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PLEASE NOTE: The following transcript is a portion of the official hearing record of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Additional material pertinent to this transcript may be found on the web site of the Committee at [http://www.house.gov/transportation]. Complete hearing records are available for review at the Committee offices and also may be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office.
RAIL SAFETY OVERSIGHT: EQUIPMENT AND FRA REGULATORY PROCEDURES
TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1996
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 1:43 p.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Susan V. Molinari (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you and good morning. This is our second oversight hearing on the current status and effectiveness of the rail safety program.
Our primary focus today will be on equipment-related issues, areas where Congress has, in most cases, spelled out specific safety requirements to be implemented by the Federal Railroad Administration. And usually Congress has also specified the timetable for those requirements to be implemented.
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As I stated, this is our second hearing.
I want to, before I proceed with the rest of my prepared statement, yield to the chairman of the full committee, the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Shuster.
Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I think these hearings are of extreme importance. They are of extreme importance for several reasons, but one of the most important reasons is because we look to rail for economical long-haul transportation. In fact, the average truck shipment is only about 139 miles, whereas the average rail shipment is over 1,000 miles, showing an extraordinary difference. This means that we've got to have reliable and safe operating procedures and equipment for these very long journeys over very long distances in all kinds of conditions.
I know concern has been expressed that FRA has not met all the timetables specifically established by the Congress, and we very much look forward to discussing that and hearing from FRA on that issue.
I think not only is safety more and more important, but the fact that industry in America is relying more and more on just-in-time delivery means that timeliness of transportation within the bounds of safety is something that is becoming much, much more significant.
So these hearings are of great importance. While we've had some recent very, very serious problems with rail safety, the overall record is very safe—one of the safest modes of transportation we have, and I think we have to keep it in perspective.
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So, having noted what I think are some of the important issues we're wrestling with here today, I thank you for the opportunity.
Ms. MOLINARI. I thank the gentleman for being with us.
I now yield to the ranking Member, Mr. Wise.
Mr. WISE. I thank the Chair. This is, indeed, the second in a series of hearings. We look forward to hearing this testimony. I think some things have already begun to happen, Madam Chair, since the last hearing, so I congratulate you and the committee for holding these.
I do think it's important to note, I just came from the eastern panhandle of West Virginia in which 500 people a day on average ride the MARC train.
I think it's significant that the National Transportation Safety Board today has issued an emergency recommendation that would affect the MARC train, specifically recommending the removal of—an installation of removal windows or kick panels for emergency exits in the interior and exterior passageway doors, the recommendation to install an easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanism adjacent to all exterior doors, and to install a signage in car interiors and at emergency exits that clearly show where these exits are and instructions on how to operate them, because one of the lead causes for the deaths—the tragic deaths several weeks ago was the fact that people were trapped in cars that they didn't know how to get out of, and I am glad that the National Transportation Safety Board has issued these recommendations.
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Now, of course, it's important that we take these recommendations and make sure they're adhered to.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. MOLINARI. The gentleman from California, Mr. Kim?
Mr. KIM. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I did concur with the other gentlemen that I'm glad to see finally it come up with this recommendation. I read it a while ago, and it did mention Cajon Pass a half dozen places. And particularly I'm glad to see that they tried to implement this two-way telemetry device installation on any grade more than 2.2 percent—actually, 3 percent example is the Cajon Pass—effective date February 12th, which is good. I think it's long overdue.
I'm anxious to listen to today's testimony.
Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you.
The gentleman from Illinois?
Mr. LIPINSKI. I thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this important rail safety hearing. Last week's lengthy hearing on human factors and grade crossing issues was an excellent opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues involved. I hope that today's hearings will be equally helpful.
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One of the key issues that will be addressed this afternoon is the effectiveness of the Federal Railroad Administration in issuing the regulations that are mandated by Congress. I do not expect any member of this subcommittee will sit here and praise the FRA for being late; indeed, there is no excuse for chronic delays in the promulgation of regulations.
But as we address this issue, we must keep in mind that, as the FRA works at performing its rail safety functions, there will be times when, in order to do an effective job of studying an issue and ensuring that the views of all interested parties are truly heard, a deadline may slip by a number of weeks or a few months.
While I would not encourage delay as a matter of practice, I believe that the subcommittee must acknowledge certain limited cases where the public interest may be best served by a complete evaluation, rather than the possibility of incomplete process in order to meet a fixed date.
I know Administrator Molitoris has been working to improve the response time of the FRA, and I look forward to working with her and her staff in the near future.
Madam Chairman, the accidents that have been happening throughout the country in recent months are a matter of grave concern to all of us. Whether actions need to be taken by Congress, by the FRA, or by the railroads, themselves, it is clear that something must be done. I hope that today's testimony will illuminate for us the best route to take.
Madam Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my time.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much, Mr. Lipinski.
Just as a matter of record, before we begin—although based on our participation, I don't know how necessary it is to state this—the first hearing that we did have, while we tried to confine it to human factors, obviously, because of the situation that has occurred over the last few months, so many Members and the people who were called forth to testify did go off that area onto equipment, so we did discuss, to a certain extent, some of the issues that are before us today. So, using the prerogative of the Chair, I was quite indulgent in the last hearing, and that allowed us to over. Everybody's rolling their eyes saying, ''Yes, I'd say you were.'' This time we are going to keep to the 5-minute rule for questions and, if absolutely necessary—and only when absolutely necessary—we'll go to round two so that we can make this easier.
Mr. KIM. Madam Chair?
Ms. MOLINARI. Yes, Mr. Kim.
Mr. KIM. For the interest of time, I'd like to ask unanimous consent to submit my written statement into the record.
Ms. MOLINARI. Absolutely. Without objection, so ordered.
[Mr. Kim's prepared statement follows:]
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Ms. MOLINARI. OK. Our first panel today then is the Honorable Jolene Molitoris, administrator, Federal Railroad Administration. I believe accompanying you is Mr. Bruce Fine, associate administrator for safety, and Mr. Grady Cothen, deputy associate administrator for safety standards, and program development.
If you want to begin, then we'll go to Mr. Hall.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOLENE M. MOLITORIS, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY BRUCE M. FINE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY, AND GRADY C. COTHEN, JR., DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY STANDARDS AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT; AND JAMES E. HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT LAUBY, CHIEF, RAILROAD DIVISION
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
This afternoon I'd like to highlight the Federal Railroad Administration's safety equipment regulations and track safety standards and discuss our progress in making the regulatory process more inclusive and more effective. I will also briefly review FRA's safety assurance program, because it is our inspection program, combined with our partnership efforts with rail labor and rail management, that provide the synergy to transform pages of the Federal code into an effective and comprehensive safety program.
In my testimony last week, Madam Chairwoman, I noted that in FRA's investigations related to February's rail accidents, as well as the 13 system safety plan meetings held in 1995, and the over 600 listening posts with labor across the country, it became clear that many involved—supervisors, craft employees, and senior management—communicated ineffectively or not at all, and that this lack of effective communication was directly linked to safety hazards.
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Although there is a commitment from rail management for a safe railroad, open communications, and employee involvement, that commitment doesn't always filter down through the ranks to the line supervisor and beyond.
As a result of FRA's focus on this issue, as well as my one-on-one meetings with BNSF CEO Rob Krebs, I'm pleased to report this week that BNSF began a system-wide assessment of every aspect of their operations: supervision, training, and the real state of communications and safety on the largest U.S. freight railroad in the U.S.
This top-to-bottom review will be done with the help of a nationally recognized safety consulting firm, and with labor and FRA as working partners from the beginning.
One particularly encouraging piece is the installation of a toll-free safety phone number for employees' use to report—anonymously, if they so desire—any and all safety issues, with a commitment from management that corrective action will be taken.
This is a solid start, and I expect that BNSF and other railroads will address these complex safety communication issues with the same intensity of investment and quality assurance that has been made in their capital programs. It will, indeed, be the best investment that they have ever made.
A good example of the return on such investment can be seen on Amtrak. An agreement that has been 14 months in the making is now in ratification with their unions, and Amtrak expects to save millions as a result of its implementation, and I will submit this for the record.
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The roadway worker safety negotiated rulemaking is the next topic, and the safety potential of the partnership process shows very vividly in this achievement.
This was FRA's first ever negotiated rulemaking. When we started this, there were many that were skeptical that any agreement could be reached, because it was a very contentious issue and there had been a long history of mistrust between rail labor and management.
But, by focusing on the data about why these accidents were happening, these reg-neg participants were ultimately able to agree upon a comprehensive set of safety standards for roadway workers. It is a measure of the ''buy-in'' to this process that rail management has agreed to institute these standards voluntarily for the 1996 spring construction season in advance of our final rules.
Within the next few weeks, I will begin a construction season tour of the railroads to see first-hand the rules and training in action, as well as discuss with maintenance-of-way employees and signalmen their reaction to the new program.
And yesterday, I sent the roadway worker rules to the Federal Register for formal public comment over the next 60 days.
When adopted as final rules, the roadway worker rules will prove not only to save many, many lives, but stand as an important turning point in safety regulation in the U.S. rail industry.
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In contrast, let me describe FRA's experience with the traditional rulemaking method in our effort to implement the provisions of the Rail Safety Enforcement Act of 1992 concerning power brakes, including the requirement for end-of-train devices.
To start the process, in 1993 we held three technical workshops; in 1994, a comprehensive and detailed notice was published and hearings held at several locations across the country.
The 77-page rulemaking proposal was published in the Register, and it envisioned performance-oriented safety requirements that provided incentives to allow trains to run longer distances without intermediate inspections.
In late 1994, both management and labor expressed strong objections and essentially told us that our vision of an incentive-based regulatory program provided no incentive at all.
As a result, last year I decided to seek additional comments and alternative approaches. At that time it was clear that, had FRA moved forward with its proposed rule in their current form, many would be questioning the potential cost in the absence of effective performance incentives.
In contrast, roadway worker was proceeding and making good progress because of the common ground they had developed.
But, given the Federal Advisory Committee Act, there was no way FRA could attempt to achieve consensus among the power brake parties, because we were already in the traditional process. Power brakes was, therefore, a perfect candidate for the Railway Safety Advisory Committee, and we proposed that committee last spring.
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I fully expected to have that committee up and running this fall, and when it became clear that it was going to take longer, I broke out the EOT device issue and put it on the fast track in the traditional way.
Yesterday, the announcement of the approval of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee appeared in the Federal Register. Another key priority for the committee and for FRA is the safety standards for track, as required by the 1992 Safety Act. Again, this proceeding represents the kind of issue which we feel can effectively be resolved in a consensual context.
I have a lot of information on that particular environment in which we developed a very lengthy and complex rule—but I will pass in terms of time.
Madam Chairwoman, I know that you and the other members of the committee seek faster movement and progress on the regulatory agenda, and so do I. We're working to reinvent this process.
I would like to point out in this context that FRA presently has regulations governing track safety and power brakes, so our effort here is, ''How do we bring next-generation standards and make them effective without being unduly burdensome?'' I expect the collaborative process will help us achieve this.
Finally, let me just touch on compliance.
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The safety assurance program's use of consensual partnerships in teaming in no way means that FRA has ceased using its enforcement tools. We have many strong enforcement tools. They include civil penalties up to $20,000 per violation, $25,000 for hazardous materials violations, orders directing compliance, disqualifying individuals from safety-sensitive service, emergency orders, and injunctions.
In 1995, we collected more than $5 million in civil penalties, which is within the average range for the past decade, aside from two recent years in which FRA was eliminating a large enforcement backlog.
And I'd like to point out that, because of Congress' support, we were able to get some more resources in that area and went from an average of 36 months to turn those around to 60 days.
At the FRA, we understand that partnership is a two-way street. When FRA's efforts with labor and management identify and resolve systemic safety problems and are then met with corresponding action by the railroad, FRA does not have to use enforcement to achieve the safety that we all want.
However, where cooperative efforts do not achieve success, FRA will use all of the tools available to us, and will use them with vigor.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the opportunity to testify. I'd be pleased to answer questions.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you, Administrator.
Now we have the Honorable James Hall, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who is accompanied today by Mr. Robert Lauby, chief, railroad division, National Transportation Safety Board.
Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here with us again.
Mr. Hall.
Mr. HALL. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to represent the National Transportation Safety Board and to discuss mechanical issues in railroad transportation accidents.
My prepared statement discusses two-way end-of-train devices, air brake inspection and testing, and passenger crashworthiness and safety standards. My oral comments will focus on passenger car safety standards.
The Safety Board has been interested in passenger car safety standards for many years. The list of accidents where the Safety Board has made recommendations in this area goes back over 25 years, from tragic accidents in Glendale, Maryland, and Darien, Connecticut, in 1969.
The 1996 accidents on Washington Metro at Gaithersburg Maryland, on New Jersey Transit in Seacaucus, New Jersey, and on the MARC train in Silver Spring, Maryland, again tragically point out the need for passenger car safety standards.
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Our past safety recommendations include some very familiar issues: advising passengers of emergency procedure, seat securement and luggage retention devices, safe window design, the limitation of sources of direct impact injury, occupant protection, emergency exits and emergency lights, car roof escape hatches, pre-departure inspection of safety devices, emergency release mechanisms for doors that are clearly identified, and requirements for minimum safety standards for passenger cars.
In 1985, the FRA advised the Board that a major regulatory effort regarding passenger car safety standards was not necessary or warranted. As a result of that response from the FRA, many of the Board's recommendations regarding passenger car standards were closed as unacceptable action.
The Board later began to work with Amtrak to have its passenger cars upgraded for occupant protection. Amtrak responded by implementing almost all of the Board's recommendations on passenger car safety. The approach covers only those cars used by Amtrak, and does not reach the other cars in passenger service.
There are currently no Federal industry-wide standards in the railroad industry or in the rail transit industry for the design and construction of railroad passenger cars other than an FRA requirement for four emergency exits on each car, and for non-breakable glass in the windows.
We are all familiar with the MARC accident that occurred on February 16, 1996, near Silver Spring, Maryland. Safety Board investigators have been working continuously on this investigation since it occurred.
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During the last week, interviews with all surviving MARC passengers were completed. Based on these interviews, the Safety Board has determined that the emergency exits and emergency instructions that currently exist on MARC cars pose an unacceptable risk to the public.
Therefore, the Safety Board is today issuing three urgent safety recommendations to the Maryland Mass Transit Administration and one urgent safety recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration.
The Safety Board only issues urgent safety recommendations in cases where it is determined that action is necessary to avoid imminent loss of life due to similar accidents that could occur under the same circumstances if the deficiency is not corrected. The MARC accident met this criteria in several areas.
Let me review for you a few important details of the accident.
