that munition laid. So, sir, I would respectfully defer to my land component brother, because that challenge lives with him and I stand by to assist.

    General NYLAND. Sir, I would say that is a multifaceted answer.

    First off, it is to ensure that they are properly equipped, as we discussed, with the outer tactical vest and the SAPI plates. Certainly that they have the supporting arms, be that our air power, be that artillery, that can suppress fires, and all of that has to be wrapped around absolutely superb training.

    Training, the harder you train, the less you hurt when you go to battle. I think that when you take the components of equipping them properly, giving them the supporting arms that they are going to need, regardless of the condition that they might face, and then realistic, hard, demanding training that allows them to be prepared, I think that is the combination of what we need to do for our young men and women that go forward.
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    Mr. FRANK. Well, thank you, sir.

    To that end, what assistance could this committee offer you in that regard? Do you feel that your training programs are sufficiently funded? Do you feel that there are any adjustments that need to be taken in that regard?

    General NYLAND. At the present, I would say that our programs look to be sufficiently funded. Certainly the supplemental is critical to us, because it will restore and reset equipment that would be vital to have should we be called to go again or, in some cases, even just to return. So I think over the years this committee's support has always been critical to allowing us not only to field the initial issue all the way through depot maintenance to repair equipment to be sure that the individual soldier, sailor, airman, Marine and that which supports them is there. I guess I would just simply ask, sir, your continued support for that, your continued support for our ability to train.

    There are several initiatives that we have been over earlier this year to talk about with the Rapid Response Planning Initiatives (RRPI) and the opportunities to train, as merged with environmental requirements. But I think those would be the pieces, sir; and I would simply say that we certainly thank you for your commitment, and we would only seek it to continue.

    General MOSELEY. Congressman, there is another side of this which is useful, and that is to capture the lessons learned that we have from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and be able to operate some of those lives on the national treasures of the National Training Center, Fallon air space, Nellis air space, Twentynine Palms and at Yuma. To be able to orchestrate jointly and, in fact, in a coalition setting in those national treasures of training space and to be able to operationalize the lessons learned as we are working through now is a critical piece of this to come out of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and what we can do now and what we can do better in the future.
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    Admiral MULLEN. If I can make one comment, sir, just to add on to what General Nyland said.

    Probably the thing that concerns me most about training in the future is having the place to train and making the training realistic in terms of the kinds of preparations that are required to fight and win in the future; and the whole issue of encroachment is a huge issue for all of us. It needs—the final result I think needs to be balanced, but it is something that weighs heavily on my mind constantly as we look to the future and having places to properly train our young men and women to go into combat where they are willing to put their lives on the line, and many of them have to.

    Mr. FRANK. But we are doing certainly everything in Arizona to keep Luke Air Force Base open that Goldwater Range, which is also a national treasure; and I thank every one of you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Would you confirm, General Moseley, that Luke Air Force Base is on the base closure list?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, I haven't seen a list of that nature, but I would hope that it would not be, if there was such a list right now.

    Mr. HEFLEY. I would, too, as a matter of fact.
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    Ms. Bordallo.

    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to say, first, thank you, gentlemen. I, too, made a trip to Iraq this weekend, along with some of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee; and I was impressed with our troops and the organization of the military to keep the peace and continue to assist in reconstructing Iraq.

    My two questions go to Admiral Mullen: You mentioned, Admiral, in your written testimony, that the Navy is concerned that, as the health of our ship repair industrial base continues to decline, we must manage the difficulty of meeting surge requirements. Would stopping the Maritime Sealift Command (MSC) from repairing ships in foreign shipyards provide the flow of work necessary in maintaining the skilled labor needed for a surge in building? In other words, I know that this is the case, Admiral, in Guam, where our shipyard is struggling to find the additional work it needs to hold its employees and cover the costs of running a huge dry-dock. Would shipyards in Guam, Hawaii or San Diego, for example, be better prepared to meet surge requirements if they were kept busy with MSC ship repair work that is now being given to firms in Korea, Singapore, and Japan?

