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[H.A.S.C. No. 108–12]








OCTOBER 21, 2003

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JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
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SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee

Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Jean Reed, Professional Staff Member
Uyen Dinh, Professional Staff Member
William Natter, Professional Staff Member
Curtis Flood, Staff Assistant





    Tuesday, October 21, 2003, C4I Interoperability: New Challenges in 21st Century Warfare


    Tuesday, October 21, 2003
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    Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee

    Meehan, Hon. Martin T., a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee


    Leaf, Lt. Gen. Daniel, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command

    Moran, Brig. Gen. Dennis, Director, Information Operations, Networks and Space, United States Army

    Rogers, Brig. Gen. Marc, USAF, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate, J8, United States Joint Forces Command

    Stalder, Maj. Gen. Keith, United States Marine Corps, Deputy Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force
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    Wallace, Lt. Gen. William, Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command


[The Prepared Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Leaf, Lt. Gen. Daniel

Moran, Brig. Gen. Dennis

Rogers, Brig. Gen. Marc

Stalder, Maj. Gen. Keith

Wallace, Lt. Gen. William


[The Documents can be viewed in the hard copy.]


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[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]

Mr. Larsen
Mr. Thornberry


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 21, 2003.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:17 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.


    Mr. SAXTON. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me apologize. We just finished a vote. And so we are a little bit late getting started. But we will try to expedite the process here so we can move through this at a smart pace.

    Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets this morning to assess command, control, communications, computer and intelligence systems—C4I—interoperability issues and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We are also interested to learn more about how these issues present new challenges in the 21st century.
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    Ensuring that systems work effectively together is a key issue for the Department of Defense as it transitions the military into a lighter, faster, more lethal force in the battlespace. Information technology plays a critical role in the department's transformation.

    The objective is to decrease the decision making time process to effectively shorten the sensor-to-shooter time to deliver rounds on targets. Network centric warfare (NCW) is an essential element in the department's transformation.

    The foundation of NCW is to use technology—computers, data links, networks—to connect members of the armed services, ground vehicles, aircraft and ships into a series of highly integrated local and wide-area networks capable of sharing critical data information on a rapid and continuous-time basis. NCW's components include: interoperability of various command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

    NCW eliminates stove-pipe systems, parochial interests, redundant and non-interoperable systems, and optimizes capital planning investments for present and future IT systems. The subcommittee supports the department's initiative to attain the goals of NCW by implementing network-centric activities and programs.

    To provide our warfighters the most accurate real-time information, they must have the latest command, control, communications, computer and intelligence systems to receive and move that data over secure communication links. The key is to have this information move seamlessly within a chain of command and between the service commanders.
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    During OIF, the United States had over 170,000 military personnel in theater. With such a large number of people involved in operations that spanned several countries, it was imperative to have real-time C4I interoperability between the services at every level to coordinate missions, air-strikes, troop movements and to prevent fratricide.

    Interoperability is more than just the individual C4I and weapon systems that move the information to leverage firepower. Interoperability also includes procedures and techniques.

    But most importantly, interoperability is about people and how warfighters can obtain real-time access to intelligence and information to make informed decisions in battle. Information, access to it and how fast it can be delivered now determines combat power.

    There are several C4I interoperability issues that should be addressed during today's hearing. These include Battle Command On the Move—the integration of command and control (C2), intelligence, logistics, force protection and weapon systems, bandwidth constraints and satellite communications and coalition interoperability.

    These fundamental issues need to be addressed as the U.S. military transforms to meet and defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in the 21st century battlespace.

    I would at this time like to yield to my friend, Mr. Meehan, for any comments he may wish to make.

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    [The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be viewed in the hard copy.]


    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am impressed by the success of our extensive military operations in Iraq. And I share your view that this success represents really the culmination of intensive investment in advanced command and control systems.

    I returned recently from a trip to Iraq. And despite some misgivings about the way we are attempting to stabilize and rebuild, I can personally attest to the professional dedication of the men and women in uniform.

    As for equipment and information systems, it is clear that the joint success of Operation Iraqi Freedom are the direct results of investments made 5 to 10 years ago. That said, I also recognize that many of the past and present shortcomings, as well as recognize the future challenges.

    Information fusion is perhaps the greatest challenge, particularly in the intelligence collection and dissemination architecture. Yet, the delivery of actual intelligence from the point of collection to the people who need to use it is a necessary and vital component of battlefield success.

    There are many challenges as well. And I hope that this hearing serves, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of increasing our focus on the appropriate investments, whether they are financial or intellectual. And I look forward to the testimony of the panelists and thank the chairman.
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    [The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Meehan.

    We only have one panel of witnesses for our proceedings this morning. I want to welcome our panel of witnesses who will testify on the importance of C4I interoperability following combat operations in Iraq.

    They are: Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander of the U.S. Army's V Corps. He was responsible for the capture and occupation of Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    His headquarters synchronized the decisive execution of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment and the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Cavalry Division, the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division, along with the associated combat support and combat service support under the 3rd Corps Support Command. Presently, General Wallace is commanding general for Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

    Also, Lieutenant General Daniel Leaf, served as director of Air Component Coordination Element with the Coalition Land Forces Component commander in Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. General Leaf served as the Joint Forces Air Component commander's representative to the land component commander. He worked with the Coalition Forces Air Component commander to develop the air and space strategy and coordinated close-air-support missions with the Army.
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    General Leaf acted as the coordinating authority between the land and air commanders. Presently, General Leaf is vice commander for U.S. Air Force Space Command.

    Major General Keith Stalder served and continues to serve as the deputy commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the command element for all Marine air, ground and combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During command operations, he was responsible for the MEF's rear headquarters.

    From this vantage point, General Stalder was able to assess the effectiveness of the corps' C4I systems operating within the MEF and those networked to higher headquarters, sister services and coalition partners.

    Brigadier General Dennis Moran, who served as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM's), J–6 and was responsible for all programs that provide command, control and communications (C3), support to the commander of CENTCOM and his staff during OIF. In addition, he was responsible for the integration of all C3 support required by the ground, air and sea components of CENTCOM.

    General Moran also provided the planning and execution of the communications architecture for Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Presently, General Moran is the director of Information Operations, Networks and Space for the U.S. Army.

    Brigadier General Marc Rogers is the director, Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate, J–8 for the U.S. Joint Forces Command. He is responsible for integrating the national military strategy with the Department of Defense's (DOD) planning programming and budgeting system.
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    His directorate conducts reviews of future capabilities requirements outlined by the combatant commanders. The directorate focuses on the degree of interoperability among all force components and then validates emerging technology for testing through experimentation and demonstration.

    At the outset, I ask unanimous consent that all members' and witnesses' written opening statements be included in the record. I also ask unanimous consent that articles, exhibits and extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

    General Wallace, you may proceed, sir.

    Thank you very much, all of you, for being here. And thank you for your patience.


    General WALLACE. Good morning, sir. Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

    My name is Lieutenant General William Wallace. I currently serve as the commander of the Combined Arms Center, where we support the Army Training through our four core missions of doctrine development, leader development, collective training and battle command.
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    I am pleased to be before the committee today. Your leadership of our country and support of our military are greatly appreciated. And I am honored by this opportunity to contribute to your endeavors.

    I have submitted a full statement to the committee, which, as you have already said, will be made part of the record. I will now give a very brief opening statement.

    I am the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's proponent for battle command. I hope to be of assistance to you by sharing my Operation Iraqi Freedom experience and insights from the perspective of the former V Corps commander during our operations to liberate the country of Kuwait—or Iraq.

    I would suggest to you that we enjoyed great success in C4I compatibilities and joint network enhanced fighting during the recent fight. But there is still some work to be done.

    I believe we need to push the goodness gained by network enhanced operations down to the tactical level. I believe that we need to design and field tactical command posts capable of Battle Command On the Move. And finally, I think we need to put some effort into overcoming what I refer to as the ''digital divide'' that exists between the combat soldier and the information that he needs to fight in complex terrain and against a determined enemy.

    With regard to command post, I believe we are capable of fielding Battle Command On the Move capabilities. Stationary command posts, in my judgment, do not support large-scale maneuver warfare.
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    I believe commanders should be untethered from fixed command post structures. And I believe that our experience in Iraqi Freedom proved that Battle Command On the Move works.

    My own command post, a small number of vehicles, a small number of soldiers, was linked to the battlefield by commercial narrow and wide band satellite connections that enabled me to observe the fight through the use of a system called C2PC, command and control personal computer. That computer and that network allowed us to see both my formations, those of the Marine Expeditionary Force and those of the coalition forces on the move during the course of the fight.