As you may recall, the left front quadrant of the MARC leading passenger car separated and was destroyed as a result of the collision. The fuel tank of the Amtrak lead locomotive ruptured on impact and the diesel fuel ignited. Fuel spilled into the MARC club car, ignited, and destroyed the car.
Three operating crew members and 20 passengers were on board the MARC train. Two crew members and seven passengers died of smoke inhalation. One crew member and one passenger died as a result of impact injuries. Eleven of the survivors were injured.
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Safety Board investigators have completed interviewing six U.S. Department of Labor Job Corps students who were passengers in the MARC club car, and two individuals, ages 54 and 23 years old, respectively, who were passengers in the second MARC car.
The students stated that after the impact the car quickly filled with smoke, making it very difficult to see. One student, who said he was sitting in the last seat on the right rear of the first car, next to an emergency window, described the smoke as extending from the ceiling of the car to two feet above the floor. The student also stated that he did not have time to open the window, and that he believed it would be faster to exit using the door through which he had entered.
Another student said that he had to crawl to the rear of the car on his hands and knees because of the smoke.
Two other students seated near the rear of the first car proceeded through the rear end interior door and made several unsuccessful attempts to open the left and right exterior side doors. They stated that no instructions were provided concerning the operation of the door handle in an emergency.
These two students made their way into the vestibule of the second car and escaped through an opening in the damaged left front corner of the second car. All surviving students, as well as a 26-year-old passenger who was also seated in the cab car, followed.
The Safety Board is concerned that emergency quick-release mechanisms for the exterior doors are located in a secured cabinet some distance from the door they control. Emergency controls for each door should be readily accessible and identifiable.
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Therefore, the Safety Board believes that emergency quick-release mechanisms for exterior doors on MARC cars should be relocated so they are immediately adjacent to the door they control and readily accessible for emergency escape procedures.
Examination of the first and second cars revealed that the left and right exterior side doors of the former, as well as the front interior end door and the right front exterior door of the latter, were jammed. None of the doors had removable windows or pop-out emergency escape panels for use in an emergency. The left front exterior door of the second car was destroyed. Thus, if the opening in the damaged car body of the second car had not provided an escape route for the surviving passengers of the cab control car, loss of life in this accident could have been far greater.
Several students stated that they were unaware of the locations of the emergency exits, and none knew how to operate them.
Safety Board investigators found that the interior emergency window decals were not prominently displayed, and that one car had no interior emergency window decals.
The Safety Board noted that the exterior emergency decals were often faded or obliterated, and the information on them, when legible, directed emergency responders to another sign at the end of the car for instructions on how to open emergency exits.
The Safety Board believes that all emergency exits should be clearly identified and provided at the exit, with easily understood operating instructions. These instructions should be prominently located on the car interior for use by passengers and on the exterior for use by emergency responders.
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As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board is today issuing the following three recommendations to the Mass Transit Administration of the Maryland Department of Transportation. They are as follows:
To install removable windows or pop-out emergency escape panels, also known as ''kick panels,'' for emergency exits in interior and in exterior passageway doors.
To install an easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanism adjacent to all exterior doors.
And to install retro reflective signage on car interiors and exteriors and emergency exits that contains easily understood instructions and clearly marks all emergency exits, doors, and windows.
The Safety Board's investigation of this MARC accident is continuing; however, the Board is concerned the unsafe condition identified on MARC's passenger cars may exist on other commuter lines subject to FRA oversight. The Safety Board further believes that the FRA should issue emergency orders to correct such unsafe conditions as necessary and incorporate the emergency measures into minimum passenger car safety standards.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board is making the following urgent recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration:
To inspect all commuter rail equipment nationwide to determine whether it has one easily accessible indoor interior emergency quick-release mechanism adjacent to exterior passageway doors.
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Two, removable windows or pop-out emergency escape panels in interior and exterior passageway doors.
Three, prominently displayed retro reflective signage, marking all interior and exterior emergency exits.
If any commuter equipment lacks one or more of these features, take appropriate emergency measures to ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into minimum passenger car safety standards.
Madam Chairwoman, we appreciate the opportunity to discuss these urgent safety recommendations with the subcommittee. That completes my comments. Mr. Lauby and I will be happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall.
Let me start with you, Administrator. Based on the last comment that was made by Mr. Hall, are you prepared to implement those emergency regulations and do the inspections on the commuter rails as quickly as possible?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Madam Chairwoman, we would work with the NTSB to get this accomplished. If you recall, part of our emergency order 20 required that each commuter property present to us a comprehensive safety plan, which included inspection of all the windows. We did not specify this particular kind of interior and exterior handle, but we will go back, following this hearing, and add that.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Use the language you used for me again. You've requested it? It has not been made an emergency order?
Ms. MOLITORIS. What we have asked is within 45 days, and I think it's about 25 days from now they are to present to us a system safety plan, which is to address all of these things so that we have a data base of information which lets us know which properties have these things and which don't, and we will then follow up on those plans on the elements that are not acceptable.
Given this new recommendation by the NTSB, these will have a very high priority.
Ms. MOLINARI. OK. And I'm really—I know it sounds like I'm trying to be picky here, but——
Ms. MOLITORIS. No, no.
Ms. MOLINARI. —I'm trying to understand the impact of what you're doing. Are you creating rules and regulations that a commuter rail can be penalized if they don't pursue the course to get to the NTSB recommendations, or is this all just voluntary at this point in time?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Right now we have requested this comprehensive plan, which will give us the first comprehensive data base of this kind. However, we made it very clear in emergency order 20 that, given this information, we held open the option of expanding or increasing the elements within the emergency order. So we have the opportunity to do that as soon as we see all of this information, and I'm sure that we will have NTSB support and cooperation as we analyze these plans and decide if a separate emergency order is necessary or if just supplementing the existing emergency order 20, or how we will do this.
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The actual mechanism, itself, will be something we'll cooperate with NTSB on.
Ms. MOLINARI. Is that acceptable to you, Mr. Hall?
Mr. HALL. That's acceptable. Let me, if I could, just extend my remarks slightly, Madam Chairwoman, to say that the Board feels very strongly on this particular issue, and these recommendations were made after our investigators had the opportunity, along with the parties to the investigation, which include the FRA, to closely examine the cars on this train, to interview the witnesses.
And let me say, before I mention this point, that Secretary Pena had a rail summit that I think the committee is aware of, and out of that summit came recommendations on passenger car standards that, while they are not in rulemaking, this administrator has acted on.
But we feel very strongly, in light of this accident and in the fact that the Board made this recommendation almost specifically on 1977 on the New Canaan, Connecticut, accident on July 13, 1976. The Board requested at that time that the FRA establish standards for the interior design of commuter cars to protect and reduce injuries from accidents; ensure that when the car's power source fails, emergency lighting is adequate and doors can be operated easily from inside and outside; establish standards for the evacuations of passengers; and prevent a passenger train from entering an occupied block.
As I pointed out in my testimony, these are recommendations that the Board has repeatedly made in this area since 1969. We feel that public interest demands that the commuter rail lines in this country that are carrying passengers ensure that they have safe and accessible emergency exits in case of accidents.
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Ms. MOLINARI. OK. Let me just ask one last quick question to you then, Administrator. Based on how clearly compelling NTSB feels about this, and that this has been—I would suggest, Mr. Hall, it's not an exaggeration, based on what you've been saying, that since 1969 this has been one of NTSB's No. 1 priorities.
Mr. HALL. No. And, Madam Chairwoman, I brought you a copy of our 1969 report and our 1975 report, which is available to the committee for your detailed review and for any of the Members.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you. We appreciate that. I think that would be very helpful.
When can you give us an outset as to—based on the compilation of information that you're getting right now from the commuter rails, what is some type of date that Congress can look forward to these standards being placed in the rules by FRA?
Ms. MOLITORIS. First of all, as soon as we get the recommendation from NTSB we'll review it, if it's right after this hearing. And, as Mr. Hall mentioned, until Secretary Peña came to office, the position before our time was that these standards were not needed.
Ms. MOLINARI. Yes.
Ms. MOLITORIS. So we have made a dramatic sea change here, if I can use an intermodal analogy, and we feel very strongly about these standards, too. In fact, as you know, on Friday will be one of the most exciting announcements possible from Amtrak, and it will be about the safest rail cars ever constructed.
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So we feel strongly about it. We'll see how the exact wording is in the recommendation from NTSB and see if this fits within the Emergency Order 20 that's already in place, and we will report back to the committee very soon.
Ms. MOLINARI. Very soon. When should I call that hearing to have that report back?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, they have about 25 days more, I think, the commuter properties. And, based on what I get from NTSB, then we'll make a judgment whether that's something we do ahead of their report back to us or whether it is appropriate to involve it in the discussion with each property. And we can let you know personally our recommendation on that within a few days.
Ms. MOLINARI. OK. So some time within the next month to month and a half we should be hearing from you relative to your intentions?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you. Mr. Wise?
Mr. WISE. Thank you. Following up, Madam Administrator, on a topic that you and Mr. Oberstar discussed last week, it goes to regulatory authority.
Concerning hours of service, I believe you stated last week that the FRA did not have authority for hours of service. In looking at the U.S. Code on hours of service, in title 49, section 21–103, it reads, ''A railroad carrier and its officers or agents may not require or allow a train employee to remain or go on duty: one, unless that employee has had at least eight consecutive hours off duty during the last 24 hours; or, two, after that employee has been on duty for 12 consecutive hours, until that employee has had at least ten consecutive hours off-duty.'' Now, admittedly, this passage doesn't say anything about what you, as administrator, may require, but places limits on the railroad carrier. But now let's turn to the general authority of the Secretary of Transportation, of which you are the agent of the Secretary. I quote section 20–103 of title 41, ''Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety, supplementing laws and regulations in effect on October 16, 1970.'' I believe the Hours of Service Act, since it was enacted in 1906 or 1907, was in effect in 1970.
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So doesn't that—cannot that be read to authorize, and perhaps even to command, the FRA to issue regulations to supplement the Hours of Service Act as necessary?
I guess, going a little further, is there anywhere that says the Secretary of Transportation does not have authority to issue regulations on hours of service that are stricter than what's required by the rail carriers in the statute?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Wise, I will have Mr. Cothen respond to a portion of that, but, in general, the answer is that the law is something that we cannot controvert by an action under regulation.
I think there was staff discussion on this issue either today or yesterday, and about the opportunity to consider doing something that is not particularly addressed within the Hours of Service Act.
Mr. WISE. I understand that. I'm arguing another point of view. And what I would suggest—and rather than getting into a long legal discussion today and eating up my time, what I would suggest is that I would be interested in a written——
Ms. MOLITORIS. Review of this?
Mr. WISE [continuing]. Written review, because I run into too many agencies that take the position that, ''Unless this thing specifically tells me to do it, I don't touch it''; as opposed to, ''If I'm not proscribed from doing it, then perhaps I can, particularly if it's to benefit general health and safety.'' So I would just ask—I don't know whether this has been tested in court before, but it does seem to me to at least offer an interpretation of how the FRA could do this.
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So if we could just agree that you all will look at it and give us something in writing, I'd appreciate it.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Certainly.
[Information received follows:]
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Mr. WISE. There was another area I wanted to ask you about quickly. You've discussed railroad cars. I'm looking through my questions here.
In doing the regulatory analysis, would you discuss again the business—how you're going to consider business benefits of proposed rules, or are you only looking at the safety benefits?
I'm here particularly concerned about the analysis of the costs and benefits of the positive train control proposal. My concern is that NTSB is, I believe—and, Chairman Hall, if I'm misstating the case, please correct me. No sense me getting you into trouble. You can probably get yourself into trouble just fine.
As I understand NTSB, they're concerned that FRA refuses to consider the business benefits of positive train control, which some would argue are substantial, which stacks the decks against the benefits being calculated ever being equal to the cost.
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Wise, with regard to our report to Congress, we did use safety benefits as the element in consideration of cost/benefit. It wasn't the only one, of course, because we consider other societal benefits.
With regard to business benefits, the elements that might be addressed in business benefits—managing the railroad, dispatching efficiencies, and other things—can also be addressed in other ways in addition to advanced train control systems. It is not the only way. And some of the ways are less costly than the existing advanced train control systems.
Our approach was to use these safety benefits, not to speculate about the business benefits, but to pursue, as we are, pilot programs which will: A, bring down the cost of the technology; and, B, demonstrate inter-operability, which was not on the table with existing technology before; and then have a package which would be very attractive and cost-competitive with regard to the business benefits involved.
Mr. WISE. Madam Chair, could I just ask—I know my time's up. Could I just ask if Mr. Hall has a quick response to that?
Mr. HALL. Congressman, I believe that the Board is on the record on the subject of positive train control and our urging to the FRA and to the emergency to consider the business benefits of positive train control and their evaluation of the system.
My concern, in this area relates to emphasis and timeliness. I think the American public deserves to have existing technology to protect public safety available as soon as it is available.
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I would encourage the administrator to call a meeting or a summit on the issue of positive train control where the whole matter can be discussed.
It has been studied now for some 20 years, and our recommendation goes back some 20 years, and I think it's a time that has come.
As I pointed out in previous testimony, the first movement on this came after the accident out at Kelso, Washington, in which the pilot program then was planned on the tracks on the west coast.
We need to be driving ahead on safety without the accidents driving us, and this is an issue that needs to be addressed, by the industry and by the regulators.
Mr. WISE. Thank you. I'm getting the impression that in some of the areas of technology it's sort of like a family buying a computer, which we just did: we're always wondering whether we ought to wait a couple more months for the next, before this one is made obsolete. So I sense that may be occurring here.
Madam Chair, I would ask—I have a lot more questions, but I would ask permission to submit them and have them responded to in writing, if that's possible.
Ms. MOLINARI. Without objection, so ordered. I think the majority of the Members are going to be in that same case, so maybe what we'll do is we'll put them all together and send them over to both of you and ask for responses as soon as possible. Thank you.
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Mr. Kim.
Mr. KIM. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I do have a couple of specific questions for you, Ms. Molitoris. I understand you stated a while ago that you plan to submit the power brake rulemaking to the newly established Rail Safety Advisory Committee?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes.
Mr. KIM. Isn't that too late? You were supposed to submit it back in 1993. My concern I have is it's really way past statutory deadline, but that isn't the issue. I understand it's going to take a year to receive some kind of consensus between management and labor.
Now, let me ask you this question: do you have any idea how you're going to expedite this negotiation? Second, how long will it take to get this new rulemaking?
That's my question.
Ms. MOLITORIS. I don't know where you got the information about the year, because I don't think it came from anyone on our staff.
As I mentioned in my written testimony—no, it is not in the written testimony. It was my oral testimony. We have just submitted—on Monday the Rail Safety Advisory Committee was printed in the Federal Register, and that has to be there for 14 days. Immediately following that, we will hold the first meeting of that committee.