    Admiral MULLEN. As the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, we are at capacity in our ship repair facilities, generally speaking, across the board right now; and, in fact, we are in a situation where we are deferring a small number of availabilities. We expect to defer in fiscal year 2004 a small number of availabilities to 2005. We do not see that and we do not anticipate that that would create a big backlog for us, first of all.
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    Second of all, we really are in the repair business right now reconstituting in order to move forward for what might possibly lie ahead as quickly as we can.

    The balance—and specifically to focus on MSC, not unlike our Navy, and in some ways even more so, MSC is around the world in lots of places 365 days a year, and the specifics of why we would put a certain ship in a certain yard is generally tied to the availability as well as the cost of doing it in any particular point in time.

    I am not familiar with any decisions that have taken Guam off the table, the shipyard there, with respect to why or why not. We wouldn't be using those particular facilities right now, and I can take that and specifically—and I will get back to you.

    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. I think it is something you should look into. We do have MSC ship business.

    Admiral MULLEN. Sure.

    Ms. BORDALLO. But we also could use more, and we understand it is the cost, but there is such a thing as Buy America, and we hope that that process will change.

    Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma'am.

    Ms. BORDALLO. The other question I have is: On October 1, Admiral Doran, Pacific Fleet Commander, said a carrier may be moved to Hawaii or Guam so the Navy could respond more quickly to a crisis in North Korea; and, of course, this puts Guam at a great advantage in the Asian Pacific region and you could respond more quickly to a crisis. At what stage in resetting and reconstituting the forces will this issue be addressed? Are you conducting a suitability study for both Hawaii and Guam?
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    Admiral MULLEN. There is been no decision to move a carrier to either Guam or Hawaii at this point.

    Back to what I talked about earlier in terms of the future environment, it does have the uncertainty I described; and in that there are many, many future options which are under consideration, which was really at the heart of I think of what Admiral Doran was talking about.

    In terms of the future uncertainty, I mentioned there clearly is a focus on the western Pacific—the Pacific and the western Pacific and how we will align not just our forces but our capabilities; and how much of that will be Navy or indeed that of other services is really yet to be determined, so I cannot—there is nothing that we have done to date which has made that decision firm, one way or another.

    Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I am just hoping that Guam will remain, you know, on the radar screen and that some kind of a study—I understand a study is being done now in the State of Hawaii, and I do not know there is any study being done on Guam, so I hope we will be even fields here.

    Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma'am. We have actually done feasibility studies for these kinds of things over the years, and I have had the pleasure of being visited recently by the Chamber of Commerce members from Guam who certainly strongly and enthusiastically not only support our Navy and our Nation—Navy and Air Force in particular, because we have capabilities out there, but our Nation; and we certainly look forward to that continuing in the future.
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    Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HEFLEY. Ms. Davis.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you all for being here to hang out with us today.

    Admiral, I would just like to say one of the first words I learned when I came on the Armed Services Committee was cannibalization; and I do not hear that so much anymore, but I am also wondering whether there are some shortfalls in ship depot maintenance that continue and are persistent. Have we dealt with that problem? I cannot imagine that it has gone away, that we are continuing to take parts and use machinery from one ship to help another, et cetera. We obviously had to deploy at one time 70 percent of the fleet. Have we—is this a problem that is going to go away or is it going to come back? What do we do to prepare?

    Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think, by and large, it is gone. Since Admiral Clark came in, he has put over $7 billion—he has recommended and you have approved and moved almost $7 billion into our accounts; and a huge part of that is from 2002 to 2004. A huge part of that has been in the spare parts world, both on the ship's side and the aviation side. So I couldn't sit here and tell you there is no cannibalization going on, but, by and large, it has—we are in much better shape with respect to that.