    We also had the capability of a thing called Blue Force Tracking, which has received some accolades during the course of the fight, which gave us the granularity to see individual vehicles during the course of the battle. All of that linked together with a capability to provide long-range voice communications through wide band tactical satellite communications enabled us to maintain Battle Command On the Move capabilities from my command post.

    I would suggest that that capability needs to be pushed down further in the chain of command in our command post structure, so that organizations from battalion all the way to corps could enjoy that kind of connectivity. I believe that mobile satellite network command posts can have a smaller footprint on the battlefield.

    I believe it is feasible to give some traditional command post functions to distant sanctuary command posts or even home station operation centers and, in so doing, enhance the deployability of our formations, reduce the drain on strategic lift. I also believe that smaller command posts, because of the size of their footprint, would be more survivable based on the smaller physical presence on the battlefield.
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    My experience also suggests that terrestrial-based communications limit our warfighting capability under conditions of complex terrain. Near real-time satellite network connectivity, in my judgment, is the key to gaining enhanced situational awareness effectiveness in that kind of terrain.

    In summary, Mr. Chairman, Operation Iraqi Freedom proved the effectiveness and potential of network enhanced warfare. We know it works. Applying lessons that we learned, we can improve our C4I capabilities by discarding technology and concepts that did not work and pursuing those that did.

    The Battle Command On the Move concept works. We just need to build a command post structure that supports it.

    I believe satellite-based communications work. But we need to enhance our ability to take advantage of the available bandwidth and better manage the bandwidth that is available to push the synergy of the network enhanced operations down to the tactical level.

    I believe that once we overcome the digital divide, then we can push the synergy of the network and the enhanced operations that that holds to the heroic soldier in the dirt. I would also suggest to you that we also need to understand and always remember that, regardless of the improvements that we gain and the networks that we build, warfare in the 21st century will remain lethal, up close and personal and that the American soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, supported by family and nation, will continue to be our most treasured and lethal weapon. Their bravery, heroism, sacrifice and compassion will continue to be our impression.
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    Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I stand ready to answer your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Wallace can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. General Wallace, thank you very much.

    We will move now to General Leaf.


    General LEAF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am also honored to be appearing before you today, especially with such a distinguished panel of friends and fellow joint warfighters.

    I cannot improve much on the basic precepts of your statement, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Meehan's or General Wallace's. I would like to offer a few amplifications of my thoughts, in addition to the written statement that you have already accepted into the record.

    My experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom was from a unique perspective of an airman with a land component. It was also somewhat unique because I had worked for the previous 3-plus years as the director of operational requirements—later operational capability requirements—for the Air Force; and thus, was involved in the formulating of the requirements and the basis for interoperability for the Air Force side of capabilities.
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    That was further improved upon, that view was improved upon, by an opportunity to travel throughout Operation Enduring Freedom, at the behest of the chief of staff of the Air Force, General Jumper, and Secretary Roche, to look at our kill chain, improving the timeliness of our time-sensitive and other targeting actions and ensure that we had as much network centricity and machine-to-machine communication as possible, not to eliminate the warfighter, not to eliminate the human element of combat, but to enable it.

    From that perspective and some Goldwater-Nichols-mandated joint service, I think I had a unique seat, working for General McKiernan. My statement stresses the importance of the human element of warfare, not just at the soldier, sailor, airman and Marine level, but at the operational level, where the component commanders executed the combatant commanders' plan, I would say, brilliantly.

    They did it as true joint teammates. And that was fundamental to the success on the battlefield, General Wallace, your component, the Special Operations Component and our maritime forces.

    That cannot be replaced by machines. It can only be improved upon. And I think it important to capture that, as we also capture the technical lessons learned and acknowledge the areas where we have room for improvement.

    We have improved, as noted, because of investment. We have also improved because of innovation.

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    We have invested heavily in C4I systems. And we have innovated through joint experiment, joint exercises and taking what we have learned there and getting it to the field.

    And specifically, we have transitioned 32 of 70 initiatives from Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX) to the field in time for Iraqi freedom. That innovation and timely application of technology to the warfighters' problem is essential if we are going to succeed at the pace of change we face in the modern world.

    We have a good structure now for examining interoperability. All of our acquisition programs at level two or higher require a key performance parameter for interoperability.

    Those parameters have to include critical information exchange requirements. In the Air Force, in fact, while I was director of requirements, made it mandatory not just for Acquisition Category (ACAT) level two and higher, but for all acquisition programs.

    That is a very good measure for setting a foundational level of interoperability. We must be careful not to over-legislate interoperability or we will reach paralysis. We will not be able to turn initiatives and equipment advances fast enough to get them to the field.

    Additionally, we have to be aware that there is some danger in homogeneity. Our components—and they are not Air Force components, it is an air component; it is not an Army component, it is a land component; and I know you all are well aware of that—bring unique capabilities to the fight.
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    We need to make them conceptually and technically interoperable without making them totally alike. Because their differences in capability, their are differences in approaches bring a broad spectrum against the enemy and enable victory.

    I believe we demonstrated that. We do have room for improvement, particularly in avoiding fratricide, blue on blue and improving the situational awareness of the warfighter.

    In terms of fratricide, zero is the only good score. And we are not there yet. We will continue to work that. The Army-led Blue Force Tracker initiative is an example of potential advances we can make in that area.

    Additionally, I think, when it comes to bandwidth and the use of the available spectrum, we do not just need to improve our user equipment, as General Wallace accurately noted, we have to improve our awareness of the utilization of the spectrum. Just like we need an operationalized picture of air activity and land activity and maritime activity and space activity, we must have a picture, that operational commanders can use, of bandwidth utilization, availability and, in some cases, waste, so that they can set and implement priorities that lead to the efficient use of what bandwidth is available.

    I look forward to your questions. And again, I am honored here to represent our Air Force with these great joint warfighters. I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Leaf can be viewed in the hard copy.]
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    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, general.

    General Stalder, we are going to move over to you now. Let me apologize for mispronouncing your name in my opening statement, sir.


    General STALDER. No problem, sir. It happens quite frequently, actually.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the First Marine Expeditionary Force's experiences and observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    I served as the deputy commanding general throughout the operation. And I returned from Iraq last month.

    Thank you very much for your support of our armed forces. Command and control systems generally were very effective and conveyed commanders' intent, reports, orders, intelligence and overlays well. They supported constant communications between and among the MEF commander, our subordinate commanders and the joint and combined units and headquarters that made up our force.
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    During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEF performed many of its tasks and missions in the time-proven tradition of the Navy-Marine Corps team. But the Marine Corps had never operated and conducted sustained operations in combat so far inland until now.

    Our command and control facilities and equipment required tactical and operational flexibility and mobility greater than envisioned. The system performed remarkably well under the very harsh conditions we encountered.

    The Marine Corps installed, operated and maintained the largest and most complex architecture in our history. It required 80 percent of the Marine Corps' communications assets and the augmentation of commercial satellite resources as well.

    We supported both Marine and British coalition forces. And while there were challenges and there are needed improvements, the overall consensus from commanders at every level was that communications and interoperability worked well.

    No amount of technology can eliminate the human dimension of war. Our best command and control system is still a well-trained Marine.

    With me today is Colonel George Allen, who served as the MEF assistant chief of staff for communications during Operation Iraqi Freedom. I am honored to appear here before you today and look forward to your questions.

    Thank you.
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    [The prepared statement of General Stalder can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, sir.

    General Moran.


    General MORAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony describing Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom C4I lessons learned, based on my experiences as the director of command, control, communications and computers or what is better known as the CENTCOM J–6.

    And I need to add, it is an absolute professional pleasure to be here, not only with these great warfighters, but in front of this committee, with the important work that you have to do.

    Prior to 9/11, the US Central Command Area of Operation was an economy of forces theater that supported relatively small headquarters. The communications architecture to support the missions was austere, consisting of tactical satellite communications and a small amount of commercial satellite supporting widely dispersed sites.
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    During Operation Enduring Freedom, the communications architecture grew, literally and figuratively, in support of uncharted locations and C2 requirements. As the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom came together, US CENTCOM leveraged lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom concerning force numbers and C4 requirements. And the architecture changed dramatically.

    Lessons learned from operations in Southwest Asia centered on three main topics: Beyond Line-of-Sight Communications; Battle Command On the Move; and coalition information sharing.