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The role of that first meeting will be to: (A) set the priorities—and I know that the two very important priorities for you in this committee are power brakes and track safety standards. I believe they are also priorities for the Safety Advisory Committee. And then they will set the timetable, which we will then report to the committee.
The encouraging feature, I believe, is that we have done an enormous amount of research and work on both of those areas, upon which these two rulemakings can then be addressed by the working group in a way that I think will truly facilitate and give us an opportunity to get this rule moving within the year.
Mr. KIM. So what kind of timetable are you looking at? Six months? Three months?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I need to respond to you on that as soon as that committee meets and sets the timetable. As I said, I will then report that timetable to the committee.
Mr. KIM. All right. Then let us know. If it's less than a year, I'm glad to hear that. Believe me.
I have a question to Mr. Hall. As I stated last time, one thing that bothers me is that El Cajon Pass accident we had. It took 1 year and 2 months to come up with a report which contains findings and recommendations. I strongly believe that if the report came out a little earlier it could have prevented the second accident.
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Ironically, the report came out the day before the second accident, which is an identical accident, again power brake failure.
Now, my question to you is: why did it take so long? Is there any way you could have some kind of draft report of findings and safety measure where right away you'll circulate that so we can sort of pay attention?
We're dealing with the public's safety. I don't think even an environmental report would take that long, so I'd like to ask you: is there any way you can expedite this process?
Mr. HALL. Yes, Congressman, I would agree with you that 13 months is not an acceptable period of time for the issuance of a report; however, I do want to point out that on the accident that you mentioned, that we issued our report on November 21, 1995, prior to the second Cajon accident that occurred in February of the following year, and we had response back from the railroads that they were aware of our recommendations, that they would take action on the recommendations.
So I would agree with you that the timeliness of this particular report and the printing of it was not as timely as this Cairman would like to have seen. However, in regard to the second accident at Cajon Pass, the railroads had received our recommendations, as well as the FRA, and were aware of them prior to that accident occurring.
Mr. KIM. Thank you.
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Madam Chair, I have just one more quick question.
Ms. MOLINARI. One more very quick question.
Mr. KIM. All right. Ms. Molitoris, again, this report bothers me. Let me read it to you. This is concerning power brake regulations.
''The two-way EOT device—'' that's what we're talking about all day today, EOT device, telemetry system, if we had it, accident could be prevented. It says that, ''When the two-way EOT device was added to the train—'' I'm talking Cajon Pass accident—''it was tested, but would not arm.'' It says, ''The carrier officials said the law only required that the device be tested, and that the law did not require that the device actually work.'' What kind of rulemaking is that? Make sure it's tested, but it doesn't have to be working?
Ms. MOLITORIS. May I ask Mr. Fine, who was there, and I think——
Mr. KIM. I'll give you a copy of this page of the statement I have.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Yes. Do you want him to respond now?
Mr. KIM. You are denying that that's not true?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. May I have Mr. Fine respond to you?
Mr. KIM. Sure.
Mr. FINE. The agreement with the railroad was certainly that those devices would work, Congressman. The problem, as I stated at the last hearing, was that there was a problem, a mechanical problem that was not found with the type of devices they were using at the front end. The arming of device—they were disarmed when they went over the hill, oftentimes because of mechanical problems. That was the real issue. It was not whether or not it was armed.
They were having a mechanical problem that they did not make anyone aware of.
Mr. KIM. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you, Mr. Kim.
Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. This is for Administrator Molitoris. Under the present Hours of Service Act, could a rule be issued requiring crew members to be given 8 hours notice before being required to report for service?
Mr. COTHEN. Mr. Lipinski, with your permission, we'd like to give you a more complete answer for the record, as we responded to Mr. Wise's question on a very related matter.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. It was related. Yes.
Mr. COTHEN. Strictly the issue of advance calling is not within the four corners of the act; however, when the act was last substantively amended in 1969, it was well known that there was an established pattern of a minimum 2-hour call for operating employees, and so the ability of the agency to take that narrow issue on, absent the ability to take on the other issues related to length of service, treatment of commuter time, treatment of dead-heading time, and so forth, and be in any way successful, from the point of view of coming out with an equitable result, I think is very much in question.
But on the specific issue that you pose, I would appreciate the opportunity for our counsel to give you a very direct response.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Lipinski, could I just add to that? I don't know if you were here at the time at the last hearing when we discussed the fact that we would be having an April 4 roundtable on fatigue. And we have done a great deal of work, which we have identified in testimony, on this issue of fatigue, particularly with locomotive engineers.
But the purpose of the roundtable will be not just to discuss the work that has been done, but to bring the parties to the table to talk about ways to get to closure on real reform of the law.
Mr. LIPINSKI. It just seems to me that almost everybody else in the country knows when they're going to go to work long before 2 hours, and it would seem to me that it would be a valuable asset to the employees in the railroad industry if they, too, would know that.
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Madam Chairman, I have to go to the floor in regards to the FAA bill, so I'd like to yield the rest of my time to my good friend, Mr. Clement from Tennessee.
Ms. MOLINARI. OK. Speak fast, Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. CLEMENT. Well, I'm just on Mr. Lipinski's time. Then I have my own time, don't I?
[Laughter.]
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Mr. Lipinski.
Chairman Hall, in light of the MARC/Amtrak collision, what changes are required in rules, regulations, practices, training to better ensure passenger safety when trains are operating in the push mode?
Mr. HALL. Congressman, as you know, that investigation is currently underway, and therefore, other than the urgent recommendations that I put on the record this afternoon with the committee, we have not reached any other conclusions or recommendations out of that accident. However, clearly the concern that is raised in your question is one of the items that is being looked at as part of our investigation, and if we find and deem it necessary, obviously recommendations will be made in that area.
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Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you. Please keep us informed about your recommendations.
Madam Administrator, how does the overall condition of the Nation's railroad track compare with it in 1990 and in 1985, and what data does FRA maintain that shows the condition of track overall and by grade?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Clement, the condition of the Nation's railroads through the years of 1994 and 1995, for example, was continually improving, according to the statistics that we have, in almost every category. I think it does represent a continuing capital investment in the plant.
With particular regard to track, which is where I believe your focus is, we use a number of tools to inspect track. One is an automatic device, a measuring device called the T–10 car. It does about 25,000 miles per year. It provides an excellent way of measuring the structural integrity of that track.
In addition, of course, we have our track specialists who go through and examine, on a regular basis, track for each railroad. They do a visual examination, they work with labor and management to examine the track record, the number of inspections, and so on.
Mr. CLEMENT. How about, for the record, submit that information?
Ms. MOLITORIS. We'd be happy to, Mr. Clement.
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Mr. CLEMENT. All right.
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Mr. CLEMENT. Also, in aviation, mechanics are certified by the FAA and have the ability to take an unsafe piece of equipment out of service. Should the carmen, for example, who are responsible for maintaining the cars, be vested with similar responsibilities?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, of course, Mr. Clement, any of our inspectors who find any portion of what we are inspecting to be not in code, that car or that element would be carded for being repaired. But I'd like to ask Mr. Cothen to address this with a little more specificity.
Mr. COTHEN. With respect to mechanical inspections that are conducted on locomotives and initial terminal air brake tests conducted by mechanical forces, there is a requirement to document that that inspection has been successfully completed.
Falsely creating that documentation can subject the individual to very severe penalties, and, of course, the railroad being placed on notice that there is a problem, placing the equipment in non-compliance.
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Should that equipment be moved, it would subject the railroad to very severe penalties, and also the individual railroad supervisor who might direct the movement of that equipment. So I think the tools are there.
Mr. CLEMENT. It is my understanding that FRA and OSHA share jurisdictional authority over the safety of maintenance-of-way workers. I know that sharing jurisdiction with another agency over any matter can lead to possible problems slipping through the cracks.
Could you tell me a little bit about the coordination of efforts of the two agencies regarding this issue?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Clement, I would say that the working relationship between OSHA and FRA is a solid one. There has been an effort over the last couple of years to increase the efficiency of that working relationship, because we did hear from maintenance-of-way employees and others that there was too much of a gap.
Chief Counsel's office and the Office of Safety have established a protocol to make sure that anytime there is any area of overlap, that there is an efficient and effective communication of this between the parties, and that there be a decision about how we proceed.
Mr. CLEMENT. What specific standards apply to passenger cars, and what other standards are being considered?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Clement, as I mentioned earlier, sir, previous to 1993, the position of FRA had been that no passenger car standards were needed, and I believe that letters to that effect in the files show that that was based on a decision that, working closely with Amtrak, the necessary standards would be incorporated into that equipment.
However, as Mr. Hall mentioned, in 1994 Secretary Peña held a rail summit, at which time he made a decision to dramatically change that point of view, to be responsive to the NTSB recommendations, and to put into process a two-phased passenger car standards working group.
In fact, Congress in 1994—the end of 1994—adopted the Secretary's program and timetable and put it into law.
Immediately following that, the working group was established. It has all members who have interest in this area. They have developed, I think, a very contemporary set of information and data. They are working diligently, and we expect that this rulemaking, the notice of proposed rulemaking, will be out this summer.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Quinn?
Mr. QUINN. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will submit some questions, as we suggested from Mr. Wise and others, but I do want to take a moment to thank the administrator for some quick work and quick action last week on a request that I had from a constituent back home. I understand staff has made contact and we're working out that question, so I appreciate that very much.
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you, sir.
Mr. QUINN. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. MOLINARI. Ms. Kelly?
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I have two quick questions, and they have to do with the interplay between the FRA and the FTA, the coordination.
In the recent MARC/Amtrak collision in Silver Spring, that occurred on track that had its signal upgraded using Federal Transit Administration funds for the commuter corridor. My understanding is that the FTA exercises sole responsibility over the use of the Federal funds for the signal upgrade, and it only looks at safety issues to the extent of checking whether a specific existing FRA regulation is violated by the proposed upgrade plan.
I also understand the FRA is not in the loop for safety purposes until the project is completed.
My question is: why doesn't the FRA and the FTA consult with each other throughout the project, rather than waiting for the FRA to possibly find something wrong after the work's been done and the money's been spent?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Mrs. Kelly, the requirements for FRA are that we examine all the safety elements if it's a downgrade. That's what the regulation says. Because this was an upgrade, the requirement is not there. But even though that is the strict letter of the law, we agree with you that more cooperation and coordination needs to be done from the beginning, and that is the whole focus of our team environment at the Department of Transportation.
With regard to that, Administrator Linton sent forward to all of his regional administrators a bulletin/directive which identified the need for them to coordinate with FRA on any of their grant programs that relate to rail.
Mrs. KELLY. Who made the determination that it was an upgrade?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Well, I presume that they did, Mrs. Kelly, because it's consistent with the regulation. I know that I didn't make that decision, but I can verify that and put that in for the record, if that is all right.
Mrs. KELLY. If that's possible.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Certainly.
Mrs. KELLY. I really would like to have that——
Ms. MOLITORIS. Clarified.
Mrs. KELLY [continuing]. Clarified.
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Ms. MOLITORIS. Certainly.
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Mrs. KELLY. The other thing that I'm wondering is: how many of these FTA-funded commuter rail projects were in progress during fiscal year 1995 and 1996? And also whether the FRA participated in any of them to check for any potential safety hazards.
Ms. MOLITORIS. I don't know that at this moment. I would be very happy to check with Administrator Linton and again provide that information for the record.
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Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mrs. Molitoris. I didn't mean to put you on the spot.
Ms. MOLITORIS. That's fine.
Mrs. KELLY. I'm just concerned about getting some of that information for our——
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Ms. MOLITORIS. I very much appreciate that and would be happy to get it.
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you.
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you, Mrs. Kelly.
Panel, as I think you've gotten from the tenor here, it's very difficult for all of us to ask all the questions that we need to in the time constraint, so we do ask—we will keep the official record open, and probably by close of business today—I'm sorry. Mr. Oberstar is here. I'm sorry.
Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Finish up what you were saying.
Ms. MOLINARI. Just that when we excuse this panel, that we will be submitting to you, within the next few days, a series of questions that we'd like you to answer as soon as possible. Thank you.
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Mr. Oberstar, I'm sorry.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
What are the minimum requirements for personnel designated to inspect track and make determinations regarding movement of trains over defective track?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, we addressed this question, I think, a little bit in the first hearing. There are a variety of standards.
Take, for example, if you're talking about our own inspectors, there is one set of standards. In addition, for those who are inspecting track on behalf of an operating property, there are other elements, mostly covered by negotiated agreements between labor and management.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Shouldn't there be at least a year of supervisory experience in railroad track maintenance? Shouldn't there be a combination of supervisory experience in track maintenance and training——
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, in fact you are enunciating——
Mr. OBERSTAR [continuing]. Done in conjunction with course work?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. You are enunciating the elements of the regulation, which does require 1 year of supervisory or training or an equivalent amount of course work. That is exactly right.
Mr. OBERSTAR. But then we heard in last week's testimony that the railroads often take a signalman who has had maybe 4 hours exposure to a video of maintenance work and allow that person to do track inspections. Does your agency tolerate that? Is that acceptable?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, as a matter of fact, we are following up on what you raised last hearing, and evaluating that particular practice, which we understand was at one particular property, and we're evaluating what that is.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I hope that you'll be able to move quickly on this matter.
Ms. MOLITORIS. And we will submit our findings to the committee and to you.
Mr. OBERSTAR. How long do you expect that will take?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Within the next month or so.
Mr. OBERSTAR. We'll be anxiously waiting and watching very, very closely.
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Another matter I've talked with our folks in Minnesota about—you know, winter is unkind in Minnesota. The glacier retreated 10,000 years ago, but every year it makes a comeback. This year it came back with 60-below-zero weather, and there were people out on the track in 60-below-zero weather on equipment that didn't have shields, that didn't have a horn, didn't have lights. They're out there to do maintenance work without the right kind of safety.
I made some inquiries about that, and understand that's the practice elsewhere around the country.
You could freeze to death going down a track 60 below zero without a windshield on it. You can also get killed if you don't have lights, if you don't have a warning horn.
Do you have standards? Mr. Hall, have you—has NTSB looked into this matter?
Mr. LAUBY. We have not looked specifically at the conditions under which they work. No.
Mr. OBERSTAR. The self-propelled equipment on track. Well, I'd like you to do that.
Mr. LAUBY. OK. We'll do that.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Molitoris?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, I think you're talking about the specialized work equipment.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.
Ms. MOLITORIS. I was trying to figure out what you were describing. We will look at that. There is no particular standard regarding that at this time.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I worked on a piece of equipment like that in the iron ore mines, though it's not so dangerous. Trains aren't moving very fast. Scared the hell out of me to be on one of those little things. There's much bigger equipment on the main lines.