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    I spoke just a second ago about some maintenance which is going to have to be deferred, but it is relatively low priority maintenance at this point. So between the vision of the future I thought that I gave Admiral Clark credit for when he took over and emphasized readiness, plussed up those accounts over the years, in addition to the supplementals we received in 2003 and what we are asking for in 2004, we are in pretty good shape.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. In thinking about some of the other issues that you have raised today—we talked about adaptability here this morning in another hearing. In many ways I think what you are talking about, reconstituting for the unknown, I am not quite sure how you do that.

    If we took an example that people have focused on today, which is the up-armored vehicles, the need for that, we didn't appreciate that need, we didn't really plan for that need, and we didn't anticipate the number of troops that were on the ground. Looking at the future and what other kind of conflict we might be engaged in, how, in your thinking and in the process I guess that you are dealing with, are we planning for that kind of reconstituting for the unknown? How can we help you with that? What needs to be done to be sure that we are addressing some of those concerns, that we are creating a culture, I guess, for this kind of adaptability for the future?

    General MOSELEY. Ma'am, if you will allow me, let me take a crack at this first. You are helping us because you have helped us with replenishment spares, so we do not have to cannibalize aviation assets.

    As a guy that has been around airplanes and flown since I was 14 years old, I will not tell you there is not a crew chief out there right now ripping off a part from an airplane; but that is not institutionalized cannibalization, and our cann rates are low now, approaching zero, because of the support of this particular committee in getting its replenishment spares.
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    There are things that are unknown. When we land C–17s on riverbeds and we land them on expeditionary airfields, we burn tires up at an unforeseen rate and we break wheel assemblies at an unforeseen rate to support expeditionary ops. We have quickly addressed that through the support of the committee to get the stocks of those tires and wheel assemblies up to where we can meet that expenditure.

    The same with C–130 engines. When you operate those engines in a very hot, very dusty environment, you consume parts off those engines faster than are normally programed; and this committee has helped us specifically with those parts.

    Ma'am, I would tell you that how we think about unforeseen tasking is to have our stocks of munitions at the highest possible level, to have our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, be they space borne or air breathing, at the highest possible level and in commission rates so we can meet unforeseen or unexpected tasking to provide air breathing and space capability for all of us.

    The same with our expeditionary combat support. To be able to regenerate those facilities, that we can stand up additional bases with secure, safe environments for our people to live, that is a snapshot of how we are trying to think through the unknowns or the sets of unknowns.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. To what extent does the training of personnel enter into that? How engaged or involved with that are you?

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    General MOSELEY. Ma'am, for us, that is a very large piece of this. This gets to our notion of an air expeditionary force rotation, to be able to bring our people back to get at those perishable skills.

    In the aviation community, those skills perish very fast with pilots and air crew, which is why we stick to the rotation time lines that we have to be able to bring the aircraft back and fix them but also to get the air crew and pilots back into that advanced composite force training with the Navy at Fallon, with ourself at Goldwater and Nellis, with the Marines at Twentynine Palms and Yuma and with the Army at the National Training Center. Those skills perish very quickly if they are not practiced and demonstrated on a very frequent level. Plus the delivery of live ordnance, to be able to check and to maintain the quality assurance on the aircraft that they will deliver the ordnance on the software and the interfaces as good as we want it to be. That is a large piece of this, yes, ma'am.

    General NYLAND. I would simply add that sort of a combination. Not only do we look to be ready because of our equipment—you asked a question about training—the lessons learned that General Moseley talked about earlier come back to play in that.

    We found, for instance, in Iraq that the training we had done in the mountain, in our urban terrain centers was useful, but we also found out that maybe we needed to enhance it and we needed a larger urban terrain or an urban fixture to move around in rather than the small ones that we had. So we take those lessons learned and add those into the training and, where we can, into the equipment.

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    For instance, our request for the AAV, our amphibious assault vehicle, 67 of those in the supplemental will come out as requested with new transmissions, new engines, and far more capable than the ones that went into the front end of the line.

    So I would echo that you all are helping in many, many ways by allowing us to have those areas to train in, by allowing and providing for the support of the equipment for the individual soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, you are doing great things; and they are eminently appreciated.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, appreciate it.