    The first lesson I will address is beyond line-of-sight communications. As General Wallace has already stated, the required distances between command posts greatly exceeded the capabilities of the current military multi-channel line-of-sight communications equipment.

    Solutions developed or adapted were hybrid military-commercial systems that proved invaluable in providing required critical communications links.

    The second lesson learned was that of the speed of maneuver that produced distances well beyond—distances between lower echelon units that exceeded the capabilities of today's tactical radio systems. The Army, in response to this, fielded Blue Force Tracking and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, FBCB2, systems that would allow V Corps to execute Battle Command On the Move and maintain better situational awareness.

    The last lesson learned I will mention concerns coalition forces. The coalition forces require an unprecedented amount of information to maintain an adequate level of situational awareness. US CENTCOM, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense—Network and Information Integration, NII, developed a coalition information sharing system called CENTRIXS, Coalition Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System.
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    This system provided command and control computer applications to allow the British and Australian tactical headquarters to receive the information they required.

    In conclusion, the Army continues to take an analytical look at the lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, to determine what adjustments will improve near-term combat capabilities, as well as to better position itself for future successes. What is clear is the need to invest in both emerging technology and emerging operational concepts that will make our forces more combat effective.

    The warfighter requires a global, interoperable, integrated network, which supports distributed planning and decentralized execution. The services are working to ensure that improvements of the joint C4I architecture and the systems to support that vision.

    Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of General Moran can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. General, thank you very much.

    And now we will go to General Rogers.

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    General ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, good morning. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss 21st century challenges to command and control for joint warfighting.

    United States Joint Forces Command, under the command of Admiral Ed Giambastiani, continues to advance our nation's joint capabilities through concept development and experimentation, advancing interoperability, integrating joint capabilities, providing joint force training, providing trained joint forces to combatant commanders.

    My personal focus at Joint Forces Command is on improving joint command and control effectiveness by working to improve and resolve interoperability issues and to integrate service and joint command and control capabilities. Our battle management command and control efforts are aimed at providing an integrated, interoperable and networked joint force.

    The primary goal is to give our people the best capabilities to plan, coordinate, control, direct and assess joint operations. And as you said in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, it is all about people, what real people have to do in real combat situations, sometimes under stress, at all levels of the operation.

    I want to thank the committee for your continued support of our armed forces and specifically for the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and their families who make sacrifices every day on behalf of this nation. They are the ones who deserve our best efforts. And I look forward to working with the committee toward that end.

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    I look forward to your questions, sir. Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of General Rogers can be viewed in the hard copy.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, General Rogers.

    We will move at this point to see what kinds of questions we can drum up for you fine folks. And we will start with the ranking member, Mr. Meehan.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General Rogers, the Department of Defense has several planned information architectures, including the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Army's twin T, the Navy's FORCEnet and the Air Force's C2 constellation. One might expect various architectures to address functional issues. But the current split—it seems to me, along service boundaries—raises the question of parochialism that is inconsistent with today's joint cyber environment.

    Is there an overall DOD information architecture? And are these various information architectures compatible? And will they convert?

    General ROGERS. Sir, I would address that question two ways: one, in terms of parochialism or any perceived parochialism, I will tell you that, in my hat, trying to improve joint interoperability and integrating joint capabilities, I have received nothing but enthusiastic engagement from the services. I was pleasantly surprised when I went to Joint Forces Command and found that every service is far beyond what may have been perceived from a few decades ago.
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    And all are interested in ensuring that their future command and control architectures are joint from the beginning in terms of architectures that need to be net-centric and be able to operate in the GIG, within the GIG construct.

    In terms of legacy systems, all are interested in one second facet, and that is the ability to maintain a capability while we transition to full net-centric capability. And to that end, Joint Forces Command has partnered with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically the undersecretary for acquisition, test and logistics, to build a battled management command and control road map, which is specifically aimed at, over the next several years, attempting to migrate various service systems to an interoperable structure.

    I hope that answers your question.

    Mr. MEEHAN. So there is an overall DOD information architecture. And, over the next several years, if I understand the answer, these various information architectures will converge and become compatible?

    General ROGERS. That is our hope, sir. It is a tremendous challenge, as you can imagine. But that is our hope, is that we will be able to bring together a number of integrated architecture—we call it integrated architectures—to achieve the net-centric capabilities in the future.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, general.

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    General Moran, how did CENTCOM physically provide the infrastructure for information interoperability in Operation Iraqi Freedom? And was this task tantamount to building a DOD intranet in Iraq?

    General MORAN. Sir, what we were focused on providing to the warfighting forces were a number of communications capabilities—secure voice, non-secure data, secure data and video teleconferencing. Those were the four services that we knew had to be delivered to almost every level of command and control.

    And so what we did, in coordination with the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps, is to develop a communications architecture, which used predominantly military and commercial satellites, that brought bandwidth to command post locations throughout the theater, which delivered those services and created the secure and the non-secure internet that you just referred to in your question and also gave the commanders the capability to communicate, via voice, both within the theater and then back to the Continental United States or to Europe or to the Pacific, and also the capability to do secure video teleconferences from many places on the battlefield, either within the theater or back to the Continental United States, Europe or to the Pacific.

    Mr. MEEHAN. General, what physical infrastructure was most successful?

    General MORAN. First of all, the military infrastructure, the green boxes that we had invested in over time in the Air Force and the Army, the Marine Corps, was extremely successful. So the capabilities, which our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines train on every day provided the baseline of communications that the command posts needed.
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    But the commercial communications, the commercial satellite communications that we brought into the theater, were needed because our military communications did not have the full capacity necessary to meet all of the needs for secure voice, secure data, non-secure data and video teleconferencing for those command posts. So we made complete and very successful use of the military system that we had already been fielded.

    And we were able to leverage commercial, state-of-the-shelf architecture—or state-of-the-shelf equipment, commercial equipment, to meet those needs that were beyond the capabilities of our military system.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Let me ask the general, what IT investment did CENTCOM make into the region that provided for this robust networking capabilities during the conflict?

    General MORAN. I am going to key on your word ''investments.'' There were some operational things that we did—and let me speak to those first—that demonstrate that the department attempted and did, in fact, give Central Command all of the satellite capability that was possible with military satellites.

    We, in fact, moved a number of military satellites so that they were in a better position to satisfy our forces, both within Afghanistan and Iraq. And we even, through agreements with Australia, leased a satellite, which also provided some communications specifically for Afghanistan, but gave us some capacity then that was available to us in Iraq.

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    From an investment perspective, we invested in Ku commercial satellite terminals that were transportable; in other words, they could be picked up and moved from location to location. And we invested in state-of-the-shelf data communications systems that are available from companies like SISCO or other commercial companies. And we invested in telephone switches and computers that gave us and created the capability for the services' data, voice and VTC that the commanders and the warfighters required.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, general.

    Last question, General Wallace and maybe General Stalder, how did Blue Force Tracking work, with respect to your troops and Marines? And what is the difference between Blue Force Tracking and combat identification? And are we going to need both for a future operation?

    General WALLACE. Sir, first let me explain to you my perspective on Blue Force Tracking. First of all, I think it was an extraordinarily successful fielding. But it was a relatively thin fielding to the formation.

    On average, the U.S. Army divisions that received Blue Force Tracking only got about 150 systems per division. And that was based on limitations in satellite capability and just the physical capability to produce those numbers and get them in the field in a relatively rapid fashion.

    The Blue Force Tracking systems were put primarily in commander's vehicles or vehicles that we assumed would be in close combat with the enemy, such as reconnaissance units. The system itself, the Blue Force Tracking system itself, worked very well.
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    It was satellite based. It provided to those folks that did have Blue Force Tracking visual signals as to where they were in relationship to the formation in which they were moving. It also gave them real-time view of other Blue Force Tracking-equipped vehicles and equipment, regardless of where they were in the formation.

    What Blue Force Tracking did not do, because of the level of fielding, it does not give you individual vehicle views because of the thin fielding that I mentioned a moment ago, which leads to your second question with regard to situational awareness and potential for fratricide avoidance.

    It is my judgment that Blue Force Tracking provides the ability to deny fires to occur. But it does not clear fires. And by that, I mean you do not have any guarantee that a Blue Force Tracking-equipped vehicle is, in fact, having a malfunction in that system.

    So to answer the latter part of your question, in my judgment, there is going to have to be some kind of identification friend or foe system that complements Blue Force Tracking. But it, in and of itself, I do not believe is a solution.