Are there requirements that govern radio communication for maintenance-of-way personnel that perform safety-sensitive functions?
Ms. MOLITORIS. I'm sorry.
Mr. OBERSTAR. That's OK.
Ms. MOLITORIS. I sort of started to ask for an answer. Could you repeat that?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Are there requirements that—are there regulations that require radio communication for maintenance-of-way personnel who perform safety functions?
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Ms. MOLITORIS. There are no regulations specifically addressing that, Mr. Oberstar; however, the roadway worker rule—which, during my testimony, I mentioned I signed yesterday and have moved to the Federal Register—does include protocols and authorities for roadway workers to ask for and get the protection they need whenever they are working in the vicinity of a live track. It gives them the ultimate right to decide what protections they need and the right to get them.
Mr. OBERSTAR. You're going to be moving then on an industry-wide regulation?
Ms. MOLITORIS. Mr. Oberstar, that will be published on Thursday in the Federal Register, but, as I announced at the last hearing, the railroad industry, after our meeting with the operating officers, agreed to implement voluntarily that rule and protocol in the 1996 construction season.
And, as I mentioned in my oral testimony, once I am finished with the Congressional hearings, I will be doing a tour—a summer construction tour of all the railroads to personally visit each railroad, find out how these railway safety programs are affecting the roadway workers.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Good for you. I suspect that's the first time any administrator's ever done that.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Certainly on this rule, sir.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. The 1992 Rail Safety Act directed the FRA to revise track safety standards and issue a final rule by September, 1994. There was an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in 1992. There were some workshops held in 1993. But, as of September, 1994, no rule issued. This is 1996. We still don't have a final rule.
Ms. MOLITORIS. That's right, Mr. Oberstar. In my oral testimony, as well as my written testimony, I addressed the chronology of that very difficult situation. We will—one of the other things that we mentioned is that the Railway Safety Advisory Committee was also approved in the clearance process, and that was published in the Federal Register on Monday. That requires 14 days, and shortly following that period we will hold our first meeting of the Railway Safety Advisory Committee.
At that time, we will have the committee decide their priorities—I know track and power brake are two of the top ones—and the timetable. And I committed to the Chairwoman that we would be reporting the outcomes of this meeting and the timetables established to the Committee.
Mr. OBERSTAR. All of that is very, very important to move forward. I know you had a legacy of neglect to deal with, but we—now is the time to move ahead and not delay.
Ms. MOLINARI. And we've also told the administrator that in about 35 to 40 days out we're going to be contacting them for an update on that.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you all very much. We appreciate your being with us once again, and we will be in touch in sending you those questions.
Ms. MOLITORIS. Thank you.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you.
Our next panel consists of: Mr. Dennis Sullivan, chief operating officer, Amtrak. We welcome back Mr. Thomas Prendergast, president of MTA Long Island Railroad. It is my understanding that Mr. Prendergast will be accompanied by Mr. Daniel Foth, executive director, commuter rail, American Public Transit Association, and Mr. Ross Capon executive director, National Association of Rail Passengers.
Thank you, and good afternoon.
Mr. Sullivan, I would like to have you begin with your testimony, please.
TESTIMONY OF DENNIS F. SULLIVAN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AMTRAK; THOMAS PRENDERGAST, PRESIDENT, MTA LONG ISLAND RAILROAD, ACCOMPANIED BY DANIEL FOTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMUTER RAIL, AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION; AND ROSS CAPON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAIL PASSENGERS
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Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
We're pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the committee on these crucial issues. I would like to submit my prepared testimony for the record and summarize my comments.
Amtrak's highest priority is safety, and we are proud of our safety record at Amtrak. My written statement has a number of these statistics that that I won't repeat here.
We believe we have an excellent working relationship with both the FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board. We've implemented 106 of 132 active recommendations. These recommendations include recommendations on equipment, operating rules, infrastructure, and training.
In 1991, we began a series of quarterly meetings with the NTSB because the recommendations that we had outstanding were long and unattended-to. Since 1991, those quarterly meetings have produced a series of agreements between us and the NTSB on implementation of those recommendations. I would suggest that the industry would benefit from establishing a similar format with the NTSB. It has worked well for us.
Amtrak has initiated a joint labor/management safety council, which was designed to improve safety. We have just gotten started on implementing that in the field with our workers. The council's basic premise is that labor is in charge of the committee and management supports it. We've done this in our red block program, which is a labor/management drug and alcohol program. It has worked very well, and we're expanding that into the area of safety. Initial results seem to show that this also is going to work very well for us.
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In the northeast corridor we've invested more than $250 million in our signal and train control systems. We've installed reverse signaling and continuous cab signaling. We have three computerized dispatching centers in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, which allow our dispatchers to continuously monitor all of the railroad under their control, as well as dispatch it. We've replaced interlocking machines with modern vital relay and microprocessor control systems.
What we have done on the NEC meets and exceeds the FRA regulations. It represents the most advanced technology available and provides the greatest minimization of risk; however, we're not satisfied with this.
Future improvements that we're working on for the northeast corridor include: positive train stop, which will provide a positive stop at a home signal or the entering signal to an interlocking; civil speed enforcement, which will enforce speed restrictions on curves, bridges; other slower-speed elements of the track structure; and nine aspect cab signals, which will allow the display of the signal in the cab all the way up to 150 miles an hour, which we anticipate our new high-speed train sets operating at.
Through our membership in the AAR, we are keeping a close eye on the development of the communications-based train control systems similar to the one that the BNSF and UP are working on in Oregon and Washington.
On equipment, Amtrak and General Electric, with input from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, has designed new locomotives with new safety features, including a virtually collision-proof crew cabin and internal protected fuel tanks. We own 53 of these new locomotives, we plan to purchase 98 more, and we're looking forward to the creation of a dedicated capital trust fund to help us do this.
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All new Amtrak passenger rail cars are designed with state-of-the-art fire-and smoke-retardant materials and meet stringent structural safety requirements. All new car orders call for emergency windows at every seat location. Amtrak equipment not only meets but exceeds national safety standards for equipment.
We train new hires in emergency evacuation procedures and are implementing CPR and first aid training for our on-board service and operating personnel.
We've distributed over 21,000 handbooks to fire and rescue departments around the country, and sent our safety directors to teach classes for emergency rescue personnel.
We work closely with the Operation Respond Institute, which is a nonprofit institution designed to improve the information available to first responders at hazardous material or passenger rail accident sites. Operation Respond provides onsite training, on-line information on emergency exits and systems to rescue personnel.
We've also donated equipment to Texas A&M University that they've use at their fire safety training school, and where we send students, along with other railroads and agencies, to be trained.
Operation Respond is supported by Amtrak, the AAR, the motor carriers, and the chemical manufacturers, along with Federal grants, including grants from the FRA.
As this committee has already heard, the biggest threat to human life on a railroad is at a grade crossing. Amtrak has submitted a detailed statement to the committee on this matter, and we'd be more than happy to discuss it further.
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We have a grade crossing demonstration project in the State of Connecticut. The FRA has issued a grant to the State and to Amtrak, and we're working with both the State and the FRA in this demonstration project. In Connecticut, we will demonstrate state-of-the-art technology in grade crossing protection, including an interlock between the grade crossing protection and the signal system that could stop the train in event of a malfunction of the grade crossing protection system.
Those are my oral comments. I would be more than happy to answer any questions for the committee.
Mr. MICA [assuming Chair]. I thank you, Mr. Sullivan. We're going to defer questions for just a moment until we hear from the rest of the panelists.
Our next panelist is Mr. Thomas F. Prendergast. He's president of MTA Long Island Railroad. I guess you're accompanied by Mr. Daniel Foth, executive director of commuter rail, American Public Transit Association.
You are recognized for your statement. For the record, too, you can submit an entire written statement and summarize, if you could.
Thank you.
Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you very much.
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I'm here today representing the American Public Transit Association's 15 commuter railroad systems located in the United States. We again appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the commuter railroads on the issue of rail safety as it applies to passenger car equipment and the procedures of the FRA.
At last week's subcommittee hearing there was a great deal of concern and frustration noted about the pace of the Federal Railroad Administration's rulemaking efforts. Prior to Ms. Molitoris' administration, commuter railroads were generally treated as the unwanted stepchildren of the railroad industry.
APTA welcomes Ms. Molitoris' outreach efforts, and from a commuter rail standpoint, their willingness to meet with APTA's commuter railroads to understand our operations is most welcome.
Rule-making cannot be done in a vacuum. We feel that the FRA's efforts to reach out to the freight and passenger railroads, rail labor, Amtrak, and others is the right way to perform this vital function. Working together helps avoid misunderstandings that can polarize the typical rulemaking process. Working together also helps commuter railroads understand the FRA's viewpoints and helps the FRA to understand the impact on commuter rail systems, both collectively and individually.
We believe that this inclusive process by which the FRA, NTSB, and employees in the industry get together to work together on safety issues creates the best possible win/win situations for long-term safety.
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This specifically applies to our recent joint FRA and APTA effort to establish and maintain passenger car safety standards.
As I noted in my testimony last week, upon passage of the Swift Rail Development Act that mandated passenger rail car safety standards, the FRA requested that APTA develop and maintain these safety standards. This process will cost APTA members over a half million dollars to initiate, and over $100,000 a year to maintain.
The commuter railroads, along with the supply community, will step up to the plate and fund and do this important critical work.
Although every commuter railroad complies with the current FRA standards, we have agreed that these standards were in need of review and updating is required. This commitment occurred prior to the two recent accidents in New Jersey and Maryland.
However, the process assumed the schedule set forth in the Swift Rail Development Act. We are very concerned that, due to these hearings, the FRA will feel pressured to accelerate the schedule in a way that is detrimental to the ability of APTA and the FRA to complete our work in a rational and sensible fashion.
As I noted to the committee last week, building a passenger car to withstand major impact force may not necessarily protect the passengers in the best way. The tremendous energy forces created may result in passengers sustaining injuries on the interior of the car and cause massive interior injuries to these customers.
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Developing the optimum crashworthiness requires a careful research and testing to fully account for all the reasonable variables and solutions. Let us not forget the other side of the equation, which is collision avoidance.
Accident avoidance requires a focus on both crashworthiness and collision avoidance systems that minimize the effect of human factors failures. Without a balanced approach, commuter rail cars will be heavy and slow, and people will quickly go back to their automobiles, where the death rate is five times greater, along with the resulting pollution and congestion problems.
We fully understand the impatience by some members of the subcommittee regarding the speed of FRA regulation implementation; however, the rulemaking process for passenger car safety is on track with the mandate set forth by Congress in late 1994.
APTA's committed to working with FRA to complete this schedule on time. The schedule we are on with the FRA is already compressed, given the resources we and the FRA have. We commit to completing this effort and request that the subcommittee allow us time to complete the effort in a rational and sensible fashion.
As we noted last week, there is risk to reacting to events with haste. In the interest of protecting the public's safety, there can be a temptation to mandate treatment ahead of the final diagnosis. Clearly, the commuter rail industry would not have one of the best records in transportation safety if we ignored safety concerns. We will work with FRA, FTA, and the National Transportation Safety Board to produce workable solutions that protect both the lives of our passengers, as well as our employees.
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We also want to respond to the concern noted at the last hearing regarding the safety of push-pull and multiple-unit car operations. These operations have been successfully used in the commuter rail industry for over 60 years. They have had a tremendous safety record. It could not have happened if such operations were inherently unsafe.
This is true for both commuter and rail rapid transit systems such as the ones that exist in Metro here or in New York City. Every commuter system depends heavily on these operations, but we agree that they should be reviewed in light of the recent accidents to try to identify issues that must be addressed.
We are also concerned. We know that members of the committee are concerned about emergency exits on passenger rail cars, and the NTSB findings for both the New Jersey and Maryland accidents will be reviewed, along with other NTSB, Amtrak, and commuter accident reports, so that we can review this issue in its entirety.
To assist our safety efforts, we ask the subcommittee to consider the development of a Federal effort to assist commuter railroads with research and development. Commuter rail systems, like other transit counterparts, have limited funding and do not have the ability to fund transit research. Suppliers also operate on thin margins, and likewise have little funding for research and development funding.
Crashworthiness testing, alone, can cost millions of dollars, especially if actual crash testing is used. Leadership from Congress on a Federal research and development effort will provide the impetus that the industry needs to start such an effort. We hope that the subcommittee will examine this issue closely when the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act is reauthorized in 1997.
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As we noted last week, one area that is ripe for research funding is positive train separation, which we commonly refer to as communication-based signaling systems. With scarce Federal and local funds, perhaps rather than devoting massive amounts to crashworthiness, such funds would be put to better use in prevention of accidents through the use of these systems.
The FRA is currently testing these on various freight and Amtrak lines; however, the nature and density of commuter rail operations is significantly different, and we strongly believe a test should be conducted on them, as well.
Finally, with regard to FRA procedures, we believe, for the railroad industry, both freight and passenger, to survive and compete we need a new overall approach to safety. Innovative advances in signal systems and other rail operations will require a change to the traditional focus on safety.
Today's total system safety requires a program that is tailored to meet the needs of individual systems. Of our 15 members, no two are exactly alike. A one-size-fits-all command and control approach by government will not work well in assessing the what and how of safety rules.
We also need to standardize the ''what,'' but support the concept of flexibility in carrying out how. Such an operation and practice has been in place in the rail transit industry, which has an excellent safety record.
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Maximum safety we believe is achieved on a performance basis, with the standard being set by the FRA, but allowing different commuter railroads to develop a workable means to achieve such a standard.
The FTA, in overseeing heavy and light rail, has used such an approach, and it has been successful. That's the partnership we're talking bout with this Congress, the FRA, the FTA, the NTSB, our employees, Amtrak, freight and commuter railroads operating together. Together we can and will achieve optimum safety for our customers and our employees.
Thank you.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast.
I now will turn to Mr. Capon. Mr. Capon's the executive director of the National Association of Rail Passengers.
You're recognized, sir.
Mr. CAPON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask that my full printed statement be——
Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered. If you continue and summarize, we'd appreciate it. Thank you.
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Mr. CAPON. Right. I'd like to highlight, on the front page, the fact that, first of all, as we've already heard, public transportation is far safer than automobile. There was a sharp increase in the fatality rate on a 10-year rolling average for Amtrak from 1986 to 1994, and that is almost exclusively attributable to the two disasters, one at Chase, Maryland, and one at Mobile. Actually, there was only one other accident during that decade in which Amtrak passenger fatalities took place. That was at Lugoff, South Carolina.
The footnote notes, for example, that the 1994 figure for Amtrak, if you took Mobile out of it, instead of 11.36 it would be 4.02 fatalities per 10 billion passenger miles. I apologize for the fact that some copies of the statement has the number 3.97. That's a 1995 figure, and that reflects the fact that, although there were no passenger fatalities in either 1985 or 1995, the amount of travel in Amtrak actually increased in 1995, therefore the decline in the rate as expressed in fatalities per billion passenger miles.