    I think a lot of our discussion earlier was not just in the first phase of this war but in the second. So the kind of adaptability that is needed as well needs to be built into some of the thinking, and I think that we also engage and hope that we can think about that together in the future.

    General MOSELEY. Ma'am, if I could add one vignette that I think will make the point: When we developed the notion of an urban close air support concept of operations for Baghdad, the officer that put that together was a United States Marine Corps officer, a major, who is a graduate of the United States Navy Weapons School who was assigned to the United States Air Force Air Operation Center and who headed a team made up of the United States Army, United Kingdom, Australia, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force officers to build the concept of operations that we employed in an urban task setting.

    At the beginning of this two years ago, who would have thought that we would have had that team of people that demonstrated that flexibility and that adaptability in a true joint and combined setting? I am very proud of those people. I am very proud of that major, specifically.
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    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Appreciate that.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. FRANK. Mr. Snyder.

    Dr. SNYDER. I promised the chairman I would only ask two yes or no questions.

    General Cody, do our ground troops in South Korea have SAPI vests? Are they in line to get SAPI vests?

    General CODY. Yes, sir, they are. We changed our basis of issues planned to cover down on all our divisions and combat support troops, as well as the JSLIST suits (joint service lightweight integrated suit technology), by the way, the new JSLIST suits which we already shipped over there.

    Dr. SNYDER. And does this supplemental cover the needs of Guard Reserve forces who are activated to and participate in Iraq, who will be coming home; but I suspect that will be leaving some equipment behind? Does the supplemental meet the needs of them so they will have equipment to train on when they get back home?

    General CODY. They will have equipment to train on. In some cases, as we look at the Guard restructuring initiative, as we reformed them, taking 18 batteries of field artillerymen from the Guard and training them to MPs, so they will have that—the short answer is, yes, but some of the individual body armor, some of that will be put in our war reserve.
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    Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

    Mr. FRANK. Any other questions?

    Let me direct a question to General Cody. As you probably saw in the paper today, there was a little article in the paper today that said there may need to be a waiver on the 50/50 provision this year. Could you address that? And perhaps it would be appropriate for the entire panel to consider that as well.

    General CODY. Right now, the Army Materiel Command, sir, is taking a look at the size and scope of the amount of equipment, especially wheeled vehicles and track vehicles in our aviation fleet that we have to reset and get ready, coming out of this first fight.

    I read the statement. I am not sure, because I haven't gone back to the Army Materiel Command, but what I do know prior to reading it is that we were going to lead with the depots, max out all our maintenance capability that we have under the Army Materiel Command, and then whatever requirements that were above and beyond that max capacity, then we were looking to go back into some of the vendors and contracts for support; and I am not sure if we are going to go ask for the 50/50 waiver, or not. I will have to take that for the record, sir, and get back to you.

    [The information referred to can be viewed in the hard copy.]

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    Mr. FRANK. General Nyland.

    General NYLAND. Yes, sir.

    The Marine Corps does not anticipate having to request a waiver for the 50/50. We believe our capacity is sufficient.

    Mr. FRANK. General Moseley, what about yourself, sir?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, with what we know now and with the capacity of the three depots that we are operating at, we don't see a requirement to ask for a waiver at this point.

    Mr. FRANK [presiding]. Admiral Mullen.

    Admiral MULLEN. Same word, about 50 347 right now, and we do not anticipate having to ask for a waiver, sir.

    Mr. FRANK. Gentlemen, I just want to echo my earlier comments about how grateful we are for everything that you do for the country, and we appreciate your commitment. Admiral Mullen, General Moseley, General——

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, could we have one more round of questions?

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    Mr. FRANK. Sure. Forgive me. I thought we were finished. Mr. Abercrombie.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Moseley, I just want to make sure for the record that this question was answered while I was out. I am sorry, I had something else I had to do, I apologize. I just want to get it on the record.