    General LEAF. May I, Representative Meehan? I would like to concur with General Wallace and add to that a little bit.

    Blue Force Tracker is part of the overall combat identification matrix. But it does not, as he noted, give specific ID. And it is not of the fidelity or latency, at this point, to enable, for example, danger close expenditure of organs where friendly forces are at risk.
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    Because of its potential, however, the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff of the Air Force visited Air Force Space Command some weeks ago and gave us strong direction to look at how we can improve, enhance and expand the role of Blue Force Tracker, as part of our overall situational awareness.

    There are ways to reduce the latency by using an atmospheric relay, as opposed to a satellite relay. There are ways—money, principally—to expand the fielding of systems that we can and should look at doing that, as we integrate it into an identification friend or foe and other means of combat identification that can technically identify enemy or friendly systems.

    So we see, in the Air Force, while the Army continues its leadership of Blue Force Tracking initiatives, a great need for our serve to step up to it as part of combat identification and to expand its utilization.

    Mr. MEEHAN. General Stalder.

    General STALDER. Sir, I concur with General Wallace's comments on their experience in the use of Blue Force Tracker. We had two different systems. We used the MTS 2011, which is referred to generically as Blue Force Tracker.

    And we also used the Marine Corps' program of record system, which is called MDAC. We fielded 319 MDAC, 177 Blue Force Trackers to Marine units and 47 Blue Force Trackers to UK units.
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    That coverage allowed us to function and operate much in the same manner as our colleagues in V Corps did, by pushing those systems to the most forward elements and those elements that might come in contact with the enemy in a situation where it required us to have as good a situational awareness as possible, as to the disposition. It was by no means complete coverage.

    With respect to Blue Force Tracker, it is certainly useful and additive to the combat identification problem. But it is by no means a complete solution. It does not have the fidelity. And the shooter, who is ultimately the one who will make the decision on whether or not to engage a target, does not have the information they need from Blue Force Tracking system to do that with the precision that we would all like.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much. And thank you for your outstanding answers. And thank you for the great work that you do for the country.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Meehan.

    I move now to the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And thank you for a terrific job in Iraq, just a terrific job.

    We are all so proud. And I know you know that. And you are proud of your troops and your airmen and your Marines. But we are also.
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    In every operation that I ever participated in back in my days in uniform, whether it was real or training, there was always an after-action in which we stood up and concluded that command, indeed, was perfect—because obviously we were the commanders—but we did not have enough intelligence and the communications was terrible.

    I am hearing a little bit different story from you today. We just heard that Blue Force Tracking was a little thin and needed to be improved.

    I would like to hear, particularly from the ground force commanders in either order, what else was broken. What could you not do that you really felt that you needed to do, in the sense of communication of control and com?

    General WALLACE. Sir, I will take a whack at it. Several things come to mind.

    First of all, we realized early in the fight the importance of non-terrestrial communications, specially wideband technical satellite or SATCOM communications. There was insufficient frequencies allocated to provide that technical satellite communications to all the formations that needed it.

    As I recall, the V Corps had allocated about eight frequencies, as I recall, several of which did not work because of what is referred to as ''low look angle;'' that is that you cannot acquire the satellite with a high degree of efficiency, and therefore, the satellite communications channel is corrupted.
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    Second, we had problems with some of the frequencies themselves, with corrupted channels on the satellites. And as I recall, three or four of the frequencies that we were allocated were just not usable for the purposes that we needed them.

    Has to do with the comment that I made during my opening statement, with regard to frequency and bandwidth management. I think we have to do a better job in that regard to provide to he who needs it the frequencies and the spectrum and the bandwidth that they need at the time that they need it.

    Mr. KLINE. Excuse me, where does that management need to take place?

    General WALLACE. I believe it takes place at the joint headquarters level, because they alone are responsible for the bandwidth within the theater. And they alone have the responsibility for providing the bandwidth to all the components.

    Mr. KLINE. So in this case, CENTCOM itself?

    General WALLACE. Central Command, with the recommendations from the component commanders, in my judgment.

    The second thing that we made great inroads on but need to continue to work on is the notion of Battle Command On the Move. From my command post, we could move. And in fact, I could have real-time visualization of both the enemy and friendly locations, location of artillery, the fans of fire of those artillery systems.
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    What we could not get on the move, however, was real-time satellite imagery or real-time pictures from UAVs, for example. We had to stop, elevate our antennas for larger bandwidth to receive the streaming video from the GBS system in order to get those pictures.

    Further, although I could get that at my command post by going to a short halt and erecting those antennas, it was very difficult to push those images down to lower levels of command. The brigade level command posts generally did not have that capability. And certainly, the battalion level command posts did not.

    So I think one of the things that we need to work on in the future and one of the things we saw limitations in was being able to get information that was available to us at higher echelons of command down to the lower echelons of command, where it is most needed and where the most granularity is necessary to fight the fight.

    Mr. KLINE. And that is, since time began, that is a problem. Is that an equipment issue?

    General WALLACE. In my judgment, it is both an equipment issue. It is a bandwidth allocation and management issue. And it is also the design of the command posts, to make them smaller and more mobile, so they can accept the feeds that we are providing them. And the command posts can continue to move with the formations that they are a part of and still take advantage of the information that is available, but presently we are unable to push down to them.

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    Those would be my initial remarks, with regard to your question, sir.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

    General Stalder.

    General STALDER. Sir, I will make a couple of comments on things that I think need more work. I would not characterize these as irretrievably broken.

    Mr. KLINE. Certainly, there were times when you just could not talk and it had to drive you crazy? It always has. I am just trying to find out if that is still there and what it is.

    General STALDER. Sir, there were rarely times when we were absolutely and completely out of communications, either at the MEF headquarters level or down at the lower levels. Everything General Wallace told you with respect to Command On the Move was certainly true of our forces.

    But in terms of creating any major friction points or rubs, we did not experience any major problems like that. We experienced one issue that gave us cause for concern.

    A couple of nights into the war, misplaced our command post to Talil in Southern Iraq. And we had only one means of communicating with them. Ordinarily, we have two or three. That caused us some concern.

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    Command of the operation was passed back to me in Commando Camp at Kuwait very briefly. The cause of the concern was the weather. A sandstorm was occurring at that point that nobody had remembered anything the like of in all of Iraq's memory.

    And at the MEF level, that was the only time when I was very concerned. But we maintained communication and we continued the battle.

    So that is my perspective from our experience.

    Mr. KLINE. I see my time has expired. But how did you maintain communications? What was the——

    General STALDER. We did it with satellite communications.

    Mr. KLINE. SATCOM. Okay.

    Okay, I am allowed another minute or so here. If you have some more ''it did not works.''

    General STALDER. Sir, these are the things that I think need work. I would characterize them that way. I will not spend a lot of time on each one.

    Combat identification needs work. General Wallace spoke to the digital divide, communication on the move and beyond line-of-sight communication and bandwidth. The integration of our combat support.
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    By those applications, I mean Theater Battle Management Care Systems, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Asset Tracking and Accountability Control System (ATACS), Airborne Seperation Assurance System (ASAS), IOC. I apologize for the alphabet soup. But all of those systems are only marginally interoperable.

    They are legacy systems. And improvements certainly are in the offing. But in terms of capability for the warfighter, that would be very valuable.

    The applications that we support coalition operations with, need work, centric-specifically. While well suited for higher levels of command, it is not as responsive at the tactical level, in terms of communicating the mass amounts of information and data that are required to be shared with the coalition warfighting partner at the coalition level.

    And finally, human intelligence is always something that will be extremely valuable. As the MEF, with the V Corps, began our attack on Baghdad and ultimately the capture occurred, our human sources in that portion of the battlespace were extremely limited.

    Mr. KLINE. Right. Let me, just one more, if I might, Mr. Chairman, because we have talked about assignment of frequencies and bandwidth. General Moran, you were the J–6?

    General MORAN. Yes, sir.

    Mr. KLINE. Presumably, you were involved in that allocation?
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    General MORAN. Absolutely.

    Mr. KLINE. I am not accusatory. I am just trying to——

    General MORAN. The issue that General Wallace is talking about and if I had to say what was broken is there simply was not enough bandwidth at all levels of command to give the warfighters at the battalion—at the brigade level—the kinds of information they needed to be more effective. The current suite of satellites that we had and we utilized that did an extremely good job of providing adequate bandwidth down to the division level, when you went from the division level down the brigade, down to the battalion and then even further down to the companies, there just were not sufficient systems, as General Wallace alluded to, in a sufficient bandwidth, to provide them all of the information they needed to be effective.