We have asked that the Safety Board recommendations for passenger railroads be directed to all passenger railroads and not simply to individual carriers, and that all passenger railroads should take the Safety Board passenger recommendations seriously.
It is appalling that even today there are commuter railroad cars with no external markings for where emergency exits are located, and we think that—and I noticed in early testimony today Mr. Hall did, after indicating recommendations to MARC, make a suggestion to the administrator regarding all commuter railroads.
On the subject of advanced train control systems, we think the cost/benefit analysis should not be strictly backwards-looking, but that there should be some contemplation of the possibility of a HAZMAT accident in a populated area. We are very lucky that this has not happened, but we shouldn't have to wait for one to happen in order for the cost/benefit analysis to reflect that.
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We also think that the cost/benefit analysis should consider a baseline, modified, if necessary, to reflect the findings of the FRA study we suggest about the appropriateness of current dispatcher work loads.
I note in my statement my personal belief that, if the dispatcher had had a conversation with the MARC engineer in which he had specifically said, ''I'm going to hold you at Georgetown Junction until Amtrak clears,'' to my mind that drastically reduces the likelihood that the MARC engineer would forget a signal if, in fact, that's what happened.
I believe I can clear up some of the confusion about whether this CSX signal installation was an upgrade or a downgrade. I believe it was an upgrade in the sense that the railroad west of Silver Spring, after the project was completed, both tracks were signaled for both directions, which increased the capacity of the railroad and the speed at which trains could operate on the left-hand track, if you will. It was clearly a downgrade in the sense that the average spacing between signals was increased.
I suspect that part of the problem here is that this work was done by CSX. It's not clear to me whether MARC, at the time, had any expertise in what would constitute an upgrade or a downgrade for commuter purposes, and it's obviously not clear whether FTA was monitoring it at all. Obviously, that's a gap that needs to be connected.
Finally, with regard to cab cars and to passenger cars, generally, I'm concerned that there is one important element of existing passenger car regulation which has not been commented upon by previous witnesses, and that is what we refer to as the ''end-loading buff strain,'' the ability of a car to withstand forces at the end of the car. And 800,000 pounds is the minimum requirement for commuter railroads. It makes the cars the safest passenger cars in the world, and I think it's important that we not lose site of that in the current deliberations.
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One suggestion which I have made repeatedly is that passengers not be loaded in the lead car of any train, whether it's locomotive hauled or push mode, if it's not necessary.
But we do agree that the future of rail passenger safety lies in preventing collisions, not in restricting use of the world's strongest and safest passenger cars—those that operate in the U.S.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. MICA. I thank you and the other panelists for your testimony.
I'll start with a couple of questions, if I may.
Mr. Sullivan, please, Amtrak's been at the forefront in including passenger safety features in its design specifications for new equipment. Since you've already begun the process, how will your efforts fit in with the regulations on passenger car safety standards that FRA is supposed to issue by 1997?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that the process that we used was one that included the Federal Railroad Administration. We had over 120 issues, and we discussed over several months with the FRA what standards are to be included in the design of our new high-speed train sets. The FRA had some concerns, and we agreed that we ought to look at this together to make sure that we had the safest possible trains that could operate in the world.
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We also did a risk analysis. We hired an outside consultant to do a risk analysis of the operation of these trains on the railroad on the northeast corridor, and the result of that risk analysis found that the risk on a railroad which had cab signals and speed control and all of the advanced safety features that we have on the northeast corridor was not at high speed, but was at lower speeds in terminal areas. As a result, we looked at ways, including a positive train stop, which will be in our new signal system that I described earlier, to stop trains in case they went through a signal—not in compliance—before they got to an interlocking signal.
So we think we've addressed both the equipment and the infrastructure side, and I think the process that we used with the FRA is one that might be considered in doing this with passenger car standards for the rest of the industry.
Mr. MICA. You said you used a risk assessment analysis. Were there any other factors that were uncovered or any other directions you think you should take as a result of that risk assessment as far as the cost in certain improvements that are being made? And should we head in any other directions based on the findings of this preliminary assessment? Or should we go back and look again and see how we can more cost-effectively spend the dollars that we're spending on improvements and safety?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, as I mentioned, the risk analysis did point out that at interlockings, which emergency order number 20 covers as a result of the Silver Spring accident, is where we're most at risk. So we feel at Amtrak —and I'm not sure this is applicable to all circumstances—but at least in ours—that we need to make an investment in the signal system to preclude an engineer from not complying with the signal, and then having the possibility of passing the next signal, which may be in a stop position.
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Mr. MICA. It appears that NTSB has recommended the Federal Railroad Administration adopt some emergency or quick-rules relating to commuter rail equipment inspections. Are you familiar with this recent proposal?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Just what I heard today at the hearing that the NTSB has issued three emergency orders to MARC and one to the FRA. I beleive me comply with those right now.
Mr. MICA. You do comply with them?
Mr. SULLIVAN. I'd have to look at the specifics of it, but, just hearing what was said at the hearing—emergency exits, we have handles. If you're interested, I could submit for the record some emergency cards that we put in the seat backs that describe to passengers how they can work the emergency exits at the doors. There's a handle to pull to operate those in emergency.
Mr. MICA. That's the first time I've ever seen those cards, but that brings up one of my next questions. Do you think that there should be some type of safety instruction? I don't think it's currently done. You're telling me you place the cards. Or should there be some requirement that they be placed on the trains, or some safety announcement as you have, say, for example, with airliners?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, it's one of the recommendations that was made to us by the NTSB, and we've been working with the NTSB to develop these cards. We are now putting them—for the most part—in all of our trains nationwide.
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We don't have a safety briefing like you would get on an airplane, but we do tell the passengers that these cards are in the seat back in front of them and ask them to please read the cards so they're familiar with the emergency exits and emergency procedures.
Mr. MICA. Just one final question. There have been two major accidents that have accounted for some distortion in some of the safety record, or impacted greatly the safety record—I should say ''skewed these figures'' rather than ''distorted them.'' But is there anything that, in these instances that you're familiar with, by making the improvements, maybe the safety card—would that have made any difference in any of these wrecks, or not?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Chase and Saraland are the two big accidents where we had the fatalities. Certainly cards like this, instructions telling the passengers how to use the emergency exits, would have been helpful, I believe, in both accidents.
Mr. MICA. Would it have cut down on fatalities or injuries?
Mr. SULLIVAN. I don't believe so.
Mr. MICA. You don't?
Mr. SULLIVAN. No. They were mostly the result of the initial impact. But they would have helped passengers, I think, know where the emergency exits are.
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Mr. MICA. Well, I'll switch over to Mr. Capon for a second.
What's your view on this? I noticed you just—your eyebrows sort of raised on the——
Mr. CAPON. I think the—I don't have any basis for disagreeing with Mr. Sullivan's conclusion. I think the issue of emergency lighting in the cars, which Amtrak is addressing, was raised by the Safety Board, particularly after Saraland, and, not to belabor my point about the way passengers are loaded, I think it's useful to remember that, at Chase, the lead passenger car behind the two locomotives was empty, and the loss of life was much greater——
Mr. MICA. So possibly a couple of other safety approaches—the loading of the cars, and then the illumination of the exits might, you feel, have a better impact on safety?
Mr. CAPON. I believe the illumination issue is a car-length issue, the ability to see. I think they have now a floor strip, a strip running along the floor the length of the car that provides some light for the passenger in the event of an accident where the lights are otherwise out.
Mr. MICA. How are our new cars and—we've got a whole bunch of new equipment running not only in the northeast corridor—I know auto trains and some of the other things. Do they all meet the illumination or signage requirements?
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Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.
Mr. MICA. They do?
Mr. SULLIVAN. And I would agree with Ross on the issue of lighting. We're working with the NTSB now on emergency lights for passengers—snap lights and flashlights. We're doing some testing of that so the passengers would have lighting in their hand when they exit the train. That was a recommendation that was made to us by the NTSB.
Emergency lighting is definitely an issue and definitely one that—we have the strip lights in the new equipment for instance. We're looking at other lighting options.
Mr. MICA. My time has expired. I'd like to yield now to Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to compliment Amtrak on the safety record that has been established, especially in response to NTSB recommendations. I think you're really been cooperative with NTSB and they have been complimentary of your responsiveness to the recommendations. You ought to get credit where credit is due.
Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, sir.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Especially in a time when the ability of a publicly owned entity to operate efficiently is being called into question. Certainly Amtrak is leading the way in safety and doing all things it needs to do to operate efficiently and effectively and be competitive.
What example, though, are you setting for and what relationship is there between Amtrak and the commuter railroads? When Amtrak implements safety recommendations, do you reach out to your brother and sister commuter rails and share information with them—for example, the emergency window issue, the emergency floor path lighting system that you're starting to install? Do you work together with Mr. Prendergast?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we are a member of both the AAR and APTA, which is the organization that represents the commuter rail interests. I'm sure you're also aware, Mr. Oberstar, that we are the operator of six commuter rail systems throughout the United States. We are the largest contract operator of commuter rail systems, with VRE and MARC being two of the systems that we operate partially here in the Washington area, three in California, and one in Connecticut.
So we see, on those contract operations, for instance, that the equipment modifications that we've made for safety are passed along to those commuter agencies so that they can take advantage of these developments in safety.
As far as the rest of the commuter rail industry, our contact there would be through APTA, and through our participation in APTA we attempt to pass along what information we have on many, many issues, including safety issues.
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Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Prendergast, do you have communication with Amtrak? Are you sharing information back and forth?
Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes, through APTA and through other industry committees, and there is a lot of commonality of purpose and function when it comes to safety standards for rail equipment; however, it doesn't exist across the board, because the nature of our operation is different than the nature of their operation.
But in terms of crashworthiness and in terms of basic safety features on the car, there are commonalities.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Sullivan, in the MARC accident, the newer P–40 locomotive with the protected fuel tanks was in the trailing position. The older locomotive was in the exposed lead position. We've heard some explanations of why that occurred—that there was a problem with the crew not qualified on the newer engine—but why wouldn't you have seen to it that the newer locomotive was in the lead position?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Those new locomotives, like any new piece of equipment, have modifications which come about as a result of using the equipment.
Now, General Electric built these locomotives for us under a contract, and there was an issue. It was a technical issue that needed a modification made to the P–40 locomotives. It had to do with the operation of cab signals on a certain stretch of track west of Pittsburgh where we operate over Conrail. And in the P–40's, the new locomotives, in the lead position, we were getting some complaints from our locomotive engineers that the cab signals over that territory were not properly kicking in when they had the new locomotive in the lead.
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So there had to be a modification made to the axle alternator on those locomotives. We made an operational decision that until that modification was made we would run the P–40's in the trail position, and that's why it was in the trail position at Silver Spring.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. There are other questions I would have liked to ask, but I have to get over to the House floor to manage, for our side, the independent FAA bill, so I'll have to leave here for a time.
I shall return, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MICA. I thank the full committee ranking Member. If you had additional questions, of course we'd be glad to submit them to the witnesses.
We recognize at this time, for the purpose of questions, Mr. Wise, the ranking Member of our subcommittee.
Mr. WISE. To follow up on Mr. Oberstar's question and your response, so then the reason that that locomotive was in a trailing position and not—the newer locomotive was in a trailing position and not in the lead, had nothing to do with the certification or qualifications of the engineers driving it; is that correct?
Mr. SULLIVAN. That's correct, sir.
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Mr. WISE. OK. I believe one of you talked about this in your testimony, but I'd ask it anyway because I think it needs to be out on the record—the use of the push cab device, what would be the impact on your operations if you required a locomotive always to be in the lead?
Mr. PRENDERGAST. There are at least four commuter rail properties that use extensively multiple-unit electric cars, in the northeast, primarily, but there's one in the midwest—Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. And a large portion of their fleet are M/U operation with cab car forward. Cab car's a locomotive, it's an electric car.
If we were to have a requirement for those, you'd have to add a car in the front, and you've have to basically take it from the existing fleet of cars. It would not only be a costly proposition; you would actually result in reduced passenger capacity to carry people.
For those railroads that do not have multiple unit operations and they operate push-pulls, they would have to increase their fleet of locomotives, and to put a locomotive on either end of the train.
We have not worked up a cost impact. We could. We strongly feel that over 60 years of operation of both electrical multiple-unit and push-pull operations, we consider them to be inherently safe. So we have a hard time understanding what you gain by saying that people can't ride in that lead piece of equipment.
Mr. WISE. Yes.
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Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think what we are concerned about, and there is a recognition of in the industry, is compatibility of equipment. As we've designed locomotives or M/U cars, we wanted to make sure the crashworthiness standards for those vehicles, if they do end up colliding, are consistent. We want to protect against one floor overriding another floor and telescoping into another car. Those historically, in terms of head-on collisions or rear-on collisions, have been the worst.
So that's been our focus to date, and that's our concern, but we could run some numbers for you. It would be very costly.
Mr. WISE. I'm getting the picture. I think it would also be—well, I think in some areas it would be unwieldy.
Mr. PRENDERGAST. I can tell you in New York it would be unwieldy, and I'll tell you why: because if we preclude the operation of people standing in the lead car, it would come into a terminal at either Grand Central or Penn Station, walk to a subway location, and get in the front of a subway train, and they'd ask, ''Why can I ride in the front end of this car but I can't ride in the front end of a commuter rail car?'' They're both inherently safe operations, as proven by the records of both systems, and it would be problematic from that standpoint, it would be certainly problematic from a passenger standing capacity standpoint.
Mr. WISE. Am I correct in gleaning from some of your testimony—perhaps it was yours, Mr. Prendergast, that safety is important in the requirements for these cars, but that the real priority ought to be on keeping them from colliding——
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Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes.
Mr. WISE [continuing]. By the use of whether it's ATC, ATS, or positive train separation, or whatever. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. PRENDERGAST. That is a fair statement, and we believe that the existing technologies that a lot of railroads have right now—cab signal—are not only at the end of their useful life in terms of the installations, but it's a technology that's been around 50 years.
The positive train separation or communication-based signaling systems are the investments we believe we need to make, because they're the systems that are going to make these operations safe for the next 50 years We try to have a balance between crashworthiness of vehicles, as well a positive train separation or collision avoidance.
Europeans actually don't even go to the same degree we do in terms of crashworthiness. We're not saying we should shrink on crashworthiness. We don't know if, in terms of improving ultimately safety, dollar-for-dollar, it's spent best in increasing crashworthiness versus making investments in signal systems.
Mr. WISE. But, as a reality, my impression is this is fairly expensive technology we're talking about. Is the reality—can you defend that, yourself?