    The tanker question came up, right, and the leasing aspect of it. In all of the discussion that takes place, particularly in the popular press, they sit out there where the carnival barkers are; I don't see any realistic discussion of where the money is supposed to come from. If you pay cash for something, presumably you can get a better deal than if you pay for it over time, right? The problem is, there is no cash. We cash-finance the Armed Services right now. I am not sure the public completely understands that.

    Isn't the reason that we are having the proposal for the leasing just as we kind of stumbled into forward funding and so on is because in order to substantiate the readiness, the capacity for readiness, utilizing the tankers, the lease is being proposed in order to be able to get a sufficient number of tankers to meet the needs of the Air Force, because we do not have enough cash and will not have enough cash in any given year's budget to be able to make up for what is required by the Air Force. Is that a fair statement?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, I believe, from our perspective, the requirement to get the tankers, the new tankers is valid. The 767 is the aircraft that will replace the 135–E and the 135–R. Those aircraft, the cost per flying hour is about twice of what the 767 would be.
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    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right.

    General MOSELEY. There is an immediate requirement for a new tanker to provide new fuel for the Navy, the Marines, coalition partners and the Air Force.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And there is not sufficient cash in the budget nor is there likely to be to purchase the required number outright, right?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, the lease notion was to deliver 60 aircraft within the FYDP and remain within the funding caps.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There you go. Now, I am glad you said that. Now, whether you can make a better deal on the lease, that is up to the Secretary. Of course, you are losing him. But I have a lot of confidence in him. I think that he is a shrewd businessperson. I think he understands what the needs are. And if he can score a better term from Boeing, all well and good. I am sure he is quite capable. He is used to tough negotiations, and I am sure that nobody is going to buffalo him or push him around in a negotiation.

    But just again, for the sake of the record and for those who may not be familiar, the reason that the Air Force is proposing the lease is in order to get the sufficient number to meet what you believe your readiness requirements entail or necessitate, right, as opposed to being—and the reason that you are proposing the lease is there is not sufficient cash to be able to acquire that number.

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    General MOSELEY. Sir, I would say there is a requirement for the tankers that is the backbone of any global force projection or combat operations. The existing KC–135 fleet is aging. The costs per flying hours are astronomical; the time in depot is astronomical. The corrosion, we are reaching safety margins on the aircraft. There is a requirement for a new tanker. The lease option gives us 60 aircraft within the FYDP. The organization plan pre-OEF and OIF expenditures of flying hours will deliver one aircraft within the FYDP which was the KCX (cargo plane). To stay within the funding caps of the Department, the lease is the quickest way to deliver the aircraft to the Air Force.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So those who would oppose the lease are welcome to do so if they can come up with the cash to get you a sufficient number of planes?

    General MOSELEY. Sir, I would let you say that. My point as the air commander is that we need a new tanker, we need to be able to provide air refueling capability in a global setting, and this plan gives us—this plan is within the funding caps and it delivers 60 aircraft within the FYDP.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is the reason, General, that I have been an advocate for some time and have been working with others who have an interest in separating the operations budget from the capital improvements budget. We should have a capital budget in the Department of Defense and an operations budget separate so that we don't find ourselves taking readiness and deployment and training and have that compete with military platforms. Because the expenditures involved in acquiring tankers or tanks or aircraft carriers and fighter planes, to put that in competition with training and acquisition of ammunition and such, deployment costs, et cetera, it seems to me is a contradiction in terms.
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    We should have an operating budget and a capital budget; and I think the lease is an interim, the lease proposition is an interim step in coming to a conclusion on that, and I hope you succeed, and you have my support.

    General MOSELEY. One last point that I would like to reiterate is these tankers are a national asset relative to anything that the United States Marines or the United States Navy or any coalition partner outside the United States Air Force have as requirements.

    Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would just add in conclusion that they are an investment in the future.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. I appreciate it.

    Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie. Thank all of you for your testimony. We are very proud of you and grateful for your service. This meeting is adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]