    So what are we doing to fix that? First of all—and again, I am speaking from my Army position, where I am in the Army staff now—as we look at the lessons learned that we have from Iraqi Freedom, the first thing that it is doing is validating the architectures—the communications architecture, the command and control architecture—that we have in our future combat system,; albeit that that system is not going to be delivered for a number of years. But it validates the technologies that we are trying to place down at the combat vehicle level, the lowest level, is going to give them the kind of information that they are going to require to be more effective.

    If you tie the investments that we are making in the JTRS radio, the Joint Tactical Radio System, and if you tie that to the investments that we are making in the wide band gap filler satellite system, which will be coming on board in about 2 years, you look at the investments that we are making in the advanced DHF satellite system, with the ground terminals that will be in these formations, we are moving in the right direction to take that bandwidth starved formations and pushing bandwidth down to those organizations.
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    And the last step, which will be the least further out, is the need to continue in the investments in the transformational communications architecture, which is really going to give us, because of the kinds of technology we will get in that satellite constellation, give us the real capability that we will require, the objective capability, for Battle Command On the Move, where we will be able to move operational information, intelligence information, logistics information—I do not want to say freely, but certainly with much greater ease than we have now.

    What we in the Army are doing right now is examining the programs that exist in the fiscal year 2005 budget. And we are making decisions that must be approved by the Army leadership, must be approved by the Department of Defense leadership and finally, will be presented to the Congress next year, which will show the changes that we would like to make in systems that will overcome the deficiencies that have been identified in Iraqi Freedom and our war in Afghanistan.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you. And I presume there is multi-service discussion and collaboration in that effort?

    General MORAN. Sir, you are absolutely right. And General Rogers mentioned the joint battle management command and control road map, which is a Joint Forces Command and a DOD level effort to synchronize, across time and across domains, all of the command and control systems within the Joint Force. And they recognize the information that must be at the joint level.

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    But as General Leaf stated, it recognizes the unique requirements that the Air Force, the land component and the naval component has, so we can satisfy not only the needs of the Joint Force commander, but meet the needs of that specific commander that is in the air, on the land or in the sea.

    Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Kline.

    Mr. Larsen, please.

    Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Got a set of questions. I am not quite sure who to start with. But I may start with General Wallace.

    We talked ahead of time a little bit about a few of these things. But I wanted to ask you about the question of digital divide. And I hope we do not—this committee—lose sight of the point you are making about the digital divide between operational level and tactical level.

    But I would like you to discuss, if there is a digital divide between us and our coalition partners, our ability to share information on the ground, as is needed—and not that it is wrong for us to get too far ahead of any other country in terms of our technology, but what that might do for our ability to work in a coalition setting in the battlefield?

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    General WALLACE. Yes, sir. My judgment is that there will be a separation in capability between our forces and those of whatever coalition that we might operate as a part of. And I think the operative word is ''any coalition.''

    We need to be prepared to operate to the same degree of efficiency with our British friends and Australian friends who may be more advanced than others in their command and control and IT technology. My judgment is that the only way to truly solve that problem is to recognize the importance of liaison teams that are sent out from our headquarters to become part of coalition headquarters and share with them the information that we have available to us.

    I think it is probably unrealistic for us to expect those coalition allies, because of the level of spending that they have within their own defense budgets, to buy the same capabilities that we ourselves enjoy.

    Mr. LARSEN. I want to ask a question of maybe General Rogers. And maybe someone else can chime in as well.

    In our background, an issues statement that was given to the committee, I want to just highlight a few statements that were made. We have to have the ability to move data over secure lines. We depend upon the security of our information technology infrastructure in order to move this data from command down to the tactical level.

    The network itself, as a result, becomes a weapon. The fact that we have this network becomes a weapon.

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    Earlier this year, in our defense authorization debate, we cut about $2 billion out of the IT programs overall in DOD, largely just across the board. We did not really, I think, have a full consideration of the impacts of what that might mean on the security of our technology infrastructure within the department.

    So that is sort of a context for the question for General Rogers and anybody else that wants to answer it. What if we faced a more technologically capable enemy than we did in Iraq?

    What if our enemy perhaps certainly was not as far down the road as we are, in terms of our ability to integrate information technology into our warfighter, but they still had the ability to get inside our systems, get inside our—not past our front lines, but sort of get inside our fiber optic lines and inside our satellite communications?

    What are we doing to prepare for that?

    General ROGERS. Sir, I will tell you, you hit on a number of areas that we have been wrestling with at Joint Forces Command. And a couple of your observations I believe we would share, one being that the network can in some ways be viewed as a weapon system.

    I will say that one thing we have learned about collaborative capability is that you build a collaborative information environment, it is more than just an application or an ability to communicate. It becomes an extension of the commander's operating environment.

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    And he needs to know how to control it, protect it, maintain unity of command within it, maintain unity of effort and hide it, so to speak. The network itself that he is going to have available needs to be one that is self-healing. We hope we can achieve that.

    And he needs to know and his communications, his knowledge managers, need to know how to manage those things; damage control, if you will. And yet, subordinate units need to be enabled to continue operations.

    All of these things point us down, as when we look to the future and know that we need to work with coalitions, share information, we need to attack aggressively the issue of multilevel security. There are some policy issues that would come to play there as well.

    I will tell you that there is a lot we do not know about how to fight inside a fully networked or a net-centric environment, across the board, top to bottom, horizontal, in coalition. And I largely think it is just because we just now got here in the information age.

    There is so much that we are learning every day about what it means to be able to communicate on that scale and to have that much data flowing around the battlefield—up, down, horizontally—and train people on what to do with all of that and how to function within all of that, keeping in mind that while our technology has surprised us all with what we have been able to achieve, the same human brains in it are the ones who marched on Moscow back in history, Napoleon. And about 50 years from now, I do not think our human brains are going to be much different.

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    The question is how you enable those human brains, different levels in command and control structure, with all of this IT capability, to execute those functions that I mentioned in my opening statement—that planning and coordinating, directing, controlling, assessing, keeping situation awareness, et cetera.

    General LEAF. If I may, Representative Larsen, from an Air Force Space Command perspective, but based on my experience leading a wing in Operation Allied Force, observing Enduring Freedom and serving in Iraqi Freedom, the inter-weaving of space capabilities in everything we are discussing today is so apparent. Not so apparent, I think, is the subtle assumption we have begun to make of space superiority.

    They are not invulnerable, our space capabilities. And we have to remember that.

    We have come to assume, just as we in some ways assume there will be air superiority, that we will have space superiority. It is incumbent upon Air Force Space Command and all our other providers of space capabilities that we recognize the importance, the asymmetric—in a positive sense—nature of those space capabilities and ensure that we are prepared to guarantee their availability to the joint warfighter, sailor, airman, soldier or Marine.

    Mr. LARSEN. General Stalder.

    General STALDER. I would offer that security is at least somewhat a function of having multiple paths of communications. And that is very important as we build our architecture.
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    My anecdote about the opening days of the war and the bad weather illustrates that pretty effectively. So even legacy systems that provide that multiple path capability and flexibility are going to be important as a defense against security threats in the future.

    The other thing that provides us with some security or measure of security are the tactics, techniques and procedures that make up our command and control process. These are integrated planning or rapid planning, mission orders, commander's intent, appreciation for the single battle, freedom of action of subordinates, LNOs and high tempo operations as well.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Good question.

    Mr. Thornberry.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General Rogers, I want to go back to where Mr. Meehan started. He asked you, as I understood it, if there is an overall IT architecture for the department. And as I understood your answer, you said everybody wants to work together and that there are several architectures that you are working to make sure are compatible.

    I do not mean to play semantics, but I am trying to understand whether there is one overall architecture, department-wide, that brings everything together, kind of like a master plan. So that when the services have various items that they are looking to purchase or obtain, then you can compare it with the master plan and see whether that fits together.
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    I am thinking a document that we could even see. Is there that sort of one, overall master plan that brings it all together?

    General ROGERS. Sir, to my knowledge, we are not there yet. That is our vision.

    And this is, as I mentioned earlier, we just now got here in the information age. It is not an excuse. It is just that discoveries happen every step of the way.

    And I think the vision is we would love to have one, single, overarching architecture that everyone could fit in. It calls for a degree of standards that allows services to design to and field systems that would be seamlessly integrated into that architecture.