Mr. PRENDERGAST. Every signal system you install is probably the most important and most costly item that you put on the system. It has useful life for 40 to 50 years. You have to make stated good repair reinvestments in that to keep it up and running.
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A lot of systems—cab systems Long Island Railroad has have been installed since 1950. I have to embark upon a state of good repair replacement, and I would do so with new technology.
So the delta between replacing cab signal technology with communications-based may not be that great given the increased safety performance as well as operational performance. You do get an operational enhancement with communication-based signal systems.
Mr. WISE. Thank you.
Did you wish to add something?
Mr. CAPON. I just wanted to underling the safety of cab cars. In the first paragraph on the last page of my statement, I mention the 1981 collision between a freight locomotive and a push-mode commuter train near Boston. The fatalities wherein the cab of the locomotive and the engineer on the passenger train, who jumped from the train rather than retreat into the passenger compartment, where there were no fatalities. So that is one illustration of the safety of U.S. passenger cars.
Mr. WISE. I guess. I understand I'm a layperson in this. I'm still visualizing what I saw in the cab car of the MARC train in which 11 people died.
Mr. CAPON. I think the odds—the central thing there was a direct hit by the MARC train on the fuel tank on the side of the Amtrak locomotive, and the odds of—however terrible that accident was—and watching it on television, it was certainly terrible to imagine what happened—the real probabilities of that exact accident ever happening again are such that you really have to—they're just very, very small.
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Mr. WISE. As I recall from your testimony, you ride the MARC.
Mr. CAPON. Yes, I do.
Mr. WISE. Fine. I hope there's agreement though—and I think we're all basically in agreement, anyhow, that car safety in terms of being able to get out of a car that has been impacted or hit, as that train was, is essential in terms of having something more than four exit windows for 40 windows, and having doors that you don't have to maneuver two quarters to get out of. I think that's something we could all—as Amtrak has installed on all of its passenger cars. I would hope that's something we can agree on as a common standard.
Thank you very much.
Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.
I want to take this opportunity to also thank our panelists for their contributions today. We're looking at how to make our railroads safer, both for the passengers and the people that work on the railroads, and then also for the Government and industry to work together with limited resources, at least on the Government's part, to do the best we can with what we have to ensure that safety.
We thank you. The record will remain open if there are other questions from either side of the aisle, and we may submit them to you during that period.
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So thank you. You're excused.
Mr. MICA. I'd like to call the next panel, if I may, panel No. 3, forward and invite, if they could come up, Mr. Edward L. Harper. Edward L. Harper is the president and chief executive officer of the Association of American Railroads. Today Mr. Harper is accompanied by John D. McPherson, who's senior vice president of operations for Illinois Central Railroad, and Mr. Charles Dettmann, executive vice president of operations, research, and technology of the Association of American Railroads.
Also in panel three we have Mr. William E. Loftus, who is president of the American Short Line Railroad Association, and we are also pleased to welcome Mr. Mac A. Fleming, who is president of the Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way Employees, and another distinguished panelist, Mr. Dan Pickett, who's president of the Brotherhood of Railway Signalmen.
So I would like to welcome each of our Panelists. As I have told the other panels, and Chairman Molinari has also explained, you are free to submit your testimony in lengthy written form to the subcommittee and committee. We would appreciate it, however, if you could summarize your comments and, your official written statement can be made part of the record.
Now that we've got everyone settled, I want to again welcome each of you. And for the purpose of serving as a witness today, welcome back a regular to our panel, Mr. Ed Harper, again, president and chief executive officer of the Association of American Railroads.
You're recognized, sir.
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TESTIMONY OF EDWIN L. HARPER, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN D. MCPHERSON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS FOR ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD, AND CHARLES DETTMANN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; WILLIAM E. LOFTUS, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN SHORT LINE RAILROAD ASSOCIATION; MAC A. FLEMING, PRESIDENT OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE-OF-WAY EMPLOYEES; AND DAN PICKETT, PRESIDENT OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY SIGNALMEN ACCOMPANIED BY RICK INCLIMA, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY
Mr. HARPER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I'll endeavor to stay within the green light.
The AAR is here to pledge its continued commitment to join with all interested parties in the effort to identify and address the important safety issues which are the subject of your hearing. Our mutual job is to deal with the realities of the recent tragic accidents that have occurred and which are under investigation by the NTSB, the FRA, and the railroads.
Over the longer term, accident trends have shown steady improvement over many years. The overall train accident rate, excluding grade crossings, was reduced 56 percent since 1981, and 23 percent from 1990 through the first 10 months of 1995.
In the areas being considered by today's hearings, the facts are these: derailment down 60 percent since 1981, 27 percent since 1990; all mechanical accidents down 74 percent and 44 percent in the same timeframes; track-related derailments down 64 percent and 26 percent; brake-related accidents down 73 percent and 43 percent.
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The industry earned its excellent safety record through the efforts of the men and women of the railroad industry, and through the industry's private capital investment, nearly $50 billion since 1980, when Congress enacted the Staggers Rail Act, which helped restore financial viability to the industry. In addition, $5.6 billion more was spent in 1995.
The industry's self-regulation through standards setting has played a significant role in its safety achievements. Railroads have identified safety problems and addressed them aggressively, without awaiting regulatory intervention.
The 60 percent cut in the derailment rate was, in large part, a direct result of the industry's initiative to accelerate the use of heat-treated, curved-plate wheels, a substantial advance in the state-of-the-art. Other examples are in my formal statement.
AAR understands that FRA regulatory procedures are an issue of interest to the committee. The industry is proud of the level of cooperation it has achieved with its employees in finding solutions to the issues of joint concern through FRA's rulemaking process.
For example, an FRA rule effective in 1995 established maintenance, inspection, and testing requirements for active highway grade crossing warning systems. The core of that rule was developed jointly by the AAR, the American Short Line Railroad Association, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalman.
Another example is in the area of on-track worker safety. Immediately after Administrator Molitoris stated her interest in issuing a rule in this area, the railroads took the initiative, with labor, to develop the fundamental groundwork for rulemaking action, resulting in the first negotiated rulemaking in FRA history.
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Cooperative approaches to rulemaking can yield positive results; however, AAR is convinced that, in order to achieve the quantum leap in rail safety that is everyone's goal, FRA should re-orient its role to bring it in line with modern safety techniques and move toward performance standards. This kind of approach has bipartisan support and has been endorsed by both Presidents Bush and Clinton.
If the investigations of the recent accidents uncovered new information that suggests a reversal of the positive, long-term safety trend, the industry, as it has in the past, will respond quickly and forcefully, in full collaboration with the Congress, FRA, and other interests.
In the meantime, AAR's members have taken the following short-term steps:
First, AAR's class one members will install two-way end-of-train devices prior to the 1997 deadline established by the Congress.
Second, they'll implement the on-track worker safety program that labor and management developed. Both of these are being done in advance of formal rules from the FRA.
Third, John Snow, chairman of the AAR and chairman and CEO of CSX Corporation, today announced the creation of an AAR rail passenger safety task force to look at the special challenges created by industry trains and freight trains operating over common trackage.
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Ron Burns, president of Union Pacific, will Chair the task force, going by Amtrak's CEO Tom Downs, Tri-County Commuter Railroad's Gil Robert, Metro's Phil Pagano, and the CEOs of the member railroads providing services or facilities for industry rail service.
The task force is expected to report its initial recommendations within 120 days. Beyond that period, it will focus its attention on the long-range relationship between freight and passenger operations.
The industry takes its safety performance very seriously.
To answer your questions, I have with me Mr. John D. McPherson, senior vice president, operations, of Illinois Central, with 28 years of railroading experience, and Mr. Charles Dettmann, executive vice president of the AAR, who has over 30 years of experience with the Missouri Pacific and the Union Pacific.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Harper.
I'd now like to recognize Mr. Bill Loftus, president of the American Short Line Railroad Association.
Mr. Loftus, you're recognized.
Mr. LOFTUS. Thank you, Mr. Mica, Mr. Wise.
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On behalf of the short line and regional railroads, I want to emphasize the benefits of collective action in rulemaking.
Unfortunately, much of the dialog before this subcommittee has been adversarial and confrontational to date. I recall when railroad safety was under the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Commerce. The environment was much the same. But I also recall that almost every committee chairman and subcommittee chairman admonished us—''us,'' the railroads and ''us,'' the labor organizations—to work together for the common good of railroad safety.
That was good advice and fairly given from legislators who had examined every aspect of the railroad safety issue.
Certainly, any statistical analysis of the status of railroad safety today will show the enormous gains in safety in all causal areas: track, equipment, and human factors. Also, our cooperative record is outstanding.
Labor and management jointly developed a comprehensive set of rules governing the inspection, testing, and maintenance of highway/railway grade crossing warning devices. FRA published those rules last year.
You've heard the administrator advise that she will publish on-track worker safety rules, which Mr. Harper just described, and also that she's also published the announcement of the formation of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee made up of all interest groups, with labor and management representatives in the majority.
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The RSAC, as it is already being called, will have the difficult task of finalizing power brake rules and track standards. I, for one, believe it can be done. We've advised the administrator that the short line and regional railroads are ready to get started and we have selected our representatives.
A few issues on specific issues that the committee has raised.
Railroad equipment—train accidents caused by equipment failures have declined more than 70 percent in the last 10 years. We also know that equipment failures or equipment that is not properly operated can still cause accidents.
But from the standpoint of FRA enforcement and railroad compliance, equipment inspections are routinely conducted on every railroad in the country by the railroad's own employees, as well as spot checks by FRA and State safety inspectors.
While we are not at a zero-based equipment safety level, we are continuing to improve the safety numbers year after year, and we urge you not to legislate in that area.
Hours of service—a great deal of discussion here so far on hours of service. It's a longstanding issue and a question of legal questions, which Mr. Wise has asked, and so has the chairwoman.
Small railroads are particularly concerned with the inflexibility of the law in its total coverage of railroad operating employees, regardless of the level of safety-sensitive duties.
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Our railroads, which often use employees in several job disciplines, find that an employee can be subject to the 9-hour work limit applicable to train dispatchers if that person does anything remotely akin to dispatching a train or giving a train order. It may have been the only single train movement order for the entire day, but it subjects that employee to the same 9-hour limit rules that govern the dispatchers who work the large central control facilities of the major railroads.
While we continue to believe that the subcommittee should focus on pending rulemakings rather than passing any more legislation, if the committee does decide to modify the Hours of Service Act, we expressly ask that you open all the provisions of the act to change in order to consider the flexible operating needs of the smaller railroads.
Finally, in employee certification, Congress did require the training, testing, and certification of railroad engineers following the Chase, Maryland, accident, because there was concern that the work responsibilities of the engineer were critical factors in railroad safety.
We feel that if all railroad workers would be now subject to certification, as some propose, it would be an enormous burden, both in terms of recordkeeping, micro-managing every employee in the system, and, of course, paperwork upon paperwork.
Qualified, trained employees is a concept that all of us support—labor, management, and Government. Training is at the heart of the on-track worker safety rules that labor and management recommended to FRA and which Administrator Molitoris says will be published next week.
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Labor and management did not recommend formal certification in that rulemaking, and rightly so. It would be redundant, time-consuming, and again add more paper and recordkeeping on top of all that we have to do today.
However, the rule does include specific training and testing requirements for on-track workers.
In summary, the short line and regional railroads strongly urge the subcommittee to give its active support to making collective, cooperative rulemaking the norm in this industry. We see no need for further legislation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Loftus.
Now I'd like to recognize a gentleman who represents a lot of people out there that are working hard and trying to make the railroads safe, Mr. Mac Fleming, president of the Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way Employees.
Welcome. You're recognized, sir, for 5 minutes.
Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The BMWE, on behalf of its 50,000 members, appreciates very deeply the concern for rail safety. We appreciate also any support that any entity can lend to that effort.
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The BMWE is basically a railroad construction union. We build and maintain track throughout the United States and Canada. It has been said by many that we are probably the most dangerous craft in the rail industry. Fifty-three deaths of roadway workers killed by train and equipment since 1986 is somewhat evident of that fact. Numerous other fatalities unrelated to railway worker issues have also occurred. High rate of personal injury and occupational illness is commonplace in the BMWE.
The BMWE is committed to be willing partners for safety with the railroads, with the Congress, and anyone else who desires to interact with us.
We are committed to partnership with the FRA. We have been members of the Railway Worker Advisory Committee the Rail Safety Advisory Committee, participated in round table and listening posts, and firmly believe that labor expertise is central to improving safety in this industry.
We currently have outstanding section six notices on most major carriers in the United States asking that the railroad commit to a partnership in safety.
We have engaged in problem-solving in safety improvements throughout the industry, and believe that the industry must embrace the maintenance-of-way and rail labor as full and equal partners to improve the situation that exists today.
The maintenance-of-way employee typically uses modern high-tech equipment. He has to be highly skilled and a productive operator of these sophisticated machines. Safety improvements with this equipment have not kept pace with technological improvements.
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For example, maintenance-of-way equipment designed not to shunt track, non-shunning of maintenance-of-way equipment makes them virtually invisible on the track. Positive train separation technology can locate non-shunning equipment. We do not have that technology available for maintenance-of-way equipment. The design of the equipment, itself, is very urgent.
Occupational injuries and disease can be prevented by proper equipment design. We need to get to this matter as soon as possible.
This committee has heard a lot over the last few weeks about accident and incident reporting requirements and about the 1989 GAO study, which chastised the railroads for compliance with those FRA standards.
I'd like to add one thing to that, and that is the fact that most subcontractors are outsourcing people in the maintenance departments throughout the United States, which numbers approximately 50,000, are not included in those accident/incident reporting, as we know it today. So the numbers that we hear cited so often by the railroads may not be accurate, especially when it applies to maintenance-of-way craft employees.
I would also like to state that medical treatment manipulation, falsified reports, discipline in injuries, intimidation are commonplace in the reporting of accidents on America's railroads.
Mr. Chairman, I realize the red light is on. I'll try to sum up very quickly.
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Performance standards—I'd like to speak on this just a minute. The BMWE and the maintenance-of-way vehemently opposes these performance standards. Performance standards only lead to carriers' control of records and information regarding accident and injuries. It's like leaving the fox to guard the chicken coop. It simply will not work.
Non-reporting and discipline, as we know it, and is a problem today in this industry in reporting accidents, will only increase. Unions can assure compliance under performance standard.
In conclusion, I'd like to repeat that the maintenance-of-way is a willing and active partner in the pursuit of safety.
Thank you.
Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony, and also statement of willingness to work with us on these issues.
Now I'd like to recognize Mr. Dan Pickett, who represents another group of hard workers in the industry, the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen.
You're recognized, sir, for 5 minutes.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the committee for holding these hearings and for allowing the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen to participate.
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In our full testimony, the BRS has identified many critical issues that would be effective and appropriate in improving our Nation's grade crossings and railroad signal systems. However, in my brief opening statement I will try to touch on some of the more critical of that list.
The Nation's highway grade crossings offer one of the most serious public safety hazards on today's railroad system. Crossing accidents represent, by far, the greatest source of fatal accidents and the railroad industry, in the past 10 years, has seen a yearly average of 5,886 crossing accidents, resulting in an average of 2,326 injuries and 643 fatalities per year.
There are approximately 168,000 public highway railroad grade crossings in the United States. Only one-third have some type of warning devices, leaving nearly two-thirds of our Nation's highway rail crossings with no active warning devices at them.
Both train traffic and highway traffic have increased dramatically over the past 10 years. Since 1985, class one train miles have increased 27 percent, while no less than five new commuter rail systems have begun operation.
Resources such as section 130 Federal funds are needed to install and upgrade these active highway rail grade crossing warning systems. It is sad that the appropriations used to fund this safety program have been reduced.
Obviously, funding for highway crossing safety programs such as section 130 need to be increased so as to provide adequate warning devices at all public crossings. It is an excellent program and I urge this committee to continue its operation.
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Some argue the ultimate solution to the problem of grade crossing safety is to eliminate high-risk or redundant crossings altogether; however, this approach is impractical due to the limited resources. In most instances, crossing closure is either not appropriate or it is not cost-effective.
The BRS recommends the installation of an active grade crossing warning device which incorporates a four-quadrant gate arrangement. Four-quadrant gates can be operated by the same control systems that are used to operate two-quadrant gates. The only modification required is the installation of two additional gate mechanisms and a timing device that would allow vehicles to exit the crossing before lowering the gates across the traffic exit lanes.
The BRS believes that four-quadrant gates offer an immediate near-term solution to the problem of providing grade crossing safety on rail lines. They provide a safe yet effective barrier across all possible lanes of highway travel.
I would like to say, on a positive note, on January 1 of 1995 the Federal Railroad Administration implemented highway grade crossing safety standards that were agreed to by labor and management. In the year since the grade crossing safety regulations have been in effect, crossing accidents have declined 9 percent—one of the best yearly improvements in crossing accidents every.
I am proud to say that the BRS has been the strongest advocate for the adoption of these vitally important safety regulations, and that our 24-year effort certainly appears to have been worthwhile.
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The incorporation of a nationwide telephone notification system would greatly improve safety for our Nation's grade crossing signal systems. The BRS has long recommended that a nationwide telephone reporting system such as a 1–800 system be developed to allow members of the public to report crossing signal malfunctions.
Training and education is another preventive measure that needs to be considered. All of you are aware of the efforts that Operation Lifesaver has made to educate the public about crossing safety. The BRS has been involved with this program for many years.
Now I'd like to touch on cab signals. As we continue to witness the mergers of our Nation's railroads, we see a major shift in rail traffic patterns. This shift results in increased rail traffic on so-called ''core lines.'' As traffic increases on these lines, it becomes even more difficult to keep trains separated.
We must improve the methods for operating safely on these higher-density lines. Cab signaling and positive train separation are two possible solutions. In 1994, a BLE petition called for a mandatory installation of positive train separation systems on our Nation's railroads.
If these proposed amendments were made, railroads would be required to install block signal systems on all routes with a speed limit exceeding 40 miles per hour.
Additionally, a cab signal system and an automatic train stop or automatic train control system would have to be installed on all tracks having a posted speed of 60 miles per hour or more.
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The Nation's rail industry can realize the greatest safety by utilizing the PTS systems in conjunction with the existing signal system. Signal circuits provide fail-safe vitality, while PTS provides what its name implies—positive train separation.
The BRS fully supports the installation of cab signal system and PTS systems only when installed in conjunction with the existing fail-safe signal system.
On the subject of electronic signal systems, when the FRA revised our current rules, standards, and instructions governing railroad signal and train control systems in 1984, these newer systems did not exist. Now many of our train control safety rules do not coincide with the newer train control systems.
The FRA has chosen to actively investigate the application of those RS&I rules as they apply to the microprocessor-based interlocking signal system.
Microprocessor-based signal systems have become a critical aspect of many of today's train control systems. Unfortunately, the railroads are encouraging the FRA to abandon long-established test procedures. Maintaining and assuring the safety of these electronic signal systems is very important to the railroad safety.
The BRS clearly sees the need to establish standard testing procedures for electronic signal systems; however, in the meantime, it is imperative that these new electronic signal systems continue to be covered by our current safety regulations.
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I would like to just touch briefly on the railroad worker regulations. While our organization only represents approximately 2 percent of the roadway worker employees, over 25 percent of the lives lost have been signalmen. A new negotiated rulemaking process was used to develop these important safety regulations; however, a time-consuming cost/benefit analysis was required before these rules could be implemented.
In issues of railroad safety, cost/benefit should not be the determining factor.
In closing, I want to mention the Federal Hours of Service Act covering signalmen.
A signal employee may be permitted to work more than 12 hours in a 24-hour period under two conditions: first, when an actual emergency exists, an employee may be permitted to work an additional 4 hours; second, the limitations of the act do not apply under conditions considered as an act of God.
For 10 years the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen's primary concern—it makes no sense to have an exception to the 12-hour rule that allows a railroad to work a signalman four additional hours under certain emergency conditions, especially when grade crossing signal systems constitute an emergency. We seek a consistent 12-hour requirement for signalmen. No more exceptions for emergencies.
We urge each of you to review our entire statement. I hope that in the future a more proactive approach will allow us to make safety improvements before lives are lost or public attention is again focused on a series of accidents.
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Again, I thank you for allowing us to participate in this hearing. I'd be glad to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. MICA. I thank you, Mr. Pickett and all the other panelists for their testimony.
I have a couple of sort of rapid-fire questions here.
Mr. Harper, there's probably nothing that would be worse for an employee who is out there busting their buns and at some tough work—you've got Mr. Fleming here who represents those people that are doing probably some of the toughest work on the railroad, and Mr. Pickett here. When those workers are injured—and, God forbid, killed—but when they're injured, I understand you have this system called FELA for—there really isn't a worker's compensation project.
I'm also under the impression that it costs your industry about a billion dollars a year, and most of that money is going to attorneys and to litigation and other things and not benefiting workers. What's the situation with that?
Mr. HARPER. FELA is probably one of the enemies of safety in the railroad industry. Most industries have a no-fault system where you don't have the employer and the employee haggling over whose fault it was; it simply works so that the employee immediately is taken care of. His costs are taken care of and the money goes into his pocket.
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In FELA, however, it is a fault-based system, and you've got to fight out, haggle over who's responsible for the accident.
Now, obviously in emotional times like this where an employee is injured, you don't want to be in that position. But the fact of the matter is, a goodly—hundreds of millions of dollars, as a matter of fact, a year go into the pockets of attorneys, rather than into the pockets of——
Mr. MICA. How much would you estimate goes to attorneys and actually to those that are injured? I mean, is there some breakdown on this?
Mr. HARPER. Out of $1.1 billion, $770 million is all that goes to the employees. The rest gets siphoned off to lawyers and miscellaneous administrative fees.
Mr. MICA. So about close to half a billion dollars——
Mr. HARPER. A little over half goes to the employees.
Mr. MICA [continuing]. Is not going to the employees.
Mr. HARPER. Right.
Mr. MICA. So that might be something that we want to look at.
Let me ask you another question. We've got short line over here. When an accident happens on the railroad, you're insured for all that loss, aren't you? I mean, you just have another day at the office, and you go on. Life is normal. Accidents just—you know, some people have gotten killed and property destroyed and things go on at the office and have another cup of coffee. It's all covered by some insurance company. Is that correct?
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Mr. HARPER. No, that's not really the way it works.
Mr. MICA. OK. What is the story?
Mr. HARPER. Well, it differs for the individual railroads.
Mr. MICA. So you have some stake and interest in there being safety in the work place and on the line?
Mr. HARPER. Absolutely. There's a first layer of self-insurance that almost every—as far as I know, every railroad has to accept——
Mr. MICA. You have a $1,000 deductible?
Mr. HARPER. More toward $10 million.
Mr. MICA. OK, $10 million. So you actually feel the pinch when there is an accident.
Mr. HARPER. Absolutely. There is no question about it that the railroads feel a strong pinch when there is an accident. It is off the bottom line.
One of the things that's true of commercial insurance is it just doesn't go away into Never-never land. Your bill in the following year equals basically your cost in the prior year.
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Mr. MICA. So safety is in your interest?
Mr. HARPER. Absolutely.
Mr. MICA. And in your interest too, Mr. Loftus. If you have an accident, is the same—I mean, it seems like it would be crazy to assume liability for lost property, safety, and then get yourself into this situation where workers are hurt and other things.
Mr. LOFTUS. Yes. I want to first of all agree with Ed, obviously. Smaller railroad, in a sense, is a family type of operation in many places. It's not Ma and Pa—small, closely related people.
We're not self-insured. We have $25,000 deductible, 35 percent of our insurance premiums are FELA-based premiums. So, on the crass side of the problem, where you think insurance——
Mr. MICA. So if you mess up, then your premiums stay the same or go down?
Mr. LOFTUS. Well, they'll go up, obviously.
Mr. MICA. OK.
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Mr. LOFTUS. Experience rating. But that's the crass side. That's the problem you get—somebody has got to pay the process.
Our concern is obviously that we have an unsullied record of no major injuries, and certainly no fatalities.
When it does happen, I feel, frankly, FELA even poisons our environment, that we have this close, working, paternal relationships, until the day a FELA lawyer walks in and runs a FELA case. From that day on, it's a whole different relationship. You're now battling——
Mr. MICA. So I think that some of these attorneys then must be living better than the injured rail workers.
Mr. LOFTUS. They are.
Mr. MICA. Mr. Fleming, I'm going to have to switch because I need to get a couple questions in.
I think in your testimony you alluded to you had petitioned FRA on safety improvements. You indicated there was some foot-dragging, they're still not coming out with some of the recommendations?
Mr. FLEMING. We have the track safety standards that are outstanding that Jolene mentioned earlier, and part of that was the applied safety for the maintenance-of-way equipment. That is embedded in that. That was, I think, what Mr. Oberstar referred to earlier.
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Mr. MICA. Have they given you any timeframe on when you can expect——
Mr. FLEMING. Well, with the Rail Safety Advisory Committee, it is designed to look into those matters if we can get it underway. I mean, it's taking some time.
If we go through cost/benefit analysis and all the things that are in place today, I hope to God that we're not here 3 years from now talking about implementing these standards, because we have a need for those to have been done yesteryear.
Mr. MICA. I appreciate your comments. Just a last thing. Mr. Pickett, you had spoken about a—it sounded like a great idea, simple idea—1–800 number to report signal and crossing out-of-order. Have you suggested this to FRA? Has anybody taken the leadership? Some of these things, you know—exit sign, some illumination, a 1–800 number—I mean, it looks like most of the accidents I've read about—I'm not a genius on railroad accidents, but most of them happen at railroad accidents, I think I've read. But that seems like it would be a simply instituted thing. Are we moving forward, or what's the status of that?
Mr. PICKETT. Like all things, it's still in review. But there are three stages——
Mr. MICA. In review? We should have the administrator doing something about that. Is she taking the lead in that?
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Mr. PICKETT. They are taking the lead in it. We've also worked with the railroad. There are some complications not quite as easy as what—I mean, grade crossings are named different names than what they really are. You have to get to where you recognize what they're——
Mr. MICA. But it seems like a safety improvement that would cost little——
Mr. PICKETT. It would be a great idea.
Mr. MICA [continuing]. Could be done. So you piqued my interest on that.
I've taken more time than I should have. I'll yield to the ranking Member of our subcommittee, Mr. Wise.
Mr. WISE. I knew I got back just in time, Mr. Mica. I gave you a chance to beat up on lawyers once again.
[Laughter.]
Mr. MICA. With that, I'll exit.
Mr. WISE. I just wanted it on the record, I never had a FELA case in my practice. I'm not sure, given my income level—inadequate income level—I don't think I've had many cases.
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I just note with interest that the recovery, which it sounds like it's about a third, or actually less than that, is—a percentage of something is a lot better than nothing, and that's what I believe is the present system that we've got.
I'll leave it. I believe FELA may be another day, and so we'll take that up then.
Mr. Harper and Mr. Loftus, I want to ask some specific questions on the rules concerning brakes. It's my understanding that several of the recent accidents have been runaway train accidents in which railroad air brakes, supposedly fail-safe, haven't been, and that obviously some of the brakes are not fail-safe.
The Congress mandated two-way end-of-train devices in 1992 and required a review of the power brake rules. It now appears, with the number of brake failures we've seen, that this review is well-advised.
It's my understanding—correct me if I'm wrong—that the railroad industry has been aggressively fighting this new brake rule.
And so my question comes, as I'm a fairly newcomer to this and a layperson, asking—some of the provisions seem fairly sensible:
One, requiring two-way end-of-train devices that the Congress has mandated.
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Second, as I understand the proposed FRA rule, it would provide more flexibility by allowing the use of the air flow method for testing brakes as an alternative to the currently used leakage test.
Third, that the rule would require increased brake testing in cold weather and on steep grades. A recent accident in Wyoming suggests that a train's brakes failed because of cold weather.
Fourth, the proposed rule would require better training of the people inspecting the brakes.
Fifth, the proposed rule would set out procedures for testing new types of brakes, like electronic brakes, presumably encouraging new technology.
Additionally, we could talk about that, but in your response—I'm not sure how much time I'll have—if you could, also talk about the proposal by FRA to do higher-quality inspections; namely, that where there has been high quality, you can go longer distances between inspection points. If they're poor-quality inspections, then railroads would have to inspect more frequently, as well as the rule, I believe, has new standards for high-speed passenger rail brakes.
I know that's a mouthful, but what I'd appreciate is if you could try to address those quickly, and if we don't have adequate time then what I would ask is a written response.
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Mr. HARPER. Fine. Let me begin by saying, first of all, we think there is a pretty good power brake rule in place, and that we fail to see the need for the new rule, because it's hard to see it justified in terms of the safety record.
From the time the current power brake rule was put in place and the time the review was called for, the number of brake accidents went down 70 percent. That's a tremendous improvement in safety, bringing it down to a relatively low level.
With respect to the two-way end-of-train device, there we have gone ahead and will be putting the devices in place, in advance of the Congressionally mandated deadline.
Now, with respect to the other five item that you requested, if I may, I'd like to call on Mr. Charles Dettmann, who was very much involved in the power brake rule, to address some of those details.