    It calls for a data management strategy and data standardization. You can extend from that all of the other pieces to it.

    At the current time, we are working hard on joint operating concepts that drive such architectures. And as you may be familiar, it is a cascading effect between the operational architectures, systems architectures, technical architectures—all driven by what you have to do from your concept of operations and above that, your operating concepts.

    So I hope that answers your question.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. No, it does. And I appreciate your candor. I think one of the concerns this subcommittee has had is that we have lots of things moving along, buying things, but without kind of an overall picture of how it all fits together. We may be going back and trying to find some sort of fixes to bring even these newer things back into the overall system in the future.
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    It does not mean that you stop everything until you have the plan. But I think it is something that we are concerned about and that we need to be aware of.

    I want to ask about one other issue. All of you talk about the limits on bandwidth and certainly with satellite communications.

    I suspect everybody agrees that we will need more—not less—in the future. Part of the problem General Leaf talked about is the importance of space and getting things up.

    General Moran, let me ask you, Admiral Cebrowski's Office of Force Transformation is involved in an experiment where they are going to launch a fast, cheap, small satellite for tactical use by PACOM next year. And the hope is that this will be an example of what we can do to dramatically improve the assets—enhance the assets—in space quickly, cheaply.

    The other side of it is it may be a threat to some of the more entrenched space-launched systems. My question is, number one, are you aware of what Force Transformation is doing? And second, are you aware of this project that they are funding?

    General MORAN. Sir, I am aware of it. I know that there is a project, but I cannot speak too much to the details.

    But I can tell you that there has always been discussion, particularly within the Department of the Army, of how do we get cheap satellites? How do you get either low-Earth orbit satellites or high UAVs or other systems that can loiter over the battlefield to meet the information and the bandwidth requirements we have?
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    I can tell you that, as we look at the operational architecture, the systems architecture for the future combat system, within the Army, from a communications perspective, we are going to rely on UAVs of some form to do exactly what you are describing, which is an attempt at the part of the battlefield that we are talking about that is bandwidth-starved, to give them an airborne capability for that network that will give them the connectivity they require.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. General Leaf, are you aware of Admiral Cebrowski's office and what they are trying to do?

    General LEAF. Yes, sir, I am.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. My concern is, if it works well, is it something that the services or Space Command will help make sure gets taken up and, you know, get the ball and run with it? Or is it going to, even if it works well, could it be starved because it threatens some other existing program?

    General LEAF. Sir, from my perspective, the one word answer would be absolutely. We are very much aware of the need for responsive space capabilities, not just responsive space launch, but improving the affordability to make it more responsive, improving and thus decreasing the time it takes to integrate any payload with the launch vehicle, our mobility on orbit, the ability to move these capabilities around and provide them in a focused manner.

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    And given that we have discussed the need for space superiority, there may be a requirement to replenish on-orbit capabilities if they are somehow addressed by a threat. So we are taking a very open mind and have several initiatives within the command, including an operationally responsive space lift study that will turn into a full-blown initiative as we work through the 2006 bomb, if we gain department and congressional approval of that expenditure, of course.

    But we understand the need to be responsive and to be more flexible. And we are working very hard to do that.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think there are some others who are working very hard to do that too. If we want to look——

    General LEAF. Yes, sir, absolutely.

    Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. For answers wherever we find them.

    Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have some other questions I would like to submit for the record.

    Mr. SAXTON. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Mr. Thornberry.

    Mr. Cooper.

    Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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    General Wallace, I appreciate your heroism, not only having commanded the V Corps, but also in your willingness to speak your mind during that conflict. I am worried that, as we discuss technology here today, the best communications system in the world will not work well if the speaker on one end is not willing to speak the truth.

    I am worried that you are widely viewed as having been put out to pasture at TRADOC for having spoken the truth during your command. So to me, the message for our troops, young and old, should be: the truth comes first, regardless of what your superiors may think of it.

    I hope, as we discuss communication, truth will not be omitted from the discussion because, to me, it is supremely important.

    My colleague, Mr. Larsen, mentioned what if we faced an enemy that was more sophisticated? As you well know, we spend more in a day than Iraq spent on its military in a year.

    Are we hardening our systems so that they will meet threats from more technologically adept nations? I know it is something that people are willing to discuss. Are we hardening the systems? Are they robust? Can they defeat jamming or other electronic interference?

    General MORAN. Sir, let me try to address that from an Army perspective. As we develop our operational requirements for communications systems, we look at the threat environment that they are going to exist in.
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    And we try to determine, based on our best military judgment, what is the appropriate technology to invest in to meet the operational requirement. And the requirement for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening has always been one that has been addressed, for example, in the MILSTAR program, and the need for there to be, on the ground, a terminal, a voice terminal, a data terminal that will exist in a nuclear environment that can provide the last-ditch communications.

    We also know that some of our communications will not exist in that kind of an EMP environment. But I think it is a judgment of risk that the Army leadership in specific makes as they are gauging the risk of that kind of an environment against the affordability of that.

    Another risk that we are very much concerned about is the cyber threat. And we are very much concerned in all of our communications on how vulnerable our computer systems are, how vulnerable are our telephone switching systems? How vulnerable are those systems to hackers?

    And we are finding from day to day that the threat is much more capable than we had anticipated. And so we continue to make and work with industry to do common sense-type of mitigation efforts to give our systems—computer systems, communications systems—protection from that type of threat.

    General LEAF. Congressman Cooper, if I may, from the air perspective, I would like to echo General Moran's thoughts. We strike a balance in hardening because it is technically challenging. It is expensive. And it is weighty. It adds mass, especially to orbital systems.
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    So we try to take a broad-based approach to guaranteeing the capabilities are available. Some of that is simply situation awareness. We are working very hard to expand our situation awareness, the threats to communications, such as jamming and other actions an enemy might take.

    And operationally, through establishing 8th Air Force under Lieutenant General Carlson as our IO focal point for the Air Force to give a good operational awareness of cyber threats. And that has become very important.

    But we need to harden when able and when required. But also look at offensive and defensive measures that will guarantee our capabilities are available.

    Mr. COOPER. I know it is a challenge because the technology in this area is moving so fast. In fact, I think if someone were watching this back home and hearing all this technical discussion, they would say, ''Hey, our FedEx trucks are tracked.''

    I understand Blue Force Tracking used part of that system. And it may have been the most successful part of the technology. If FedEx can do it, I am glad that our military can catch up and keep up with commercial technology that is available.

    Also, when they hear about the need for pushing pictures up or down, you know, now the youngest teenager seems to have a picture cell phone. It works pretty darn well, photographing all sorts of things. They are probably wondering why our military does not have something like that when it is ubiquitous in the regular commercial market here in this country.
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    And when people hear line-of-sight radio discussed, they probably wonder, ''Why would anybody ever want that?'' So I worry that we are perhaps behind the curve due to military procurement, time delays, things like that. Because the commercial market, it seems to me, is always going to be faster.

    Are there ways that you can keep tabs on absolutely the latest developments in the commercial marketplace, so that we can get those promptly in the hands of our troops?

    General LEAF. Mr. Cooper, I think we do, sir. We have a good awareness of what is occurring in the commercial market. We work hard to transition commercial off-the-shelf initiatives, recognizing that our requirements are more stringent.

    FedEx does a great job of tracking their packages and their vehicles. But again, when we have the lives of our warriors on the line in danger close situations, that may not be of appropriate fidelity or latency to expend ordinance based on that situation awareness.

    The need for sharing imagery is driven by what we do with that imagery, not the mere presence of a picture. If we are going to have an imagery that is usable for stereoscopic viewing and precise mensuration of coordinates to derive latitude, longitude and elevation in 3–D—and that requires stereoscopic viewing—so that we again can expend lethal force based on that imagery in part, that is a much bigger picture than what I might send to my daughter at the University of California to show her what her mom and dad are up to.

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    Sometimes those images are good enough. And sometimes, the timeliness is good enough.

    We have to recognize that it is not always real time. It might be right time. It is not always the perfect picture. It might be the right picture.

    That is not so much, I do not think, an awareness of the commercial marketplace, sir, as defining our requirements in genuine terms—what is needed versus wanted—and continuing to build our information age, discipline, the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures that General Wallace alluded to.

    We have room for growth there. But we are aggressively pursuing it.