Mr. DETTMANN. Congressman Wise, as President Harper said, one of our problems is, as we looked at this, according to FRA's statistics and what we have, this would have cost the railroad industry $10 billion over 20 years, with a savings of $39 million a year allegedly for safety.
Let me address just one of these, and I'll be brief.
As for high-quality inspection, the proposal of FRA was that we will allow you to go ahead and operate additional 500 miles if you have a tighter inspection, based strictly on an FRA inspector's judgment of what you were doing or not.
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In the absence of you reaching the 1,500 or 2,000 miles, each quarter you could drop back to 500 miles, based on one inspection, and you had to maintain facilities and people every 500 miles to do this in case, for whatever reason, you dropped from 2500 to 500 miles, or whatever.
Now you can't operate a railroad network in the United States based on ifs like this, and that's the reason why the railroad industry had such great difficulty with the proposed power brake law.
The balance of these, if I may, I'll go ahead and submit for the record, because they are fairly complex.
Mr. WISE. I would greatly appreciate that.
[The information received follows:]
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Mr. WISE. Madam Chair.
Mr. LOFTUS. Should I respond for the short lines?
Mr. WISE. I'm sorry. Mr. Loftus?
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Mr. LOFTUS. Much of our operation has been excluded by the statute from EOT devices. Where they're not excluded, we are going to meet the same schedule as a larger railroads.
I agree with Mr. Dettmann on the power brake rule. The RSAC is going to have that now in front of it, we hope.
For example, you'd have to be able to measure the thickness of the brake tread on every car if you want to run over a certain number of miles. It was that overly specific, and just caused a complete breakdown in how we got to a final rule.
Now we can look at it with labor, with the Government, and with the management on how to craft a correct rule.
Mr. WISE. Madam Chair, could I get one more short one in?
Ms. MOLINARI [RESUMING CHAIR]. Sure. Please.
Mr. WISE. Short question, not short line.
If I could ask the gentleman from the Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way, do you believe—Mr. Harper had spoken about performance standards and the FRA. I just wondered whether you thought the adoption of performance standards would help or hurt the FRA's ability to police the industry.
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Mr. FLEMING. Mr. Wise, before I get to that I would like to respond to one response that Mr. Harper made regarding FELA.
FELA, in our opinion, offers the best safety incentive in this industry, and without it we're going to be in desperate shape. I don't agree that it's a system that needs to be replaced. I think it's very much a need for it out there. Without it, there would be no near as much incentive to provide a safer work place in the rail industry tomorrow than exists today.
To answer your question, though, I'd like to call on my director of safety, Rick Inclima. He knows a little bit more about this subject and will give you a better answer.
Mr. WISE. Would you mind just spelling your name? Thank you.
Mr. INCLIMA. Yes. Rick Inclima, I-N-C-L-I-M-A.
Mr. WISE. OK. Thank you.
Mr. INCLIMA. With regard to performance standards, we have—we obviously oppose the adoption of performance standards, because what that does basically is shift the control for compliance over to the industry, and basically it's a self-—in other words, the industry is asking to self-regulate. ''Trust us,'' is the motto, ''and we will take care of our safety problems without the workings of the FRA,'' or basically pull the FRA and their compliance and inspection and everything out of the loop.
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Basically what happens is the industry wants to set a particular standard, say a 90 percent standard of compliance, and if they're in that 90 or 98 percent compliance, then they're considered in compliance, and the FRA, or whoever's looking at the statistics would move on.
The problem with performance-based standards is those statistics—that 98 percentile is derived from the carriers' own statistics, so there's no way or it's very difficult to balance out what they're telling you their compliance record is and what it really is.
In other words, they are, in fact, being judge and jury on those statistics, and that's where we find difficulty with those standards.
Mr. WISE. Thank you. I thank the Chair.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much, Mr. Wise.
I apologize to all of you for not being here for your statements. I had another meeting that I had to go to.
Let me start with you, Mr. Pickett. In your written testimony—I don't know if you've discussed this in your oral testimony, but you did call for the establishment of a national certification program for employees responsible for the installation, maintenance, and testing of railroad signal systems. Is this a big problem in the industry? And why did that come to be one of the items on the top of your list in terms of a national certification?
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Mr. PICKETT. Certification of signalmen—our belief is on the same thing with the engineers, that if engineers—we're probably in one of the most safety-sensitive positions of anyone in any of the crafts out here, and the certification of signalmen is something that I think that these signalmen should be, that we should know that, whether or not they are certified in the electronics, in the signaling field, and the proper training would have to be given for them to be able to be qualified and be certified each year.
Ms. MOLINARI. It's not that there's any particular problem that you sense in the industry at this point; just that it can be made better?
Mr. PICKETT. I think it is a problem that in some areas we're not getting the training in some of our fields that we need, and that's a—we need to be certified so we know that everyone out there has——
Ms. MOLINARI. Has gotten the training.
Mr. PICKETT [continuing]. The proper training.
Ms. MOLINARI. Has gotten the proper training to assume that responsibility. Thank you.
Mr. Harper, again we heard today, as we heard in our last meeting, that employees who report accidents are intimidated, and that it's common and widespread. What instances have you had of this, and what's your interpretation of how widespread this is in the industry?
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Mr. HARPER. I have no evidence that it is a widespread problem. The FRA, on more than one occasion, has been called upon to investigate the reliability of the statistics generated by the railroad industry, and on more than one occasion has investigated complaints and come back and concluded that it's not a widespread problem.
They are fully empowered to investigate any complaint brought to them about the reliability of the statistics or intimidation, and obviously we encourage them to do so, because we are interested in the credibility of our statistics.
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Loftus, do you want to answer that?
Mr. LOFTUS. Yes. I'd like to add that a great deal of inspection of railroads is really looking at our records, particularly in this area. And so an FRA inspector will come in and take a look at all our sickness and injury records. Some of those did not—someone decided they were not a reportable injury.
Now, you have a very small minority that there will be a disagreement on. FRA is a final arbiter. They'll tell you no, that is a reportable injury.
And so your month-end, or quite often your year-end report is going to have to—will collect all those that were decided to be reportable, which were marginal, and you'll put them in as a reportable injury. So your final report is kind of a catch-up, but it's almost always a decision as to the facts, and it's always on a margin.
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To me there is no possibility that serious, meaningful injury statistics are not being reported to the Federal Railroad Administration.
Ms. MOLINARI. And what if there is an employee who senses that there is a problem and he or she feels that someone at a supervisory level is trying to squash it because they're concerned about their record? What avenues do they have on any one of your short lines to go above that level position or to get their complaints heard elsewhere?
Mr. LOFTUS. I think there are two. First of all, they obviously could go to the senior management—in our case, the owner/operator. But they also have and they use complete access to the Federal Railroad Administration, both their regional directors—they have specific discipline directors in place. And they also have direct access to Ms. Molitoris at the Federal Railroad Administration. There is no way that they do not have an avenue to report a gross misuse of the accident statistics.
Mr. DETTMANN. Madam Chairwoman, may I ask John McPherson, senior operating vice president of Illinois Central, who's out there in the real world on what happens.
Mr. MCPHERSON. Let me just say something about my railroad. When I came on this job in August 1993—and you can see it here today—there continues to be, and there has grown over the years an adversarial relationship between labor and management.
One of the components of my administration was that I wanted to knock down these barriers of adversarial relationships. One of the ways you do that is safety, because that's a win/win proposition for everyone.
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Immediately, I went across the railroad. We had meetings with our employees, town hall meetings, followed them up with meetings with strictly local chairmen. I have been to local lodge meetings to develop a safety program that we did not have on the Illinois Central in 1993.
We formed a risk management group. We formed safety committees out on the property where employees could come up with safety ideas, suggestions, complaints, and funnel them through their superintendents on the division level.
We set up the phone number S-A-F-E, 7–2–3–3, quite a while back. It's not an 800 number, but it's a company line. We also have a line that goes directly to our public relations people, and we put out a publication every month where, if an employee has a question about what's going on in the railroad, they can ask it and we will respond. And we'll get sensitive questions.
But the intimidation factor—I hope we have driven intimidation and fear out of the work place. We're probably not there yet, but this is one thing that's high on our agenda we work toward.
I'll cite an example of a maintenance-of-way employee last year who wrote me a letter personally who was concerned about a policy we had, a procedure we had, unloading rail. I immediately went down to the Baton Rouge area. I observed what was going on. We had quite a bit of dialog. He took over one of the safety committees, and last year the gentleman won the Harold Hammond Award on behalf of all the railroads.
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So I can tell you that at Illinois Central we have tried very hard to drive fear and intimidation out of the work force.
Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you. I just have one more question for Mr. Fleming.
Oh, did you want to answer that question?
Mr. INCLIMA. Yes. Can I just make a comment on the effects of discipline and intimidation on employees?
Ms. MOLINARI. Sure.
Mr. INCLIMA. What we have is what the railroads refer to a ''incidents of accident-proneness.'' If a railroad employee, particularly a maintenance-of-way employee, is injured several times over the length of his career, he is disciplined. He goes to a hearing. He is found guilty of a rules infraction or of being accident-prone in this very dangerous industry, and that individual is basically taken out of service and dismissed.
He could appeal his case, and the union does that. That case may take one, two, or 3 years through the appeal process to get that employee back to work.
What happens there is the effects of that type of intimidation pervades across the board, where the next guy in line says, ''Oh, no, I'm not going to—you know, I can't report this injury, no matter how slight, because I'm next in line.'' The intimidation is there, it is pervasive. And it may not be at the level of the gentlemen at the table here, at the higher levels of the corporation, but at the lower levels, at the mid-management levels, that is a very intense and a very effective way of squashing the reporting of injuries and illnesses.
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Another factor in that mix is the fact that some middle managers, their promotions and their bonuses are based upon their accident rates, so there is a lot of one-on-one intimidation to employees. ''Don't report this injury, and we'll make amends. If you report it, we're going to bring you up on charges and you're going to lose your job, like your co-worker did.'' Those things are happening every single day.
Again, we stand by our statement that it is pervasive throughout the industry.
Ms. MOLINARI. I'm not trying to minimize an injury that occurs to someone who's working on the rail, but I'm a little confused, because I was—I thought that you were representing, as were people who testified last time, that if there was an unsafe condition that could lead to a train accident, itself, and if that condition was brought to the attention of middle management or management, that they were disciplined.
So, in other words, what I believe the unions have been alleging over the last two hearings was that, if someone who was working on the rails said, ''This could lead to an accident,'' they were hushed up. That's very different from someone having personal injury on the job.
Mr. INCLIMA. Well, the personal injury statistics that are being referred to time and time again are where the charts and graphs are derived that show the declination in the injury rates. What we're saying is those graphs and charts and statistics are not valid because of the intimidation of people who incur injuries during their work day.
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Also, what happens is a supervisory employee will accompany a maintenance-of-way member or a railroad worker to the hospital and barter with the doctor on what type of treatment this employee should get.
If the doctor wants to give a prescription, that prescription makes his injury reportable, and so what happens is the supervisory employee or the railroad official will coerce the doctor into providing an over-the-counter medication as opposed to a prescription. ''Bandage it up. Don't give him a stitch because a stitch makes it reportable. Don't put him on light duty or lost time because that makes it reportable.'' So you have a bartering of medical treatment for an injured employee, and that's absolutely wrong. And that, again, reflects in the statistics that this downgrading of injuries is—may not, in fact, be happening. What you have is a manipulation of the statistics through these various tactics.
Ms. MOLINARI. That's a rather tremendous allegation that you make against the rail industry and the medical profession, frankly. I'm not denying that that does not occur, but you'd best believe that we're going to investigate this, because, frankly, you have just labeled a tremendous charge of tremendous malfeasance against an entire industry and the entire medical profession, and that's something that I think we have to look into.
But these words are all taken down, and you'll all be held accountable to those words, because that's a heck of a charge, and I appreciate your bringing it to our attention.
Mr. Harper, do you want to respond to that, and then we'll wrap up.
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Mr. HARPER. I would just say that these are very general comments. Again, the FRA is fully empowered to investigate any specific situations. And, again, we stressed the role of lawyers in all this because there are FELA lawyers. We can find the publication and submit it for the record. The instruction essentially is, ''If you have a health problem, call your lawyer.'' He will then advise you as to whether or not you should seek medical diagnosis.''
Ms. MOLINARI. Well, I can see we just got into a whole area that sort of makes rail safety seem kind of easy to resolve at this point in time.
Mr. Fleming, why don't I let you make the closing statement, and then we'll adjourn.
Mr. FLEMING. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. I don't agree with Mr. Harper's assessment of the FRA determining that there is no problem with the reporting of injuries on the railroad.
In a recent conversation/meeting with the FRA involving all of rail labor, this subject was discussed. Jolene Molitoris indicated at that point that she would do a study.
Now, if there have been determinations made such as Mr. Harper is referring to, I would like to know when and where they occurred, because my information is she's yet to do that study.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Go ahead, Mr. Harper.
Mr. HARPER. I can provide it for the record.
Ms. MOLINARI. Excuse me?
Mr. HARPER. We'll provide it for the record.
[Information received follows:]
Formal FRA findings supporting Mr. Harper's statement on page 127 of the transcript that FRA ''on more than one occasion, has been called upon to investigate the reliability of the statistics—and concluded that it's not a widespread problem'' follow: In its analysis of a 1989 General Accounting Office report which contained criticisms of railroad reporting, FRA concluded that ''most of the missing accident reports were 'fender-benders' and that the unreported injuries were minor.'' (See 59 Fed. Reg. 42,881 (1994).) Also, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 14, 1994, FRA reported that current railroad data ''fairly reflect the true pattern of accident causation.''
Ms. MOLINARI. I do—we take these statements, suggestions, allegations very seriously. We intend to look into this, as we do all the other suggestions that have come forth.
Our last hearing is going to be March 27th, which is my birthday and I cannot accept gifts but you can all come by and wish me good wishes.
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[Laughter.]
Ms. MOLINARI. We're going to have a joint hearing at that point in time with Connie Morella, who is Chair of a subcommittee on Science and Technology, to look at some long-term technologies that we should be thinking about to increase productivity, but especially to increase worker safety and passenger safety, so we'll all be getting back together at that point in time.
After that, I'm sure we will be in communication relative to all these areas that you raised over the next few months, so again, not on as formal and official a basis as a hearing, but informal meetings.
I do want to thank you all for your time, and we'll see you on the 27th.
Mr. Wise?
Mr. WISE. Just I want to note, Madam Chair, to thank all the representatives who have testified in the last 2 days, and particularly those who are back at this table again. The testimony that I've ready has been as detailed and explanatory as any I've seen in any set of hearings, and that's a—I thank both the AAR, as well as rail labor. There are other witnesses, as well, but both of you have provided extensive testimony that's very helpful.
Thank you.
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Ms. MOLINARI. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene on
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