    Mr. COOPER. I hear the phrase, ''state-of-the-shelf'' technology, I cannot help but think: you wait until it is on the shelf? Aren't you working with the investors and manufacturers long before it hits the shelf, so that the robust military variant can be available as soon as possible?

    General LEAF. Absolutely. We have a very strong interface in a variety of venues with industry, through industrial associations at our development centers, our product centers and simply through our informal contacts with industry as well.

    And American industry, by and large, has been very forthcoming with bringing their innovations to us, sometimes with purely a profit motive, but at least they are bringing us the initiatives.
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    General WALLACE. Sir, if I might add, during Iraqi Freedom, we were actually provided, in each of our headquarters, a number of commercially produced satellite telephones that were securable, that were off-the-shelf items, that helped maintain communications in times when other, more conventional communications systems were either not available or had failed us for one reason or another.

    Mr. COOPER. You mean like INTELSAT?

    General WALLACE. I forget the name of the gizmo, but it was a little black phone.

    General MORAN. The Iridium, sir.

    General WALLACE. The Iridium phones, yeah. And it gave us a secure capability.

    General STALDER. Sir, over in I MEF, we worked in a partnership with our industry colleagues and the Marine Corps Systems Command to develop and deploy what became the Marine Expeditionary Force Command Operations Center. It worked very, very well.

    And we sent it into Kuwait in about mid-January. And it represented some of the best thinking and the best technology that all those partners could put together. And it worked extremely well.

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    Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Great question.

    Mr. Wilson.

    Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for your service. It is really encouraging to find out the success of the developments, say, of the broad band capability, 42 times that which we had in 1991. And I am familiar, we have read articles today and it has been discussed, about problems.

    But I am very hopeful. Additionally, I appreciate the attitude about fratricide. I retired 2 months ago as the JAG officer.

    And that was one of my assignments, of course, fratricide investigation. And I agree that we should be working to zero.

    Also, I was concerned though, during my service, the level of communication—as the JAG officer, obviously they do not expose us to everything. But I was really startled.

    We used the SINCGARS system. And the people in communications loved it. But it seemed like, to me, General Wallace, as you identified the satellite telephones, to me a secure satellite phone, I was hoping would be ultimately universal.

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    And so I appreciate you raising that issue.

    This afternoon, General Leaf, a question: how successful were our joint operations with coalition airborne assets? Did we have C4I interoperability with coalition airborne assets during missions? Or did we merely stay out of each other's way?

    General LEAF. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we had coalition members integrated at the combined Air Operations Center. I had RAF officers on my staff of the air component coordination element, with coalition forces land component headquarters.

    And the interoperability at the staff level was very good. Now we had the same interoperability when I was a wing commander in Operation Allied Force, with the combined mission planning cell at Aviano.

    But there was this, to some degree, a separation of assets in the fight. And the major missions were predominantly U.S. only.

    The integration of coalition assets, particularly the RAF and the Royal Australian Air Force, in the fight, I think was greater in this conflict than ever before. I believe we have made great strides in taking the planning together to actually fighting together.

    Mr. WILSON. And it sure was appreciated, to have their support in the coalition.

    General LEAF. Yes, sir.
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    Mr. WILSON. General Moran, will the proposed common operational picture allow a more efficient engagement of U.S. and coalition troops?

    General MORAN. Oh, yes, sir. Let me give you an example. Because we had an integrated common operational picture, we were capable of knowing where our special operating forces were, where our ground forces were. And also overlaid on that was the capability to, based on analysis, to lay down where the enemy was suspected to be.

    And using the command and control systems that we use for time-sensitive targeting, because we were enabled with a common operating picture, that we knew where people were on the ground, commanders were able to make rapid decisions when a target of opportunity presented itself, to be able to, using those command and control systems, determine if there was a risk for a blue-on-blue. And once they determined that there was no risk, they were able to very quickly pass the instructions to the Air Force or to another weapons system to engage that target.

    That quick response of sensor-to-shooter was enabled because we knew where our forces were, where we were and where the enemy was. So it was certainly a combat multiplier.

    Mr. WILSON. And it seemed so successful, I want to just congratulate all of you on that.

    And General Rogers, are the services committed to the net-centric warfare and interoperability? Or are technical solutions taking a backseat to parochial interests?

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    General ROGERS. Sir, I am lucky to be in a central seat to get a view of that. And at General Forces Command, as we work towards battle command and control solutions, I work with flag officers from every service and with the more technical officers at lower levels.

    All of them have a strong interest in being able to operate in an integrated manner and a net-centric environment. And my main problem is I cannot keep up with the demand from the services for involvement in their projects.

    I am working to resolve that, using some of this very technology that was used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, to make us, in a peacetime environment, more effective at solving these problems by integrating us into collaborative environments, et cetera, with the services, so that as we attack these problems, we do them together.

    But bottom line, sir, is I see zero pushback from the services. The main interest is that they have the capability to deliver their service-specific core competencies when they come to the battle.

    And that is what we are aiming to help them do. They want to be on the team. That is my own personal problem, is keeping up with the demand to provide them the joint help.

    General MORAN. Sir, let me, if you do not mind, let me just give you an example where the services have voted with their pocketbook. And it is the joint tactical radio system.
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    That is a program which is going to be fielded to the land force, both the Marines and to the Army. It is going to be in air frames, both in the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. And it is going to be aboard ships.

    And it is a program which has got a joint program office and where all of the services have brought their requirements, their operational requirements. Those have been vetted. We have determined what the technical solutions are. And we are moving forward with an investment strategy to put that radio, that will be a common radio, but at the same time, meeting the unique communications requirements that each of those services have and will make interoperability much easier to achieve for the joint force commander.

    General WALLACE. Sir, if I might, I think most of our discussion today just kind of demonstrates our commitment on the part of all the services. I can speak from my perspective. Not only are we committed to net-centric or net-enabled warfare, but we want more of it.

    That is why we are talking about bandwidth and frequency management. That is why we are talking about increased situational awareness for Battle Command On the Move, as well as fratricide avoidance.

    That is why we are talking about joint-capable systems and not going our own way. And I just think, specifically from the Army perspective, but I think on behalf of all the other services, we are into it.

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    We are interested in it. And we just want more of it.

    Mr. WILSON. Well, again, I want to thank you for your service. I am excited for you to be in the service as technology is expanding exponentially and how this can help our troops be more effective and safe.

    Thank you very much.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

    General Wallace, you just gave me a great segue into the question that I wanted to ask. You said that what we have is great. We just need more of it. Or words to that effect.

    And that is good. That is very encouraging.

    My question, I guess, is this—it goes along the same line—as I look back to the last major conflict in the Gulf, 1990 and 1991, we had a level of capability with regard to systems and communications, et cetera. And now today, a little more than a decade later, we have evolved to something that few people could probably dream about in the 1990, 1991 theater.

    And it gives me rise to question what we will look like some years ahead; five years ahead or ten years ahead. Because you are all involved very much on a daily basis with these kinds of questions, project for us, if you could—let's not try to jump 10 years ahead. That is impossible.
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    Let's just say 4 or 5 years ahead. What do you see us looking like, in terms of capability?

    General LEAF. Sir, I would offer, Mr. Chairman, that given that 5 years from now, we will have, by and large, the same systems that were used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, some new systems, what we will see is an improvement in machine-to-machine communication to increase the timeliness of data, decrease the error rate.

    We will see better and more prolific user equipment. We will see concepts for integration that are formalized. They were developed by the component commanders and their major subordinate commanders, like General Wallace in Iraqi Freedom, and worked well.

    But we will formalize those concepts. And I suspect that there will be a move towards multi-faceted situation awareness.

    Because what we have spoken today about is kind of one dimensional. We could not even get it in 1990 or 1991, whether it was imagery, an ATO, whatever the information was.

    Now we can get it. We have better access to it. It is more available, even with the digital divide.

    But what we want to do is consolidate, amalgamate, fuse different sources of information, whether it is to build a picture from historical data or to recognize the nature of a changing situation.
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    So I would hope that that is where we are headed within 5 years, sir.

    General WALLACE. Sir, if I might, I would agree with General Leaf, if you look forward 5 years, I do not see any dramatic changes in the equipment that is fielded to the force. I think what we will see are dramatic changes in our awareness, as based on recent experience, awareness on the part of all the services of the great goodness of network solutions and the great goodness of joint application of power across all the services.

    I think that our emphasis over the near term needs to be on training of formations and leaders and development of young leaders who can take advantage of what we have seen in the recent past and advance those advantages in the future, so that we are creating both units and leaders that are very adaptable to any situation on the battlefield, using the technologies that are available in the very near term.

    General STALDER. Sir, I would add to some of that discussion by saying that in 5 years, I would hope that we could get to a much lower level of digital architecture in the fighting units and reduce that digital divide that both General Wallace and I have spoken to, at least to some degree.

    There is a lot of potential in the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) world that, over 5 years' time, I would hope we would start to understand and see more use of. The integration of these combat support applications certainly could be done within 5 years in a way that would make the warfighters—air and ground—function much better together, both in planning and execution.
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    I think you will see continued improvements in joint tactics, techniques and procedures. The relationships and experiences that have come from this war will propel all the services to do more of that and improve on the already good things that they have done.

    And hopefully, those systems that are coming in—joint tactical radio and so on—will arrive, if not sooner, earlier so that we can pick up on some of these problems, rather than waiting more than 5 years to solve it.

    Mr. SAXTON. General Rogers.

    General ROGERS. Sir, I believe that regardless, the globe will move ahead and we will be more and more connected. The information age will not go backwards. We will be more and more connected.

    And we will have to acknowledge that our adversaries will be able to use that same environment and they will. So we must learn how to operate within that environment better than them, that will take all of these tactics, techniques, procedures, training and capabilities that have been discussed here.

    And I think one of the challenges will be keeping in mind that, in order to execute, it is always going to be about the people with mud on their boots and jet fuel dripping on their back and those kinds of things and being able to provide the command and control to enable those people the best. I think we will make headway in certain areas, such places as standing Joint Forces Headquarters capability to be more ready to command and control of joint operations.
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    And I think that we will fill a huge gap at the operational level that is comparable to what General Wallace talks about, Battle Command On the Move, deployable joint force command and control capabilities. We have not had any existing standard, joint task force headquarters facility, that is deployable to this date.

    So we have had to build a different one every time. And those kind of capabilities will be necessary to operate in an environment where there will be more information than ever flowing around the battlefield.

    And to give you an example, in World War I, the point-to-point communication capability was about 30 words a minute. In World War II, it was about 60.

    In Vietnam, it was a little over 100. It was about 192 K in Desert Storm. I think it was on the order of 800 megabytes in this operation. And by 2010, it is projected to be 1.5 trillion words per minute flowing around the theater.

    That is the equivalent of the Library of Congress every minute. And buried in there somewhere is the information that a battalion commander or a squad leader or a component commander or a joint force commander needs.

    So you can see, we have a lot of work to do to figure out how to manage that and operate within it. It will take some investment to get us there.

    I think we are up to it. Our problem generally is that every time we look out ahead a couple of decades and imagine what might be, we just advance the clock a few years and it moves forward a little quicker.
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    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    General MORAN. Sir, I think you will see great improvements in bandwidth management to make that bandwidth more effective. And really what that translates to is exactly what General Rogers just talked about, is the more efficient movement of information and getting it down to the soldier, the sailor, the airman and the Marine that needs it to make a decision as he or she is engaging the enemy.

    And I think where the challenge is going to be is in the battle command systems and how we fine tune those systems so they can present to the soldier, sailor, airman, Marine a relevant common operational picture that he or she can make a decision on.

    Mr. SAXTON. You each sound as if you are saying a couple of things. One is that these systems are going to continue to evolve and that the systems that are out there today will continue to evolve closer together.

    Is that right? Is that a fair conclusion?

    General MORAN. I think so, sir.

    Mr. SAXTON. Can we expect that maybe we could get some kind of an overall architecture plan of how this can be expected to happen in the foreseeable future? You know, Mr. Larsen mentioned that we reached out, under the leadership of the chairman of the full committee and myself, a few months ago and reduced by 10 percent, across the board, $2 billion—I guess it was not 10 percent, $2 billion across the board—expenditures.
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    And we did it for two reasons. One was that we did not understand where all of this was leading. And we have a better picture now.

    And the second was we needed to get people to talk to us. And when we decided that $2 billion should be cut, a lot of people came and talked to us. And we are starting to understand this a whole lot better now.

    But one of the things that we still have not been able to do is to get a plan laid out, where we can see how at least your vision is that things are going to evolve together. That seems to us to be really important.

    And I am wondering if we can expect, based on what you are saying, that all seems to be happening, but we have trouble seeing the overall architectural plan. Can you help us with that somehow?

    General Wallace.

    General WALLACE. Yes, sir. We can. [Laughter.]

    Damn, that is something we all want. I mean, a single, joint architecture that makes life easier for all of us is something that we all aspire to. The road map to getting there, I leave to the technicians on my far right and my far left.

    But from a perspective of a warfighter, regardless of service, I think that is something we all want to get to—a single, joint architecture which allows us all to communicate and share information and make decisions in a coherent manner for the——
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    Mr. SAXTON. I am asking these questions just for information, not to be contrary. Why is it so hard?

    General LEAF. Mr. Chairman, I think it is difficult for a purely technical reason; and that is, capturing in what we now know as an architecture both present and future. It is very difficult because architectures, as you fully appreciate, are extraordinarily intricate.

    To capture where we are and then capture, first on a service level, where we are going and then integrate that with the overall joint view. I know the Air Force has a warfighting integration directorate, Air Force XI, and a Chief Information Officer (CIO) who worked hand in glove to develop that. And we are speaking to the other services.

    I would suggest that, knowing that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are working that, that through the leadership of Joint Forces Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J–6, we should be able to bring you such a road map, if not a complete finished architecture.

    But I will defer to General Rogers. That is more work for him.

    Mr. SAXTON. He is going to thank you.

    General ROGERS. And it is a lot of work, sir. To amplify a bit on what General Leaf said, this is an immensely complex challenge. It goes back to what I have said a couple of times here.
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    It just becomes obvious to me, several times a week. We just now got this far in the information age and realizing these types of capabilities. And we make new discoveries every day about what it means to us.

    And it is not like we can just throw up an architecture out there. It is based on what real people have to do from the trenches all the way to the top, of reaching back to decision levels here in Washington and at senior levels coalition.

    And when you try to look at how you are going to operate the capabilities you want to deliver operationally and then try to build your systems and technical architectures for that, it becomes a mind-exploding experience. And the ability for hundreds or thousands of people across the services and in the joint commands to pool together to work this problem has still not worked out all the details.

    I think it is going to be a huge challenge to achieve the single architecture. But I do not for a minute believe it is unachievable.

    As I mentioned before, every time we think about something in the out years, and think it is X amount of time away, just the very fact that we conceived of it and put a little brain time on it, we just advanced the clock. So I cannot tell you exactly when we will achieve that nirvana vision, but I have great hopes for it.

    It is a challenging dilemma.

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    General MORAN. Sir, again, speaking from my current hat within the Army, I can lay out for you, in excruciating detail, first of all, what we understand is the DOD architecture, the global information grid with its three components of GIG bandwidth expansion, the Network Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) and the transformational communications architecture.

    And I can show you, over time, how the future combat systems, the war fighter information network terrestrial and the other satellite initiatives that the Army is investing in, along with the other services, I can show you how all that stitches together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) global information grid.

    And I can also show you, through the joint battle management command and control road map, how the Army battle command systems must be stitched together with the Air Force, the Marines and the Navy and also satisfy the unique requirements for our special operating forces. So the architecture that you are looking for, I believe does exist. But I am afraid I am not in a position to speak for Mr. Stenbit and be the one that delivers it to this committee.

    But I do feel that there is a vision that certainly we in the Army are operating in, and ensuring that our systems are interoperable certainly with the other services, but also are going to be able to leverage the investments that DOD is making with the Defense Information Systems Agency in both terrestrial and space-based systems.

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. Well, we do not have the advantage of seeing what you do every day. We have the advantage of having occasions like this when we get to talk about it a little bit.
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    And we are wanting to be supportive obviously because the capabilities that we have been able to collectively demonstrate have been very impressive. But we need to recognize where we have been and take note of where we have been and recognize what that means, going forward. And those of us who would, looking at this situation, still think an overall plan would get us there in a more effective, efficient, financially efficient way.

    So to the extent that we can work with you to understand or at least gain a better understanding of this evolution which we think is taking place together, it will help us out a whole lot and help us make resources available to you to make even further progress.

    Anything else? Mr. Wilson.

    Well, we want to thank you for being here with us today. This has been extremely informative. The members asked great questions and you gave great answers. And we appreciate that.

    And we look forward to seeing you again in the future. And keep up the great work.

    [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]